

Washington, D. C.

20 June 1946

**SUBJECT:** Recommendation for Distinguished Service Medal to Colonel Philip R. Paysonville, Ordnance Department (03349).

**TO:** The Adjutant General, United States Army.

1. It is recommended that the Distinguished Service Medal be awarded to the above officer for the reasons outlined hereafter.

2. In making this report it is necessary for the undersigned to inject himself frequently into the story in order to provide full opportunity to estimate the value of his understanding of the case and of his recommendations.

3. In the spring of 1941 the undersigned, by Presidential Order, was designated as the Executive of Defense Aid Reports, an organization that in theory reported directly to the President but was in large part under the supervision of Mr. Harry Hopkins. It later became the Lend Lease Administration. In July of that year, and shortly after Germany attacked Russia, the President decided that, under the Lend Lease Act, he would send the maximum practical amounts of munitions to Russia to help that country withstand the German onslaught and thus help in the defense of the United States. He directed that the undersigned take charge of the program of aid under the supervision of Mr. Harry Hopkins.

4. Without consulting him, the undersigned decided to seek the services of Colonel Paysonville to direct this work. He was then Chief Ordnance Officer to General DeWitt, in command of the Western Defenses, a very important and attractive assignment and one which he was filling to the complete satisfaction of General DeWitt, as indicated by a subsequent telephone conversation with General DeWitt. The selection of Colonel Paysonville was approved the same day by the White House and he was ordered to report to Washington for duty. Two days later he took over the task of formulating and executing a program of munitions aid to Russia.

5. Colonel Faymonville immediately started to create an organization to accomplish his mission from the stand-points of duties, authorities, responsibilities and personnel; he outlined a program that was approved by the President; and, in a very short time, had his job fully in hand. He built so well that this section which he created endured throughout the entire emergency in spite of the constantly changing overhead organization and personnel. Only recently its last chief was given a D.S.M. for his services in guiding the work of the unit during the latter period of the emergency.

6. In the late summer of 1941 the President decided to send a special mission to Russia in conjunction with the British to establish more comprehensive aid arrangements and the undersigned was a member of that mission. Because of Colonel Faymonville's knowledge of the existing Russian program, his ability to speak fluently the Russian language, his intimate knowledge of Russian problems, customs, psychology, life, etc., including the City of Moscow, with all that it entails, he was selected as the secretary of the mission. From the undersigned's personal observation of Colonel Faymonville's activities in this assignment he can state that Colonel Faymonville did a superior job under conditions that were very complex, difficult and discouraging.

7. Incidentally, in going to Russia from England it was necessary for Colonel Faymonville and some of the mission (but not the undersigned) to fly in an American bomber hastily modified to carry passengers. The trip was highly dangerous, not only from the standpoint of possible enemy action but also from the standpoint of the uncharted and very difficult air route to the north of Norway that had to be followed, and, finally, the uncertainty of landing arrangements and facilities in Russia. After having been attacked by both friendly and unfriendly planes, after having passed through flying conditions that were so severe as to altitude, fog, cold and doubt that one passenger collapsed and all others suffered severely, the plane finally landed in Russia on an unknown airfield. This occurred some seventeen hours from the time of takeoff, with the gas practically exhausted and without any assistance from the Russians in spite of the fact that the Soviet Ambassador to the United States was on board the plane. The undersigned has never heard one word of criticism or complaint or boastfulness from Colonel Faymonville with reference to this flight. His only action was to recommend that the pilots be given suitable recognition for successful accomplishment under such difficult conditions.

8. When the mission completed its work in Moscow it was decided (by Mr. Harry Hopkins) that Colonel Faymonville should remain in Moscow as the head of an organization under Lend Lease to assist in the execution of the aid program in order to achieve maximum effectiveness and by handling such problems as future modifications of the program by items, quantities and design; maintenance; expedition; technical information; and, most important, teamwork between Russia and the United States.

9. In early 1942, after we entered the war, the President, in agreement with the British, established a Munitions Assignments Board to operate under the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of assigning munitions to various allied countries. Mr. Hopkins was designated as Chairman and the undersigned was designated as Executive and also acted as Deputy Chairman. Somewhat later the President created a Soviet Protocol Committee to formulate and coordinate the Russian aid program and make a team of the many United States agencies involved in the effort. Mr. Hopkins was made Chairman and the undersigned was made Executive and also acted as Deputy Chairman. As a consequence, the undersigned continued in detailed contact with the Russian aid program until he was incapacitated by sickness in late 1943. During all this time it was his definite impression, and he believes it was Mr. Hopkins judgment, that the then General Faymonville was doing his work as Chief of the Lend Lease Mission in Moscow in a highly commendable manner. In fact, General Faymonville had been promoted on the recommendation of Mr. Hopkins, who had asked that he be made a major general but this was not done because it required a two-step promotion.

10. In the spring of 1943 the undersigned, by direction of the White House, went to Russia to get the feel of Lend Lease activities. He found, and so reported to Mr. Hopkins, that General Faymonville had his job well in hand, was conducting himself with the dignity, decorum, proprieties and capabilities with which the head of such an important assignment should conduct himself, and was persistently pursuing a policy of good understanding with the Russians and constantly striving for effective teamwork with Russia for earliest possible victory in the war.

11. Shortly thereafter it was decided by the President, presumably in order to develop a more friendly and unified team spirit toward Russia within the American colony in Moscow, to

change all the senior American representatives (State, War, Navy and Lend Lease) then assigned to Moscow. As a result, General Faymonville was relieved along with a number of others.

12. As an indication of the importance of this work in Moscow -- inaugurated, organized and pursued by General Faymonville -- it is pointed out that his successor received the decoration of the Distinguished Service Medal. This officer also worked with the undersigned and it is believed he fully earned this recognition, not only for his efforts in Moscow but also for his contribution to the Russian aid program while with Lend Lease, the Munitions Assignments Board and the Soviet Protocol Committee.

13. It is fully appreciated that the question of American policy toward Russia is a difficult one on which American public opinion is divided. This was so before the war, during the war and is true since the war. Opinions are varied and prejudices are pronounced. For instance, it was the opinion of many, even during the war, especially among the lower levels, that supply aid to Russia should not be sent unless Russia would agree to give American representatives complete and accurate answers to the multitude of questions submitted. Others felt that we were aiding Russia primarily to help her destroy the maximum possible amount of Germany's war potential as quickly as possible and thus assure victory in Europe in minimum time and so save American blood, suffering and treasure in its many forms. Furthermore, that such a concept might in due course bring Russia on our side in the battle of Japan with similar advantages to America. And that, while certain information was essential and should be sought in a friendly way and on a high level basis, it was not in the interest of the United States to make aid contingent upon full information.

14. This conflict in concept was really quite serious and caused much trouble and animosity, especially in the American colony in Moscow. The press was naturally on the side of the advocates of full disclosure of information and American press representatives in Moscow had much influence.

15. The difficulty of persuading Russia to disclose information was foreseen when the mission went to Russia in the fall of 1941 and it was then informally agreed that, in the interest of the United States, we would not make supply aid contingent upon information.

16. But whatever was or is the right policy for America to follow, it is crystal clear that during the war it was the duty of all of us in the Executive Departments to give loyal support to the policy of the Commander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt.

17. In the undersigned's judgment, both the President and Mr. Hopkins definitely followed the second concept outlined above. It is believed their basic principle was to help the United States and the world by helping Russia and other Allies in the spirit of generosity and friendliness in order to create the most effective teamwork during the war and after the war. The undersigned absorbed such an understanding from his contacts with the President and Mr. Hopkins, believed in it, followed it and was nearly always fully supported by the President and by Mr. Hopkins.

18. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the directives for aid to Russia were signed by the President and always conformed to the strategic policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which required in substance that the maximum practical amounts of supplies be sent to Russia. The master aid programs and protocols were approved by them and by both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. They did not contain stipulations for disclosure of information but reflected a spirit of generosity and friendliness.

19. Emphasis is placed upon this question for the approved policy was not too well known and was not too popular with many representatives of the United States. However, the undersigned is fully convinced that Colonel Foyonville not only understood but sincerely believed in the President's policy and, as a matter of duty, lived up to it persistently and scrupulously in all his thoughts, words and actions pertaining to the Russian aid program.

20. As written proof that the undersigned's estimate of President Roosevelt's position with reference to Russia is substantially correct, there is attached a letter sent to him by President Roosevelt.

21. It is believed that Colonel Fayonville has earned a commendation which corresponds in substance to the following quotation from the above letter:

"In particular, I want you to know how much I appreciate your steadfast support of the Russian aid program and of the efforts which you have made to bring about better understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States."

J. H. BURNS  
Major General, U.S.A. (Ret.)

1 Inclosure -  
Photostatic copy of  
letter signed by  
President Roosevelt  
to General Burns  
dated Sept. 7, 1944.