The Pizza Connection


The FBI received concurrent jurisdiction to investigate Title 21 (narcotics violations) in 1982. This was a year that we were seeing an epidemic of drug abuse throughout the country, especially impacting the large cities. New York in particular was experiencing a surge in heroin deaths, with an estimated addict population of 400,000. Murders in New York City that year exceeded 1,600 and were rising; many of them were attributed to the illicit drug trade.

At the time the Bureau was tasked to enter the “war on drugs,” there was great debate both in the Field Offices and at FBIHQ as to what exactly that role should be. There were many concerns as to the amount of resources that would be taken away from other investigative programs, whether we were equipped to deal with the dynamics of working narcotics cases and most importantly, how all this would be coordinated with the existing federal law enforcement agencies. There were even some within the FBI who felt that getting enmeshed in this battle would be a huge mistake.

As the debate took shape in the New York Office (NYO), several things began to emerge. It became clear that as the Bureau became a part of this effort, we needed to find a place where our investigations would make a difference and have an impact in reducing the incidence of drug trafficking and the violence that follows. The NYO also needed to ensure that the effort be focused, so as not to become something that would diminish other important investigative programs.

It is important to note several factors that were occurring in the FBI in 1982. The Bureau was beginning to have significant impact in working cases against La Cosa Nostra families throughout the United States. We were also adjusting to working with the RICO statute and attacking the families as an organized criminal enterprise under the terms contained in the statute. The use of informants, undercover operations and eavesdropping orders under Title III were proven to be invaluable in this program. Our Agents and the Bureau’s leadership also recognized the value of long-term and focused investigations.

In this context, it became clear that the greatest contribution the FBI could make in reducing the devastation of drugs would be to apply the lessons learned in the Organized Crime program and apply that to large-scale drug trafficking organizations. As the discussion continued in the NYO, a decision was made to develop the connection between the New York Bonanno LCN family members and their connection to Sicilian-based heroin traffickers. This was the beginning of a case that ultimately became known as the “Pizza Connection.”

In the 1970s, the Sicilian Mafia turned from its success in cigarette smuggling ventures to step into the void left by the breakup of the French Connection and into the heroin trade. A number of members of the Sicilian Mafia immigrated to the United States and established themselves in restaurants and pizza parlors under the auspices of the American LCN. Multi-kilograms of heroin and cocaine would soon be sent to the U.S. for distribution by Sicilian Organized Crime members. Morphine base was refined in Sicily after being imported from Turkey and smuggled to New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania with the approval of the highest levels of the Sicilian Mafia.

The NYO Organized Crime Division had come to the realization that Organized Crime could not be adequately addressed by scattered prosecutions of low-level members and a few bosses. By February 1980, the New York Office reassigned and rearranged the way it would address traditional Organized Crime matters. Thanks to the undercover efforts of Special Agent (SA) Joe Pistone, aka Donnie Brasco, it was apparent that the Bonanno Family was becoming the most powerful and active of all the New York families. An “AR” investigation of Salvatore Catalano, an Italian baker from Sicily was opened. It was being reported that Catalano was the head of a crew of Sicilians operating under the protection of the Bonanno Family centered on Brooklyn’s Knickerbocker Avenue, the ancestral power of the Bonanno Family. At the time, the goal of the investigation was to develop a RICO investigation against Catalano and members of his crew. Toll record analysis of locations frequented by members of Salvatore Catalano’s crew, was
followed by pen register Dialed Number Recorder (DNR) coverage for those phones. Daily DNR results were collected and analyzed in an attempt to make links to other members. Due to the myriad of toll records collected and DNRs in place, a method was required to analyze the information.

FBIHQ supervisors dusted off the CTNF computer that was originally developed to assist Agents in major gambling and wire room investigations of the 1970s, seeking to identify the patterns of telephone calls to identify suspected wire rooms.

The events of the turmoil within the Bonanno family erupted in May 1981. Three capos were killed in an attempt to gain control of the family. The N.Y.O. responded by linking all Bonanno Family investigations and to utilize SA Pistone’s efforts and information in each case. The code word “GENUS” was designated and applied to all Bonanno family investigations at the time. The investigation of Salvatore Catalano was renamed Genus-Cattails and reclassified to a RICO matter. Later, at the time of the indictment in 1984, the press would nickname the investigation “The Pizza Connection.”

To implement the Bureau’s first major effort to curtail illegal narcotics trafficking, the N.Y.O. brought together some of the most talented and dedicated Agents in the office. They were taken from three separate squads, thus creating a new squad, specifically tasked to develop and prosecute the Sicilian Connection.

As the case grew, it quickly incorporated units from the NYPD (Brooklyn North Narcotics), the DEA, U.S. Customs, numerous international law enforcement and judicial agencies from Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, Great Britain, Germany, Spain and Brazil. The effort of the N.Y.O.’s Special Operations Branch was unparalleled as Agents travelled around the world to conduct surveillance and overcome incredible obstacles to execute the numerous Title III orders.

The N.Y.O.’s surveillance located a fixed position that overlooked Catalano’s bakery that had been the base of operations for Catalano. The look-out was manned by squad members who were able to maintain surveillance on Catalano’s bakery and the front door of the residence of his number one man, Giuseppe Ganci around the corner by a video hook-up. The perch was located in the attic of an older home in the neighborhood that gave a direct view of the main street where Catalano held his daily meetings. The owner of the residence, a local businessman, eagerly assisted the FBI, as he had recently been awarded a contract to produce HVAC duct work for the reconditioning of the U.S. Navy’s battleships being refurbished at the time. Inside the attic, old cue cards from the Tonight Show, were stapled to the rafters. Hours of surveillance were passed by reading some of Johnny Carson’s best monologues from the early shows that were performed in NYC.

The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in NYC and the NYPD both operated intelligence operations, comprised of experienced personnel, well-versed in the identities of organized crime members in the NYC area. DEA’s Unified Intelligence Division provided additional information regarding the identities and the operations of members of the Sicilian Mafia, operating between New York and Italy. DEA identified a large wedding that took place in NYC in November 1980. The wedding reception at New York’s Pierre Hotel was a who’s who of international organized crime members and international drug traffickers. The reception celebrated the wedding of the daughter of the owner of a small pizza shop in Jamaica, Queens — Giuseppe Bono, the

The Badamanenti (“Pizza Connection”) case represents the FBI’s first major, transnational criminal enterprise investigation and prosecution, which began in 1980. In addition to cementing the US-Italy law enforcement partnership, which is robust to this day, the Pizza Connection case brought together in a single, global law enforcement action, investigators and prosecutors from ten nations, and served as the ‘blueprint’ for the subsequent expansion of the FBI Legat network. For these reasons the case was a historic turning point for international police cooperation and coordinated enforcement action — which also served to establish the FBI’s later counter-terrorism program on a global scale.

Louis Freeh, former FBI Director
head of a Sicilian Mafia family that had relocated to Milan, Italy. Information was developed that lead DEA to issue a subpoena for the photographs. The photographs recorded the wedding on film with some of the biggest international organized crime members from Europe and the U.S. at that time. In order to protect the integrity of the investigation and not to expose the fact that photographs from the wedding had been recovered, several hours were spent painstakingly cutting head shots and reprinting them.

The head shot photos were shared with law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and in Italy. When Italian investigators learned that Giuseppe Bono had moved to the New York City area, Giovanni Falcone, the Italian investigative magistrate, who by this time was a prominent anti-mafia investigator in Italy, became extremely interested in the U.S. investigation. Bono’s wedding photographs have been subsequently utilized over the next thirty years in a number of organized crime prosecutions, both in NYC and in Italy. Intelligence provided by DEA and NYPD, identified connections between Catalano’s crew and a number of heroin seizures that had occurred around the world. Analyzing evidence seized, pocket litter, contacts and the intelligence workup from those arrests, pointed to Catalano’s crew involvement in some of the largest heroin seizures around the world. DEA and NYPD also assisted in identifying many of the unknown subjects photographed by the FBI’s Special Operations Group (SOG) teams. DEA was of the opinion that the Sicilians were vastly surpassing the traditional American organized crime families by the scope of their international contacts.

NYO SOG continued surveillance of the subjects for months. One surveillance led the SOG team to a previously unknown location on a residential street in Brooklyn. It appeared that residents were hosting some type of meeting. As was the norm, the team recorded license plates of all vehicles in the vicinity of the address in an attempt to identify the individuals entering the address. All registrations were recorded, checked and indexed for future use if needed. Several weeks later, the NYPD was investigating the murders of three CBS employees and a government witness, Margaret Barbera, at a roof-top parking lot in Manhattan. Homicide detectives theorized that the CBS workers stumbled across the murder of the government witness and were subsequently killed. NYPD developed a suspect in the matter and the

Chief of Detectives requested a name check with the FBI of the suspect. The check came back to a reference in the Genus Cattails investigation. Within the piles of intelligence being gathered, surveillance teams had recorded the murder suspect’s license plate. The suspect was stalking the female victim on the day when the surveillance team recorded his license on the street. NYO surveillance personnel testified in the subsequent murder trial and the subject was convicted. That investigation was the subject of a book entitled The CBS Murders.

The Organized Crime section of FBIHQ hosted an International Law Enforcement Conference at the FBI Academy at Quantico. Representatives from the U.S., FBI, DEA and U.S. Customs, Canada and Italy came together and discussed what was now being identified as the expansion of the Sicilian Mafia to the U.S. The RCMP of Canada had successfully investigated members of the Sicilian Mafia, who had been involved in the worldwide heroin trade in the late 1960s and 1970s. Some of those individuals investigated by the Canadians had either moved into the U.S. or were part of the expanding investigation. The Italian delegation included investigative magistrate, Giovanni Falcone, who was aware of the FBI’s expanding investigation. This meeting was the beginning of the Italian American Working Group that would continue for years between Italy and the U.S. Falcone, his spouse and three security detail members would later become victims of a Mafia roadside bomb in May 1992, when they were traveling from the Palermo Airport to their residence. A bronze bust of Giovanni Falcone was later erected in the Falcone Memorial Garden at the FBI Academy to honor his devotion to the rule of law and bravery against organized crime.

Fortunately, the case was assigned a new AUSA, Louis Freeh, who was tireless in his efforts to push the case forward and direct the ultimate prosecution. While he also handled other prosecutions, it is perhaps this case that helped most to shape him to become the Director of the FBI. The theory at the time was to develop an affidavit based on a totality of information coming from surveillance, telephone call analysis and multiple agency investigations. Agents from the FBI, DEA and U.S. Customs Service came together one afternoon to assemble the mound of information that had been collected during the investigation into a working affidavit. A 101-page affidavit was produced and was eventually presented for HQ and DOJ review. In summary, the affidavit reflected that there was probable cause to believe that a crew comprised of members of the Sicilian Mafia, associated with the Bonanno LCN family, was conducting an international criminal conspiracy to launder cash and import and distribute drugs, and this conspiracy had been in place for more than ten years. At the time, the organization that was being investigated was described as the Sicilian Faction of the Bonnano Family.
In early 1983, a conference was held at the Officers’ Club on Governor’s Island, in NY Harbor. Attendees included FBI representatives from New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, Springfield and Milwaukee Divisions as well as members of DEA, U.S. Customs, ATF and FBI and DEA Headquarters. Each office and agency presented a summary of information that had been developed in investigations of Sicilian Organized Crime members within their respective areas. Copies of the affidavit were shared with other field divisions to assist them in applying for coverage of phones in their divisions.

As the investigation entered into the Title III phase, it was apparent that there was a lack of translators fluent in the Sicilian dialect. Two NYO support personnel familiar with the dialect — a former housewife who spoke several languages and was working in the Closed Files Section and a special clerk — were recruited to the investigation to assist one of the Case Agents who was a native Sicilian speaker. DEA contributed several Agents and the NYPD also contributed manpower versed in the dialect. Shortly after the beginning of New York’s Title III coverage, Title IIIs were initiated in Newark, Philadelphia, Chicago, Springfield and Milwaukee Divisions. As the case expanded, it was recognized that it would be necessary to establish a pool of translators who were recruited to assist in the translations. Legat Rome obtained assistance from the Italian services to assist in monitoring and translating calls. An international working relationship was established with the Italian National Police and prosecutors, and information was being exchanged. A surveillance photo taken by surveillance officers in Palermo, in February of 1980 was passed, identifying the U.S. subjects involved with a 40-kilogram shipment of heroin, seized by Italian authorities before it left Italy. Accomplice testimony would later link the shipment to the U.S. subjects.

After three years of developing the probable cause to initiate the Title III portion of the investigation, some management anticipated a quick conclusion to the investigation — a phone call, a drug deal and a seizure would take the case down. However, this matter was aimed at a level of an international conspiracy that had not been seen within the FBI. In addition, this Title III, as most, was manpower intensive and required an increasing number of employees to support the case over other matters. After 30 days of intercepts, it became apparent that the subjects all spoke in Sicilian, utilized coded phrases, used inflections in their speech as code to discuss their criminal conduct and were speaking of transactions above the normal street corner distribution network.

Surveillance of Catalano and his crew members took them to numerous Italian cafés, where they would meet and talk with a number of individuals. The cafés were a social gathering location, where visitors spoke of the old country, read Italian newspapers and played cards. The cafés would also host a floating game among them, where big money would change hands and Sicilian loan sharks would lend money as a recruitment tool for assistance in the drug trade between Europe and New York. Aiello was known to have invested in a dairy farm in upstate New York, where according to NY State Police, the cows were falling down dead from lack of milking. New York teams surveilling Catalano identified NYPD surveillance units in the neighborhood. The NYPD units were supporting an undercover operation by Brooklyn North Narcotics into drug activity at one of the cafés. Thanks to alert surveillance teams by both NYPD and SOG, a meeting was arranged at “One PP,” NYPD headquarters between Brooklyn North Narcotics commanders and the FBI. A frank discussion took place, and it was clear that both agencies were investigating the same organization, at different levels. At the conclusion of the meeting, it was agreed to join forces to address the problem.

In June 1983, Rudolph Giuliani returned to the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, upon his appointment as the U.S. Attorney, which was technically a demotion from Associate Attorney General (the position he held at DOJ), but his appointment to the prestigious office coincided with both the FBI’s investigations and coordinated prosecutions of Organized Crime in the NYC area. Giuliani’s presence in New York was of major importance to the success of the FBI’s efforts against organized crime in the New York City area and supporting all law enforcement agencies in their efforts.

The investigation developed evidence of money laundering by members of the conspiracy. Between 1980 and 1988, over $60 million in used $5, $10 and $20 dollar bills were smuggled or transferred by various channels from New York to Switzerland, Italy and Turkey. Cash was sent out of the U.S. by cash transfers, wire transfers and through brokerage accounts established at EF Hutton and Merrill Lynch to business fronts operated by mafia members overseas. Several cash transfers were made by Swiss Airways by placing Samsonite suitcases full of cash with the Swiss Air station manager. Between July and December of 1980, one metric ton of cash was sent out of the United States. $17.5 million of this was sent to pay the Turkish supplier of morphine base for his part in providing the network with 3,900 pounds of morphine base. Based on the prices of the day, the retail value of the heroin sold in the U.S. at the time was estimated to be $4.8 billion.
Between June and August of 1983, a DEA undercover agent in Philadelphia made contact with a pizza shop owner in Philadelphia. The joint FBI/DEA investigation began to work up the chain from the pizza shop owner. The undercover Agent negotiated a small purchase of heroin from the shop owner. The shop owner reached out to his suppliers, the subjects in New York and New Jersey. With the joint investigation in Philadelphia and New York, the undercover Agent negotiated two additional kilogram purchases of heroin in Philadelphia. Surveillance coverage in Philadelphia, New York and Newark determined that the heroin purchased in Philadelphia was supplied by the subjects in New York and Newark.

Title III intercepts made references to articles appearing in the Italian newspapers regarding an unidentified person. Several intercepts determined that the participants were discussing the events related to an unidentified male. References and clues led the investigators to suspect that the person that was being spoken about was Gaetano Badalamenti, the same Badalamenti who was present at the Palermo, Sicily Mafia meeting of 1957. Badalamenti was the Boss of his own family in Cinisi, Sicily, located immediately outside the airport in Palermo, Sicily. He later became the head of the Cuppola, the Boss of Bosses, of the Sicilian version of the U.S. Commission. In 1978, Badalamenti was deposed as the head of the Coppola family as a result of infighting among the members. This event coincided with the beginning of the mafia’s war on the legal authorities in Sicily. Badalamenti became a marked man and was forced into hiding to remain alive. The FBI’s suspicions had been passed through Legat Rome to Italian authorities and a colleague of Falcone, Nino Cassara, was dispatched to the U.S. to learn more. Cassara was one of several young investigative magistrates enlisted by Falcone into the investigation of the criminal activities of the Sicilian Mafia. Cassara traveled to New York, where he met with Agents in the wire room. After the introductions and some animated argument, Cassara could not grasp the concept that the former Sicilian Boss of Bosses was being intercepted in New York City on a series of Title IIIls. Upon hearing several of the recorded conversations suspected to be Badalamenti, Cassara became a believer. Cassara, who had started his travel from Italy 18 hours earlier, tried his first hamburger that did not meet his expectations. During the meal, Cassara repeatedly said that he was astounded that Badalamenti had been intercepted on a telephone in the New York City area. Unfortunately two years after this encounter, Cassara, along with his security detail, was assassinated in front of his home by the Sicilian Mafia in August 1985.

It was becoming apparent that the U.S. subjects and Badalamenti were in the process of planning a shipment of a quantity of drugs. The hints dropped during the calls led them to strongly suspect that Badalamenti was in Brazil. The U.S. subjects were receiving phone calls at public telephone booths in Queens and Long Island. The subjects used coded phrases to designate which telephone number was going to be used for their prearranged calls. Team members broke the codes and they were able to identify the phone scheduled to be utilized for the next call. Affidavits would be prepared and hand carried to FBIHQ for review and approval in less than a forty-eight hour turnaround. Thanks to the expertise of the technical Agents, they were able to capture each conversation made from overseas locations to payphones — they attempted to trace the origin of the call in order to locate Badalamenti. Tech Agents were able to narrow the origin of the calls to a bank of payphones located in a post office in Rio de Janeiro. Agents were dispatched to Rio de Janeiro to work with local agencies to arrest Badalamenti during a call to the U.S. subjects. At the prearranged time, Badalamenti placed his call to the U.S., but the Agents in Rio were unable to locate Badalamenti.

During the call, Badalamenti threw a new wrinkle into the investigation when he indicated that he had relocated and instructed his nephew, Pietro Alfano, to travel to Madrid, Spain, to discuss the arrangements. Alfano, a pizza shop owner from Oregon, IL, followed his uncle’s instructions and quickly booked a flight to Madrid, Spain at Frank Nitti Jr Travel in Illinois. On April 6, 1984, Chicago Agents surveilled Alfano from his residence in Oregon, IL to O’Hare airport, where he boarded a KLM flight to Madrid. New York also scrambled to send several Agents to Madrid.

At the time, Madrid, Spain was covered by Legat Paris. DEA maintained an attaché office in Madrid. The DEA country attaché coordinated with the Spanish police to identify Alfano upon his arrival on the morning of April 7. Alfano was quickly met by one of Badalamenti’s sons and after retrieving luggage, the two jumped into a cab. Spanish police followed the pair to a high-rise apartment building in Madrid’s residential area where they quickly entered the
building and were lost from view. The officers set up on the apartment building to wait. Officers remained on the building until midday the next day, April 8, when Alfano and an older individual stepped out of the building and began walking to a local bakery. At an appropriate time, Spanish police took the two into custody. During questioning by Deputy Chief Jose Merino, Badalamenti denied his identity and proclaimed that he was Paulo Alves Balboa. Alfano denied knowing his uncle, Badalamenti and though he told Merino that he resided in a hotel, he was unable to identify it. Spanish officers subsequently located Badalamenti’s apartment and arrested Badalamenti’s wife and son, Vito Badalamenti who had met Alfano upon his arrival. Both residents denied knowing or having any connection with the older Badalamenti.

Back in New York, Sunday morning, April 8, 1984 plans and briefings were being developed to conduct arrests of the subject and searches at a number of locations around the country. At approximately 11 am, FBIHQ called to New York to advise that Badalamenti and Alfano had been arrested by Spanish police. Their arrest was the go-ahead for the coordinated take down of the investigation around the U.S., early the next morning.

Later that day, another co-conspirator who had arrived from Italy and was suspected as being a money courier between the U.S. subjects and others back in Italy was dropped off at the Alitalia Terminal at JFK airport by several of the New York subjects. After clearing security and walking up the jet-way to the plane, he was arrested by Agents and NYPD detectives and hustled down the stairway and into a waiting vehicle. He was carrying a sum of U.S. currency and Italian lira and a list of pay telephone numbers to be used for prearranged calls.

On April 9, 1984, Agents spanned out in multiple divisions in a coordinated series of arrests and searches of the subject’s residences and businesses. The affidavit that was used for renewal of Title III affidavits through the course of the investigation had grown to 660 pages and was used as the basis for the complaints against the defendants. On April 19, 1984, a twelve-count indictment was filed in the Southern District of New York, charging 38 defendants with violation of Title 21 USC Section 846. Ten defendants were also charged with operating a continuing criminal enterprise for the distribution of narcotics, Title 21 USC 848 and Title 18 USC 371. Subsequent superseding indictments were returned in this matter charging currency violations of Title 31 USC, violation of Bank Secrecy laws, and Title 18, Section 1001, causing false statements to be made in connection with the filing of Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) prepared by financial institutions at the time that cash deposits were made.

Between the date of indictment and the beginning of trial, there were fifteen months of additional investigation and trial preparation by the team of investigators that continued throughout the trial. Potential witnesses were identified in Italy, Canada, Turkey and Spain for testimony at the U.S. trial. Fingerprint evidence and records of wire transactions were located. A series of video recorded interrogatories, (questioning of indicted defendants in the custody of foreign government) were conducted. Interrogatories took place in Switzerland and Italy under the judicial guidance of a designated special master for the SDNY. These video interrogatories were introduced at trial during the appropriate point to coincide with the order of proof that had been developed by the prosecution team.

The trial commenced on September 30, 1985 and was held in the large ceremonial courtroom at the Foley Square Courthouse. Two full juries were empaneled to hear the evidence. Hours of intercepted conversations from 93 Title IIs around the country that were conducted in this matter were read to the jury by a group of unemployed actors, recruited to read the conversations into the record in place of a member of the prosecution team. Intercepted calls were supported by the surveillance testimony of police officers from Spain; Italy; detectives of the NYPD; testimony of cooperating defendants and testimony of numerous surveillance agents from New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Chicago, Springfield, Milwaukee.
and Detroit Divisions. Latent fingerprint evidence recovered from drug transactions/seizures and laboratory analysis by DEA were also introduced. The government called a total of 300 witnesses, introduced 12 foreign depositions, testimony from Joe Pistone and three accomplice witnesses that included two pentiti, who were the first to cooperate with Italian prosecutors and who were lent to the U.S. to testify.

On February 10, 1986, Italian authorities commenced the maxi—trial of 474 defendants at Palermo. Giovanni Falcone was the lead prosecutor and was able to utilize some evidence developed during the U.S. investigation. During the development of the Pizza Connection Case, Falcone came to the U.S. and met with prosecutors and investigators. Falcone spent time meeting with Rudolph Giuliani, Louis Freeh and other members of the prosecution team. For purposes of the Italian prosecution, Falcone was able to introduce the affidavit from the U.S. and the indictments of the American subjects. That trial ended on December 16, 1987 with the conviction of 360 of the defendants.

The U.S. trial concluded on March 2, 1987 with the conviction of 18 of the 22, who began the trial. Badalamenti’s son was found not guilty by the jury, one defendant was murdered, one pleaded guilty during the trial and one was wounded in an attempted “hit” near the end of the trial.

There can be no doubt that the “Pizza Connection” was a great case and did impact a major heroin pipeline into the U.S., which went far beyond the final prosecution. The lessons learned are ones the FBI utilizes today. The relationships that were developed during that time continue 30 years later and most importantly the dedication, resilience and courage of the Agents involved were in the highest tradition of the FBI.

“This was the first major drug case after the FBI obtained concurrent jurisdiction under Title 21 in 1982 to investigate drugs with DEA. We were able to use our complex investigative tools that we had honed in working organized crime in this major international drug investigation.”

—Lew Schiliro, Supervisory Special Agent C-13

Society Scoop Roundup

The Society has partnered with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). One of our most important advocacy goals is “Protecting America’s Children” and working with NCMEC is a great way for our members to do just that. Two programs at NCMEC which offer an opportunity for our members to use their investigative experience to assist law enforcement with challenging cases involving child victims are Project Alert and Team Adam.

Project Alert members perform case reviews, analysis, recommendations for investigative strategies and incorporating NCMEC resources into investigations. Learn more at www.missingkids.com/ProjectAlert

Team Adam provides rapid, on-site assistance to law enforcement and families in critical cases of missing children. Team Adam members offer help to law enforcement agencies with search and rescue, technical support, investigative recommendations, and case analysis. Learn more at www.missingkids.com/TeamAdam

Candidates are selected to serve jointly in both programs. The application is available at the NCMEC website at: www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/TeamAdamProjectAlertApplication.pdf

NCMEC really needs your help in Texas, the Pacific Northwest, and the Mid-West right now, although they provide services throughout the United States. If you have any questions, please contact Ray Harp at RHarp@NCMEC.ORG.