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May 1st

T-R came to see me about Gilbert Kyle and the suggestion that he should go into the T.I.S. I.B. instead of Gwyer. T-R was evidently very annoyed that this appointment had been made before his return. He said that it created a considerable gap in his organisation which would have to be filled. It would be difficult to find a suitable officer and still more difficult to get him trained under a number of months. Apart from this, he did not think that Gilbert was very well suited to run a records section. He had no particular knowledge of I.B. matters and able as he was, he was not very good at keeping records. His records were almost entirely in his head.

Godfrey Thomas came to ask whether the Swedish diplomat Wachenfeldt was a suitable person to be given a residence in Windsor Park. We said that as far as we knew he was entirely harmless.

May 2nd

I had a meeting with Dick, TAR and Horrocks when we discussed personnel for T.I.S. I.B. and Gwyers future. It was agreed that if and when we were requested by SHAFF to supply beaver strength we should do so at least up to the number of 4. We should not attempt to force Gwyer upon SHAFF for the position of G.2 Records and if requested for an alternative nominee would suggest SHAFF securing the services of Mair.

If we are requested to nominate an MI5 officer for the German Records section we should suggest Gwyer. Our representative in the war room should be all or any of the following: Hart, Bird, Courtenay Young or Mark Johnstone. The French Who's Who should be finished as soon as possible by the remaining available staff. Beaver functions would be likely to come to an end at that point. Horrocks seems rather to have his knife into the beavers. It seems a little odd that he should run them down since we naturally expected that when he supplied them he supplied us with good people. In fact the beavers have done extremely good work and probably have a better knowledge of the Abwehr and various organisations that produce information than anyone else. They have worked extremely efficiently under Gwyer's direction. Horrocks is I think a little reluctant to admit that any good registration work can be done outside his direction.

McLeod rang me up to say that he had done his best to get Whiteley to write to the D.G. about the T.I.S. I.B. staff but that he had shot his bolt and could do no more. Would it be possible for me to do anything. I said I would consider the matter if no letter arrived in the course of the next day or two. It is extraordinary how gutless these I.B. staff officers are. They seem quite incapable of making any impression on the chiefs.

I spoke to Leonard Ingrams about the security

of EWE broadcasting. I said that this matter might be raised by the Findlater-Stewart committee on Overlord and to save himself trouble he might like to have a statement on the security aspect made by Sefton Delmer and sent to me. He promised to do this. He said it would be difficult for anything to happen as all or most of the programmes were recorded. Unless therefore there was a special code there was no real danger.

Some of Delmer's employees are certainly a bit odd. He has a good many rabid communists who should not however constitute a danger where action against the Germans is contemplated, but he also has people like Columbine and Harlequin.

Ingrams has promised to see RUSTON about whom I wrote to him a short time ago.

Seymer spoke to me about the repatriation of I/W. The Gripsholme is proceeding from here to Algiers where she will pick up a number of Germans and take them to Barcelona where the exchange will take place. The S. Africans will go back to Algiers, the ship will proceed with the remainder to Belfast where it is proposed to dump the Irish. The British will be transhipped and the Gripsholme will then proceed to Canada to deposit the Canadians. This is unsatisfactory and it is obviously essential to get the English and Irish on board here and passed through the transit camp. I am going to try and arrange this.

Artist has been given the Kriegsverdienst Kreuz.

Tricycle's latest reports have been treated very favourably in Berlin.

May 3rd

Findlater Stewart asked me to go over and see him about the JIC memo for the Chiefs of Staff which referred to certain facilities which were to be given to the French for communication with the Committee at Algiers. It appeared to him that in addition to the suggestion that a censor should be put in to see to the encyphering of each message (the censor to give an undertaking that he would on no account divulge to anyone the contents of the message), that it was intended that the French should also deposit this particular cypher. Such an arrangement would in fact amount to no concession at all. He therefore proposed to hold another meeting and arrange that in the meantime the JIC should not go to the Chiefs of Staff. I told Findlater that we were giving careful consideration to the security risk involved in bringing 30,000 refugees to this country from the bridgehead. On the whole we did not consider the risk very high since any spies among them would be unable to operate for some considerable time, being without their wireless sets, and if forced to fall back on some alternative method of communication which might take some time to establish. We did not consider that the sabotage risk was particularly high. He suggested that when he got our memo he should consult with SHAEF as to whether they were prepared to run this risk or not. If they said they would accept it we should then have to consider how

we could make the best of a bad job from the security point of view.

At the weekly meeting today Hart said that at Lisbon had stated that the agent Fundus was expected back in Lisbon by his office on 27.4.44 and that it was not known whether according to the latest regulations he could bring courier mail from England to Lisbon. This comment would seem to disqualify BENDIR for Fundus since he has no office in Lisbon and there are no suggestions that a bag could be intrusted to him. Furthermore he is not intending to return to Lisbon as early as the end of April. Accordingly attention is centred on the only other character who entered the UK from Lisbon on 15.4., DUDLEY of the JKCC and Ministry of Food. This gentleman has been interrogated in an effort to establish whether or not he will correspond with the data known about Fundus, but there seems considerable grounds for the conclusion that in this case as in many others, the agent is merely the invention of Hans. He has also announced that an agent will arrive from Switzerland in Lisbon on 29.4. and that he will continue his journey to England as a special courier in connection with economic negotiations now in progress between Switzerland and England. No character has yet been identified corresponding to these details, which are so comprehensive that if the agent actually existed he would certainly be caught.

There is the usual flow of unreliable information purporting to come from this country. Hart also mentioned the case of Mrs. CAIN @ JACKSON. This

woman who was repatriated shortly after the outbreak of war as a British subject, has a New Zealand father and a German mother. She was interrogated and found to be unsatisfactory and has on numerous occasions been reported as highly anti-British. She married a man called CHAIN from whom she is now divorced, and wants to marry an American sergeant. She has confessed to this sergeant that she was in fact recruited by the Abwehr and gives considerable details about her instruction and about her secret ink and methods for its use. She had several cover addresses which she has also given. She made this confession as she wished to make a clean breast of everything before getting married. The sergeant reported it to his C.O. There seems little doubt that the woman's story is correct. She was told to use the pseudonym of Katia but states that she never did anything after her arrival here. The case is interesting as showing that we should not be too ready to dismiss cases of this kind. It is fair to say that B.4a had her under observation for a longish period and that nothing materialised.

I lunched with Marsden-Smedley who has taken a portion of Farrer's work. The latter has gone back to D.O.T. Marsden Smedley's job is to collect information bearing on the blockade which he passes to the appropriate section in MEW and the economic state of occupied territory which he passes to Vickers section which is now attached to the F.O.

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Dick and I saw Gen. Whiteley. Dick gave him an account of his visit to Italy and mentioned certain difficulties in the system which he thought had been provided for in the arrangements made for I.B. work on the Second Front. We also discussed the position of the French. It is clear that an impasse has been reached in the negotiations between Gen. Konig and Gen. Eisenhower owing to the cessation of communication between London and Algiers. It is therefore questionable whether Paillol will be allowed to come here on the grounds that if he did he could not go back. On the other hand it was felt that if he was not allowed to go back this might indicate that Anvil was off, which in fact it is. Whiteley thought this question could not be settled until the whole question of relations with the French could be settled. Whiteley is however impressed with the fact that it is highly desirable that we should take advantage of Paillol's offer provided it is clearly understood that C.I. staffs will direct his activities within the zone of the armies. Outside the zone of the armies action would be in his hands, and he would be asked to keep us informed. Dick pointed out that there was a certain friction between the Direction de Service Militaire in which Paillol works and the Resistance Movements in France which are controlled by Vattier. The Resistance Movements feel that they have borne the brunt of the trouble and that they therefore ought to have the direction of affairs, instead of those who like Paillol collaborated as a means to an end and finally double-crossed the Germans.

Whiteley mentioned the T.I.S. I.B. staff and told me that he had written to the D.G. I said that we understood that there were difficulties about Gwyer and that we would not put him forward as candidate. We suggested the most suitable person would be John Mair. I said that although we had the highest regard for Gilbert Kyle, for a variety of reasons neither we nor his C.O. felt that he was ideally suited for the job in T.I.S. I.B. Whiteley asked us to see whether we could get hold of Mair. He also asked Dick whether he was satisfied with Shean. There was rather an awkward silence. We neither of us felt that we could at that stage support a campaign against Shean although of course he is eminently unsatisfactory. We therefore confined ourselves to saying that he had of course a lot to learn.

I saw Caulfeild at the Club in the evening. He is highly incensed with Harker and as usual with Bennett. He complains that Bennett is always coming to him about things which are not his concern. He regards Bennett's job as being confined solely to the security of Admiralty contracts. He therefore dismissed Bennett rather summarily. This caused Harker to ask Caulfeild to come over. Harker reopened all the questions which Bennett had put and was told by Caulfeild that he had already dealt with them and that it was really rather a waste of time. It looks as if things were boiling up for a row. I asked Caulfeild if I could help in any way. He said that at the moment he did not think there was anything I could do.

May 4th

The D.M.I. came this morning to see the D.G. Lick, TAR, JC, Rothschild and I were asked to come down. The D.G. went on with his work and we were asked to answer any of the DMI's questions. This seemed rather a waste of time as obviously we could not all speak at once. I hope to get an opportunity later of explaining things more fully. The DMI is to go to 020 with the D.G. this morning, and then to Oxford with Harker. I do not feel that we are giving him a very good start. I would much prefer to have a quiet talk with him in my own room.

I attended a meeting at the F.O. of the Communications committee which is chaired by Lindlater. We considered the J.I.C. paper for the Chiefs of Staff which we felt should be amended in order to make it quite clear that if Gen. Konig was allowed a special cypher for communication with the Committee in Algiers, he would not be called upon to deposit his cyphers but merely to the indignity of having a British censor present during the encypherment. In theory the British censor's lips are sealed. We all doubted whether the French would accept this arrangement but came to the conclusion that if they refused we should probably have to allow them free communication in their own cypher with an undertaking that they would confine their communications to getting instructions in connection with negotiations with Eisenhower. The whole position is complicated by the attitude of the P.M. and the President. The P.M. says "Stop these people from moving and stop their communications". On

the other hand when talking to Morton he seemed to realise that the efficiency of Overlord might be seriously jeopardised if the negotiations could not proceed. The suggestion was made that perhaps Konig and Eisenhower or his representative could go to N. Africa and continue the negotiations there but this was ruled out as it would more than ever imply recognition of the Committee which the President has so far resolutely refused to give. We reviewed the position of clandestine French communications. These are all under control by C. but there is a transmitter in Duke St. C. says that this transmitter is not operating but that it is receiving from Algiers. He has given instructions that steps should be taken to see whether there is any station transmitting in Camberley. Mention was made of a Norwegian transmitter in Dumfries. It was suggested that an undertaking should be obtained from the Norwegians that they would not use this transmitter without prior consultation. This is to be used to broadcast instructions to Norway when the balloon goes up in that quarter.

I lunched with Frost at the BBC. He is now either directing or in the War Reporting Dept. He tells me that he is responsible for war reporting from all 3 theatres and that the sum of a quarter of a million pounds is being spent on this work. He is having a good deal of trouble with the Americans, most of whom are members of American broadcasting companies dressed up in uniform. SAEF are supporting the Americans, probably due to the fact that the assistant director of the Columbia Broadcasting Co. is

Eisenhower's P.A. 21st Army Group are anxious to keep these movie-men out of the way until the operation is well under weigh. Frost says that he is giving this idea his support. He attended a meeting with the Americans at which he tells me he said that the whole situation seemed a little curious. He as a member of the BBC in civilian clothes was representing the interest of the Army while they who were dressed as army officers were representing the American broadcasting companies. There is apparently a great deal of uncertainty about this operation. The W.O. did not seem to realise that when a BBC man is called up for the operation there are a number of things that he has to do which will make it apparent to his colleagues that he is going away. If they know that a BBC man or a journalist is going with the assault troops all his friends will naturally think that the operation is coming off as soon as he disappears. The W.O. seem t think that these people can just fade out of existance and that nobody will question their absence. We are of course having this same difficulty with the press correspondents. Frost asked about the M.J.s. He understood that they were not going abroad until D.plus 60. In his view somebody ought to go over pretty early, and use sniffers since if the beach-head was small it would obviously be difficult for vans to operate.

I met Sir John Dashwood at the Club last night. I asked him to give me an account of his visit to Ankara, to investigate the leakage of ourn

Balkan plans, the cover names of which had appeared on ISOS. He said that the Ambassador had travelled with members of the Turkish Govt. from Ankara to Addena, and that during the period of 3 hours while they had lunch their private baggage and papers had been left in a compartment. It would have been possible for these to have been opened. It would equally have been possible for the documents to have been taken or seen in the Ambassador's house which is staffed by Turks, Yugoslavs etc. etc. There were many sinister occurrences in the house while he was there. On one occasion he was sitting in the Ambassador's sitting room when he heard a very faint knock on the outer door. He made no response. He then heard the door open and the inner door very carefully pushed open. Finally the valet appeared, who was a Yugoslav. When asked what he wanted he could only reply that he thought Dashwood had left. The possibility of the place being miked was gone into but nothing was found. I gather that or two of his experts have been there.

What is apparent however is that the house could be burgled by anybody from inside or outside. Instructions are being issued that in future the Ambassador must study his papers at the Chancellery. There was an almost total lack of security at Ankara, and this state of affairs must have existed practically during the whole war, even though it was known two years ago that the Ambassador's safe had been opened. So much for Will Codrington's

May 5th

We have sent in to Windlater our estimate of the risks involved in allowing 30,000 refugees to come here from the bridge-head and be absorbed in the general population. We say that short term view there is very little risk of espionage but that on a long term view the risk may be considerable particularly if the enemy get to know about the evacuation of civilians and push people through the lines. We regard the sabotage risk as not particularly high since people even if they get through with detonators concealed in brushes, etc. would not be able to do any appreciable damage and certainly could not affect operations. As regards subversive elements they might be embarrassing but they could not constitute a real menace. If S.A.E.F. are prepared to accept the risk of these refugees being absorbed under Ministry of Health arrangements we would wish to conduct some very superficial interrogation at the arrival camp near Shoreham. It would be largely confined to asking other than the aged, or women with children, how long they have been in the particular village where they were residing. If they have only been there a short time and there are other suspicious circumstances we might send some of them to the LRC.

Harry held a conference on Overlord Security, when we discussed the various loopholes which
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which had cropped up during the week. We are

proposing to take up the question of journalists at a conference with Shean. At present nobody seems to know precisely what the arrangements are as regards their being warned before the second front, neither has it been decided whether journalists as a whole should be allowed to go to the banned area after briefing day.

A wire has gone off to Hill-Dillon from the D.G. asking for the services of John Mair who is suggested for the appointment in SHAEF formerly earmarked for Gwyer.

Burt talked to me about the case of the wife of an SOE agent, who was reprimanded some time ago for her indiscretions, and has now sent a letter to us stating that she met near Hyde Park Corner a man called Miles REINECKE whom she knew in Berlin. She merely passed him in the street and says that he evidently recognised her. We have a considerable file about this man who was here before the war. She has produced photographs which can be used for purposes of indification if the man can be traced. This may well be a case of a woman who wishes to ingratiate herself with the authorities from whom she has had a reprimand. Burt is going to see her and her husband before we organise a general hunt for REINECKE.

May 6th

I am rather worried by discovering that the VERMEERENS are in this country under SIS control. It seems to me that they should only have control over people who are to be used by them as

accredited agents. If an enemy alien is to be brought here solely for the purpose of his being pumped for information he should think as in the case of [redacted] be under our control. There is first of all the security aspect and secondly the possibility that the man may get into difficulties. The VERMEERENs are housed in Iamstead but I have to deal under that restrictions.

The D.C. wants a lecture given to S.B. on spies and how we catch them. Kendal has responded and rather significantly confined the meeting to some 30 officers. Hart and Wilmo seem to think that this should be made rather an occasion and that I ought to take some part. The question is whether it is more important that they should be given a good lecture or that they should think that we are sending them a senior officer. Probably the solution is that I should say something in rather general terms and let Hart and Wilmo get on with the details. Personally I hate lecturing.

Lennox and Hart talked to me about the Felipe V-man 305 who for many months had been consistently reporting entirely inaccurate information. By accident it would seem that he had hit the target, at any rate in one place. This is however wrapped up in a mass of inaccuracies and hedging, that there is anything much to worry about. Furthermore Berlin have taken a poor view of his latest report.

Lennox also told me about his plan for sending

Monty's double to Gib. and Algiers prior to D-Day. The man selected is a lieutenant in the Pay Corps whose features are undoubtedly very similar to those of Monty. The cover story to the man himself is that Monty will be going away to some other theatre at some future date and that it is desirable to disguise the fact by having his double who will be required to play a certain part in this country and give the impression that Monty is still here. This story has been given both to the double and to the head of the Pay Corps but no one else. In actual fact, it is the double who will be sent out of the country prior to D-Day and whose presence in Gib. and Algiers we shall endeavour to make known to the Germans, through arrangements which are being made by Dudley Clarke. The double will arrive at Gib. in Monty's plane, his crew being briefed at the last moment. He will then lunch with the Governor and then go on to Algiers where he will be suitably received. The Governor's servants will be told that "General Smith" is coming to lunch. This is just the sort of plan which might conceivably come off, like Mincemeat, although the odds are heavily against its producing any real results. In any case it cannot do any harm. Monty is rather flattered by the whole plan which of course is based on the theory that the Second Front cannot possibly start without him. The double is to be paid a normal rate except during the period he is impersonating Monty when he will be paid as Monty is paid i.e. £10 a day.

The Germans are sending very few reconnaissance planes over the Channel in the last 10 days however they seem to have confined themselves to areas

west of Portsmouth.

We have drafted a reply to Whiteley about John Gwyer saying that we would provide the staff he needs and expressing regrets that Gwyer is thought unsuitable. We have offered John Mair if he can be got back from N. Africa. A telegram about this has already gone to Hill-Dillon. It is then proposed that we should clear up John Gwyers position, possibly by Dick and J.C. going over to see Vivian in the first instance and then getting Viv. over here to see the D.G.

I had a long talk with Schlater about the RSS exercise. Apparently the first report of Garbo's transmitter came from Gib. This was subsequently integrated with a V.I. report. The R.S.S. fixed stations in N. Ireland and the north of Scotland took a bearing which was well wide of the mark, and although the original report came in on 1 March 13th it was not until April 14th that sufficiently accurate bearings were obtained to warrant the putting into action of the M.U.s. They were started off on an entirely inaccurate location of the target somewhere in the Guildford area. Other bearings only led to greater confusion. Had it not been for the fact that the ground wave of the transmitter was then ranged with the Barnet station it is doubtful whether the transmitter would ever have been located. The final round-up was not done according to the book, i.e. by the 3 M.U.s taking bearings and gradually closing in. One M.U. got a particularly strong signal and followed it home.

The S.D. in Lisbon are very worried about the disappearance of Artist. He may have been lured into France against his will by the Abwehr. The S.D. are worried because they have been employing Artist and fear that if this comes out there will be a row. The whole situation is rather worrying as Tricycle's value depends almost entirely on Artist being kept in position. It may be that the enquiries about Artist are due to his various speculations in currency which have come to the notice of the authorities.

Felipe has just given a description of his v-man 305. He says that he is an officer in the Portuguese Navy, over 35, who has always refused to make direct contact in spite of tempting offers. He is controlled through v-man 217 in Lisbon. He gives his reports orally every 2-3 months when his ship visits Lisbon, and collects his information from various friends in ports in southern England. He has been reporting since 1939 and has on occasions received favourable comments from Berlin. The fact that personal contact cannot be made and the bona fides of his various sub-agents cannot be assessed, more than ever confirms that 305 is entirely bogus, since there is quite clearly no method by which Berlin can get a real check on him except through weighing up his reports against information received from other quarters.

May 7th

Last night a wire came in from Gib. referring us to an SIS wire and a telegram from the Ambassador in Madrid to the F.O. On getting copies of

these telegrams it appeared that an Irish priest named Father Joseph MULREAN, the holder of a British passport and head of some local British education institute, had 3 charges up against him of homosexuality. In one case a Spanish soldier was under arrest. Apart from this MULREAN is said to be anti-British and a great personal friend of the Archbishop of Madrid. Apart from this there are allegations that he has supplied a certain amount of American press information to MOLDENHAUER and that he has attempted to pass off rather tendentious reports on the Ambassador. In all these circumstances it was agreed that he would have to leave Spain, if he could be persuaded to do so voluntarily. I do not think he could give us any information and he can obviously only be an embarrassment. Loxley tells me that Sam Hoare who has just arrived, is relieved to hear of MULREAN's departure. It is suggested that possibly Cadogan might say a word about him to the Apostolic delegate. On arrival we shall house him and interrogate him. If we are satisfied about his German connections, he will have to run loose, at any rate until after Overlord.

J.C. tells me that the Germans have taken Artist off to Berlin. We do not know the nature of the enquiry but there are indications on ISOS that someone is being deputed to take over the Tricycle case. It may be that the enquiries relate solely to Artist's financial transactions on the exchange. Tricycle has been told that all is not well with Artist who has disappeared from his home in Lisbon.

May 8th

Lane rang up this morning about two KLM pilots who had been arrested and interrogated by S.B. Their names were SYBRAND and ALSEN. It transpired that these men had been arrested for diamond smuggling. However there is a possibility that if they have been smuggling diamonds they may have been smuggling other things as well.

I attended a meeting at Norfolk House to discuss further the proposition of the 30,000 refugees. Newsam cut rather a poor figure. Having originally wished to lay-off all responsibility on the military for the internment and ultimate return of all the refugees to their own countries, he now says that the transit camp at Shoreham must be under H.O. control, as the Home Secretary will be answerable for it in the House of Commons. When however he was asked to supply personnel to run it he said that this was not possible, which indeed it would not be. Other internee camps in this country are guarded by the military and the commandant is a soldier who works under general H.O. directions. Newsam thinks that this should be the position at Shoreham. Findlater Steward said if this was the view perhaps the H.O. would take on the responsibility of bringing the various Ministries, War, Navy, Air, Food, Health etc. together and forcing them to disgorge the necessary personnel to run the camp. By this time however Newsam had left and Sir John Moylan did not seem very enamoured of taking on the responsibility. He thought it might be possible to provide a commandant and an assistant commandant. This might

take a little time. The W.O. then said they had been proceeding on the assumption that they were to supply the commandant and the assistant commandant and already had someone earmarked. They were quite ready to go ahead with the construction of the camp but could not do so until they knew exactly what the civil authorities required. It was finally agreed that de-centralisation should take place and that the details should

○ be worked out within the command. It is quite evident that whatever view SAAEF take of our paper it will never be possible to find either the accomodation or the staff to run a camp for 30,000 refugees. It seems barely possible to get sufficient to run a transit camp for 6,000. I was extremely sorry for Lindlater and felt admiration for his powers of keeping his equilibrium during such a lamentable buck-passing performance. We confined ourselves to saying that if SAAEF agreed to take the risk we should want to conduct what could only be a somewhat perfunctory examination of the refugees as they passed through Shoreham.

I lunched with Creedy, Robertson of the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs, the D.G., C. Dick Butler, Arnold Foster, Hastings Diplock and Wells. I sat next to C. and had quite a long talk with him and also with Hastings. C. told me that Faillol was due to arrive here shortly. Whether he went back would have to be a matter for consideration. C. felt that as his units could not operate in the early stages it might be better for him to have arrived a bit later. C. is apparently passing communications to Algiers on behalf of Bonnefousse and receiving communica-

tions back from Pailliol. This apparently does not altogether please B.C.R.A. who wish to take an injured line that communications have been stopped. C. said that he did not propose to stop communications. It was of course open to the B.C.R.A. to ask Monnefousse to show them any telegrams that he received.

C. then talked about an extraordinary incident which had occurred in Italy. An O.S.S. man named ~~PIOMBINO~~ arranged a party consisting of Princess PIGNATELLI, who has been working for Amgot, and others to pass through the lines in a red cross van and proceed to Rome. How this could actually happen is a mystery. I believe however that ISOS shows that she did in fact go through and divulged a considerable amount of information to the Germans. Her husband has apparently been acting as a spy behind our lines. While in Rome the Princess brought back PIOMBINO's wife. It looks therefore as if she had imposed a plan on PIOMBINO to bring his wife to safety as a cover for communicating information obtained by her husband. She has I believe given the approximate date of our next attack which is not altogether accurate.

I talked a little to Hastings, who has of course been in Washington dealing with "Y" material. He asked me if I saw much of Vivian and Cowgill. I said that I had not seen much of either of them lately, and rather wondered what was coming. He then said that Cowgill, although a very energetic chap, had got a secrecy complex which amounted almost to insanity. He had also got a mania for canalisation. Hastings told me that he is at present employed in acting as a kind of link between B.P. and Section V and that in the

course of his duties he had suggested that ISOS and ISK material sent abroad should go direct from B.P. This had met with a loud protest from Section V who said that B.P. would not know how to interpret the messages. Finally it was agreed that a copy of whatever was sent should go to Ryder St who should make their comments. After this system had been in force 3 months, Ryder St had not made one single comment. I took the opportunity of saying that I thought too much secrecy could be a real danger, and that if a man was sufficiently trusted to be given the information he should be told precisely what it was. I also said I was very much opposed to bottle-necks and that it was extremely important to get users and producers together. Had this been so in the past hours of work might have been saved.

After lunch I had a word with Arnold-Foster. I told him about ISNOR and the memo which I had left with C. I explained that it was not so much the intrinsic value of the messages as the fact that Dick, as chairman of the RSIC with the responsibility of assessing priorities, did not in fact know that the service was being taken. The other point was that the Services who had received the information had been told that on no account was MI5 to be informed. This seemed to be an unnecessary blackballing of our dept. and obviously caused a good deal of ill-feeling. Members of my division could not help knowing about it and naturally took the view that information to which they were properly entitled was being deliberately withheld. Arnold-Foster said he would certainly look into the question

Arnold-Foster also had a conversation with Dick Butler about Gwyer which was quite illuminating. He pointed out that accusations had been made outside this dept. without reference to the D.G. Whatever the facts were nothing had ever been stated in writing. Moreover most of the people who had taken exception to Gwyer had never even seen him. Foster said that although C. was quite capable of taking an objective view he always got these questions put up to him in a prejudiced way. Arnold-Foster is going to have dinner with Dick Butler on Thursday.

Two lots of two spies have arrived in Iceland from Norway. This is perhaps due to the Germans interest in an attack on Norway, which has been part of the cover plan for some time. I believe too that they have recently sent another division there, making a total of 13 divisions.

May 9th

I attended Findlater Stewart's Committee on the refugee question. Representatives of SHAEF, Home Forces, Newsam, Moylan, were present. The point for discussion was whether SHAEF and Home Forces were prepared to adopt our alternative proposal that refugees should eventually be housed in hostels, but that some sort of perfunctory examination should be made. We had put in a paper showing precisely what the reasons were and stating that the only thing that could give 100% security would be the internment of these people pending their re-shipment to the continent. We did not however on a short term view rate the risks as being

particularly high. After the experience of the previous day's meeting it seemed almost impossible to get the necessary equipment and staff for a camp at Shoreham to hold 6,000 refugees. It seem extremely unlikely that we should ever get accommodation for 30,000 and that if we did the conditions would be so bad that the Govt. would be forced to let them out before very long. We had therefore made up our minds to make the best of a bad job. S-AEF said that Gen. Whiteley would like them all interned and Home Forces said that they would be guided by the Security Service. Note was taken of S-AEF's view but Sir Findlater felt that in the circumstances there was nothing to be done but accept our alternative proposition. It was arranged that a meeting should take place tomorrow at Command H.Q., Reigate, of all the parties concerned, in order to discuss details about the layout of the camp. We have decided to send Robb and Vesey. We estimate that 90% of the people coming into the Shoreham Camp will be able to be released and since they all have to be dispersed after certain formalities have been completed, in London, it was suggested that the 10% doubtfuls should go to Battersea, where they will be further examined. It is estimated that 2% may have to pass through the LRC after a further sifting at Battersea.

Billy Robertson came to see me. He is taking up a job in UNRRA. He will be P.A. to Leith-Ross, who is our representative.

Curry came to see me. He is still rather restless about his work. He was wondering whether

there would be any place for him in the CCIB after the Armistice. I said that this was possible and promised to bear him in mind.

May 10th

Brig. Howman, D.D.M.I. (S) India, came to see me. He is anxious to get an MI5 officer to assist him in security duties in India. He seems to cover a good deal of ground. Under his control are the forwarding investigating centres all along the frontier. These are a kind of forward LRC. After examination suspects are sent to the CSDIC camp at Delhi and if they are proven spies or very highly suspect they go to the equivalent of Camp 20, the location of which is kept very secret. CSDIC is run jointly by the Army and DIB. In the Forward Group, CSDIC, security work is the responsibility of the I.B. staff who again work in close contact with the local police authorities. The Army have representatives with the Indian Police in all the various provinces. I think it would be useful if Howman could see the LRC and also have a talk with Dick, Victor and Courtenay Young. People spying for the Japanese who have been caught in India have not been of a particularly high grade, and most of them as far as I can understand have been rounded up. The Japanese however are training very large numbers and it is anticipated that there may be a certain amount of trouble in the future.

Blunt

Anthony told me that Tommy Harris was extremely worried about the Artist situation. He had a strong feeling that Tricycle should be liquidated

He thinks that this would have the effect of preventing any Germans from investigating Garbo. He is afraid firstly that Artist will under pressure say that he thinks that the Felipe organisation is controlled. He also thinks that if comparison is made of the traffic of Tricycle and Garbo it will be seen that they both point in the same direction. He feels therefore that if the Germans know that

cycle is controlled they will more than probably think that Garbo is controlled. Personally I do not share his apprehension but I intend to talk the whole thing over with TAR and JC.

At the weekly meeting Miss Clay said that for the first time the training and instructions of S.D. saboteurs had included murder. The two S.D. saboteurs who had been captured at Anzio had said that one of their assignments was to murder Alexander and Clark. They were in possession of low-level photographs of a house which was said to be the headquarters of the two generals. Which in fact it was not.

Stamp said that BRODERSEN, who had arrived yesterday, was now at 020. He had confessed that he was a German agent. He had a two-way communication method, secret ink for outgoing letters, and a plain language code for incoming messages which would come over on the Norwegian radio station. It is possible that he may be of some use to B.IA.

Hart gave the results of the recent exercises in the regions, when notional spies were set to

work, and the police given a warning after 3 hours. The "spies" were disguised in a variety of ways, both military (allied and British) and civilians. The only ones who were not caught in a very short time were those disguised in American military uniform. All the spies were provided with faked documents and papers, many of them with quite obvious mistakes in them, but those carried by the "Americans" were passed even by the American military police.

Brock said that Nelly KAPP, the secretary from the German Legation at Ankara was being questioned. G.C. & C.S. considered that her knowledge of codes and cyphers would be of great value to them. As she had only been in the post for about 5 months, however, her general knowledge would not probably be of much value on the whole. It appears that she was educated in the U.K. and in America, had lived for some time in India, and had spent very little of her life in Germany. Her father was in the German Consular Service. Brock said that the K.O. in Turkey was being strongly reinforced.

Art Thurston turned up in his naval uniform. He is going to be here for about 10 days before going to China, where he will work for OSS.

Buster and I gave a talk to S.B. down to inspectors and to CID superintendents. This meeting had been arranged by the P.D.G. and Norman Wendal, who was present. I told the meeting about the basic organisation of the Abwehr and S.D. and gave them a very brief outline of the developments

from the period immediately preceeding the war up to the present day. Buster gave an extremely good lecture explaining first that the work we were doing and the information we were collecting had very wide repercussions. For example, the case of HELMUTH had caused the severance of diplomatic relations between USA and the Argentine. The Portuguese Govt. owing to the case of MENEZES had been forced to expel a number of Germans engaged in espionage, and similar action had been taken in Madrid on representations made by this country. He then went on to describe the various types of spy who have come to this country and our methods of dealing with them. I think that on the whole the party was a success. S.B. have perhaps been rather neglected in the past, partly because there is a feeling that they would not appreciate being lectured by us and secondly that being so near they knew more than the other special branches. Of course this is not the case. I thanked them for their assistance which they had so willingly given since the outbreak of war and explained to them that we were aware that some of the enquiries we gave them were of a rather trivial nature. This arose from the fact that in times like these we felt that we had to leave no stone unturned and that we regarded it as inherent in our work and theirs that we only expected to get 1 % of valuable information but were forced to comb through the remaining 99% in order to get it. I said that we felt that on the whole this country had been kept pretty clean of spies during the last 4 years. We did not wish to

be complacent however and I always had it in mind that when the war was over some alien will write a book saying that he had been a spy in England for 4 years.

I had a long discussion with TAR, J.C. and Tommy on the situation that has arisen owing to the removal by the Abwehr of Artist to Berlin for detention. Tommy is still extremely apprehensive and I think a little too inclined to imagine that the Bosche will think as we think. I am personally against any departure from the policy which has been very ably argued by J.C. He recommends (a) that we continue to run the Tricycle traffic in the same style as before and with as little change as possible, but that no cover for the deception should be put over on it. (b) that the other agents continue for the time being exactly as at present. (c) if we get information that the situation has deteriorated the agents should be used to fill the German mind with confusion instead of passing over a complete cover plan, and (d) that if and only if the blowing of Tricycle and Garbo is certain, we close down all agents shortly before D. day and deny all information to the enemy. Tommy's grounds for thinking that Garbo may be compromised are rather that we know that Artist thinks that all Felipes -men in this country are under our control. He reported these facts to us and did not for obvious reasons get a very strong reaction. We took the line that he should not endanger his position by poking his nose too much into other people's affairs,

and that the probability was that most of Felipe's V-men were figments of Felipe's imagination, and therefore not worth bothering about. It is doubtful however whether Artist has accepted this view since he has continued in his conversations to assume that Felipe's V-men are under our control. He cannot be certain about this, but he may express this view to the Germans under duress. The other reason is that if the Germans make a comparison of Tricycle's and Garbo's traffic, they will see that they both point in the same direction. We are having a comparative table made out because we are on the whole rather doubtful whether this deduction could be made. In any case if you do get a particular regiment or H.Q. pin-pointed by both of them, it does not necessarily mean that if the Germans know one of them is controlled they will assume that the other is also, particularly since the information given by Tricycle has been picked up by W/T intelligence. Tommy thinks that if the Germans review all our traffic over the last few months as was done recently by an officer with an entirely fresh mind, they will come to the same conclusions as he has. This may or may not be so. Somebody else, reading the traffic, might place much more emphasis on one thing than another. Whichever way you look at this case it is full of imponderables and my feeling is that it would be a mistake to move at this moment in any direction. We ought to get some reaction as regards Artist's fate from watching any communications to Belgrade by Tricycle's brother. We should also get some reaction if Berlin started enquiring

into the affairs of Garbo's organisation from Madrid. I feel certain that if we were to close down Tricycle at this stage it would be just as likely, if not more likely, to call Garbo into question than otherwise. There is the additional factor that such action would undoubtedly put Artist completely in the cart and seriously jeopardise Tricycle's brother. While I think the odds are much in favour of the Germans eventually coming to the conclusion that Tricycle has been controlled, I was not in favour of giving them any assistance in coming to this conclusion which may well take them some time and get us over the critical period.

May 11th

Harry Allen called a meeting with Shean, Barry, Cussen and myself to discuss the question of journalists who are to take part in the Second Front. Shean said that Gen. Davis who is in charge of Public Relations had this matter in hand at SAEF. Shean himself had been in favour of the journalists being warned on about D-12 hours, but he had been over-ruled by the Chiefs of Staff who decided on D-4 days. We all felt that this arrangement was bad and fraught with considerable danger, since it was inevitable that the whole of Fleet St. being on their toes, the information might leak to a neutral journalist and we had to expect that since the ban on diplomatic communications had been enforced Embassies would probably have some arrangement with one of their journalists to get the news across in code. I

emphasised strongly that whatever day were fixed, it was highly necessary to consider carefully the precise instructions given to journalists. I might be possible to introduce a phrase indicating that in addition to their field kit they should take with them other kit as well as they might be waiting in the area for some considerable time. It was quite clear to us all that as soon as these journalists were told to report it would be impossible to explain their absence from their normal duties. Shean said that he would take this matter up again with Gen. Whiteley. Shean pointed out that broadcasters and photographers were all in the same category.

Hill-Dillon has telegraphed to say that he cannot spare John Mair. In the meantime SIS have put forward Stuart Hampshire. We have decided to wait and see the outcome of Dick Butler's and J.C.'s interview with C. Givian. We have however ascertained that C. does not propose to make Gwyer's appointment a major incident between SIS and ourselves. I very much doubt whether Gwyer is seriously persona non grata with anyone except old

who was responsible for the work done for SNAEF which Gwyer criticised. There is no doubt that was rightly criticised although the manner of doing so, might perhaps have been different.

I understand that Jock Whiteley is to go to the M.I.6 side of SNAEF and will be replaced by Kenneth Strong.

I had a talk with Paillol and Bonnefusse yesterday. I was at pains to explain to Paillol that we thoroughly sympathised with his point of view although the matter was not entirely in our hands. He recognised that he would be chez lui, and would obviously, with the personnel at his disposal, be better qualified to deal with many matters than the C.I. staffs. I hoped therefore that this view would prevail in high quarters. He told me something about his history since I last saw him in January 1939. Schlesser had left the 2eme Bureau in the early stages of the war in order to take a command and Paillol had stayed on with his sccessor. When the debacle came he had been forced to go underground in Marseilles. He nevertheless maintained communication with the various units of the French Army and built up an organisation which effectively liquidated some thousand German agents. When the total occupation came he got a good many of his officers away to N. Africa but remained behind himself to lay the foundations of what is now known as his précurseur organisation, and then got away through Spain. He had been through many difficulties in N. Africa. What had wounded him most was the suggestion by certain French authorities that he and his colleagues had been collaborators. However, all that was a thing of the past and he had thrown his lot in with de Gaulle and got de Gaulle's authority to operate as the head of C.E. and Security. He was very depressed about the state of France and about the future.

I asked him about Daru. He said that Daru had finally landed up in N. Africa and was now on

the retired list. He did not know what had happened to Beliard.

Major Calvert of ETOUSA called on me today and showed me a telegram from G. 2 in Washington asking that

for any letters from a certain Boris FREGEL, a Frenchman of Russo-Jewish origin. This man is amongst other things said to be connected with the radium business. The Americans have regarded him some time as somewhat suspect, though what precisely of I do not know.

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I attended a meeting at Norfolk House on the subject of the communications from Iceland. There was anxiety lest cypher telegrams should be going from Iceland to Sweden. From the point of view of the cover plan this was dangerous. Herbert undertook to make full enquiries but provisionally his view was that all cables were routed through this country and that nothing in cypher would be re-transmitted. En Clair messages would in future, if not diplomatic, be subjected to a certain delay.

May 12th

Garbo has received a message asking him to pin-point Second Front headquarters. It is not thought that this can be for the purpose of bombing and it is more likely that some

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/194

airborne operation is contemplated. This view is somewhat reinforced by the statement of a French woman named Androyes who has recently come through the LRC. She reports that she saw an airborne division near Troyes and that she overheard someone saying that these troops were to be used for sabotage purposes at the time of our invasion. The fact that an airborne division has been moved into the area is confirmed on M.S.S. We are getting out a paper for the JIC who dealt with sabotage some time ago in a rather light-hearted way. We took exception to the paper they produced as being somewhat misleading but they refused to accept our amendments. Some 6 months ago there was a paper by the Chiefs of Staff rather writing off anything in the nature of airborne or seaborne raids. I very much doubt whether if 250 parachutists came down in Hyde Park or Bushey Park there would be any troops there to deal with such a situation.

J.C. and Dick Butler went over to see Viv. this morning about Gwyer. Viv. was told very firmly our views, firstly on the undesirability at a time like this of blackballing an officer who was very well qualified to fulfil a Second Front job which urgently needed doing, and secondly on the manner in which it was done. He had to admit that he had never seen Gwyer and also that Trevor-Wilson had hardly ever seen him. He however got hdd of Kim, who stuck to his former views about the general dislike of Gwyer. J.C. scored several bull points. When Gilbert Kyle's name was raised J.C. said that he did not think him entirely suitable as he was a man who Catalogue Reference 4/1194 in his head. When

Viv said "Well, that's a matter of opinion", J.C. said that his opinion of Ryle was based on 20 years intimate association whereas Viv's opinion of Gwyer was based purely on hearsay. Again, Viv. said "We have our troubles of a similar kind. You would not have liked it if we had imposed T-R on you." He implied that we should have found T-R a very difficult customer to deal with. J.C. said that he had dealt with T-R for 2 years and found no difficulty in handling him at all. Viv. however stuck to his point that this was not a question of evidence. It was merely a feeling which existed and could not be eradicated. He said that C. did not intend to have a row over this matter with us, but that he was still of the opinion that things would work better if we did not make the appointment. Both J.C. and Dick Butler told the D.G. that in the light of this attitude they did not see how we could force Gwyer on SHAEF and that the only thing to do was to explain the position and make another bid for John Mair

Ingrams rang me up about SCHRADER, a Dutchman who came out of Holland last October. This man has drifted into PID and according to Prince Bernhardt is making a certain amount of mischief by telling the Dutch Govt. that the British Govt. are trying to intrigue against certain Dutch officers in this country. Prince Bernhard never liked the man and evidently regards him with some suspicion. I promised to get the records and let Ingrams know. I recall the case vaguely and I think that we had

considerable doubts about SCHRADER ourselves.

Inspector Rogers of S.B. came over to see Buster "on a subterfuge". What he really wished to convey was that the officers of S.B. did not wish to be associated with Sir Norman Kendal's concluding remarks after our lecture on Wednesday. Kendal rather gave those present to understand that we were perhaps a bit complacent. We had told them all about the inefficiency of the Germans but we had said nothing about any operations which they had carried out successfully. This remark evidently caused quite a lot of ill-feeling. In fact Gill came up to me immediately after the meeting and said "Sir Norman never seems to be able to avoid having a dig at somebody".

Harry had a meeting on Overlord security. Cussen drew attention to the frequent speculations by the Press on the date and place of the operation which was based on news published either by the Germans or under foreign date-line. The danger of this was that it encouraged people to speculate at a time when we were doing everything in our power to restrain them from doing anything of the kind. It was also evident that sooner or later the actual date would be hit. If this were after the briefing period the troops would have the impression that there had been a leakage to the enemy and their morale would suffer accordingly. A particularly bad impression would in any case be caused at a time when they were being urged in every possible quarter to keep their mouths shut. We all felt that this was an extremely serious matter and that it should be brought to the notice

of the P.M. at the earliest possible moment.

I mentioned that steps had now been taken by TAR to get certain radio telephony circuits round the coast and in particular to the Scilly Is., suspended. These were in VHF and it was commonly thought that they could not be picked up by the enemy. Evidence has however been produced that in certain circumstances they can have a range of anything up to 500 miles.

I saw Gilbert Hyle in the evening at the club and talked to him about the recent exercise on R.S.S. It seemed to me that the vans, if they were any good at all, and this would seem to be open to doubt, should go over before D plus 60 or 90 as was at present intended. It was quite clear that RSS could not D.F. very accurately, some of the 200 stay-behind stations which had been located in the coastal area and that something in the way of vans and sniffers would probably be required. I gather that M.E. has very little faith in the D.F.ing or in the efficacy of the vans, and the suggestion has been put forward through the RSIC that Stuttgart, Wiesbaden and Cologne, from which these stay-behind stations are controlled, should be put out of action by bombing. They would not of course remain out of action for long, and there is the consideration that we should be missing some of the enemy's communications.

May 13th

We have put in our paper on the possibility of Catalogue Reference KW/4/194s from now onwards.

I hear that according to MSS a batallion of the Brandenburg regiment has been moved up to the vicinity of Paris. There is the additional evidence of the woman Androyes and the questionnaire received by Garbo.

Brooke-Booth talked to me about SCHRADER. SCHRADER whose case was gone into very carefully at the LRC was one of the people who caused us considerable anxiety. It seemed however that he had been instrumental in effecting the escape of a very large number of people and there was nothing which could be proved to his detriment. Brooke-Booth tells me that he was approached the other day about this man by van t'sant. SCHRADER apparently sees SIS and SCE agents before they go into the field and gives them notes or instructions. He tells van t'sant about them and sometimes the Queen avails herself of the services of these agents to send a letter. All this sounds eminently undesirable even if SCHRADER himself is perfectly all right. I have asked Wethered to look into the matter with SOE and if necessary with SIS, and have suggested SCHRADER.

Brooke-Booth also told me about the case of MARECHAL, a Belgian. Le Page had heard that MARECHAL had been in touch with the notorious German agent DESITTER who had said that he received communications from him through the B.B.C. Le Page's information came from a Belgian paper. He followed this up by saying that MARECHAL had been seen at the Belgian Institute and asked whether it were possible

Catalogue Reference: KV/4/194

to be placed in touch with him. SOE, to whom the matter was referred since MARECHAL was one of their agents, replied that they had not heard from MARECHAL since the beginning of the year and that according to their information he had been arrested by the Germans in Marseilles. The matter therefore looked like a case of mistaken identity. We asked LePage to put us in touch with the individual who had seen

MARECHAL at the Belgian Institute. LePage immediately became evasive and said that if we would send along a photograph he would give it to the informant. I have suggested that we should send along at least a dozen photographs and ask the informant to select that of MARECHAL.

Peter Hope is joining SHAEF as a G.3 to work under Christopher Harmer. He is anxious to stay on with us after the war and would I think be very happy to continue in a region.

There is no further positive news about Artist except that the S.D. being charged with having relations with him are going to say that they did so in order to assess his reliability. They did in fact establish relations in order to get his information, which they considered valuable.

A suggestion has been made by the DMI to start a Free German Movement under von Thoma and if possible other officer I/Ws. There does not seem to be much chance of this movement linking up with the civilian Free German movement in

this country which is very much at sixes and sevens, except for its communist group. Von Thoma clearly would not cooperate with the communists. He might however be ready to start a movement on his own, but I doubt whether he would do so except on the understanding that he and his caste would have some place in the sun after the Armistice. He will undoubtedly expect this unless the position is made quite clear at the outset, that he is only being used as a disintegrating force to get rid of the Nazis. The whole question would seem to be a matter for discussion on the highest level since if there is any suggestion that favours are going to be granted to high officials in the German Army, the whole of the Left Wing, the Vansittartists and probably the whole of the population here, will rise up in anger.

Patrick Day came to see me. He said that he had joined section V. rather with the feeling that we in this office had been over-critical of its work. After staying in the section for some months he had entirely revised his view. He said that while there were many extremely nice and able officers there, their measure of success was governed entirely by the extent to which they could by force of character over-ride the many regulations, restrictions etc. placed on their activities. He said that as regards withholding information there was no consistent policy and that much of what was done was entirely pointless, misleading, dangerous and thoroughly detrimental to the work.

As an organisation he, and indeed all the serious workers inside, regarded it as hopeless. In this he included the office procedure, the records, which are in a pitiable state, and the calibre of many of those employed in the outstations.

He asked me whether there would be any job for him to do here after the war. He is apparently a lecturer in philosophy, but he does not think that people will have time for philosophy after the war. He would be very interested to work in any section here that dealt with Russian espionage. He has been learning Russian for 18 months and hopes very shortly to bring it up to the level of his French and German. He thought that possibly his Russian would be useful after the Armistice for liaison purposes in Germany. I said that I should be very glad to bear him in mind, and asked him to keep in touch. We hoped before long to get something settled about our future prospects.

May 15th

There is evidence of ISOS that we may expect quite shortly the arrival of a parachute agent who will be bringing a wireless set and Leica camera in addition to funds for Brutus. The present arrangement is that these goods will be delivered at the Connaught Hotel for a Mons. Lefevre. The difficulty is that the hotel will refuse to accept them because M. Lefevre is not registered as living there and because hotel keepers at this moment are particularly

reluctant to accept packages for people they do not know in view of various black market transactions. Unfortunately we cannot approach the hotel management as the owner is a German or of German extraction and regarded as slightly suspect. However we shall probably get more precise details through Brutus in due course. Meanwhile Fighter Command have been told to be specially on their toes.

I saw Tommy last night. He told me that the P.M. had backed up Eisenhower's wire to Washington about disclosing the target and approximate date of future operations to Konig. The President's replied giving his agreement to this and I think also to de Gaulle being told. I mentioned to Tommy the rather naive idea about these sort of things being told to one person only. In a matter of this sort where the underground movements were concerned, obviously many more would have to be informed. The P.M. seemed to be under a similar delusion, particularly where people gave their word of honour. He did not seem to realise that in doing so to one person, it meant accepting the word of honour of at least 100.

I gather that the Italian operation which opened on the night of 10/11. May is so far considered to be success and that we have got off with fairly light casualties.

The blowing up of a supply ship in Bergen harbour which the Germans at the moment think was due to sabotage, was in fact carried out by one of our midget submarines with an Australian officer

in charge. The real purpose was to blow up a floating dock, but a ship moored alongside was blown up instead.

A report has now been received about Hamlet's meeting with Werner in Madrid. Approximately £1,390 was paid back to Hamlet in escudos/notes. Werner then borrowed £250 back. According to Hamlet, Puppet is trusted, though his difficulties continue. A new questionnaire has come in as a result of this meeting. Werner is interested particularly as letters can be and have been transmitted by the Mins. of Supply bag.

The fruit merchant in London has received confirmation that his brother has received 250,000 pesetas and has now handed over to us the deposit note/exchange for the sterling left with Dick Butler's firm. Garbo has thus gained £2,952. A further deal for a quarter of a million pesetas was postponed until the 9th May and sterling has been deposited with Butler's firm.

Treasure is being controlled from Wiesbaden. For the first time on the 10th May two way contact was established with the German transmitter. The Germans have evidently found that sending blind is unsatisfactory and have now adopted the normal method of working.

Peach has signed off his ship and is now ashore in the pool at Cardiff. He will remain there at least a month to see whether the Japs make any ~~payment~~ payment through the Carmen Fernandes

bank as they agreed to do and also to see whether they send anyone to get in touch with him.

The further transaction under Plan Dream has now gone through and we have received £3,027.15.6.

May 16th

A Mr. R.G. Graut of the Ministry of War Transport came to see me at the request of Newsam. On about D-1, certain ferry transports at Gravesend at present employed by LMS between Gravesend and Tilbury, are to be used for the embarkation of troops. It is desirable that until the operation has been launched, the personnel of these ferry boats should be kept from returning to their homes. LMS will provide accommodation on board, food etc. It is proposed however that the police should keep them from leaving the jetty. Newsam objected to this on the grounds that the police would be acting ultra vires and suggested that this was really a matter for the military. I said that this view was right and that I would have a word with Sir Findlater Stewart and also with the ISSB, who should make the necessary arrangements with the local command.

Lennox came to tell me that when seeing Monty in connection with his little deception plan, he had suggested to Monty that it would be advisable for him (Lennox) to continue his present functions on behalf of C. and ourselves

in keeping us au fait with operations. Monty had suggested that he should talk to Williams. This he had done. He impressed upon Williams that such an arrangement would not interfere in any way with any other liaison that we might have on I.B. matters. Williams had, according to Lennox, agreed with the suggestion and the proposal is that when 21st Army Group move overseas there should be periodical visits by Lennox or members of his staff. Lennox was at great pains to impress upon me that he had not tried to force this arrangement on 21st Army Group but that they had all thought it an excellent idea. While it is transparently obvious that this is part of a Lennox self-aggrandisement scheme, it is fair to say that there is a certain usefulness in knowing what is going on and that if we look to D. Branch to provide the information we shall get nothing. I should however be much happier about the job if it was being done by somebody who was not so self-interested.

TAR tells me that an MSS appreciation up to 7th May shows that from W/T intelligence the enemy have a very good idea of the disposition of our forces and of our objective. The whole picture is built up from a number of details. Agents reports do not appear to play a very big part. These are the views of Rundstedt, on which he bases his demands for units to deal with the situation. It is not possible to say how far the OKW accept his appreciation or how far, if they differ, they would be able to impose their views. I cannot help feeling that the enemy, as in the case of ourselves, are more likely to rely upon "Y" information and

"T intelligence than on anything they may receive from other sources, when formulating their plans. All that agents can really do is to fill in the picture.

TAR has talked to Niall MacDermot about the vans not going overseas until D plus 30. He has suggested to him that he might raise the question of sniffers with Ted Maltby.

TAR had a talk with me about the Connaught Hotel. We agreed that we should have to take the manager into our confidence, even though he may be a German. There is nothing of a really serious nature against him and he would probably be more subservient and more anxious to comply with our wishes than a British subject. We propose to let SB do this job as they will have to conduct the arrest if the man turns up.

Heinkel training machine landed yesterday at Lowestoft. The pilot was somewhat damaged in landing and is at present in hospital. It is not thought that this has anything to do with our operations or with the Brutus case.

I had a discussion with TAR, JC, Hugh Astor and Stamp about the case of Fido. I went over the ground very carefully. I rather dismissed the evidence of Bothereau who is under arrest in N. Africa which did not seem to me to have much significance. Bothereau met Fido originally at the training centre and later outside Montet's office. On that occasion according to Fido Bothereau asked him to come and see him at the Hotel Avia. Fido went there but found that

Bothereau had gone. Montet, seeing the two men were acquainted with one another, was rather concerned, but told Fido that Bothereau had done several jobs for him. Bothereau's account is that Fido told him that he had just got a job which would take him either to England, USA or N. Africa. Fido never mentioned this in his statement. This would however be quite a natural thing for him to say if he had been informed by Montet that Bothereau was in the game. I then discussed the statement in Fido's letter to his parents that he hoped that they had been getting his parcels. I rather wondered what these parcels were. Are parcels which are sent as from a postbox in Lisbon like letters also subject to censorship? Another point was the weakness of Fido's cover story. Was it possible that the Germans had never bothered much about it as they really intended Fido to plant himself on us and then XX us? These are other points which should be weighed against the general impression created by Fido and the fact that he is now engaged to an English girl. In general there seems to be some element of doubt about the case although the odds are that even if Fido had intended to carry out his assignment, he gave up the project before he made his statement at the LRC. It seemed impossible to send him either to North or West Africa, Russia or Canada. It was therefore for consideration with W/C Chaney how he could best be disposed of during the next month or so. The point to be aimed at was to ensure that in so far as it might be humanly possible he did not get into a plane and fly it back to occupied territory. It was

further necessary to ensure that he got no access to operational information of any kind and that he was as far away from the zone of operations as possible.

Findlater Stewart called another meeting to discuss communications to and from Iceland. It seemed from the discussion that in fact since the 17th April there have been no cipher telegrams and that en clair messages were all censored in Iceland and in this country.

There was however communication with the USA by wireless, but this was censored locally. Movements of ships were gone into and also fishing craft. It was clear that it would be possible for fishing craft to get to Norway or Sweden, and there had been a case of a boat which had been missing. Nobody knew whether it had gone to Norway or whether it had been ship-wrecked. Fishing boats had wireless but this was strictly controlled and a watch was kept on their wireless for what it is worth.

I had a word with Findlater about the ferry boats at Gravesend. He said that he would be very glad if the ISSB would deal with the question.

We had a meeting to discuss a suggestion which is to come up at Norfolk House tomorrow, that certain of the restrictions imposed should be removed on D-day. I gather from Crowe of the FO that they are going to press strongly for the removal of the diplomatic ban on communications. They say that this was the understanding and

and that any attempt by the Army to continue the ban would create an impossible situation. The FO rather felt that the Army are trying to pull a fast one. I confined myself to saying that I did not think he would get a great deal of support from us. The real point of course is that if the diplomatic ban were removed it will be a clear indication to the enemy that no attack is coming elsewhere. It is extremely important that until the bridge-head is firmly established and the enemy realises that this is the one and only attack, all restrictions should be maintained. Otherwise he will concentrate his forces on the bridge-head instead of keeping them available to attack elsewhere.

Geoffrey Wethered tells me that the agents who have been seen by SCHRADER are not SOE agents. The assumption therefore is that they are SIS agents. I tried to get on to but he was away. I was told handled Dutch affairs and that he would communicate with me, presumably fearful of the regulations communicated with who rang me up. He said that if Wethered would come over and see him he would arrange for to be present. I said that my one and only desire was to speak to the man who actually handled the agents and that provided this was ensured I was quite agreeable.

Harker is going to see Maxwell about the Greeno case. He thinks that it would be wrong for us to keep this information up our sleeve.

The latest information about Crossbow is that some 20 new sites have been found, 11 in the Cherbourg Peninsula and 9 in the Pas de Calais. They are almost all in an early stage of construction. The essential arrangements appear to consist of a launching point and a square building only. Of those in the Peninsula some seem orientated on Bristol, some on Plymouth and other points on the south-west coast. Those in the Pas de Calais are orientated on London. Repair and construction is still proceeding at other sites. The large sites at Sottevest, Wizernes and Mimoyecques have been substantially interfered with by bombing during the last 3 weeks. There has been a tendency in German home propaganda during the past fortnight to predict the use of secret weapons as an anti-invasion or counter-invasion measure.

May 17th

Garbo will receive a special questionnaire of a very delicate kind. Its nature has not so far been disclosed. The answers are to be given a special prefix which will give them priority in their re-transmission to Abwehr-kommando Arras. It seems not unlikely that these messages may be connected with commando raids against headquarters and other vulnerable points in this country.

I attended another large meeting at Norfolk House today to consider what restrictions affecting the security of Overlord could be taken. Catalogue Reference: KV 47104 said that he thought that at the present juncture the whole nexus of

restrictions could not be dealt with piecemeal but that we should all assemble on a certain date after Overlord when the question of the security of future operations should be considered de novo in the light of the situation as it then presented itself to the Supreme Commander. It might be that we should then be able to say that a number of the measures at present in force could be cancelled or alternatively that all the present arrangements should be retained and others added. I said that I agreed with Herbert's view, that it was not for me to say but that I could see reasons of the highest operational importance which would make it highly undesirable to do away with the diplomatic ban on communications on D-day.

This however was a matter for SHAEF and we should be guided entirely by what they said. As I saw the position the maintenance of the present restrictions, of which I regarded the diplomatic ban as the lynch-pin, was likely to be as important for the first week or so after D-day as it was in the preceding period. Crowe from the FO said that the diplomatic ban had been put on expressly to safeguard the time and target and that as soon as that information was available to the Germans and to the general public it would be impossible for the FO to maintain the ban. His Secretary of State had only put it on on that understanding and if it was to be maintained the case would have to go before the Cabinet. Vivian slightly blew the gaff and so did Plant, on the point that there was in fact only one operation but in view of the presence of people from all sorts of non-

operational departments, I felt it unwise to enlarge on this. After the meeting however I did explain to Findlater Stewart that in our view immediately the diplomatic ban was lifted the enemy would say "This is the one and only target". It was clearly of vital importance to keep the enemy guessing until the bridge-head was firmly established. I felt that D plus X namely the date on which we could reconsider the whole question would be the date on which Eisenhower would say "In the light of all the information in my possession I am satisfied that the enemy is no longer re-ensuring by keeping reservess in Holland and Belgium and even in Norway, and is concentrating all his efforts on the bridgehead". Until that moment was reached I did not see how we could possibly remove the diplomatic ban. Findlater agreed.

I lunched with ~~Edward~~ Ingram and Selton Delmer, primarily to discuss the security arrangements with regard to Delmer's "black senders". On the whole I think the situation is fairly satisfactory. His 7/11 personnel are under guard and do not leave the premises without escort. Other personnel like Padgham, Zech etc, have a greater measure of liberty and on occasion do come up to London. His refugee personnel are mostly Left Wing. They get the customary holiday of 2 days a fortnight. It is not thought that any of them would be the least likely to attempt to give away operations in the remote possibility that they could have gleaned anything about them. They were all domiciled down at Tisbury Abbey. The Marinendienst, Soldatendienst and Luftwaffe dienst are all recorded programmes. Certain news items however come straight over the air from

a script which has been censored. There is also a monitor with a switch who can cut off on the slightest sign of anything going wrong. For his sources of information Delmer draws on foreign broadcasts and press, CX reports and information from MEW, and on SSDIC reports. He never uses an CX report without permission but has a certain latitude as regards SSDIC reports. He sees nothing in the Top Secret category.

I have seen the MSS reports on the enemy's appreciation of our invasion intentions. It does not seem to me to be quite so bad as T&A described it. On the other hand "Tintelligence has given away a certain amount in relation to the exercise Fabius and has set the Germans thinking as to whether we are likely to attack at high or low tide, when the obstacles which they have placed all along the coast will be more easily dealt with. Abwehr reports feature in all these summaries and have produced a plethora of dates of forthcoming operations. This apparently refers to Ostro and the like since we have not so far committed ourselves in any way. We have merely reported factually and left the Germans to draw their own deductions. Garbo for example gave considerable details about the preparations going on immediately prior to Fabius. This all pointed towards an invasion operation. Garbo's other contact in the M.O.I. however simultaneously reported that this exercise was not the real thing. He had therefore given a raspberry to his agent on the south coast. The Germans came back in some

anxiety saying that he should not reprimand his agent who after all had reported quite correctly what he saw, since if and when invasion really came he might not report the facts at all. This was of course precisely what Garbo had wanted them to say. They have warned Garbo against possible deception in the MOI, but he has shown that on the occasion of Tabius his MOI informant was quite accurate. The stock of his two agents therefore should be high. They have given information which at first appeared conflicting and both have been shown to be right. MSS however shows that very large numbers of the male population between the ages of 15 and 60 have been evacuated from the coast in Belgium, Holland and France. This is a useful piece of information for those who will have to deal with refugees but would not normally have reached us.

Burt tells me that he met two CID officers yesterday who had attended the lecture Buster and I gave to S.B. They were apparently immensely impressed and interested. One of the points they mentioned was a statement by Buster to the effect that the most disarming questions to a parachutist who had just landed were "Why are you here? Where have you come from and where are you going?" This they felt was a new approach to crime and it showed them how different our work was in many ways from theirs. They were extremely annoyed by Kendall's concluding remarks which they thought were entirely uncalled for. From what Burt told me their language about Kendall, although Burt in his usual way

never mentioned Kendall's name, was quite unprintable. His views on the lecture and Kendall's remarks were entirely unsolicited by Burt.

The D.G. has seen Gwyer and I am told by JC handled him extremely well. He began by saying "I understand that you have expressed rather strong views at various times about the activities of Section V". Gwyer said that he was bound to admit that in the course of 3 years he had done so. The D.G. rapped the table and said "Well, I've done it myself". He then expressed his appreciation of Gwyer's work and said he would regard it as the greatest possible waste if he felt compelled to apply for a transfer back to the Signals Corps. Moreover he felt that it would be running away from Section V. which was an impression that he did not wish to create. He was quite certain there would be plenty of work for Gwyer to do and it was his earnest desire that he should stay here. I think the result was satisfactory.

Dick went to see General West yesterday and discussed German affairs after the armistice. West will take over the running of the C.C.I.B., it is felt that the fact that SHAEF is an integrated Anglo-American organisation would present considerable difficulties when we have to co-operate with the Russians, zones are being allocated to ourselves, the Americans and the Russians in Germany, and collaboration will take place in Berlin. Our new regional centre will probably be somewhere near Munster.

West said that he had no place at the moment for Maunsell on his staff. What he really wanted was a G.1 to plan out the organisation. Dick suggested Haylor and West seemed to welcome the idea. He said however that he was about to have conversations with C. Dick asked him if before he saw C., he would let Dick prepare the ground. This he subsequently did by having a talk with Kim Philby. His first question to Philby was "Do you consider that the head of the organisation, from a purely functional point of view, should be an MI5 or an MI6 officer". Philby said that unquestionably he should be an MI5 officer and that the number 2 should be an MI6 man. Dick then suggested Haylor, and asked whether he would be persona grata. Philby said he thought he would, but that there was a certain prejudice against him in the P. Sections due to old differences at the LRC. Dick said that all these cases had been gone into thoroughly at the time and that it had been found that the trouble was invariably due to a muddle between the P. Sections and

He was quite ready for Kim to see the papers if he so desired. Kim is going to make certain enquiries about Haylor's suggested appointment and will let us know the results. Doubtless Viv. and Cowgill will make trouble about this, but if the return of Felix from America is going to break up the very good relations we have had with Section V. during his absence I think the question of his continued employment as head of Section V will have to be taken up on the highest level with C.

May 13th

J.C. came to talk to me about Tricycle. A message from Mihailovic from his DMI has been intercepted and decyphered by the Germans locally. Its contents have been sent on with a high priority to Hansen in Berlin. The gist of the message is that Freak, who is Tricycle's wireless operator, here, is working for the Germans. Similar information has reached SOE through Mihailovic. This gives us an opportunity of closing down Tricycle's transmitter, at any rate temporarily and may possibly assist Artist. The Germans might quite naturally think that Mihailovic had passed the information on to us or even that we had picked it out of the air and decyphered it while being transmitted by Mihailovic to his DMI. Our natural reaction would be to get on to Freak and for him owing to his anxiety to close down further transmissions. Tricycle will write a letter which the Germans will not get for some 6 weeks telling them that there has been trouble for Freak and that for that reason he felt bound to stop communicating. If we see from the traffic that Artist is once more on a good wicket we can go on the air again and explain the trouble by wireless, stating that the difficulties have been got over and that Freak has come successfully through his interrogation. This arrangement of course will be very acceptable to Tommy Harris, who is anxious to dissociate Garbo from Tricycle's affairs. He felt during the previous discussions that this could only be done by closing down Tricycle's transmitter.

This would not have been desirable at the time since it would not only have compromised artist and Tricycle but probably also Tricycle's brother. The Freak incident gives us a let-out. We shall not suffer from the point of view of deception because Tricycle is merely reporting factually and giving no pointers as regards invasion.

A paper has come in from the J.I.S. who have discussed our information about possible commando attacks on headquarters in this country. They regard this as possible but on the whole unlikely. They think that the information about headquarters is more probably required for bombing or for Crossbow targets. The paper is to be further discussed tomorrow and we shall be present.

I have been rather shocked to find that embarkation and disembarkation leave in addition to compassionate leave is still being granted. Embarkation leave is only granted to troops going overseas to duties other than those connected with Overlord. People are said to be leaving the country for Eire and also on discharge. Harry Allen is going to see A.G. with a view to getting things tightened up.

May 19th

The cyphers used by Brutus and Treasure have enabled G.C. & C.S. to break another extremely important group.

I spent a good deal of the morning going into the significance of the recent indications that Garbo is to receive certain questions, the answer to which are to be despatched by special priority to Berlin and the Abwehrkommando in Arras. I spoke to Brooks in Melland's section in order to find out what the significance of Arras was. It seems that there is a direct link from Arras with Corps 65 of the Zbv. Brandenburg Regiment. Apart from this there is no very satisfactory explanation as to why East Arras has been established. There is also information dated 24th April to the effect that the Jap MA reported to his Govt. that 65 Army (believed to be Corps) is Hitler's anti-invasion unit. The J.I.S. paper on the subject of possible commando raids here is a little inclined to write off the possibility. It is however difficult to explain precisely why the Germans should ask not only for the town but also for the street and number in the street of various headquarters, if they do not contemplate a landing and subsequent attack on the ground. There is just a possibility of course that they may wish to have the street and number in order to sort out the welter of reports that they are probably receiving mostly of a notional kind, particularly if there are more than one headquarters in the same town. I gather from RSS that Garbo's cypher is being given to Arras so that his information can be transmitted from Madrid to Berlin and on to Arras without any re-cyphering.

I attended a meeting of the JIS with Victor, and I think that they are just a little bit shaken. Winterbottom who is representing SIS said that he had very definite evidence of a connection between Arras and Crossbow. Arras is apparently the headquarters of Crossbow. We pointed out however that it did not necessarily follow that Arras might have other projects than Crossbow but which might be of a commando type. Apparently an immense number of lines are running into Arras which from the point of view of an underground headquarters would be admirable. When I was there in the last war it was honeycombed with chalk tunnels. Some of the cellars in the town are extremely deep and hewn out of the solid chalk. You can burrow down to almost any depth. We actually had an underground railway from Arras to the front line in the last war, and underground dressing stations to hold up to 700 wounded.

Victor and I concentrated on trying to get the JIS to draw attention to two factors, one the necessity of adequate precautions at the various headquarters and secondly the possibility of parachutists dressed in allied uniforms of one kind or another. Both these points were included in the final draft which is to go to the Chiefs of Staff. The JIS cannot however state very positively what they think ought to be done as they are only an intelligence body. It is to be hoped that somebody will have the sense to take the necessary action. It seems to me a mistake that those with the intimate knowledge of the intelligence and of what lies behind every phrase in a report of the kind

which has been prepared are not present when the action is discussed. It is obviously difficult for the Chiefs of Staff in the absence of any positive recommendation to grasp the significance of much boiled-down intelligence report.

I had a talk with Geoffrey Wethered about the case of SCHRAEDER. It seems that there is now some question of posting SCHRAEDER as a private to the Dutch Army. He is trying to resist this by making out that he is being employed by PID. This is not really true. He knows somebody in PID to whom he has been giving information. Six agents according to our informant and Van t'Sant have seen the Queen. They are all on the books of SIS. They are not a particularly attractive lot. In fact two of them have quite adverse records from the LRC, in particular one who is supposed to go off for his course in a few days. None of these 6 were seen by SCHRAEDER but he has seen two others. There also appears to be little doubt that he is interfering and making mischief between the British Govt. and the Dutch authorities. He has been working since his arrival here with a minister called BOURG whom he was instrumental in getting out of Holland some months ago. At best SCHRAEDER is an intriguer but there is at present no evidence to show that he is a spy, and certainly not sufficient to get him locked up. Probably the best thing is to let him join the Dutch Army and instruct the Dutch 2eme Bureau to keep him under close observation. He should

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not be granted any leave until after Overlord.
Meanwhile we have to take up the question of
the agents with SIS.

Stopford came to see me about the two KLM
pilots who have been arrested for diamond
smuggling. One of his agents has got on to
a Dutch Jew called PEPPER who is apparently
at the back of the whole business. It seems
that fairly large quantities of diamonds have
been going out of the country to Lisbon
where they are presumably sold to the Germans.
My suggestion is that

with a view to finding
out which other people are concerned. The
diamonds are taken out sewn into articles of
clothing.

May 20th

The D.G. and I went over to see Lindlater
Stewart about the calling up of press corres-
pondents for Overlord. Major Goudie of ISSB was
also present. He said that the ISSB took
a grave view of the situation and had in fact
been discussing it. They had asked their
representative at SHAEF to get Gen. Whiteley's
views which they hoped to hear at this morning's
meeting. Sir Lindlater was shown a copy of
my letter to him suggesting that something
on the lines of the following scheme should alone
ensure any degree of security: (a) all journal-
ists taking part in the operation should be
informed now that they should be on 6 hours
notice; (b) they should be warned that they had
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already deposited, extra clothing which they

could leave behind as they would be remaining in the marshalling area for some considerable time before their departure; (c) they should in fact be called up 12 hours before the operation is due, to take place, told to report at some suitable rendezvous, and be taken down to the area in buses; (d) while in the area they should not be allowed to communicate by telephone; (e) after they are called up, the strictest possible censorship should be imposed on all outgoing press cables, which should be heavily paraphrased. An alternative, to avoid any possibility of code, though perhaps a somewhat extravagant one, would be to send the cables of, for example, the Chicago Sun to the New York Herald, and vice versa. It is of course important that there should be no interruption in the normal flow of press cables. Major Goudie pointed out that there were already press representatives being used in the marshalling area. It was of the highest importance to get them back before briefing day.

I showed Findlater my note about FWE and black senders and he agreed that the situation was satisfactory.

I saw Cheney about SCHRAEDER. He is going to throw a fly over Dirksman and find out the position.

There is still no indication that Artist has made any confession or that the Abwehr have come to realise the true position in the Tricycle case.

The Portuguese International Police have handed to SIS in Lisbon a statement about Tricycle in which they come to the conclusion that he may be either a British or a Russian agent.

Bronx has received a further monthly payment of 198 from the Germans.

We are still waiting for a full report of Hamlet's meeting with "erner in Madrid. It is still possible to use the bag for letter-writing.

The Germans have now received further letters from Father and have transmitted two new messages to him. It now appears that broadcasts from India have been heard continually but it has not been possible to pick them up here. Arrangements for the delivery of the wireless set to Father through Blackguard appear to be proceeding satisfactorily.

May 22nd

I spoke to Melland. He did not know about the new Garbo Stichling messages and was much interested by what I told him. I have arranged that he will in future be kept informed through the War Office representative on the Twenty Committee.

I had a long talk with Michael Ryde. From what he says I very much doubt whether there is anything much to be gained by his going back to

S. Africa. Firstly the S. Africans are practically out of the war That is the general atmosphere of the Union apart from Smuts and his immediate entourage. The police are without doubt riddled with O.B. and it is quite clear that they cannot be made use of in any way. Nobody knows this better than Smuts himself. Smuts is relying to a very large extent on the support of certain Afrikaans elements in the Union and if he were to come out into the open to attack van Rensburg and the O.B. he would probably get the country up in arms against him. With this in mind his sole concern is to keep S. Africa in the Empire because he thinks it is the best thing for S. Africa and because if S. Africa went out of the war she would not be able to give us certain facilities which we now enjoy. Lenton who has written to the D.C. in glowing terms about Michael Ryde has been giving us all the support in his power. He has most of the police chiefs on telephone check and the results have been extremely helpful and illuminating. It appears that the O.B. element of the police are aware of the efforts that have been made to round up SITTING and FRASCH and of the extent to which the O.B. is involved. Wild was undoubtedly planted by SITTING and co. on Michael Ryde. It was his intention to discover just how much was known against him. He did not get very far with this. He was told to go away and find out the whereabouts of SITTING and to report to Ryde. He in fact did practically nothing until Ryde put Lenton's agent in touch with him. The agent told Wild that Ryde knew a great deal about him and knew that he was implicated up to the hilt. As Wild was clearly playing about he decided

to get the police to arrest him. Lenton's agent urged Wild in his own interest to come clean with Ryde. This had the desired effect but Wild only came clean as far as Rooseboom and van Rensberg were concerned. He produced the Rooseboom document and wireless transmitter both of which are damning evidence against the O.B. After this he disappeared. Rooseboom has also disappeared. It seems not unlikely that they may both have been kidnapped. Wild did not disclose anything about what happened after SITTIG took over from Rooseboom and was told that the evidence as far as it went was all right but there was a great deal more which he had not disclosed, and that he was therefore regarded as unsatisfactory. It was at this moment that he disappeared. It seems that Baston has been told a certain amount by de Villiers who made a complete muddle of the attempt to round up the transmitter. Michael Ryde has been running all the agents for SIS (Section V) in Lorenzo Marques owing to differences between the SIS and SOE men, which made work almost impossible.

Dick, TAR and I had a talk with the DG about certain appointments. It was agreed that Mair would have to remain where he was and also Stephenson. It was also agreed that if possible Furnival-Jones should take the records job in SIAEF, and failing him Boggis-Rolfe who was recommended by Hill-Dillon. This seems to be the only chance of getting things going within a reasonable time. Joe Stephenson has been given added responsibilities and promoted to the rank of Major and Hill-Dillon is still anxious to keep Mair particularly busy at the moment when he is in

the middle of a battle. TAR put in a plea for Michael Ryde but the D.G. reserved judgment until he had heard Ryde's story. I said that I thought Gwyer would have to go to SOE at his own request. He seemed quite convinced that there would be no future here for him any more. The D.G. has agreed to Taylor's appointment if General West is prepared to have him as G.I. At the moment there is no place for Maunsell but this may come later on. The D.G. also agreed to consider Mark Johnston as the extra interrogator promised to SHAEF.

I talked to Stopford and Craufurd about the KLM diamonds case. Craufurd is going to try and get S.B. to interrogate all KLM and BOAC personnel as to whether they have ever been approached to carry either diamonds, other valuables or documents. We might I think get something out of this. Meanwhile we shall try and get S.B. to lay off PEPPER, the Dutch Jew, and also a man called BRANDEL. It seems likely that these people are the ones behind the whole racket.

There has been a serious leakage by a Capt. Wright of the American Navy who was on the staff of Admiral Stark. A friend of his, du PRE, gave a party at which Gen. Sturges of the Commandoes and others were present, when Capt. Wright referred to the target area. He had on a previous occasion disclosed the approximate date. Statements have been taken and he is now under arrest.

May 23rd

I had a talk with TAR, Dick and Seymer about B.4a. We agreed that he should have an extra female assistant and that the work as he had outlined it should go on; subject to anything Horrocks has to say he will clearly have to keep a card index of his own.

We discussed the possibility of the Germans landing in allied uniforms by parachute. It was agreed that such individuals would be our prisoners and go to Camp 020. This has been fairly extensively preached to the Americans by Herbert. Seymer will arrange M.I.19 about our seeing any members of the Brandenburg Regt. in German uniforms who are taken prisoner.

We have been given accommodation for 30 people in Chancery Lane Tube Station for use if Cross-bow gets going.

Harry Allan has agreed to let Furnival-Jones take the job in SHAFF.

I spoke to Canning and suggested that he might find it worth while to interrogate 11 members of the crews of KLM and BOAC travelling to Lisbon. They could be asked whether at any time they had been approached by anyone to carry anything. In the present atmosphere of the arrest of the 2 KLM pilots for diamond smuggling this may produce some results. In any case it will act as a deterrent which at this moment is extremely desirable. We know that BOAC crews frequently fail to disclose papers which they carry. Canning

agreed that this would be a good idea and said that he would look into the question.

May 24th

TAR has suggested that it might be a wise precaution to get some people out to the country before D.day, in order to relieve the congestion if there is to be a sudden exodus owing to

Crossbow. There is some point in this. At the same time we all know the difficulties of running our sections in halves. Unless we are absolutely forced to do so, it is a thing to be avoided. TAR thinks that proactively the whole of our work could be just as easily done from the country. I very much doubt this, as long as other offices remain up in London. He also thinks that we will not be able to have papers at Chancery Lane. If we are not going to have papers there is obviously no use going there at all. All this of course has been gone into before and the decision was taken on a high level that there was to be no evacuation in anticipation of Crossbow. This was ofcourse before the matter had any publicity and when it was known only to a very small circle within the office. It was felt at that time to be of paramount importance to do nothing that might create unnecessary panic. I shall be raising this matter with the D.G. Meanwhile I see no objection to people going to the country if it is not going to interfere in any way with their work.

I attended a meeting at Norfolk House which lasted 2 hours. Gen.Davis, DPR SHAEF, Herbert,
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Admiral Thompson, Harry Allen, Cussen and myself were present. SHAEF have apparently worked out the details which have been approved by Eisenhower as regards the calling up of journalists for the Second Front. We questioned the periods, namely D-6 for airborne troops, D-4 for ground troops, D-2 for naval personnel. We were told that circumstances varied according to the areas and according to the Services, and that these periods were to some extent elastic. Some people may be called up for airborne troops on D-6 and some later. Gen. Davis could not however tell us very much about any of the details worked out by the local commanders. As it is largely on these details that the effectiveness of any scheme must depend, one would have thought that SHAEF would have taken the trouble to find out what the local arrangements were. I have no doubt however that as a result of this meeting they will make enquiries. At the moment the whole thing looks to me a little too sketchy. Plant drew attention to the fact that as far as airborne troops were concerned there did not seem to be any arrangement by which journalists would be kept within the perimeter of the camp.

Having dealt with the question of the calling up of the journalists who were actually going on the operation, we proceeded to discuss the possibility of information reaching more important journalists in London from any source and the deductions that they would inevitably draw from the absence of their war correspondents. If we assume that Fleet St. knew the date but not the target, was there anything more that could be done to prevent this information reaching papers

in America or in neutral countries. Could their communications be heavily paraphrased. Admiral Thompson seemed to think that this was impossible and both he and Herbert drew attention to the fact that they could give no guarantee as regards code, although Herbert at any rate was doing his best to detect anything of the kind. Thompson on the other hand is generally inclined to put a halo round the journalists'

head and to discount any possibility of his attempting to get the news out. Herbert rather torpedoed this idea by referring to some information that he had just received from Francis in USA, to the effect that some code in broadcasting is to be put into effect. He hoped to have the full details before long.

Lastly we discussed the possibility of delaying telegrams to neutral capitals. This raised the odd question of the importance of British news in neutral capitals. If we did not get in first the news is invariably distorted to our disadvantage. Personally I think this is a very over-rated idea. I doubt very much whether at a time like this it would make the slightest difference if neutral capitals were deprived of some of our news, or received it at a later date. Certainly when weighed against the possibility of the consequences of any leakage such consideration seems to me wholly insignificant. The only danger to my mind in imposing such restrictions is that it is too late. They may at this stage pin-point the time of the operation, particularly if considered in conjunction with tides, moon-periods etc.

The whole of the above discussion is being
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embodied in a note which will be sent to SHAEF and which will at least cause them to look into things a little more carefully. I doubt whether at this 11th hour we shall get any material change in the present arrangements.

One of our Icelandic spies who arrived a week or so ago was in all probability trained by ZIGZAG in Oslo.. The description of the trainer has been given in some detail and corresponds accurately with that of ZIGZAG. Moreover ZIGZAG's former master is now in Oslo. This does not necessarily imply that ZIGZAG has gone wrong. Obviously having gone back to the Germans he would have to swim with the stream. May be he is angling for a job over here which he may in due course succeed in getting.

The proposal to create a Free German Movement in the UK with von THOMA at its head has been further considered and an approach has been made to the General. From CSD+C reports it would appear that the view of the Generals is that (a) since the war is lost, the vital question is to prevent chaos in Germany which must be expected when the crack comes; (b) chaos will produce communism which is the ultimate bogey; (c) they are all interested in Germany and it is therefore essential to preserve at least part of the army intact to prevent chaos; (d) it is up to the British Govt. to lay down their policy so that a programme can be planned in conjunction with the senior group-commanders which will be of service to Germany and also to England; (e) broadcasting from behind barbed wire is only niggling and absolutely useless until at any rate after the collapse. Major-General

BASSENGE later told the British officer who had discussed this question that Germany had lost the war, that the crack might come before the Allies were in occupation, that it was essential to avoid total collapse and to ensure that the allies arrived in Berlin before the Russians, and that a plan should be made whereby the Germany Army in the west returned to Germany, weeded out the Nazis and left the anti-Nazi bureaucracy in power, thus avoiding total administrative collapse. BASS-ENGGE said that in no circumstances would he broadcast at this juncture, but without any conditions whatsoever, even retaining his P/W status, he would be prepared to try and contact Rundstedt with the support of the British Government. In the strictest secrecy he stated that the advisability of abandoning a hopeless position had been discussed by a group of senior German commanders some 18 months ago. All except one were in favour of over-throwing the Party and giving up the war. Rundstedt was present at this meeting.

Dick spoke to me about PAILLOLE. He is very anxious that he should be allowed to return to N. Africa and he had heard that C. was going to see Gen. Bedale-Smith on the subject this afternoon. I spoke to C. who confirmed this and I told him that we supported the proposition. In fact we felt that it was essential that he should go if the plan worked out with the I.B. Staff was to be really effective.

I attended a meeting at the F.O. where we discussed a number of cases of diplomats who were anxious either to come to this country or to leave it.

I raised the question of PAILLOLE. Findlater took the view that this was a matter for SHAEF and that if they backed the application the case need not go before the committee. There was a note on the agenda asking SOE to report the result of their investigations about the position of the French in Algiers using Russian cyphers for communication with this country. It seemed that the suggestion was based almost entirely on surmise. There was some evidence to suggest that communication was going on and also that the French were in fairly close touch with the Russians. There was nothing however to show that in fact Russian cyphers were being used.

Findlater talked about the abolition of the diplomatic ban. He said that the P.M. had to some extent sold the pass by telling the President and also de Gaulle that communications would open up immediately after D.day. He had however put forward a paper expressing the anxiety of the various departments concerned particularly SHAEF. He had not however overstressed the argument that the abolition of the ban would be detrimental to the cover plan. The F.O. are apparently taking the line that if there are cover operations the more the Germans get to hear about them through diplomatic cables the better. Personally I doubt the soundness of this view. I do not see how the Germans can draw any other inference than that D.day

operation is the one and only one.

Hill, Cunliffe-Owens' solicitor, has told L.A.Byrne and the Solicitor General that he is worried about HOYES. He thinks that he ought not to be at large in the banned area and is inclined to believe that he may be a spy. The A.G. was informed and sent for Jim Hale. Dick Butler is going down to find out exactly what Hill's information is. I am quite certain that HOYES is merely an unscrupulous crook. It is reported that he had both Eisenhower and Monty to dine at his house, and it might be just worth while to have them warned. HOYES continues to live on a lavish scale at his country house, Marwell Hall.

May 25th

We made arrangements two or three weeks ago that E.Division should have a general check-up on all doubtful released from the LRC. The object was to find out whether they were employed and where and with they were associating. Beaumont accordingly wrote to S.B. about a man called de la FER. Our odd friend Inspector Cain was deputed by S.B. to go down and interview de la FER. He did this in characteristic style, hectoring and bullying. The result has been a complaint by Theodore Goddard & Co., de la FER's solicitors, to the H.O. It is a wonder to me that Cain has lasted so long. He is of course a lunatic. On looking at the file I was amused by Tin-Eye's opening remarks in the yellow peril summing up: "De la FER is a hyper-sensitive bastard who

arrived here in a canoe. Once this is understood, the case of this shabby individual falls to the ground".

CX. reports indicate that there is a sharp decline in German morale. Some 60% are said to be convinced that the war is lost, 25% believe that some miracle will take place to save Germany without actually wishing for the victory of Nazism, 15% believe absolutely in the victory of German arms and Nazism. The bombing of Bavaria and the Rhineland appears to be regarded more as the responsibility of the German Govt. than of the British or Americans.

Buster has produced a note on the recent arrivals in Iceland. Prior to April this year the enemy had sent over 3 espionage expeditions to Iceland in the course of the present war. All three had been Abwehr enterprises. The first involved a Norwegian by the name of SAETRANG who made a passage from Northern Norway in a boat accompanied by genuine refugees. This man committed suicide before he was interrogated. The second expedition involved the landing of the XX agent Cobweb by submarine in the Spring of 1942, and the 3rd, the XX agent Beetle who was landed by similar means in the early autumn of 1943. The latter half of the month of April this year, has been marked by the arrival in Iceland of no less than 7 new enemy agents. These agents, carried between them 6 wireless transmitters and came in 3 parties from Bergen, two by submarine and one by small boat. Two of the parties were despatched by the Abwehr and one by the S.D. They were all of Icelandic nationality except one FRESINIUS,

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who was a German. The S.D. pair had instructions to report on weather and allied troop movements and shipping. The two others in addition to reporting on weather for which they were equipped inter alia with barometers, had orders to send information on the presence of troops, landing craft for invasion, number of ships in the fjords, keeping a special watch on certain harbours. The third party had the usual instructions with regard to weather reporting and were also required to report on shipping, particularly for invasion purposes, troop movements, divisional signs and other matters. One of them, the German, who appears to be a convinced and ardent Nazi, incidentally the first we have encountered, has stated in terms that the Germans are expecting that invasion may be coming from Iceland. 5 of the 7 agents were recruited as far back as 1942, the other two being recruited the following year. They have all had extensive training although the wireless efficiency of one or two leaves a good deal to be desired. The agents have roughly \$3-4000 each in their possession. The first two parties were captured within a comparatively short time after their arrival, and protest that they never thought of operating. The 3rd party however were at large for over a week before they were captured and have now admitted that during this time they made attempts to establish contact with the enemy by W/T. These cases afford positive evidence that the enemy is anticipating an offensive operation of some magnitude to be launched from Iceland at some not far distant date. The fact that both the Abwehr and the S.D. are in the

field suggests that the idea is not confined to the Intelligence Services but may well be occupying the minds of the OKW itself.

We have of course for some time been running the deception plan which implies an attack on Norway. Brutus, and Garbo, have been actively engaged on this. Bevan asked the Russians to co-operate when he was in Moscow. They were enthusiastic but we have no details of what they are doing.

I saw Walter Bell today with Cecil. We discussed the case of MARLIN in the light of the P.M.s directive that conversations with Americans were only to be conducted on special lines of mutual interest. MARLIN seemed to be going outside his sphere by seeking for information of a political kind both here and in Ireland. Walter Bell took the view that MARLIN was considered to be rather a joke in his own organisation and we all agreed that it would be a mistake to get at loggerheads with OSS. We decided therefore to pursue the line that in view of the P.M.s directive we could not give purely political information. If MARLIN persisted, we would take up the question with Bruce.

Cussen tells me that the Daily Mail had got a camera with a telescopic lens fixed up in a house at Seaford. They intend to take pictures of the invading barges. This comes to us through one of M's informants. This is of course a technical breach of the regulations although from the point of view of security I cannot see that much harm would be done by the publication of the photographs at some later date. I shows

however that the press are as usual all out to get scoops regardless of security and of the regulations.

May 26th

A Jap B.J. indicates that Ribbentrop proposes to attempt a peace deal with the Americans if our Second Front operations are not successful.

Harry held his weekly meeting on Overlord Security. A propos of journalists I pointed out that although we were endeavouring to devise security measures for those who are being called up to go on the operation, we still allowed journalists to visit the banned area and presumably they would go on doing so right up to zero hour, and after. The only check upon them at the moment was a kind of self-denying ordinance enumerating various points on which they have been asked not to report. Undesirable as this state of affairs was, it was felt generally that there was nothing that could very effectively be done. They could always beat the ban and it might be that some of them were actually resident in the area and came up to London every day. I asked about the possibilities of a telephone check on newspaper offices or calls coming from the banned area. It seemed that this could only operate as a part of general censorship measures which were already laid on. Such measures were of course little more than a small cross-section of the calls being made. It appears that the P.M. has told both de Gaulle and the President that the ban on

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diplomatic communications will be lifted on D. day. The matter is being taken up with the P.M. by the Chiefs of Staff, on the basis of the paper supplied to them by the Findlater Stewart Committee.

Lennox informed the meeting that the Admiralty had instructed all units of the Fleet taking part in operations to open their sealed orders. Included in the vessels operating is the French destroyer "Combattante", which was to be visited today by the French Admiral Argenlieu. If this visit took place the Admiral would doubtless be given full details of the operation, and all our efforts to prevent the French from knowing anything about the date and target would be nullified. I was asked to speak to C. about this in case any communications were going on between the French here and Algiers. I spoke to Arnold-Foster and told him the position and suggested that we should put the French Naval Office on telephone check. He readily agreed to this. As far as I can ascertain all French communications are under C's control except certain individual messages which Konig and Viennot have been allowed to send by the P.M. Arrangements have been made with the 10 lines at the French Naval Office were on check as from 6 pm. Findlater Stewart has been informed about the opening of the sealed orders by the Fleet. This was the first he had heard of it. One presumes that the Chiefs of Staff knew, but probably it is a typical example of uncoordinated action. The Navy are always very independent in these matters and it may be that they have a very

good case for issuing their orders well in advance. It would however be helpful to those concerned with security if they knew what was going on, since this is the first big impact on security machinery. The limited naval personnel who have been briefed are not confined to their ships but can proceed to an area within 20 miles. The possibilities of leakage are therefore considerably increased.

Victor and I visited Villiers' office and examined with him his key-point maps, which were very elaborate and well set out. They show all the marshalling areas, petrol pipe lines, A.A.guns sites, balloon barrages, etc. all round the coast. Villiers said that a big risk was being taken by the Chiefs of Staff who had written off the possibility of an attack on our midland industrial areas via the east coast. The position is that there are hardly any searchlight or A.A.guns to defend that area.

Considerable precautions have been taken against Crossbow by means of belts of balloon barrages and A.A.guns. Villiers was high in his praise of Pluto and Phoenix. Phoenix which constitutes the improvised landing stages is so constructed that it rises and sinks with the tide. The drums for Pluto are apparently 90 ft wide and 60 ft high and may be towed at the rate of 8 knots. Very little recce appears to have been carried out but apparently a flashlight photograph was taken in the Southampton area last night. The place is of course bristling with invasion preparations of one kind or another. There seems little

doubt that the most important targets are the power stations which could very seriously affect operations if they were put out of action

May 27th

I spoke to Cecil of SIS about the case of Miss de JONG who is being tried in Berlin for assisting British airmen to escape from occupied territory. I gather that her father has since been arrested. Some attempt was made to effect an exchange with My ERICKSSEN about 6 months ago but negotiations were allowed to fall into abeyance owing to the arrest of the father. S.I.S. are now anxious to re-open the ball through the Swiss Government. Before doing so they want to know whether we are still prepared to let My ERICKSSEN go. I said that as far as we were concerned there was no objection. At that time SOE had also agreed but since then they had raised very serious objections to the release of anyone who had been in contact with Victoire. They think that any information going back from here might affect her agents in the field. This all seems to me to be a little far-fetched and to pale into insignificance when considered in conjunction with many cases which we have looked into on behalf of SOE. It seems to us that they are running far greater risks by their employment of people like LOUBER and ROGER. I told Cecil that we would make another approach to SOE and let him know the result.

I had a long discussion with TAR and Victor and RSS. It seemed to me that the position was

eminently unsatisfactory. I could see that the picking up of an agent here was a difficult matter. If he were transmitting on ordinary H.F. at fairly frequent intervals to a fixed station on the continent in Abwehr procedure we should probably get his signals. If he were transmitting in our military procedure it was problematical whether we should get his signals. If he were transmitting in VHF it was almost certain that we should not get him.

I entirely accept this as being the position but my complaint is that the problem of detecting illicit wireless from this country has never been submitted to a real body of experts, and that possibly had it been given careful study by such a body at least the present dangers might have been to some extent mitigated. Victor agreed that it might be possible to work on some automatic ether scanner which would increase the chances of picking up an agent. There might also be other possibilities, if the ground were thoroughly explored. So much for picking up the call. The next stage is to D.F. the position of the illicit transmitter. Recent

experiments had shown both in the case of GARBO and in the case of an imaginary agent who was located at Whaddon, that the bearings from the fixed stations were 50-60 miles out. This being so, the margin of error on the continent would be considerably increased. We have always been given to understand that fixed stations could give a fairly accurate bearing. The effect is that unless your vans get into the ground-wave they stand very little chance of picking up the agent. The D.G. is

rather anxious to take this matter up; both TAR and I are opposed to any such course. I pointed out to the DG that the Radio Security Committee consisted of a Chairman who knew nothing about wireless, and that he and I had no knowledge of the subject, and therefore we would all be at the mercy of Gambier-Parry who could cover us with megacycles. The discussion would get us no where and only create bad blood. He seemed to think however that we ought to get some statement of the position particularly since I pointed out to him a false impression was created by the notes on discussions by the Findlater-Stewart Committee. The impression given is that if an agent were dropped we should probably pick him up within a reasonable time. The fact is that unless the aircraft tracks pin-pointed him and the police and Home Guard did their job, we should be extremely unlikely to get our man. Technical means would give us little if any assistance. By the time a man had been located the harm would have been done.

May 28th

Grassby telephoned this morning to say that he has received a police report that a boat has been found on 27th May at Climping near Little-hampton. A description of the boat which had no rudder or oars was given. It had no markings. With it was found a life-belt, also without markings. The S.C.O., S.E. Command has been informed.

Treasure has made a statement to the effect that she is in a position to blow her case to the Germans at any time she wished to do so.

Although her statement may not be true it shows that she is unreliable and for this reason it is impossible to send deception material by her transmitter. Her case is being continued

because valuable information of a cryptographic nature is being obtained, but only accurate

information is being sent over. The future of the case will be considered again in a month or 6 weeks. Meanwhile a telephone check

will be working. Although Treasure sends her messages herself she is under close observation all the time. A report from S+B indicated that she had made an arrangement with her German master in Lisbon by which she could communicate. We see no particular objection in having a show-down with her at this moment since if she refused to send any more we should not get the cryptographic material. She is a very temperamental person and suffering from a serious kidney disease which which she is not likely to survive very long.

We have taken off observation at the Connaught Hotel but S.B. will re-impose it at a moments notice. An arrangement has been made with the management by which they will be informed if the mysterious stranger turns up with the parcel for Mons. Lefevre.

Freak transmitted his last message on the 18th May and fixed the next transmission for the Catalogue Reference KV/46194. It is intended that Tricycle should write a letter explaining that

transmissions had been interrupted because an accusation has been made in London as the result of the accusation against Freak coming from Mihailovic, but such a letter need not in fact be written for a fortnight or so, during which time the position may be clarified.

Tate is shortly to change his location and will be transmitting from the Wye area in Kent, probably by the end of next week. He has just sent his thousandth message, in which he extends humble greetings and good wishes to the Fuhrer.

Hamlet has now returned to Lisbon, and is compiling a full report of his meeting with Werner in Madrid. We have already received two matches which were given to Hamlet in Madrid to replace the original matches which were wearing out.

Father's W/T set has arrived in Bombay.

Bronx is sending a telegram in code to the Germans indicating that an attack will be launched against the Bay of Biscay on about the 15th June.

"Monty" left for Gib. and Algiers on Friday.

Brutus is being notionally posted to Fusag.

Cecil is very worried about the continuous flow of troops to Eire on either compassionate leave, or embarkation or disembarkation leave. Some 5,000 a week have been going. This of course
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 goes through all the res-

trictions that have been placed on travel to Eire. Harry Allen I think committed himself to the policy in his capacity as DDMI(S) and therefore is disinclined to oppose it in his capacity as D.C & D. Findlater Stewart has written a note on the subject urging the Services to cut down as far as possible. There seems to be no reason why disembarkation leave should be granted and very little reason for embarkation leave.

I discussed the anomaly of D.D.M.I(S) and D.C & D. with Rupert Speir. He feels that the position is entirely wrong and that both we and the WO. are inclined to suffer. He thinks that it is necessary to keep W.O. section here which must be larger than the other service sections for obvious reasons. On the other hand he regards the duties performed by C. and D. divisions as mainly civilian and in any case less military than those of B. division. I gather that the DMI is rather thinking on these lines and may as soon as he is firmly in the saddle, make representations.

A lot of telephone calls are coming in from the French Naval Office but none of them seem to have any bearing on future operations.

May 29th

I hear that the Germans have staged an armed parachute raid on Tito's headquarters. Tito himself got away and so did the SIS representative, although he lost his wireless set and cyphers. Other officers were captured. This Catalogue Reference:KV/4/194

may be significant of what may happen here during invasion time. In this connection I gather that the J.I.S. paper has resulted in precautions being taken at 21st Army Group H.Q.

The bogus Monty scheme appears to have been successful. His arrival in Gib. has got to Madrid and has been wired through to Berlin. The whole thing was I believe very well staged in Gib. A Spaniard named Molina was visiting the Governor at the time of "Monty"'s arrival. He was shut in a room waiting to see the Governor, from the window of which he could see "Monty" and the Governor walking up and down on the terrace. The only trouble about the scheme is that it has perhaps been placed a little too early.

De Gaulle has said that he won't come here unless he is allowed to communicate in his own cyphers. This raises the question as to whether he should arrive before D.day or immediately after. If he is allowed to remain in Algiers he will probably broadcast to the resistance movements on lines which we might not consider to be very appropriate. If on the other hand he comes here before D.day he may communicate information about the date and target in cyphers which will probably be read by the Germans. The question is to be decided by the Chiefs of Staff.

The Russian Admiral KHARLAMOV and Air and Army representatives are to be taken on a cruiser to witness the Overlord assault. Ostensibly they will be going to visit Rosyth. They will

however be taken from there by car direct to their ship. The question as to whether KHARMALOV's party should be allowed to witness the assault was discussed in the J.I.C. It was pointed out that no facilities of any sort were being given to Gen.Burrows in Moscow. He could not even visit the front. It was thought however that this would not be a very appropriate moment to bargain. If however Admiral KHARMALOV's party wished to witness further operations on the continent they would be told that no facilities would be granted unless reciprocal treatment was given to Gen.Burrows.

John Senter came to see me about the French agent Lt.ROSENTHAL who appeared to have information about the target area. At a meeting at Claridges in the suite of Col. Stirling of the S.A.S. Regiment, at which several other British officers were present, the uses of S.A.S. troops had been discussed. At one point during the discussion ROSENTHAL made a semi-circle on a large-scale map immediately behind the target area. He said

that he thought that S.A.S. troops could be effectively used at this point. There was some doubt as to whether he had put his thumb on that particular spot accidentally or whether he had done it with knowledge. The general impression was however that he had done it with a full knowledge of the target area. As a result of this incident Mockler-Berryman and Senter visited Shaef on 26th or 27th May and reported to facts to Col.Sheen and Gen.Betts. It was felt that it must be
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assumed that Duke St. were aware of the target area and that in consequence no French agents run by SOE in conjunction with Duke St. should be allowed to go into the field before D.day. I raised the question as to whether a similar instruction had been issued by SHAEF to SIS since if the presumption about Duke St. was correct, any agents that they had of a similar type should also be prevented from going into the field. Apparently this point had not been considered. With Senter's approval I went over and saw C. to whom I explained the situation. He said he would look into the matter and issue the necessary instructions. SOE are reporting the whole matter to SHAEF.

A paper has come in from Norfolk House calling a meeting tomorrow to discuss the possibility of the diplomatic ban being removed on D.plus 1 or 2. The proposal is to notify Embassies and Legations that the ban is being removed but to say that owing to the general congestion it is likely that telegrams may be held up for some time. In fact instructions will be issued to stop any telegrams, bags or couriers going out until D.plus 7. In the light of this decision Findlater Stewart thinks that we ought to review all our security restrictions now. What disturbs me about the present proposal is that the main issue has not been properly understood. As soon as foreign govts. are notified that the ban has been lifted, the information will reach the Germans via Madrid and Stockholm and they will immediately conclude that the Overlord operation is the one and only.

The subsequent staggering of telegrams until D plus 7 will in no way affect the German conclusions unless it is intended to stop en clair telegrams which are now authorised. I spoke to Peter Loxley. He said that SHAEF had put up a paper urging that the ban should be retained until D plus 30 and the Foreign Secretary had put one up advising that it should be removed on D plus 1. Subsequently

Eisenhower and Bedell-Smith had seen the Foreign Secretary and the compromise arrangement had been made. I pointed out to Loxley that from the point of view of the cover plan it was wholly unsatisfactory. He said that he, Cadogan and Eden were all away but that he would speak to Eden in the morning. Meanwhile we have been thinking up some form of deception if we are faced with the removal of the ban on D plus 1. We shall have to try and put it over to the Germans that this is a deliberate hoax. Tommy Harris has worked out quite an ingenious scheme. I still feel however that once the removal of the ban is announced in Madrid the Germans will take appropriate action before the deception has had time to work.

I talked to C. about the removal of the ban. He said it would put all his deception scheme for a supposed attack on Bordeaux in the cart.

May 30th

TAR saw Williams at 21st Army Group yesterday and gave him my views about the removal of the

diplomatic ban. I gather that Williams is putting up quite a strong note about it.

At the D.G.'s meeting today we discussed Crossbow arrangements. The staff is to be divided into 4, 30 people to go to the Chancery Lane dug-out, others to Blenheim, others to different offices with which they are associated, and the remainder on leave.

At 11.30 we had a meeting on Overlord Security at Norfolk House, when the removal of the restrictions in the light of the abolition of the ban on D plus 1 were considered. Kenneth Strong made quite a good speech in which he said that he thought he would be able to give the meeting an appreciation of the situation by D plus 12 and that he would like all the present restrictions to remain on until that date. With one or two exceptions this was the general feeling of the meeting. I spoke to Strong afterwards about the removal of the diplomatic ban on D plus 1. He agreed that it was extremely undesirable and said that Gen. Eisenhower had put in a strong note of protest which he hoped would be effective. If not we should have to use the best deception methods at our disposal.

There was apparently a raid on one of our H. "Q.s" at Portsmouth last night with a certain number of casualties. This may be due to information which has been put forward by our agents, after approval by all the authorities concerned.

May 31st

At the weekly meeting today I asked what steps had been taken to vet the 4,000 Frenchmen who had come here with the French Armoured Division some time ago. Brooke-Booth seemed rather ill-informed and could only say that Beaumont had the matter in hand. I asked him if he could find out the position and let me know.

Seymer drew attention to the case of a Russian who had arrived here as an escaper from Italy. The Russians refused to accept responsibility for him until they had checked up on him in Moscow. This meant that a potential spy was at large. My own view was that such characters should be examined at the LRC and then locked up until they could be properly identified. I asked Seymer to get up the papers in order that the matter could be taken up with the appropriate authorities. The probability is that we shall have quite a number of Russians as soon as the Second Front opens.

The D.G. gave a lunch today for Cummings, the N.Z. Commissioner. He is certainly extremely talkative but not a bad fellow. He is quite green as far as espionage is concerned. Canning was also present at the lunch and seemed pleased to have been invited.

Stopford talked to me about the diamonds.

which disclose
a further attempt to smuggle diamonds from
Catalogue Reference KV 4184 a mention of wolfram.
Clearly all this is being done on behalf of

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the Germans, and a charge under the Treachery Act would lie if PEPPER's complicity in the traffic could be proved. The difficulty is that Matthias, head of the diamond control, is muscling in on all the enquiries by S.B. It would not surprise me in the least if he were in the racket. I am advising Canning to keep him out of the enquiries as far as possible. The added difficulty is to

S.B.
without disclosing the sources.

Bill Stephenson came in to see me for a moment. He seemed very friendly. We are arranging a meeting.

Crossbow reports indicate that a further 14 new sites have been found and suspicious activity has been noted on 8 other points. The sites are almost equally divided between the Pas de Calais and the Cherbourg Peninsula, those in the Pas de Calais being aligned on London while those elsewhere are aligned on various places between Worthing and Plymouth. None of the modified sites have ~~been~~ so far reached an advanced stage of construction. It is not yet possible to make a reliable forecast about the way in which they are to be operated. Work is proceeding on 33 ski-sites which are potentially operational. No activity can be seen on 36, while 27 have been damaged too recently to enable any statement to be made. Work on the large sites has reached a fairly advanced stage. German propaganda indicates that they still expect to use secret weapons on a large scale but not until after the invasion.

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Desmond Morton rang me up about one van Heuven GOEDHART, a young Dutchman. He had been approached by de WIT, the ADC to the Dutch P.M., Gerbrandi, who asked whether arrangements could be made for GOEDHART, who had been got out of Holland through S.I.S. channels, to come herē with the least possible delay as he wished to give information about the Dutch internal situation. He was an emissary of the Fatherlands Commission in Holland, and was at the moment in Gib. The suggestion was that he should be allowed to pass into the UK and to go straight to the house of the Dutch PM to give his information, and then be taken in for interrogation by the Security Service. I told Morton that we had no adverse traces of GOEDHART, whose name had been mentioned by various incoming characters, and that I would consider the proposal and let him know.

Archie Boyle has informed Findlater Stewart about the action taken in the ROSENTHAL case.

June 1st

I talked to Roger today about the scramble that might occur for his body after the war. The H.O. seemed to think that his division should be under them, whereas SIS thought that both C.E. and subversive organisations should come under C. Meanwhile we had somewhat different views. I thought it would be well for him to get his arguments thoroughly defined and told him that we were proposing to discuss next week the future of the dept.

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A propos of this, I saw Drew today on the possibility of Findlater Stewart being charged with the task of looking into the post-war problems of ourselves and SIS. Drew said that he was quite certain that Findlater would enjoy the task. At the same time we could not expect him to stick his neck out. There had some time back been the question of his acting as co-ordinator of the activities of SIS, SOE and ourselves. He had received a very polite raspberry from Eden and Selborne. They were very grateful for the offer and should occasion ever arise would make a call upon his services.

On the 27th May Hitler when speaking to the Jap Ambassador said that he himself thought that after having carried out diversionary operations in Norway, Denmark, the southern part of the west coast of France, and the French Mediterranean coast, the allies would establish a bridgehead in Normandy and Brittany and after seeing how things went would then embark on the establishment of a real second front in the channel. If this is the firm view of the German General Staff it is not altogether discouraging since they evidently expect that our first effort will be a diversional one. They do however seem to think that the main attack will be dependent to some extent on the success or failure of the establishment of the bridgehead in Normandy or Brittany. This might therefore lead them to make an all out attack on the bridgehead at once. If however they think that the main attack is coming across the

narrows, they should at least maintain considerable reserves, and the firmer the establishment of the bridgehead the more inclined they should be to withhold these reserves. Garbo's whole plan is not to speculate on the actual target but to build up the idea that the first attack will be a diversionary one and that reserves are being kept for the main drive. Meanwhile we have destroyed 2 or 3 days ago the principle bridges over the Seine. This should leave the Germans in doubt whether we intend to attack north or south of the river. They may of course think that this is a somewhat early manoeuvre, and merely a blind. Meanwhile the 21st Army Group are getting rather nervous about the number of divisions moved into the area south of the river and are suggesting that we should put over some hot deception to get them out of the area. My own view and TARS is that we should continue as we are. It is extremely doubtful whether anything we could do, unless we were prepared to blow all our agents, would have any material effect at this juncture. Garbo's build-up more likely to be effective after D day.

Hitler claims that the output of fighters, which may include every type, fast bombers and dive bombers, should be 6,000 a month by Sept. and 8,000 a month by Jan. 1945. This is probably a very exaggerated estimate in order to impress the Japs.

The decision of the Chiefs of Staff is that de Gaulle is not to come before D day.

Dick and I saw Douglas Roberts who is returning to Mid East tomorrow and suggested to him that Joe and Martin should be allowed to come back for a spell of leave as soon as possible. Martin is working himself to death and has not been fit for a long time. He seems to be opposed to Martin being made a Lt. Col. He says there are already too many in SIME. He thinks on the other hand that Joe should certainly be promoted to Major. We all agreed that if Joe and Martin could be persuaded to remain in Mid East at any rate till the end of this year it would be a good thing for SIME. Their services are very much valued.

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I spoke to Canning today about Mathias of the Diamond Control. I said that I had no evidence of any kind but just a slightly uncomfortable feeling that in view of his background and his many friends in the diamond business he might not be entirely averse to dropping a hint if he thought that one of his pals was in danger. I thought therefore that it might be as well to keep him out of the present enquiries in so far as this was possible. Canning took the point very readily and said he would have a word with Johnson, the Inspector in charge of the case. I made it very clear that I did not wish to be quoted in any way since

this was merely a hunch based on the flimsiest evidence.

Gen. Keiper, the German general who was captured in Crete by the Commandos, has arrived here and has given an extraordinary account of what took place. The Commandos apparently dressed themselves up as German sentries, stopped the general's car when he was proceeding from the mess to his billet, and asked for his pass.

He became indignant and rather stupidly stepped out on to the road. He was immediately stunned, gagged and thrown into the back of the car. His driver was similarly dealt with. The car then proceeded to the coast and a message was left in it to the effect that the General had left for N. Africa by submarine. In actual fact he was taken into the mountains and kept there for about 10 days until he could be got away in an MTB. He certainly had a very unpleasant experience. He says amongst other things that he groaned like a dog on account of acute constipation and suffered a complete stoppage for a week. The only food he had was an occasional chunk of bread and cheese and drink of water which was got from the natives. However he was well treated as soon as they got him on to the MTB and has been given all the honours of his rank since that time.

Michael Ryde tells me that he is not going back to N. Africa. This decision has been reached after a conference between Ede, Sir John Stephenson and C. This is the first I have heard of the decision or indeed of any of the negotiations.

I have not even had a sight of Ryde's report. This I am afraid is rather typical of this office. Ryde himself thinks that he ought to go back for about a month to tidy things up and to explain the position to the various officers concerned. With this I am inclined to agree. I propose to talk to Ede in this sense and find out precisely what the arguments were.

June 2nd

I went down to Oxford and gave a lecture to the B. Registry. I gave them a general survey of the development of German espionage here and the measures that we have taken to counter the enemy's activities. I covered the whole ground as they were fully acquainted with secret sources, having already had lectures from Dick, Herbert, Victor, Buster and Bird.

June 3rd

TAR spoke to me about Peter Hope. I told TAR that Hope had had a talk with me two nights previously. He had complained that he was rather taken away from the Newcastle Region under false pretences. He said that he liked the work there and he had never been very willing to come. He had however done so on the understanding that he was not to suffer in promotion though he might possibly drop a little in pay. He did not in fact wish to do either. He then went on to express diffidence about his capabilities for doing the deception work under Harmer. I told

him that there was nothing derogatory in dropping rank in this war, that many people had done so, that we certainly should not have chosen him for the job if we had not thought that he was the best choice. It was because he had done well in Newcastle that we wanted him to go on the Second Front. I said that I thought he had been very lucky at his age to get promotion to the rank of major, that people could not pick and choose on war time, and that I was quite satisfied that he was as well qualified to do the job as anybody, seeing that he had a good knowledge of wireless and French, and a general knowledge of the whole work of the office. He still seemed reluctant and diffident and in spite of his protests to the contrary I made up my mind that he did not fancy a Second Front job. In fact generally speaking both TAR and I took a very poor view of his behaviour. TAR has accordingly and rightly decided to give him the sack. He feels that if he is sent out to British Honduras to replace Luke it will do him a world of good.

TAR tells me that since 12th May RSS have been picking up the signals of an agent communicating in Group 2 cypher. They have at last succeeded in getting a bearing which places the agent somewhere in Ayrshire. The vans are moving up to the Newcastle area. Two hours later, TAR told me that a further bearing indicated that the agent was in Austria. So much for RSS's powers of D.F.ing. My mind

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goes back to a meeting held 18 months ago under the chairmanship of Harry Allen when G.P. had the effrontery that he could D.F. a set in France down to an area of 5 sq. miles.

A Frenchman named BOUDERIE turned up on an aerodrome yesterday evening, saying that he was going to Algiers to bring back Gen. de Gaulle. He said that he had permission to leave from the F.O. and an Air Force officer told the SCU that he had the backing of the P.M. The case was communicated to Burne who got an answer from 10 Downing St. to the effect that the P.M. knew nothing about him and that on no account was he to leave. Action was taken accordingly.

Stopford tells me that

PEPPER are giving a number of useful clues. There is no doubt that the man is deeply implicated in the diamond smuggling business. He also tells me that he has ascertained that at the instigation of CERVELL, aeroplane parts and technical journals are being sent out of the country on the Liberators returning to Stockholm to bring over more Norwegians. Later I ascertained that two of these planes were leaving at midnight tonight for Stockholm. The question arises as to whether the service should be suspended or whether the aeroplanes and crews should be searched in conjunction with American C.I. personnel, or whether Col. Balchan the American officer in charge who has been condoning this traffic should be hauled up by his own authorities. In the absence of Petch I spoke with one of his opinions who will find out from ETOUSA what they can do about it, and

let me know.

An informant of Dickson's in the Agence Francaise Independante has stated that a cable in code was received at the agency yesterday evening from one JEANNERAT, who has gone as a war correspondent with the Second Front. The cable said that at that moment JEANNERAT was on board ship expecting to leave at any moment. He gave exact details of the equipment which the soldiers carried and it is believed that he mentioned the regiments concerned. He deduced that they were bound for France because everyone on board was particularly nice to him as soon as they learned that he was French. There was some speculation at the A.F.I. office as to how this cable got through the Censorship. It would not of course be surprising if a message had come through since except for a snap censorship there is no other obstruction. It was decided to inform Norfolk House, also Admiral Thompson, in order that the latter might keep a sharp lookout on all the Agence cables. Lastly it was decided to get at Shaef in order to find out exactly where JEANNERAT was quartered.

Jardon, a Norfolk House officer telephoned later to say that he had spoken to McLeod of SHAEF who had undertaken to move the appropriate American authorities to get into touch with Balchan and obtain a guarantee from him that no documents or other goods will be shipped on the aircraft leaving Leuchars tonight.

The D.G. called a meeting at which Dick, Ede, Clayton, Hyde and I were present, to discuss whether there was anything to be gained from Ryde going back again to S. Africa in order to tidy things up. "C" had apparently said that he saw no useful purpose in his going and so had Sir John Stephenson. I was not convinced however that they were expressing their opinion with a full knowledge of the facts. Neither of them has seen Hyde. Hyde himself thinks that in so far as our liaison with Baston and Lenton is concerned the matter might be arranged by letter. As regards SIS relations with the Union he thought this was a very complex matter and that his assistance would be valuable. I raised the question as to whether information relating to Ossewa Brandweg was of any interest to HMG and whether we had any responsibility for obtaining such information. If so a liaison with Lenton would give us something of a line. This of course would have to have the concurrence of Smuts but should not be known to Baston. Lenton has miking facilities and telephone facilities which are not available to the police and he runs the Censorship. He has records dating back for some years which are of considerable value and could be drawn upon. He is not allowed by Smuts to make any enquiries but occasionally does so. It was decided that Ede should have another talk with Sir John Stephenson and that Michael Ryde and Courtenay Young should discuss the whole case with Vivian and Oliver, putting to them the difficulties that their new representative in Lourenzo Marques might encounter in his

relations with the Union and asking them if they were quite sure that they did not want Ryde's assistance. Stephenson would be asked whether he expected us to provide him with information about O.B. and whether he thought it would be useful for us to be in touch with Lenton. If he is in favour of this, we would approach Gen. Smuts.

○ We discussed this matter amongst ourselves afterwards, Courtenay Young being present. He said that there were considerable manifestations of the O.B. in Southern Rhodesia. He thought therefore that it was a matter of some importance that we should know which way the wind was blowing in S. Africa. If the Union went out of the Commonwealth at a later date we might find that the S. Africans were trying to penetrate Rhodesia, rather in the way that the foreign organisation of the Nazi Party penetrated German S.W. There would then be a distinct security problem in colonial territory. This was perhaps looking rather far ahead but it was certainly a problem that might arise. Dick did not feel that we could very well run a secret service in S. Africa. He thought that we should rely upon our relations with Easton and hope that under a new regime they might improve. I pointed out that if SIS operating from Lourenzo Marques had to conduct their negotiations with the Union, British liaison with the S. African authorities would pass into the hands of SIS and out of our hands. This might not be altogether desirable.

Lennox tells me that the latest weather reports are not particularly favourable. The final decision about the assault will be left until 5 a.m. on D.day. The bulldozers are to go in first, followed by some light craft which will occupy the beaches. The main attack will not go in until after midday, at low tide.

De Gaulle is arriving tomorrow morning.

I have seen the Press directives which are to come into force after the opening of the Second Front. There is one para which invites a certain amount of speculation about attacks elsewhere. I gather the P.M. is to throw out some veiled hint of this in his speech. This strikes me as being an extremely unwise move. I am convinced that it would be much better to leave the Germans guessing about attacks elsewhere. If they are hinted at by the P.M. and Press the natural inference will be that there are going to be no such attacks. I have mentioned this to TAR and suggested to him that he should make the point with Wild at SHAEF.

There is still no final decision about the diplomatic ban. The latest information is that the P.M. has told Ike that he favours the Foreign Secretary's view unless Ike feels very strongly that the ban should be maintained. Meanwhile there has been a directive about the ban from the Cabinet which is so incomprehensible that Findlater Stewart has had to send it back and ask precisely what it means.

I lunched with Curry today. He is really rather

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at his wits end about the inefficiency of SIS. He thinks that he ought to put up a statement to C. about the position and the impossibility of working effectively, otherwise he may later on be criticised for not having done so. He told me about an extremely significant incident which occurred the other day. A report was received from the SIS representative in Madrid alleged to have been obtained from the headquarters of the Falange. As there were some 70 names mentioned Curry felt certain that he would not get them looked up by for some weeks and that even then there would probably be no significant traces. He therefore took a copy of the document which he sent to Miss Bagot. Miss Bagot sent him an extremely useful criticism which showed that 30 of the people mentioned had been dead since 1941 and the general indications were that the document was both out of date and unreliable. Meanwhile the original had been circulated to Section I and other sections in the office who had sent out a report to the F.O. and other depts. based on the document indicating recent developments in the Spanish Communist movement, to which the document related. This shows conclusively how dangerous a bad registry can be and how ill-equipped SIS are to give any adequate appreciation of the documents they receive, at any rate of those which relate to communist activity.

June 5th

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A good deal seems to have happened since I left

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the office at 7 p.m. on Saturday. The decision was reached to postpone Neptune I owing to the weather conditions, mainly I gather on account of cloud, although there must have been a considerable amount of wind in the channel. The latest decision reached at 4.30 a.m. today was that the operation is to take place tomorrow morning. I gather that the weather shows signs of improvement.

There has been an appalling slip-up by the offices of the Associated Press of America. A message was issued for cabling to America, saying "Eisenhower's troops have landed in France today". The message was given to the operator, who was told to practice getting it over quickly. The Russian communique came through for despatch to Washington, and the girl apparently typed it on the same sheet on which she had been practicing the above message, and within a matter of minutes it was broadcast all over America. Almost worse than this, it was discovered ~~that~~ as a result of the JEANNERAT case that this correspondent had quite correctly handed his message to the American officer who had forwarded it to SHA. SHAEF, acting on an extremely badly worded and ambiguous directive written by Lt. Col. G. Warden, Chief of the Press Censorship Branch, stamped the telegram "Not for publication until release of first SHAEF communique". According to the directive the original was to be stamped and returned to the P.R. Branch for forwarding to the "parent service" for holding, Censorship retaining a copy. The words "Parent service"

were apparently taken to mean the paper's headquarters or the news agency concerned. JEANN-RAT's message was passed to the Agence Francaise Independante who passed it back to M.O.I. The latter, seeing the SHAEF stamp, sent it back again to the Agence for holding until the appropriate moment. On discovering this Sheen and Cussen made further enquiries as to what special messages of a similar kind had been received by SHAEF. They found quite a number, one from Reuters, Newark Evening News, another from the Sydney Morning Herald, another from the Washington Evening Star, another from the Daily Express, another from the Canadian press, one from the Baltimore News Post, one from the Toronto Globe Mail and one from the International News Service. All these messages left no doubt that the operation was imminent. The Sydney Morning Herald, the Toronto Globe Mail and apparently the International News Service have all communicated their information to the headquarters of their papers and the cables were presumably passed by M.O.I.

Lastly Ostro in a long message which is almost entirely inaccurate has hit on the target area. TAR has 3 times, backed by the Twenty Committee, put up suggestions for getting Ostro blown. Each time the scheme has been turned down by C. as he thought it would jeopardise the source. The information about the target area is supposed to have come from a colonel on Monty's staff. This is clearly untrue but it is bound to cause considerable anxiety at 21st Army Group.

Lennox has been running round in a state of pathological excitement and self-importance. The general feeling is that if the Second Front does not open soon he will blow up.

I have just heard the result of the case of DUFOURS.—DUFOURS was a Frenchman—

On arrival here he was passed through the LRC and enlisted in the French Forces. The French then imprisoned and ill-treated him. He eventually escaped from Camberley and brought an action against de Gaulle and company for ill-treatment and wrongful imprisonment. The case was due to come up shortly. The French have always taken the view that they have a perfect right to treat their own nationals as they wish, and that if there are legal differences it is up to the British to get over them. They were told that in this country British law had to be respected and that the Courts were supreme. It now appears that the P.M. hearing of this case and realising how undesirable at this moment it would be for de Gaulle to appear as a defendant in an action of this kind, told Stafford Cripps and the A.G. to look into the whole question and see whether there was any way out. It was eventually decided that negotiations should be opened with the plaintiff's solicitors for a settlement. The British Govt. proposed £1,000. The plaintiff asked for £10,000 and settled for £5,000. Application to discontinue the action was made to Mr. Justice Pilcher by Pat Devlin. Pilcher was informed that the plaintiff was withdrawing the case and that the plaintiff was satisfied with the

representative of the FO. was present to explain details if necessary but only vouch-
ified the information that it would not be
ue to say that the British Gov. had paid
e sum of money but rather that they had made
e necessary arrangements for the sum to be
id. In fact the sum is being paid by the
cret Service vote. It was pointed out that
it was amatter of considerable urgency
that the settlement should be reached
sterday afternoon, presumably on account of
e opening of the Second Front tomorrow. I am b
und to say that this arrangement, though
parently satisfactory to all parties, is rather
stasteful since it seems to violate the
inciples of British justice, which should be
tirely free from govt.influence or politics.
the other hand the plea of expediency at a
ment like this is very great. Whatever the
sult of the action had been, it would have been
e British Govt.who would have paid, since de
ulle is beholden to us for every penny he gets.
me fell early this morning. Everything on the
Italian front seems to be going well.

June 6th

e Second Front opened at 5 this morning, with
rcraft roaring overhead.

nger Lewis observed the landing from a cruiser
d reported fairly early that the landing
d been effected and that things were going
ll. It was apparently decided that the main

forces should go in at 7 and not wait for the low tide at midday. Reports received at 10.30 state that 5 brigades had landed and that all first objectives and strongpoints had been taken. Of the 300 aircraft carrying airborne troops only 9 were lost in the assault, and casualties generally have not been heavy.

D.D. Amphibious tanks could not be used owing to rough weather and J. force of the Navy from Portsmouth for some reason or other did not arrive quite on time. There are 6 battleships in the channel dealing with targets on the coast in addition to a great deal of other naval craft. One story is that a number of submarines came up off the Calais coast, put up a heavy smoke-screen and started broadcasting through loudspeakers a series of battle-noises from records, which immediately drew the big guns on the coast to fire into the smoke-screen.

Only one gun position was in action after 8 o'clock. The Germans reported parachute landings at Havre. This was a blind, and the "troops" were made of saw-dust, and exploded when touched. All the bridges had been captured intact at the mouth of the river north of Caen.

TAR went up to Hendon early this morning to get a message over at 3 a.m. from Garbo to the effect that one of his agents who had escaped from a marshalling area had reported that the Canadians had embarked. The Germans were evidently asleep and he could not get any reply until 8 a.m. Garbo has complained bitterly that by their negligence they are endangering the

By 12.45, 12 brigades had landed. The Americans on the right bank had practically no opposition. Out of 6 battleships, 18 cruisers, 78 destroyers and other naval craft, in the channel, only one mine sweeper, one corvette and one LTB have so far been hit. 7,000 tons of bombs were dropped in the area prior to the assault. The total craft which have been engaged in the whole operation is over 22,000.

At 4.30 p.m. the latest news about the battle was that we have now lost 3 destroyers, one British, one U.S. and one Norwegian. These losses are however very slight in view of the immense number of ships that there are in the channel.

Ginger Lewis says that the operation was a complete surprise to the German Navy, who did not get going till quite late in the day. Hardly any bombers have so far put in an appearance. It is believed that there is a small number in the area, which may attack the bridgehead but that the main base is in Germany. Presumably the Germans are waiting until they have ascertained precisely what their target should be. I am told that there is a deception plan to indicate a large convoy moving north. The deception is either on wireless or RDF basis but I do not know at the moment how it works.

Lennox tells me there is some Swedish special material indicating that the Swedish Legation here considered that Monty is in Corsica. This may indicate some sort of a leak on the bogus Monty story.

At 3 p.m. there were 70,000 troops ashore, 600

tanks, a considerable quantity of light and heavy artillery. Penetration was to a distance of approximately $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Later in the day however it was reported that we were fighting in Caen. The Fleet bombardment which lasted for an hour and 10 mins. prior to the assault, involved the firing of 6,000 tons of metal and explosives.

June 7th

Hitler when talking to the Japs on 27th May said that his rocket guns were installed on specially strong concrete emplacements so that there was no cause for anxiety about the British bombardment of the sites. It was apparently his intention to demolish the whole of the south of England. He did not intend to wait too long for the invasion. If it did not come soon he would start his rocket offensive and withdraw troops for offensive action on the Russian front. There seems little doubt that Hitler is trying to put a good face on things for the benefit of the Japs. According to him, the Russians have approximately 700 divisions in the first line and 200 in the second though some of these are not up to strength. The quality of the infantry is said to be inferior but the artillery and tanks are excellent. The quality of the Russian guns is better owing to the large quantities of tungsten, molybdenum and other metals, used. The T.34 tank is thought to be better than the Germans as it was more suitable to the topography and climate of the battle area on the eastern front.

The German Tiger is too heavy and cannot be used in the mud season. The German assault guns are likewise lacking in mobility. The new German tank, the Panther, is still in its seething troubles. The Germans hope to produce their output of antitank guns and tanks. The monthly output by Jan. 1945 is estimated at 1800 and 1500 respectively.

The Tricycle-Freak transmitter is still off the air. The control stations call from time to time and there are indications that it is tuned in ready to receive Freak at most if not all the scheduled times. On 29th May the control station indicated that it had a message to transmit. No arrangements have been made by the Germans with Freak for them to transmit blind in case for example his own transmitter broke down and it is therefore very doubtful whether they will send this message so long as we are off the air this end.

There is still no clear indication as to what has happened to Artist, though some messages have passed that suggest that the Abwehr is investigating his dealings in money. The deposit note for Plan Dream was handed over last week and instead of the cheque for £355 being cashed, ARMAS paid over £5 notes. We have received a total of £3,027 during this last transaction.

Tate's transmitter has now been moved to Wye and contact has been made.

Hamlet's further report has arrived but contains
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little of interest.

We have received 1500 dollars which is only the first instalment.

I attended a meeting at the F.O. on diplomatic communications. I mentioned the case of BOUDERIE and said that as a certain amount of mud had been flung at M.I.5 I should be glad to have the committee's backing for the action taken. This was readily given. I explained that both our action and the action of the H.O. was in fact ultra vires since the members of allied forces, once enrolled, ceased to be subject to the Aliens Order. They could leave the country provided they could obtain the necessary transport. They could not enter, unless they came within the provisions of the Amendment to the Aliens Order by which we were entitled to examine military personnel coming from abroad. I also mentioned the case of the Mexican military mission. It was agreed that this should be a matter for the Chiefs of Staff. Findlater Stewart said that as he understood it the present decision with regard to the ban was that it would go off on D plus 7 and that diplomatic missions here would be notified to this effect on D plus 6. It would be open to Gen. Eisenhower between now and D plus 6 if so desired to make out a case for the continuance of the ban. The P.M. has however written him a very strong letter urging that only in the case of extreme necessity should the ban be continued.

The P.M. in his speech to the House said that

the recent landing in France was only the first of a series of landings which would take place on the continent of Europe. I cannot help feeling that this is a mistake. The Germans should deduce that this is the one and only landing.

The latest news (personal to Col. Lennox from Gen. Montgomery) is as follows:

On the right flank the 82nd US Airborne Division has had as its objective St. Marie Eglise, and the 101st US Airborne Division went to Carentan. They report all objectives taken. St. Martin and Carentan have been taken. The 44th US Division went west of the flooded area round St. Marie Eglise and reported that they had taken their objective having met no opposition. The 50th British Division landed east of Aramanche and all got through by yesterday evening. They have the 8th armoured brigade under their command. The 3rd Canadian Division have also landed. We have taken Aramanche and Creully but we are not yet in Bayeux. The 3rd British Division got about half-way to Caen. No official news of the fighting in Caen. The 6th Airborne Division who are holding the bridges over the Orne sent an S.O.S. The position was restored by 2 o'clock yesterday. The principle German forces are the 21st Panzer Division in the area of Caen and the 12th s.s. Panzers between Paris and Caen. Both are moving on Caen.

We flew 7,500 sorties in 24 hours. The A.E.A.F. flew 3,500 sorties, losing 33 and claiming 19 enemy aircraft destroyed.

The Germans flew 168 defensive sorties in the 24 hours. Last night 1,146 bombers went over the area and lost 13. Out of the 259 British gliders 7 were lost, 5 were lost out of 50 supply gliders. 208 U.S. gliders lost 5, and a further 126 went out with supplies at dawn. Last night a light tank airborne squadron went over and airborne brigade was landed. Naval news is that the weather was not too good but is improving.

I have just seen Niall MacDermot. He said that the decision to attack was based on a guarantee from the met. experts that we should have 30 hours of tolerable weather as from 9 O'clock on Monday evening. Their calculations worked out correctly. Between 9pm and 12 midnight the sky was absolutely clear, and so far the weather has held tolerably well.

Nobody seems very clear as to where the Americans are. This is due to the fact that they refused to have phantom units reporting back to Army Group. They said that such units would upset the normal channels of communications. It was pointed out to them that they would probably find themselves in difficulties which has indeed proved to be the case. They have asked for air support but as nobody is quite clear where they are such support is difficult to give. Eisenhower has now given orders that phantom units are to go in. These are to be British units and will go in tonight.

For the 24 hours preceding the attack the German Catalogue Reference:KV/4/194

did not send over a single recce plane to this country. The view is that they had made up their minds that owing to the weather conditions no attack would take place. The photographic units have done a marvellous job. In fact practically all the information about the enemy's dispositions has been based on the photographs they have taken. S.A.S. troops have been given a large number of targets in the Pas de Calais area. Their instructions are to blow up certain specific targets and to harrass any units attempting to come down in the area. When they have completed their tasks they are to try to get away to the maquis. They will be going at varying periods up to D.plus 4. S.A.S. troops have already done one good job near Chartres where they have blown up a viaduct. This has been established from aerial photographs and is known not to have been carried out by bombers.

MacDermot tells me that Felix is rather taking up the attitude that his SCI units are really M.I.6 units on loan to the army. McDermot is going to make it pretty clear that they are part of the I.B.staff. He also takes the view that we are not in the WarRoom as liaison officers but as joint partners with M.I.6 in preparing the necessary appreciations. If there is any difficulty on this score he is anxious to be informed.

Dick attended a meeting of Gen. West's committee yesterday at which Kenneth Strong, V.V and C. were present. The meeting decided to have Maunsell as head of all security in SIAEF and

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to appoint Haylor as GSO 1 to West. Haylor would be responsible for a good deal of the planning for the organisations working in Germany. Maunsell would have an over-all responsibility for all occupied territory and Germany. Viv. suggested that Haylor's appointment should be filled by Connor-Neal or someone of his type, who had an intimate knowledge of continental affairs and of Germany in particular. Dick pointed out that the job which Haylor was to do did not require this kind of knowledge. It was actually a planning job and one involving organisation, controls etc. Everyone else agreed that it was essentially an MI5 job and that experts on country and so on could form part of the staff. S.I.S. were asked to appoint a GSO2 to carry out this work. Melland is to continue in his present post and join the party after the Armistice.

After yesterday's meeting of the Findlater Stewart committee, I spoke to Findlater about the possibility of his arbitrating in the matter of our relations with SIS after the war. He said he would be very keen to do the job and would be glad to have a discussion with me about it. I mentioned to him my plan for a loosely-knit intelligence organisation comprising the Services, ourselves, SIS and certain posts in the F.O. He seemed to think the idea was a good one particularly since he had noticed the same defects in the Service, Intelligence Depts. as we had. He agreed that there seemed to be very little continuity in their work.

In our May report for the P.M. the case of Knut

BRODERSEN was mentioned. This man has confessed that he had a mission on behalf of the German S.S. to supply them with information regarding invasion details here. This information was to be sent in S/W to cover addresses in Spain and BRODERSEN was to get further instructions by means of broadcasts in code sent over the German-controlled Norwegian radio. Particulars of this code have been given by BRODERSEN and attempts are now being made to decypher messages broadcast over this service which appear to be intended for him. His secret ink was concealed in one of the straps of his plus fours and in a pocket knife. More material for secret writing had been hidden underneath his big toe nail and in his tooth. The former came out when he had a bath and the tooth broke off while he was eating.

Another arrival was the Pole Wladislaw WILLMANN. He came from Gib. and had been imprisoned by various powers no less than 6 times. On his arrival here he produced a negative from which he developed secret writing and micro-photographs. The latter contained diagrams of a powerful wireless transmitter which he was to build when he reached this country or Canada. He also gave details of codes, call signs, cover addresses etc. His mission was to transmit technical details of new aircraft which he was to obtain by getting work in an aircraft factory.

The Belgian spy van HOVE was sentenced to death at the Old Bailey on the 24th May.

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June 8th

I attended Findlater Stewart's meeting this morning to discuss the relaxation of travel restrictions between now and D plus 12. It was agreed that operational needs should be met and travel by civilians should be authorised provided a responsible officer in the Ministry concerned backed the application in the national interest. The directive would however state that the restriction should remain as heretofore in cases of those who wished to travel to Europe.

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It has been decided that Michael Ryde shall not go back to S. Africa, which in some ways is a pity. He will have to tidy up his affairs by correspondence.

Brooke Booth came in to discuss the vetting of Cameroonian paratroopers. It seems

as if it would be extremely difficult for us to do any useful vetting, particularly if we cannot get fuller details about their past history. I am inclined to think that we shall have to accept embodied troops. There are however dangers, since a considerable number of them have come out of France since the total occupation, while others will be refugees who during the last 2 months have been sent to N. Africa instead of this country and may have been given missions by the German S.S. We are going to discuss this at a meeting tomorrow. Meanwhile a party of over 200 mixed Arabs and Europeans has arrived with certain embodied troops from N. Africa. No authority was given and none of them appears to know what he is supposed to be doing here.

The battle seems to be going pretty well although the casualties in Caen are said to have been heavy. We appear now to have made another landing east of the Caen estuary. Airborne troops took Carantan this morning. Our line runs along the main road to Bayeux, thence nearly to Caen which is still in enemy hands. The Panzer Division is in occupation and another panzer division is coming up from Paris. There are two static divisions in Cherbourg Peninsula and another panzer division is believed to have moved up from Rennes. The Luftwaffe fighter force is beginning to put in an appearance.

June 9th

Cecil left for Ireland this morning to discuss with Dan a matter raised by an anonymous letter

to the effect that German P/Ws have a wireless set and are communicating. RSS have no trace of this but it is not altogether impossible seeing that 3 German P/Ws are attending Dublin University.

I met Winterbottom on my way to the office. He was rather pessimistic about the weather this morning which is preventing our heavy bombers from operating with any degree of accuracy. We have been forced to use medium bombers which have suffered rather heavy casualties owing to the lack of altitude in which they are forced to attack.

We had a meeting of Harry's security committee today at which Cussen and Tangye disclosed that SHAEF had passed a report sent up by the Evening Standard war correspondent on the subject of Mulberries. The report was to the effect that everybody had been wondering how we could hope to establish a bridgehead without capturing a port but that this difficulty had been overcome by the special landing -stages which had been towed across the channel. It is amazing that a report of this kind should have been officially passed by SHAEF censorship. The whole incident draws attention to the fact that there are two bodies carrying out censorship in this country, one the M.O.I. and two S.A.F. This is clearly undesirable, and steps are being taken to bring it to notice as soon as possible. This latest disclosure should lead to a more satisfactory arrangement.

Personally I think that censorship should remain with the M.O.I. who have all the necessary experience and knowledge of D. notices, etc. and

that SHAEF should have their officers attached. Certainly nothing should go out unless passed by M.O.I. The only contribution that SHAEF do make is on the purely operational side.

After this meeting we discussed the arrivals of French personnel ~~xxxxxx~~ in this country. It was agreed that Burn should get accurate information from Creen as to precisely what was going on in N.Africa. We decided that in so far as embodied personnel were concerned we should probably have to rely upon the French examinations. As regards Air Force personnel who constitute a special danger, it was decided to continue the present procedure by which all those who had come out since the total occupation of France should be submitted to an LRC examination. We would not however in future look up the names of the remainder. Other allied personnel should be submitted to LRC interrogation.

Garbo is continuing with his set-up about attack on another front. The Germans reply to his indignant message was extremely apologetic although they did not say precisely why they were not listening at 3 a.m. They are evidently very worried at his being so upstage. In passing on his message (they ultimately received it at 8.30) they told Berlin that it had only reached them at 9.30 owing to severe pressure on the lines.

I gather from Lennox that there is a possibility of another landing, after the present beach-head gets sealed off. Thiggs are going quite

well although fighting in the Caen area is very severe. The Bridgehead has been slightly enlarged. The Germans are continuing to attack with tanks but have not made any real impression. 1202 naval vessels took part in the initial operation. Naval casualties have been almost negligible.

Things in Italy are going extremely well and Alexander has been told to take risks if he wants to. The line on the Adriatic is beginning to move back and the Germans are obviously afraid of being encircled.

A survey of German P/W opinion between Jan. and April 1944 shows that the morale of all ranks is high and remarkably little affected by political misgivings. There is evidence of a strong desire to rally to the support of the regime and an increasing unwillingness to contemplate the possibility of defeat. German opinion has returned to the position which it occupied in the early spring of 1943. A possibility of victory is generally thought to depend on the result of the invasion in Western Europe, and this is tied up in the belief in the efficacy of German counter-measures. In regard to the regime, P/Ws showed a high proportion of men completely loyal to the National Socialist system. In the period under review 59% are described as completely loyal. Among 112 there were only 3 real anti-Nazis. P/Ws adopted a somewhat cooler attitude towards Hitler which generally however falls short of destructive criticism. Belief in the soundness of the home front is as firm as ever, and

German propaganda has apparently succeeded in controlling the concern felt in regard to air raids.

According to a report by Milmo dated 2.6.44 the flow of agents to this country in the past two years show a slight decline. It shows no evidence that the enemy are sending any increased number of agents here with assignments connected with the invasion and there is a mention of invasion only in connection with 3 of them.

I understand that the German panzer divisions operating in the bridgehead are far from up to strength. Against a British division they have only about half of the normal complement. The Germans still seem to think that the Calais-Dunkirk area is likely to be the object of our major attack, and are in consequence leaving their major reserves out of the line.

Garbo's traffic should be helpful in this respect. The Jap in Vichy is still betting on the Calais Dunkirk area and is presumably getting his information from Laval and Abetz.

The Brazilians are very cockahoop about having got the invasion date from their representative in Ottawa 24 hours before the events actually took place. This was undoubtedly due to the indiscretion of SHAEF in allowing reports from war correspondents to go to the various newspapers, to be held until after Eisenhower's first communique. We know that such a report went to Toronto and probably there were others.

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An SIS report from a Swiss source refers to

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a possible amalgamation of the Abwehr and S.D. and conversations at Salzburg held by Himmler at which Hansen was present but did not take a very active part.

De Gaulle is getting excited about the anticipated arrival of French refugees. He wants to go down to Shoreham and make them a speech. The answer is that up to the moment only two have arrived and one is half dead.

C. put over a deception a short time ago through a blind transmitter which he knew to be under the control of the Germans. The Germans asked where escapers and evaders should rendezvous. The answer was that they should all make for the Bordeaux area by the 15th June where there would be a good chance of their being picked up. This piece of deception may have been effective since there has been a big concentration of submarines, some 30, in the Bay of Biscay. These are now moving up to the bridgehead, one has been sunk and the others chased off.

June 10th

Kellar talked to me about the Mid East. There has been a certain amount of telegraphing between SIM, DMI, India, D.I.B, I.P.I. and the W.O. about future plans in the Mid East. I.P.I., SIS and DIB appear to have been getting together about a better organisation in Iran and also in Iraq. There are of course very much concerned particularly from the Russian angle. Maunsell is taking the line that future organisa

tions in these countries should be part of a general plan which is very much bound up with the future of SIME and the relations between M.I.5 and M.I.6 in the Mid East.

A very encouraging message has been received by Tate. The enemy say that his reports can even decide the outcome of the war.

Butus's reports are being passed to Paris with all possible despatch and we have made an arrangement with the Germans that a wireless contact can be made regularly 3 times a day.

The Germans have suggested to Sniper that he should try and get a letter out of the country by contacting naval personnel. They should know of course that anything of the kind is quite impossible.

June 11th

I saw Duff over the weekend at Tring. He was very interesting on the subject of de Gaulle. With a tremendous struggle he managed to fix up de Gaulle's visit with the necessary condition that he would be allowed to communicate with Algiers from here in his own cypher. De Gaulle however did not show much appreciation of Duff's efforts and merely said that he wondered whether it was worth while his coming at all. Since his arrival here efforts have been made to get something going in the nature of discussions involving the recognition of the Committee and the part it is to play in the future of France.

No agreement in the question of American participation has been obtained. The President has agreed to our having unilateral conversations. When this ground has been cleared de Gaulle will presumably go to the USA. I doubt whether he will be a very good advocate against the welter of prejudice which exists in the minds of the President and numbers of those who serve him, who probably include Admiral Leahy, the former American Ambassador at Vichy. Other questions that have caused trouble are Gen. Eisenhower's leaflet addressed to the French which after some pressure was submitted to de Gaulle for his approval. Certain comments and amendments were suggested but when received the French were told that as millions of copies had already been printed it would not be possible to do anything. More trouble has been caused by the notes printed in the USA which are to be used by our and the American troops in France. Firstly no arrangements appear to have been made for any Govt. guarantee to back these notes, secondly the French, who have been asked to co-operate say that in issuing any instructions to the French people they want to sign in the name of the Comité. Everybody jibbed at this as they thought it was tantamount to recognition of the Comité. In actual fact all the French were doing was to ask for the right to sign documents in what they understood to be their own name. The P.M. was rather shaken when he was told that the notes had no backing. He pressed the button and said "Send for the Chancellor of the Exchequer". The reply came back that the Chancellor had left an hour ago for his country seat. The P.M. said "Blast his eyes, what does he mean by deserting his

post on a Friday afternoon". Eventually a man called Fraser arrived from the Treasury who confirmed the fact that the notes were not backed and that they were in fact of an extremely indifferent quality. Moreover the 5 fr. note looked just like the 50,000 fr. note. The P.M. was rather inclined to brush this aside, but on being shown the notes and having an eye for something that was well done, was visibly disappointed at these cheap-looking notes which were of a kind which you would expect to buy at Hamleys. The whole question is being further considered. The P.M. seems to have three bad bees in his bonnet. Firstly de Gaulle, secondly Ireland, and thirdly the visitors ban. His good bee is the President, and anything that is contrary to the latter's wishes is liable to be swept aside. Duff has made it very clear to the P.M. that he regards de Gaulle as the only person who ~~entst~~ ^{counts} ~~any~~ ^{is} nice at all in France and for that reason he should be supported.

June 12th

The P.M. is proceeding to the beachhead today and de Gaulle has expressed a wish to go too. Duff thinks he ought to be allowed to go and if he is not given permission by Wednesday he will go back to Algiers.

Duff manages to get on with deGaulle who apparently likes him. On the other hand there is no doubt that de Gaulle is an extremely difficult and dour personality.

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Alexander has asked the P.M. for a free hand in pursuing the enemy in Italy. It seems that the Germans only have 6 divisions in reserve and that there is a good opportunity of rounding up a large number. Things are evidently moving very fast.

A message received today indicates that the Germans are extremely pleased with Garbo. They say that the reports received in the last week have ~~been~~ confirmed almost without exception information from other sources and are to be regarded as of special value. The main line in future for Garbo is to be the enemy group of forces in eastern and southeastern England. They would also like to know in good time when the formations assembled in Scottish ports put to sea and what their destination is. This all shows that the cover plan is working well and that up to the present the Germans are convinced that the major offensive is coming elsewhere. Another message indicates that ZIGZAG may be with us again before long, probably accompanied by a man named LEHAR. Von GROENING, ZIGZAG's boss, was asked on the 7th June to ascertain from the 9th Fliegerkorps whether the operation was possible.

I attended a meeting at Norfolk House at 12 today to discuss a new proposition with regard to the diplomatic ban. Bedale-Smith lunched on Sat. with Eden as a result of which he sent Eden a letter stating that it was a matter of operational necessity that the ban should be maintained until the 15th June and that after the 26th June other restrictions could be taken off. The Findlater Stewart committee considered on Sat.

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whether it was possible to modify this demand in any way by allowing some of the allies or co-belligerent neutrals to have their communications restored. They came to the conclusion that this was not possible since the information would undoubtedly get round, when the deception advantage of the ban would immediately be lost. A paper is to be prepared for Eden explaining this point and for the Minister of Production a somewhat different paper informing him in connection with tomorrow's Cabinet meeting that the situation had changed and that new demands are now being made. Murrie, of the War Cabinet Offices, said that he had the P.M.'s comments on the previous paper. It was clear that he still had the visitor's ban very much on his mind. He said that steps should be taken to get rid of this obnoxious restriction at the earliest possible moment, and followed this by recommending that this should be done quickly and unobtrusively. He does not realise of course that the ban involves penalties against anyone found in the area who cannot properly explain his reasons for being there, and that the position was made clear to the public before the ban was put on. If the ban is to be removed some announcement will have to be made. This will imply a letting up of restriction and will be just as harmful to the cover plan as the removal of the diplomatic ban. Murrie was very concerned about the P.M. being properly informed before the Cabinet meeting, otherwise he might give some ruling which would not conform to realities from which it might be extremely difficult to get him to recede. I said that as far as the Security Service were

concerned the visitors ban had not the same importance as it had prior to Overlord. We had expected a number of parachutes to be dropped in the area immediately before the operation or very soon after it and we wanted any spies of this type to stand out. This would not have been possible if the whole area had been cluttered up with trippers. Nothing had in fact happened. We could not therefore definitely say that it would not happen in the future but we did consider that the risk had been very much reduced. It seemed to all those present that those responsible for billeting the troops were now the only people who should be actually concerned. The most we can hope for is that the Minister of Production will be able to persuade the Cabinet that a new situation has been created and that the various points which arise should be referred back to Lindlater Stewart's committee for a detailed report.

In reply to a letter I wrote to Eddie Grant asking whether he would be prepared to take on a job as liaison officer with the French on the continent if need arose, he has written me the following:

"Very many thanks for your letter received this morning. Yes, of course I will go to France. But I beg you, if you possibly can, to send me as a GSOL. It took me 26 years to rise to the rank of Major from the grade of Captain, so you may say that I am impatient, but Major is a suspect rank. Captains bow down and cross themselves, while colonels of 25 take one glance at one's medal ribbons and class one immediately as a silly old bugger. And I want to be a colonel

for other reasons; I want more pay (to keep the farm alive until such time as it can support itself, and me) and I mind having to salute every little pipsquak in the West End of London whose sister (or wife) has got a lover at the War Office. In any case I feel I must go back to France if possible, since I bolted from there during the summer of 1940 twice within a fortnight. Indeed I went so far about 3 weeks ago as to send this advertisement to the Times, to be put into the Personal Column:

"INVASION. Major on the Reserve of a distinguished Regiment is anxious to play a part (not necessarily prominent) in the invasion of the continent. He would be prepared to serve, preferably with the rank of Lt.Col. as Personal Assistant to a General Officer. Qualifications: served in France 1914-1918; fluent French and a sound knowledge of wines; fairly active. Highest references given and required. No agents. Write Box -"

Well, the Times wrote back and said they would have to show this to the Military Censors and under the circumstances, did I "wish to vary my instructions?". In the wisdom of my middle age, I did. It occurred to me that the Censors - and perhaps the D.G. - mightn't think it funny. But all through life one of my chief failings has been that, if I thought something funny, I thought everyone else would think it funny too. And quite often they haven't. In fact it's continually got me into trouble."

and I,

Dick, Brooke Booth, Bonnefousse, Paillole, Beaumont Vaudreuil, Manuel and another French officer had lunch together. The meeting was extremely friendly. The real purpose of it was I think to persuade us that the French should now take

a more active part in the examination of people coming back from the beachheads. Paillole told me privately that de Gaulle was extremely intransigent, and that if we were to make any concession in that regard it might go so far towards putting the scheme for cooperation which had been drawn up between Dick and Paillole on its feet. We said that we quite understood their feelings in this matter. Our main difficulty in the past had been to prevent the LRC from being inundated by officials of allied governments; if we allowed the French in we should immediately get requests from the others and the task would become impossible. We did however undertake to see if there was any way out. The French pleaded that as France was now invaded a new situation had been created which would give us an argument in dealing with other nationalities. There is I think something in this and I am quite convinced that we should rightly go a long way to meet the French. Moreover if we get large numbers of refugees they will undoubtedly be of considerable help. We also discussed the question of their so-called accredited agents. In dealing with SOE they were always told that they had to produce the man's name and address and a good deal about his antecedents if he was to be examined at the LRC. This they said they were not always in a position to do although they could vouch entirely for the man's bona fides. They did

not meet with similar difficulties when dealing with SI, who accepted their word and passed the man's name to us as an accredited agent. In fact they said quite frankly that the best scheme for them was to get an agent out by SOE and bring him in through SIS

As regards those who are examined, they said if they could be allowed a few minutes with a man they could persuade him to tell us the whole story. It often happened that Frenchmen were reticent because they preferred to tell their story to their own people. We ~~xxx~~ therefore stood to gain by allowing the French some access to a man before he was interrogated. There is probably something in this but as I pointed out to the French, we all run XX agents and some of them were highly successful. It was therefore difficult to be confident about a man's bona fides unless you actually saw him and sifted his story. They readily agreed to this but said that they might have been a great help in establishing the truth in many cases. Quite probably this is true but the disadvantages of having all the allies in the LRC would have outweighed the advantages, of getting a more satisfactory interrogation of Frenchmen. Dick, Baxter and I are going to discuss the whole question tomorrow.

Manuel said that by some mistake the French Resistance Movements had received the wrong instructions. Instead of being told to stay put for the time being, they were told to go all out. In the Toulouse area they appear to have captured 300 Germans. They also claim

played

to have ~~paid~~ a considerable part in preventing reserves from being brought up to the peninsula.

V.V. rang me up to know if we could provide him with an officer with a fair knowledge of European politics. He is to help with the work that Curry is doing and might eventually find himself in Gen. West's Bureau in Germany. I said that we should be very pleased to help but that it was impossible to say at the moment at what our commitments were, going to be. We anticipated that Gen. West might make further calls on us. Vivian then went on to talk about the building up of Curry's section. He realises that at the moment SIS had to rely very largely on our records but evidently he hoped to improve this situation. I said I was well aware of this but that if we were sitting down seriously to build up two organisations to deal with the communist movement we all ought to be locked up in a lunatic asylum. Viv. said that the system before the war had worked quite well. I said that it might have done so but it would be extremely difficult to justify a duplication of records without which the two sections could not possibly carry on their work. I said that I should be very pleased to discuss this matter with him in detail as soon as he had free time.

Curry came to see me. He showed me a copy of the memo he had written stating the position in his section as he saw it and placing the responsibility on those in authority. His 3 main grievances are (1) that there is no proper organisation abroad for providing information (2) that the interception work, good as

have advised him to withhold this document for the time being, firstly on the grounds that it will receive no consideration at this moment, and secondly that I should like if possible to move some way towards an amalgamation scheme before SIS start building up a huge organisation and trying to card 8 years of back material. Curry has agreed to keep his memo, but does not think that its presentation ought to be delayed too long.

Since the occupation of Rome a large number of probably S.D. agents have either fallen into our hands or given themselves up. These include a man called Armando PERRONI, an important member of the SD post-occupational sabotage network. As a result of his information the premises of the former German Embassy in Rome were raided and sabotage material, arms and W/T sets were found. PERRONI has also reported the location of other sabotage dumps and given the names of about 40 saboteurs. Many of these are ISOS characters. Other valuable information has been given by the Rome police who had by unspecified means obtained documents from Kappler's office. These contained the names of 60 saboteurs among whom were many identical with those denounced by PERRONI. The originals of SD messages dealing with despatch of a group of saboteurs to Belgrade in April, etc.

ISOS discloses that 150 stay-behind agents were left in Rome and other areas near or south of the present front line. 16 of various categories

W/T operators, Secret writers, and others, who are to recruit couriers and send them north through the lines, are mentioned are being in Rome. Of these only 3 are so far in our hands but two are key men who should with luck lead us directly to half a dozen others and indirectly to many of the remainder. Outside Rome one W/T man and his assistant are already behind our lines and another should be over run in the near future. There are also 6 W/T men waiting to be over run before making their way south and establishing themselves in towns such as Naples, Catania, Bari etc.

According to information from Section V. there is a German agent called Ivans working a wireless transmitter on the Cherbourg Peninsula.

June 13th

I saw "C" last night. He said that we were getting fairly near some of the Crossbow sites. Meanwhile he has heard that projectiles of some sort or another are being brought up. He was not very confident about this information which came from an agent and might or might not be accurate.

I was on firewatching last night and just missed seeing what has subsequently proved to be the first Crossbow arrival. Sonnex and a policeman both saw it from the roof but described it quite differently. Sonnex said it was like a red ball jinking from side to side, and the policeman said it was white and glided rapidly down. It fell somewhere in Bow and a reddish flash was seen as it hit the ground. No report

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was heard. Villiers of the Key Points adviser has apparently established that this projectile is a pilotless aircraft. The damage I understand is not very great, nothing more than one would expect from a 2,000 lb bomb. I spoke to "C" whose information was that 21 in all had landed including one in Dorset and one in Wilts. The general impression is that the Germans are rushing things in view of the invasion and that in fact the apparatus is not really passed its teething troubles. C. had had information that pre-fabricated sites were being erected in certain places. His agent had also reported that the fusilages of the aircraft were being brought up. It will be interesting to see whether we get any Stichling messages asking Garbo to report on where the aircraft have landed.

M.S.S. generally shows that the enemy is in a fair state of confusion. There is a Degs message today indicating that the officer of the SD who was responsible for the kidnapping of Mussolini is now in western France and recruiting some 100 men who have been specially trained in Zbv functions. Teresa Clay has established that this same individual was recently applying for uniforms of the allies. It seems possible therefore that we may expect an armed parachute raid on one of our headquarters. The matter is being considered by the JIS this afternoon.

Dick, Baxter and I discussed the question of the French being allowed to participate in some way in our interrogations. Baxter is strongly opposed to this. We impressed upon him the

desirability for general political reasons of meeting the French to some degree. We thought that they might perhaps be allowed to have a representative down at Shoreham. This would not amount to very much since it seems doubtful whether we shall have very many refugees. If they had been coming in in any quantities they would probably have arrived already. We also agreed that refugees who arrived at other ports might be seen by the French at Battersea after we had dealt with them. I think that this concession ought to satisfy them.

Page and Twin have been up here seeing TAA. about the possibility of using XX agents for getting cribs. This is already working accidentally in the case of Treasure and Brutus but it seems possible that we might engineer something which might be useful to G C & CS on similar lines.

The SOE French section under Col. Bickmaster have a circuit operating near the north coast of Brittany. A study of this traffic received from this circuit appeared to Warden to suggest the possibility of German control. This impression was verified by the report of an SOE officer who had been over in an aeroplane which was dropping stores to the organisation. This officer had had a conversation by means of an S. phone with the head of the organisation reception committee. He reported on his return that the voice of the latter individual had sounded extremely guttural and that he spoke neither fluent French or English. This was

dismissed by Buckmaster as probably due to atmospheric conditions. Two days ago a surprising message was received from the wireless operator of the circuit, thanking SOE for the stores which had recently been delivered and stating that unfortunately certain of the agents had had to be shot but that others had proved more willing to do what the Germans asked them to. So blatant did this message appear that at first it was thought to be some sort of hoax. Independent information was received however to the effect that the whole circuit had been under German control for some weeks. This circuit is dangerously near the present operation. A list of the names of the people concerned in it has been sent to the LRC.

Brook Boothe, Dick, Tar, Hart, Milmo, Stone and I had a meeting to discuss our relations with O.S.S. I said that in my view we were perfectly entitled to have direct relations with OSS and that on grounds of expediency this should be done. OSS were at any rate in part the equivalent of an allied 2eme bureau. Since we have relations with all the other allied 2eme bureaux so much the more should we have them with OSS in so far as the discussion of our own material is concerned and in any matters which primarily concern this office. In fact OSS are receiving copies of U20 reports direct from Milmo. The only case in doubt seemed to be the one which affected vetting. Where OSS were integrated with SOE the vetting was done through SOE. This seemed reasonable since SOE were equally affected by the introduction of a dud. As regards SIS the relations were

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somewhat different. Stone is going to look into this and if it is considered advisable establish a direct contact with OSS. Their complaint is that the vetting they have done through SIS takes too long.

We also discussed with Trevor-Wilson the case of a Frenchwoman called Madeleine BERNARDE @ Gabrielle @ Madeleine, who surrendered to the allied forces on or before June 12th at the bridgehead area. She claimed to be an agent of the French 2eme Bureau and mentioned the names of certain contacts in Marseilles. She says that she was recruited for the Germans as aXX agent by one who was also French XX agent. She claims to have carried letters from Marseilles to Dijon for one Dr. BECKER. She states that she was asked by one SCHNEIDER of St. Lo to set up a German stay-behind agent at Carentan who she believes to be now there. The French say that unless this woman is identical with one Mme. PELLEGRIN of Antibes who was recruited by POUSSIN in the spring of 1942 in Marseilles they cannot identify her, although they know the names of other people with whom she claims to have been associated. The French have no special plans for this woman and it seems desirable that she should be got over here and thoroughly interrogated. Meanwhile a stay-behind agent in Bayeux has been arrested on a denouncement by some other French citizen. He is to come here for interrogation.

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At the weekly meeting Mrs. Spring said that Brandes, who some time ago talked of sending a Swiss courier named PEDRO here as an agent, has now stated that PEDRO has returned from his mission to the U.K. with detailed answers to an Einzheer questionnaire, and that he will be returning to the U.K. at the end of this week at the request of the British. There is no one so far whom we can identify with PEDRO, who is probably notional. Brandes also talks of recruiting as an agent the assistant to the Swiss M.A. and is discussing setting up a wireless agent in U.K. He talks also of training PEDRO in secret writing. If, as seems likely, all these projects are notional, Brandes' imagination is going to have to work overtime.

On 7th June Abt. II in Paris asked Berlin to arrange for Unter-offizier Count SOLIKOV to be sent to Lille, and also asked for supplies of English underclothing to be sent there. SOLIKOV is probably identical with a man of that name who was here before the war and who has a certain number of traces. He may be going to be used for some sort of parachute landing here.

Vesey said that so far between 30 and 40 French refugees had arrived at Shoreham, also a certain number of Italians. LRC interrogators had seen about 20 of the French, and there seemed no reason whatever to suspect them of subversive activities. They were all of the labourer type. Incidentally the Americans are very unpopular because they have stripped these people of all their personal belongings to keep as souvenirs.

Wethered said that an SOE man from Bergen had just arrived back here with a Norwegian who is now at the LRC. They have particulars of fortifications in the Bergen area, and say that they are in contact with the men responsible for building them, who are working under a German professor of 60 who is an N.C.O. in the Army. There are also other people there who are democrats and are prepared to work with the British against the Nazis. So far this story has not been checked, but if it is true there may be some useful work to be done.

Marriott said that Gargo has been asked to find the headquarters of General Bradley and Air Marshall Cunningham.

I attended a meeting of the Findlater Stewart Foreign Office committee. The ban is definitely to come off at midnight on Monday 19th June. The Diplomatic Corps will be notified on the following day and the allied governments on Monday morning. We have eased up to a considerable degree on the entry and exit of ministers who pending the removal of the ban will be regarded as special cases. I spoke to Findlater after the meeting. He asked me to dine with him next week.

Dick, Kellar and I had a meeting with Vickery and Bamford. We discussed Mid East affairs on the basis of the telegram sent by Maunsell to DMI India, mentioning future relations between M.I.5/6 and suggesting that any conference between D.I.B and C.I.C.I. might be somewhat premature. The fact is that all D.I.B. want

to do is to settle their future sphere of interest with S.I.S. Several years ago they divided Persia into two headings, D.I.B. taking responsibility for the eastern portion and leaving the rest to S.I.S. These zones have to some extent been modified to conform to the Indian and Middle Eastern Commands. D.I.B. I think wants to go back to the old arrangement which gives him rather more territory than he at present covers. It seemed to us that any negotiations on this subject were no affair of ours and that a settlement could be reached on this somewhat important matter without in any way affecting the future relations between M.I.5/6. We were all more or less agreed that there was a good deal to be said for regarding Turkey, Persia, Palestine, Iraq and Egypt as one unit. The normal division between 5 and 6 would be Egypt and Palestine under 5 and Persia Iraq and Turkey under 6. SIME of course has more or less co-ordinated activities within these areas although ISLD is still an independent organisation. If SIME is disbanded there will be no local co-ordinating body. This would be a pity. Should 5 and 6 get together in the Mid East it would clearly be desirable for them to have the closest possible relations with D.I.B.

We then discussed the desirability of sending another representative to D.I.B. on the assumption that we might stand to get more from that quarter if we had our own representative. The conclusion reached was that we could get all we wanted through IPI here, but that it might be desirable to have someone with D.I.B. who would

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be based on our station in Ceylon. We shall be looking into this.

Lastly Bamford said that there was at present in India a Planning Commission which would be concerned with the re-occupation of Singapore and Malaya. It seemed to us that any representative that we might nominate for Singapore after the war might usefully join this Commission and make a study of the files in D.I.B which might affect his area. We shall be discussing this point with Ede.

June 15th

There were 513,000 troops landed in France by the night of the 13th/14th June.

On the 11th June Steengracht, intaking to the Jap, said that the German military authorities had ~~had~~ at first been anxious lest the British, having failed in their first objective should break off the operations and switch the attack to another area. Since then the British had continued to bring up reinforcements and in view of the forces employed to date it was thought it would not be easy for them to make a change. There were no reports of landings in other places but such landings were of course possible and the necessary precautions were being taken. Germany's plan to allow us to land as many forces as possible and then concentrate all the armoured units in the bridgehead, bringing up the requisite forces should be completed by the 11th, when the counter-attack would take place.

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Steengracht explained however that it was a fact that our bombing in the German rear was very severe and was making the movement of the German Armies difficult. What was worrying the Germans was beyond doubt the superiority of our Air Forces and the guns of our war-ships. The Germans held the view that as regards quality the British troops were better than the Americans.

I dined with the DMI and JC last night. The DMI was very complimentary about the work of this office both as regards deception and security. He was intending to write a letter to the D.G. expressing his gratitude for all that has been done. He said that he had given it as his opinion that it would not be possible to deceive the enemy as to our real intentions for more than 4-6 days and that quite possibly it would not be possible to deceive him at all. He thought therefore that an immense success had been scored through the tactical surprises which had held so long and indeed was still holding, although perhaps to a slightly lesser degree. He said that the JIS were writing a weekly paper on this particular point and he thought that we ought to be consulted since the JIS might not be aware of the degree of confidence placed by Himmler and the Abwehr in Garbo's theory of a two-pronged attack. I mentioned the Jap D.O. quoted above and said that at any rate on the 11th the Germans were still in some doubt, and were clearly re-insuring, although perhaps to a lesser degree. They have so far had 4 Panzer divisions in action and others were coming up. One had for example been brought down from Antwerp. I

gathered that there are only 8 in the whole of the western theatre and that some of these are not very well equipped or up to strength.

Everyone seems very pleased with the general progress of the operation so far.

We discussed with DMI the question of Service Intelligence generally. He seemed to think that there was something in the idea of a permanent civilian staff, although he was not entirely clear as to what their status would be. He thought that they as experts might find it extremely irritating to work under colonels who were constantly coming and going and that it might therefore be difficult to get good people. The only possible method of running it would be to put Intelligence on a higher plane than it is at present. He did not seem to think that the difficulties were insuperable or that there would be any real difficulty to the promotion of these staffs round the Services including SI and ourselves.

14½ divisions should be landed in France by tonight.

I saw Eddie Grant. He said he would be quite prepared to accept the regional job with the French subject to us being passed medically fit. I explained to him that the scheme was held up at the moment owing to the difficulties with de Gaulle.

I dined with Joe Lynch.

June 16th

There appear to have been a good many Crossbow incidents last night. It is reported that there were 120 in the London area. I gather that the nearest one to me was in Regents Park. The weather was apparently suitable with a good deal of low cloud. The alert sounded at 11 o'clock and continued until 9.30 this morning. A further alert occurred about 10 o'clock, which lasted till 11.30. The Home Secretary has now made an announcement to the Press to the effect that these missiles are radio-controlled aircraft.

Harry Allan held a meeting today on the relaxation of security restrictions. There is to be a meeting this afternoon about the way in which the diplomatic ban should be taken off. I gather that the present arrangement is that the allies are to be told on Monday morning and the neutrals on Tuesday morning, the ban coming off actually at midnight on Monday. It seems desirable that publicity of any kind should if possible be avoided. We should at least give the impression that we are not giving undue publicity to the ban. It will of course be put ultimately on a foreign date line, since the various capitals in Europe have been notified. The visitors ban is apparently to come off at the end of the month and also other restrictions which are automatically bound up with the diplomatic ban. I said that the visitors ban once removed, diplomats would be sure to go into the area. It might be for consideration

whether an attempt should be made to stop them moving into the area even after the ban has been removed. We would not presumably stop journalists and it might therefore be argued that there was therefore no particular point in trying to stop the diplomats.

June 17th

Further details have been ascertained about Crossbow. The aircraft is 25 ft long and 20 ft broad. The speed is said to be about 3-350 mph. The aircraft is not radio-controlled its range being determined by the amount of fuel used. It travels normally at about 3,000 ft and carries about 2,000 kilos of explosive. 75 crossed the coast last night, of which 40 reached the London area. 7 exploded in Croydon. The Germans are already asking us questions about Crossbow arrivals. At present we are hedging by saying that it is very difficult to get any information of a detailed kind. Casualties and killed so far are about 100 and 800 seriously injured. These are considered slight as compared with normal air raids. SHAEF have given instructions to the Air Force to bomb the Crossbow sites in so far as this does not interfere with any calls from the Second Front.

The battle appears to be going well. The Americans have pushed quite a long way across the peninsula. The Germans have two divisions on the northern end but no panzers. They have already begun to demolish Cherbourg harbour and have sunk a ship of 12,000 tons.

right across the mouth. On the American front there are only one Panzer division in operation while there are 4 or 5 operating against the British sector. The line has fluctuated a little here and there but no appreciable gain has been made on either side. Meanwhile the mulberries are 50% completed, and troops are still pouring across. The Germans have still got one Panzer division in the vicinity of Brussels and another in the Bordeaux area, which is moving up very slowly, and another on the south coast. This appears to be all the armour they have in the west.

I attended a meeting at Norfolk House last evening to discuss taking off the diplomatic ban. The plan previously arranged was generally agreed. I raised the question of publicity. I felt that there was perhaps a certain advantage in not giving the matter publicity and letting it leak out under a foreign date line. Marshall who was present from SHAEF agreed that such a course might possibly help the cover plan. I also pointed out that instructions not only to British but also to the American press would be necessary if anything of the kind was contemplated. It was generally agreed that the removal of the diplomatic ban would not affect the present instructions regarding prohibited movements of diplomats and service attaches into the banned area.

Nerbert raised the question of Crossbow. It was agreed that the previous arrangement should stand by which diplomats should be asked not to refer to Crossbow in their telegrams. This
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should include all allies as well as neutrals. There is also apparently an arrangement to prevent leakage of information in the event of Big Ben (the rocket) coming into operation. There was a suggestion that telegrams should be held up for 48 hours not in order to conceal the places where the projectile had landed but for the somewhat obscure reason that the Air Ministry would have 48 hours during which to prepare counter-measures. Personally I can -not see what use this scheme can possibly have.

I took the 12 o'clock meeting today. The Frenchwoman Madeleine BERNARD is on her way here, also the Frenchman who was arrested in Bayeux, called ^{YVES} GUILCHER. The latter's capture was the result of a rather smart piece of work by the FSP. GYLCHER was denounced and had his premises searched. A small piece of paper was found with a plan of the orchard and certain markings. This led the FSP to a particular tree where on digging in the ground they found a wireless set.

We have written to the French giving them permission to interrogate refugees after our own interrogation has been completed both at Shoreham and and at Battersea.

Cordeaux of S.I.S. rang me up to say that owing to some mistake permission had been given to GOEDHART to leave Gib. and that he might therefore be arriving tomorrow morning. SIS realised that this was contrary to the arrangement and have telegraphed their representative accord-

ingly. It might be therefore that GOEDHART would be stopped. I have informed D.4 who had already made arrangements for GOEDHART to be taken straight to Gerbrandi's cottage. It will however be necessary to warn Gerbrandi. At 5.45 I tried to get on to Desmond Morton, Neville Bland and A.D.E. but as they had all left I made arrangements with D.4 to let us know as soon as the man arrived at the airport tomorrow.

Orr has a story that the French are trying to buy up green fl notes for which they are paying an extra 1/6. They say that these can be sold in France for 25/- or 26/-. It is difficult to know exactly what the game is. I told Orr to have a talk with Ned Reid.

I saw Peter Loxley last night and asked him about our getting the Cabinet papers relating to Palestine. He said that there was a special Cabinet Committee which dealt with this matter. He thought Dick Law was the F.O. representative. He felt however that we ought really to apply through the C.O. He agreed that it was important that we should see all papers.

Later in the evening I received a call from Colledge at Oxford to the effect that GOEDHART had infact arrived this morning and had according to instructions been taken to GERBRANDI's cottage. The FSP officer who had conducted him had gone on to London to deliver a bag which GOEDHART had brought with him.

June 18th

I attended a meeting in Norfolk House at which
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Wild, B.1A and Charles Cholmondley were present. The meeting was anxious to get some sort of direction from the Air Ministry as to how questions about Crossbow could be answered. Was it desirable to play up the efficiency of Crossbow or run it down? Should we attempt to mislead the enemy as to where the projectile were falling? If so, in what direction? How far would anything that we said be affected by the lifting of the diplomatic ban? There seemed to be very little answer to these questions on the information available. I left the meeting after 10 minutes and proceeded to another called by the J.I.C. which was primarily concerned with "Big Ben". Photographic reconnaissance showed that at Watten the site was clear of stores and contractors' plant on June 14th and on June 15th parts of the site had been camouflaged and increased stores and packings were observed under camouflage at the stores dump. This site appeared to be externally complete. The other sites Wizerne, Siracourt and Mimoyecque were in varying stages of completion. The general conclusion to be drawn was that Watten almost certainly and Wizerne possibly had reached a stage where civil construction was complete and military construction was in progress. The other two sites were slightly less advanced. This assessment of the position made it advisable to attach rather more importance to a report received from an agent of C's on the 16th June in which it was stated that Watten would be operating in the near future. There was a word in this connection which might imply today, June 18th, but on

further examination and without a check it was impossible to say anything definite. It seemed therefore a wise precaution to attack Watten at the first opportunity and the other 3 sites in the near future. Arrangements have in fact been made for this to be done with 12,000 lb bombs which penetrate concrete to a depth of 12 ft. and are likely to do considerable damage if they fall even in the vicinity. It was agreed that these matters should be brought to the notice of the Chiefs of Staff.

"Big Ben" is apparently 38 ft. long and carries 5 tons of explosive. Nobody knows its degree of accuracy, but on general form it is not considered likely that it will go more than within a few miles of its intended target. I asked the meeting for some guidance on the answering of questions which we had received from the enemy about the effectiveness of Crossbow. Were we to try and mislead them about location and effectiveness, and what were the chances of our being found out. Air Commodore Grierson who attended with A.C.A.S.I and appeared to be the expert on Crossbow, stated that as far as was known the pilotless aircraft carried some form of wireless apparatus which would approximately indicate to the Germans their course and place of landing. From the point of view of the agent therefore it was important that if he did report he should report accurately. Equally it seemed that there was no particular point in extending the diplomatic ban since any reports made by diplomats would only be telling

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the enemy what he already knew. D.N.I. then asked for some general information about Crossbow. Air Commodore Grierson said that out of 225 of the aircraft which had left the sites in the first attack only 120 had reached the London area. In the second attack 144 had started and 110 had reached the area and in the 3rd attack 138 had started and only 78 had reached the area. This means that roughly three-fifths actually reach the target area. The speed of the aircraft is estimated at about 250 mph while gaining height and probably about 330 when on the level. Spitfire 9's can and have got right up to them and alongside. They can explode them with cannon at a range of about 2-300 yds. with a fair margin of safety. The explosion may have the effect of putting the Spitfire into a backloop. It is not likely to do it much harm. So far however neither the balloon barrage, A.A. guns nor fighter attack have been particularly effective. Last night 5 were said to have been brought down by aircraft and 2 or 3 by A.A. There are at the moment about 69 sites from which these aircraft are probably being launched. Few of these are in the Cherbourg Peninsula. The majority are in the Pas de Calais. Our planes were out on reconnaissance yesterday but got no indication as to where the projectiles were coming from. This was mainly due to bad visibility. Today the visibility has improved and better results are hoped for. As regards counter-measures the meeting of the War Cabinet at which Tedder was present considered what could be done. Tedder said that these would depend entirely on visibility and operational neces-

cesities. He would devote as much time to the ski-sites as was possible, but could give no guarantee as there were so many uncertain factors. Pin-point bombing is not easy and an immense amount of aircraft and bombs are employed to make a real impression. The sites are said to be capable of launching 2 aircraft per hour. There is no positive information about the supplies of aircraft although there are rumours that some of the supplies are in caves near Rheims and Paris. It is felt therefore that for the moment bombing by pilotless aircraft must be expected to continue more or less on the present scale. The enemy is more likely to operate in cloudy weather than in fine, when it is easier to locate the sites from which they are discharged. Most of the aircraft last night came down south of the river, one fell in the Bayswater road, and this morning about 11.15 one came over Queen Anne's Mansions and went right into the Guards Chapel at Wellington Barracks. It is feared there may be considerable loss of life. I actually saw the damage a few moments after the bomb fell. It seems to be about the equivalent of a thousand pound bomb which is in fact the weight of the explosive.

We reported the facts of the meeting to Drew for the information of Findlater Stewart, and also to Dick Butler in the country for the D.G.s information. The D.G. had apparently been contemplating coming up. I said I did not think there was the slightest necessity.