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Garbo received a message on the 16th stating that it was of the utmost importance that he should give information about the effects of the bombardment. The Germans were ^{not} interested in partial details but wished him to indicate results as follows: "Take as your basis a plan of London by the publishers Pharus which I suppose you have in your possession, and indicate how many targets or missiles have fallen in determined squares on the plan, defining them by the ordinates and co-ordinates and the approximate hour. For example during bombardment from 3 to 4, six shells fell in the east end in sq.K.10. No further details are necessary. The foregoing is only intended for your guidance, knowing that it will be almost impossible for you to get these details but it is intended you should know the form in which these reports should be transmitted. Your primary object is not to endanger or take risks with the rest of the service which continues to be of primary importance."

I have ascertained that the FSP did deliver GOEDHART into the bosom of Gerbrandi yesterday. We have no information however about GOEDHART's subsequent disposal.

I spoke to the DMI about Douglas Roberts being brought into OATS. Both C. and he are in agreement. A telegram has therefore been despatched to Maunsell to the effect that he should go ahead after getting Paget's approval.

Freak's control station has not been heard since 10th June. Tricycle's letter explaining why radio transmissions have been suspended has now been despatched. There is still no conclusive evidence of the extent of the Germans knowledge of the true position of Tricycle and Artist. Such evidence as exists is consistent with the view that the full facts have not been extracted from Artist.

Treasure operated her transmitter herself for the last time last Friday. We have now taken over and are imitating her and she no longer has any connection with the case. As a further illustration of the German desire to maintain confidence in their agents in the face of contrary evidence, it is of interest to note that information has recently been received on ISOS which shows that the Germans are still debating whether or not they should send a further questionnaire to Lipstick, although the last letter written by this man was dated 15.3.44. The Germans appear to attribute this failure to correspond to the fact that the air mail service has been suspended.

June 19th

TAR came to see me this morning to talk about his section. He thinks that he should move down to the country. Wild and Fleetwood Hesketh would move down as well. The main reason is that his 3 wireless operators are indispensable. They are in fact the cases, since they are doing the transmitting. Apart from this they could not be replaced as

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wireless operators. I mentioned this to the D.G., who is quite agreeable to the move. I also suggested that there might be other sections who had surplus people and might be glad to get them away. He thought this might also be considered.

Crossbow reports from 6 a.m. yesterday to 6 a.m. today show that during the day yesterday 48 started, 38 crossed the coast and 20 landed in the London area. During the night 110 started, 86 crossed the coast 25 reached London. The total casualties during the period were 162 killed, 1,265 injured, another 80 injured so far unclassified. There were 35 killed in the Guards Chapel but there may be others. The east wall and the altar were not apparently damaged, and the clergyman taking the service, reported to be the Bishop of Rochester, was unhurt.

On the first day the general trend of Crossbow was to the left of the target, on the second day to the right and on the third day more or less on the centre. This seems to indicate that the Germans have some system of plotting their bursts. Out of 35 pilotless aircraft with which the RAF made contact yesterday they show down 17. One incident was actually witnessed by Marcus Heyward, who was in a train crossing Charing Cross Bridge. He saw a pilotless aircraft coming in with two Spitfires about 50 yards behind it. The pilotless aircraft fell suddenly while over the Thames.

It is now reported that there are two types,
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a heavy and a light and that one type can reach a height of 8,000 ft. The normal flight is somewhere between 1-3,000 ft. The P.M. is taking a personal interest in Crossbow and is holding a meeting at 5 today to discuss plans. He is to be kept informed daily of all developments. A.A. operating on the south coast claim 38% hits. The barrage has been very much intensified during the last 24 hours and a suggestion is likely to be adopted for flying kites between the balloon barrages.

I had a long discussion with Dick and Richard Butler about Arnold Foster's visit to the country over the weekend. He was apparently very impressed by the Registry and thoroughly enjoyed his time. He also got on well with the U.G. All this seems to be to the good. On the other hand he is still harping on his theory that SIS should take over D. Division. I said that I could not help feeling that Arnold Foster, wanting to find some way out of the general muddle in SIS and being convinced that some sort of amalgamation was necessary, got C's agreement to his looking into the affairs of MI5 with our concurrence. Having obtained all the information that he wants he will presumably present his case for taking over B. Division to the Foreign Office committee which is sitting on the future of SIS. I am rather confirmed in this view because when talking to Peter Loxley the other night at the Club I said "I understand Arnold Foster feels that SIS should take over D. Division" Loxley I could see was rather embarrassed and evidently

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knew something about it. It seems to me that if Arnold Foster is to be allowed to present a case from his point of view after getting all the dope out of us, that he wants, we ought to have an opportunity of presenting our case and the sooner the better. We did not wish the committee's minds to be prejudiced by an ex parte statement from someone who cannot be in a position to know as much about the facts as we do ourselves. Dick's view, and I think on the whole he is right, is that there should be two services, one offensive and one defensive and that the defensive service should be controlled from here. Dick I think feels as I do that the ACE project is not really feasible on the grounds that it would merely create another body dealing with confidential material which should really be available to all the case workers in its virgin form. Dick envisages the offensive and defensive service both working to Cadogan and the H.O. with the Foreign Secretary as the co-ordinating minister. We could still remain responsible to the H.O. for everything that we did for them and in fact for any other government department such as the C.O. and D.O. The really crucial difficulty is connected with the penetration of the enemy's service. Dick thinks that we ought to conduct these operations on foreign territory. This is I think going to cause considerable difficulty. I think that we should use D.A.s from this country and perhaps carry out the very simplest form of B.6 enquiry, but that anything more should be carried out by the offensive side of SIS with which there would

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a link on foreign territory.

Nevile Bland has been rather concerned about two ex-SOE agents, UBBINK and DOUERLYNE, of Dutch origin, whom we have locked up pending the Overlord period. On consideration of their case we have thought they can now be released. The Dutch have been fussing about them, particularly Col. de Bruyne who was mainly interested because quite improperly he gave these agents a mission in addition to the one that they had from SOE. Nevile Bland seems quite satisfied with the action we have taken in this case and is very grateful for the concession that we are making.

Stichling messages should now be coming into operation. A message to this effect was sent to Madrid on 16.6.44. It will be interesting to see whether any messages that Garbo sends about Crossbow receive the S. prefix. Such messages should go direct to Arras, the headquarters of Crossbow, without re-cyphering.

The diplomatic ban has again come up for discussion. Noble of the J.I.S. rang up to ask our views. He said that he understood from what Cavendish-Bentinck had heard from me yesterday at the J.I.C. that we were indifferent. I said that the point I had made at the meeting was that if the pilotless aircraft had a wireless apparatus which showed their course and point of landing, there seemed to me to be no point in maintaining the diplomatic ban. Grierson of the Air Ministry

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had expressed this view although he did not seem very positive on the question. I suggested therefore to Noble that he should get into direct touch with Grierson. Meanwhile I have been told that there is a proposal by the Minister of Home Security that the ban is to be postponed for 5 days and that this is to be discussed at the Cabinet meeting this evening. Stewart tells me that the F.O. are in a real jam as they have telegraphed to all their representatives abroad telling them to inform the local governments at 6 pm. this evening that the ban will be removed. They have had to send chaser telegrams telling them to hold their hands but whether the chasers will arrive in time is a matter for some speculation. It seemed quite definite that telegrams will not be released today as it would not now be possible to put the machinery into action. There will therefore in any case be a postponement of 24 hours.

June 20th

I spoke to TAR about the move of his section. I said that although on paper it might appear that this work was self-contained, there were many points on which the rest of B.Division had to keep in close touch with B.1A, and the physical separation might well be detrimental to the work if there was not someone from B.1A on the spot. It might be for consideration whether one officer should not remain in London. As regards the rest of B.Division it was agreed

that B.3a could quite easily go to the country. They are to go next Monday.

I had a meeting with Dick, Buster and Herbert on the subject of Curry's book. We agreed that that with a few minor amendments the book could be circulated to all the recipients of the first volume. We felt however that it was necessary to put in a preface which would emphasise that the picture was of necessity not drawn to scale and that the importance of the subjects or cases discussed should not be judged by the amount of space allotted to them. We should then point out that the fact of the document being out of date would not have mattered if the developments in the Abwehr and S.D. had proceeded at the normal tempo. Since November 1943 however changes of exceptional importance had taken place which would render the document misleading if they were not borne in mind. These were (1) that on June 1st 1944 the increasing control by the Sipo and the S.C.D. on Abwehr preserves had led to the Abwehr now being a sub-dept. of the R.S.H.A. known as the Militarisches Amt of the RSHA, directly responsible to Kaltenbrunner and through him to ~~Himmler~~; (2) that Admiral Canaris was dismissed at the end of February or the beginning of March and that for the 3 months following his dismissal while the situation status of the Abwehr remained uncertain, temporary control was invested in his deputy Hansen; (3) that by May 1944 the Abwehr in the west had changed consequent on the establishment of Army Groups from static to mobile organisation designed as part of the

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German preparations for operations in the west. All Asts and Nests in France and the Low Countries were dissolved save for a central Leitstelle on Paris and were replaced partly by Abwehrkommandos and subsidiary Truppes and partly by static reporting centres, Meldekopfe. Concurrently with this change 3 fixed stations in Germany, Stuttgart, Wiesbaden and Cologne, were strengthened by the addition of a number of high-ranking officers and administrative officials formerly working in the various Asts in France and the Low countries, and that these stations might be regarded as the rear echelon under the new conditions of the Abwehr in the west. In them is vested the control of the many agents whom it is intended to operate behind our lines//It is now confirmed that the first Stichling message was sent by Berlin to Madrid on 16.6.44. It referred to reports it was hoped to receive from Garbo about "London being shelled with long-range artillery".

The diplomatic ban was removed at midnight yesterday after a Cabinet meeting. Dick Butler, Grogan and I went through the Censorship restrictions imposed for Overlord. In most cases we agreed to return to pre-Overlord conditions.

I had a long talk with Roger about his meeting with Arnold-Foster. Roger seems to have made it fairly clear that in his view it was a waste of time to try and build up two organisations, one to deal with foreign aspects of

communism and one to deal with the home aspect. It was particularly desirable to have one set of records and equally desirable to have the personnel working together. Arnold Foster's ideas seem to be veering towards either control by SIS or dual control by SIS and the Security Service. Roger pointed out to him that it did happen that from time to time our deptl was drawn into the open and that this might be an embarrassment to SIS. Arnold Foster was I think much impressed by our records which SIS at any rate in their present state could not hope to emulate.

Some 12 flying bombs have been reported during the period of 12 hours ending 6 pm today. 6 of them flew over land; of these 2 reached the London area.

June 21st

At the weekly meeting Hart mentioned the case of ZIGZAG and the request to Lisbon to provide 2 W/T sets for an operation in England. It is thought that these sets were required for ZIGZAG and another agent known as LEHAR who is to be sent to bring money to Brutus.

Sclater mentioned that the Mersey Harbour Board were using a large number of W/T sets in connection with ships and that similar measures were contemplated in other ports. This was the first that we had heard of this scheme which has been working for 3

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months. Clearly there is a risk to security. I told Selater that as soon as he had obtained the necessary data he should report the facts to the Reid Committee.

I lunched with Stephenson at Claridges. I told him that for personal reasons I was rather anxious to visit America but that I could not very well do so unless there was an office reason. I thought myself that it would be good thing for someone from here to visit America and Canada. In fact when I was last there I had recommended that visits should be as frequent as once every three months. I said however that I did not wish to go if it was going to cause any upheaval. Stephenson said that the whole of that question was dead and that in his view nothing but good could result. He would be quite ready to sponsor such a visit if the proposal were made.

I attended a meeting at Norfolk House to discuss the relaxation of Overlord restrictions with particular reference to the cover plan. I suggested this meeting in order that we might to some extent clear the ground before tomorrow's vast meeting of over 50 people. The main question for discussion was the visitor's ban, and how far its abolition was likely to affect the cover plan. SH-EE were somewhat weakly in favour of the retention. I said that from the point of view of catching spies we thought it had outlived its usefulness but that experience had shown that even if a pointer had been give

by the removal of the ban it would be better not to emphasise further the deduction which might have been made that the bridgehead was the one and only operation. So far the cover plan had held although there were indications that it was beginning to weaken. It was agreed that SIAEF would put forward a special paper on this question which would be forwarded by Lindlater Stewart to the Cabinet.

I saw Niall MacDermott who has been over to the beachhead. He gave me an account of the de Gaulle visit. De Gaulle took over with him on the "Combattante" a number of other French officials who were supposedly to go to Bayeux in order to organise a clique. De Gaulle made a speech in the market square. He had previously declined to lunch with Monty, but was redeived by him on landing. After making a speech at Bayeux he went on to Issigny instead of returning to the boat which was scheduled to leave at about 4 pm. When he got back from Issigny at about 8 pm. certain members of his party were missing. They had in fact remained behind and in conjunction with the local resistance party removed certain collaborators from office and installed his own representatives. Civil Affairs had already started to work with the collaborators and were extremely annoyed. The de facto position was however eventually accepted both by our military and by the Americans. In other words de Gaulle has presented the British and American Govts.

with a fait accompli, which has been recognised de facto by both the British and American Armies. Having done this de Gaulle does not very much care about whether his Committee is recognised or not. This performance is of course typical of de Gaulle's mentality, and outlook on the whole situation and will undoubtedly cause considerable indignation in Washington and London. On the other hand it may force the issue of recognition which would undoubtedly be a good thing for everyone.

Harry Allan's Overlord Security panel had a meeting to compare notes in relation to various meetings held about the relaxation of restrictions on Overlord. He said that the W.O. were taking a strong line about the visitors' ban which they wanted to maintain. I pointed out that this had not been the attitude of SIAEF. It seemed a pity that SIAEF and the W.O. did not march in step. Harry said that the W.O. were putting their views to the Chiefs of Staff. I said that if they did not make a strong case the issue would go by default since the P.M. had minuted the file that this obnoxious restriction must be removed at the earliest possible moment. It seemed to me that there were two reasons for maintaining it, one to maintain the cover plan and the other to provide whatever security was necessary for other operations. I doubted however whether the ban would in fact provide much security and I thought that we should probably be forced back on to restricted areas. From

the point of view of the cover plan it seemed to me desirable that the ban should be maintained in the east and south-east.

Lennox mentioned that it was curious that immediately the diplomatic ban was removed the first German panzer division started to move down to the beach-head area.

I met Murphy of OSS with Bill Stephenson at Claridges in the evening. Murphy was extremely appreciative of the assistance that had been given by us to representatives of his organisation. He also expressed his admiration of the way we ran our affairs and recorded our information, as compared with Section V. I mentioned the matter of Ceylon. He told me that he had already been hauled over the coals by Felix Cowgill. He said that in fact there were no X2 personnel of OSS in Ceylon and the activities of which Airy was complaining must therefore be those of the S.I. sections of OSS. S.I. section corresponds to the P. Sections of SIS, S.O section to SOE and X2 section to Section V. of SIS. Murphy said that he had come to the conclusion that as far as work was concerned there was far more to be gained from us than from Section V. He realised that there was very little that Section V did that was not already covered by our dept. and that there were many things which we covered which were not covered by Section V. at all. Murphy's remarks on the subject of the functions of ourselves and Section V were not solicited by me but made quite spontaneously.

I dined with Vickery who gave me an interesting account of the latest developments in the SILVER case. It appears that the Russians have been playing rather a dirty game. Originally the case had had a considerable bearing on their affairs since plans were being devised against Russia as well as against India. Since this factor had been eliminated, largely through the removal of WITZEL, SILVER's controller on the German side, the Russians evidently felt they were not getting very much out of the case. They therefore arranged a meeting with RASMUS, the First Secretary of the German Legation, told him that they knew his code to SILVER and that unless he was prepared to work for them they would expose him. This of course had led to considerable suspicion by the Germans of SILVER. The Russians then pressed for SILVER's return to Kabul. India felt anxious for SILVER's safety and as an excuse said that he could not very well go back to Kabul unless the suggestion came from the Germans. Eventually however they agreed to his going back. He was cross-questioned about the code but apparently put up a good story and so far seems to have got away with it. RASMUS of course refused to work for the Russians. SILVER notionally controls a large subversive organisation in India which supplies information regularly to the Germans and also to the Japanese. The latest development is that WITZEL, with a wireless set and party, was to be landed somewhere on the north-west frontier. He is to establish touch with

SILVER though the precise purpose of his mission is not yet known. The whole matter could not be taken up with the Russians as the information about the meeting between the Russians and RASMUS was obtained from a German B.J. The matter however is further complicated by the fact that Hill, the SOE representative in Moscow, who is in touch with the NKVD, does not know about this piece of Russian duplicity and merely thinks that the Govt. of India are being sticky.

84 flying bombs have been plotted during last 12 hours up to 6 am today. Of these 65 came overland, 33 of them reaching Greater London. Two others got as far as Luton in Beds. and one to Overton near Andover in Hants. The remainder were either shot down or landed in the S.E. counties. London casualties so far reported are 19 killed, 94 seriously injured, 112 slightly injured and 30 unclassified. 18 flying bombs are reports to have been shot down, two in Kent and 16 in Sussex. The total number killed by the bomb which fell in the Guards Chapel is now given as 111. A bomb fell on Constitution Hill 50 yds from Hyde Park Corner, destroyed a 100 yds of Buckingham Palace wall. Blast damaged extended from St. Georges Hospital to the In and Out Club. The flying bomb which came down in a field made a crater 24 ft in diameter and 15 ft deep. The crater on Constitution Hill is small and shallow.

On 17.6.44 Madrid sent the following recommendation to the successor of Guillermo (Canaris) about Garbo: "Immediate award of Iron Cross II to Spanish national V-man 319 Alaric, Leiter Arabal, who has rendered services of great importance in the war for the last two years as the Leiter Wolfplatz (England) network, at the constant risk of his life. We consider immediate award necessary to maintain his morale, because under present conditions he is further endangered by our own fire. In this connection we draw your attention to the special mark of recognition recently conferred on Rex. In our view V-man is in the same capacity as the volunteers of the Blue Division who received the same decoration".

June 22nd

I attended a meeting of some 50 people at Norfolk House to consider the relaxation of restrictions imposed by Overlord. The two principle matters where we wished restrictions maintained were firstly the continuation of the ban on A.B. Transport, and secondly the restrictions on Irish trawlers. Our grounds for the first were that it provided an uncontrolled channel for rapid communication between this country and Sweden, which meant almost direct with Berlin, and for the second that fishing trawlers could report matters of importance and could carry messages to Eire. They had orders not to put into Eire ports but this could not be effective firstly because the necessary evidence could not be obtained

and secondly because it could always be pleaded that the call at the Irish port was necessary owing to weather conditions. We were asked to put forward a case on both these matters. There appeared to be no difficulty about retaining the control over the Irish ships which formerly went to the Iberian peninsula. The Irish in fact derived considerable benefits from the new arrangement which gives them greater tonnage. They might however at a later stage have objections raised by the shipping companies. If so the question would have to be reconsidered.

The D.G. has written a memo for Anthony Eden on the work of the office since the beginning of the war. Dick and I feel that on the whole it is fairly good although it is not quite what we should have written ourselves. We have suggested a few additions which the D.G. has accepted.

Niall MacDermott told me yesterday that the whole of the I.B. machinery was working extremely well, that the FSP were acting with great intelligence and that their reports were coming through in well-ordered fashion. There is no doubt that all the trouble taken by Dick and others in planning, instructing and lecturing, has borne fruit.

The casualties for Crossbow from June 12th until today were 731 killed, 2,548 seriously injured, 2,577 slightly injured and 816 unclassified. 939 aircraft have been launched, 677 crossed the coast and 243 reached London, approximately 26%. For the 12 hours ending

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6 pm yesterday, 25 flies were plotted, 23 came overland, 15 of them reaching Greater London. The casualties were 21 killed, 122 seriously injured, 176 slightly injured. 6 were reported as having been shot down.

The flying bomb which came down at Icklesham exploded 16 minutes after landing. For the 12 hour period ending 6 this morning, 34 flies were plotted, of which 26 came overland and 14 reached Greater London. The total casualties for London were 11 killed, 16 seriously injured, 31 slightly injured, 7 unclassified, 3 mission.

June 23rd

On the 19th the Jap in Berlin was told that there were 23 divisions in this country under Gen. Patton ready to carry out an invasion. For this reason the Germans had refrained from pouring their armies into Normandy. It had been thought that our original plan was to occupy Cherbourg and Le Havre with about 17 divisions and then advance south-east down the Seine. Simultaneously Patton's army would have carried out landing operations between Dieppe and the country lying to the east of that port. It was thought however that Monty's plan had gone wrong. At the same time the Germans still considered that there was a great likelihood of Patton's army group landing between Dieppe and Boulogne, and were prepared for this.

The new secret weapon was at present being used against London but it was being tried for the first time and was therefore directed against an area offering a wide target. As experience was gained it would be used on a still more extensive scale against the ports and south of England. At present there was so much smoke that recce planes were unable to say for certain what the results had been though it was believed that they came up to expectations. Since there is no smoke over London and no recce plane has dared to put in an appearance, this report appears to be wishful thinking.

I had a meeting at 10.30 which lasted till 1.30 at Norfolk House. We discussed the visitors ban and service leave at some length. The present suggestion of SHAFF is that it should be retained from Southampton to the Wash. There appears to be some doubt about the Scottish area. SHAFF were under the impression that the ban should be removed, but Wild who is dealing with deception at SHAFF, took a contrary view. Wild was not in favour even of a partial removal of the ban but he told me afterwards that he had merely objected because he thought a partial removal would only be the thin end of the wedge. I said that although it was not within my province I felt that the partial removal might considerably assist the cover plan since it would emphasise that something might be expected from the east and south-east. It seemed to me that there was some advantage in putting this into operation immediately and making a public announcement. Wild told

the meeting what the cover plan was and said that it was holding both as regards the Pas de Calais and the threat to Norway. There was little opposition from either the H.O. or the Ministry of Home Security.

We then discussed the question of Service leave. The 3 Services, particularly the Army, are being pressed very hard for some relaxation. I said that leave was a question to which the Germans attached very special significance. They were always asking whether leave had been stopped prior to Overlord. If there was any relaxation now it would inevitably get back to them through neutral Embassies. It would not be possible to explain to them that there was only partial relaxation of leave or to get it across in a convincing way. Wild very much endorsed this view.

The question was raised as to whether the risk to the cover plan would be any less if the ban was partially abolished or wholly abolished. I said that I did not think it would make very much difference. I am bound to say that I felt the arguments in favour of granting leave were rather poor when a matter of such importance is at stake. Surely the troops could wait another month, having waited so long. There were many troops from the Mid East who had not had leave for 3 years, and we thought nothing in the last war of going 6 or 8 months.

Murphy of O.S.S. came to see me. He wants to get us to train 2 or 3 interrogators for FUSAG owing to a request that he has had from Gen. Seibert of G. 2 for officers of this type. I said that I would discuss the matter with Dick and let him know what the best was that we could do.

I had a meeting with Janson, Dobson of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and 3 other Naval Officers including Commander Welby of the Ops. Section of the Admiralty. We discussed the question of trawlers fishing in southern Irish waters. Dobson said that from a purely administrative point of view he would prefer the present arrangement to continue since it was extremely difficult for him to control these fishermen. There was rarely sufficient evidence to warrant any form of sanctions. On the other hand his dept. had been pressed very hard by the Ministry of Food to allow fishing to continue in Irish waters since the arrangements imposed since Overlord had caused about 10% reduction in the supply. Commander Welby said that it was vital from an operational point of view that the present arrangements should continue. German submarines were concentrating in southern Irish waters for the purpose of contacting our transports going across to the beach-head. They were being dealt with by Coastal Command, using radar. For this reason it was essential to keep fishing trawlers out of the area, since there was no means of distinguishing at night between a trawler and a submarine. For operational purposes the whole area was regarded as

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a "bomb at sight" area. Our operations were being highly successful and it might be that in due course the Germans would abandon the struggle but until that moment was reached it was of paramount importance to keep the area clear. This seemed to be an over-whelming argument. On the security side I said that these trawlers provided uncontrolled channel and Janson felt that they might take a certain amount of information across which related to convoys etc. We neither of us felt however that the security grounds were very strong. I said that I would report the facts to Sir Findlater Stewart.

Lennox tells me that Jumbo Wilson is prepared to mount Anvil with 3 divisions in a month or two.

Our balloon barrage yesterday got 23 doodle-bugs, and 23 were shot down by the Air Force. The percentage reached the London area however for the last 36 hours is roughly 50% 4 or 5 sites have been knocked out by bombing and 20 odd have been damaged.

A propos of the sirens the P.M. has declared "Let this something banshee sound only once a night". He has also ordered the removal of the London area of his private balloon called Lord Inskip. He is sick of seeing it bobbing up and down.

Our operations in Italy appear to be going extremely well and it is hoped to attack the Rimini Pisa line before long with 14 divisions keeping 6 in reserve. The Germans are extremely short of reserves and do not appear to be transferring any others to the Italian theatre.

Operations in the beach-head are considered satisfactory with the one exception of the munitions which have not come up to expectations in withstanding rough weather. 50% of them are said to be damaged. This makes the capture of Cherbourg all the more important.

June 24th

I attended a meeting of the ISSB to discuss the suggested re-opening of the Swedish air line. I put the pros and cons as fairly as I could and said that while it must be accepted that as long as the line was open there were facilities for rapid communication between this country and Berlin which could not possibly be 100% controlled, there were compensating advantages,

The points for opening the line were (a) that the FO would like to do so for diplomatic reasons, (b) that BOAC line could not carry all the mail and this mean that some of it would have to go via Lisbon and be subject to German censorship, (d) that ball bearings could be carried, (e) that the line was fairly well covered in other ways. Against re-opening were the

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following points: (a) fast route was provided to Berlin (b) Florman, the head of the line, was considered unreliable and had a son-in-London. SIS had reported recently that the head of Einzluft had been Stockholm and had had an appointment with Florman; (c) searching of crews is impossible (d) the Germans were interested in the re-opening of the line and had given a safe conduct; (e) Swedish diplomats could travel by that line at a moment's notice and would have priority. (f) it was possible that the re-opening would affect the cover plan to a slight degree and might be dangerous if operations from Scotland were contemplated at a future date. Lastly, it seemed that it would be difficult to close the line once it had been re-opened. The meeting, taking all these points into consideration, thought it would be better to remove the ban and take whatever risk there was.

On the 15th June the Jap in Vienna informed his Govt. that the German production of fighter at the end of last year was somewhere between 12-15,000 per month. Owing to our bombing, production has fallen to about 600. The Germans had in consequence suspected production of the rocket in March and increased the weekly hours of aircraft workers to 72. They had hoped in this way to bring the figure of fighter production up to a thousand in July, but despite these efforts that had not been able to bring it higher than 600. It was alleged that the installation of some 400 catapults on the defensive walls on the

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Germans were engaged in producing rocket shells with a range of 350 kms. but they felt that as long as it was not possible to strike a decisive blow at the London area at a single stroke, by means of this weapon, there was a risk that it might aggravate the British rather than otherwise. An increase in fighter production seemed to be more urgent and the production of rocket shells had therefore been discontinued. There may be some confusion in the mind of the Jap between the doodlebug and the rocket. The general impression in Vienna was that the Germans had been making preparations for our invasion which they thought would take place in July and that the recent landing occurred rather too early to suit them.

The total number of doodlebugs launched up to Saturday was 1,200, 889 (75%) had crossed the coast, 359 (30%) had reached the London area. A.A. claim 138 (16%), R.A.F. 204 (23%). The present balloon barrage consists of 450 balloons and is to be increased to a thousand.

June 25th

I saw Tommy today. He said that when he visited the bridgehead with the King, they proceeded to Monty's H.Q. where an investiture took place in the presence of some 50 press representatives. The King had been accompanied by one Louis WOLF, an Ass. Press correspondent attached to Reuters. WOLF had subsequently written up the visit, giving the names of all the villages through which

the King had passed on his way to Monty's HQ. This had been published after Censorship by SHAEF. De Guingand, Monty's Chief of Staff, had subsequently written a letter to Tommy pointing out the undesirability of this publication. Tommy had spoken to WOLF who said that he had given these details in order to give local colour to his story. He had never thought they would be passed by SHAEF but had put them in as he felt that someone else might and that if theirs got through he would lose the scoop. This is of course typical of the actions of all journalists. They never consider whether it is wise or unwise to publish information but regard the whole thing as a kind of game, in which it is their job by hook or crook to get something passed the censorship unnoticed. Tommy informed de Guingand about his enquiry and received a letter from Monty which he showed me. Monty said that had he known that his Chief of Staff was going to write about this he would have prevented it. He did not therefore wish that anything he said in his letter should be brought to the notice of His Majesty. He stated however that shortly after the King's visit a nearby farm was bombed and subsequently his own headquarters had been shelled. He had been forced to move elsewhere. The reason was that great care had always to be exercised when dealing with such a formidable opponent as the German. He himself has spent many hours trying to think out what was in the German mind. His letter was extremely friendly and cordial. This is one more instance of the inefficiency of SHAEF censorship. I have told Harry and Cussen but have made it

very clear that no use can be made of the information, except to keep in the back of our minds that WOLF is a man to keep an eye on. I seem to recall some conversation of Freddie KUH's which indicated his interest in WOLF and his movements. Presumably the whole of the Press know that he is specially employed to report on the King's visits. Any movement by WOLF therefore has a certain significance in Fleet St.

I gather that Alexander has advised the P.M. that in his opinion he will have the Germans on the Alps by August. He then thinks that he should turn right and strike at Vienna via Trieste rather than enter France from the South.

The information that Lennox gave me about the inefficiency of Mulberries appears to be somewhat exaggerated. The P.M. sent the mulberry expert down to the beachhead and had a report from him on Saturday to the effect that the mulberries would be in working order despite minor deficiencies, within the next two or three days and that each one of them would be able to land 2,000 tons a day, which was as much as could be done by the whole port of Cherbourg.

June 26th

The Key Points Intelligence Directorate report for 1943 indicates that air activity against this country during the past year has continued to decline. In the first quarter about 790 tons were dropped, in the second 728, in the

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third 380 and in the fourth 422, a total of 2,320 tons, somewhat less than the approximate load dropped by the RAF in a single attack. The total we dropped on Germany in 1943 was 136,000 tons. May was the month in which the greatest weight was dropped by the enemy but that month's total was less than that dropped on London in the heaviest attack of the war. Although the potential threat to key points was appreciable, the results have been of small account and in general the effect of the year's air attacks in so far as the essential war effort is concerned has been negligible. The total number of enemy action fires defeated by the NFS during the year was 1,568, compared with over 50,000 non-enemy action fires. The maximum in any one night was 136 in Grimsby in June, a figure that is little more than one-twentieth of that for London in April 1941. The largest number of overland sorties flown against land targets in any one day in 1943 was 60 on the 20th Jan. and in any one night 74 on the 17-18th Jan.

Courtenay has produced an amusing report of the reactions of the various Embassies to Crossbow. The Turkish Ambassador is apparently rather disturbed, and one member of his staff fainted when the bomb exploded. The Swiss Air and Military Attache feels that with the arrival of Crossbow he is now actually in the war. He spends most of his afternoons and evenings running into the streets, and it is reported that one of his cables in code to his home govt. regarding Crossbow was

"Goodbye but not with tears". He like the Swedish Air Attache is also certain that the invasion of France is the best answer to Crossbow. The Peruvian M.A. who has just arrived is definitely frightened. The Greek M.A. describes Crossbow as the gesture of a drowning man who tries to save himself by clutching at his own hair. The Spanish M.A. thinks that the doodlebug has not come up to expectations and states that the life of London continues with complete normality. The Swedish Attache CERVELL states that the Germans tested out the doodlebug from an island and aimed them at Sweden. This trial bomb carried no explosive and the Germans knew that if they shot them off one at a time they could check on results by the automatic protest the Swedish Minister in Berlin would make naming the spot in Sweden where they fell. This also had the advantage of the Swedes having several doodlebugs intact. CERVELL thinks that the dive is controlled by a time clock which works the elevators. He guesses that these attacks will continue for about three weeks and then peter out.

Milmo is rather worried about the case of BRODERSEN. Apparently defending counsel wished to call witnesses from Ham. There is to be a conference with the A.G. and Byrne at which I hope Cussen will represent us. It may be that it would be wise to find a pretext to withdraw the case rather than establish the precedent of calling 20 witnesses. We may also have to consider whether the cases where

an incriminating statement cannot be obtained before removal to O20 it is in fact desirable to prosecute at all.

Bonnefous has replied favourable to our suggestions about letting the French interrogat refugees. Hewould however like to have copies of our reports and also advance lists of those who arrive. This will be considered.

DenhamEde, Dick and I discussed the question of interrogations at Trinidad. Denham thought Henderson needed some rather positive directive from a senior officer here.

Denham is leaving us at the end of this week.

Kenneth Strong has asked Harry to provide him with a good senior counter-intelligence officer for SHAER. The possible candidates are Jack Barrow, Spens and Bertram Ede. Strong mentioned Ede and although he is not very much in the picture he might not be a bad candidate.

June 27th

I had a talk with Charles this morning about salaries. I said that I thought that those of many officers serving under me were low by any showing, firstly by comparison with those people holding similar posts in other services and secondly by reason of the rise in the cost of living and the expense of living in London as compared with the country. I felt that we were very lucky to have held the services of so many good people for so long. I pointed out

that we had lost the services of Billy Robertson purely on a question of pay. He was only getting £50-100 more than he got here Charles said he would let me have a list, when we would discuss the matter further.

I also suggested to him that I should put forward a list of people for decorations in order of priority. This would be an extremely difficult thing to do but I felt that if we left it till the end of the war the chances were that we should only get very few. He agreed. He did not think that the office would ever get more than one C. one O and one M or two O's and one M. in each list and there were of course the other divisions to be considered.

We then went to see the D.G. about Stopford's organisation. The D.G. seemed satisfied. We talked about Hooper's pay. He seemed to think that he was well paid at £600 and the fact that he was extravagant did not constitute very good grounds for an increase. I said I thought Hooper made out a good case on his budget but I was very anxious not to encourage him to get over his difficulties by adding to his incidental expenses. D.G. said he would consider the case.

I had a word with Archie Boyle about the suggested integration of SOE with the French. They were already integrated with the Americans and the new triangular problem may considerably affect the work of Geoffrey Wethered. Archie said that at the moment the suggestion was very much in embryo, and that he could not

really say very much. He would ring me up however in the course of 2 or 3 days and would arrange a meeting between myself, himself and Mockler-Ferryman. He was not at all clear as to how this new French arrangement was going to work.

It is possible that we may be re-occupying the Channel Islands before long. The present arrangement is that in addition to the I.B. officer, Stopford and d'Egville should go out and be attached to the Force Commander. Once things had got going and authority was handed back to the civil power, Stopford would go away and leave d'Egville in the capacity of an RSLO, the necessary arrangements being made with the H.O. D'Egville was formerly a port security officer in the Channel Islands prior to the German Occupation. It may not therefore be necessary to get H.O. authority for his return as an RSLO although they should probably be notified that he is there.

A telegram has been received from the DMI India suggesting the establishment of a Sino-British cum American Intelligence Bureau with a Chinaman at its head. The proposal has come from the Chinese. DMI rightly remarks that it might be as well to get ourselves integrated before we go into such a party and that the Americans might well do the same as they all appear to be squabbling. There is a suggestion that there should be a complete interchange of information including "Y" sources. DMI remarks that he doubts whether "C" will want to join. I must say that a combination of SIS, SOE, OSS in all its aspects, plus a Chinese

SIS and SOE, with a Chinaman at the head, seems to say the least to be a somewhat ambitious scheme, particularly when it involves an interchange of most secret sources. The question arises as to whether we ought to join the party. Our only possible candidate is Courtenay. DMI perhaps rightly remarks that if we do not accede to the Chinese request in some form or another various

Intelligence Services will probably find it impossible to work in China on their own. I suppose that in due course the Russians will want to join. The general view seems to be that it would be wise to start in a modest way with a Sino-British organisation.

For the 12 hours ending 6 this morning, 87 ~~flying-bombs~~ have been plotted, or which 61 came overland. Of these 43 reached the London area.

Cherbourg was reported to have fallen on the 8 o'clock news this morning. It was not though that it will take very long to get the port into working order.

Poles are starting an Intelligence organisation in conjunction with the Swedes. Their headquarters will be in Stockholm with branches in Lulea and Malmo. It is hoped ultimately to have an interchange of information with the Swedes from London. The Poles evidently want to have a good liaison with the Swedes for post war purposes. I think this line may

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June 28th

I dined with Peter Reid last night, when we exchanged notes about the deception for Overlord. He told me that he was getting his part of the story carefully written up, and I explained to him that we were doing the same, particularly in connection with the highly interesting map which had been picked up in Italy. This map was dated 15th May 1944 and purported to show dispositions of all our units in this country. It was almost identical with Plan Fortitude. The map was issued by Section Ic of the Abwehr contact point for Gruppewest, Kundstedt's group and was compiled from all information received by Fremdeheere. Nearly all the notional divisions were shown, giving the notional build-up in Scotland for the threat to Norway and the notional army in the south and east which the Germans were led to believe would attack through the Pas de Calais. Of special interest were 2 divisions shown to have moved down from north to south by red arrows. We in fact reported on the movement of the divisions slightly prior to the 15th May.

Peter told me that it was not until 5 am on D day that the Germans were aware that anything in the nature of a serious attack was likely to take place on the western front. They were evidently not clear as to where it was since a general alert was given all down the coast stretching from Holland to Brest. By Catalogue Reference: K V 41194 it was possible to give a general blurred picture and to avoid the

Germans getting any idea of various convoys concentraing on one particular point.

ZIGZAG arrived last night at a placed called West Retting near Newmarket. He was dropped from a height of 12,000 but came in at about 30 ft, turned north up the coast and then rose to a height of 12,000. He said that another aeroplane started with him but that he had no idea who was in it. He thought that possibly it was sent solely for the purpose of cover. He had been told that a raid on London would be staged to come off simulataneously with his arrival. This was of course purely for the purposes of binging hin up. Although he reported himself to the police, he found they were inclined to disbelieve his story, he therefore told them to ring up the police station at the place where he had dropped before. This they did. The police communicated at once with Hughes. ZIGZAG brought with him £6,000, £4,000 of which is almost undoubtedly for Brutus. He has no sabotage mission but a 5-fold espionage mission (1) to obtain information about night fighters, (2) to obtain information about Asdic types, (3) to ascertain what jamming devices we have against radio-controlled aircraft, (4) to report on the doodlebug and (5) to find out whether we had any plan by which aircraft starting from certain places are directed on certain targets in Germany. They have a theory that if aircraft leave a certain aerodrome they always attack Hamburg. If the Air Force are prepared to play this should provide an excellent opportunity of getting the Luftwaffe in the air.

At the Wednesday meeting today Herbert said that Berlin had received within a period of 4 days a verbatim extract from Alba's despatch about the doodlebug. The report was an objective one and stressed that life in London continued normally. The population were described as placidly observing the projectiles as soon as the alert was given.

Grogan raised the question of neutralising process for the Analine Pencil. As there was no evidence that the **pencil** was in use I said that I did not think that it was worth raising the question with Censorship at the moment. I agreed with Grogan however that it would be a good thing to raise with Censorship the question of intermediary mails. If we can get them stopped it would certainly be to our advantage. There is no doubt that the Germans knew about the system and the pretence of having letters posted in Lisbon could not possibly hold water.

Our casualties up to 28.6.44 in Normandy, both British, Canadian and American, are as follows:

Killed 5,694, wounded 27,298, missing 11,485, total 44,475. The total number of doodlebugs despatched up to date is 1,599. 1,213 have crossed the coast and 519 have reached the London area. A.A. claim 147, R.A.F. 311, and the balloon barrage 26. The percentage of killed **per** bomb is 1.8.

I lunched with Ede. He wanted to discuss various aspects of O.C. I said that I was

quite convinced that certain of our stations such as Singapore, Trinidad, Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt and Palestine, should continue and that it was highly important that they should be a lot more live than they had been in the pre-war period. This would necessitate constant visits by the D.S.O.s to this country and by representatives of head office to the various colonies. I also thought that it was necessary to have some officer here who was au fait with the situation and of fairly high standing, who could talk to Governors and also receive Colonial officials, police commissioners etc. from places where we had no D.S.O. but only a link. As regards work we should do in the colonies, I thought there was a case of keeping ourselves well up to date regarding movements which had either an international significance or constituted a vehicle for foreign intrigue. As regards the purely indigenous movements it might be that we should act as a clearing house, but the responsibility must lie with the local Governor and the local police. I pointed out to Ede that in the past I had always had the impression that the administrative tail was wagging the intelligence dog, and that had been a fundamental mistake. Experience during the war had been that officers who had visited the various stations on intelligence matters had been the best people to see this or that in the way of staff or equipment was necessary in order that the intelligence work could be done properly. Ede seemed to think that there would have been considerable advantage if an administrative officer had been visiting these stations fairly

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regularly. The necessary staff and equipment might then have been provided instead of waiting until a crisis arose. He thought that the status of O.C. should be something between R.C. which allowed direct access to RSLOs but knew nothing about their work, and D.4 who allowed no direct access to SCOs but was well informed as to all the duties that they performed. This he thought could be met by having an officer who was thoroughly au fait with the work of B.Division and also with the administrative problems in the colonies. I said that I thought this would be difficult unless one was going to duplicate the work of at least 4 or 5 sections in B.Division. Ede had been looking for another job but apparently the negotiations had broken down. He is therefore reconsidering whether in fact there is not something to be made out of O.C. since it now has something of a charter from the C.O. and the D.G. since Denham's visit is more amenable. I said that I would like to read Denham's report and also the charter, as up to now I had seen neither. There is I think something in what Ede says. At the same time I rather doubt whether there is a case for an Overseas Division, which is what he seems to have in mind. He complains bitterly of having to deal through Harker, who never takes the trouble to master the subject and either obstructs or mismanages any problem which is put up to him. In this he is of course merely reiterating the experience of all other officers in the department.

Dick, TAR, Roger and I had a long meeting about post-war office organisation. We came to the conclusions: (1) that we should aim at total amalgamation with S.I.S. (2) failing that, an offensive organisation under C. and a defensive one under ourselves, the latter to control counter-intelligence activities abroad as well as at home. If the objection were raised that you could not have two

Services operating abroad, we should suggest something in the nature of an SCI unit where the direction would come from here. Action on foreign territory wd. still be subject to veto by C. if he could show good cause.

(3) we thought that we should be responsible to each ministry independently for the work that we did for their departments, and that preferably SIS should be in the same position.

We should however have the backing of the Committee of Imperial Defence in the person of Bridges, with access to the P.M. if we were attacked by any particular ministry or if two ministries were in dispute about the responsibility for the work which we did.

(4) we agreed that passport control should become a C.I. responsibility and carry with it liaison with foreign police and 2^{ème} bureaux.

(5) we agreed that C.E., subversive movements and security should hang together firstly because the experience in technique and investigation was the same, secondly because espionage and subversion were both part of the technique of modern warfare. Even if it were not possible to get control over the whole movements, they had at least provided an efficient recruiting ground for spies of one kind or another. For example at the moment at any rate Russian

espionage could not possibly be carried out except in the background of the CPGB.

Two panzer divisions which have been brought back from the eastern front are moving up towards the bridge-head and a 3rd is being brought down from Norway. On the 23rd June the Japs in Berlin had information received from official sources that a further landing of our main attacking party would take place. Similar views are expressed in German official communiques. It would seem therefore that the cover plan is still holding. So far there has been no movement of troops from the Pas de Calais area, or indeed from further up the coast.

The question of raiding Axis consulates in Italy or elsewhere has been raised by Jumbo Wilson and is being discussed by the JIC. The Services' view is that we stand to gain nothing by sticking to the letter of international procedure. The Germans violated our consulate in Copenhagen and the Japs have done so elsewhere. The F.O. take the view that evidence shows that when there was a possibility of Axis legations or consulates coming under our control, all papers have been destroyed and that therefore there would be little advantage to be gained from raids. They think therefore that we should keep our hands clean, and not argue on the lines that two wrongs make a right. Personally I do not think there is much to be said for this argument. It is quite certain that any of the Axis powers would raid any of our consulates

if they could get their hands on them, and that there is no real advantage in being on the side of the angels.

June 29th

I discussed with Dick, Tar and Buster the question of the exchange of My ERIKSEN or FRESNIUS for Andree de JONGH, the Belgian woman who is under sentence of death for having assisted over 100 British airmen to get out of occupied territory. We have decided that My can be exchanged provided SOE saw no objection and likewise FRESNIUS could go provided there was no O2O objection and provided that the Americans, whose prisoner he was, were in agreement.

I went with J.C. to talk to [redacted] who had expressed a wish to secede. He was very distressed about his position. He thought that he was not altogether trusted. I assured him that this was not the case. His real difficulty however is that he feels that if he remains here he will never be able to go back to his own country. Germans of all political views even though they were bitterly anti-Nazi, would not understand a German who deserted his country and went over to the enemy. They would however all understand his running away from the Nazis. If therefore he could get back to Spain or S. America, the way for his return to his native country after the war would still be open. I said there were very grave difficulties which I could not explain to him but that I would only reconsider the whole position. I discussed the case afterwards with

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J.C. While I can see that it is probably impossible to send him back to Spain where he might well be kidnapped and under duress give away information about Artist, I could not see any real objection to his employment in the Argentine. I feel pretty confident that he would play straight and that he would not disclose any information unless he were kidnapped and tortured. If SIS do not wish to employ him in the Argentine possibly the FBI would be ready to do so. I propose to take the matter up with Kim.

I had a talk with Bonnie Reed about ZIGZAG. No track has been found for the other plane. There is no doubt however that it came in with ZIGZAG's plane from Utrecht, since 3 of our own aircraft were shot down over their bases when returning from a raid. There is apparently a row going on about this. Presumably the plane came in about 30 ft. as ZIGZAG did and so was not recorded by radar. The Air Force did not however that two planes left Utrecht and in view of previous action by planes from that quarter should have taken some sort of action.

ZIGZAG who is being interrogated by officers at O20 has mentioned 2 or 3 of the Icelanders who came here some weeks ago. He gave a description of some and got the names of some of the others fairly accurately. He has also got a list of the frequencies and times used by the Oslo station. His code is similar to Catalogue Reference KV/4/194, with certain modifications. From Lisbon he was sent to

Barcelona, and eventually to Paris and Berlin. He refused to be interrogated at any length except by his former master GROMANN. He was told that GROMANN was in disgrace and had been sent to Oslo. ZIGZAG himself was sent to Oslo where he was subjected to fairly searching interrogations. He was given 10,000 marks for putting the piece of explosive coal on the ship which took him to Lisbon, and later got 100,000 marks for his exploits in this country. He is not quite sure whether the Germans accepted his story about the sabotage at de Havilland's factory, since they had no evidence against which to check the story. He rather got the impression that they thought he was trying to build himself up, although they did not appear to question his loyalty to Germany. He says that he made two trips to Berlin from Oslo where he was questioned about the possibilities of sabotage in factories in this country. He expressed the view that this would be extremely difficult. He had very little to do in Norway and spent most of his time amusing himself. He got a yacht and cruised up and down the fjords. He also did a lot of winter sport. He brought two wireless sets, one is for a notional sub-agent, a friend in the crook world who is to report from the Cambridge area on the departure of our aircraft on bombing raids. The other is for his own use. Of the £6 000 he brought £1,000 is for another agent. The impression is given that this agent was to arrive here shortly. On the other hand as he was told that the money was to be delivered at an hotel, we are inclined to think that it must be intended for Brutus. He will receive instructions about

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this money when he gets into wireless communication. ZIGZAG had two courses with the Air Force and also with the "avy as he said that if he was to fulfil his assignments he must know precisely what they wanted him to discover in regard to night-fighter devices and Asdics. He told them that he was not a wireless expert and would not be able to retain all the information that he required, and tht it was therefore necessary for him to get some of it over the radio once he established communication. It was thought at first that his story did not quite tally with that of the Icelandic agents, an impression having been given by them that ZIGZAG had acted as their instructor. On further examination of the reports of the Icelandic agents it seems however that they never said more than that they met him at the headquarters of the Abwher in Oslo.

I saw Ronnie Sinclair for a moment. He is going to take up a post in the British Consulate in New York where he will be collaborating with the Americans on Indian affairs.

Our technical knowledge of one of the flying bombs is now virtually complete and our knowledge of the layout and construction of the launching sites should be complete within a few days. Suspicions that the main supply depots were located in the area north of Paris have been confirmed. There are two types of flying bombs, so far identified. One has a wing span of 17 ft 6 ins and one of 16 ft. It is probable that the former, since it has a great wing span and a longer nose, carries a

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heavier charge. Bombs have been observed at heights of between 1-4,000 ft and flying at speeds which have been variously reported as between 250-400 mph. They appear to be sufficiently reliable in operation and accurate in flight for about 80% of them to hit a target of the size of Greater London. Defensive measures however have reduced the number that do actually reach the target to 40% of the total launched. The bomb has a blast effect equivalent to the detonation of an H.E. bomb of about 1,000 lbs. There is nothing remarkable about the filling, which is in fact of a comparatively poor quality. The bombs are vulnerable to A.A., machine gun and cannon-fire and appear to become out of control if they are disturbed by such things as impact with balloon barrages or forcible diversion by their wings being tilted by an aircraft flying alongside. It is now almost certain that the bombs are launched by means of a rocket propelled trolley which is jettisoned on leaving the launching rails. The launching rocket seems to work on the bi-fuel system making use of concentrated hydrogen-peroxide and potassium permanganate. Small craters, made presumably by the launching trolley have been observed at distances of between 150 and 200 yds ahead of the launching points. These craters are a useful indication as to which sites are in use. These marks suggest that a certain number of projectiles fail to fly and fall short as soon as they are launched. No craters or blast marks have been seen in the vicinity of ski sites and it seems probable therefore that these are old sites and not in operation. These old sites were 120 ft long

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whereas the modified sites are 170 ft. A photograph shows that at Peenemunde some of the old 120 ft. launching platforms are being dismantled. A number of supply depots have been identified in underground workings in the neighbourhood of Paris and one south of Rheims. Supplies of bombs and other equipment are delivered by rail to these depots and re-transmitted by road to the launching sites. The headquarters of parts of the organisation have been located in five chateaux, and it seems almost certain that important telephone lines pass through the citadel of Doullens. Incidentally, ZIGZAG has stated that the headquarters of Crossbow is in Amiens. 50 modified sites have now been discovered in the Pas de Calais north of the River Somme, and two in an area between the Somme and the Seine. Of these 34 including the latter two appear to be complete and 21 have been identified as being in use. 7 of those which have been in operation have suffered Cat. A damage, as have a further 5 which have not reached completion. From radar plots it is evident that there are a number of other sites in operation between the Somme and the Seine and efforts are being made to fix their position.

Information on continued preparations for the launching of an attack with the large rocket continues to be received from various sources. P/W reports, which are generally subject to exaggeration, estimate its weight as being between 15 and 20 tons. Agents reports refer to the transporting of rockets towards the Pas de Calais and to the large

site at Watten itself. Photographs of a recent attack by 12,000 lb bombs on the structure at Watten show that a direct hit failed to penetrate the concrete roof of the main structure. Considered in relation to the fact that the majority of the A.A.defences at Watten have been removed, this fact appears significant. It may be that the Germans now consider that the essential parts of the site are sufficiently well protected by concrete to render the provision of A.A.defences unnecessary. From all the information available there seems to be no reason to suppose that an attack with a big rocket will not take place in the comparatively near future unless sufficient damage was done to the installations to prevent it.

The conclusions on this report, which is dated 26th June, are that it seems probable that the present scale of attack on London by flying bombs will continue for some days and may even increase within the next two weeks or so. After this period however it is likely that given ^{able} reason/ weather conditions the combination of improved information and increasing counter-measures will gradually reduce the scale. As regards the large rocket on the evidence available it seems likely that the enemy is making every preparation to launch an attack with this as soon as possible, and that the large sites are intended for this purpose. Unless these sites are destroyed or seriously damaged there seems to be no reason why the enemy should not be able to launch his attack in due course. " propos of the rocket, TAR told me the other day that t

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the large site on the Cherbourg Peninsula has considerably mystified the experts, since it appears to be pointing in the direction of Newfoundland.

June 30th

I attended a meeting at Norfolk House to discuss the Cabinet ruling which was given yesterday on the suggested relaxation of security restrictions. Findlater explained that the Cabinet had now decided that the cover plan, having been so successful, should be supported at all costs. It was therefore essential that no relaxation should take place which necessitated either a public announcement or overt action which would come to the knowledge of the enemy. The Home Secretary had apparently tried to point out that this virtually meant that most of the restrictions would have to remain in force, but he was not able to get his point across, beyond a suggestion which was adopted that Findlater's committee should re-examine the 43 restrictions in the light of the Cabinet ruling.

We dealt first with the visitor's ban. It was quite clear that the modifications suggested could not be carried out if a public announcement to the effect that the areas west of Southampton would in future be open to visitors were made. The same appeared to be the case with travel to Eire. While there might be certain relaxations within the framework of the regulations for people who wished to proceed on compassionate grounds, it would not be possible to make relaxations with

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regard to the business people without its coming to the knowledge of the Press and the House of Commons. If it did there would be a complaint that many who would have liked to have taken advantage of the relaxation had not done so because no announcement had been made. The opening of the Swedish Air Line and Air Lingus could clearly not take place without the fact becoming known to the enemy. Telephone censorship to Eire would have to march in time with travel. The EFM service could not be opened without publicity and the same applied to the air mail service to Lisbon, the increase in P/W mail and to the normal flow of service mails to Gib. Herbert raised the point of the abolition of the control of communications order except for parcels etc. for N. Ireland. Under the present regulations a permit had to be obtained Findlater said that if his Minister was prepared to face the Cabinet he could at his discretion cancel the order. In the light of this discussion it was decided that Findlater should make an approach to SHAEF and ask them in each case whether they felt that de-restriction would affect the cover plan. He thought that it was arguable that a modification of the visitor's ban so far from being detrimental to the cover plan might in fact reinforce it. I entirely agree with this view, and said so at the earlier meeting. Wild and SHAEF however felt that any sort of relaxation in regard to the visitors ban would be detrimental to the cover plan. SHAEF will also be asked about the other points, whether they think the opening of the Swedish Air Line is likely to affect them. I said that I thought

a distinction should be made between de-restrictions which would ultimately come to the knowledge of the enemy, and public announcements. It was our experience that the enemy did not as^a rule piece together a number of rather nebulous facts and pass a conclusion on them. If on the other hand a public announcement were made about any restriction being relaxed they were quite capable of drawing a wrong conclusion and saying that there was a general let-up of restrictions and that therefore a major attack had been launched and that nothing else of importance would follow.

I had lunch with Charles, and told him about our discussion relating to the future of the office. He seemed to be in general agreement.

Harry had his security meeting. We told those present about the Findlater Stewart meeting and also that Lambert of the W.O. had said that the proposals to the Cabinet by the Findlater Stewart Committee were already in the possession of certain newspaper interests, awaiting publication. He told Harry privately that the leak had been on a ministerial level through Beaverbrook. This may account for the statements in the Beaverbrook press about a possible relaxation of the travel to Eire.

Buster and I saw Maxwell this afternoon about BRODERSEN. I explained to Maxwell that Knut BRODERSEN, a Norwegian, had come to our notice through most secret sources as being prepared for a visit to this country on behalf of the German I.S. He had duly arrived via

Gib. whence he had come by ship to Leith. Special instructions had been given to Leith that they were to explain to BRODERSEN that it was at that point that he should disclose everything that he had to say. This had been done but BRODERSEN had stuck to the cover story that had been given him by the Germans, namely that he was coming here to join the Norwegian forces as a refugee. I then explained to Maxwell the normal procedure for the preparation of evidence. We always endeavoured to get a statement under caution before a man was sent to W20. In a few instances however that had not been possible and prosecutions had been launched on statement made on arrival at W20. We had always realised that we might be challenged in such cases by defending council and asked to produce documents and witnesses from W20, but until the case of BRODERSEN arose this had never occurred. BRODERSEN had been sent direct from the port to W20 where he had been subjected to the usual rigorous search and then left for 24 hours to think things over. This move had the effect of convincing a man that we had evidence to show that he was a spy. He was then interrogated, told that he was in a secret service prison, that his position could not possibly be worse and that although no promises could be made to him he might be able to help himself by telling the truth. It was only in this way that we could get the full intelligence value out of a spy, and we had adopted it as we attached more importance to intelligence than to the death penalty. BRODERSEN had on being confronted with this situation made a complete confession,

and a statement under caution had been taken immediately. It was on this that the prosecution had been based. BRODERSEN's defence was that ~~he~~ always intended to tell the full story but that he would not do so until he knew positively that he was talking to the right people, and his council thought that in this connection both documents and witnesses of O20 would assist the case. He was not pleading that his story had been extracted from him by threats or promises. This meant that the whole procedure at O20 would become known to defending counsel and in fact might become public property. All sorts of things would come out such as the recording by microphone of interviews, conversations etc. It seemed therefore desirable that prosecution in this case should be dropped. A conference had been held between the A.G., Byrne, Cookie and Cussen at which the A.G. had agreed to a plea of nolle prosequi and the whole case had been called off. Maxwell thoroughly understood the position and thought that the action had been correct throughout. He did however wonder how the Home Secretary would be able to defend himself if he were asked why he had been unable to prosecute in a case where only by accident a man had been interrogated at one place rather than another. On reflection he thought that he could say that the man had not been prosecuted because he had given valuable information or that prosecutions were instituted in all cases where the appropriate legal authorities considered that the evidence would justify such prosecution.

(5)a order. Later Cookie informed me that the wheels were moving rather fast and that the Central Criminal Court would probably give an order to the Governor of Brixton to release BRODERSEN. I spoke to Maxwell who thought that we were covered by the refusal of leave to land. Meanwhile however Cookie had promised the Governor the necessary powers under the arrival from enemy territory order. This would hold the position until the 12(5)a order had been issued.

Doodlebugs are now shutting off at an earlier stage and gliding to their targets sometimes in a straight line, sometimes in a curve.

At the discussion at the H.O. yesterday it was decided that all German repatriates who were not interned on the I.O.M. should not be allowed to go back to Germany.

I spoke to the D.G. about my going to America. I explained to him my personal reasons and then said that I did not wish to go if ~~if~~ he thought my presence was required here, and unless he thought there were intelligence reasons which would justify a visit. He said that on general grounds he thought there were and that on particular grounds he thought it desirable for somebody to discuss communism with the F.B.I. There had been a suggestion that a representative from the FBI should come over here. This however had been vetoed by the State Dept. who said that they did not wish any official visit on this subject to take place. I presume they are suffering from their old trouble, namely the belief that if

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policemen and soldiers came together they might run the State Deptl into an awkward situation. In this case they probably imagine that a leak would seriously embarrass their relations with Russia. This is of course an entirely mistaken notion.

Freak has returned from his journey with the King. He did not meet anyone who could give him news of Dreadnaught. The Yugoslav Govt. wished to send Tricycle for a short visit to the USA for their own purposes and it is proposed that Freak should send a short message on his radio explaining that his own and Tricycle's tavel will prevent them from continuing to report.

July 1st

P/W mail shows that an Irish camp has been formed at Luchenwalde near Berlin for the purpose of forming a Free Irish Movement which will fight against the North. One letter received on this subject which has apparently come out through German censorship says quite frankly "How do the Germans imagine that they are going to get us to join a movement of this sort when they have been feeding us on pig swill for months". This looks like another typical psychological blunder by some German who thinks that he is going to get southern Irish soldiers fighting in the British Army to join a movement for attacking N. Ireland, because they are Catholic and anti-Bolshevik, and should therefore be opposed to the British Empire which is in association with Russia. The only possible
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value

/ of such a movement from the German point of view would be to publicise it as an anti-British Empire movement which was being joined by thousands of P/Ws.

Total casualties in Normandy up to June 29th were 7,174 killed, 35,390 wounded, 10,509 missing, total 53,074. This includes ourselves the Canadians and the Americans. The total number of prisoners taken is 41,000. The total number of men landed up to June 29th was 769,770. During this period 126,427 vehicles and 358,170 tons of stores were also landed. This seems to be a terrific achievement when it is considered that we started merely by running small craft on to the beaches. Mulberries are now more or less a going concern.

Monty has apparently changed his plans. He intends to keep the enemy forces on his right flank occupied by reinforcing the resistance movements in the Brest Peninsula. Meanwhile he will drive hard in the direction of Paris.

78 flying bombs were reported throughout the period 12 hours ending 6 am today. 65 of these flew overland and 37 reached the London area. 26 of them were destroyed.

Romney House was hit at about 6.30 this evening. There is apparently no structural damage to our part of the building, only blast effect, which has blown the windows out etc. Our NDO there happened to be in the basement and was unhurt. Our documents were all locked up and the specially confidential ones had been evacuated to Birmmham.

July 3rd

I attended a meeting at Norfolk House today to discuss the minutes of the last meeting, and to get SHAEF's approval for various suggestions made. SHAEF had now agreed that the removal of the visitors ban west of Southampton will in fact assist the cover plan. They did not mind about EFM messages. They did not however wish for any let-up on Irish travel except on compassionate grounds. They did not wish either AB Transport or Air Lingus to be opened. It has been suggested that the position should be reviewed at the end of this month. The attitude of SHAEF has considerably stiffened since they discovered that the Cabinet was on their side.

After lunch I attended another meeting at Norfolk House to discuss whether diplomatic ban should be re-imposed, if Big Ben started to operate. The general view was that as near a total ban as possible should be imposed for 48 hours, when the position should be re-considered. It was not thought that any such ban could serve any useful purpose after a period of about 10 days. The Air Ministry representative, Wing-Commander Lamb, said that very little was known about the rocket of a positive kind. It was thought that it would be far more inaccurate than the flying bomb. The only possible counter-measures would be bombing of the sites and jamming the German radar which would be engaged in plotting the point of impact. We are apparently using radar to pick up the rocket and if this is successful it may be possible

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to give a few minutes warning.

I suggested that we might get American co-operation in advance as regards the banning of their telegrams. It was generally agreed that the Russians should be included in the ban. I felt however that it would be better not to say anything to them in advance but merely to stop their telegrams. It was generally felt that a delay of 48 hours should be justified on grounds of general security confusion. After 48 hours it might be able to be relaxed with belligerent allies and perhaps more precisely with the French. It was felt however that on present information no decision on this point could be made.

On the 27th June Steengracht told the Jap that in the opinion of the German Supreme Command Patton's army remain concentrated south and south-east of Southampton. More than 350 large and small vessels had been got ready and landing operations would be attempted in the near future. Nothing definite can be said about the place but it was considered that it was extremely likely to be in the area in the east of and contiguous to the existing bridgehead and embracing Le Havre. This seems to indicate that the cover plan is still operating.

Lennox tells me that we have put something between 420-450 German tanks out of action and that 167 of these have been totally destroyed. The total number of tanks that the Germans are believed to have left is given as roughly 700.

I saw "C" about my going to America. I told him that I wanted to go for personal reasons but that I had told the D.G. that unless he felt that I could be spared and that my going had some definite intelligence advantage, I would prefer to remain here. I thought personally there was considerable advantage from an intelligence point of view since nobody had been to America from head office for 18 months. Apart from this, the FBI representative who was coming here had been prevented from doing so by the State Dept. who for some reason best known to themselves did not want what they described as an official visit. I suppose they thought that any get-together on the subject of communism might come to the ears of the Russians and cause them trouble. This is of course pure nonsense. I told "C" also that I had spoken to Bill Stephenson who saw no objection to my going. "C" said that he had no objection at all particularly since Stephenson was agreeable. I said that I told Stephenson quite frankly that if he thought my presence there was going to start another barney, I should certainly not go. He had assured me that all that was a thing of the past and that my visit would be welcome.

"C" seemed very pleased about the battle. He said there was no doubt that German morale was right down and that things in Normandy were going well, mainly on account of our remendous preponderance of artillery and aircraft. I asked him about "Big Ben". He said that Paine had recently paid a visit to Bomber Command where he had been shown certain

photographs of the rocket sites. These indicated that very considerable damage had been caused. He did not understand why this information had not been made available before since the Air Ministry were evidently in ignorance about these photographs. He also told me that the rocket was radio-controlled. Steps have been taken to pick it up by radar should it start firing. It was thought that probably several minutes warning could be given. He did not think however that it was likely to operate for several months. The indications were that it was very much in the experimental stage. It was possible however that Germans might try and experiment on this country, even though they might not have much idea as to where the rocket would land up.

I mentioned to him that it seemed likely from a Jap BJ that the Germans were not contemplating the use of gas. He said he thought this was most unlikely, neither did he think they would start bacteriological warfare. The general talk about gas was probably due to a German belief that we should retaliate for the doodlebug with gas or some other weapon. He personally was in favour of retaliation though not with gas or microbes. He thought we should bomb open towns and villages, and that this might even be forced upon the Govt. by public opinion. He was very scathing about Air Force Intelligence. He had reported various places where the doodlebug was being made and also the depot at Creuil near Paris but these targets had never reached Bomber Command. Harris on being given these targets

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by SIS said that he would be delighted to bomb them.

Anvil is now definitely on again. This is probably due to American pressure of a political kind. The matter was debated by the joint Chiefs of staff at Washington and a decision was reached yesterday. This will mean a certain depletion of Alexander's forces, and is of course contrary to Alexander's recommendation that he should turn right instead of left on reaching the north of Italy.

July 4th

Some 400 Russians working with the Todt organisation in Normandy have been brought over to this country. The question has arisen as to whether they are to be treated as civilians or as P/W. We should prefer to see them kept as P/W at any rate until they have been identified and accepted by the Russians. So far they have been passing through the LRC.

I lunched with Walter Bell, Arnold-Foster and Alexander Halpern. The latter is a White Russian Jew who left Soviet Russia after the revolution and has established himself in business here. For the last few years he has been working in DSC New York and making a special study of European minorities. He has a very wide knowledge of affairs in America and seems extremely able. Arnold-Foster mentioned his visit to Blenheim, LRC, and C 020 and seemed very pleased with the attention that had been given to him. I asked him when

he was going to visit SJ. He said that the ball was with us. He thought it would be a good thing if he came fairly soon "as things were moving rather fast". I do not quite know to what he was referring but a rumour has reached us from Diplock that Eden has more or less given his blessing to the idea of SIS taking over B and F Divisions. Quite clearly we shall have to get our house in order for battle. When Arnold-Foster comes to have his talk with me I shall ask him quite frankly the purpose for which he is collecting information about this office and what he intends to do with it. Is it his idea to present a finished memo with proposals to the Foreign Office Committee which is considering the future of SIS. I shall then proceed to tell him in a spirit of the greatest friendliness that we do not altogether agree with his suggestions. In fact that we think they are fundamentally unsound. I shall also say that I think it wrong that any ex parte statement should go to the Foreign Office Committee. Dick thinks that we shall be making a mistake to table a memo at this stage. He thinks it better to wait for the attack and break it up, if we think it unsound. We could then table our suggestions, which to a considerable extent have the backing of Section V.

The Russians are streaking ahead beyond Minsk at the rate of 15-20 miles a day and are now only about 150 miles from the East Prussian border. At the height of their advance the Germans never averaged more than 10 miles a day.

Apparently the question of Anvil is not finally decided. 10 divisions would be required and these would have to be taken largely from Alexander's forces. The P.M. is opposed to this and is saying so to the President.

The total number of doodlebugs launched up to date is 2,331. Of these 1769 crossed the coast and 939 reached London. 303 have been brought down by day and 150 by night. Aircraft have brought down 214 plus 76 which are being investigated, and balloons 41 plus 18. The remainder presumably have been brought down by A.A. Total casualties are 2,358 killed, 6,930 seriously injured, 7,836 slightly injured, 204 unclassified. The production of doodlebugs is estimated at about 1,200 per month. The question of retaliation is under discussion. It is being opposed by Bomber Command who say that they are already using up 40% of their bomber forces in counter-doodlebug activities.

Total casualties for ourselves, Americans and Canadians to date in Normandy are 56,716. Total number of prisoners 50,972. The figures for the build-up in Normandy are really astonishing. Up to July 2nd we had landed 911,524 men, 171,532 vehicles and 566,648 tons of stores. The mulberries at Arromanche landed 4,500 tons of stores on July 1st. Pluto which is in operation, discharged on the 1st July 1100 tons of oil at Porte en Bassin. We shall have 6 more armoured divisions in the line by the beginning of September. This includes a Polish and a French division.

Fleetwood-Hesketh has done a note on deception in support of Overlord before and after D-day. The object was to contain German forces in the the Pas de Calais (Plan Fortitude) and to a lesser extent in the Bordeaux area (Plan Ironside). The latter was not put into operation until the second half of May. It threatens an assault from the west of England with a shore to shore build up from the United

States. For a variety of reasons it was not possible to pitch this threat very high. The agents Bronx, Garbo and Tate were employed in its execution. Before D-day the implementation of Fortitude, the main deception plan, was confined to building up an order of battle and location of forces notionally engaged. Care was taken to avoid the specific mention of the Fortitude ^{target} area. The Fortitude forces in the south and south-east were to balance the Neptune forces in the west and south-west, thus leaving the enemy in doubt as to our intentions. From D-day onwards, the Neptune area being known to the Germans, it has been the policy specifically to threaten the Pas de Calais with the highest degree of intensity possible, to exaggerate the state of preparedness of FUSAG which is to control the notional operation, and to encourage by every means the belief that 21st Army Group and FUSAG are being employed in independent roles. The agents employed under Fortitude at the present stage are Garbo, Brutus and Tate, all three communicating by wireless. They are supporting the plan in the following ways: (a) Garbo through his position at the M.O.I. has interpreted notional PWE directives in

reverse. He explains away the removal of the diplomatic ban by referring to a Cabinet dispute on the subject. He has continued to receive detailed observation reports from his network of subagents which confirm the location of the FUSAG formations. These reports he summarises and a full appreciation transmitted on the 9th June in which the Pas de Calais was given as the target area for the second assault. He has also sent the Cabinet document which indirectly discloses transport difficulties in eastern and south-east England, caused by impending operations. (b) Brutus was appointed to an allied mission attached to FUSAG on the 27th May. From this position he has been able to give a comprehensive FUSAG (Fortitude) order of battle with locations of formations under command. (c) Tate, through his connection with a railway clerk at Ashford has seen a schedule of troop movements which with other information already in the possession of the Germans indicated the move of FUSAG formations from concentration to embarkation, without giving actual dates. The continuation of the present threat against the Pas de Calais is limited by two factors: (a) the appearance of FUSAG formations in the Neptune area, (b) the withdrawal of wireless equipment. For the protection of our agents it was decided therefore to put over shortly after the 20th June the story to the effect that the Neptune assault had failed to draw sufficient reserves from the Pas de Calais and that it had consequently been decided to reinforce the present operation with formations of the First Canadian Army. From now onwards the story will be

passed that Neptune has succeeded beyond expectation and that Monty has therefore asked that the assault against the Pas de Calais be postponed, and FUSAG be used to exploit his success. Gen. Patton, notionally commanding FUSAG, will notionally object strongly. The Supreme Commander will notionally decide in favour of Monty and therefore Gen. Patton will be relieved of his command and will assume command of the Third U.S. Army, Gen. Bradley assuming command of FUSAG. Meanwhile the Second U.S. Army Group will be built up in the U.K. whereby the threat to the Pas de Calais and to other ports of the north-west European coast can be maintained, after FUSAG has been committed. It was clearly demonstrated by Most Secret sources that up to June 11th at any rate Plan Fortitude was firmly in the minds of the German High Command. The first Panzer Division which on D-day was at Turnhout was estimated to be likely to move into the target area between D plus 3 and D plus 7. On D plus 6 it was at Ghent. The Second Panzer Division which on D-day was at Amiens was instructed to move into the target area between D plus 3 and D plus 8 and was actually engaged on D plus 8. It was probably delayed as a result of the bombing of the Seine bridges. The 116th Panzer Division which was at Pontoise and was expecting to be in the target area on D plus 1 did not move south of the Somme until D plus 5. The 84th Infantry Division which was north east of Rouen and expected to be in the target area between D plus 3 and D plus 7, was on 18.6.44 still in its old location. The same applies to the 331st Infantry Division at Hazebrouck.

In the Bordeaux area the Second S.S. Panzer Division which was at Toulouse on D day, had only reached Tours by D plus 10. It was originally calculated that it would be in the target area not later than D plus 7. The 11th Panzer division estimated to be in the target area about the same time still had its headquarters at Bordeaux on D plus 10. It was then dealing with French resistance groups. The 17th S.S. Panzer Grenadiers which were at Thouars and expected to come into action on D plus 2, did not enter the field until D plus 4.

July 5th

The German I.S. in Lisbon has recently been making arrangements to send certain agents to the U.K. who are referred to by numbers. They have a strong Swiss flavour and it is possible that they may be connected with the Swiss courier Pedro, the agent with which Einzheer representative Brandes claims to have working for him in the U.K. One of them is expected to leave Switzerland between 17th and 20th July and would arrive in England at the end of July after staying in Lisbon. Discussions could therefore take place either in Switzerland before the 17th or in Lisbon after the 20th. It was thought that Lisbon would be preferable since German subjects were liable to be shadowed by frontier police in Switzerland. Another one was said to have successfully trained in secret writing at Lisbon and was due to fly to England on the 27th June. Only 2 non-British subjects travelled by air from Lisbon on that date. One was Dutch,

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named MAAS-GESTERANUS, who until recently was head of the Dutch I.S. in Lisbon. Up till now there has been no question of his loyalty, but he has recently been sent home either for inefficiency or indiscretion. We are making further enquiries about this. The second non-British traveller was the Swiss courier Rudolf HAFTER. This man has been going regularly for the last year or 18 months travelling on an average once a week. Orange considers him to be reliable, and if he travels so frequently it would not be necessary for him to have undergone a training in secret writing as he could carry his information in his head. It is quite possible that we may once more be dealing with one of Brandes' notional set-ups.

Dick, Curry, Hollis and I had a talk about the future of Curry's section in SIS. Curry said that the tendency was to put it back with Section V. I said that I did not think that this, from a purely SIS point of view, was illogical, since any Section V agents abroad, if properly instructed and the right sort of people, should be able to cover both subversive movements and C.E. On the other hand discussions were going on with Arnold-Foster and his view seemed to be that in some way or another both Section V and ourselves should be amalgamated. It was an open question whether we should go to SIS or SIS come to us.

I had a long talk with Arnold-Foster. It was fairly clear I think that he had been giving considerable thought to the future of his

office and ours and how the obvious difficulties of the present organisation could be remedied. When therefore the offer was made to him to come and visit our dept. he accepted it with pleasure. He thought that if between ourselves we could agree on how the two depts. could come together it would be difficult for any outside body to oppose our solution. He quite realised however that we might differ. He did not intend to submit any report to the FO Committee or in fact to anyone without showing it to us. The cardinal plank in his platform is that it is absolutely essential that the investigating body responsible for keeping British territory clean of enemy agents and so on should have the fullest possible information available from foreign sources. He does not see how it is possible for us to get this information unless we are actually a part of SIS. I see the force of this argument in practice, but when I put the point to the D.G. later, all he said was "Why not?". The real answer is that psychologically secret service depts. are disinclined to disclose detailed information about their informants and about how they obtain a piece of information to anyone outside their dept. Arnold-Foster seemed to think that some sort of rump should be left which would constitute MI5, but I could get no clear view from him as to what this should consist of. His idea was that it should act as a kind of buffer between SIS and outside depts. I told him that I did not see how an emaciated MI5 of this sort could really serve any useful purpose and I also warned him against shutting himself up in a box and refusing to communicate fairly full information to selected people

in govt. depts. In the long run these depts. could absolutely stymie one's activities. It was necessary on occasion to tell them a great deal in order to get their co-operation. I also told him that if he were considering the transfer of B and F Divisions he would have to include O.C. and probably R.C. and M.S. He thought this would probably be necessary and expressed the view that after the war defence security would probably be to a large extent decentralised, the dominions and possibly the colonies being made responsible for their armaments. This would mean that places like Australia would have to have their own secret service directed against the Japs. I said that this would necessitate close liaison and at the same time something in the nature of an Empire clearing-house. It was rather on these lines that we had been reviewing our dominion and colonial organisation.

We then discussed the ministerial question. I said that we both served most govt. depts. and were in fact responsible to those depts. for the work which we did on their behalf. It seemed therefore illogical that we should have a minister other than either the Minister of Defence or the PM. Arnold-Foster thought that the Minister of Defence might throw the emphasis too much on the military side but did not quarrel with the idea of the PM. I said that our Permanent Under-Secretary could be the Secretary of the War Cabinet or in peace time the Secretary of the C.I.D. I had always

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wondered precisely how it was that SIS had the Foreign Secretary as their representative. Presumably the idea was that as they function abroad they must be under the Foreign Minister. I did not however think that this argument had been a good one. I explained to him that as we were at present constituted we should normally have more say in the direction of counter-espionage activities abroad. The reason was that the D.G. was ultimately responsible for keeping the country clean of enemy agents. C.E. and counter-subversive movements began abroad but we had no control over these activities. If it were found that there were 10 enemy agents in 10 govt. depts. in this country who had been working here for 4 years, it would be idle for the D.G. to say that C. had not told him about their preparation and arrival. He would be told that he was responsible and should have succeeded in locating them, although the best means for doing so normally, attacking the problem abroad, were not at his disposal.

I then spoke about liaison with our opposite numbers in foreign countries and said that if you did not have a separate offensive and defensive organisation but lumped them both into one integrated organisation, this was always likely to be regarded with some suspicion. This was particularly evident in the USA. They did not like SIS because they found that they had been making enquiries in their country, about matters which they did not think were our concern. SIS had moreover been running agents in the USA. When dealing with us they felt they were in touch with a

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dept. which was purely a defensive one with no offensive intentions. This made liaison much smoother and more effective. He agreed that this was a point for serious consideration. I said that if the combination between defensive and offensive were made, it would be necessary for the defensive organisation to have some sort of footing in SIS rather on the analogy of the footing of the Fighting Services. On this he went back to his old theme that unless we were absorbed by SIS he did not think we should have get real satisfaction. He asked me to keep an open mind on this question. I said that I would certainly do so but that I thought that total amalgamation was an arguable proposition, but I doubted whether the transfer of certain sections of the office and the leaving behind of an emaciated M.I.5 would be really feasible. I then passed Arnold-Foster on to Dick who went over with him fairly carefully the ground covered by B. Division. He is coming to see TAR's outfit tomorrow.

July 6th

I attended a meeting at Norfolk House to discuss security measures connected with Big Ben. H.O. had pointed out that unless a total stoppage of all travel were imposed in addition to the censorship measures, it would not be possible to reconsider an extension of the ban after 48 hours. It was generally agreed by the meeting that there were two propositions, one to prevent the information reaching the enemy for 48 hours and the other to prevent

any information leaving this country for 48 hours. Under (1) the measures previously suggested would probably be quite adequate since for example any information carried by a traveller to Eire would not be likely to reach the Germans for about 6 days. The Air Ministry and the Ops Branch of the W.O. were very insistant that all information should be prevented from leaving this country for 48 hours, and that the position should then be reconsidered. They pointed out that if the enemy only fired one or two ranging shots every 24 hours to begin with, it would be very important to prevent him from knowing just where they had la ded until some aounter-measure could be put into operation. These counter-measures would consist in bombing the sites, and in jamming any RDF which was locating the point of impact. There were 3 ways in which the Germans could obtain the information (a) by recde (b) by RDF and (c) by leakage. The Air Ministry did not think that it would be possible to hold (a) and (b) indefinitely and this would be a limiting factor on the period for which the ban could usefully be maintained. It was decided to put forward to the Cabinet the two propositions outlined above and to point out to them that the first one was easy and would mean no drastic modification of the existing regulations other than the imposition of the diplomatic ban, and that the second would cause considerable dislocation for a period of 48 hours and that any further extension would be a serious meance to the efficiency of our whole war machine. Findlater Stewart said he could not get this matter before the Cabinet

tomorrow and he thought that should anything happen in the meantime some machinery should be laid on for holding everything for a matter of 6-12 hours until the Cabinet had made up their minds. Individual ministers would have to take the responsibility for this at the suggestion of their depts.

Cussen has told me about the worst Overlord leakage case that has so far come to light. Apparently in March last M.O.I. sent a map of the target area to the British vice-consul in the Faroes, who is a Norwegian, instructing him to withhold it from the press until .day. Precisely what the covering letter was we do not yet know. The map was opened by an intelligent secretary who, seeing the implication locked it up in the safe and said nothing about it to her Chief. The question arises as to how the M.O.I. knew anything about the target area ~~at~~ all, what led them to send the map to the vice-consul in the Faroes, and whether they did in fact send these maps to other consular officials. My own view is that we should get a mandate to investigate this matter. If it is left to the M.O.I. we shall never get at the true facts. The first thing is to obtain the covering letter and the envelope in which the map was despatched through the open post. Findlater came over to see the map this evening. He thinks the case is a really bad one and should be investigated by the Security Service on Bridges' authority. If the case is, as it appears prima facie, it is enough to blow the whole M.O.I. sky high.

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I showed Findlater and the D.G. a copy of Alva's despatch obtained by Duck in which it was stated that he had joined with John Anderson who had disclosed to him information about mulberries. This was apparently done on the 6th June. Both thought that this constituted a bad leak but there is I think a certain reluctance to bring it to the notice of John Anderson.

July 7th

ZIGZAG has started to transmit. At the moment it is intended that he should be stationed in London in order to carry out deception in connection with flying bombs.

A discussion took place at Norfolk House on July 4th at which TAR was present in order to discuss deception in connection with Crossbow. Up to the present 80% or more of the bombs have fallen south of the river and the greatest concentration apart from particular areas like Wandsworth and Croydon is towards the east. In view of this the Air Ministry are of opinion that we should base our deception on what appears to be an error in the enemy's present calculations and protect Whitehall and central London by leading him to suppose that his bombs are over-shooting and falling towards the north and west. He may thus be led to shorten his range so that the main concentration is shifted still further towards the east and south. The Ministry of War Production raise no objection to this policy. Their factories are fairly evenly distributed through the London area

and there is as much in the centre as on the fringe. The approval of the Ministry of Home security, which is affected in much the same way, has also been obtained. Our method for doing this will be that when a bomb falls south of the river, the time when it explodes will be given for the explosion of a bomb which has fallen to the north, and vice versa. Bombs which fall in the centre of London will be report accurately since they may be mentioned by diplomats in their telegrams. Similar misleading information is passed over by adding or subtracting 25% of the wind-force and one-tenth of the cloud cover. This plan may work up to a point but it has to be borne in mind that a cross-section of all the bombs that fall in London is probably being applied by the Germans by means of certain of these flying-bombs which emit wireless signals. These plottings may show a concentration on Wandsworth, Croydon or Kensington, and the Germans may rely on these to adjust their fire so that they will fall in Piccadilly Circus, quite irrespective of anything that we report. However since these calculations would only be a cross-section there would be a considerable margin of error. Our misleading information might therefore confuse the picture still more. They must be making use of our recordings since they are so insistent on getting them.

Civil Affairs reports from Normandy are to the effect that the civil administration generally is satisfactory but that in some cases the

French are rather cool in their attitude towards civil affairs detachments. Two factors complicate the feeling of the local population (1) war destruction which in some cases is considered to exceed the necessity of the military situation and (2) that large elements of the population are making considerable profits under German administration. The supply situation is being helped by the use of captured German stores and horses.

The supply of labour is at present adequate but there may be a shortage in a few weeks. Action is being taken by the French authorities to segregate French civilian Todt workers and provide for their reorganisation as French pioneer battallions. Refugees are being dispersed as they arrive but the camps are well organised for possible emergencies. All French newspapers have been suspended pending enquiries.

I spoke to Stopford about the future of his organisation, when he goes to the Channel Is. and also in the event of his going later to Germany. He said that he was quite hard-pressed. I suggested that Michael Ryde might be put completely in his picture as he was going to work in B.1a for the time being. I had the idea that this would help to co-ordinate the activities of B.1L and B.1A. It might too be possible for Ryde to look after the accounts, which are too much for Elton, who is already overburdened. Stopford told me about the case of JOSEPH, who is being worked in conjunction with the FBI. Joseph is based on Liverpool or Glasgow. He has a notional agent in Baltimore and also one in San Diego on

the Pacific coast, whom it is hoped may get into direct touch with the Japs by wireless. There is also a scheme for the recruiting of a notional wireless operator who is proceeding to Kandy. This man will be fed with information by Peter Fleming.

I talked to Curry about Miss Sherer joining his section. We agreed that in view of recent developments it would be unwise for her to engage in any work which constituted duplication of effort. If on the other hand there was work for her to do which would be of value after the amalgamation she would be very keen to do it. Curry said he would have a talk with her. His second book on the Abwehr and S.D. is now completed and will go to the printers shortly.

Charles, Dick, Butler and I had a meeting on post-war planning. We put Charles fully in the picture. We all agreed that it would be necessary to go rather further than the D.G.s memo although we thought that as far as they went his views were sound. His thesis is that SIS should merely be a collecting body and that all the recording, direction and action should be centralised in this office. He is also hotly in favour of the G C & C S being separated from SIS and run as an independent body with a committee consisting of members of the users depts,

Anvil is now definitely on but we do not know what the number of divisions is to be. Alexander is at present in this country. There has already been a bad leak on Anvil by a naval

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officer who has told some woman that he is going to the Mediterranean to take part in another invasion.

July 8th

I dined with Hindlater last night. We had a long discussion about the future of MI5/6. I told him everything that was going on and in particular what Arnold-Foster was doing. Hindlater thought that the proposal that SIS should take over B and F divisions did not make any sense at all. Quite apart from questions affecting the efficiency of SIS as an organisation, the capability of its directing heads to manage even what they had got let along something more was doubtful. He thought in fact that G C & C S should be separated from SIS and agreed that it should be run by a committee of all the user depts. He did not think that total amalgamation was a feasible proposition. He thought that it would be opposed on political grounds, and that such an organisation would be too unwieldy. He much preferred our idea of an offensive and defensive service involving the abolition of the 3 mile limit. As regards ministerial direction he felt that both depts. should be under the same ministerial head and that the only suitable person would be either the minister of Defence or the PM. On the Under-Secretary of State level they would work to the chief of the War Cabinet or in peace time the head of the CID. He thought it essential to have some person in authority such as Bridges and ultimately the PM to knock the heads of the two organisations together if

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this proved necessary. I put forward to him my pet scheme for a permanent civil branch in each Service Intelligence Directorate with possibilities of promotion throughout these organisations also SIS and ourselves. He seemed from taken with this idea. He said that the war had shown him the need for it and indeed had shown in general that permanent civil staffs who had the right sort of

experience and could give continuity to the work were essential throughout all branches of the Services. Endless dislocations had resulted from the constant comings and goings of the Service personnel in a whole variety of branches. He regarded the Military Intelligence Directorate as a somewhat useless body. They initiated very little, if anything, themselves, in so far as the collection of information was concerned and were much more inclined to collect intelligence for the sake of collecting it and not to turn it to proper use. I said that I felt the principal fault had been that military intelligence thought much more of collecting reports from all possible sources than of studying the problems of the soldiers in the field and seeing how far they could be of assistance to them. I told Findlater that I thought Arnold-Foster was honestly trying to find a solution to a very difficult problem and that he had some hopes of getting an agreed proposition. It might be that after he had taken a look at the whole of our organisation he would considerably modify or radically alter his present proposals, which so far differed widely from our own. I was inclined to think however that there would in the end

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be a very wide gap between us and that it would be necessary for some impartial authority to arbitrate. I wondered therefore whether he would be prepared to take on such a job as I could think of no one who would inspire greater confidence. He said that he was quite convinced that a detailed investigation into the activities of all the Intelligence Services would be essential and that it was a job that he would have great pleasure in undertaking. I said that if any such suggestion were made it could not very well come from us. He said that when the appropriate moment came he thought that probably it would be best for him to put the idea to Sir John Anderson or to Bridges or possibly to both. He would think however very carefully over what I had said but would do nothing until I let him know what conclusions Arnold-Foster had finally reached. He had met Arnold-Foster on one occasion when he dined with him and Hooker of the Cabinet Offices. The occasion was some kind of dispute between SIS and SOE. He got the impression that Arnold-Foster was far from satisfied with his own organisation.

I talked with TAR this morning and told him the suggestion that Michael Ryde should look after B.L.L. in Stopford's absence. He seemed to think that this would provide a satisfactory solution. He told me that Garbo has been notionally arrested for poking his nose too deeply into buildings damaged by Vly-bombs. This was reported by his deputy to the Germans who are in a terrible state. Garbo will be released in a week's time. The main purpose

for liquidating some of Garbo's 27 sub-agents. He will plead that this is necessary in view of the possible vigilance of the authorities. The manoeuvre will have a subsidiary purpose in reliving Garbo to some extent of the necessity to report fly-bomb damage.

Charles Cholmondeley showed me some MSS today which indicates that on the 30th June Rundstedt still believed in an attack in the second half of July on the Pas de Calais by Patton's Army. This idea of Patton's Army has been entirely put across by Garbo. The fact is of course that there is no such army. Patton's Army is a phrase that is also used by the Germans when discussing the military situation with the Japs. Units which notionally form part of Patton's Army are now appearing in the field and deception is going on which will provide a plausible excuse. The total number of German tanks in France at the moment is estimated at 630.

I talked to [redacted] today. He said that the situation in Italy is very unsatisfactory from the C. point of view. All members of the SCI unit were up in Rome. There appeared to be no coverage in the south of Italy at all from an IB point of view. Hill-Dillon is obviously trying to cash in on the number of spies and saboteurs that have been caught. The fact is that a number of them gave themselves up and that the remainder were caught as a result of the activities of S.I.M., the Italian organisation. [redacted] wanted to initiate some

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[redacted] prevented from doing so by Hill-Dillon who

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wished to use the SCI units for the purpose of interrogation. They are of course not qualified in any way to carry out interrogations. Jarvis who is by way of controlling things from N. Africa was a nice chap but hopelessly woolly

Victor has at last got permission to go to Rome. Meanwhile I see from the Times that the dump of bombs found in the German Embassy have been thrown into the Tiber. A letter from Victor indicates that allied armies in Italy were mainly responsible for not letting him in earlier although they might have done this at the instigation of H.D. There is no doubt that the situation in Italy from the IB point of view is eminently unsatisfactory and doubtless nobody responsible welcomes the presence of an intelligent observer. The position has been complicated by the proposed move of AFHQ to Italy. This elephantine body consists of 14,000 officers and O.R.

The Yanks have got their way and Anvil is to consist of some 10 divisions drawn from Alexander's forces.

Barry and Burley came to see me about the employment of Russian Todt workers and German and Austrian P/Ws on pioneer duties, in this country. I said I saw no objection from the security point of view. It seemed however that the FO should be consulted about the Russian Todt workers.

I attended a meeting at Norfolk House to consider the Cabinet's decision about the

visitor's ban. It seems that the H.O. in anticipation of a favourable answer from the Cabinet had already told the police that they were to turn a blind eye to people who had entered the protected area in order to get away from fly-bombs. This has got round and there is now a question in the House on the relaxation of restrictions. It was proposed that an announcement should be made stating that the privileged categories, i.e. mother with children of school age, pregnant mothers, aged and infirm, and invalid and blind, and grounds of children, should be allowed to go to protected areas under the Govt. evacuation scheme. It is to be made clear that they will reside in these areas. Visitors ban is not to be modified for 10 days in order to allow the bombed-out people to get accommodation before visitors and holiday makers can go to the area. The H.O. have in fact rather bounced the committee, alth they were doubtless in a difficult position. All the other relaxations have been accepted and it has been agreed that travel abroad and to Eire should be held until the 1st August. The opening of the Swedish and Irish air lines is also to be considered on the 1st August.

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July 9th

Captain Hartogg, M.I. 3.b., W.O. Extension 220, rang me up today to say that he had to give a reply to the Chiefs of Staff in 10 minutes time on the question of security in Mid East and particularly in Turkey. What he really wanted to know was whether, if the Turks came into the war and we had to concert plans with them, what would be the chances of these plans coming to the notice of the enemy. I said that in so far as Mid East was concerned this was really a question for SIME to answer, and that if Turkey in particular was in question SIS should give an opinion. From my general knowledge I should say that the chances of leakage in Turkey were extremely high, and that the SIME area was to say the least difficult to control. It might be thought that with the addition of certain measures they could hold the position fairly well at least for a time. The chances however of a leak in Turkey would have to be envisaged at an early stage. I spoke to Arnold Foster who agreed with this estimate of the position.

We have received a paper from Findlater Stewart setting out the various restrictions that it would be necessary to impose if it were considered desirable to prevent any information regarding Big Ben leaving the country for 48 hours. It was agreed at the meeting that pending a decision by the Cabinet, individual depts. should take the responsibility for laying on these measures. They comprise a complete hold-up of all communications, diplomatic or otherwise, and a cessation of travel except

on compassionate grounds. I communicated with Noble, D.4., and gave him all the restrictions which would apply to SCOS. I also arranged with Tjaden of HDE that we should be informed by Ministry of Home Security immediately Big Ben started. NDO has instructions to inform me and also NDO Blenheim for Noble.

Dudley-Clarke has drawn up a report on the effect of his deception policy in the Middle East. The Allied Armies in Italy have recently captured a large number of enemy intelligence documents relating to our order of battle. Since most of these emanate from the German W.O. it has been possible from an analysis to assess the German High Command's view of our strength in the Mediterranean theatre including PAIC up to as recently as the 28th May, 1944. The figures of complete divisions are as follows: There were 38 complete divisions, which Dudley-Clarke built up to 64. The Germans estimate was 71, thus showing an exaggeration of about 85% of our strength. By including unallotted units and formations below divisional strength, the relative figures amount to a total equivalent in divisions to 51, as per Dudley-Clarke deception plan 70, and as per the Germans 77. This shows a gross exaggeration of about 50% of our strength. These figures indicate that deception in the Mediterranean area has been as successful as our own.

July 10th

Last week Dan notified us that O'REILLY, one of the Irish parachutist spies dropped in Eire, had escaped. He rather stupidly went home, and his father, who is an ex-RIC man, gave him up to the Garda but has refused the reward for his capture.

A character named who has been well known to us for some time as an agent working in the German I.S., has been captured in Normandy. He is to be brought back to this country and may subsequently be run as a DA.

Kenneth Younger was the only British officer privileged to be present at the trial of two Frenchmen at Cherbourg who confessed to being German spies. These two youths pled that they were given the alternative of joining the German service or being sent to work in Germany. They chose the former but protested that they had never had any intention of doing anything. They were given life sentences.

Kenneth has written a long letter in which he points out various difficulties arising in France due to the fact that there is no civil affairs organisation at Army Group. There are apparently civil affairs officers with armies but their activities are not very well co-ordinated and they are not very popular with the French authorities. The Americans are a bit wild and have enlisted a whole host of civilians many of whom were bona fide refugees and handed them over to the French authorities for

Catalogue Reference: KW/4/194 Monsieur Coulet has given instructions that no one is to be

taken into custody by the gendarmerie unless it is thought there are substantial grounds for so doing. This is of course in a sense an infringement of the agreement by which in the zone of the armies the army writ is the only one which runs. On the other hand M. Coulet's complaints against the Americans appear to be fully justified.

Apart from these difficulties, and Kenneth's usual moan that he has got nothing to do, things seem to be working out quite satisfactorily according to the C.I. instructions which were drawn up here. Niall MacDermott appears to be a little too impetuous and has on one or two occasions come rather near to getting across both the French and the Americans. Kenneth however appears to be a steady influence, and steady reasoning has got Niall to agree to his point of view. It may possibly be necessary for Dick to go out.

I had a talk with Teresa Clay about the Marita Case. Jack is rather beginning to get into difficulties. A stage of the war has been reached where he has got to express some rather definite views about the future. There is a tendency amongst the 5th column to attribute Germany's defeat to treachery by the Generals. This is a question of course on which Jack in his role of Gestapo agent, should be informed. We decided that he should quote the instance of Rundstedt's departure, explain that of course the generals are not party men and that although loyal to their country they have not got the same fanaticism as party members.

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It is for this reason that Himmler is gradually extending his control. He is further to say that defeat, although not yet a fait accompli, must be regarded as a possibility, and that it is therefore important that his followers should take no overt action which would spoil their chances of reforming and playing their part in the preparation for the next war.

Roger Hollis dined with me. He has just read Whitson's report on the communist movement in USA which he says is extremely interesting. The Russians apparently have a clandestine wireless set in New York and another in San Francisco. These are in touch with each other and also with Moscow. The trouble is that we are in duty bound not to pass this information to SIS, as it has been given to us under the strictest bond of secrecy. It may be that if we had the monitoring of these services or the times and frequencies that we could break the messages.

July 11th

I have today gone into the question of pay for officers in B. Division. There are a large number of anomalies, due to some people receiving their salaries taxed, some untaxed, and also due to RSLOs and DSOs being paid far higher rates than officers in control of sections. I have suggested that RSLOs and DSOs should have a basic rate plus allowances and that it should be made clear to them that as soon as they relinquish their jobs they will go back to their basic rate without allowances. Charles is I think considering

with Horrocks some form of grading for officers pay. Personally I am a little doubtful about this as a rigid system is extremely difficult to operate in an organisation like this. The grading system for the female staff while having certain advantages, has many disadvantages. A further difficulty in the matter of officer's pay is that when they get a high salary for doing a specific job they are naturally reluctant to accept a reduction and may very well walk out in consequence. There is nothing to prevent an officer from leaving the dept. at any time, except the fact that he may incur the displeasure of the D.G.

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The case of STYLES has gone forward to the JAG. It is a huge dossier containing about 100 statements and it may be possible to stage a prosecution under the Treachery Act even before a number of witnesses return to this country. Burt thinks that STYLES is mental.

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Joe Lynch has just telephoned to say that Hoover wants me to go to America. On the other hand it seems that Whitson is eventually to be sent to this country.

Three French and three American divisions are being used for Anvil, Alexander to receive two new American divisions in exchange. He apparently feels that he will be able to bring his campaign in Italy to a successful conclusion in spite of this.

The port of Cherbourg is gradually being cleared. It is now said that all the German armour in France is engaged. There is still however a reluctance to withdraw any of the other divisions from the coast belt on the continent.

There is a rumour that doodlebugs are now being fired from Belgium and coming up the Thames Estuary. We have during the last 24 hours been pretty successful in shooting them down. Only 33% reach the London area.

July 12th

At the weekly meeting Noakes said that three French agents who have been trained by the 8th Brandenburg division have arrived at 20. They have given the names of a number of people who trained with them.

Miall MacDermott is back from France. He brought with him a letter from Kenneth Younger to Speight of the F.O. suggesting that he might have some job for him as he felt that in

his present position he was not really pulling his weight. According to Niall he is doing extremely well and the French and Americans both like him. He will have plenty to do when the 21st Army Group headquarters is established in toto on the continent. I have told Dick to tell him that it is of the highest importance that he should remain where he is both from the point of view of the prestige of the office and the work that he is doing. Dick has told Niall that he should do everything he can to retain Kenneth as he thinks that as a pair they act as check on each other's faults. Niall is a little too impetuous and Kenneth a little too cautious.

Russian ~~Edt~~ workers are in future to be treated as P/Ws. Any other Russians not in uniform will go through the LRC and be held until the Russian Govt. claims them.

Cheney came to tell me that there were a certain number of Americans, U.S. citizens and American arriving with a party of British repatriates from Germany. I ascertained from Joe Lynch that Clayton had been in touch with Warner of the American Embassy. It had been decided that these Americans should be kept in Liverpool pending their shipment to the USA. They will be examined by a repatriation committee in Lisbon. S. Americans will go to the LRC.

I saw Curry today. Apparently Viv. is rather concerned that the FBI do not appear to be giving much exchange information to Evans of Security Co-Ordination. He rather wished me

to throw out some sort of hint of this to Hoover. I did not say much but I have no intention of doing anything of the kind. The fact is that as long as Bill Stephenson is there the FBI never will give any information to BSC which is of any value and by taking up the cudgels on behalf of SIS I can only jeopardise our good relations which have been carefully fostered by Cyril Mills. The latter has just obtained an extremely interesting document on the American CIPit which unfortunately we are prevented from showing to SIS.

Gen. Pile gave an off the record talk to the press on the flying bomb. He told them that about 8 months ago he was summoned by the PM to discuss the possibilities of a German rocket attack on Britain. That was about all our Intelligence people could say at the time. They did not know the speed, numbers, bomb-load or ceiling of the flying bombs. On the basis of this very sparse information Pile was asked to devise A.A. defences. At the same time the PM told him to devise a 2nd plan to cover our invasion ports and communication lines. Plan 1 was put into operation immediately, but as months passed and the attack did not develop Pile was told to move his guns down to the coast to cover our invasion forces. When the attack came therefore the guns were all the wrong place. A few days after D. day he was told that 6 flying bombs were on their way from the coast of France and heading inland. Later another 36 were launched. He therefore

ordered that Plan 1 should come into operation immediately. There were difficulties and delays due to the fact that the guns were dispersed along the coast. He had great difficulty in bring them across the second front lines of supply, but succeeded in doing so within a period of 24 hours. Under Plan 1 batteries were ranged on the high ground along the North Downs. Having got them there, the PM told

Pile that it had been decided to use the North Downs for a balloon barrage. While more than 2,000 balloons were being brought up to the area, Pile's men were frantically searching for new sites. A number were chosen but later found to be unsuitable. They were either too near factories, too near fighter zones or well off the bomb lanes. Others were swamped by heavy rain-storms. Much time was wasted and all complained that they had spent more time on the roads than on the sites. The rocket guns were found to be useless. The only answer was precision firing and speed. Three new forms of equipment are needed for this, the new American radar set, a number 11 fuse, and some appliance which would stabilise the mobile guns. All were eventually obtained including a special mattress for the purpose of stabilising the guns. It is hoped to get 90% of the raiders down before reaching London by guns, fighters and balloons. According to Pile the fighters got altogether 450 in the first fortnight while the guns destroyed 240. On good days fighters have got 80% of the raiders. This I think is somewhat of an exaggeration. On bad days more than 40% broke through to the London area. There is a good deal of argument about the London guns. Only

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a little over 10% of the machines are being destroyed by guns in the air. Pile thinks it would pay us to open fire in London. On the other hand he admits that people in south London who would be most affected might have a few words to say about the AA gunners. They would say "Shift your guns to north London. We have had enough". N.London would in turn say "Why bring them here. Let them either pass over or take them over the river". Pile concluded "We have never been really popular figures. A little bad shooting in London and we would become Public Enemy No.1". He nevertheless believes that London should be given a chance.

Crossbow report for 9th July states that a new feature has been discovered in one bomb, a knife-edge cable-cutter in the leading edge of the wing covered by a thin fairing. The cutter is considered to be of an inferior type. In the case of a balloon cable apparently severed by a cable-cutter is being examined. It has not yet been finally established whether launching is by means of rocket or catapult. There is however definite evidence that permanganate solution which is used to decompose hydrogen-peroxide in a two-liquid rocket is being sent from the depots in the Paris area to the launching site area. Since the two liquids are in use in the main propulsive unit it almost certainly follows that they are used in the initial launching system. 2% of the bombs launched either detonate on the launching rails or at a short distance in front of them. There is

no evidence that any of the original ski-sites are in use. All but 5 of them have suffered Cat.A damage. Of the modified sites 85 have been identified, 67 have been completed, 17 have received Cat.A damage, and the number completed and operational is estimated at 50. The number known to have fired is 56, 15 of them have received Cat.A damage. Of those not completed, 5 have received Cat.A damage. Investigation of sites in the peninsula reveals that they are easy to repair and that it is difficult to inflict permanent damage on them. Four of the supply sites in the operational belt in N.France have been damaged to such a large extent as to make them unusable. It is not yet clear however that their destruction has caused any diminution in the scale of attack. Their depots at Nucourt and St.-eu have been attacked. The damage done at St.Leu has caused a reduction in the scale of effort. Repairs are proceeding energetically. The Germans are increasing thair AA defences in this area. There is no indication that attacks on headquarters or on the at Coulens have interfered with the telephone system sufficiently to cause the enemy to use W/T. The headquarters of the DF system for following the siting shots has probably been found. It is in Amiens and has been targetted for attack. This information was supplied by ZIGZAG. No new evidence has been acquired either to prove or disprove an agent's report that stocks of bombs in mid-June were 8,500 and the production was of the order of 1,200 per month.

The existence of the large rocket weapon is now established beyond doubt, but the stage to

which it had been developed is not yet known. Experimental launches continue and at least 7 missiles were fired between 7th and 30th June. Parts of such a weapon are being examined in Sweden. These are consistent with the large rocket, probably radio-controlled. The use of aluminium pipes in the fuel system as in the glider bomb indicates that hydrogen peroxide is probably used. A large rocket has been found on photographs of the U.S. camp at Debice in Poland which has been working closely with Peenemunde. Reports have been received from the Polish Intelligence Service which point strongly to a large radio-controlled rocket with a range of 200 or more kilometres. Considerable damage has been inflicted on large sites at Watten, Siracourt, Mimoyecques and Wizernes. In spite of the inspection of the large sites captured at Sottevast there is still no firm indication that they are in fact rocket projectors. It seems probable however that they are intended for bulk storage of large rockets. A report from a prisoner indicates that the launching mechanism may well be much simpler than was formerly thought, and that construction of launching points and storage dumps may have started some months ago.

Van HOVE was executed this morning, his appeal having failed.


July 13th

I saw Maxwell today on the subject of ZIGZAG. He agreed to his position being regularised and is taking out documents in his own name. As

regards the possibility of a pardon he said he was doubtful since if he remembered right it was laid down in the Bill of Rights that the King could not pardon a man who had not been up on trial. On the other hand he said that obviously if ZIGZAG were taken into custody we should take steps immediately to get him out and it was necessary to use the Home Secretary's name. If we were in difficulties we could tell the police to communicate with Maxwell. I have told Ian Wilson to ascertain precisely what charges lie against ZIGZAG. We might then consider an approach to the CCs concerned and ask them whether they would be prepared to drop the idea of a prosecution. Meanwhile it was necessary for us to lay on some machinery by which, if ZIGZAG gets into trouble Ian Wilson can get to work on the job at the earliest possible moment. The great thing is to prevent a charge being preferred. Once that happens it is always difficult if not impossible to get it back-pedalled. Maxwell is very intrigued by the whole story.

There is a move by Kenneth Strong to get Dick as a G.1 at SHAEF under Sheen. I have said that, inconvenient as this would be, I would be prepared to let him go provided there is really a job for him to do in the national interest. As I see it and as Dick has pointed out it is really a waste of 2 high-grade security intelligence officers; if Maunsell is to be appointed in the capacity of a brigadier surely he can look after SHAEF's IB policy until the armistice. If on the other hand Dick is to go in there and Maunsell is to be found some other employment clearly Dick cannot ~~xxxx~~ act with

any real force unless he is in charge. Kenneth Strong - I gather is rather feeling the draught on the IB side and appears to be conscious of the fact that IB has shown serious deficiencies in N. Africa and Italy.



The RSIC meeting which was held on 6.7.44 has drawn attention to the fact that owing to lack of staff RSS have had to drop a number of services. 8 months ago they were taking 10,000 messages per fortnight. This was too much and groups had to be dropped. In November they were intercepting 13,000 when a further group had to go and in March 14,000, when the W/T network of the Brandenburg Division had to go. Later the Sofia network was dropped and the Aegeans only just spared. GC & CS say that for cryptographic purposes coverage is now at the irreducible minimum. The present difficulty of coverage is essentially to ensure the continuance of the present supply of de-codes and a higher degree of coverage might on certain current services alleviate cryptographic difficulties. All W/T forwarding routes have

to be covered in order to provide a steady flow of groups from one cypher system to another. Small assessments of coverage of operationally unimportant W/T links might result in the collapse of much of the decyphering of Abwehr traffic. Maltby said that 150 more operators would be required and that he doubted whether this could come into operation for 9 months. The conference felt they could not rely on the war ending soon and that something ought to be done now. Some of stay-behind agents at present engaged in practice traffic may be instructed soon to begin operational traffic, the intercepting and reading of which may be of tactical or even strategic importance. The advance of our armies may well require before very long an establishment of one or more forward intercepting stations which may be an additional tax on RSS.

July 14th

The Japs are very worried by the disclosures that have been made in the examination of KOBBE by a special committee of the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. KOBBE's connection with Alcazar de Velasco is now definitely established and the matter is in the hands of a military tribunal. Any public disclosures would have course be extremely embarrassing to the Spanish Govt. and it is hoped that possibly the proceedings of the tribunals might be indefinitely postponed. A representative of the State Dept. in Washington with a personal letter from Hull to Jordana. This has rather precipitated matters since the U.S. principals

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propose that in future the representation of Japanese interests should in future be performed according to a procedure to be determined by a committee appointed by the U.S. Govt. Until this has been done, the Spanish Govt. are requested to exercise restraint over Velasco who is considered to be the wire-puller behind the incident. As there seemed a possibility that Velasco might be arrested and shot steps have been taken to get him out of Spain, across the Pyrenees when the Germans will look after him. The Japs are expecting a formal demarche from the Spanish Govt. in which the latter may refuse to carry Japanese representation in future or may even break off relations. It is pointed out that this would be a very serious matter since probably if Spain broke off relations Portugal would follow suit. Japan would then be deprived of a valuable look-out station which the Iberian Peninsula at present affords.

Abt. 3 has now been taken over by the RSHA and does not even form part of the Militarisches Amt RSHA of which Hansen is now the head, working of course of Kaltenbrunner and Himmler. // On the 6th July Steengracht was still talking about a possible attack by the allies across the Straits as the result of which Germany had not moved the coastal divisions in that area.

There is a change of plan in Normandy. Instead of driving through to Paris, the Brest Peninsula is to be sealed off by operations directed due south.

Burt talked to me about ZIGZAG. He said that he was pretty confident that he could arrange with all the C.C.s concerned to have the charges against him dropped. He could also ensure that any circulars out could be withdrawn. In this way we shall achieve our object.

The D.G. saw Gen. Strong, Gen. Bedale-Smith and Gen. Eisenhower yesterday. He was thanked profusely for the part that the office had played and a formal request was made for the services of Dick as a deputy to Sheen with the rank of full Colonel. It was made quite clear that such an appointment was necessary in order to bolster up Sheen, who was not really qualified to hold his job. It would be no real use trying to change him for another American who would have to start from scratch. The D.G. seemed to think Dick should take the job. I said that provided he could operate satisfactorily I thought he should, too. TAR and I could carry his work between us. The only thing that was worrying me was whether Dick would be in such a position as would enable him to work effectively. Our experience in the case of Haylor had been rather bad. He was clearly hamstrung with a totally ignorant full colonel over his head who did not know anything and would therefore do nothing but would not let Ronnie get in touch with his opposite numbers in the hope of getting things going. I also mentioned to the D.G. the negotiations which were at present going on with SIS. I thought that

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these might come to a head before long, in which case Dick's presence here might be of some importance. I thought this difficulty could be overcome if we got an undertaking from Gen. Strong that Dick would be released at the earliest possible moment and that if his services were required here owing to illness or other causes, an effort would be made to release him either temporarily or permanently, subject of course to the exigencies of the moment. The D.G. is rather inclined to brush all this aside by saying that there would be no change until after the war, that Bridges had given him an assurance etc. etc. and that in any case he would not have SIS taking us over. He was however strongly opposed to a total amalgamation. I tried to explain to him that SIS had very definite views and that if they put them forward to the PM he might very well say that an amalgamation should take place and that a committee should investigate how this could be best brought about. We should then have to be ready with our proposals and concrete arguments. It was obviously no use my talking on these lines since his mind was made up. He did however agree that Dick should be allowed to see Gen. Strong and make up his own mind whether he would be in a position to carry out what was required. This is the only really important point. As regards the rest, we shall probably be able to get on all right.

U35 has just returned from Lisbon. We had a long talk at Dick's flat. He paints a positively lamentable picture of SIS. When he arrived

he was seen by Gledhill, who is head of the station and holds a cover position with the Embassy. Gledhill said "First I should like to know whose idea was it that you should come here. Was it C's idea, Section V's, MI5's or perhaps your own". U35 replied that he really did not know whose idea it was. He had merely been approached and asked to go out. U35

learned later that his arrival had been viewed by Gledhill as an attempt to set up some new organisation independent of himself. He then told U35 by hints of one kind or another that very few people, particularly the minister Hopkinson, knew anything about Intelligence matters except himself. His whole conversation was full of innuendos of one kind or another.

U35 is horrified by the way both Gledhill, Charles go about their business. They do not appear to exercise any reasonable precautions and are obviously being led up the garden in a number of cases which were brought to U35 notice. Attempts were made to put U35 himself in touch with all sorts of undesirable people who would have ruined

all the work he was doing with Mariaux. He tactfully declined. The office itself is overlooked and no attempt is made to screen it. People can be seen from the other side of the street photographing letters and every sort of thing. The only part of the work that he seemed to think was good was the facilities which had apparently been obtained for examining the air mail. This is presumably done through some informant in the Post Office. Doubtless the Germans are doing it too, since everybody takes bribes from both sides. SIS apparently have

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information that LORENZO, the Chief of Police, has been bribed by the Germans to the tune of 1 million escudoe. They nevertheless seek Lorenzo's co-operation in cases where their hand must inevitably be disclosed to the Germans. The whole business is childish. U35 said that _____ were both very nice people but obviously complete amateurs and pretty indiscreet ones at that. Far and away the best element in the office are the women. One of the failings of the post is that there is no one there with any intellectual qualifications. Huge dinner parties are staged for likely representatives of the Portuguese press but they fail completely because nobody makes a real study of the man's personality and interest and if they did they would not have the requisite knowledge or ability to talk to him in an interesting way. All this of course confirms precisely what we have known and suffered from for a long time. Hopkinson was the only man of real intelligence but of course could not play a very active part in these affairs, and kept out of things as far as it was within Gledhill's power to do so. U35 was very anxious that no use whatever should be made of this information. He had of course many amusing stories about his various experiences.

July 15th

I was told by Marcus Heywood that there was now a proposal to bring 3,000 Frenchmen from the Cherbourg peninsula who are to be enrolled in the French Armoured Division here. I spoke to Carlisle of M.I.L., to Tritton of Norfolk House

and to Sheen. It appears that G.3 have made this arrangement on consulting Gen. Koenig. They wish to have these men, some of whom were from the resistance movement, as reinforcements for their armoured division since they have no troops in N. Africa to fill up casualties.

I explained to Sheen that I did not think we could do very much by way of examination and of course this scheme was entirely a new one, and contrary to any previous arrangements that had been made. I thought that the French would have to do most of the examination locally and if there were any doubts we might pass a few of them through the LRC and look up their records. No attempt to examine them all in a comprehensive way was possible, and would in any case be profitless. He said that he was representing the security point of view and he would let me know any further developments. It is proposed to bring the men over about 250 a time.

SI want to bring out the head of the Bulgarian Counter-Espionage, who is in Turkey, to Cairo. He has been ordered back to Bulgaria and does not wish to go. He should be in possession of a good deal of useful information. We have agreed to this.

The Germans have ordered Garbo's agents to maintain wireless silence for 2 weeks. In future there is to be no further reporting by Garbo's organisation on the doodlebug. The Germans have just been informed that Garbo has been released and that a letter is on the way. This has confirmed it in their minds that

his arrest was due solely to his poking his nose into air raid damage. They have consequently stated that he should report only on operational matters. This is all very satisfactory.

Joe Lynch has produced for our edification an example of a typically American piece of sabotage. A vessel that had been built by a shipping company in San Francisco had recently experienced a great amount of trouble with the smaller pumps failing to function properly. The pumps were found to be in perfect condition and no reason could be found for their failure until a pair of ladies panties were taken from the suction pipe. These were, says Joe, undoubtedly discarded during the construction of the vessel in a moment of thoughtlessness and left lying in the tank, later finding their way into the pipe line. Other tankers built at this particular shipyard have experienced similar difficulties. Joe thought that B.L.C might run across the same difficulties in investigation of cases and passed on the incident for what it may be worth. He ends: "I suggest that if you or Lord Rothschild run across cases of this type, I suggest that you advise all the employees that in order that all may co-operate 100% in the war effort for the total destruction of the Axis powers, lady workers should be requested to keep their pants on during working hours for the duration." I feel inclined to ask him for a definition of "working hours."

July 16th

I had a talk with TAR and discussed with him
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the case of COSTES and CARVAILLHES, about which he wishes me to talk to Cyril Mills and the FBI. We also discussed the case of a negro who is apparently being sent as an agent to the USA.

TAR told me that he was having a certain amount of trouble with Stopford about Michael Ryde getting acquainted with B.LL's work.

Stopford has agreed in principle but he does not seem to be very co-operative. I told TAR quite definitely that it was my wish that this should be done for two reasons (a) Stopford might be away in the Channel Islands and subsequently in Germany when it would be necessary to have someone who was acquainted with his work, and (b) it was necessary to have a closer liaison between B.lA and B.LL. If there is to be any trouble an order will be issued.

I went to see our underground H.Q. at Chancery Lane this afternoon. It is a section of the tube. This is to come into operation if Big Ben is a real menace. There has been something of a decline in the doodlebug lately. Meanwhile the defences are to be reorganised. There are to be planes out over the channel, the AA barrage is to move down to the coast, there will be another plane patrol on the Downs and behind that a thick balloon barrage. The number of planes getting through to London is now something between 20-30%.

ZIGZAG is now in regular communication. He has fully satisfied his interrogators as to his

bona fides.

Instructions have been sent from Arras to Berlin that there is to be a concentration of fire on particular areas and that it is important to get details of damage, location and time. Whether this is V1 or V2 we do not know. The information has been passed on to Hindlater Stewart and also through Brooman-White to Duncan Sandys. B.W. is now working temporarily with Duncan Sandys as a link between him and the Intelligence Services and as an interpreter of information received. Duncan Sandys is apparently seeing everything, including MSS.

Walker tells me that the Germans are now putting their own pigeons into the baskets dropped by us in occupied territory. They then place these baskets in the vicinity of some house in the hope that a message will be attached and the pigeon will then fly into a German loft. One woman who observed through a crack a fat German placing a basket in her garden, subsequently got the pigeon out and attached a rude message to the Gestapo to its leg. She was shortly arrested. The message stated that everyone in the vicinity knew that the Germans were doing this kind of thing.

Dan has picked up a pigeon from the resistance Movement in France. He has sent over the message but Walker apparently wants to have the pigeon as well. This raises a question of Eire's neutrality. I have suggested to Cecil that he should write a letter to Dan stating that it cannot of course be denied that the

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pigeon was on an operational flight and should therefore, according to international law, be interned for the duration of the war. On the other hand, if he could see his way to assisting us we should be very grateful.

I leave for America tomorrow at 7.45 a.m. Too early.

July 17th

I left London at 9.15 am and Bristol at 4 pm, arriving at Rhynanna at 6 pm. We motored through Limerick to Foynes and left there by Clipper at 9pm. We were at Botwood in the early hours of the 18th, after a 13-hour flight. We remained at Botwood only about an hour but took nearly 9 hours to get to Baltimore owing to the failure of one of our engines. The failure of one engine is not considered serious. In fact if it shows any defect the pilot prefers not to run it in case he may cause further damage. He might however put it into commission in case of emergency. These ships are run on 2 engines without losing height and I believe keep in the air on one engine for about 1½ to 2 hours, if flying at a height of 8,000 ft.

I travelled with Alexander Halpern, who was returning to Security Co-Ordination. He is an interesting man and clearly very knowledgeable about American politics and about alien minority questions in the States.

We were met at Baltimore by a representative

of Bill's office and got a train to New York which arrived about 9 pm. I motored straight to my rooms at the Westberg on Madison at 69th.

July 19th

I went to the Rockefeller Building and had a pleasant talk with Bill.

August 22nd

Cecil and I got the 7.30 a.m. plane today from Langford Lodge to Heston, a flight of 2 hours and 20 minutes in an American service plane. We ran into thick mist and had to come down very low before getting below the cloud level. I had lunch with Dick. He told me that subject to my approval it had been more or less agreed that he should join SHAEF up to the armistice. There have been the usual delays and trouble about establishment. He is to be a full colonel and will more or less be co-equal with Sheen although Sheen of course will be nominally the senior. Owing to the formation of the American Army Group, probably ending with the incorporation of the southern group, SHAEF will be taking a much greater control. There is therefore a good deal of work to be done particularly as regards the formation of SCI units under OSS. With Dick at SHAEF we shall be in a very commanding position. I understand moreover that Brooman-White is taking over the War Room at Hyder St.

There has apparently been a certain amount of trouble between Omar Bradley and Patton on the one side and Monty on the other. The Americans did not think that we were being quickly enough and wished Eisenhower to take command. There is I think something to be said on both sides. Monty is perhaps a bit cautious. On the other hand Patton has rather run ahead of his supplies and although he has stretched far and more or less liquidated the German front it is said that the Germans in certain instances

are dispersing into the maquis and then coming back again to persecute those French who are hanging out the tricolor. The Americans of course have had practically no opposition except for a counter-attack by the Germans at Avranches which they managed to repel. Practically the entire German armour has been concentrated on the British and Canadian fronts since the beginning of the operation. There is very little opposition in the south. I gather that as the southern operation progresses it will head for Belfort to try and enter Germany beyond that point. Meanwhile Alexander is to be reinforced by another American Army and will carry out his scheme of turning right when he reaches the north of Italy and entering Austria via Klagenfurt with the assistance of Tito on the right. Opinion is optimistic about the progress of events. Most people think that the Germans will be rolled up before the end of the year.

The conversations with Arnold-Foster have continued during my absence but have reached rather an impasse. The account of our previous meeting differed considerably. Arnold-Foster in his report had rather gone back to the old idea of SIS taking over B and F Divisions, while Dick and Dick Butler on reflection had come to the conclusion that our plan 2 was the only possible solution. The problem of total amalgamation postulates so much that we almost feel that it can never be realised. We are however to have further talks as soon as Arnold-Foster returns.

I had a talk with Anthony. He tells me that the attempt to get rid of CERVELL has been stymied by the Air Ministry. Apparently they were influenced to some extent by the fact that the Swedes have given us the V.2 which dropped in Sweden a few weeks ago, minus its head charge. The head charge is apparently not more than 1,000 lbs or equivalent to V.1. Opinions vary as to its imminence.

I told TAR about my consultations with Cyril Mills on the subject of GARBO's sub-agents. Cyril did not think that it would be possible to run any of them very effectively from Canada owing to the dearth of suitable material. He has very great difficulty in getting anything from the D.S. of I. and can only just keep Moonbeam alive under present conditions. If a transmitter is required it could probably be arranged for Moonbeam to get one. TAR said that there were rather wider issues at stake as we were considering the transfer of GARBO and all his works to the Argentine, where he might be able to sell himself to the Japs. I also told TAR about the plan for threatening the Germans with the uranium bomb if they attempt to use V.2. He said C. had a good deal of information about the uranium bomb but was extremely cagey about the whole business. C. probably does not realise that the FBI have been trying to protect the experiments in the USA for the last 10 months or two years.

and consequently know what is going on. They are extremely concerned since the communists have muscled in on the experiments and on the manufacture, details of which are almost certain to be known to the Russians. Meanwhile the Canadian Govt. have bought up the El Dorado mines in Canada which produce pitchblend from which the uranium is extracted. There are a good many wheels within wheels since if the uranium bomb claims are substantiated (I get that successful experiments have already been made) there will be a complete revolution in the method by which all machines are driven.

August 23rd

I had a talk with Roger Hollis on Whitson's visit which seems to have been an unqualified success. There was a complete exchange of information although it was made clear to Whitson that we did not propose to take him over Mrs. Grist's establishment since this would entail getting the sanction of two or three departments which were not under our control and would moreover emphasise the fact to the employees concerned that close co-operation on communist matters was going on between ourselves and the States. Hollis and Clarke spent nearly 10 days in continuous conversation with Whitson, whereas SIS only gave him 2 hours and a quarter. The fact is of course that SIS have nothing to say whereas we have a great deal. At the conclusion of the visit Hollis tried to arrange that he should correspond direct with Whitson. Vivian has raised a storm as he thinks that we should stick to the old

arrangement and help to build up in New York. He points out that after the war we shall have no one in Washington and it is therefore in our interests to build up the SIS representative. The real answer of course is that we cannot continue on the old basis indefinitely and that we must be able to speak to our opposite numbers direct. Both ourselves and the FBI and the organisations which have the whole machinery of state at our backs and are operating in close contact with official Govt. Depts. and with the H.O. SIS on the other hand are merely concerned with the obtaining of information through secret agents, and do not have the responsibility of taking action upon it. Vivian seemed to think that I was going to try and build up Evans while I was talking to the FBI. The fact is that by doing so I should only have succeeded in arousing suspicion of our own relations with the Americans. It was quite clear to me from conversations I had with George Burton and also with Hoover, that there will be no real co-operation with SIS until Stephenson's organisation has been liquidated.

Even then it is doubtful how far Hoover will go with that organisation, which engages in offensive operations. I shall have to explain this to Vivian some time. I am afraid however that he will start stirring up the mud again. There is in fact nothing to be done until the relations of our two organisations are finally decided.

I saw Ede and told him about my conversations with Henderson. I explained that Henderson had no intention of building up a position for himself

He felt however that if he was to be the head man in the Caribbean he should be kept informed as to what other DSOs were doing. He would therefore like a wide interpretation of any instruction by which he should receive copies of communications between DSOs and head office. There were a number of other minor points which we discussed. Ede said there was a proposal to send Stratton to Ceylon in order that he should co-ordinate S.O.I.s and SCOs. The present line of demarcation is that the SOI is responsible for anything that happens on the sea and that the SCO takes on from the foreshore. This of course involves a considerable amount of over-lapping. Ede does not think that Stratton is quite the man to go. I am inclined to agree, as Stratton will probably try and throw his weight about in various quarters to the embarrassment of Airy. Ede I think would rather like to go himself but the DG is opposed to this.

Kellar brought in W/C Walker our DSO in Turkey to see me. He told me about the Blackguard case which he is running. This man who is a Persian was formerly associated with Rashid Ali, the Iraqi and has on more than one occasion visited Berlin. He is being paid a high salary by the Germans but is working for us as he did not approve of his treatment in Berlin. Blackguard is in some way tied up with Father. Walker works in closely with ISLD but as far as I can gather the work that he is doing is in many ways more effective than that done by SIS. The Turks are for the most part very co-operative but the wheels of their organisation grind very

slowly, particularly when it is in their interests to procrastinate. They will tell us most things if we ask but do not volunteer a great deal.

Victor returned from Italy a few days ago, and is now proposing to go to France with Trevor-Wilson in order that he may get in early on any sabotage equipment found in Paris. I gather that he did very well in Italy after he finally succeeded in getting to Rome. Most of the effective work has been done by the Italian organisation known as SIM. He had a talk with the head of this organisation who disclosed that for some considerable period before the Armistice with Italy, SIM had been double-crossing SOE on a very large scale. Much of the material dropped had gone straight into the hands of Italian agents. The counter-intelligence organisation in Italy is extremely poor. AFHQ who have now moved to Caserta near Naples are not really in the picture. No effective work has been done except that carried out from Alexander's headquarters. The local SCI chaps are not bad but do not appear to have much method. They are used for all sorts of jobs for which they were not really qualified.

The BBC announced at 1 o'clock that Paris has fallen to the maquis after 4 days fighting.

August 24th

I saw Ogilvie who runs the Australian RSO under Brig. Simpson, who is head of the Commonwealth Investigation Bureau which has certain federal responsibilities akin to those of the FBI.

Unlike the latter however it has in addition to

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its law enforcement agency of detectives, a uniformed branch known as the Commonwealth Peace Force. The origin of this force is interesting. In 1916 when Billy Hughes I think as Minister of Defence was talking on the question of conscription in the state of Queensland, he was pelted with rotten eggs, and received no protection from the local police whose commissioner was strongly opposed to conscription. Hughes therefore insisted that some sort of federal police body was necessary. The constitution however did not provide for anything but the State police, and any body calling itself federal police would have been regarded as unconstitutional. It was therefore decided to establish what is in fact a federal police body but to call it the Commonwealth Peace Force. This force has considerable responsibilities in connected with protected areas and coastal areas. The security division of the Commonwealth Investigation Bureau is an organisation apart from the main body and its records are not available to other branches except under special safeguards.

I gave Ogilvie a brief outline of our organisation here. I shall be seeing him again before he leaves. He had recently been in Washington where he had had long talks with the FBI. He is very anxious to talk to me about the Americans and what he believes to be a definite attempt by them to drive a wedge in between ourselves and the Australians. He mentioned Hoover in particular. Hoover tried to persuade him that his interests lay with America and not with us. Ogilvie said that he was British and that Australia's King was

England's King. He realised however that there were some people who were thinking on American lines. He did not think however that this would get very far. He was rather shocked that Hoover should have been so blatant in his approaches. He did say however that if we were having any difficulty with the FBI he thought they might be more ready to communicate information to the Australians than to the

British. I said that as far as we were concerned our relations were extremely cordial and that we had a complete interchange. He said that he had gathered that this was so as Hoover had spoken in plain terms of our organisation. Hoover had apparently made it clear that he did not like SIS.

I mentioned to Ogilvie that Dick Casey had had a very great success with Adolf Berle of the State Dept. whose attitude towards us at one time had been anything but friendly. This led him to talk about Casey whom he said he knew personally. He thought Casey was finished as regards Australian politics and that he would never be forgiven for having left Washington and taken up the job as Resident Minister in Cairo. He had been doing a magnificent job in Washington for Australia and the feeling was that his duty was to Australia first. Ogilvie thinks that the Americans are intending to stay in the Solomons, Gilberts and other adjacent islands. He was in fact in one of these islands when the Americans landed. They hoisted the American flag and when this was remarked on the officer in charge said "We have come here to stay".

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Harker spoke to me afterwards about Ogilvie and showed me a letter which the DNI had received from the Australian DNI. It was in very veiled terms but implied that Ogilvie and his colleague Hill were solely concerned with the RSS aspect of the Australian Security Service and had no mandate to talk about other subjects. He hinted rather directly that their mission had some political angle, and that they were inclined to poke their noses into affairs which were not their concern. The purpose of the letter was obviously to spike the guns of Ogilvie and Hill if they made any approach to the British Admiralty. Ogilvie makes a very good impression and I daresay that he is the victim of some inter-intelligence intrigue in Australia. He has come here mainly to see the workings of RSS and also to get some explanation of them for the presence of Sanford, the British RSS representative in Australia. Apparently no explanation of Sanford's presence in Australia has ever been given to Brig. Simpson, with the result that he has been under fairly close observation.

Curry came to see me this afternoon. He told me that ISCOT seemed to indicate fairly clearly that in a number of countries, Yugoslavia, China, Holland, France etc. the Soviet appear to have taken soundings after the abolition of the Comintern as to the effect of this move. They were to report on the reactions, particularly of those who were in opposition to Moscow and to take the necessary counter-measures. Curry seemed pleased with Whitson's visit and agreed with me about Vivian's latest demarche on the subject of direct correspondence between ourselves and

Whitson. I told Curry that in my view it was quite hopeless to build up SIS in USA and that we had much better continue as at present until a final decision was reached as to the form of amalgamation of ourselves and Section V.

Donnie Haylor came to tell me about the latest developments in CCMS. A considerable amount of planning has been done during the last month but is now held up on questions of establishment and decisions as to major policy, which have to be taken by high authorities. Donnie is moaning a good deal about Nobby Clark his immediate superior, who apparently performs no useful function and merely prevents others who know something about the job from getting together with those who can really do something. Donnie has to put his stuff up through Nobby Clark but never knows what happens to it. He rather thinks that he ought to see Gen. West and bring things to a head. I advised him to hold it for a bit. Maunsell's position is rather obscure. He is attached to SHAEF though nominally still head of SIME. He has no place in CCMS but there are vague references to some advisory co-ordinating function to be performed by him as between SHAEF and CCMS. In CCMS he will be responsible apparently for C.I. matters which affect occupied territories other than Germany. Nobody seems to know whether after the armistice he joins CCMS or not.

Burt during my absence has fixed up everything about Zigzag. There are now no warrants for his arrest or interrogation. Burt contemplates using him as an informant. He is quite convinced

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that ultimately he will go back to his old life appear in the dock, and plead that he has been of great service to the British Empire.

Tommy Harris has a plan for evacuating GARBO to the Argentine, where he may have considerable postwar value. This plan will be gradual and will not take effect until we are sure that the war in the west is over. He is therefore keen that No. 4 and No. 7 should if possible be transferred to Canada.

August 25th

Baxter came to talk to me about the future of the LRC, with particular reference to the Information Index. He wondered whether carding should go on to the same degree as heretofore. I said that I thought there was a slight danger in thinking that the war in the west was over and that it would probably be as well to continue on present lines at any rate for the next few weeks. The Index might be of considerable value later on in providing information about collaborators and others who might wish to seek refuge in this country. As regards the staff, Baxter said there were quite a number who were anxious to do a job of work in Germany when their work here came to an end. He himself was only too anxious to get back to civilian duties.

I discussed with Victor and Burt the case of Moss SIMMONDS, with particular reference to the suggestion that Burt should see Moss SIMMONDS who was undergoing sentence for evasion of

military service. Burt felt emphatically that he could not do this without reference to Norman Kendal even though Howe had given his approval. He thought therefore that he had better have another word with Howe or with the officers concerned in the case.

Later he told me that he had not been able to see Howe, but he had had a talk with Barrett and the officers specially concerned at the Yard with the corruption case, whose integrity he places beyond question. He threw a fly over them and discovered that the case was now in the hands of the Chief Constable, that the report that we had had from the B.O.T. which would have provided a good starting point for investigations was in the possession of the Yard but that no action had been taken upon it. Likewise other opportunities had been missed. He said "You can take it from me that nothing will materialise in this case and that the Yard know as much about it and about BOLSON as we do here." I reached the conclusion that we are probably wasting our time. This whole business of corruption in the police is a complete impasse. The information that we received by

enquiries should of course be substantiated by personal observation which would enable legal action to be taken. The only people who could take such action would be the police but from experience we know that as soon as we pass our information over the interested parties are warned.

One of the basic troubles is that the police

are badly paid. A Chief Inspector after he has paid his income tax gets little more than £5 a week; while out on a job he would not get more than 13/6 a day detention allowance with 7/6 bed and breakfast. If he has a wife and family and a position to maintain he is obviously very much up against it. War restrictions make it worth while for certain people to pay highly to get round them. They amass large profits in black market activities and then dangle thousands of pounds in front of the police in order that they may continue unmolested. If the police are so badly paid it is not surprising that they fall for the temptation. If an Inspector goes wrong he recruits under him sergeants and p.c.s who are prepared to play his game. In fact he virtually trains them in corruption. This reaches a point where they are entirely dependent upon him for their promotion. As the Inspector rises so corruption spreads under him and may well reach the rank of D.D.I. or even C.C. There is no reason to think that the whole of the police are corrupt. In fact there are many good people in the CID. Although they know or have a pretty good idea of what is going on they will not come forward under the present regime, which is weak and lacking in imagination. They know from experience that it will get them nowhere and in fact may cost them their promotion. It is very difficult to know what to do. I should like to talk to Maxwell but unless the H.O. are prepared to make a clean sweep in the higher ranks no useful purpose would be served. The only other course would be to consult Kendal or the Commissioner both of which would be useless.

I lunched with Harker, Ede, TAR and Ogilvie. The latter enlarged somewhat on his previous statements about American aggression in the Pacific Islands. He is quite sure that they will make a definite attempt to retain the Gilberts, Marshalls, Solomons and others and their whole policy is to draw Australia into the American orbit and away from the Empire. In speaking again about Casey he agreed that had his appointment as Resident Minister in Cairo been properly handled it would have been regarded as an honour to Australia rather than an incident rather derogatory to Casey. The first the Curtin heard about the suggestion was in the form of a message from Winston saying that he had asked Casey to become Resident Minister in Cairo and that he hoped Curtin would see his way to releasing him from his post in Washington. Curtin felt that he was being confronted with a fait accompli. The whole exchange of telegrams was published in the form of a White Paper in Australia and caused a very bad impression. Feeling ran so high that even a request for the withdrawal of the Governor General was contemplated.

I saw "C" today about the uranium bomb and put to him the suggestion that it should be used as a threat of retaliation to the Germans if they used V.2. "C" said that he had no reason to think that V.2 was imminent although it was possible that it might start in the near future. He felt however that there was nothing to be lost and said that he would put the suggestion to the PM who might take it up on his visit to Roosevelt which is to take

place early next month. On the other hand he might decide to act more quickly.

"C" was a little shocked when I told him that a large number of people in America, including the FBI, were aware of what was going on and that the Germans had in fact been enquiring as to the progress of the experiments. He said that only about 3 or 4 people were supposed to know anything about it in this country. He said that the potentialities of uranium as a motive force were enormous and that some attempt was being made by the Americans to get control. The President had however made an offer to Winston to discuss some sort of share-out. I pointed out to "C" that we had control of the El Dorado mines in Canada which had recently been taken over by the Canadian Govt. I do not know what other pit blend mines there are within the Empire. Presumably the Russians, who were already aware of the experiments going on, had pitch blend resources.

"C" told me that the great expert on this matter, Professor BOR, a Dane, had been got out of Denmark by SIS a year or two ago and was working in the States. BOR told SIS that he had received an offer to go to Moscow and work on this problem for the Russians but had turned it down.

"C" was very pleased with his present set-up in France. He said he had 300 wireless sets operating from behind the lines. Some of these sets were being operated by the same man so as to confuse the d.f.ing operations by the

Germans. He was getting 100 messages a day about German troop movements and general conditions. MSS had proved invaluable during Second Front operations, although it had become far more difficult to deal with. He had in consequence asked for 500 more staff at G.C. & C.S. It was doubtful whether he would get them. The Americans had been warned 48 hours before the German counter-attack at Avranches and had precise details of the German plans. When the German 7th Army H.Q. were captured copies of all these messages were found. G.C. & C.S. were congratulated on not having missed one. It appears that the Germans were within 3 miles of getting through the American defences in this counter-attack which is one of the few really serious ones that they made.

I asked "C" about the alleged differences between Monty, Bradley and Patton. He said that he did not really know what the rights and wrongs of the case were. Possibly there was a certain amount to be said on both sides. The plan as it has developed was in fact

Monty's original plan, although perhaps in its latter stages it moved rather more quickly than was anticipated. The Germans only have 7 or 8 static divisions on the coast running up to Belgium and there is no doubt that they have lost a large proportion of their armour. Koenig's statement that Paris was in the hands of French Resistance is somewhat premature. French and American forces are now fighting in the city. Hitler, according to MSS, has given orders that Paris is to be destroyed. The Germans are making all sorts of promises

to the Luftwaffe about reinforcements and also are making out to the Japs that their production figures are on the increase. They are also saying that they intend to launch an offensive on a big scale in about 2 months time when they will have mobilised from 100 to 125 divisions. The Japs are alarmed by the defection of Roumania, who has now declared war against Germany and have instructed their minister in Berlin to press the Germans to make peace with Russia. They appear to be taking steps themselves to bring this about.

"C" told me that the new fuse being used by our A.A. guns against the doodlebugs has been highly successful. The burst of the fuse is regulated automatically through the RDF predictor, as it leaves the muzzle of the gun. 70% of the doodlebugs brought down are in fact knocked out by A.A. fire, the remaining 30% by fighters and balloons. V.2 sites are apparently a very simple contrivance, just a platform which you can put down anywhere. There is therefore no answer except to get the German away from the coast. The range is roughly 200 miles, but this is uncertain. We have a complete replica built up from the parts of the rocket fired on Sweden and one found in Poland.

The proposal made some time ago for the formation of a Sino-British or Sino-British-American Intelligence organisation with a Chinese at its head has been torpedoed after much discussion. The answer to the Chinese has been that after full consideration it was thought that it would be better at the present

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stage of the war to expend effort on improving present arrangements for the exchange of intelligence rather than to set up new machinery which must take time to run in and entail some addition personnel.

August 26th

I had a talk with Joe Spencer of CICI and with Brocas-Burrows. Harry, Hollis and Kellar were also present. Spencer and B-B were anxious to exchange notes, B-B being head of the British Military Mission in Moscow and Spencer responsible for liaison with the Russian ASATUROV in Teheran. Spencer had established good relations there due to the fact that he had bawled the Russians out on two occasions and forced them to come to him hat in hand about one of their agents who was either being followed or had been arrested. After a great deal of referring back to Moscow ASATUROV had evidently got instructions to co-operate within certain limits. The latest case was of a man called BJSURI* who had for a long time been suspected as a Russian agent.

Spencer had been following him about and making all sorts of enquiries which were rather jeopardising this agent's position. The effect had been to make the Russians come clean and to place them under somewhat of an obligation. On the other hand the case of KISS, whose real name is an ex-agent of MAYR the German saboteur, was somewhat hanging fire. It was desired to obtain chicken food from the Russians to keep this man's set alive but all overtures in this respect had received no response although a

* ? VAZIRI

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good deal of telephoning to Moscow was still going on. B-B did not think that an approach in Moscow was likely to improve matters, although he was only too ready to complain to the Russians if Spencer thought it would have the desired effect. B-B was afraid it might jeopardise Spencer's relations with ASATUROV and possibly lead to the removal of the latter. It was agreed therefore that for the time being nothing should be done.

Spencer was a firm believer in taking a strong line with the Russians whenever they asked for it. He thought however that it was unfortunate that people should talk loudly in bars in a derogatory fashion about the Russians as this only got back to them with disastrous results. B-B seemed to be entirely in agreement with this view. His experiences in Moscow had evidently been very bitter. He had to put his questions to some Russian dressed up as a general who was never able to give an answer and always said he must refer the matter to higher authority. Endless delays followed and very often no answer was obtained at all. In order to counter this policy he presented notes to the general with the remark that if he did not receive an answer within 10 days he would assume that the Russians did not wish to co-operate and would so inform the CIGS. This almost invariably produced some sort of a reply, although very often an unsatisfactory one. B-B was very worried about the policy of appeasement adopted by the Govt. and in particular the F.O. He said it got us nowhere and only brought us into contempt. The Russians were asiatics and

Source: Reference: KV74/194

understood bargaining. He gave as an example the fact that there was only one air route from Moscow to Teheran which was a Russian one and that high British officials were turned off this plane to make room for Russians, whereas on our route and the American route from Teheran to Cairo British subjects were again turned off to make room for Russian missions. The right policy would be to keep the Russians waiting in Teheran indefinitely until they allowed us and the Americans to have our own route to Moscow. B-B had never been allowed to look inside a Russian tank or Russian aeroplane and had only once succeeded in getting up to the front after a very firm protest had been made. He took a poor view of the Russian military machine in so far as its equipment was concerned. He said that it succeeded solely on account of its enormous preponderance in men and material. A high percentage of the latter was British and American. Its transport was rather like a circus. You would frequently see a huge tractor with a car hitched up to the back because its front wheels were out of order and tied to the back of the car a peasant's cart. In the car would be ammunition and in the cart rations. It was not at all uncommon to see the Russian motor-cars with one German wheel on them, rather smaller than the rest of the wheels. The remarkable thing was however that things seemed to get to the right place at the right moment. Perhaps however this is not quite so astonishing if it is realised that an army commander is just told that he has to attack a certain objective. If he fails he is in trouble. The occupants of tanks which go

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forward and return without any scars are severely dealt with. The Russians are incredibly tough, having lived under a tough regime for 25 years, and there have been cases of their eating freezing mixture, and they would not hesitate to eat a candle if they could not get other fat.

I asked B-B how much he was told about the Russian offensive. He said that he was merely told that on a date subsequent to Overlord the Russians would launch an offensive and that they would launch another offensive and the another. No times or places were specified. It was hoped to keep the whole Russian front moving until Germany was finally defeated. B-B has been given all sorts of gadgets connected with our armaments to hand over to the Russians. They are not of the very latest type. He feels however that as the Russian machine as at present constituted is perfectly capable of dealing with the Germans there is not much point in giving them free gratis and for nothing devices which we shall be bringing into production after the war. We of course have been given no opportunity for inspecting any Russian weapons at all. B-B had the opportunity of talking to some German prisoners. He asked a fairly senior German officer how it was that the German army was being defeated by the Russians whom they so despised. The officer said that they had learned something from German speed and tactics but that the real reason was their over-whelming superiority in man-power and equipment.

Spencer believes that the Russians will try and hold on to Persian Azerbaijan after the war, in spite of their declaration regarding the maintenance of Persia's integrity. They will probably get over the difficulty by saying that the population have voted for incorporation in the Soviet Union. He thinks also that they may want certain facilities on the Persian railway which will give them an outlet on the Persian gulf for the export and import of material. He rather doubts whether they will go much further than this, at any rate for the time being.

I lunched with Curry, who is anxious to obtain some sort of liaison with the French 2ème Bureau. He understands that Paillolle has a small section dealing with communists. He has to keep this very dark as there are of course communists on the Committee of Liberation who object to these activities. I told Curry that I did not think that PAILLOLE would have time to do much in this line at the moment but that as soon as he was established in the various régions in France it would be a wise move to get his full co-operation. I promised to speak to Dick about this matter. Curry is also a little anxious about his own position. Vivian and Cowgill are both proceeding on the assumption that Section V will be running subversive movements abroad either by themselves or after they have absorbed F. Division. I said that all this was under discussion and that for the time being I thought it was best for Curry to carry on. If he came back to this office next week I certainly should find great

difficulty in finding anything for him to do in B. Division. I thought however that if there was something in the nature of an amalgamation after the war there would undoubtedly be work for him to do.

I had a talk with Kim this afternoon. He wanted to know whether we would consider letting SIS have ~~Courtney~~ Young as part of their Far Eastern organisation. I said that I did not think there was really any chance since demands were being made upon us and he was our most promising candidate. I said that if he wanted to "C" could write to the D.G., but that I should have to advise the DG that Courtney Young would probably be required for M.I.5 duties.

Kim seemed to approve of the memo which Aylor had put up on the organisation of CCMS. He thought it was very sound and well drafted. He told me that Hill-Dillon was over here and taking the line that he is to take over all CI duties in Austria and would not require any assistance from SIS. I presume that he has in mind Alexander's offensive which is to take place shortly. SIS are not going to take this lying down. It is incredible how Hill-Dillon gets away with it. He has not of course had the slightest idea of what he is doing since the day he entered N. Africa. His CI in Italy is a shambles, and John Mair is about the only person who keeps it on the rails.

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August 27th

The SHAEF Counter-Intelligence Review for the period 6th June to 6th August 1944, states that German espionage activity in France has so far followed the lines anticipated. There have been two main categories of agents, the long ~~time~~ stay-behind type installed before our landings with a wireless transmitter, and the short term agent sent through our lines after the commencement of operations with instructions to collect information by observation and return to his German masters to report verbally. The great majority of the agents have been of French nationality, mostly young men some of whom had connections with French collaborationist organisations such as the P.P.F or the Francistes, while others agreed to work for the German I.S. as an alternative to being sent to forced labour in Germany, or as a means of escaping punishment for black market offences etc. Most of the short term agents sent through our lines have been of a low grade quality without much pertinacity. On the other hand two agents sent out by the S.D. to collect political information on conditions in liberated areas adopted the technique of making contact with allied intelligence officers and endeavouring to gain their confidence by volunteering information about the Germans.

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Military Security discipline has on the whole been satisfactory but there have been serious cases of the capture by the enemy of classified documents containing important information as to our dispositions and intentions, carried into

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action by officers. There has been no proven case of successful sabotage. Occasionally telephone lines have been short-circuited by means of gramophone needles inserted in the wire. The task of verifying or disproving the many accusations of collaboration has been lengthy and difficult. Delay has sometimes caused resentment among good Frenchmen. There is some compensation in the fact that no indiscriminate blood-letting has yet taken place and the situation is under local control. Anyone belonging to the Milice Francaise, the Partie Populaire Francaise or the French agency which has recruited Frenchmen for German civil or military duties are treated as suspects to be automatically arrested. These organisations boasted only a very small membership in Normandy. The control of civilian movement has not been an easy task and this has undoubtedly made it easier for the Germans to infiltrate agents through our lines. Security check points and mobile patrols have been established to deal with the situation. This task has fallen mainly on the FSP and certain members of the Resistance Movement who have been recruited. There is an appreciable danger of enemy agents seeking to enter liberated territory from the sea by small boats. Air patrols and volunteer coast watchers working under the direction of the FSP have the matter in hand.

A German officer P/W has suggested that leaflets should be dropped over the lines suggesting that in the present plight of the German Army Corporal Schickelgruber should be called up.

A report on V.1 and V.2 gives the following facts:

There have been cases of incendiary bombs being carried by V.1. From remains recovered it seems that approximately 1 kilo of explosive incendiaries are carried in a small frame.

The monthly production of V.1 was formerly put at about 1-1,500 a month. If any reliance can be placed on the works numbers this figure may now be 7,000 per month. Whatever the facts there would seem to be an ample supply to maintain the present or even an increased scale of attack until the coastal areas are occupied. The control of flying bomb operations which was under the 15th Army Corps may be moving to an area south of Brussels from Arras.

A total of about 6,750 flying bombs has now been launched against the U.K. During the fortnight ending 16th August an average daily scale of over a 100 launchings was maintained. During this period a maximum of 295 flying bombs was recorded over the consecutive 24 hours on the 3rd August, but from the 8-16th August activities dropped to the lowest level yet recorded, averaging only 60 launchings a day. This was probably due to the better weather and to the improving defensive measures. Less than a quarter of the bombs despatched penetrated the London area. Launchings of flying bombs from bomber aircraft were observed on 2nd, 3rd and 4th August but only on a very small scale.

A number of documents captured in Normandy and the continuing examination of the parts received from Sweden enable a more definitive opinion of the German long-range rocket to be formed. This would appear to be 45 ft. 10 ins. long and 5 ft 7 ins maximum diameter. Estimates as to the total weight are between 7 and 20 tons. Farnborough say 14 tons and a warhead of about one ton. One of the two principle fuels is almost certainly liquid oxygen. The second fuel cannot be identified as alcohol with the same assurance although alcohol is at least its main constituent. The full bomb is driven by hydrogen peroxide and permanganate. The rocket is radio controlled probably from a completely portable equipment. There is no evidence that control extends beyond the period of burning of the order of $1\frac{1}{2}$ minutes but the possibility of some later control cannot be ruled out. The rocket has a range of at least 160 to 200 miles. There is no doubt that it is intended as a weapon of considerable precision but such evidence as exists indicates that the degree of accuracy obtained as yet is not impressive. The rocket leaves a visible trail of vapour in its initial stages of flight. It is erected vertically on a steel firing base which is placed on a heavily reinforced platform. Firing is done from a special vehicle which is driven into a control hut some distance off the side of the road. This of course points to a vertical or nearly vertical take off unassisted by auxiliary launching devices. There is no definite evidence of the imminence of attack although preparations seem to be

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fairly advance d.

Through the FBI the objections of the State Dept. to granting a visa to Tricycle have been overcome and if and when the Yugoslavs make application a visa will be granted. A further application which the Yugoslav P.M. promised Tricycle would be made does not in fact seem to have been made. I discussed

this case with the FBI while I was in Washington. They were rather worried because the previous application for Tricycle to attend the monetary conference has been turned down by the State Dept. (I understand privately from Joe Lynch because it had not been supported by the Yugoslav Minister). The State Dept. thought that we and the FBI were trying to bounce them. The FBI did not know that the previous application had been made and refused. They of course were particularly keen on seeing Tricycle again but they quite appreciated our position and Hoover had given orders that everything was to be done to get the State Dept. to comply with our request. Since I have been away Dreadnaught, Tricycle's brother had arrived here as a refugee. The Gestapo were on his tracks for black market activities. He does not think that Artist has been compromised, otherwise his younger brother in Paris would probably have been disturbed. Moreover Abwehr contacts in Bulgaria are still assisting him in his difficulties with the S.D. on charges of corruption.

The Germans have resuscitated Dragonfly by sending him money through Swiss sources. He is

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therefore on the air again but has not yet succeeded in establishing contact.

Joseph is now in New York and has been interviewed by the FBI. They have given us a suitable story for a notional agent in New York whom Joseph is supposed to have recruited. The FBI have also supplied us with traffic supposed to have come from this agent. It is hoped that he will be shipped back to the U.K. shortly with the assistance of the Bureau.

August 28th

On the 20th August a Swiss Legation wire from Vichy to Berne stated that at 7 am Petain was arrested in his bedroom by the Germans with the application of brutal violence. He protested to the Nuncio's representative and the Swiss charge d'affaires, as having been witnesses of the whole most unhappy course of events and of the fact that he now no longer exercised his functions as head of the state. About 8 o'clock he was removed under a strong German guard and with a small personal suite by motorcar to an unknown destination, presumably Belfort. The Marshal explained to the Swiss charge d'affaires that Laval was also under arrest in Belfort, together with other members of the Govt. Laval had been informed that he must go to Belfort because of Petain's presence there. Petain on the other hand was informed that he must go to Belfort because the Govt. with Laval at their head was there. At the moment in France there is no head of the State, no head of the Govt. and no Govt. The diplomatic corps were

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requested to leave by the Germans but with the exception of the Japs all refused.

I saw Maxwell today. I told him about the case of GUY, a Frenchman who had been brought back from Normandy to be interrogated. The French here had asked if they could keep him under interrogation all night. This had been refused, and Milmo and Dick Butler had given an assurance to Maxwell that the French were not being allowed to undertake any interrogations without a British officer being present. From an indiscretion by a French officer to Milton of the LRC it seems that an officer from O20 had allowed the French at their request to interrogate GUY alone for a short period and that a break had subsequently been obtained. The O20 officer was acting entirely contrary to instructions and disciplinary action has been taken. I explained all this to Maxwell as Milmo and Dick Butler did not wish him to think that they had deliberately misled him. He took the matter very well and entirely accepted by explanation.

I then talked to him about the case of CARON and left with him a letter. CARON is a German agent who has been operating in N. Africa. Unknown to himself he had been fed by an agent of the French and had been passing on the information by secret letter. Recently however he received a wireless set from the Germans and the French felt that he could not be allowed to operate any more except under control. They therefore arrested him and have taken over his set. They cannot keep him under

lock and key without bringing him to trial which would almost inevitably jeopardise the case. They have asked is therefore if we can lock him up at any rate for the duration. Maxwell felt this was virtually a request by the French to get them out of an administrative difficulty which they ought really to solve for themselves. Hewould however speak to the Home Secretary, explaining that there was not likely to be a recurrence and that we were anxious if possible to do the French a service. The proposal is that CARON should be sent over here and put into 020.

Finally I discussed the arrangement which has been made for sending back spies or suspected spies from Normandy. It has been agreed that they shall be treated purely as military prisoners, provided they are not kept here too long. They will not therefore be refused leave to land or detained under any order. They will just be held by us on behalf of the military and then sent back as soon as the interrogations have been completed. A difficulty has arisen in the case of women spies, three of whom have recently been sent here. They have to be detained at Holloway and therefore have to be R.L.L. by the I.O. This arrangement is perfectly satisfactory to us provided the H.O. see no objection. Maxwell agreed that this procedure should continue.

I had a short talk with Maxwell about the future of the office and gave him our ideas on the defensive and offensive organisations.

He seemed to be interested and is obviously going to think about the whole problem. I explained to him that much trouble might have been saved in this war if we had had some footing on the continent.

Col. Murray, the Canadian D.M.I., called in. He said that he had not been able to get much further with his problem of the P/Ws in Canada. The proposal is that they should be split up into black, white and grey and that some attempt should be made to lecture to the grey and white camps in preparation for their being sent back to Germany. PWE appear to have designs on some of them. I said I thought that his best line for getting a settlement would be to prepare a paper and put it up to the J.I.C. I think he is going to adopt this course.

We afterwards had a talk with TAR, who outlined Tommy's proposal that Garbo should be evacuated to Canada. The reason for this is that various members of the Abwehr are coming over to us in Spain and must be expected to know of Garbo and all his works. The Germans would naturally suppose therefore that we should get on to Garbo and liquidate him. In anticipation of this he himself is going to ground and leaving his organisation in the hands of his No. 3. Garbo will then suggest his going to Canada which will be notionally arranged by Moonbeam. He will then suggest joining up with the German rats in the Argentine. We may in that way maintain some sort of connection with the remnants of the Abwehr,

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S.D. and S.S. who may try to carry on the fight.

The presence of Garbo in Canada will not involve sending over much traffic except that which concerns his domestic affairs and his organisation generally.

I have just had a look at Lennox's map, which indicates that there are only 9 divisions in Germany, practically no divisions in front of the Americans, and the remnants of some 40 divisions on our front and the Canadian front between the Seine and Belgium. These are nearly all static divisions, the only armour being that with the 7th or 8th divisions which have already been engaged. We now have two good bridgeheads across the Seine and our plan is to advance on a line from the Seine north east in the direction of Antwerp. The Americans are now beyond Vitry and the southern force are moving up in the direction of Belfort but have not yet reached Lyons. The whole of the southern part of France appears to be more or less in the hands of the maquis.

Cecil and I took Ogilvy out to dinner and had a long talk with him until 1 a.m.

He controls fairly big business interests in Australia. These include a broadcasting network a group of newspapers and a chain of cinemas. He appears to be a personal friend of Brig. Simpson, a federal barrister of high repute who is of course in charge of the Commonwealth Investigation Bureau. Ogilvy seems to have the interests of the Empire very much at heart and is extremely concerned about American penetration. He says that OWI are using their

organisation for big business interests and have been trying to get control of press and propaganda. Their agents for this purpose have been the British advertising firm of J. Walker Thompson. They attempted to buy a controlling share in Ogilvy's broadcasting network but were turned down. It is difficult to say how far the American Govt. is behind them. They have a certain number of supporters of an influential kind, who run a society called the American-Australian Union or Association. The Chicago Tribune which is bitterly anti-British, has been trying to get facilities for publication of its paper in Australia. This has been turned down by the Govt. Curtin seems to have got over the Casey incident and to have been completely won over by the P. M. during his recent visit to this country. He is extremely keen to get the P. M. to go out to Australia. Gowrie, the present Governor-General, has according to Ogilvy done a wonderful job. He has travelled all over Australia and made contact with every class of person. His democratic behaviour has won the hearts of the Australians. Ogilvy gave various instances of this. Anyone who took the trouble to go to Government House and sign the visitor's book receives an invitation to the Governor's party. It does not matter whether he is a high official, a butcher or a baker. Since the war the Governor has refused to have a special train or even a special carriage. He travels as any other citizen and gets into conversation with anyone he meets. The appointment of the Duke of Gloucester as his successor, which is entirely an Australian idea, is considered by Ogilvy to be a very good one. The

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fact that the Duke is not a great brain is of little consequence provided he receives proper guidance and carries out his duties with reasonable tact. While Ogilvy thinks that the Americans want careful watching he agrees that they will in the long run cook their own goose. He thinks however that it is necessary for this country to wake up to the fact that Australia as a whole leans towards the British Empire. The man in the street does not know the meaning of the words British Commonwealth of Nations. He never refers to them. Over here, according to Ogilvy, we are too mealy-mouthed about the Empire. We seem to have the impression that people in Australia do not care about the home country and their connections with it. In fact they do.

Ogilvy admits that the American Fleet saved Australia at a most critical moment and that the Americans have done quite a lot for the country in the building of roads etc. The view of most Australians however is that England would have been at their side if she had not had another war on her hands, and they would much prefer to have British troops in Australia than American, whose behaviour has not altogether been to their liking. At present there is only one battalion of the Black Watch there. These have been paraded round to almost every city and an impression has not got about even in government circles that there as many as 50,000 British troops in Australia.

The Government is now taking a much firmer attitude with regard to Americans and are taking every opportunity to show them that the Austra-

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lians wish to be masters in their own house. Parties of Americans appear to be coming and going just as they liked. Instructions were given about 3 months ago to hold up a party of technicians who were returning to America until the proper formalities had been completed. The Australian SCO at the airport refused to let the plane leave. The head of the party rang up MacArthur who was told that the SCO had his orders and could now allow people in and out unless they complied with the necessary formalities. MacArthur was extremely annoyed and got on to Simpson and then on to Evatt the Minister of Defence, and finally on to Curtin.

All concerned had been warned and he got the same answer from everybody. The party was not allowed to leave till the following day. This has had an extremely good effect. Other incidents that have caused annoyance are the special guards provided for Mrs. Roosevelt and for high-ranking officers (American). Evatt found some of these standing outside his door and kicked them out of the office. They were also asked to withdraw from Govt. House when a reception was being given for Mrs. Roosevelt and they put in an appearance in the grounds.

Ogilvy is quite convinced that the Americans intend to hold on to certain of the Pacific Islands. He thinks we may have a lot of trouble about this in the future.

I asked him what he thought we should do about our representation. He said he thought that we should derive reciprocal advantage through havin

an officer suitably camouflaged on the High Commissioner's staff.

He then told me about the RSS incident. Stratton the professor of Astrophysics had been sent out in order to collaborate with Ogilvy about setting up the necessary machinery for detecting anything in the nature of the Jap ISOS. Independently however G-P and Maltby seem to have recruited a certain Capt. Sandford as their representative. Sandford is a cryptographer of considerable abilities who is a representative of the Australian D.M.I.'s dept. and a member of a joint Anglo-Australian-American Bureau which is concerned with picking up Jap naval military and air messages, breaking them and relaying them to G.C. & C.S. The head of this Bureau is an American named Mitken. Sandford happened to be in this country and apparently received a charter from RSS to provide them with any unclassified material picked up by the Y. units of his Bureau. This arrangement was I understand unknown to Prof. Stratton. Maltby and G-P said that they spoke to Evatt's secretary about this matter and that he was going to put things right on his return to Australia. He however went sick and it is alleged that in consequence the proper people were not informed. Ogilvy is going to look into all this when he gets back. The result was that Sandford was working for RSS without the knowledge of his own DMI and Brig. Simpson. His activities were considered peculiar and observation was kept on his correspondence, telegrams etc. on the assumption that he was trying to act as a political observer to the British. As the result of this

observation Ogilvy discovered that Sandford had a house which was being paid for by RSS, that he had furnished this in a lavish way, paying £70 for a dinner set etc.etc. All this appears to have been news to G-P and Maltby and when asked what value they were receiving in return for the money spent had to admit that they got nothing from Sandford. This of course

is typical of RSS finances generally. Nobody really knows how their money is spent. Their accounts are supposed to be vetted by Creedy who is of course in no position to say what they all mean or whether anybody is getting value for money.

Ogilvy was rather annoyed about the reception that he got from the DG who seemed quite uninterested in the affairs of RSS. Ogilvy had in consequence shortly after his arrival telegraphed to Simpson saying that he did not expect to get much help from Petrie. Since that incident however Ogilvy has been taken in hand by Ede, TAR and others and I think is now thoroughly sympathetic towards our methods.

He told me that while in Washington Hoover had given our organisation an extremely good chit but quite clearly had his knife into SIS. Hoover's good relations with us had not prevented him from trying to drive a wedge between Australia and Gt. Britain. He did not seem to understand Ogilvy when he said that he was British and that his loyalty was to the King of England.

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August 29th

TAR and John Senter came to see me about the case of CASSARD, a Belgian, formerly an SOE agent who got into the hands of the Germans. He returned here about a year ago and was thoroughly examined by Geoffrey Wethered in conjunction with SOE. We found it extremely difficult to accept his story, although it is quite probable that he obtained his release by promising to serve the Germans although he never intended to do so. Apart from this however he is rather indiscreet. It is therefore decided that on no account should he be allowed to return to the field and the Belgians were warned against giving him any confidential employment. He has now drifted into S.A.S. and is concerned with briefing of airborne troops. An operation involving 4 airborne divisions is to take place on Friday and CASSARD was apparently due to come down to SOE in order to discuss questions affecting their organisation. It did not seem that there was any great likelihood of CASSARD attempting to communicate direct with the Germans. On the other hand he might talk to the Belgians through whom a leak might occur. I said that this was a matter for SHAEF to decide but that in my view the best thing to be done in the circumstances, and on the assumption that CASSARD already knew what the plans were, would be to arrange things in such a way that he did not have access to the Belgian authorities before Friday.

TAR gave the papers to Mark Johnston and sent him down to see Dick.

Catalogue Reference:KV74/194

Anthony talked to me about an extremely bad case concerning special material. SIS had given us a report of a conversation with the Swedes of a somewhat sensational character which when compared with our conversation was completely erroneous. SIS explained this by saying that a different officer was working on the board and that he had heard another conversation on a legation line not tapped by us. He had amalgamated this with the conversation that we had picked up. Apart from the danger of mixing up two conversations SIS were not prepared to admit any liability. This once more shows the very unsatisfactory nature of organisation.

I have asked Anthony to go over and see the installation which had already been suggested by Arnold-Foster. We shall of course never get any further but personally I very much doubt whether any other conversation on the lines reported to us ever took place.

Bertram Ede came to talk to me about our set-up in the Far East. I said that I thought there were two problems. One was the appointment of a D.S.O. and the necessary staff in anticipation of the reoccupation of Singapore, and the other was the military question. We had planned and partially staffed the C.I. set-up for SIAEF. Were we called upon to do anything on similar lines for SEAC? I told him that in my view the best plan would be to let Airy visit Kandy on his return from Australia, consult with SEAC regarding contribution that they might require from us and then come on here.

Meanwhile I could see no particular point in Stratton going to Ceylon to set up the relations between various security officers and our organisation. I thought this could quite easily be done by Airy and Patterson who after all was an SCO. If the D.C. was sold on sending Stratton out it should be made clear to him that he could confine himself strictly to the port security question and not dabble in anything else. I told Ede that I would do my best to put this across during his absence on leave.

John Phipps tells me that Legge, C.C. Berks, is again making a nuisance of himself. He apparently took exception to an address given by Mitchell on Fascist and quasi-Fascist organisations. He wrote to the D.C., who gave him a suitable reply which was not to his liking. He then went to the H.O. but got no change. He has now, in his capacity of Chairman of the Special Branch meetings in his regional area, said that owing to the paucity of the agenda he does not think it is necessary to hold the next meeting. In fact the agenda is just as long as the agenda for any other meeting, and moreover it is laid down by the H.O. that these meetings are to take place at least once every two months. I believe that Harker intends to take the question up with the H.O.

Joe Stephenson has returned from Mid East and is inclined to think that his services there are no longer justifiable. He takes a very poor view of SIS activities and personnel in the East. His only bright spot is who is extremely good.

August 30th

I had a meeting with Stopford, Dickson and Anthony about the Swedish project. It seems now completely set. We only have to wait the return of J.74 in order to get on with the job. We have, I think and hope, taken every possible precaution.

SHAEF have decided to leave CASSARD where he is as it appears that he has up to the moment no intimate knowledge of the operation. Meanwhile a suggestion has come forward that he should go into the field tonight. This we are strongly opposing on security grounds.

Ogilvy came to see me again to say goodbye. He seems to be thoroughly satisfied with his visit and I think is taking away a good impression of the office which he will convey to Simpson. I urged on him to do all he could to wipe out the old troubles particularly the Mawhood-RSS incidents which are nothing to do with us. Ogilvy is very keen that we should have a representative in Australia and tie in closely with Singapore when it is reoccupied.

I saw Dick. He gave me a rough outline of the present SHAEF counter-intelligence scheme. There is to be part control from Bordeaux, Rotterdam, which is hoped will be staffed largely by personnel from M.I.5. who may be released from port duties here. There is also to be a ring round Germany which will need security control personnel. The direction and planning of all this in the hands of Robb and his assistants at SHAEF. C.C.M.S. is apparently to

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come under the direction of SHAEF and although it will plan separately it will emerge from SHAEF C.I. organisation. There has also been a dust-up between R.J. and "onnie Daylor. Ronnie has had for some time a planning committee on which he, other members of CCMS and representatives of SHAEF have been working. R.J. swept in yesterday as chairman and started to attack the scheme which Ronnie's committee had put up. With the exception of Melland, all those who had been working with Ronnie joined in the attack against him merely because they thought that R.J. was now the big noise. The points on which R.J. attacked Ronnie were that he had put forward his proposals through West without the knowledge of SHAEF. To begin with the Constitution of CCMS vis a vis SHAEF had never been clearly defined, secondly SHAEF's representatives had been working on the committee all the time and had subscribed to everything in Ronnie's memo, and lastly an outline of the memo was passed to McLeod at SHAEF a long time ago. SHAEF therefore have nothing to complain about except their own incompetence. R.J. if he had had any sense of decency should have consulted Ronnie and his planning committee before barging into the meeting. The fact is of course that he dislikes Ronnie in spite of the fact that he served him well in the setting up of the LRC in the Mid East. He did not of course do this without considerable difficulty and opposition. R.J. has apparently bounced in on Harry Allen and said that Ronnie must go.

I asked Dick about the DSO appointments for the French regions. He said that all that had

gone by the board. All they would require would be officers in the principal capitals, Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam and possibly Copenhagen. If we have anyone to fill these posts he would like them..

Dick thinks that J20 ought to be transferred to Germany after the Armistice, more or less lock stock and barrel, leaving just a small staff to liquidate the existing organisation.

Nobody seems to have considered yet how the various bodies are going to be disposed of. Will they just be released and told to make their way to the continent or will they have to be handed over to the allied government concerned. The H.O. I think will be rather reluctant to take this latter course.

Dick has had long conversations with Hill-Dillon about his set-up in Austria which will have to tie in with SHAEF and CCMS. Dick evidently finds him refreshing after some of the characters he has got in SHAEF, though there is no reason to suppose that H-D has any better idea of what he is doing than when he went to North Africa. The whole of his C.I. activities were conducted in a typically Irish steeple-chase horse-coping atmosphere.

August 31st

I have been reading various reports which came in during my absence in America about the plot to assassinate Hitler. It seems that all was going fairly well until the news began to come through that Hitler had only been very slightly wounded. At that stage all the officers who

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were formerly in favour of the putsche began to waver and to talk about their oath of allegiance. There was a dramatic moment when Goebbels sent for von der Heyde. A kind of sparring match went on while Goebbel's secretary was trying to find out whether Goebbels was von der Heyde's prisoner or vice versa. His secretary came in and whispered something in Goebbels' ear, presumably a out the way things were going, and immediately von der Heyde was placed under arrest. There seems little doubt that the plot had been brewing for a very considerable time. There were a few active people surrounding Beck, the ex-chief of staff, but there were also a number of others who were in the know.

The number of flying bombs launched has recently been on a somewhat reduced scale. On some days the figures have been very low and this may be due to the fact that the sites have to be moved as the allied armies advance. The percentage brought down is fairly high and the percentage of those that reach London is between 10-15%

The J.I.C. are putting out a spate of reports about the weaknesses in Germany's capacity to resist. These include battle wastage, the allied bombing offensive, the blockade, pre-emptive and diplomatic action. They say that the allies' policy of attacking Germany's oil production is for the first time threatening her with a potentially fatal situation. The operational efficiency of the German army in the west is being drastically affected by lack of fuel which has been a major factor in the present battle. Equally their oil shortage in the Navy is attributable to the attacks on the Biscay ports.

Production of supplies for non-military purposes is affecting the transport and armaments industry. The loss of Ploesti will reduce the enemy's supply by some 15%. As regards man-power the situation is growing daily more serious. It is estimated that during the first half of 1944 the German army suffered over 1 million permanent battle and medical casualties. If this rate is maintained during the second half of 1944, and this is regarded as a conservative assumption, the numerical strength of the German army will have declined at the end of the year from the estimated peak figure of 7,100,000 reached last June to some 6,250,000 after allowing for the intake from all sources including the mortgaging of the 1927 class and Goebbels' total mobilisation scheme. By the end of this year the German army of 6,250,000 will contain under 2 million fit Germans between the ages of 19 and 46. The balance will be made up of 1,250 between the ages of 19 and 46 with disabilities caused by wounds or sickness, 1, million foreigners whose reliability is steadily decreasing, 1 million boys aged 18 or less, 750,000 men over the age of 47 and 450,000 men in hospital. The Germans have suffered very serious losses in arms and equipment in recent battles and the task of bringing replacements up to the present battle fronts appears to be almost insuperable. Thus the possibility of Germany opposing the allies in mobile warfare in the west is virtually precluded. Germany's fleet, particularly her U-boats, have suffered serious losses and the position as regards her surface craft remains very weak. The Tirpitz might be capable of undertaking a limited

operation. One additional 8" cruiser is available and some 6 Elberg class destroyers may soon be in commission.. U-boats can now no longer operate in the Atlantic unless they are based on Norway or the Baltic. There have been serious losses in merchant shipping and the Swedish Government's decision to withhold insurance from Swedish ships through to German Baltic ports has been an added blow. Germany's increasing shortage of aviation spirit is the greatest potential weakness of the German Air Force and has resulted in the prohibition of all non-essential and non-operational flying. The drastic curtailment of air transport, the limitation of training occasional countermanding of actual operations ordered. By the end of July every hydrogenating plant in Germany and German Europe, with one possible exception, was for the time being out of action, and stocks of aviation spirit in the west had been substantially reduced by air attacks. At present only defensive fighter operations remained unrestricted. The only part of the German Air Force which constitutes an exception to the general weakness are the night fighter squadrons. They have been expanded by some 575 aircraft during the past year. Low operational wastage has ensured the maintenance of an ample cadre of crews with long operational experience, and reserves of crews are available from the numerous disbanded bomber units already trained for night flying. These factors combined with Germany's development of radar and anti-radar devices has brought the night fighter force to a peak of operational efficiency.

It has finally been decided by the Chiefs of Staff in Washington that bona fides diplomatic and consular property of enemy governments including their archives and the property of enemy diplomatic and consular personnel found in territory of third powers occupied in the course of hostilities should be accorded the following treatment. If any such property is in the custody of the protecting power that custody will be respected in every way. If it is not it will be safeguarded until such time as the governments represented by the occupying powers gives specific instructions as to its disposition. In such cases important diplomatic and consular archives may be copied pending disposition but not confiscated. This policy does not preclude the theatre commander at his discretion and on his responsibility right of entry and search of premises allegedly diplomatic or consular in character which he has substantial reason to believe to be or to have been used for clandestine warlike operations against his own forces, and examination of which he believes to be essential to the security of his own forces, communications and operations. In all such cases a full report must be referred to the governments to whom he is responsible, justifying the entry and search.

Hill came to see me this morning about his work, and particularly about the case of Moss SIMONS and BOLSON. There was a suggestion of putting in a Jewish FSP who would try and get BOLSON to get him out of the army on medical grounds through a doctor who is working for BOLSON.

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False X-ray photographs indicating duodenal ulcers are presented to the medical authorities. This has become a regular racket. Hill talked to me about his other cases and in particular about the police. He is quite convinced that Stevens, who is working under Supt. Barrett on corruption cases, is working in with STOCKMAN. He has the following chain of evidence. Sergt. Noble in whose room Stevens formerly worked is asked whether Stevens is reliable and has said "He is one of us". Ned Reid at the request of the Bank of England is asked to explain certain banking transactions regarding the account of one BUXTON who is defrauding the revenue. Noble is asked by STOCKMAN whether he can obtain these figures, and an individual calling himself STEVENS subsequently telephones about these figures to STOCKMAN. The case of Greeno who had opened an account into which he had paid in in a very short space of time some £4,000 in treasury notes, has not progressed even though this information was given to the Yard. Some of the notes have been traced to dog-racing bookies. It is however wellknown that such transactions are recorded in the ledgers of doubtful bookies for a consideration in order to give the necessary cover. For some reason or other Kendal does not wish Greeno's account to be passed to the Inland Revenue in order that they may claim income tax and possibly take proceedings for failure to disclose. Greeno is a Supt. and considered to be the ace CID sleuth at the Yard.

Brian Melland came in to ask whether I could help him in digging out certain pre-war information relating to the organisation of the German I.S. and propaganda organisation and the foreign branch of the NSDAP. The beavers had already done a considerable amount in this connection, of which he has had the benefit. I said I would do what I could to think of other cases.

I took the opportunity of tackling him about R.J.s performance. He said that it was an extremely bad show, that Ronnie was a very sound fellow with an excellent brain who had worked hard and produced a good report. R.J.s criticisms were clearly prejudiced and personal. Melland said that although in certain circumstances it might have been difficult to have two Lt. Cols. working alongside each other he had got on extremely well with Ronnie. He thinks it would be a disaster if Ronnie packed up since he is a very good organiser while Melland himself can supply the necessary knowledge of German organisations, particularly the police.

Burt came to see me. He had been to Southend to have a talk with ZIGZAG, from whom he has extracted a certain amount of useful information on criminal lines. He also at our request threw a fly over ZIGZAG about the reward that he was expecting for his services. It seems that Michael Ryde had mentioned a figure of £6,000. Burt said he thought there must be some mistake, but that in any case Ryde was not high enough in the organisation to make a

promise of that sort. It transpired ultimately that ZIGZAG thought that if he got £3,000 he would be doing extremely well. He is apparently well satisfied with the way that his case has been conducted by this office. He seems anxious to make contact again with the Germans somewhere in the North Sea where he has an idea that he will be able to hand over bogus photographs of Asdic devices for which he thinks he will receive the sum of £5,000. I said to Burt that I doubted whether the German navy would ever fall in with a scheme of this sort particularly at a time like this. We had previously had cases of submarine rendezvous but the indications were that the naval authorities were not prepared to risk their ships for the Abwehr. They would be still less likely to do so now when they have had so many submarines sunk.

We have been asked to estimate the sabotage risks to factories and dockyards now and after the cessation of hostilities. I said that at the moment they were practically negligible and after the hostilities would be positively negligible. I felt however that the question of sabotage would have to be joined with that of espionage. After hostilities I did not think that the risks were very great from the point of view of Jap espionage. I did think however that we ought to watch our allies. This however was quite useless as long as they were given free access to all our latest devices. There is no doubt that the Russians are out for all they can get and that the Americans will commercialise our inventions after the war.