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1st September 1944.

I had a talk with J.C. and Marriott about the future of B.I.A. agents. In principle I thought we should not be in any hurry to liquidate the organisation but that that it should take its natural course in accordance with the various characters of the agents. Our principal objective would be to maintain touch with such agents, ~~members~~ of the Abwehr or S.D. that remain whether in Germany or abroad. I did not imagine that there would be any attempt at espionage in the ordinary sense either by the Abwehr or SD until there is some properly constituted government in Germany with a certain amount of freedom of action. Unless Germany is allowed a limited quantity of arms or control becomes so lax that she is able to make or acquire them clandestinely, there is no point in her having details of our latest devices. She may however be after industrial secrets. The main objective of those working for the regeneration of Germany and a 3rd world war will be to get themselves back into power. Their activities will therefore be concentrated on propaganda for a modification of the armistice terms and for the removal of foreign armed forces from German territory. This will be conducted through clubs, associations and individuals, some conscious and some unconscious of what they are doing. The line will probably be the familiar one: (a) you can't keep a great nation down; (b) Germany's regeneration is in the interests of Europe; (c) an unstable Germany leads to trade dislocation; (d) money spent on

occupying troops in Germany could be better spent on social services in this country; (e) the real menace is Russia and we should combine with Germany against her. It is possible that the Germans may resort to guerilla tactics directed against those who assist the allied authorities and also ~~possibly~~ against the allied authorities themselves. It will therefore be valuable if we can establish some link with these parties either in Germany or outside. GARBO may perhaps be able to contribute something in this direction. As regards the Japs there is the possibility that when the war in the west is over and facilities for travel are relaxed, they may attempt to pick up information from this country. Personally I am doubtful and even if they do there is little that they could obtain that they could put to good account before they are forced to capitulate. I think however that we should maintain such contacts with them as we can, as an insurance against their building up any sort of network in this country.

Harker called a meeting with Charles, Harry, Richard Butler and myself to discuss our commitments in the Far East. It was generally agreed that Stratton's visit was unnecessary and that the situation as regards port security could be handled by Jim Airy and Patterson. Caulfeild will recommend to the DNI that he should send no reply until the D.G. has had an opportunity of considering the matter. He agrees that we should first get a report from Airy and Burton as to precisely what is required and why. If co-ordinating is required he feels it is the job for the DSO.

R.J. came to see me and started raving about the CCMS. He says that his instructions are vague as regards phase 1 i.e. responsibility for C.I. up to the cessation of hostilities. He says very charitably that he is quite prepared to leave this to Dick. For phase 2 he is definitely responsible. This period is from the cessation of hostilities until the setting up of CCMS. Phase 3 is C.C.M.S. of which he takes command. He said that CCMS will now come under SHAEF and that he will therefore be responsible for all the planning. He started to abuse Ronnie for not having disclosed the figures of officers and personnel required to SHAEF. I said that I understood that Ronnie had given global figures to McLeod and that although I had not seen his plan I understood it was a good one. The nucleus of CCMS had been dumped down without any direction at all and as the war was progressing they very rightly set to work to produce a plan. If SHAEF were not satisfied with it they only had themselves to blame. Their members had been sitting in on the committee and everything, even figures, had been discussed there. I think RJ saw that he was batting on rather a bad wicket and that I was not prepared to listen to any abuse of Ronnie.

GOLUB the Palestinian who is coming over here for discussions with Shertok, and possibly Weitzmann. Palestine is now a hotbed and might at any moment go up in the air. It is therefore very important that we should attempt to obtain some sort of information about these meetings. It would be useless of course to attempt to

obtain authority and I am therefore just going ahead on my own responsibility. If the check looks profitable we shall probably have to get some sort of official sanction.

I have had a telegram from Victor saying that he has discovered a large dump of German sabotage equipment near Paris. The Germans blew up the sabotage school with 30 tons of explosive and incidentally blew the village up as well. They missed the sabotage dump however which contains new devices, such as sabotage equipment in the form of coat hangers, shoe trees etc. — Victor wants a car and Tess Mayor. I spoke to Dick. It is quite hopeless to try and get a car. Q Movements or whoever is concerned would have to open at least 6 files and the car would not get to France until about 1950. There may be a chance of getting Tess off through SIS. I have spoken to Kim about this.

C. rang me up rather alarmed because Derek Morley had been round talking to his professor Jones about the U-bomb. I said that neither I nor TAR had had any consultations with the controller on this subject. It seemed to me just possible that the controller might have heard of it through C'Connor since he would probably be aware of the questionnaire to be put by the Germans to the agent who is being run by the FBI. C. said that V.2. might conceivably go into operation in south Jutland whence he had had two reports. We discussed also the probable reactions of fanatical Nazis in Germany

after the armistice. I told him that in my view the job of CCMS would be very largely a police job requiring fully qualified interrogators who would have to deal with denunciations etc. I mentioned to him that I had spoken to Hoover about this. I was quite sure that he ought to be represented on the American CCMS. C. said he would bear this in mind and try to put in a word with the Americans. He agreed with me that neither G.2 nor OSS could possibly carry the task.

I went to see Lamplough, who is DMI SEAC, in order to find out from him whether he was looking to us for any assistance on the CI side. We came to the conclusion that on the whole it was doubtful whether we should make much of a contribution although it was possible that we could sell something on methods of control in the field. We both agreed that in so far as port security was concerned we had a definite part to play. Lamplough thought it might be useful if somebody could go out and take a look at their CI organisation in the light of experience in France. I should have thought that if he could be spared Niall MacDermot would have been ideal for the job.

The war seems to be going extremely well. The Americans are in Verdun and we are streaking ahead north of Amiens. There does not appear to be much resistance.

September 2nd

Wilson has put up two very interesting reports based on information that he has received from DREADNOUGHT. They throw a particularly interesting light on the attitude of MIHAILOVIC. If DREADNOUGHT's appreciation is correct, MIHAILOVIC is really doing what he considers to be best for his country as distinct from the allied cause. He dislikes both the Germans and the Partisans. He had collaborated with the Germans for two purposes: 1. to get greater freedom of movement and control over certain areas of the country, and 2. to get arms. He has not so far been in a sufficiently dominating position to come out into the open and deal with both Germans and Partisans, and continues his collaboration with the Germans in the hope that he will, as a reward for his apparent collaboration, be in a position to obtain such equipment as they will be forced to leave behind or be prepared to hand over to him. As far as Nedie is concerned, he is playing a somewhat similar game, fighting bogus battles in order that Nedie can have plausible excuses for losing equipment which comes to MIHAILOVIC's headquarters.

DREADNOUGHT's own efforts were concentrated on economic sabotage, i. e. in preventing the Germans from getting raw materials and manufactured goods by devious means, and seeing that if they did get them they were likely to be defective in one way or another. He has given a long account of his association with Artist which tallies in almost every detail with reports we have already received. As regards the Tripple case he said that

neither Munzinger nor Wiegand had ever expressed any doubts about Tricycle, but Dreadnought said that Abt.3 had raised two points as casting doubts on the bona fides of Tricycle. The first was that after Tricycle had visited Rio almost the entire German I.S. in Brazil had been arrested. (Tricycle had in fact not been responsible for this). The other was that at some time during the early stages of the case Tricycle had had some knowledge of another German agent in London, and the latter had broken down. Unfortunately Dreadnought cannot amplify this statement which might presumably refer to Giraffe, Tate or Balloon. Munzinger's opinion on these points was that if you looked only at them it was possible to argue that Tricycle was controlled but to do so was to ignore hundreds of other things pointing to the fact that he was not. Wiegand's opinion was that when Tricycle's last report had been vetted they would see whether Tricycle was controlled or not and in fact after the vetting they were completely satisfied.

They were also completely satisfied with the wireless messages that Freak was sending while Tricycle was in Lisbon. After Dreadnought had returned to Belgrade, Sensburg came and asked him for some details about Freak. (This would probably be during the second half of May or early June 1944. It was about this time that the Germans intercepted a message from Mihailovic to his DMI about Freak's bona fides, which was relayed to Berlin). Dreadnought was curious to know why Sensburg was asking about Freak and tried to find out through Toplak. Toplak reported back to Dreadnought that Sens-

burg had said that there was a slight possibility that the English had grounds for suspecting Freak. Toplak had asked Sensburg if he thought that there was a suspicion that Freak was controlled and Sensburg had denied this and said: "God help us all if Freak goes bad. We will all lose our heads".

Dreadnought's explanation of the lack of interest shown by the Germans in the reports of the Worm and Meteor is that both were regarded primarily as Munzinger's men and when M. lost his job in 1943 nobody was interested in trying to run his cases successfully.

On the 28th August the Jap Govt. informed the German Ambassador that the Supreme Council felt that the war situation was very serious. Things were going badly on all fronts and a restoration of the balance of fighting power to which the Germans were looking could not be expected to materialise at any rate for some time. Meanwhile on the diplomatic front Germany was gradually being encircled through the defection of her allies. In such circumstances was it wise of Germany to try to put an end to the war by force alone. Germany should therefore try and reach a compromise peace with the USSR. The Japanese would be prepared to intervene with the USSR in this sense but would prefer the Germans to make direct negotiations.

Ronnie Haylor has put up a draft agreement to SIS on the respective work of Section V and CCMS in Germany. He assumes that SIS will be setting up its own independent network and that Section V will wish to have a long-term organ-
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isation for CI purposes. This will not be the concern of CI branch of the CCMS except in so far as the branch will wish to receive the product of SIS work whenever this is relevant to immediate CI activities in Germany. The CI will need to keep a very close watch on all aspects of German life, and the Public Safety section of the Control Commission will use many informants for this purpose and will ultimately be largely responsible for what may be termed overt enquiries. It will also be responsible for covert enquiries by agents to supplement the information obtained by SIS. This will have the advantage that a widespread network of minor agents can be maintained and at the same time a higher grade (and long-term) agents of Section V will thereby receive additional cover. This I gather has been rather a bitter pill for Felix but Kim thinks it quite sound.

September 4th

Our casualties, including those of the Americans and Canadians on the 30th August were roughly 198,000 of which 38,000 were killed. The total number of German prisoners taken was 193,000.

The latest reports indicate that we are in Antwerp. This means that all the main railways from the Pas de Calais back to Germany are cut. There are elements of some 25 German divisions between us and the Channel Ports. The advance from the south is continuing at a rapid rate. The Germans are reported to be moving in several parties of about 10,000 including civilians. We have reached Bougg. It is said that some of our armoured divisions have been dropped in the

Belfort gap. Algiers radio states that we have taken Calais and Le Treport. The Russians have pushed on well beyond Bucharest and Finland has requested all Germans to leave her territory by September 15th. Altogether things seem to be going pretty well.

On the 9th August a large amount of allied sabotage equipment which had been dropped by parachute was captured at the SD and SIFO headquarters at Rennes. A German who was interviewed stated that the Rennes headquarters had contained the best collection of sabotage material in the Brittany peninsula. All suspicious objects dropped by parachute and captured from resistance organisations were brought to Rennes for examination. A further attack by the KDK took place off Normandy on August 3rd and although a certain amount of damage was caused including the sinking of HMS Quorn, the enemy lost at least 20 explosive motorboats and 20 human torpedoes. A further attack took place on the night of August 16-17th. On both these occasions the Germans sent over a few aircraft immediately prior to the attack in order that the light from the British tracer flak and searchlights should assist the human torpedoes in finding their targets. The Germans had intended to block the Seine by blowing up some harbour installations and sinking ships in the river. It is believed that the disorganisation was such that they were unable to carry out these plans.

Reports from the field show that during the fortnight 12-26th August 9 new cases have been brought to O20. They did not add very much to what we already knew about the procedure adopted

by stay-behind agents and line-crossers. The spies themselves come from areas remote from the battle which has moved so fast that visual recon line-crossers have been put out of business and W/T agents ~~where~~ installed or about to take up their posts were presumably discouraged from their assignments. But these deductions tell us a little of what may be going on at the front. At least the enemy may have had plans for installing more formidable stay-behind agents in Paris and may do so in other large centres before they are liberated.

From the field we learn that several enemy agents have already been apprehended as a result of the rapid circulation of descriptions obtained from the interrogation of agents already in our hands. A procedure has been adopted whereby as soon as an enemy agent is broken a tactical interrogation is carried out under the direction of the Army C.I. staffs. Headquarters armies then immediately distribute the descriptions of any agents known to the prisoner and believed to be at large. Headquarters 21st Army group distribute periodically down to C.I. sections and provost commanders a printed list with photographs, where available, of wanted persons based on detailed interrogations of agents at Army Group Interrogation Cage, and information from central agencies. Copies of one or two lists produced by 1st and 3rd and U.S. armies are also distributed on the same scale. Copies of all these lists go to the French at Army Group. C.I. sections pass necessary details one one or two persons to special police in their area. The Germans do not appear to take any trouble to provide their agents with

elaborate cover stories and have sometimes allowed them to produce their own without rehearsal. The obvious stories are: seeking relatives in liberated territory, escaping from forced labour, desire to join the allies, avoiding of charges of black marketting, and ex-Todt workers. A better effort was the obtaining of a forged letter from a resistance leader. Some agents have succeeded in making themselves believed at least by their first interrogators. An old confidence trick is also being tried in which the agent attempts to bluff his interrogator by admitting that he has been in contact with the G.I.S. and denying that he has accepted. The Germans have made such elementary mistakes as to allow more than one agent to carry identical articles, e.g. pastry in Jam jars, loose biscuits, calvados Green Gauloise cigarettes, false identity cards with particulars written in German handwriting and ration coupons with issuing stamps badly smudged to obliterate their origin. The enemy is now giving to allied P/W immediately upon capture a postcard called Siegfried Front Lone Service. One side of the card provides for a personal message. The other has space for the address. The address required is that of the company, battalion, regiment or army post office address. After the cards have been filled in they are fired back by rifle grenade or other means to the British lines. The inducement held up to the P/W is the rapid transmission of news of capture to his unit and so to his family. Any quantity of these cards of course provides the enemy with our order of battle.

C.I. personnel have been instructed when searching
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

houses to do so in the presence of the occupier, to get a receipt for money and valuables and to seal up the house, placing a note upon it to the effect that entry is forbidden by the British Security authorities. If possible a neighbour is asked to keep an eye on the house. Some of the British sabotage material found at Rennes consisted of HE bombs disguised as stones. These are operated by pressure switches and used as tyre busters. This device can also be camouflaged as horse-dung, or various types of rock or stone. Two of the saboteurs of the Chateau Mauberg who were caught were found in possession of these articles.

I saw Courtney Young this morning about M.T.5 report. In my view its style should be changed. I have suggested that we should say something about the D.A. network as a whole, how it is used from the point of view of C.E. and finally deception. We should also indicate what we had done on the second front and finally make some statement about the form of agents captured in the field who have been interrogated at 020.

" have been asked what should be done with a renegade or collaborationist British subjects who are picked up by the army who are in no sense public figures. We have said that each case will have to be treated on its merits and that before a man is sent home we should like to be informed of the case against him. PG. WOODHOUSE has turned up in Paris and Cussen has gone over at the request of the Home Secretary to interview him. It might be that if he were sent back he would be the cause of considerable embarrassment through M.P.s wishing him to be imprisoned

and brought to trial for treachery.

Joe Lynch came in to see me. He was apparently booked to travel on the plane which crashed the other day at Prestwick but luckily for him postponed his journey. He told me that while I was in Washington the US had very nearly declared war on the Argentine. Cordell Hull had requested them to round up certain Germans who were operating a wireless transmitter and had received a refusal. An extremely stiff note was sent which produced the required result. There were apparently people in Washington who thought that it would be better to deal with the Argentine while people's blood was hot rather than to be saddled with the problem after the war. The crisis has apparently passed.

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Curry came to see me again. He is worrying about his future. He seemed to think that if I took on the writing of the history of the office he would be overmooked for any other job. I said that I did not think he need worry on this score since if he were in this office he would clearly be considered. I told him however that if I had anything to do with it it would be difficult for me to place him over the heads of Hollis or Dick. I quite saw that he had lost his place in the office through no fault of his own. At the same time Dick and Hollis had been doing the work and it would be difficult to demote them. The probable result would be that they would seek a career elsewhere. Curry quite understood this position. I told him that it was difficult to give him any answer until we knew precisely what our future was whether we were going to be amalgamated with S.I.S. If this came off I could quite see there might be other fields into which he could direct his energies.

Craufurd came to tell me a long story about diamond smuggling and deals in platinum and gold. This had all resulted through a Pole named SLUBICKI bringing in 32 carats of diamonds to the DSO Gib. These he said he had received from a BOAC pilot, a Pole named JONIKAS who had been in the Middle East or Cairo with
Catalogue Reference: KY 4/195

instructions to hand them over to another Polish pilot with an unpronounceable name or alternatively to one DUNKEL, a Polish officer who is apparently working for SOE. SLUBICK's visit to the DSO was followed shortly by a visit from DUNKEL who accused SLUBICKI of having stolen some of the diamonds out of a brief case delivered to him. DUNKEL was quite frank about the smuggling and is clearly a very unsatisfactory individual. He has been recalled by SOE and is already in this country. Meanwhile SLUBICKI and another Pole have been recalled by the Polish Mission here. S.B. have been drawn into the case which is a highly complicated one. My view at the moment is that the Polish authorities here who appear to be implicated also, will not wish to come clean. Even if some of them are not involved they will wish to avoid scandal. DUNKEL will by now have put them wise that something is brewing although they will not know that SLUBICKI has been to the British in Gib. and handed over the diamonds. Our only strong suit is that we hold the diamonds but at the moment I am not quite clear how we should play the hand.

September 5th

According to ISOS Father was heard for the first time on 5.8.44 operating from India. No message was transmitted, but contact was made.

The Japs are very worried about their agents in the peninsula. Since the return of the American Ambassador the Spanish Govt. yielding to British and American pressure formally asked Germany that 300 German residents whom they regard as having

been engaged in espionage and whose names are given, should leave the country. Meanwhile ~~the~~ anticipating the rupture of relations between Japan and Portugal, Japanese officials and other nationals in Lisbon are making arrangements to go to Madrid. The Jap Ambassador in Madrid fears that this may lead to a rupture of relations between Japan and Spain. It would be disastrous to the Japs if they lost both their stations. The German Minister in Sofia was recently in Germany where he had an interview with Hitler. The Ambassador informed the Japs that Hitler appeared to be extremely calm and had foreseen from the outset that such a day as this would dawn. He said that within the next 3-5 months the effects of Germany's latest mobilisation would become apparent and the new weapons would all be in use so that Germany would go over to the offensive. The immediate necessity was to obtain time and to this end the shortening of the lines was inevitable.

The latest reports on V.1 show that there is evidence that actual launching s are about 10% in excess of those recorded by radar. Defensive measures have now reached a stage where less than 50% of the flying-bombs launched cross the coast, and only little more than 15% penetrate London. Only one operation by pickaback plane is believed to have taken place up to 19th August. The aircraft operate from bases in Belgium or Holland. Further details are now available about V.2. Its length is 45 ft 10 ins., maximum body diameter 5 ft 6 ins, length of fins 11 ft 8 ins., all up weight including full fuel load and war head, 13½ tons.

Full fuel load $9\frac{1}{2}$ tons, war head somewhat less than 1 ton. Range 215-230 miles, representing an operational range of about 200 miles. According to P/Ws the rockets starts vertically and climbs at a steep angle to a height variously estimated at 9-15,000 metres. During the climb the rocket is said to emit a loud roar but accounts disagree on the question of smoke and flame.

I saw Kenneth for a moment this morning. He was one of the few British soldiers to make the official entry into Paris. He has written a report on the whole thing of which he is going to let me have a copy. He says that much of the shooting was pointless and irresponsible, most of it being straight up into the air. It was probably due more to joie de vivre than anything else.

Kenneth has just received a wire to go back at once as he is part of the T-Force which is supposed to enter Brussels. He feels that this expedition is a bit late in the day.

I had a conference with Craufurd and Milmo about the SLUBICKI case. Buster thinks we are perfectly entitled to talk both to SLUBICKI and DUNKEL on the grounds that they communicated information and made statements to the DSO Gib. It was decided that Craufurd would put this to S.B. and suggest that the interview should take place under our auspices while they should have their men present. Instructions will be issued to the ports to get SLUBICKI to 055 without MOLDICKI becoming aware of the

fact. The two are both travelling to this country on a warship. DUNKEL will be got hold of through SOE. Meanwhile Craufurd will get into touch with MEW, SIS and the RO.


There have been no flying-bombs from 1.15 pm on Friday last till last night. All these fell in Herts and one near Charles' house at Weston.

I lunched with Hoare at Boodles. I gave him my views about America and SIS's chances. He agreed with me entirely. He was also a firm supporter of an amalgamation between ourselves and Section V. He is going to begin by suggesting to Viv. a joint section to deal with communism. I see no harm in this although it is merely nibbling at the wider problem.

I had a talk with Findlater Stewart. He told me that while I was away he saw Sir John Anderson. Anderson is strongly opposed to a complete amalgamation of SIS and ourselves. His reasons are of course the old political ones. He thinks that there should be two organisations, an offensive and a defensive, with possibly an exchange of personnel. He was also quite receptive to the idea of civil intelligence sections in service ministries to give continuity to the work, but was a little worried about how these people could be paid. I had a long discussion with Findlater in which I outlined to him what I thought would make an effective defensive organisation. He seemed to me to be more or less in agreement. He then told me that he had not made any positive suggestion to Anderson that he should look into the whole matter but that he was sure that if

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the question came up Anderson would refer to him. He is going to have some similar confersations with Bridges. This should effectivly block the way to any hasty decision through the P.M. He then told me that some time ago he had been asked to arbitrate between SIS and SOE. Nothing had materialised however as they settled their own differences themselves. He had since heard that Arnold-Foster was anxious to see him. He is going to encourage a visit by Arnold-Foster which I think might lead to his suggesting of his own accord that Findlater would make a good arbitrator.

September 6th



I had a talk with Baxter, Albert and Whelford about the work of B.LD/UK. We decided that the B.Division aspect of the work had practically died out although it was still necessary to see certain people. On the other hand the F.Divn. aspect had come very much to the fore. If we did not have some intervention of British
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subjects returning we might well find that certain renegades had got in and that local people were disturbed about it. If the Home Secretary were asked in the House whether he was aware of the presence of these people in the country — and no steps had been taken to have them examined and if necessary brought to trial, he would be in a very weak position. We agreed therefore that F.Divn. would from now onwards have to take a more active interest in the work of Bid/UK. We thought however that some selection could be made of those who could more profitably be examined in London, but thought a number might equally well be interrogated by the Regions.

At the weekly meeting Brook Booth said that the Belgians wished to recruit their nationals in Belgium and send them over here for training. They wish to equip the Belgian armed forces with British rather than American weapons, and therefore wished their troops to be trained here. Lapage and his men are supposed to be vetting such men before they come. We did not see why they should not be given equipment and instructors and do their training in their own country.

Walker said that there had only been one doodleb plotted last night, off the Naze. Of the 14 launched yesterday, 10 crossed the coast but none reached London. They fell in Beds. Suffolk Herts and Essex. They were probably launched from planes which flew out from the Dutch coast for a short distance. In the last week only 11 have reached London.

Walker then gave the meeting a short description of his pigeon-deception scheme now in progress. Belgium and Holland are being filled with phoney pigeons, British but with false German marks and rings. It is hoped that at first the Germans will use them, and perhaps some of the messages will be flown back here. Later, when the trick is discovered, it will take a good deal of time to sort out the pigeons, good from bad, and thus a certain amount of delay and dislocation of the service will, it is thought, be caused.

I lunched with Jane.

We agreed that for the time being at any rate we were far more likely to get information by overt liaison than by underground means, and also that whereas in war time the Eire Govt. might be prepared to wink an eye at SIS activities about which they were aware, they would probably take strong exception to them in peace time. At the same time we felt that there was a risk that at some future date things might boil up again in Ireland and that our liaison might come to an end or at any rate cease to be profitable.

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She then asked me about her future. She is anxious to go on working for a few years more and naturally does not want if possible to lose her pension. She has of course forfeited it

in so far as this office is concerned unless she is reinstated by some special arrangement. Certainly it would be a scandal if after her many years service she was given nothing. She is therefore anxious if possible to come back and work here for a time but cannot of course do so until Harker leaves. I have advised her to stick on in SIS until this question of reorganisation had been decided even though she had practically nothing to do. If the worst comes to the worst I shall try and get Charles to give her what is really due to her.

The total number of enemy aliens apprehended in the USA up to May 15th 1944 was 15,786. This figure includes, Japa, Germans, Italians and also Bulgarians, Hungarians and Roumanians. Of this number at the date in question, 3,686 were interned, 5,579 at liberty on parole, and 1,744 released by the Attorney General. A total of 3,001 were released without the presentation of their cases to alien enemy hearing boards. In Hawaii and Alaska the military authorities interned 616 alien enemies, while 91 were paroled and 109 released. Of the entire total of alien enemies apprehended 459 have been repatriated and 85 are deceased; 3,988 alien enemies were apprehended and held for action by alien enemy hearing boards in connection with more than 25,000 searches of alien enemy premises and declarations. As a result of these searches numerous prohibited articles were seized, including 4,500 firearms, more than 307,000 rounds of ammunition and upwards of 12,000 explosives items. In addition the searches resulted in the seizure of numerous signal

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devices, radio receivers and transmitters, cameras, maps, enemy military uniforms etc.

I had a meeting this afternoon called by Harry to discuss counter-intelligence planning for SEAC. There was present a Major Drummond from the Army Group who gave us some idea of the very complicated set-up. Mountbatten's Deputy is the American general Stilwell who is in control of British troops, what were formerly Wingate's troops, Chinese Forces and American Forces, operating in the North East Asia Command. As far as I can see the only control that Mountbatten has over this force is by virtue of the fact that Stilwell himself is Mountbatten's deputy. Coming directly under SEAC are C.in.C. Eastern Fleet, who had other responsibilities, C.in.C. Army Group, comprising the 14th Army and Ceylon Army command, and being also in some way responsible for G.O.C. Ceylon, Gen. Wetherall. Thirdly the C.in.C. Ceylon, Geoffrey Langton, to whom the Governor of Ceylon, Caldicott, is apparently in some way subordinate, and lastly C.in.C. Air Command, who also has other responsibilities outside the SEAC area. It is not surprising that in this extremely complex picture there is some confusion as to who is responsible for security in Ceylon. I explained to Drummond precisely what we had done on the Second Front and what the C.I. set-up was. He was very glad to have this information as he had been extremely confused about the relative functions of I.B.1, 2 and 3 which as I explained to him were now S.C.I., C.I. 2 and C.I. 3. He could not quite make out what I.B.1 was. I explained that this was an SIS unit or as he preferred to put it, an ISLD unit, that I knew

that a party of 20 people were going out to the East and that it was possible although I had no positive evidence that they might be the basis of the SCI unit for SEAC. I explained how they worked but said that in the far eastern set up I was not very clear as to what sort of a contribution they could make since they as far as I knew would not have any special knowledge of the enemy's

intelligence organisation or the appropriate methods for dealing with it. He then told me that he had already a unit known as Sips (Security Intelligence Planning Section), which came into the CI picture. It is engaged in preparing lists of suspects and intelligence targets. In other words it is performing precisely the functions of an SCI unit. It might be of course that boys were going to do something quite different. If not, the only thing they could do would be to join up with Sips and pick their brains. This whole question is to be thrashed out at a meeting with the JIC at which Lamplough, DMI SEAC, and Caulfield, DMI India, are to be present.

told Drummond that while we had planned CI for the Second Front we had done it on the basis of our knowledge of the German IS and of general CI methods. I did not know how far our knowledge and experience would be applicable to the Far Eastern situation. It seemed to me that the best contribution to CI there would be to get an MI5-trained officer who had actually taken part in the direction of CI work in the field on the Second Front, somebody like Niall MacDonogh. Reference ex 44/195 It might be that his experience would be valuable and that certain

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methods employed could be adopted to local conditions. Apart from this I do not think that we could help very much. It seemed to me that where the Second Front had drawn on this office for its CI experience in France, SEAC should draw on DMI India plus DIB. Drummond said that by far the most useful document he had seen on CI matters had been the one prepared by us for SHAEF. SEAC have also been sent reports about CI experience in the field in France, but for some reason or other these have never been sent on to Drummond.

September 7th

I saw Victor this morning. He had just returned in order to report progress and get his car and Tess, which I have no doubt with his usual persistence he will somehow achieve. He had had a very interesting time, having found the German sabotage school more or less intact with all its equipment and files. There was a large quantity of SOE material and the files show in rather an interesting way how some of it has been disposed of. Some of it has gone to 3F obviously to bolster up penetrating agents. The documents obtained should enable the CI staffs to get on to saboteurs left behind. There are of course other dumps and schools which will have to be visited and it will clearly be very convenient if Victor could have a car to move about. It is difficult if not impossible to get anything from the Americans, even though Victor has one of the American officers whom he trained working with him.

There have been no more flying bombs. The total sent over is roughly 7,800.


A German transmitter has piped up from the Munich area wishing to assist the allies and giving as a reference a certain Mr. Cobden TURNER. This man has been located and from particulars given, thinks that the transmitter is being run by a German called Lothar ROHDE with whom he had business talks before the war. He does not altogether trust ROHDE but the approach may be a genuine one. We checked the identity of ROHDE by asking the German station to give the first letter of the maiden name of Turner's wife. The German came back with "F" which is in fact correct. Her maiden name was Fisher. We are keeping in touch.

I saw C. this morning and told him about Plan Z. He was particularly interested because he said that he had just got in from SIM in Italy information that they had been inside our Embassy for years and had bought up all the Italian staff. They had been reading all our cyphers. He said that he thought the job we were going to perform was an important one and would be extremely useful.

I then went on to see Vivian. I told him about my visit to America and that I had not been able to intervene on behalf of Evans simply because it was clear to me from the general atmosphere that Hoover would not pay more than lip-service to any arrangement with SIS until BSC and all its works were removed. I said that even then I thought SIS would have quite a lot of trouble

in establishing really useful relations with Hoover. "or one reason or another he had got the impression that they did not wish to co-operate with him and that he should never get on to a real basis of frankness. I then had to tell Vivian that I found great difficulty in discussing this whole problem if he was still thinking of going back to the status quo after the war. I said it was of paramount importance that we should have direct contact with people like Hoover, and that somehow or other this would have to be achieved. "ither Section V would have to come to us or we should have to go to them. Vivian seems to have set his face against any such arrangement and it is quite useless talking to him on the subject. He is full of all sorts of rather specious arguments about SIS's responsibilities to the FO which make it essential that they should remain under the FO as a separate organisation. I said that I did not see why SIS should be under the FO any more than we should be under the HO, and that it would be far better for both of us to come up to the same peak. I felt that the most suitable arrangement would be to put us under the Ministry of Defence in wartime and, and the CID and PM in peace time.

I attended a lunch given by the DG for the D.P.P. at which Byrne, Vincent Evans and Paling of his office were present. There is a possibility that Byrne may be his successor, unless he thinks his obvious prospects at the Bar are likely to be more attractive.



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Burt spoke to me afterwards about his saying a word to Kendal. He feels that he were called upon to use his authority to lay off the police he might be in serious trouble with Kendal if he had not previously warned him about the possibility of his having to take such action. I told Burt that if Kendal were favourably disposed towards us I should not hesitate. On the other hand we both knew that he took the extremely poor view of MI5. His reaction might well be to say that we were certain to make a mess of it and that the less Burt had to do with it the better. What is worse he might talk to the Commissioner about it who might talk to Maxwell, etc. etc. Burt V/4/195 suggested talking to Catalogue Reference.

Howe. I again said that I thought it would be better not to say anything. I had in mind of course that Howe is extremely friendly with many of the Swedes and an incident some time back when one of the Swedes lost his pocket book. The pocket book was recovered by Howe presumably through police channels and the impression was given that MI5 had pinched it, but that he of course having a hold on MI5 had caused them to give it up. I think I ought to tell Burt about this some time.

Giles, head of the CID in Palestine, came in for a talk. He seemed fairly confident that we were in for trouble in Palestine. He is clearly for a Joint Legislative Assembly with an equal representation for Jew and Arab. He thinks that if the British Govt. imposed this it would, after a certain amount of trouble, be accepted by the majority. Jewish immigration which he feels has reached saturation point would of course have to cease. The urgent necessity is that the Govt. should make up their minds and that some plan should be put through. Giles thinks that Palestine is extremely important to the Empire and should remain under its protection. He says that if we left the Jews to govern Palestine and defend themselves they would be outed by the Arabs within two years. Although Giles did not say so I gather from R.J. that he dislikes the Jews. I talked with him about the ~~Arabs~~. He says that if they do not get equal rights he is convinced that we shall have the Moslem world against us. This view is somewhat contrary to the view expressed by Teggart who is inclined to say that there

are only a certain number of Bedouin Arabs who are of any account and in so far as the rest are concerned the Moslem world would not be particularly interested.

R.J. came to see me. He had written a letter to the D.G. asking him for male and female personnel and also for the transfer of O20 to Germany after the armistice. I said that I saw no fundamental objection to this although we were getting somewhat down to rock bottom. The liquidation of O20 would be a fairly ^{easy} matter directly we could get some minor policy out of the D.O. The question was whether all internees would be handed over to their governments or just told to make their own way out of the country.

R.J. tells me that he is going to get his own police force which he intends to recruit from commandos and SOE. I impressed upon him how necessary it was to obtain the services of good interrogators. He said that Kenneth Strong had queried this item. I said that it was by far and away the most important, since most of the information would be derived from denunciations. Both the denunciators and the suspects would have to be carefully interrogated by those who knew the job. It was in this connection that I had spoken to Mr. Hoover since his men who were experts in dealing with gangsters would be in their element in Germany. R.J. is I think becoming a little anxious about the magnitude of his task and is desperately anxious to get as many people from this office as he can

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I dined with Walter Bell at the Travellers where I met SIS representative in Monte Video. He is I gather regarded as good. He did not seem to take a very high view of the FBI's activities down there and said that he thought they would be pulling out before long. OSS are not visible in S. America although he suspects that they have one or two people roaming about. G.2 on the other hand are quite active. None of them is doing a very good job. They are I believe antagonising the S. Americans on every point.

During the afternoon Lord Gort came in to discuss the representatives of the Hagana who are coming to this country. He said it would be of considerable importance to him to know about their deliberations with Shertok. Armed with this view we are approaching the H.O. for the usual telephone warrant.

ISOS discloses that Schellenberg an S.S. Brigade fuehrer, is responsible to Kaltenbrunner and Himmler for security and policy of Amt. 6 and the Militarisches Amt of the RSHA. Hansen was arrested at the time of the putsch of July 20th. Amt. 6 has absorbed the economic section of the Abwehr, namely Eins Wi. The section is jointly under Schmeed and Col. Focke, the former chief of the Abwehr section. It is possible that Schellenberg may be interested in the Abwehr's contacts in the commercial world not as sources of intelligence valuable in winning the war but as channels for communication. Catalogue Reference: KV/4/195 before defeat. The technical air section of the Abwehr has

also been absorbed in the newly constituted dept. of Amt.6 which is thus responsible for all technical and economic intelligence from abroad.

In Spain this organisation is trying to get away from the Embassy and to recruit agents who have been drawn from Spanish business circles. Journalists and technicians of the falangist

type and men of independent means who have co-operated from conviction and not from convenience, are also being taken on. Amt.6 has formed yet another section from the dead body of the Abwehr, namely Amt.6(Z). This section is staffed by those headquarters officers of the former C.E. section of the Abwehr who have not been transferred to Amt.4, the Gestapo Amt or subordinated as security officers to Army Command. Amt.6 is still determined to extend this organisation in S.America. In Brazil it is arranging to take over all the remaining funds and many of the contacts of the dissolved organisation of the Hamburg stelle. It has brought into use two or three new W/T stations in Europe in order to maintain its communications and it has sent more transmitters to the Argentine. Despite all its past discouragements it is recruiting more seamen of Spanish ships as couriers. An order has gone out that the new station in Brazil must succeed. Contacts with the Argentine General Staff and with nationalist conspirators in Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia are being maintained. Money is still made available for the acquisition of property in the Argentine. Becke and Utzinger, the two most experienced German agents in S.America are still collecting and

transmitting reports and have been told that political and technical intelligence is now most urgently needed. The rupture of diplomatic relations in Turkey has brought almost complete ruin to the old Abwehr organisation. Amt.6 however at Istanbul is going ahead and relations have been established with the Turkish police. Amt.6 uses Turkey as a base for espionage in Georgia and S.Russia. Amt.6 in Spain is trying to build up a position outside the Embassy and clearly many members of the Abwehr will be recalled from K.O.Spain, under British protest. Schellenberg who now has the S.S.equivalent of the rank of Major-General, is still in the process of consolidating his control of all sources of secret intelligence. He has as his personal assistant Steinle, who controls the Militarisches Amt. He is making use of certain numbers of Naval and Air officers. The old Abwehr 2 will, while remaining part of the Milit.Amt., be placed under the command, unlike the other sections of the Amt., of an officer of the Wehrmacht, but of S.S. Sturmbannfuhrer Skorzeny, the liberator of the Duce. Skorzeny's command includes the Wehrregiment Kurfuerst which provides the men for his undertakings. Skorzeny is also interested in the KDK or naval sabotage section. Skorzeny was formerly head of the sabotage section of Amt.6.

To sum up Schellenberg must now know that most of the Milit.Amt is now both compromised and unreliable. He may therefore use it as a front behind which he can expand and develop Amt.6 whose personnel and policy are still comparatively unknown. This expansion in neutral territory will probably be independent of the Embassies. Amt.6 has absorbed the economic and technical

sections of the Abwehr which are the least seriously compromised and which have the best chance of survival when Germany is demilitarised. Our sources which are incomplete suggest that Amt.6 is reinforcing its stations in neutral countries while the old Abwehr stations are breaking up in confusion. The RSHA through Skorzeny disposes of the most useful material for underground and partisan warfare which is available.

September 8th

I saw Wibroe from the LRC. He is a Dane naturalised British. He told me that recently he had come into contact with the head of the Danish Resistance Movement. He says that this movement is quite powerful politically in Denmark and associated with various other parties, including the future P.M. It is the desire of the resistance movements and all these parties that a close alliance should be formed with England involving the granting of facilities in certain Danish ports. The Danes are anxious to make some sort of influential contact here in order that they can get an idea as to whether their proposals are likely to be acceptable. If they were they would go to the country as soon as Denmark is liberated. I told Wibroe to let me have a note giving the names and particulars of the various personalities involved and of their proposals. I said that I did not think he was likely to get any answer at the moment out of the British Govt. but that they would certainly be interested to hear of the proposal.

I told the D.G. about Plan Z and he seems fairly satisfied, and prepared to leave things to me.

Seymer came to see me. He has broken down two P/Ws one a seaman called McPartland, and the other a commando called Maton. The latter is quite young. He was taken prisoner, segregated in a special camp where he was lectured by Amery, Baillie-Stewart and our old friend Stranders. He eventually joined the British Freikorps. It is not entirely clear whether the Freikorps was intended to go into the field or whether it was merely for propaganda purposes. He was granted a considerable amount of liberty and eventually persuaded to speak on the radio. He admitted all this after he had been pulled up on certain details of his previous story. He says that he succeeded in getting as far as Brussels with a lot of German troops, then changed into civilian clothes and got across the lines.

September 9th

Last night while I was still in the office there were two explosions in fairly close succession about 6.45. We learn today that two V.2's have landed, one in Copping, which I do not imagine we could possibly have heard, and one in Chiswick which obviously we did hear. It sounded very much nearer. Probably the second report was something in the nature of an echo. In Chiswick I believe about 3 houses were demolished and 3 people killed. A hole has been made about 16 ft deep and 20 ft broad. An examination seems to indicate with-

out doubt that the projectile is a rocket. It is believed to have come from Holland.

I saw Neville Bland today and told him that I knew about his committee which had been discussing the affairs of SIS and that I rather wanted to give him my views about the future of our own organisation and the possibility of some form of amalgamation. This I did. I also told him more or less the part that we had played during the war. He was very interested and sympathetic and anxious that I should get my views about the future of the office on paper, and that Peter Loxley should see them. I told him I had talked to Loxley and that also we were having off the record discussions with Arnold-Foster. He agreed that anything in the nature of total amalgamation was really out of the question. All that the Bland Committee has done so far is to try and tidy up SIS from within. They feel that Passport Control should be cleaned up and that offensive SIS activities should take place under some other cover. Bland seemed to like the idea of an offensive and defensive organisation and was not apparently shocked by the suggestion that we should have some sort of representation abroad. I explained to him exactly why this was necessary and why we should be called in on security cases by the Embassies abroad. In particular I mentioned the Ankara case. I also told Bland precisely what we had done for the Second Front. We then discussed ministerial representation. While he felt that SIS came logically under the FO he was convinced that we should both come up to the same peak and did not dissent from my sugges-

tion that both organisations should come under the Minister of Defence in war and the CID and PM in peace. Over these matters however he was fairly non-committal. I asked him whether his committee had made any positive recommendation about amalgamation between ourselves and Section V. He said that it had been more or less alluded to and vaguely discussed but it had not gone farther than this and was really completely in the air. His committee had made no recommendation on the subject.

He said that he himself did not expect to be leaving for Holland for several weeks, particularly since he had heard that German troops were entering Holland.

I have spent most of the rest of the day going through in very great detail the Plan Z arrangements. There has been a slight hitch however. The clerk who was to be specially housed in the country has been kept at his desk, presumably getting out wires about V.2.

Victor has decided that the sabotage risks for utility undertakings are now negligible and that the sabotage squads at Gib can be disbanded. As regards the latter we are asking for local views, in particular the Admiralty's.

Dick has returned from France and is crying out for German-speaking bodies for SHAEF, which is likely to move over to Versailles lock stock and barrel fairly soon.

September 10th

The final ruling of the Chiefs of Staff about entering diplomatic and consular establishments in territory being reoccupied by the allies is that the theatre commander has discretion and responsibility for entering and searching Embassies and any premises legitimately diplomatic and consular in character if he has substantial reason to believe that they are or have been recently used for a clandestine warlike operations against his own forces abroad, when he believes that examination is essential to the security of his own forces communications and operations. In the case of property in the custody of the protecting power, the theatre commander will request the representatives of that power for permission to search the premises. In all such cases a full report must be referred to the governments to which he is responsible, justifying the entry and search.

Brutus was informed at the end of August that the Germans had left a wireless transmitter for him in Paris, but they have not yet supplied details as to where or how it is concealed. Arrangements have also been made for Brutus to receive a sum of money in London.

Since the 26th August ZIGZAG has been pressing his German control station to send him particulars of parts of the nightfighter radar equipment that they want him to steal. At the end of August he received these particulars which have been considered by the Admiralty and Air Ministry. It has been decided that

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ZIGZAG should inform the Germans that he is in possession of very valuable information on anti-submarine detection devices. He has also transmitted verbatim a letter written by Prof. Wood containing some deception on the capabilities of the invention. He is now waiting instructions from the Germans as to how he can get photographs of the apparatus which he has notionally stolen from a factory in Manchester, to them. He has also said that the obtaining of information of this sort is a costly business and has asked for a further £6,000.

Sniper is still waiting for the delivery of a transmitter but he has made it clear to the other side that his departure for the continent is becoming imminent and that he may have to go before the delivery is effected. In such an eventuality he will continue to listen for their messages on the continent and will hope that they will put him in touch with someone who can help or at least tell him where he can find a transmitter.

Father has now arrived in this country.//A German officer P/W of considerable education and intelligence with a fairly wide experience born in the Balkans and on the western front states that the invasion of Normandy came as a complete surprise. To illustrate this he says that on the night of the invasion a meeting of all Division Commanders of the 7th Army was called at Rennes to discuss operations in case of an allied air-borne landing.

On the 4th Sept. Hitler had an interview with the Jap Ambassador and Ribbentrop. Hitler asked

about the situation in the east said that at the moment things were very critical in the west so that he could say nothing definite until he saw how things went there. He thought however that Germany would have to fight another round with the Soviet armies in the east. Ribbentrop speaking in front of Hitler said that if Japan sounded the USSR views about peace directly this would be interpreted by the enemy as having been done at the request of Germany and as revealing her weakness. He trusted therefore that this subject would be avoided. The impression given by Hitler was that his views regarding victory over the USSR had undergone a complete change. He made no denial about Russo-German rapprochement but said that at the moment there seemed to be no starting point for negotiations. Both Hitler and Ribbentrop seemed to agree on this point, and thought any direct attempt would be a sign of weakness. The Jap Ambassador is therefore advising his government to sound the views of the USSR in a manner which will not embarrass Germany. Hitler spoke of the attempt on his life on July 20th. He had been disappointed by events in the west but indicated that this was in part due to confederates of those responsible for the attempt on his life. This is probably nonsense and merely an excuse for the German break-down in the west. Hitler however expressed his intention of liquidating everyone who had the slightest connection with the affair. He said that the British forces' left wing was at present on a continuous front which they had formed and that on the right wing the Americans were moving in 5 or 6 columns which

were each composed of 3 or 4 divisions. His intentions were to strike at these on the flank; forces were being concentrated S.E. of Nancy for that purpose. He estimated the present strength of the enemy in N. France as 50 divisions. His offensive would be carried out with the sole object of stabilising the front. With the million new troops now being formed together with the detachments withdrawn from various fronts supported by the replenishment of the Air Force, ^{he intended} to undertake a great offensive in the west, probably in November. The Jap appeared to be somewhat sceptical about the possibility of mounting such an operation and still more as to its success. Hitler expressed his intention of retreating from the Balkans and Greece and proposed to occupy a line extending from Transylvania and the southern Carpathians to the boundary of Yugoslavia to the southwest, but it might be a line westwards from the old Hungarian frontier. In Italy he proposed to retire to the "lps. He could not withdraw his forces from the Baltic coast since this would have the disadvantage of leaving the Baltic entirely exposed to the enemy. Neither could he withdraw from Norway owing to the loss of submarine bases in France. He had a stock of the principle raw materials which would last him about 2 years. Against a possible enemy aerial bombardment he would have anti-aircraft units withdrawn from all the various front. It is somewhat significant that on the 7th Sept. Steengrachts, Ribbentrop's vice-minister made a special approach to the Jap Ambassador. He had been instructed to explain that in their interviews on the 4th neither Hitler nor Ribbentrop wished to convey the idea that a Russo-

German separate peace had been turned down flat. The Jap said he had examined every aspect of the question in his conversation with H. and R. and thought that he had succeeded in understanding both of them and what they had in mind. He realised that they were in a position which precluded their making a definite statement on a question of this sort. He had therefore read between lines and in telegraphing to his Govt. had added his own interpretation. This he conveyed to Steen-gracht. The representative of the Jap Minister of the Interior in Berlin held the view of 6th Sept. that the collapse of Germany was only a matter of time. He therefore proposed to remove himself to Switzerland.

The JIC, reviewing the possibilities of attack against the UK by airborne and seaborne forces state that while the Germans are still in Holland there is just a remote risk of attack by one-man torpedoes, explosive motor boats or 2-man submarines carried by L. boats or larger craft. When the enemy have been driven out of Holland the possibility of such attacks south of the Humber can be ruled out. It is not thought that the German Navy will in the hour of defeat undertake a suicidal operation against targets in the UK. If they do the most likely targets would be Scapa and the general area of the Firth of Forth.

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September 11th

The present deception policy in the west is as follows (a) in order to extend further enemy forces and accelerate his retreat threats will be maintained against his rear communications in N. France. (b) in order to disrupt his system of control and undermine his will to fight, maximum efforts will be made in allied psychological warfare. (c) if the enemy offers serious resistance to the allied advance into Germany the allies by deception measures will be in a position to assist the resumption of this advance with the full weight of the resources at their disposal. He will be told that Eisenhower has decided to retain large airborne and amphibious striking forces and a highly trained strategic reserve in the U.K. This force will (a) reinforce the allied armies in France as the situation may demand (b) carry out large-scale airborne operations anywhere on the enemy's line of communication (c) open new

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lines of communication from the UK against enemy positions and lastly occupy areas in the event of German withdrawal.

I had a talk with Burt, Stopford and Courtney about Saturday's operation. We decided to find out more about the character of PETERSEN and in future operations to obtain better control of telephone lines and also of the movement of anyone who might embarrass us.

Stopford gave me a history of EILEEN who has as far as I can see been entirely satisfactory. She must however have a fair idea as to what we are doing.

R.J. and Ronnie came to see me about getting assistance from this office. They were mainly concerned about the transfer of O20. I pointed out to R.J. that good as Stephens was in breaking a man and in running his organisation he had certain defects. These were his rather pontifical pronouncements as to people's guilt or innocence and his tendency to mould his interrogators in stead of allowing them to develop in their own way. The result had been in some cases that the work there was not in the same standard as that produced by the LRC interrogators. R.J. took the view that he wanted primarily a good organiser to set the whole thing on its feet and that Stephens was the obvious choice. He was therefore prepared to accept the other defects which might rise. He realised that certain adjustments would have to be made. Personally I think in the circumstances that he is right. He seemed to have some idea that Stephens

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and all his works should move over to SHAEF HQ at Versailles. I said that in my view this would serve no very useful purpose. For by the time they had got established they would have to move on to Germany. It seemed to me that the whole thing should be done in one hop. With this he agreed. He has seen the D.G. who agrees in principle but wishes to have the whole thing presented to him in writing.


Ronnie talked to me privately afterwards. He has got the impression that R.J., having burst in like a whirlwind and told everybody where they got off, is now a little bit rattled by the magnitude of his task. He is now rather hanging on to Ronnie and Dick's coat-tails.

Three more rockets fell early this morning, one near Cambridge, one at North Fambridge, Essex and one at Lullington, 6 miles south of Dartford. It is said that the fragments found at Chiswick were in part so hot you couldn't touch them and in part coated with ice. The rocket is supposed to have gone 38 miles high.

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Patrick Day came to see me and talked about his experiences in France. He said that the whole of the C.I. planning had worked out extremely well at any rate up to the point when the break-through occurred. At that stage he thought that it might have been advisable to do what the Americans did, namely to withdraw all the units to an Army Group pool and send them out on specific tasks. He was rather critical about the French C.I. organisation. The quality of the personnel was not particularly high and they did not display much zeal.

I also had a talk with [redacted]. A proposition of what C. had told me, namely that he had 100 agents with wireless sets behind the German lines in France in the early stages of the battle, I asked whether the information supplied had been of value in dealing with V.2 (B-W has been specially employed by Duncan Sandys in affiliating all information about V.1 and V.2 from secret sources). He said that there were only about two or three agents who were any real good but that the low grade stuff did often provide confirmation and it did on occasion cause them to send out a recce plane.



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I had a talk with Arnold. He told me that we had used our jet-propulsion planes with great success in knocking down the doodlebugs. So far there were only 9 of them but they are in full production. With the present engine they can do 450 and are extremely manoevrable. They have an almost unlimited ceiling and of course can operate faster in the stratosphere than at lower altitudes. The latest development in

jet-propulsion should give a speed of at least 550. Our machines are superior to the Germans because they suck in their oxygen as the go. The Germans have two types, one with auxiliary rocket propulsion and another with an oxygen solution which only gives the plane a limited range. The Germans are not supposed to know that we used jet-propulsion against the doodle-bugs but it was discovered recently that when pilots were talking to each other the particular hum of the jet-propelled plane could be heard through their conversation. They have therefore been warned that in certain places and at certain altitudes no conversations are to take place.

I saw C. this evening. I told him about our little exploit on Saturday night, in which he was much interested. I also asked him whether there were ways and means of getting Garbo a decoration without being published in the press. He said that this was quite possible. He has been doing it frequently by putting the names up specially through Peter Loxley.

Dick Butler, Dick and I had a long conversation last night. Dick has quite independently come to the conclusion that R.J. may back out of his job. He has already developed a limp which he says is due to some vein in his leg. I recollected that when I had seen him he had said to me "I can't think why you didn't put Dick White into this job". There is also the fact that R.J. has now become quite friendly with "onnie. Dick is very insistent that he shall not be driven into taking over the job and that if it remains he will not serve under

him. He wishes to return to this office as soon as the white flag goes up.

Dick will be going to Versailles in about 10 days.

Tess has been told at the 11th hour that she cannot go to France unless she is in battle-dress as a private. I thought of ringing her up and telling her that instructions had now been received from SHAEF that she could not go on the plane unless she was in a bathing dress. It seems to me that if she gets off the rails she will have some difficulty in explaining herself.

C. told me today that the Germans are practically out of ammunition both in Brest and Havre and he was expecting them to fall at any moment. News has now come through of the fall of Havre. The Germans are furious about Ostende. Apparently the army left it without informing the Navy. The result is that there have been practically no demolitions.

Early this morning some rockets fell at Orpington, Knockholt and Dagenham. There was also one at Kew which hit the Chrysler works. Seven people have so far been reported killed.

September 13th

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Masse has had two conversations with the Jap
Ambassador in Vienna on 22nd and 28th August.

Musso was very bitter about the way the Germans were treating the Italians in N. Italy. They had clearly more or less taken the command not only of the forces but also of administrative posts. Their action against any recalcitrants were extremely drastic. Musso had complained to the German Ambassador but without getting much redress. He thought the incidents would have a serious effect on Italo-German relations. The Germans were requisitioning all kinds of commodities and means of transport in N. Italy. They took food stuffs and live stock, machine implements, typewriters, handcarts, clocks and even motor-horns. Reprisals against banditry and acts of terrorism were extremely severe and the Germans carried them out indiscriminately, even against party members and Govt. officials. Many innocent people had suffered at their hands and there were even instances in which women and children and old people had been locked up in houses and burned to death. As the reprisal for acts of terrorism in Milan 15 corpses had been left all day in the public square. Such things excited popular feeling and furnished the enemy with excellent propaganda material. It is not surprising therefore that the feelings of the populace towards the Germans had become extremely acute. Under such conditions one could not guarantee that they would not even rejoice at the arrival of the British and American forces. They had also had their effect on Italian troops who had been trained in Germany and were returning through N. Italy to the front. The existence of the Italian Govt. and their authority were becoming a dead letter in the eyes of the people. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining the

supply of gasoline and other commodities the Germans wish to make a reduction in the Italian Air Force which numbers some 20,000. The idea was to turn these people into Air Defence personnel. Musso was prepared to give his consent under certain conditions but without any notification the Germans surrounded the airfields and detachments of the Italian forces all over N. Italy, cut the telephone lines and severed all contact between the officers and men and the outer world. Having done this they gave them the choice of being incorporated into German forces and going aboard aircraft or joining A.A. units, and asked for an immediate reply. The majority had said that they could not act without the orders of the Italian High Command. They consequently remained interned. Subsequently the Germans asked Musso to issue orders to them, but as he was required to tell them to swear allegiance to Hitler he had felt bound to refuse. Even Musso's Finance Minister had his car commandeered by the S.S. though they knew the identity of the occupant. Musso himself was determined to carry on in spite of these difficulties, even if it meant a dramatic trial and an end by shooting. He apparently made this statement with an extremely pathetic expression. Musso referred once more to the advice he had given Hitler on the Brenner Pass on no account to go to war with Russia. He felt this had been the cardinal blunder.

Lord Swinton came in to see us all today. He seemed extremely full of beans. I told him something about our work in connection with the

Second Front. He was extremely interested to hear about the work of B.I.a, the major outline of which he seems to have learned from the PM. The PM said that the operation would probably not have succeeded had we not been able to keep the Germans from committing themselves for a matter of 2-3 weeks. I also told Swinton about what we had done for C.I. planning and the provision of staff for SHAEF and subordinate formations.

Sclater has discovered that the Americans are talking pretty freely on radio-telephone circuits to France. They give away quite a lot about the transport of equipment and the ports to which this equipment is destined. We are taking this up with Peter Reid.

The attitude of the Russians at the moment is quite interesting. It would seem that they have almost deliberately left the resistance movement in Warsaw in the lurch. They have refused to allow our planes to drop arms. At any rate they will not allow them to land on Russian soil after doing so. We have nevertheless provided quite a lot in the way of food and equipment. It seems to me that their policy is to occupy such territory as they intend to hold after the war, namely the Baltic states, east Poland and Bessarabia and to extend their forces over such parts of the Balkans as they consider to be within their sphere of interest. They probably think that it will be an asset to them to be in occupation when the Germans put up the White flag. This probably accounts for their present drive through the Balkans and for their not continuing their

offensive on the Warsaw front. There are strong indications that in the Baltic they intend to go as far as Koenigsberg. As a quid pro quo they are suggesting to the Poles that they should occupy Germany on the line running due south from Stettin which will include Breslau and Upper Silesia. The Poles are not particularly anxious to have the territory, which would doubtless be a permanent thorn in their sides.

This however would suit the Russians since it would drive a permanent wedge between Germany and Poland and cause Poland to lean on Russia. In Turkey the Russians are anxious to see the Anglo-Turkish alliance abandoned. Presumably they imagine that as long as it exists there is a threat to their flank. Meanwhile they are intriguing in Persian Azabaijan which may well declare its desire to join the USSR. This would of course be brought about by eruption from within. It is also possible that the Russians may wish to have certain rights over the Persian Railway which would give an outlet for their goods to the Persian Gulf. Generally speaking they are fairly active in the Eastern Mediterranean. They are extending their consulates to Palestine, Syria and Iran, and taking quite a keen interest in political affairs in those countries. There is also talk of their building a canal through Bulgaria to the Mediterranean with German labour.

Numerous memos are being produced as to what the Germans are likely to do when we occupy their country. These are of course mostly speculative. There is a certain amount of information about the Nazis going to ground and forming a kind of maquis. Doubtless such

preparations have been made. It will be interesting to see how far they can offer any effective resistance. My own view is that when the Germans have collapsed the majority of them will become abject. If they realise that the various allied missions are really going to take control and exterminate the Party they will probably come forward in large numbers and supply information. It may however take them some time to realise that freedom of speech once more exists in the country, and that they can express their views without the risk of being shot. Much will depend on the firmness with which the allied authorities act since the first target of any underground movement will undoubtedly be those who collaborate and furnish information to the occupying forces. There may be a certain amount of trouble in the early stages but I am not inclined to think that it will last very long. Certain authorities will probably escape to Spain and the Argentine and try to infiltrate money, instructions and arms to resisters, but should not be too difficult to deal with this situation. The other main line will be propaganda abroad to get a modification in the armistice terms and a relaxation of control. This is likely to be intensive as the years go on and there will doubtless be a large number of people both here and in America who will agitate against a continuous occupation.

At the weekly meeting Burley gave us the present position in the discussions taking place at the H.O. about the relaxation of travel conditions. There is to be maintenance of check on aliens from the U.K., preceded by a retention of the

existing control for 2 or 3 months after Stage A to fit in with the arrangements for Censorship control. In fact conditions will revert to those existing at the early stages of the war. There will be about 50,000 former enemy agents who will want to go home. It will be necessary to distinguish between British and aliens going through the ports. Everyone will therefore still have to carry a passport whatever their nationality or destination. This will be the position up to Stage B. There will be no issue of exit permits for British subjects but we shall supply the H.O. with a list of names of those we should like referred to us in the case of aliens. Travellers between U.K. and Ireland, both north and south, will carry a travel document of some sort until Stage B is reached.

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Milmo mentioned the capture of COTELON, which he thinks is the most important capture since D-day and perhaps the most important of the war. He is an SD agent, once a member of the Breton Nationalist Movement, and has worked with Abt. 2. He is holding out on many points and it is essential that he should be sent here for proper interrogation. At present he is in the hands of the Americans in France. He has mentioned several interesting things however, such as the fact that he had run an agent from Brest to the U.K. who so far we have not been able to identify, and the fact that he had a system of reports coming from this country. He is in a position to give a great deal of information about S.D. and IRA connections.

Walker gave details of the arrival of V.2. It started on 8th Sept. with one at Chiswick and one at Epping. On the 10th another fell at Epping. On the 11th two fell, one in Kent and one in Essex. Three fell on the 12th, one at Kew, one at Dagenham and one at Biggin Hill. In the evening one fell about 5 miles north-east of Southend. So far the casualties have been less than from the same number of doodlebugs. From the location of the falls, it appears that they are launched from near Rotterdam.

Baxter said that the Russians resented our treatment of all Russians arriving here as P/W and wished them to be treated, as were British subjects in Russia, as civil internees. They have suggested re-classification into the two categories.

Hale said that the Home Secretary wished to abolish 18B as soon as possible after the cease fire and substitute something less stringent. He merely wished to detain people suspected of espionage on behalf of Japan. Hart suggested a regulation dealing with those who are in touch with members of any underground Nazi movement. Hale will try and put this over with the H.O.

Brook-Booth said the Russians for some unknown reason had applied for the repatriation of all Finns in the U.K. There are two camps of merchant seamen in the I.O.M. and there seems no objection provided they go direct from there to Finland and are not allowed to wander round in England first. The Finns are not pro-Nazi though they are anti-Russian and probably on those

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grounds inclined to be anti-British.

Miss Wadeson came to discuss the future of the LRC index. We came to the conclusion that its main function would be to provide information about collaborationists who were trying to get away from territory formerly occupied by the Germans. Miss Wadeson pointed out that if this was to be properly covered there was the SHAEF index as well as PID, our own Central Registry, RB, SIS and SOE. We agreed that if things were working properly the SIS and SOE material should get on to the SHAEF index, and that if any unification of records was to take place we ought to try and get such cards from SHAEF as are based on information other than that which we have supplied to SHAEF. Meanwhile there seemed no point in LRC carding "white" people in occupied territory as well as "black". It was desirable we thought to start before long pruning the LRC registry with a view to its absorption by the Central Registry. As soon as this had taken place copies of the relevant SHAEF cards could go direct to Blenheim. All of this of course would depend on the cessation of the LRC's normal functions. As long as they existed they would have to keep their own registry.

September 14th

Jeffes came to see me about Back of Passport Control's son who has got himself into very serious trouble with the police. He is being prosecuted at the Exeter assizes for theft and Catalogue Reference: KV 74/195 other charges against

him, in the metropolitan area. Jeffes was anxious if possible to keep the father's connection with Passport Control out of the papers. This had been done at the police court proceedings in Torquay. Apparently has spoken to McIver about this. The latter has said however that the RSLO could not intervene as the delinquent is once removed from the government official. I said I would speak to Burt and see if anything could be done.

Lt. Col. Wordsworth of SHAEF came to see me about a conversation between KUH and Lt. Col. ~~KANE~~ of Civil Affairs. There is obviously a close liaison between KUH and ~~KANE~~. ~~KANE~~ gives KUH information about civil affairs intentions in Germany on the understanding that KUH does not publish anything which would be traceable to SHAEF. We came to the conclusion that any direct action on the present information would blow our source. It was decided therefore to get Press and Censorship to let us see copies of all KUH's telegrams. If there was anything which pointed even remotely to a leakage from SHAEF an enquiry could be made which would probably have the necessary deterrent effect.

Kellar came to talk to me about his future. He is I think anxious to stay here but feels that opportunities are now passing by which might be more remunerative, and that if some assurance as to his future prospects here cannot be given he ought to consider them.

This of course brings us back to the old question of pay which in my opinion is inadequate,

and to the future status of the office which is undecided.

Stephens came to see the D.G. and we had a discussion about the proposal that he should set up an O20 in Germany. The D.G. in a letter to Maunsell has laid down the conditions that Stephens should have a certain independence in the running of O20 and should employ to some extent the same methods that he has been employing here. In particular the D.G. wished for an undertaking that he would not be asked to use any third degree methods. O20 had a perfectly clean record in this respect and it would be highly undesirable from the point of view of our dept. and the country as a whole if such methods were used. The D.G. had in mind that Maunsell's record in this respect was not altogether clean. There I had I think been a case of his sandbagging somebody in the Mid East and one of his employees there had ideas about the use of Evipan, the drug which is supposed to make people talk. In fact Evipan is quite useless and in any case it would be undesirable to use it. Equally third degree was just as likely to produce bad results as good; apart from the moral side, it never pays. Stephens is I think quite keen to do the job but does not wish to be stuck in Germany for 5 or 10 years. He wants ultimately to return to this office.

Louis de BRAY the notorious character who penetrated our escape routes on the continent and has been instrumental in denouncing a large number of allied subjects, has been captured and is being sent back for interrogation.

September 15th

last night.

I met Caulfeild at the club. He told me that Long, the Australian DNI, had been to see him and had talked for nearly 2½ hours about Ogilvy and others in Australia. Caulfeild had taken an intense dislike to Long, who had got very over-excited and used most abusive language about the Australian Security Service and those who directed it. He had some idea that the D. C. would give him his support in setting up another Security Service, of which he would presumably be the head. He said that Ogilvy was nothing but a political intriguer looking after Simpson's interests and that he had the idea of becoming head of the Australian Security Service himself. Caulfeild gave Long no encouragement whatever. He told him that he could not possibly expect the D. C. to give him any support in setting up a security service in Australia. The Australian Govt. had established the Security Service under Simpson and obviously MI5 would have to liaise with him unless the government thought otherwise. If Long had a case against his own Security Service he should put it up through the proper channels.

In May of this year IPI wrote an interesting memo on the subject of Jap espionage against India. Very little was known before the war except that the Japs through their consulates and through their principle companies and banks were collecting information and carrying out propaganda in a rather crude fashion. The principal figures in Japan for conducting propaganda in India before the war were the well-known revolutionaries Rash Behari Bose, Anand Mohan Sahay and the ineffective Mahendra Pratap. The Jap Legation in Kabul was also paying par-

particular attention to northern India tribal territory, contacted mainly through the Legation interpreter, Abdul Hamid. After the outbreak of war these activities were continued by Inouye head of the Jap intelligence organisation in Afghanistan and ultimately led to the notorious SILVER case, in which Bhagat Ram and Subhas Chandra Bose were concerned. Activities were also developed in Turkey where the Jap Embassy at Ankara were subsidising Inomoto, correspondent of the Tokio Nitchi Nitchi, who had arranged for the establishment of a branch office at Delhi of the Spanish newspaper Vangardia. The Delhi correspondent was Chaman Lal of the Hindustan Times, who provided a regular supply of low-grade political information which was controlled. In Lisbon the Japs endeavoured to make use of an Indian merchant named Qureshi. Under the Indian Independence League, controlled by Rash Behari Bose, were concentrated renegade Indians from all over the Far East. As far back as 1937 the Japs had inspired the training of a certain number of Indian collaborators who moved with the Jap troops and established local Independence Associations in Japanese occupied territory. Agents were subsequently recruited from the ranks of this organisation. A second important source from which the Japs could select Indians for work in India was the Indian National Army which had been formed from suborned Indian F/Ws. This the Japs began to create in 1941. Prisoners were persuaded by propaganda and ill-treatment to volunteer for service with the Japanese. The Intelligence Section of the Indian National Army was known as the Iwakuro Kikan, a department established to take charge of 5th column and intelligence activities in Burma and

Malaya. Col. Iwakuro who was at the head of this organisation was replaced by Yamamoto in March 1943. The organisation had its headquarters in Bangkok and branches at Singapore, Penang and Rangoon with a sub-branch at Akyab. Each of these branches was under the control of a Japanese colonel with a staff of Japanese officers and civilians assisted by Indians of the I.I.L. and the I.N.A. At first the training given was superficial and the men chosen for work were capable of carrying out the tasks allotted to them. By the end of 1942 however the instructions were becoming more efficient and detailed and the last party of agents reported to have arrived in India in the last part of 1943 were considered to be superior and better trained in every way than those who had come before. It has become customary to refer to these agents as the Japanese-Inspired Fifth columnists which has been abbreviated to J.I.F.s. The first ^{organised} parties reached India by land from Burma in May 1942 amongst Indian refugees. There were 3 parties each consisting of 5 men. They were instructed to collect military information and find out the attitude of the Indian Army vis-vis a Japanese invasion of India. They were to communicate by wireless through two Siamese who have never been identified. At the end of Sept. 1942 the first graduates of a short training course at Penang arrived in India in two parties, each consisting of 5 Indians, who landed from Jap submarines near Dwarka in Kath-iawar and near Tanur in Malabar. The agents were Malayalam and all civilians. They were to collect military information and spread propaganda. Each was to establish connection with an

opposite number who would be travelling to India by land and would remain in the vicinity of the eastern frontier in order to pass on to Burma the information which had been collected. The plan came to nothing as all the submarine agents were captured. At the end of April 1943 or the beginning of May about 50 Indian students left in several parties for deep penetration tasks in India. Many of them were duly picked up on arrival. They were to sabotage communications and to prevent demolition by British troops in the case of a Jap invasion. They were also to make contact with revolutionary parties and spread propaganda. In April 1943 7 parties of agents were dropped by parachute in Assam. 5 parties consisted of military personnel and 2 of civilian. Each comprised 3 men including a wireless operator. Agents had been carefully prepared and were to collect information about aerodromes, troop concentrations, bridges, recruitment and public morale. They were advised to go to the nearest congress centre should they run short of money. All the members of 6 of these parties were arrested. The 7th is believed to have jumped too soon and to have been lost in the jungle. The most recent party of agents reported landed again by submarine near Dwarkar on Dec. 23rd 1943. This party consisted of 8 agents, 4 of whom were ex-P/W from Germany. They were to work in pairs and were equipped with W/T. They were instructed to collect military and political intelligence which was to be transmitted to the Bengal pair and thence to an enemy control station. They received instruction from Subhas Chandra Bose and were told to make contact with his brother and other persons. They

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were well trained and equipped with arms including Japanese grenades and incendiary devices. They were all arrested despite the fact that they had been landed on a lonely part of the coast and had quickly made their way to distant parts of the country. Members of the party reported that another party had been landed in Ceylon by submarine in the previous December but no confirmation of this had been obtained. In all up to April 1944, no less than 2,575 persons are known to have been despatched on various missions or to be in training. Missions included not only espionage but also sabotage, propaganda and the suborning of troops in the forward areas. Of the 2,575 there were 967 at training centres or INA camps, 653 in the Chindwin area, 341 in Arakan, 559 picked up and 35 at large in India. 20 were unaccounted for. The 559 captured but of a possible 614 belonged to 151 different parties of one or more members. The probability is that at least some of those at large having obtained their objective in getting to their native land are refraining from any activities which might attract attention. It has been shown from the above that the Japs were very quick to put in operation their pre-war plan to make use of Indians in the Far East. The material available was however poor and their methods somewhat crude. Consequently the must have been disappointed with the results. Training and selection of agents has however improved. The Japs have in Subhas Chandra Bose an Indian leader of international repute and a man of outstanding ability and not lacking in personality. His influence on the I.I.L and the I.N.A. cannot therefore be ignored. At the same time it should not be

forgotten that as a race Indians are supporters of China rather than Japan and the subservience of the majority in the Far East to the Japsn can safely be attributed to force majeure. That this majority have given nothing more than lip service to the Japs is clear from the attitude of the J.I.F.s who have returned to India. It has hitherto been rather rare for them to make any attempt to carry out the tasks imposed on them by the Japs once they have been beyond Jap control. So far as is known no one of them has hitherto succeeded in establishing contact with Subhas Bose's own Bengali terrorist follower in India for for that matter with revolutionary elements which count or are not already under control.

A report from SEAC dated 5th August 1944 shows that through their own ineptitude and through our deception policy the Japs have been singularly ill-informed about the disposition of our units. In determining our order of battle they had the following sources of information: (a) contact with important elements of our forces for over 2 years; (b) captured prisoners and documents in considerable quantities; (c) they had from their allies material bearing directly or indirectly on our order of battle in the eastern theatre; (d) they had a number of Indian agents infiltrated into our rearward areas who should have been difficult for us to control; (e) they had Bose and his organisations at their disposal. Where they have been assisted by the Germans e.g. with extracts from information fed to the Germans and from genuine identification on the western and mediterranean fronts, their estimates are

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intelligible though erroneous. But where the Japs have been left to their own sources or have rejected German advice results of their intelligence work is lamentable and shows marked ineptitude. Indications from special sources are that Yokio is unlikely in the future to get any more accurate overall picture of our order of battle than heretofore. Moreover considerations of "face" make it improbable that Tokio will view with favour reports of any reduction of the estimated strength of SEAC in view of the failure of the Japanese armies in Burma area.

V.2 continues at the rate of 2 or 3 per 24 hours. The remarkable thing is that the explosions are heard quite definitely even when the rocket falls at a distance of up to 20 miles away. Since lateral blast is not near so great, as that of V.1, it may be that some new explosive is being employed which has a vertical blast, and the sound therefore carries further.

Major Mallam came to see me. He was formerly in Home Forces and is being sent out as a G.2 to Brig. Howman, head of security in India. He wants to get some sort of idea about the workings of this office. As far as I can see he is more interested in the machinery than in actual methods of investigation. He is to see the ports, LRC etc.

I had a talk with Brooman-white about V.2. The only reason for not publishing is that the Germans have said nothing about V.2 and may therefore be in some doubt as to where their rockets are landing, whether on British territory or in the

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sea, On the other hand there is some indication that the Spaniards may have been passing on information. If this is so the obvious course would be to make a simple announcement that V.2 had started and that no information would be communicated as to where the rockets are falling. The Press are apparently anxious to get at Duncan Sandys whose statements regarding V.1 and counter-measures have rather given the impression that the government was slow off the mark but that everything was now over. The result has been that families are pouring back in into London, when they had much better remain outside for the time being. The authorities still seem to think that V.2 is radio-controlled. Apparently the jamming process is difficult as the frequency is changed a number of times during the course of the flight. There has been one case of a rocket bursting in the air, probably due to over-heating. This has I believe been one of the main troubles which the Germans have had to content with.

We entered Germany the day before yesterday. The attitude of the population as described by a B.B.C. war reporter is not without interest. They came forward with flowers, seemed to be pleased to see the troops, said they had been waiting a long time for them, that 90% of the people were anti-Nazi and that they hoped we should go right through to Berlin and put an end to the Nazi regime. They said that all the local Nazis had left with the armies. 'If this is typical of what we shall meet everywhere in Germany it shows that the German is still running true to form. The attitude seems to be just the

same as it was at the end of the last war when we marched into the Rhineland. 90% of the population were ready to lick our boots. Only in one case did I remember them behaving in a correct manner. This was at a billet where the inhabitants gave us everything we asked for but clearly did not wish to have anything to do with us. I believe that 20% of the population might be regarded as being violently anti-Nazi, 10% violently pro-Nazi, and the remaining 70% quite ready to swim with the stream. If as appears the Nazis are moving back with the armies our advance should act as a kind of net which should eventually round up the majority of the bad hats. I feel that our best policy would be to tell all German minorities to go back to their own country, to refrain from carving up Germany in any arbitrary way, but to be adamant on the question of rearmament and conscription. Once we have more or less purged the country of the bad elements we should allow the Germans to sort out their own troubles, as far as is compatible with maintaining strict control over any attempts to rearm. This would be far better than keeping a foot permanently on their necks and then being forced to give way bit by bit in the face of public opinion which will clamour for the regeneration of German trade and the removal of a large occupational force which will be costing the country immense sums of money.

September 16th "

The Times today published the figures of bomb damage done since the beginning of the war and by flying bombs and air raids generally.

In air raids 1940-44, 84,000 houses were destroyed; 142,000 houses are still to be repaired of which 42,000 are not fit for occupation. In the flying bomb attacks 1944, 23,000 houses were destroyed; 1,104,000 houses were damaged though in a large proportion the damage is slight. The total damage caused is 107,000 houses destroyed; 170,000 seriously damaged needing repair; 700,000 houses have received first-aid repairs, but need further work to make the reasonably habitable.

V.1 has started up again. 13 were launched early this morning, 6 crossed the coast and two reached the outer London area. It is not known at the moment whence they came. They may possibly have been launched from pick-a-back planes or alternatively from Holland.

I have seen Machell and fixed up with him and MacIver about an approach to the Torquay police in the case of Back's son. As usual had got the whole thing muddled. MacIver was asked to intervene with the M.O.I. in order to keep the whole thing out of the press. All that is really required is a word to the C.C. or the Superintendent asking that Back's connection with Passport Control should not be mentioned.

I have just been reading the case of Hans Carl SCHARF who was captured by the French and sent over here for interrogation. He has a long history and is of particular interest in view of the fact that he took part in the Leibbrandt expedition to S. Africa although he did not

actually land. The case has been extremely well written up by McAllister of O20 and is an excellent example of what can be done by careful interrogation.

Pam Frazer's son David, a tank officer, has written an amusing account of his race across France through Paris and into Brussels. One incident tickled my fancy. He says: "We entered a town just after the Poche left and felt hot on their tails. It is a town which houses many monks and priests and a large cassocked group was standing cheering our entry. I noticed one very big man who looked vaguely out of place. He was red-headed and red-bearded, and his eyes were bright. Then the scales fell and I saw - he could have been in Timbuctoo or Honolulu but here was unquestionably an Irishman. As we rolled by his agitation seemed to boil over. His priestly training, his cure of souls, his doctrines of history, his neutrality and all else seemed to fall away in a single second. With a mighty roar of "After 'em boys, & luck go with you" he boarded the leading scout car, urging it in the direction of the enemy!" He came from Killarney."

September 18th

I saw Capt. Howman, the American who is working with Victor in Paris. He has come over to try and get another jeep and trailer and a camera. Tess appears to have got over all right and has discarded her battle-dress. This carries with it the disadvantage of not being able to get anything to eat. I believe however that she is

being put on the ration strength of the British Embassy, doubtless through the good offices of Duff.

Howman is very excited about a French Abwehr II agent who is called JIGGER. This is not of course his real name. Victor writes that he was responsible for the selection of all saboteurs in France. He was also present at all conferences with von Eschweger in Paris not only regarding French sabotage but also with such persons as Umberto from Madrid, officials from Berlin, Belgium and Holland. He also had access to all Abwehr II files and for a period of about 6 months before the Germans left Paris systematically stole files from them which he now has and which are being studied. For example he has a complete list together with the official designations of all persons working in the German Sabotage Service at Berlin. He also has details of the locations of all underground sabotage dumps in France, which number 16. These we are unearthing for the American authorities. JIGGER met ZIGZAG and is most interesting about the confidence that the Germans had in him and their joy after his first act of sabotage at de Havilland and the second on the City of Lancaster at Lisbon. JIGGER has a complete list of all the targets which stay-behind organisations in France, Belgium and Holland are proposing to sabotage after the allied advance.

I had a talk with Ede. He is going to suggest to Henderson that he should prune the FSP who will be required for duties in the Far East.

Meanwhile it has been decided that Lt. Col. Quill

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shall be the Marine officer who is to go out to take charge of the security of the port of Trincomalee; he will be under Airy. As he has far eastern experience, Ede thinks he might ultimately become our DSO at Singapore. Tim Airy is expected back in Ceylon on Oct. 1st and after a few local discussions will come on here

I saw Thomas this morning. He tells me that CURLANDER has arrived. He has papers and photographs showing himself as an officer in the Waffen S.S. He is now in hospital, having been wounded at the barricades in Brussels. His general story is that he joined the S.S. etc. in order to get as much information as he could. We shall get an entirely independent statement from him and then probably have another go at MATON.

I saw Craufurd and Buster on the case of SLUBICKI. We decided we should get special examiners to open a letter which MOLDICKI was carrying for KAMINSKI of the Polish mission here. We should then interrogate SLUBICKI again and tell him that we propose to speak to MOLDICKI about the smuggling of the diamonds. He would then have an opportunity of modifying his former statements and of giving us his views on this subject. Our belief is that SLUBICKI intended to keep the diamonds and that he has for some time known about the smuggling. It was naturally ~~only~~ when he foresaw trouble that he brought them to the British authorities. Ultimately we propose to take the matter up with the Poles on the grounds that the diamonds were brought into

Gib. illicitly by the Polish BOAC pilot JONIKAS and that these diamonds apparently were despatched from this country. We are also suggesting to S.B. that they should pull in JONIKAS and the other pilot with a view to their interrogation.

Hunter came to see me about the future of B.6. I told him that subject to anything that Hollis had to say he would probably want about 12 good watchers after the war and that it was essential that these people should be wellpaid and should have some pension scheme. They are people who have to do highly confidential work and it is therefore desirable that it should not be worth their while to leave us and take on other employment. They should go through a fairly probationary period.

Miss Shaw came to see me about the sabotage squad in Spain. I said that until we saw how things were going to develop it might be advisable just to keep a few of them who could be used in cases of emergency. The present squad consists of about 22. It seemed to me just possible that some of the more desperate Nazis might ultimately land up in Spain and try to damage our ships. We should then look rather foolish if we had no means of dealing with them.

September 19th

I attended a meeting of the JICat which DMI India's paper on the future of Intelligence in Mid East, India and the Far East was considered. The discussion only lasted a few minutes.

Cawthorne complained that had the German moves been successful in the Caucasus and in Egypt, there was no stay-behind organisation and in fact no organisation at all in the pre-war period. He thought that some centralised Intelligence Bureau on the lines of CICI, which would have representatives both in the Mid East and India, might be a solution. Cavendish-Bentinck thought vaguely that JIC Egypt and JIC India co-ordinated by JIC London, would meet the case, but that at the moment it was not possible to say anything definite. He thought therefore that Cawthorne's paper should come up again at a later date.

"C" said that Cawthorne could take it that his activities in Persia were closely co-ordinated with those of DIB. Cawthorne said that neither he nor Pilditch, of DIB, had any idea about what was proposed. It had been suggested some time ago that there should be a meeting of all the parties interested but nothing came of it. On this the discussion ended and Cawthorne's memo has been filed for future reference.

I had a talk with Cavendish-Bentinck after the meeting. I asked him whether he considered the paper was concerned mainly with offensive intelligence and whether he was proposing to discuss C.I. aspects of the problem, but he had clearly no wish to go any further. Cawthorne held the view that something in the nature of SIME with a representative in India and Mid East, should continue on a joint V/VI basis. He said that in fact SIS had no organisation at all which was worth talking about and that the personnel they employed was extremely indifferent.

He thought that a territorial division of functions is nonsense and that some form of unification should take place. He was in fact quite violent on the subject. I pointed out to him that nothing on these lines could very well come about until some solution was obtained at headquarters. We had ideas on this subject which we were trying to put forward but whether we should be successful or not was another matter.

Craufurd has seen SLUBICKI and with the latter's concurrence has talked to MOLDICKI. MOLDICKI says that he knows something about the business of the diamonds but that being an army officer he cannot speak without the authority of his superiors. The letter that he is carrying to KAMINSKI contained nothing of any interest. With S.B.'s concurrence we propose to put the facts to KAMINSKI and suggest to him that the police should be allowed to investigate. Meanwhile we are urging SB to get hold of JONIKAS.

TAR, Marriott and Buster came to talk to me about the possibility of MI5 being allowed an officer in Paris. This seemed particularly necessary since clearly the French 2eme Bureau have a large number of reports from people they are arresting daily which would be of interest to us. We shall not get them unless we have someone on the spot. Secondly it will for some time be necessary for us to send officers out to what was formerly occupied territory for the purpose of clearing up old cases and dealing with renegades. Unless we

have someone in Paris who is in touch with the Americans with an office and a car it will not be possible for us to get very far. Dick is at present in Brussels where he is going to try and suggest to the Belgians that they should ask for the services of Brook-Booth in the capacity of an M.I.5 liaison officer. If we can get this across there seems no reason why we should not have someone in Paris and later on at the Hague. It is of course part of our scheme for dividing intelligence into offensive and defensive. If we take the defensive side we shall certainly have representatives in the principal capitals.

Roger Hollis came to talk to me about renegades, both civil and military. The H.O. are being very sticky about getting any of these people back here. They do not wish to retain powers under the DRs to keep renegades in detention here. Equally they do not seem very anxious to get a bill through the House. Still less do they want the renegades wandering about in this country since this would undoubtedly give rise to questions in the House. They are therefore suggesting to the Home Defence Executive that the army should detain them in France until such time as the necessary evidence has been accumulated for their prosecution. I see the advantages of this but it seems to me a little weak-kneed.

Cussen has seen P.G. WODEHOUSE in Paris. He says that he is a stupid old man who has made so many blunders that he has brought himself perilously near the clutches of the Treachery Act.

For the time being he is to remain in Paris. It is hoped that there may be an opportunity later of interrogating the Germans who handled his case.

I had a talk with Charles about salaries. I said that if we were either to keep good people here or get good recruits, it was absolutely essential that we should pay our staff at a higher rate. We could not be compared with ordinary civil servants who when they reach the higher grades had a very wide field for promotion. If this office were given a larger sphere of activity and was loosely knit with other intelligence branches set up in the various Service depts. there would be opportunities here. If on the other hand we were reduced to our pre-war level there was absolutely no inducement for anybody to join the dept. except ex-officers or ex-officials who had reached pension age. Charles said that he was glad I had put this point of view as he and Horrocks were considering what our budget to the Treasury should be. He wants me to have a talk with him and Horrocks on Thursday morning. I am quite sure that we should not grade our officers in any way until we know what the future shape of things is to be.

Lennox came to see me. He wanted to have my opinion of Maunsell. He said that he had heard from many sources that he was extremely ambitious and would like to be head of this office. I told Lennox that I was well aware of this but I was not worrying very much at the moment.

He said that the battle was going very well. Th

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present plan is to hold the centre and swing north and east through Holland.

Our casualties in the battle for France are as follows: Northern Allied Group, killed 16,546 wounded 59,675, missing 9,336. Central Group (Americans) killed 22,746, wounded 103,217, missing 11,431. Southern Group, killed 3,664, wounded 7,579. Northern Group have taken 97,163 German prisoners, Central Group 239,667, and southern group 82,000. Total 418,842.

Flying bomb casualties are, killed 5,923, seriously injured 15,794. V.2 casualties are 40 killed, and 100 seriously injured. So far there have been 25 V.2 rockets.

September 20th

Bronx has received the sum of £247.17.8 which represents her salary for the months of August and Sept. at the rate of £100 per month. There is some doubt about the reason which prompted the payment of the additional £50 which appears to be in the nature of a bonus. It is known that immediately after Bronx's telegram to ALMEIDA which implemented Plan "onside, the Germans authorised the payment of £50 to Bronx. It may be that this sum has only just arrived. Alternatively the bonus may be in recognition of the general excellence of her traffic. Tricycle's letter dated 20th May in which he gave an explanation of Freak's ceasing to transmit has been returned from the Dead Letter Office "Addressee Unknown". He gave a subsequent explanation early in July which it is hoped has reached the enemy.

Letters written by Gelatine have also been returned through the Dead Letter Office. ZIGZAG has during the past week received a message from the Germans in which they undertake to expedite the delivery to him of a sum of money. He is still waiting for instructions as to how he can deliver the photographs which he has taken of the Asdic which he notionally stole in Manchester and until these instructions are received little progress can be made.

Joseph has just got back from New York after being torpedoed twice on his return journey without suffering any serious damage. He was interviewed at great length by the F.B.I. and got on well with them after making it clear that he must work through London until otherwise ordered. He has established a notional agent in New York called Mr. C., a communist who is supposed to think Joseph is working for Russia. Meanwhile Joseph's courier Irma has returned from Lisbon where he saw Kidosaki three times at the beginning of August. The Admiralty document on submarine matters which Irma delivered produced an almost over-poweringly cordial atmosphere. There was nothing to suggest that the Japs were about to leave Lisbon or were nervous about their own future. Irma brought back £100 for Joseph which is less than he expected.

I had a meeting with Seymer, Cussen and Hollis on the subject of renegades. We felt that the first point to be decided by the HDE was whether military and civilians should be treated

on an equal basis. If this is agreed then some legislation will have to be passed to prevent civil or military renegades who have already been sent back here from moving about the country. Although the H.O. suggestion that the armies in the field should hold renegades until such evidence is obtained to stage a prosecution would be quite a suitable arrangement from our point of view it is we think just as likely to raise questions in the House as any other procedure. We all felt doubtful whether the military would be prepared to accept the obligation. The probability is that the H.O. will be forced to get a bill through the House authorising the detention of renegades for a period of 6 months pending investigation of their cases.


Hollis told the weekly meeting briefly what the position was in this matter.

Hart is proposing to stop issuing a weekly ISOS summary as the reports are now quite worthless.

Milmo said that a German Red Cross ship, the Rostock, had been captured by the Navy in the West Atlantic as it was not notified as a Red Cross ship, and brought into Plymouth. She had sailed from L'Orient with wounded and medical staff on board. Reports from an SOE agent in France state that Gestapo men were making their getaway on board. This agent is coming over here and will pick out the men from amongst those on board. The SCO is going through the papers of the wounded and has discovered 8 among them who seem phoney as their papers show that they were only enlisted for a period of 3 months into the army.

Noakes mentioned the case of HULSMAN, a Dutch subject engaged in resistance activities, who had first been captured and condemned to death by the Germans, and then reprieved and approached to work for them. He went to an S.D. training school, was given a W/T set and put into Calais. On the advance of the Canadians however he deserted and joined up with them, and has given a good deal of information about the Abwehr and S.D. set-up in Calais.

The Press Attache in Madrid has again returned to the charge about sending Spanish press representatives to this country and also to SHAEF. We are telling McCann of the M.O.I. that we cannot accept either proposition for the time being.



It tells me that STYLES is to be prosecuted. This is a great tribute to Spooner and Davis who have spent hours on the case collecting evidence.

Milmo is worried about the case of a man called SIEGEL who is being sent back from the front. The American escort have lost him and there are no papers of any sort or kind. He is said to have been interrogated by Victor.

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The D.G. gave a dinner last night to Prince Olaf and the Norwegians. Hansteijn, the Chief of Staff, Rocher-Lund, head of Intelligence, Nagel, head of C.I., Gleditsch of C.I. and one other were present. All of them seem to be extremely keen on maintaining the good relations with us that have been established during the last 4 years. They would very much like to see an MI5 representative in Oslo. In any case for the moment they propose to leave someone behind to keep touch. Olaf is of course bi-lingual in English, having been born and largely educated here. He was very pleasant and struck me as being intelligent. He has also a keen sense of humour. Hansteijn is a very pleasant personality. He talked a certain amount about the Finnish war of which he had some first-hand information. I asked him whether he thought that when they attacked the Finns in 1940 the Russians had deliberately used untrained troops and poor equipment in order to mislead the Germans. He said definitely no, the Russians had used untrained troops as they had very much underestimated the strength of the Finns, who are extremely courageous and good fighters. Later on the Russians had realised their mistake and put experienced troops and better equipment into the field. He did not think that many of the German troops in Finland would get away and that those who reached Norway would not be likely to get any further. Rocher-Lund is a gunner who has been in intelligence for some time. I think he feels it something of a dead end and will not be sorry to go back to duty. He was full of plans about the internecine

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strife which goes on in all intelligence organisations. The Norwegians are apparently no exception to the general rule. He was very anxious to maintain touch with our office which had given valuable co-operation. He hoped this would go on during the post-war period. Nagel is well disposed towards us but not such an attractive personality as Uleditsch who is obviously the best C.I. officer the Norwegians have. He really knows his stuff. The Norwegians evidently intend to deal fairly drastically with their renegades.

September 21st

I had a talk with Charles and Horrocks about the future of the office. The D.G. has apparently talked to John Anderson who has asked him to let him have some estimate as to what he thinks our future budget will be. This the D.G. has promised to give him and Charles and Horrocks have been told to provide the figures. I said that I felt this was rather putting the cart before the horse. It was impossible to budget until we knew what our commitments were going to be. These at the moment were very much in the air although we were doing all we could to press for some sort of settlement. We had reached a stage where we were proposing to say to Arnold-Foster that we could neither accept a total amalgamation nor SIS absorption of B and F divisions, leaving only what was described as an executive rump. In our view the only possible solution was to have a defensive and offensive organisation. We should be responsible for the former and SIS for the

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latter. If Arnold-Foster felt that a deadlock had been reached we should have to take the matter to higher authority, either to Bridges or to John Anderson with a request that the case should be submitted to arbitration. I pointed out to Charles and Horrocks that this was becoming a matter of very great urgency since we were in danger of losing good officers who for lack of any knowledge of their future were considering either going back to private life or taking on jobs with CCMS or UNRRA. Further, Section V were recruiting all sorts of personnel for jobs abroad after the war. If we were going to be in control of CI activities we should like to have some say in the personnel who were going to be employed. Haldane Porter who has just got back tells me he has a definite offer from Felix for permanent employment. He is not very keen about joining Section V and would really much rather stay with us but he must be told something definite. I told Charles and Horrocks that I thought it was of paramount importance that we should pay our people well, particularly if we were not going to be able to offer them any wider field for promotion than the one which exists at present. If there were no compensating advantages in pay we should never be able to get good people. It may be true that through our honesty we stand well with the Treasury but it will not do much good if as a result of cheese-paring we lose all our good officers. I think both Charles and Horrocks saw my point. The great thing is to get on with the proposals for amalgamation with SIS.

Dick came in today. He has just returned from Brussels, where he had a talk with Bill Williams, Monty's BGSI. Apparently the latest strategical move by which we are outflanking the Rhine in Holland was Monty's and it now looks as if 21st Army Group are likely to be the first in Berlin. The view of the staff is that if we can get the bridge at Niemijn and also at Arnhem, there will be very little to stop us. Niemijn has in fact fallen today and a link has been formed with our first airborne division. It is estimated that some 100,000 German troops are between our forces and the Dutch coast.

I have given Dick a copy of Hart's note on the amalgamation of ourselves and Section V. He is going to study it and we hope to discuss it on Saturday.

Dick was not able to make any progress in Brussels with regard to the appointment of Brook Booth. He felt that the atmosphere was for the moment too confused. He intends to try again a little later when the page has settled down.

I told him that there was already a necessity for some similar appointment in Paris to deal (a) with renegades and (b) with intelligence generally and liaison with the French. Doubtless there will be strenuous opposition to any such appointment from SIS although as at present constituted they cannot possibly carry our problems. I have asked Dick to find out about the course to CI officers which McDermott has asked us to give in Brussels. He had never got my telegram on the subject.

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Lastly I told him about the difficulties we were having with the American Army Group in getting bodies back here in an orderly fashion. If he could look into this matter when he got to Paris it might be a good thing.

Bonnefous came in to pay his respects and to tell me that he was shortly leaving for Paris. He will however leave behind several officers who will continue the liaison with ourselves. He seemed to be very appreciative of all we had done and hoped that we could keep in close touch and appoint an officer for liaison purpose in Paris. I said we should be very glad to do this if we could possibly obtain the necessary authority, since at the moment Paris as a station was outside our sphere.

Philip came in to see me. Since he left here he has been working in NID6 at Oxford. I asked him how far he regarded the work of his dept as being of value and what its limitations were. He said that basically they worked on directories, photographs sent in by the public, and guide books. Information supplied by individuals unless they happened to be technicians in some particular line, was generally of doubtful value. He said this was not surprising since if anyone were to ask him to give information about the supply of gas, electricity and water in the city of Oxford where he had lived all his life nearly, he would be completely at sea. Equally he would not be able to give width of the roads or the strength of the bridges. Nevertheless it seems that the reports put in by NID6 have been of value in Italy, but people like Philip who have accurate

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minds would infinitely prefer to cut out much in these reports which is doubtful. NID6 are now trying to work up a report on Japan. This is an extremely difficult matter owing to the paucity of any information regarding that country. I asked Philip what he thought would be the value of NID6 in peace time. He said that there was obviously an attempt to carry on the organisation by certain interested parties.

He himself however felt that it would be a pure waste of time and money to keep expensive records about all towns, ports, railways, roads etc in all foreign countries where we might conceivably be engaged in war, at some distant date. On the other hand he agreed with me that some record of the machinery and method of working employed by NID6 which could be put into operation about Munich-time would be of value. Meanwhile the show should be disbanded.

The D. G. has had a letter from Duff, I think inspired by Victor, suggesting that Cussen should go over to Paris to discuss the security of the PM's visit there some time next month.

I pointed out to the D.G. that while I thought Cussen might be able to ascertain through Paillote of the 2eme bureau the general state of law and order in the country and the reliability of the Prefecture and Surete, he could not very well go further since the protection of the PM was essentially an SB responsibility. If the PM or the King and Queen were visiting Paris in peace time it would be for Canning to get into touch with the Prefecture and Surete in order to make the necessary arrangements. He would of course send officers over

with the PM. If we tried to interfere in this and something went wrong we should be held responsible for a matter which we in fact were quite powerless to control. The DG thoroughly appreciated this point.

September 22nd

I dined at 020 last night. Stephens seems a little worried by the vagaries of Ken Johnso. and Maunsell in regard to his future. He is working with Rawlinson to set up some joint establishment in Germany under CCMS. He wants to feel that he is still an officer of MI5 and can have direct access to us when he wants to. I said that I did not think there would be the slightest difficulty in this but that we had made a great point of telling the Army that when we lent them personnel they were for all purposes in the Army. At the same time we had made it clear that we felt we had the right to say from time to time that we thought this or that officer should either return to HQ or be employed on duties where his services and experience were urgently required. We had established for ourselves quite a name in military circles owing to the contribution we had made to the Second Front and the value of our organisation and officers seem to be thoroughly appreciated. I did not think therefore that he would meet with any difficulties, and that if he intimated that any particular case was of interest to MI5 his wishes would be respected. SIS on the other hand had got themselves a bad name in the army because they always wished to flout

army authority and advertise their independent status. This had led to many difficulties, and to their being regarded with some suspicion. It was important that we should avoid falling into the same trap.

Stephens had a small complaint about the difficulties he was experiencing in producing a report in 5 days concerning agents who have been brought back from the field. He said that by the time he got the property etc. this period was often reduced to about 2 days and that his officers were in consequence having to work very long hours. Apart from this he thought that the practice was a rather dangerous one since a man might quite well tell one story and at a later stage in the interrogation say that he had been lying and begin all over again. I said that I would look into this but that the principle reason was that the armies in the field were anxious to get in the shortest possible time any information which might lead to the apprehension of other spies or the disclosure of sabotage dumps. There was a danger that if we did not give them some interim report on these lines they would not deliver up the bodies at all.

I spoke to the D.G. about Courtney Young going to France to clear up the tag-ends of the Stella LONSDALE case. He has agreed to this.

Roger has given me his views on the suggested amalgamation between ourselves and Section V and Section IX. He agrees that counter-espionage

subversive movements and security should hang together. He feels however that if SIS take over F.Division they would be extremely embarrassed by the extent to which F.Division activities are likely to come out in the open at any time. He thinks that SIS should not attempt to study communism abroad without the extremely important and in fact major contribution on the subject which is bound to come from this country and may well affect the F.O. far more than the possibility of a revolution in Brazil or Paraguay. He does not think however that the H.O. would ever tolerate the placing of subversive movements under the F.O. He thinks, and I agree, that much could be achieved if an offensive and defensive organisation were established, under separate heads but in the same building and working to one registry. His suggestion is a building with exits on two different streets. SIS would have their entrance in one street and ourselves in another and both would meet in the centre of the building. I said that I thought that SIS would say that it was dangerous for them to be in the same building as ourselves but that such fears would be groundless since the C.P. always know where SIS are through following the couriers and delivery vans.

I talked to Cheney about the seamen's index. Horrocks and the D.G. and Adam have over the weekend decided to discontinue it though no further reference has been made either to Brook-Booth or myself. While I feel that this was the wrong way of doing things, and rather

typically D.4, I feel that probably on balance the work imposed on the SCOs in keeping crew lists up to date was probably not justified at the moment when staffs were being depleted to meet the requirements of SHAEF and SEAC. The index Cheney thinks should be kept and not destroyed for at least 2 or 3 years as it will provide something in the nature of a starting point for enquiries.

○ had a further discussion with TAR about the amalgamation scheme with SIS. He still hankers after carrying secret counter-intelligence duties abroad. I am quite sure that this might have certain advantages in that the work would probably be better done but there would be a disadvantage for our people who would be attempting to make overt liaison with our opposite numbers abroad, by placing them in an awkward position. Further it is open to the objection that you cannot have two organisations carrying out clandestine activities abroad. The only conditions under which such a thing could be done would be a total amalgamation. TAR thought therefore that

perhaps we ought to go for total amalgamation. This led me to think that tactically there might be something to be said for telling SIS that from the point of view of production of intelligence we thought the case for total amalgamation was unanswerable, that we would be quite prepared to see it brought about provided the ministerial authorities would agree. At the same time we felt quite convinced that they would not, for certain reasons put forward in our memo. The advantage of this of course would be that we should put go

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forward with SIS instead of being immediately thrown into opposition. If scheme 1 is thrown out, it will be thrown out by the great ones who will realise that both C. and ourselves consider the present state of affairs unsatisfactory. This would inevitably lead to some sort of enquiry and arbitration. If on the other hand we go forward with our own scheme in opposition to SIS they will probably want to know what it is, pull it to pieces and have the whole thing sat on by Eden or the PM. Our great difficulty is of course that the DG will hotly oppose scheme 1.

I had a talk with Stopford. He evidently suffers from a slight feeling that his qualifications

are not being full use of. I explained to him that he went away from the office just at a time when it was in a somewhat fluid state and that he came back when it had crystallised. Also there were many people like Hart, Milmo etc. who were people of great ability but had stayed on here doing important but perhaps not very high ranking work. I was surprised that they had stayed, but for some reason best known to themselves they had. A minor point that had apparently worried Stopford was that Gwyer's book had been published without ever being passed to him for his observations. He evidently thought that he could have made some contribution though precisely what I do not know. This discussion arose on my asking him whether he wished to take any part in the answer there is that if he can get a job which he thinks will give

him scope and rank he would probably be prepared to go but if not he would I think go back to his own job in the city. I said that I would speak to Maunsell and suggest that an interview could be arranged. He could then state his terms. I thought he might be well advised to get them quite clear from Maunsell, and the job he was to do and rank he would hold. This might be difficult at the moment since the whole organisation was in a somewhat fluid state. Stopford is quite an able fellow but is rather a lone hand, jealous of his own preserves, somewhat dogmatic, and does not appear to get on very easily with other people.

September 23rd

Dick came in to see me before going off to Paris. We first discussed the position of Gisda. Dick will find out whether there is any chance of getting her into uniform for the use of CCMS.

Joe Stephenson is wanted for the Civil Security section of SHAEF. I told Dick he would have to write a letter to the D.G.

While in Paris he will try and get the necessary approval for Courtney to go to France in order to clear up the Stella LONSDALE case.

Peter Hope who apparently thinks he has been forgotten at the LRC is to be seen by Maunsell as a prospective candidate for C.C.M.S. Stopford is also to see Maunsell.

We then considered Herbert's memo on the amalgamation of Section V and ourselves. Dick was in general agreement that we should do well to agree with Arnold-Foster that total amalgamation was undoubtedly the best remedy for the difficulties of the present situation in so far as the collection, collation and distribution of information were concerned, but that from soundings that we had taken we were confident that the proposition would be turned down by the Ministers, and that we should find it difficult if not impossible to get the U.G. to put it forward. Nevertheless if "C" liked to put it forward to the responsible authority we personally would not mind. As an alternative however we should try and get Arnold-Foster to agree to reorganising on offensive and defensive lines.

In a paper produced by the JIC, the DMI has given his views on what measures should be put in force to co-ordinate intelligence after the war. He thinks that JIC London should be constituted as at present with C. and a representative of the Security Service as members. Its responsibility would include SIS, SIGINT, Economic Intelligence and Geographical Intelligence. Intelligence within the British Commonwealth would be co-ordinated in London. JIC London would consider the world as a whole, and issue general statements on policy to regional JICs. It would also ensure the dissemination of detailed intelligence. It would maintain contact with JIC Washington and with allied intelligence organisations. The Dominions would have their own intelligence

organisations also in touch with London. Regional JICs would be established in Cairo, Delhi, Canberra and Ottawa, on the London model, with a representative of "C". No mention is made of counter-intelligence. DMI also envisages dominion representatives on all JICs.

September 24th

Sniper has been promised a transmitter by the Germans in 10 days time. His future employment either here or in France has to be considered. Harmer is being asked whether he wishes to have him in France.

Baydur, the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, is to be replaced by Salmi Sarper. Before leaving he had an interview with the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vishinsky. He told V. that he had observed that Soviet circles had not always been getting clear and accurate information about Turkey and that this had led to misunderstandings. As an example Baydur mentioned that the view had been expressed in the Moscow press that Turkey's non-aggression pact with Germany was an action designed to safeguard the German Army's right flank. Baydur said that the action of his country had merely been designed to defend its national security against a very powerful and aggressive state, which at that time was in a dominating position in central Europe and the Balkans. He concluded his remarks by saying "And Moreover you yourselves signed a treaty with the Germans for the same reason, and before we did."

Vishinsky merely replied that the reason for for theirs was wellknown and passed on to another point. He complained that people in Turkey had rejoiced when the Russians were retreating. Baydur said that this merely meant that some people held different views from the majority. This was not surprising in a nation of 20 millions. It seemed to him too that in Soviet Russia the public trials in the past had been an indication that even important personages had held views contrary to the policy of the Soviet Govt. When such things happened the Turks did not say "Everybody in Russia thinks like that". V. replied "Yes, in our country we do not permit people to go against general conceptions. If they do we punish them". The Turk said "We do the same in so far as our constitution permits". V. then touched on the Turkish attitude to the war. He said that Turkey could have helped by entering the war. Baydur said that Turkey could not have entered the war since it was a nation which had to make war and not an government. Democratic governments were bound to keep in view the nation's desire in the matter of entering war. Turkey would defend her frontiers but there were many political and military considerations to be taken into account. He could not assume the responsibility of dragging her country into war unprepared.

In the event of Rankin B or C conditions coming into force, SOE have been assigned a number of tasks involving the rendering of assistance to the allied commander. They are to furnish means of communication with local resistance

leaders and civil authorities, to assist in preventing civil war and excesses by the populace especially the partisans, to furnish local information regarding ports, airfields, roads rails etc. and to booby-traps and other preparations left by the enemy, to assist in preventing the destruction of naval, air and communication facilities and also public utilities, to provide additional information to C.I. regarding undesirables, to assist in the recovery of escaping allied P/W, and to prevent the escape of German or collaborationist officials, to preserve records useful to the occupying forces and machinery of technical value.

A CX report gives an account of plans for a post-war German resistance movement. The main centre is to be in Styria but the Tyrol will also be a stronghold. The organisation is in the hands of Bormann. Partisan groups are being trained and are being entrusted with stores of poison gas for hiding. It is realised that the active resistance can only be temporary and that the main work consists in laying the foundations of a secret organisation intended to operate years hence. The immediate objectives are to prevent any group of Germans from overthrowing the present regime so that the idea can be spread that Germany never capitulated and that the struggle goes on. A further objective is to make sure that Hitler disappears in time and cannot be traced, whether in reality alive or dead, in order to maintain the legend of his existence which must be kept going at all costs for the next

20 years or more. The whole organisation is being run by Himmler and is said to number about 25,000 all of whom have taken over the identity papers of harmless non-Nazi Germans killed in air raids and have moved away from their places of domicile thus rendering tracing them difficult. A number of members of this force is to concentrate on attacks on pro-allied Germans rather than on the allied occupation forces themselves.

D.M.I. has put up a paper on military security policy after the German surrender. He thinks that security should be maintained in so far as it is necessary to safeguard (a) future operations against Japan (b) forces occupying Germany, operations against resistance, the liquidation of German secret and political organisations and the military administration (c) secret tactics, methods and equipment which would be of value to any other power. The order of battle should not be compromised to the extent of revealing the forces to be employed against Japan, revealing the degree of our successes in building up a notional order of battle. This will involve keeping secret until the surrender of Japan the order of battle of forces remaining in Germany and the order of battle of allied forces in the UK. The present standards of security should in general be maintained for secret equipment, methods and tactics. It may also be found necessary to safeguard information about German weapons which may be used by the allies against the Japanese.

A J.I.C. appreciation of the enemy situation in the Pacific states that Japan desires to avoid war with the USSR in order to be free to direct her energies against her enemies. As a result of their fundamental beliefs the morale of the Japanese populace and especially of the armed forces has remained relatively high, but a continuing series of sharp defeats will tend further to confuse and disrupt the Japanese. Such defeats joined with the collapse of Germany might conceivably cause a re-shuffle of the ruling clique followed by an attempt to secure a negotiated peace. Japanese propaganda has already shifted from the offensive to the defensive. Production of high priority armaments and items such as aircraft may continue to expand for some time even if the rapid growth of Japan's basic industry has been levelling off since the beginning of 1944. A further substantial growth of the Japanese steel and other basic industries is believed impossible, in the light of the present Japanese shipping position. Shipping is now barely adequate to assist current

production rates in the basic industries and sinkings exceed launchings. Japan is continuing to develop raw material sources in the inner zone (Japan proper, Korea, Manchuria, North China, Formosa and Japanese Sakhalin) in an attempt to achieve self-sufficiency but is unlikely to achieve this goal. She is particularly dependent on the outer zone for oil. Her present stocks are estimated at sufficient for about 9 months possibly less. Any other raw materials not available in sufficient quantity in the inner zone Japan is

believed to have stock-piles to carry her for longer periods. Her food supplies are stringent but not yet critical. Other commodities, e.g. clothing, are deteriorating. On the military side Japan has been compelled to adopt the strategical defensive. She hopes that she may wear the allies out and conclude a satisfactory peace. Her Air Force has deteriorated in quality of personnel and her navy has suffered serious losses. Only her ground forces have maintained their strength and fighting qualities. She will make desperate efforts to resist any allied penetration of her inner defence line, Japan, Formosa, Luzon and Mindanao.

A meeting of the HDE on the subject of renegades took place last week. The military have undertaken to hold renegades captured in their area. The H.O. have refused to legislate. It has however been pointed out to them that by detaining renegades in a military camp in France they will not necessarily escape the odium of the House of Commons. The Home Secretary may possibly raise the matter in the Cabinet.

I dined with Walter Bell last night. He tells me that OSS are recruiting what they consider to be likely German P/Ws with the idea of putting them across the lines as soon as our forces enter Germany. They want to train these P/Ws in this country and are anxious that they should avoid the LRC. I suggested to Walter that he should try and persuade OSS of the futility of such operations. Firstly it is

extremely unlikely that suitable candidates would be found although quite a number may volunteer. They will have to be carefully trained and to be any use would have to have wireless sets. The average German P/W, having had a really difficult time, would either report himself to the nearest German military commander or go quietly home. He would have nothing to gain by acting as a traitor to his country, and even if he did operate it is very unlikely at this stage that he would be able to tell the allied authorities anything worth while. The probability is that he would be used for deception by the Germans. Hence no reliance could ever be placed in anything these agents said. The whole thing strikes me as being a typical OSS project designed solely as an attempt to justify the existence of their organisation.

Kliemann of Alst Paris, the spy master of Treasure and Brutus, has been captured. He is to be brought over here. He is to be the prisoner of M.I.19 but we shall supply material for his interrogation. They have also got the brother of his mistress. Both of them were caught in Paris. There is some idea that Kliemann had mixed up in the plot to murder Hitler and that for this reason he thought it better to stay where he was than to attempt to go back to Germany.

September 25th

Horrocks wants to amalgamate B.4a and F.3 on the basis that both are dealing with renegades. While this is true, that the emphasis has changed from espionage to renegades to a certain degree, B.4a still nevertheless have to go on dealing with P/Ws who have been in contact with the German I.S. which is solely a D.interest. Apart from this B.4a deals entirely with the military and Seymer would have to go on doing this work. Horrocks is I think thinking mainly of a tidy chart. Personally I think that as long as Shelford and Seymer are in close touch, which is now ass red through Shelford coming up to London, it would be better to leave things as they are. BLD/UK are also concerned with renegades though more as a filter than as a section dealing with cases. I have discussed this matter with Shelford and Seymer who appear to be indifferent about the proposed change. Both agree that the work will have to go on in the same way as before.

Briscoe and Jimmy Dickson had their party over the weekend. It was suggested to the victim who was to assist in picking apples that he would be well-advised to put on an old pair of trousers. This he accordingly did. Meanwhile Briscoe did a bit of high precision work which should give us all the data that we require.

I discussed with Baxter the Information Index. We propose to incorporate certain cards at SHAEF and with the armies in the field plus records about spies and collaborationists from the U.S. 7th Army. The index so completed will act as a useful check against collaborationists coming here who wish to evade arrests and for reference by allied governments who are trying to clear up their various cases on the continent. We feel that the index should be kept for about 5 years and that at the end of that period only such cards as have been in action in the interim should be included in the main index. This is only a provisional view since it is difficult at the moment to see all the uses to which it might be put.

Arnold Foster came to see me. He was evidently rather perturbed by what he thought was a volte-face by Dick White and Butler, following what he thought was an agreed policy. He wanted to know what had prompted this. I said that I thought it was pure reflection on the whole question. In reality I did not think that our views were so divergent. We all agreed that the present arrangement was unsatisfactory and that to put it right either Section V should come to us or we should go to SIS. We agreed that total amalgamation would be ideal from the purely intelligence point of view but we were rather appalled by the obstacles that we should meet in putting such a proposal forward. I had taken certain soundings and was quite convinced that in many high quarters any such suggestion would be vetoed. What then would happen to the scheme. "ould it just be

thrown into the WPB in the same way that has happened during the last 25 years on every occasion when such a proposal has been mooted. I did not wish to prejudice what in my view was the next best thing, a division into offensive and defensive and the abolition of the 3-mile limit. Arnold-Foster seemed to think that the objections on a high level were not really valid and that if we went forward together there was at least a reasonable chance of being considered. I said that this might be so but we should be up against a very great difficulty in getting the D.G. to make a serious proposal on these lines. Arnold-Foster went back to his old arguments that we could not possibly get the benefits from the SIS machine unless we were part of it. I said that I thought this view was in a way more apparent than real. To my mind the worst factor of this war had been the ruling that we were to conduct all our business through Section V instead of talking to the people who were actually doing the particular job in question. A liaison section was all right when an organisation was expanding. Once it had settled down it could have no meaning. Any representative could come and see anybody in this office. The same had never been the case in the opposite sense. We had always been forced to deal through a bottle-neck and not a very good one at that. The result had been stagnation. We had gradually broken this down in a number of ways. For example we had now got direct liaison with GC & CS which had been of the greatest value to us and also to them. All this seemed to me purely a matter of administration. What I could understand much more

easily was the psychological difficulty of getting information out of anybody who handled agents, and that in that sense I could understand his arguments. Arnold-Foster did not seem prepared to accept our alternative scheme at any rate in toto. He did not like the idea of the removal of counter-espionage from SIS or of a controlling section put in by us into SIS to direct the activities of SIS agencies abroad. He thought this would meet with considerable opposition, but precisely why I did not ascertain. I said that if total amalgamation were not accepted I felt that our scheme at least provided more logical division of functions than the present arrangements which were chaotic. At this stage I had to go to a meeting called by the DG. I told Arnold Foster however that I should like to come over and see him again this week to continue the discussion and decide precisely how we were to go forward with our proposals.

The D.G. called a meeting to discuss the D.M.I.s paper on future security requirements. We are agreed that the essential D.R.s should remain in force until Stage B. It was merely a matter of their application. If the D.M.I.s requests were to be fully implemented clearly the D.O. would have to maintain a more strenuous control over travel than they at present contemplated. The dangers could however be very largely mitigated if the government brought pressure upon all neutrals to sever diplomatic relations with the Japanese. This would pretty well hamstring the Jap I.S. such as it is and make rapid communication of information either from here

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or the USA an extremely difficult task. We decided to put this view forward and also to recommend that when the Chiefs of Staff had reached their final decision their paper should be discussed by the HDE.

September 26th

Lord Gort came to discuss ISPAL I with Kellar. He was anxious that one of his P.A.s should be put into the picture. I said I thought this was highly desirable but since we had so much trouble about this project of which C. was the custodian I felt that it would be as well for Gort to take the matter up himself direct with C. Gort said that he would be going back to Palestine shortly. He was only held up on account of the PMs absence. Before leaving he was anxious to know whether any matters relating to the future of Palestine had been agreed on at Quebec.

I attended a meeting of the J.I.C. to discuss the D.M.I.s paper on future security requirements. I said that I thought that if a directive on this matter could be obtained from the Chiefs of Staff it would be for Sir Findlater Stewart's committee to work out the details with the govt. depts. concerned. Meanwhile I thought it would be worth exploring the possibility of bringing pressure to bear on neutrals after Stage A to sever diplomatic relations with Japan. This would reduce the security risks by at least 75%. Cavendish-Bentinck wondered whether it would be necessary to expel the Jap Embassies or whether

a withdrawal of their privilege to use bags and cypher would be sufficient. I said that I thought it would not since they might quite easily get some other power to carry their traffic. C. then raised the question of Jap B.J.s which of course would cease. He said that he would like time to consider whether the intelligence value of these B.J.s outweighed the security risks.. My own recollection is that very few of them are really of value except the Berlin traffic but I have asked Courtney to look into this. There is also the deception angle to be considered. If there are no Jap Embassies there will be no channels through which to pass deception. Cavendish-Bentick thought that we should have to leave the Jap Embassy in Switzerland and and we might therefore also leave the one in Afghanistan which from the deception point of view was the most important since it controlled the Silver case.

We have been asked to prepare a paper showing what security measures will be necessary to give effect to the D.M.I.s paper (a) if the Jap Embassies in neutral countries are turned out and (b) if they are not. We have also been asked to state what the effect of (a) or (b) is likely to be on man-power. A propos of this I said I did not think there was likely to be very much difference since travel control was being maintained for other reasons as well as security reasons, and that therefore the requisite personnel would have to be retained. We were retaining all the basic DRs until Stage B. It was only a matter of to what degree they should be applied.

Naumann, Vice-Minister for Propaganda in Germany, has had a conversation with the Jap on the various problems with which Germany is now faced. It was made clear that while peace with England or America was out of the question Germany would not be averse to peace with Russia, if a favourable opportunity had occurred. It was mentioned that Hitler had specially refrained from putting Vlasov's army into the field as he felt that once he had done so he would be unable to get rid of these people if the situation suddenly underwent a change. Naumann said that Goebbels, Himmler, Speer and Bormann were now in complete agreement as regards the conduct of the war and were the persons mainly responsible for its prosecution. Himmler and Goebbels both were anxious to see Naumann. It appears that Rundstedt has again been appointed to command the armies in the west. Those on the German right wing are under Model and on the left wing under Blaskowitz. Rundstedt is apparently regarded as a soldier without political views.

Horrocks, Bird, Kellar and I had a discussion about the post-war Black List. First of all we agreed that the main purpose of the list was firstly to prevent undesirables coming to British territory and secondly to give us a clue to the movements of undesirables and the business cover under which they were working. We then considered the German problem. We felt that the most satisfactory way of dealing with this would be if Passport Control in Germany or CCMS could refer all visa applications for Germans to go abroad to this country. It would also be necessary to tie up this procedure with our

allies. It was suggested that I should discuss this matter with Jeffies. The type of German who will be of most interest will be the ex-Abwehr or SD man who is opening up international trade relations. If he goes abroad he should immediately be put on the world-wide list. Other Germans of interest will be those reported as having got out to Switzerland, Spain, the Argentine or other suitable countries. If they have an intelligence background they should also go on to the world list. It follows from this that there is no particular point at this moment in trying to list any Germans, that is provided the Control Commission or Passport Control are prepared to refer back here before granting visas.

We then passed on to other nationalities. We felt that collaborationists from former occupied territory were unlikely to be of particular interest. They would only be interesting when they had formed some sort of a party, overt or underground which was trying to establish contact with people in this country.

Kear had in mind certain types which might be found in the Mid East, such as Persians acting for the Russians, Arabs and Jews. They should be listed on a highly selective basis. We all agreed that important international communists or communists likely to travel should also form part of the list.

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Roger came to talk to me about taking over B.4a and the formation of a renegade section under Shelford. I said that in my view there was bound to be over-lapping between B and A Division that Seymer would have to deal with the military, that some of his work still had a B. Division interest and that much of it had not got a renegade interest. It seemed to me therefore that it would be better on the whole for things to continue as they were. For some reason or other Roger seems to attach considerable store to getting Seymer and Shelford into the same room, but he agrees with me that the case had better be put to the D.G. for a decision.

September 27th

There are two operations contemplated on the SEAC front, one north and one south. There appears to be a certain amount of doubt as to whether either of these can be mounted before the monsoon period. Much depends upon the forcing of the west wall, and the general feeling is that this must be a priority consideration.

Hungarian representatives have arrived in Italy to discuss armistice terms. By request, we are sending a representative to discuss the Slovak army

and partisans in Czechoslovakia who have risen. It is I gather being done rather secretly without the knowledge of the Russians, who are very touchy about our having anything to do with Czechoslovakia. The Russians have taken 3 strips of Finland, the Petsamo area and two strips on the eastern frontier running into the gulf of Finland. They do not want Hanko but are taking Porvo, an island 15 miles east of Helsinki. The Germans have developed the nickel production of Finland to 9-10,000 tons a year, and when they lose this their other reserves have only a yield of 1,000 tons.

At Brest all unloading facilities are unusable. There is a 400 ft gap in the harbour. At Doulogne 26 craft were sunk and all the berths fouled by cranes etc. It is estimated that only 1,200 fit men are left out of the 8,000 odd of the first Airborne division. In assessing what has happened at Arnhem it was said that on the liability side we had (1) failed to gain the Arnhem bridge and (2) suffered very heavy casualties, while on the asset side, by holding the place, especially for the last 48 hours, we had prevented much heavier attacks on our corridor and against Nijmegen, where the bridge we did capture was the most important of all. The non-capture of the Arnhem bridge does not prevent development of our operations against Germany.

I dined with Noble and Sloane last night. Sloane seemed in very good form and was clearly looking forward to returning to his native land. He talked a great deal about Russia. He thought

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Benes' policy had been a very wise one. He was quite certain that Russia had no designs on Czechoslovakia either territorial or in the sense of creating a communist revolution. Stalin realised that fundamentally the Czechs were anti-communist and individualist barring a small clique of intellectuals. He also realised that their cultural ties were more with the west than with the east. Stalin was glad to have friendly relations with Czechoslovakia which he regarded not as a menace to his security but as a link with western Europe. Sloane was well aware that Stalin was a completely unscrupulous man but taking the realist view of the situation he did not think that Russia would in any way constitute a menace to his country. Sloane was sorry for the Poles and he thought that they were extremely ungeschickt in all political matters. They had no able political leaders. They always seemed to say the wrong thing at a critical moment. Whatever the facts of the Katyn murders might be, it would have been much better if the Poles had kept silent. Equally Sosnowski's recent performance in blaming the British for the Warsaw situation could not possibly have been more tactless. Sloane was quite sure that the Russians in taking the Curzon line had calculated that it would be difficult for the British to argue against it since they had in fact created it and what was more important Stalin had calculated that if the Poles could be induced to take a piece of Germany in compensation it would throw them permanently into the arms of Russia and drive a wedge between them and the Germans for all time. He thought that if the Poles were wise they would take a little of Germany as they possibly could since

whatever was done in the way of moving the population the matter would rankle permanently in the German minds and might well be the cause of a future war.

Sloane was not worried about the Sudeten problem. He thought that the really hot Nazis would disappear of their own accord and that all those who were of Czech origin would wish to claim Czech citizenship.

The M.E.W. representative at the British Embassy in Madrid on the 10th August draws attention to the case of one KNIPPING who is a representative of H.A. BRASSART & Co. of Berlin, who is in turn a branch of the American concern of that name. There is also a branch in London. KNIPPING has been in Spain about 2 years and has also travelled frequently to Gijon and Oviedo. He is primarily a technician. The MEW representative states that men of this kind hold key positions in firms for which they work and when they become attached to firms in neutral countries, whether there is any German capital interest or not, the firm's activities are virtually controlled by them. A considerable influx of these people is being noted of late. They are chemists, engineers and laboratory workers, all working in Spanish technical industrial concerns where they will be safe from allied supervision after the war, where they will have access to equipment enabling them to carry on research work for their German principles and where they can plot and plan to their hearts' content. It is not much good controlling Germany synthetic engineering and chemical plants if all the scientists have slipped abroad and are

carrying on under cover for the day when another Adolf decides that the German army was never beaten and it is about time to have another go. As an instance of this, it is pointed out that a few days ago some high German officials arrived in Madrid to consult with a wellknown lawyer about the formation of a Spanish company to take over certain German patents. They are prepared to put all the capital in the hands of Spanish nominees and comply with any requirements of the Spanish law so long as they can safely get these patents out of Germany. They made no bones about the fact that it was because they were beaten. Schoring are pushing ahead with plans to develop Quimica Espanola. German technicians are developing the shale oil project at Puertollano. Lurgi sent out their specialists on furnaces. KNIPPING arrives to hold up the banner of Brassarts of Berlin. Und so weiter. Apart from the looted property, Germany may not have so much capital to smuggle abroad after this war, but she does have a considerable amount of intellectual capital which she is clearly not going to allow to fall into allied hands if she can help it. These technicians are dangerous. Apart from the comparative professional freedom which they will enjoy abroad after the war they form the nucleus of an intelligence organisation which is always a source of potential trouble and in the interests of all concerned it might be well to keep the closest possible eye on their activities.

A report from Italy dated 16th September states that 7 agents have been captured in Italy during the past week, 5 in the forward area and 2 on the

lines of communication. All had espionage missions on behalf of the Abwehr. Two were apprehended in Leghorn on their way to Naples to ascertain the preparations of amphibious operations against the Ligurian or north Adriatic coast. The case of one of the others, a woman named Anna SPATA, is of interest as showing the difficulty of preventing infiltration under refugee cover. SPATA and a male companion were despatched on 8th August from Milan allegedly to report on preparations in the ports of Leghorn, Naples and Salerno for an allied landing in the south of France. They crossed the lines on the 14th August and registered as refugees at San Casciano. The man then proceeded to Rome where he contacted a third agent who was in fact under allied control. He was accordingly arrested on 23th August and interrogated. He had not seen SPATA since they parted at San Casciano. He gave a description and other details which enabled allied security agencies to trace her to Salerno where she was arrested on the 5th Sept. She had been evacuated to Sicily as a refugee. This is a clear indication of what happens when there is no LRC machinery and when attempts are made to catch spies on a purely catch as catch can basis and without any system of controls. All this of course has been put to Hill-Dillon more than once. He was offered Taylor to get this on its feet, but turned the offer down. In Florence the head of the OVRA in Tuscany has been captured. 5 further stay-behind agents of the Abwehr have been arrested by the American 7th Army in Nice, Monaco and Draguignan. All except one, a Luxemburger, are of French nationality. It seems apparent that the rupture of diplomatic relations

between Turkey and Germany took place before the conclusion of Nazi plans to leave agents behind. It is believed that all agents are now either known or are remaining in hiding, without directives. At Adana German intelligence activities are virtually at an end.

September 28th

I had a conference this morning with B-W, TAR

Buster and Courtney. B-W thinks that we should put someone permanently into the War Room, since otherwise he does not see any hope of our getting what we want. I pointed out to him that we had previously had Hart in the War Room but that he came to the conclusion that there was nothing he could do to improve the rather lamentable organisation and apart from that there was very little of any importance going into the War Room at all. Some weeks ago B-W himself and Kim Philby had come over to tell me that they proposed to close the War Room down mainly I gathered in order to provide an excuse for getting rid of the Americans who were hanging round and were merely an embarrassment. After they had gone, something in the nature of a war room would be re-constituted in the German Section. B-W told me that this idea had been turned down by Felix whose pet babies were the War Room and the Purple Primers. Meanwhile the War Room had been staffed to a large extent by people who had not the slightest idea what they were doing, and reports which came in often went astray and were not properly distributed. He thought that the only way of meeting this situation was to have our own man on the spot

who could tactfully exercise the necessary direction. Buster complained that practically nothing came through from the War Room and as far as he could make out there was nothing there. Occasionally a very inadequate wire was received about an arrest but there was never sufficient in it to say whether it was worth having the body over or not. He presumed that if a man had been arrested he must have been interrogated and that there must be a report somewhere. Such reports never seemed to come through.

B-11 explained the life of an SCI unit in the field under present conditions. "A considerable amount of time was spent in getting food, mending jeeps, getting accommodation, getting in touch with the nearest signals station etc. Once this had been got over streams of people were sent to the SCI unit many of whom were of no importance and who normally should be dealt with by the indigenous organisation or by the officer representing the P. Sections, who could rarely be found. Then a message would be received, as was in fact the case, that a Belgian spy had come in with a wireless set. The local police were not particularly interested in him and had passed him on to the Air Force Police, who not knowing what to do at told him to go home and report himself regularly to the police and in the meantime to keep in touch with the Germans. A case of this kind needed a good deal of sorting out. The SCI units were primarily responsible to the Army HQ for keeping the area clean of any spies who were actually operating. Once therefore they had got a man into the collar they passed on to another area. Buster pointed out that in so doing they were not getting the

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benefit of any records here which might assist them to arrest other people within the zone of the armies. This was generally admitted. It seemed clear that what was required was somebody of the calibre of John Mair to control the SCI unit at the army level. It is presumably too late now to get anything like this done even if the necessary personnel were available. Secondly it seemed desirable that there should be an MI5 officer in Brussels attached to Capage and one in Paris attached to the 2eme Bureau. There would be ample justification both on military grounds and on grounds of cleaning up our own cases and lastly in order that there might be someone to handle the cases of British renegades. Meanwhile I think we should, in order to maintain our rights and possibly get better service, put Joe Stephenson into the War Room if for no other reason than to ascertain what the present position is and whether there is anything that could usefully be done. It was agreed that we should put forward a memo stating our reasons for having someone in Brussels and Paris and then consult with Dick about how it could best be put over. Probably the simplest thing would be for the demand to come from SHAEF. Whichever way we handle it there is bound to be a storm from Felix who will regard this manoeuvre as the thin end of the wedge.

I saw Dick last night. His policy seems to be to get all the SCI units ready to deal with the German problem. This means that unless we have officers in Brussels and Paris we shall never be able to give the allied governments the benefit of our records in cleaning up the back areas and

lines of communication. Dick has apparently had something of a row with Maunsell. There was a discussion between Kenneth Strong, Maunsell and Dick on Sunday, when Dick felt bound to point out that he thought R.J.'s plans for CCMS were conceived on a far too grandiose scale. Dick's idea is that CCMS should finally establish itself at Army Group and should be receiving information from corps and armies. In this way it would gradually build itself up and take control of the whole British area. He thought that this was preferable to going in with a huge organisation at the outset. R.J. then accused Dick of being solely interested in the SHAEF aspect of things up till the time of the hand-over. Dick said that this was absurd. He had no axe to grind whatever and was merely saying what he thought would work out to the best advantage in the long run. Personally I think that Dick is more likely to cut ice with Kenneth Strong than R.J. and there is nothing much to worry about.

Pandora discloses that the Irish have received an offer from the Germans to exchange one Robert Edward Kingston VERNON and other Irishmen at present under sentence of death for certain people whom the Germans propose to name. Presumably this will be GOERTZ & Co. Nothing has come through officially so far. I imagine that this is just a ramp and that the Germans have passed sentences of death on these people in order to bring pressure to bear on us. We shall have to consider how far it really matters to us at this stage of the war if the various German spies in Eire are sent back. Presumably the Eire Govt. will release them as soon as hostilities

cease, and it may be better to get them away to Germany while the going is good. I doubt if they can do us much harm in the present state of affairs. On the other hand the precedent of submitting to blackmail is rather a dangerous one and if successful may be extended to cover people that we have interned here.

John Senter came to see me about Prince WEIKERS-HEIM. I asked him how it was that W. got taken on by OSS. We seemed to be partly to blame in that we had passed him after vetting. There was nothing really against him except that he was one of those who sat on the fence. He had previously had connections with the Nazis but probably owing to the fact that he had property in Germany. He was not however the sort of person whom one would think it wise to employ since he would obviously later on ask for some quid pro quo. It had occurred to me as likely that the OSS were employing him to recruit German P/Ws to be put back across the line. Senter said he would try and find out. He would also try and ascertain what OSS policy was with regard to recruiting P/Ws. I said that if they wanted to bring such people back here we had no objection provided they kept them under detention while in this country. On the other hand it seemed to me that such people could be of very little value at this juncture. Most of them were being used for espionage purposes and been given wireless sets, and then deserted back to the enemy, they would constitute a real menace. On the other hand if they were being put across the lines to commit acts of sabotage, they could not really do us any harm. Senter

told me that SOE policy with regard to Germany had recently been discussed. They too had been recruiting German P/Ws. It was however quite impossible at this moment to get SHAEF to provide any agents over the line. German internal defences were extremely strong. Were an attempt made at this moment to carry out a thousand bomber raid on Berlin the estimate was that we should lose 150 planes. The only planes that could carry out such raids were Mosquitoes. It would be necessary to reduce the enemy's fighter forces considerably before extensive raids into the German hinterland could be carried out from the western front. Hence the only policy of putting agents across was to infiltrate them through the lines.

Senter then told me that SOE were going to maintain a small section in Paris for the purpose of clearing up their own cases. He would let me know the results of any investigations where we had been interested.

A P/W report from one of the Generals states that Goering is completely senile and malicious.

According to Rancke, who was ordered to report to him one day at 2 o'clock, and eventually saw him at 6, "At last when I was called into the room, Goering was sitting there dressed in the following way: a green silk shirt embroidered in gold with gold thread running through it and a large monocle. His hair had been dyed yellow, his eyebrows were pencilled, his cheeks rouged. He was wearing violet silk stockings and black patent pumps. He was sitting there looking like a jellyfish. He never never rose but sat staring in front of him. In

that get-up he dismissed me to return to the front".

One of the German generals has stated that V.2 could not be adapted to aim at the bridgehead in Normandy because it would have taken four weeks to alter the position of the launching sites. The question as to whether this should be ~~done~~ was raised but the decision was given against it.

I had a long talk with Arnold-Foster. I said that

I had come to the conclusion that it would be impossible to get the D.G. to go to the table and argue in favour of one huge united show but that I myself, and I thought Dick and Richard Butler also, were all agreed that a united show provided you could get anybody capable of running it on such a big scale, was, from the point of view of the collection, collation and distribution of information and action taken upon it, the only thing which would remove the evils of the present situation. I should however feel great difficulty in going beyond this or in arguing against the objections which would be raised by ministers and in particular by the H.O. who would feel that the absorption of subversive movements in an organisation which was predominantly an espionage and counter-espionage one might lead to their interests being lost sight of. Another possible objection was that the head of this vast secret service would have to some extent to be a public figure. He would have to be personally acquainted with the C.C.s and also with foreign police and 2eme Bureaux. Foster did not think that this mattered very

much. "A lot of care had been taken over this matter in the past but the representatives of foreign services and their offices were all well-known and we were practically the only country to endeavour to keep the head of the Secret Service and its location in the background. I said that for practical purposes I did not think it mattered at all but that somehow there was an inherent objection in this country to a Secret Service, particularly if it was not kept strictly in the background.

Foster then explained how, if his plans were agreed, he proposed that SIS, basing itself on G C & C S proposed to carry a great deal of the work of the Service Intelligence Depts. It would be carefully integrated with all available information and be served up on a plate. A division of functions between ourselves and SIS would be a reversal of this pattern since we were demanding to do our own collation from the raw product. I said that we could not really be classified with the Service Intelligence Depts. in this matter. Not only were we, like SI, a producer dept but we had to implement executive action by giving advice to govt. depts. in the handling of such information. Foster agreed and said that it was precisely for this reason that he thought we ought to be united with SIS, and co-partners in one organisation. A considerable amount of further discussion took place at the end of which I suggested that we should enumerate the points concerning which we were both agreed: (a) we were both agreed that the present situation was unsatisfactory and some immediate remedy was essential; (b) we felt that the solution lay either in the Security

Service coming in toto to SIS or in Section V and Section IX of SIS joining the Security Service. Foster demurred slightly over the alternative. He wanted to know precisely what this would mean. He agreed that we should have our representatives abroad, for the purpose of overt liaison. He had always thought we had a very good case for having someone in Washington. He agreed that we should have the right to communicate our wishes direct to those who have to carry them out in the field and be informed precisely the circumstances in which information had been obtained in order that we might assess its reliability. He did not think however that we should dictate to stations abroad how they were to carry out their enquiries. He was in some doubt about the feasibility of our having overt liaison officers in some places and not in others. For example he felt that if SIS wanted to have overt liaison with the Paraguay police we might not wish to do so. I said that our wishes were bound to be subject to revision from time to time. We should only be concerned in having overt liaison where a profitable exchange could be made and that this might vary from year to year. We should only be concerned with those countries which would be able to assist us through the exchange of information about a common potential enemy. If we came to the conclusion that overt liaison was no longer profitable because the particular country was alive with one of our potential enemies and was operating against us, any enquiries in that country would have to be tackled by clandestine means. It would fall

within the sphere of SIS. Foster then instanced the Argentine. Who would be responsible for ascertaining that a revolutionary plot against Brazil was being staged by the Argentine. I said that I did not feel that this was really within the sphere of C.E. It would be a straight SIS job. The functions of CE would only relate to potential enemy countries where clandestine activities would have to be covered by SIS and to those countries who were similarly menaced. Foster said he felt that we were getting very near to agreement on the above points and he would try and draft a formula. Lastly I suggested that we might agree on both organisations being housed in the same building with separate entrances and with a joint registry. On this point he seemed to be whole heartedly in agreement. He then read me an extract from a letter which I imagine was addressed to the F.O., in which he had pointed out that there were 9 major problems affecting SIS, which needed some immediate solution. One of these was the relations between SIS and ourselves. He said that Intelligence post-war planning could not be delayed and that some immediate settlement of all these problems was of paramount importance. There was some suggestion of the hearing of witnesses, Whether or not this document is addressed to the Bland Committee or to Sir Alexander Cadogan I don't know. There is no doubt however that Arnold-Foster is as anxious to bring the question of our relations with SIS to a head as we are.

Before leaving I told him that I thought he ought to know that the D.G. had seen Sir John Anderson several weeks ago on the question of finance, in so far as it related to the future commitments of our office as at present constituted. Sir John Anderson had asked him to submit estimates. It was possible that when he saw Sir John again the question of the overlap between ourselves and Section V and possible economies that might be made would come up for discussion.

I dined with Gisela. She has made application to the Red Cross for employment in Germany of an executive kind after the cease fire. She thinks that in moving round she may collect a good deal of useful information. She is to be interviewed by Brig. Ling on this matter on Monday. I said that I would have a word with Rupert and try to get her on to a good wicket. I told her that Dick and I had been discussing the possibility of getting her into uniform in order that she might join CCMS. It was impossible to say at the moment whether this would come off as nobody seemed to know very accurately what would be required. I thought therefore that it might be a good thing for her to take the Red Cross job and possibly to transfer to CCMS later if this could be arranged.

September 29th

the Pope is preparing a memo to be handed to the Great Powers concerning the position of the State of the Vatican

City during the peace negotiations and after the general settlement. The Pope wants a revision of the present territorial boundaries so as to include an air port under direct Vatican authority and a sea port or at least the free use of one. He also wants international guarantee of the State's neutrality and the Vatican's presence at the Peace Table. The Pope is also said to have been negotiating with Russia for a concordat. The Russian Govt. have been showing signs of impatience and ill-humour with the dilatory methods of the Vatican. Contact had been maintained up to the middle of August but had now ceased. The Pope is somewhat disturbed and is endeavouring to establish contact through the Apostolic Delegate in Ankara.

I had a talk with Joe Stephenson today. Dick does not want him at the moment for SHAFF but rather thinks that he should join the CI establishment at a Corps or Army. These establishments have now been largely increased the idea being that at phase 2 C.I. work will filter back from corps to Army Group and that CCMS instead of coming in as a huge community will establish itself at Army Group and gradually take up the running. R.J. on the other hand is inclined to think that he wants Joe to join his staff, but he is going to think this over. I doubt if he is very clear in his own mind as to what Joe would do at the present moment. Meanwhile I should like to make use of Joe either in the War room or to help Kellar who is very hard-pressed.

Joe has written the following notes on C.E. in the Mid East. He says it is intended to call attention to certain facts and not to make points of criticism. The opinions expressed are his own and controversial and he is anxious they should be treated as confidential:

"1. The Mid East has been defended from the attacks of the enemy intelligence services by good luck, by ICE, by double agents, by captured agents, by Turjeys and the Turks and by defectors.

2. ICE has undoubtedly played an important part in building up the general picture and also in warning us of spies to be expected in M.E. It has also given us a picture, now believed to be false, of several large networks of resident spies; the falsity of these reports where checked suggests that they were invented either by venal Levantines or by the Turkish I.S. or by unscrupulous members of the German I.S. The information from this source was usefully but tardily distributed by D. Section I.S.L.D. in a monthly "Parish Magazine"; current items were passed to SIME at first with little appreciation of SIME's requirements or of the difference between facts and deductions, but with increasing confidence and understanding on their part as we explained what we wanted and produced from interrogations results of value to them, without "blowing" their source.

3. Double Agents. (a) There are two facts of importance about the W/T agents played back from M.E. (i) They were all run primarily

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for deception; (ii) they were mainly run by SIME Special Section. CHEESE and SAVAGES (Egypt) and LEMONS (Cyprus) all operated from SIME territory; PEES\$IMISTS and QUICKSILVER were begun by ISLD but their case officer was provided by SIME and received (I speak at second hand) far more assistance from DSO Syria than from any representative of ISLD in Syria. KISS was I suppose controlled by C.I.C.L, but his case officer was provided by SIME and the B. Section of ISLD. ISLD representative in Persia was incapable of making any valuable contribution to his working. The guiding hand controlling all the D.A.s was Major Robertson of SIME Special Section, and he, not ISLD, trained case officers for similar work in Italy and Greece.

(b) There were two ISLD agents, SMOOTH and CRUDE started by and voering Syria wel But the most important agents were run by SIME representatives, namely DOLEFUL, handed over to DSO Turkey by the Turks, and BLACKGUARD, handed over to DSO Turkey by B. Section ISLD representative in Istanbul (this may be wrong but he was certainly run by DSO). DOLEFUL continued to work for the Turks and also most certainly for the Germans; and BLACKGUARD was used primarily to penetrate the Abwehr (ISLD's job) and might perhaps have been better run (ISLD certainly thought so). But the fact remains that DSO ran them, not ISLD.

The indirect view of the C.E. work done by all these controlled agents lay in the fact that the Catalogue Reference KY 4/195 and reduced the need for further spies.

4. Captured Agents. The amount of C.E. information obtained by interrogation from those was great, and the value of the work done by SIME's Interrogation Section in getting it out of them as well as in holding sour ISLD agents, was expressly and handsomely recognised by in a letter to Brig. Maunsell. It was, in my opinion, far superior to what ISLD themselves obtained by kindness either from travelling agents like BRANDLI and GROSS or from defectors like VERMEEREN.

5. Defectors. It was perhaps fortunate that these began with VEERMEREN, when ISLD, still under the influence of , engineered his defection in Istanbul, but applied astonishingly friendly treatment to their capture with deplorable results. It was never applied again. gave SIME every support in treating rats as rats and the results were admittedly better both for security and for intelligence. Information obtained from VERMEEREN ultimately did, however, show how well the Mid East had been covered by controlled agents.

6. Turkey and the Turks have played a part which should not be under-estimated in making the enemy's task of spying on the M.E. more difficult. (a) Turkey is a very large country and it is a great mistake to suppose that an agent who reaches the Turkish-Syrian frontier, whether travelling from or to the M.E., has finished his task. Egypt in particular is a long way from Istanbul, whether you consider it from the point of view of a spy being sent in
Catalogue Reference: KV/4/195 Only W/T can shorten

the route, and it is not easy for a spy to bring a W/T-set into M.E. if he comes by the legal land route. (b) The Turks may have co-operated with the Germans against us as they have against the Russians; they have certainly co-operated with DSO Turkey against the Germans. How far they have co-operated with ISLD I don't know; but I do know that the Turkish I.S. supply D.S.O. Turkey with the personal particulars (usually including a photograph) of nearly every foreigner (i.e. non-Turk) arriving in Istanbul from Europe. The value of these records is high (although ISLD do not always consult SIME for them, as is shown by several gaps in e.g. their Turkish Purple Primer), and the presence of a well-informed SIME outpost at the far side of Turkey is a most powerful aid to anticipating and countering the enemy's moves against M.E.

7. The greatest achievement of SIME seems to me this: that it built up a single organisation covering the whole M.E. with its DSOs. This has made possible the unification of CE activities, though DSOs have, in my view rightly, been left with considerable independence, particularly in CICI where the relationship to SIME is more distant and less definite. But it has ridden rough-shod over territorial divisions and plants DSOs in Turkey, Syria and (through CICI) in Persia where M.I. 6's unit would like to run. In fact ISLD have representatives in Turkey, Syria, Persia, Iraw, Palestine and (a H.Q. only) in Egypt, and B. Section representatives in all those countries except Palestine (withdrawn about a year ago); they have no longer a representative in Cyprus and

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as far as I know have no representation in E. and N. Africa where SIME have 3 DSOs. It would be a step backward if such a unification of SIME for CE as for economic and military purposes, were to disintegrate after the war.

8. I doubt if any member of ISLD in ME with the exception of _____ could have built up such an organisation and I am certain that ISLD could not man it after the war without recruiting from SIME or other bodies the holders of most of its responsible posts. Indeed its lack of good men (both words should be given their full value) is largely responsible for the back seat its B. Section has taken in CE in Mid East."

September 31st

I had a long talk with Dick, mainly about his difficulties with R.J. It has been decreed that the CI-staffs down to corps are to have their establishment increased, with the idea that those who will ultimately go to CCMS will gain experience of German problems and at phase 3 will move over to CCMS. 21st Army Group and American Army Group will each have four armies. Armies and corps will have lists of categories of people to be arrested. When they affect an arrest in one army, all the other 7 armies, two Army Groups and London will be informed. Such interrogation reports as there are will be linked up with records through the War Room, results being returned to Army Group. Cavalry Group Reference No 4195 phase 3 will have fairly complete records of what has been going

on in Germany up to that stage. Dick feels that CCMS should at phase 3 plant itself with a very small staff alongside Army Group and gradually take up the reins. R.J. wants to build up a huge CCMS here with a complete duplication of all the records and then to move himself bodily over to Germany at phase 3. As Dick quite rightly says, this is an unnecessary duplication and with the extra staff required to build up these records, for which purpose R.J. is making a demand to us, is quite unjustifiable. R.J. is becoming a little nasty about this and is beginning to say that he does not think there is room for himself and Dick. Kenneth Strong is weak and cannot make up his mind, but I think and hope that ultimately he will do so, coming down on the right side. Meanwhile R.J. has been trying to canvass the D.G. The D.G. has told him to put his ideas on paper and has asked Dick to do likewise. He is then proposing to deliver judgment. Dick Butler feels that he may be making a mistake since R.J. is quite capable of quoting him to Strong. Strong might then say "This is a decision for me to make and not for the D.G. to meddle in my affairs. It is one thing to express a private opinion to Dick but quite another to say so to R.J. Dick is also going to try and get some sort of joint 5/6 mission going in the principal capitals in Europe. These will be SHAEF mission attached to the various allied 2eme bureaux. This would certainly solve our problem of keeping in touch with the allied govts. and getting our own work done properly.

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Scholtitz, one of the Generals, who was responsible for the defence of Paris and is now a P/W, has given an extraordinary account of an interview that he had with Hitler just before the fall of Paris. He says: "I arrived at

Hitler's H.Q. I took my knife and fork with me, thinking I might have to defend myself. There was an SS man behind every tree - one might say behind every flower. I was called in to the Fuehrer to discuss the defence of Paris, but he started immediately to declare that a moral basis must be created ready to defend itself. (sic). I was to defend Paris by an outer defence ring - 'a completely impenetrable ring round Paris'. Back in Paris after combing out all I could I had 5 battalions for this ring. I had explicit orders to reduce Paris to ruins, but in fact I had no guns, no H.E., only that poisoned arrow rifle (98), and with this I was to set fire to the Louvre and raze the Chambre des Deputes to the ground. I said: 'You give me 5000 men scattered over a city of 5 million inhabitants. As for food I have ten cases of tinned pork.'

Speaking again about his interview with Hitler CHOLTITZ said: "I saw him shortly after the assassination attempt, and he was still rather jaded. I went there and he made me a speech for three quarters of an hour as though I were a public meeting. I went into the room and there he stood, a fat, broken down old man with festering hands. They had been scratched a bit as a result of the attempt on his life, and all the Gauleiters whom he created shortly afterwards, in order to gain fresh courage, all shook hands with him so enthusiastically and trustingly that he got badly festering sores. When I gave him my hand I gave it to him very carefully. I was really almost sorry for him, because he looked horrible. He is bloated now, he has put on 17 lbs. He spoke

to me like a gramophone record of a man stung by a tarantula. With difficulty I succeeded in interrupting him three times. He talked about the Party and how he had struggled for 14 years. He said some words which I seemed vaguely to remember having heard before. He trotted out all that old nonsense. His left eye dropped a little to the left, his right one was fixed very suspiciously on me all the time, because he hates us all like the plague".

Jeff is being interrogated by the Norwegian Security Service and it is reasonably certain that the latter will form such an unreasonable view of his conduct that the question of his disposal on the termination of hostilities will be able to be settled now.

A wireless transmitter together with 50,000 francs has been buried somewhere outside Paris and the Abwehr are proposing to put this equipment at the disposal of Brutus in the event of his being posted to France.

October 3rd

I saw _____ last night at the club. He is very perplexed about his position. While he was in America he received two letters from Viv saying that he wanted him to return in order to relieve him of a good deal of work which he was doing. He wrote back to say that if he was expected to act as a glorified P.A., he would rather stay where he was or do some other job. He wished to have a job where he had some scope in his own sphere. He suggested that he should

come over and discuss the matter, on Bill Stephenson's advice. To this he got a reply that his presence was urgently required and that he should pack up and come home. When he arrived here nobody seemed very clear as to what he had come for or what he was to do. Vivian said he was going on leave and would be very glad if he would keep a watching brief on his work during his absence. When he was asked what this meant he was told that occasionally

it would bring him down a few papers.

Not quite satisfied with this he went along on Viv's advice and to see Arnold Foster. Foster asked him rather curiously what he would like to do. He said that there might be quite a lot of things he would like to do but he had been called back urgently and would rather like to know what the office had in mind for him.

Evidently nobody had anything in mind, and Foster suggested rather tentatively that he should help Denn who is the receiving point in SI for communications from

in Moscow. He went to see Denn who seemed a sensible chap but was clearly thoroughly dissatisfied with his position. He dealt with three or four papers a day. He had had a series of ideas which he had put to higher authority, expanding the organisation to deal with Russian affairs, but said that they had all been turned down. While going into the office next morning he met Beddington who said "You are just the man I want to see". He went on: "I am making arrangements for you to be reduced to the rank of Captain. We cannot have these temporary Lt. Cols. walking about the place and now that you no longer hold a position in Security Co-Ordination your rank will have to be

reduced".

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then met [redacted] who embarked on a diatribe against Security Co-Ordination and Bill Stephenson. This was too much. [redacted] apparently let himself go and told [redacted] that Security Co-Ordination was at least an organisation of some sort which Broadway was not, and that he did not intend to listen to any abuse of Bill Stephenson whom he had been serving for the last 4 years.

Finally [redacted] went and saw "C" who did not seem to have any clear idea as to why he had been brought back or what he was to do. He told him that he would probably be wanted in future but in the meantime he had better hang around. He would be generously paid until some suitable employment could be found. When Bill Stephenson was over last he was told that [redacted] was required here to look after the Western Hemisphere as head office, but there was no mention of this on his return. It may be of course that he is intended to take over Viv's work and that Viv's services will be dispensed with. Viv is according to [redacted] somewhat apprehensive about this. He is sorry for Viv but says that he seems incapable now of getting a grip on anything.

I asked [redacted] about Hawley the Jap expert. He said that originally Felix had gone out to America with the idea of setting up a joint C. show with [redacted] S.S. who had some sort of directive from the President. As [redacted] put it, everybody Catalogue Reference: K14/105 President but they all conflict. Any suggestion to Admiral Sherman of

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ONI or Gen. Bissell of G.2. that they should
abrogate their functions in regard to Jap
intelligence in favour of OSS would of course
have been quite fatal. The only possible line
would be for Hawley to make himself useful to
ONI and G.2 through his knowledge of the
language and the country and get out of them
what he could. If however he were to tie h
self up with OSS he would get nowhere. Felix
was apparently persuaded that this was the
only line but after he got back here it was
apparent that he still wanted to stick to his
old plan of setting up a joint bureau with OSS.
This led to Hawley's return to this country for
consultation after a rather peremptory telegram
from "C" asking him precisely what
his policy was as it now seemed at variance with
what was finally decided at Washington. Hawley
has now gone back to Washington to continue
liaison with G.2 and ONI and I imagine that
Felix's grandiose scheme with Murphy of OSS has
fallen to the ground. The difficulty is that
Hawley has really nothing to exchange with G.2
and ONI except his own general knowledge of Japan
and the Japanese. Any information that there
is about Jap Intelligence organisations is
being got by India.

I asked what the party of 20 officers under
was going to do. He said that as
far as he knew they were to form SCI units for
SEAC. I then told him about my talk with
Major Drummond of the Army Group under SEAC who
was by no means clear as to the origin and
purpose of the SCI unit which was shown on his
chart. He told he he already had an organisation

known as SIPS which was collecting data about undesirables and organisations in the area to be invaded.

We then talked about Australia. I told about Ogilvy and asked him about Kendal. He said that Kendal had as far as he knew endeavoured to run a few agents into the islands from Australia but as far as he knew these ventures had been unsuccessful. He then mentioned a fellow called Gerald Wilkinson who is now in New York and had some time ago been attached ~~xxxx~~ with Gen. McArthur. He had been reporting back to "C" on what was going on at Gen. McArthur H.Q. but copies of all his communications had been obtained by some girl who had been planted in his office. This had led to a scandal and to Wilkinson's removal.

views about Broadway are absolutely unprintable. He says that there is no semblance of organisation and almost all the people there are totally unfitted for their jobs.

Bill Stephenson is apparently winding up his show but may stay on to conduct any high-level liaisons with OSS and to look after SOE's interests. Nobody seems very clear what SOE are doing. They were going to wind up their organisation in S. America but they have now decided to hang on to it.

I saw "onnie Haylor today when we discussed the controversy between Dick and R.J. "onnie thinks that to some extent the right course of action depends on whether all the CCMS organisations are going to be in Berlin or in their respective

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zones. If they are all to be in Berlin there may be some case for building up a more complete record section here on an integrated basis. If however as everyone confidently expects our CCMS is to be in the centre of its zone, Dick's scheme is the only possible one.

Despite widely publicized arrests of enemy agents since the fall of Rome the enemy still persists in sending spies and saboteurs into allied occupied territory with the same disregard for their safety which has characterised nearly all his work. During the past week 7 have been detected, 5 in Florence and 2 in Sardinia, the proportion being 4 Abwehr to 3 S.D. Of those in Florence one is reported from Anzio where he collected shipping intelligence for the Abwehr, one had a stay-behind S.D. political mission, and one with a similar assignment had come down from Verona on the 12th August. One was an S.D. saboteur trained at the Hague school. The 5th is an Abwehr W/T agent who was to have gone to Naples to transmit shipping information. His case is of interest in that he has stated that the Abwehr is collecting intelligence codes tapped in the Mediterranean for passing to the Japs.

Measures taken by the Turks against German agents are still considered unsatisfactory. Although agreement had been reached for the deportation of 10 of these agents, to Syria, only 7 had arrived by the 5th Sept. and two of the most important ones were not included in the party. Corruption in the Turkish police force is believed to be one of the causes of the continued delay in repatriating Germans.

October 4th

Milmo came to see me about Hill who has just been before a medical board. His health seems to have deteriorated and it is likely that the board will recommend that he be given leave and fresh air. Milmo feels that Hill is not so indispensable to him that he cannot be spared. He now has Ian Wilson to help him out.

At the 11.30 meeting Baxter spoke of the irregular activities of certain S.A.S. pilots who have been bringing aliens back into this country without the usual formalities. I asked him to take this up with Blake-Budden.

Lennox says that the P.M. is going to Moscow in the course of the next 10 days.

Mrs. Lee of the A.O. came in at Newsam's request to tell me about her husband who had brought back an Austrian named KRAUS from France. Lee who has already been in trouble twice with SOE and sacked by them is now in SAS. (This ties with what Baxter was saying at the 11.30 meeting).

While in France he got into touch with one of Mrs. Reginald Fellowes' daughters by her first marriage. This daughter was apparently married or living with the Austrian who was at one time an agent for Siemens-Halske, according to his own statement on work for the British, but had been discovered by the Gestapo and subsequently forced to work for them. He was now afraid lest he might be beaten up by the FFI. Lee had light-heartedly put him in British uniform and placed him in the charge of a lieutenant who was returning with a party of SAS to this country

by sea. Lee told the man that this would be quite all right as his wife in the H.O. would straighten it out. Mrs. Lee was so appalled when she heard the story from her husband that he decided to keep her out of it and said that he would put things right through the military, getting KRAUS enlisted in the SAS. Mrs. Lee against her better judgment refrained from saying anything to the H.O. Meanwhile her husband got ill and was unable to get in touch with his C.O. who was still in France. The result was that KRAUS had been staying with the Lees for roughly a month, until he received a visit from two FSP from the London district. Lee then denied to these officers that he knew anything about KRAUS. His wife on hearing this told him that he must at once get into touch with the military and give them a true statement of the position. He was in fact forced to do this by a friend of Stopford's who told him that she would get the authorities if he did not do so himself. Lee and KRAUS were put in touch with Stopford and gave the whole story. KRAUS has been R.L.L. and is to be examined at the Oratory and Lee is under arrest by the London District for conduct prejudicial to military discipline.

I have re-written the M.T.5 report, which is a review in bare outline of German espionage activities in this country. It is not an altogether satisfactory document as I have been rather pressed for time.

Dickson came to see me about his lecture to the CCMS boys. I told him to confine it to methods and experience which would apply to the conditions likely to be found in Germany.

Tommy Harris, TAR and I had a long talk about Garbo's future. Tommy has worked out elaborate plans for him to go via Canada and the Argentine to Lisbon and Madrid, stopping off for some considerable time on the way and collecting any information of value as to German intentions in the Argentine. After a lengthy discussion we all agreed that the Argentine was at the moment an extremely bad spot. American relations with the Argentine were pretty bad. In fact whilst I was in America they had been on the brink of war. The situation had only been saved by a decision of the Argentine Govt. to arrest a number of Germans. Any information that came into the hands of the FBI they felt in duty bound to pass to the State Dept. might easily land up in the hands of the Argentine police. The State Department had been pretty unscrupulous in handling information which it thought could be effectively used as a stick with which to beat the Argentinian Govt. Although the FBI might be willing to help us there would be endless complications which it would be difficult if not impossible for us to control at long distance. There was much to be said for keeping the whole case in our own hands, and if possible getting Garbo to Madrid which would more than probably become the sort of Clapham Junction for escaped Nazis. He would have to change his identity and if we could get him a Gib. passport he would be in a position to travel between this country and Spain when he liked. We rather envisage him after Stage A sitting in the same office with Frederico and running a joint show. Tommy was very insistent that TAR should go down and explain this change of plan to Garbo who

is always very argumentative if he has to be ridden off something about which he has already made up his mind. Tommy thinks that if the position in Spain is represented to him as being important and if the dangers in the Argentine of his cheme going awry is strongly put to him he will accept the new plan quite cheerfully.

I dined with Cecil and Wickham. Wickham is retiring and is to be succeeded sometime next year by a man called Pym, who I believe has something to do with the Cabinet Secretariat. Wickham I think will be glad to retire. He is heartily sick of the N.Irish politicians. Partition has now become the battle cry which keeps both Dev and Sir Basil Brook in office. If they had not got the border to shout about they would probably both lose their jobs. Wickham says in the whole of his experience he has never known the IRA to be more down and out. Both in the north and south more interest is now being taken in communism, particularly in the south where the church of course is always anxious about these matters. Wickham is extremely knowledgeable about Irish politics generally and I should say would be a great loss to the Govt. of N.Ireland. He is of course an Englishman and quite impartial. He would like to see a united Ireland and thinks that if there had been one Irish Govt. it would have joined us in the war. While it is possible this is not necessarily so that the Irish would join us in any way, and if we gave up N.Ireland we would make ourselves extremely vulnerable.

October 9th

Got back after four days away with a cold.

Tin-Eye has got ahead rather too fast with his plans for moving to Germany. Milmo feels, and I think rightly, that O20 cannot be much use in Germany until CCMS is properly established.

Further that it is no use taking interrogators who cannot speak German, and lastly that at least 2 good German interrogators must remain here since O20 will have to remain in existence for some months after the cease fire. O20 in Germany is to be amalgamated with M.I.9 who should have a number of good German interrogators available. There will also be a certain number of LRC personnel available both from Wandsworth and those already in the field.

At the request of Maffey the D.O. have tried to define the status of an Eire citizen in relation to a British subject. The 1930 Imperial Conference reaffirmed the common status of British subjects. It laid down that, if any changes were desired in the existing requirements for the common status, provision should be made for the maintenance of the common status, and that changes should only be introduced after consultation and agreement among the several members of the Commonwealth. It was for each member of the Commonwealth to define for itself its own nationals, but so far as possible those nationals should be persons possessing the common status, though it was recognised that

local conditions or other special circumstances might from time to time necessitate divergences from this general principal. It was also laid down that the possession of the common status in virtue of the law for the time being in force in any part of the Commonwealth should carry with it the recognition of that status by the law of every other part of the Commonwealth. These conclusions were reaffirmed at the Imperial Conference of 1937, which added that the common status was described by the term "British subject", by which was meant "subject of His Majesty". It was recognised however that a distinction existed between British subjects in general and those British subjects whom they regard as being members of their own respective communities. This would entitle a dominion like Canada to deport a British subject who was not a Canadian. Although it has never been done a similar distinction could be made by the U.K. This has not so far been the practice and legislation would be necessary if any variation was contemplated. So far as Eire citizens are concerned, the principal exceptions to the rule that their treatment is exactly the same as that of British subjects belonging to the U.K. are now as follows: (1) National Service. Eire citizens are not liable to section 11 of the U.K. Nat. Service (Armed Forces) Act 1939 (which follows the corresponding provision of the Military Training Act 1939). This only applies however if they are not ordinarily resident in Great Britain. By the term ordinarily resident is meant resident in Gt. Britain for less than 2 years or if they can show that the circumstances of their residence are for temporary

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purposes only. Other members of the Empire (except N. Ireland and the Union of S. Africa) are liable after 3 months residence. An informal arrangement was made in March 1940 with the Eire High Commissioner that where he would give a certificate that a man had a home in Eire the man could be allowed to leave before the date of calling-up on the understanding that he could not return here except for

○ military service. As regards general service it is likewise permissible for Eire citizens to return to their own country as an alternative to registering under the National Service Act. This has been extended to registration under the Registration for Employment Order, and the issue of directions to employment under DR. 58a. In the latter case the directions are issued, but the worker concerned is given the opportunity to return to Eire before proceedings are instituted (2) Travel into and out of UK. The Prevention of Violence Act 1939 permits in certain cases the making of an expulsion or prohibition of entry order against persons in Gt. Britain who have not been ordinarily resident in Gt. Britain for the last 20 years (or their

○ lifetime if less than 20 years). Registration with the police orders may also be made without restriction as to the period in which the person concerned has been ordinarily resident in Gt. Britain. Eire citizens who are British subjects are not treated as aliens in this country, e.g. for registration purposes. It is however the case that under the Passenger Traffic Order of June 9th 1942, a British subject entering Gt. Britain from Ireland (north or south) may be R.L.L. and returned whence he came or alternatively may on landing be subject-

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ted to conditions as to length of stay in Gt. Britain, occupation or employment therein or registration or notification of his particulars. This has been employed in practice to limit the duration of a stay in this country to 6 months, to prevent change of occupation without notifying the M/L and to force application to the police for an extension of permission to remain here for a longer period than 6 months. It should however be noted that none of these provisions are directed at Eire citizens as such. They apply to all British subjects who enter Gt. Brit. in from Ireland.

3. Allegiance. Special consideration has been given to the position of Eire citizens in relation to the condition which it is proposed to impose on Germany that she should hand over to the United Nations any of their nationals for whose surrender they may ask on the ground of activities during the war inimical to their interests. The conclusion reached has been that while each case must be considered on its merits, there can be no objection to the U.K. Govt. demanding the surrender of any British subject who is also an Eire citizen if it is clear that before the war he had a substantial connection with the U.K. or that he had maintained no substantial connection with Eire.

I have been reading Commander Cox's report to Peter Reid's committee on wireless deception and security measures broadcast by the 3 services prior to Overlord @ Neptune. There is no doubt that the Navy and to a lesser degree the other Services, have done a very fine job. They based

their work on the assumption that the enemy listening-posts being favourably established from Norway to the south of France, all signals would be monitored with comparative ease. Having made a careful study of our own signals which incidentally assisted in tightening up our own security, they knew exactly the type and volume of traffic to put across if they wished to create the impression in the minds of the enemy monitoring service that a force existed in a particular place and was likely to be used for a particular purpose. This work involved amongst other things what was known as "finger-printing". Certain ships have certain types of wireless the waves from which when photographed are of a distinctive type. Equally an operator's touch can be photographed in such a way as to identify with almost certainty any operator who has any peculiarity in his transmissions. The more skilled the operator the more likely he is to have idiosyncrasies. Although the science of finger-printing demonstrates clearly how units and their location can be identified through their operators, it also provides a valuable means for deception. When planning an operation it is essential that those who plan the wireless deception should be in right at the start, since it is necessary to get the enemy accustomed to certain signals and to a certain volume of signals during the various stages of the training period. It is quite possible for a clever monitoring service to work out precisely to what point training has actually developed and what the lifting power of any particular force is likely to be. For the purpose

of Neptune two entirely bogus assault forces V. and W. with their associated ships and craft were created by wireless in the Clyde area early in April and were maintained there until the end of May. As the result of this manoeuvre not only did the enemy retain his forces in Norway but actually reinforced them. The second part of the cover plan was so closely related to the actual operational plan that in its later stages it should be regarded as tactical. Its intention was, as the amount of activity in the south became increasingly apparent, to induce the enemy to anticipate the main attack in the area of the Pas de Calais and eastward from there. This deception plan was launched before Neptune and its intention persisted after the Neptune assault which was thus to be regarded by the enemy as a large diversional operation. A completely bogus Force F. was created and maintained by wireless on the east coast. This force, the groups of which were at first situated between Yarmouth and Harwich and later moved south, was heard to work up and trained with elements of the First Army Group. For the benefit of enemy reconnaissance planes there were dummy landing craft, tank, and eventually a stand-by headquarters ship. Further to reinforce this threat considerable effort was put into giving the Free Neptune Naval wireless traffic a south-eastern bias, particularly by increasing the importance of Dover and the Nore and of Harwich. A special broadcast consisting entirely of dummy traffic was initiated from Chatham. By D day it had been so arranged

the activity round the principal headquarters there was greater than usual. In the east and south-east it was increasing. In the south it had decreased. In support of the main assault two inter-service diversionary operations were planned to lead the enemy to expect landings in the Boulogne area (Operation Glimmer) and in the Fecamp-d'Antifer area (Operation Taxable). The notional H hour of these operations was about 3 hours before that of the real assault. On the naval side the main contribution was made by various radar counter-measures and sonic devices. These were arranged to give the enemy's radar the impression shipping appropriate to the assault forces approaching each target area. On the 12-13th June it was required by the general army tactical plan that the enemy should retain troops on the west of the Cotentin peninsula instead of moving them to oppose the US forces moving over from their original assault area. In order to give the enemy some reason for holding his troops as desired, wireless traffic indicative of an assault force moving in towards the coast north of Granville was transmitted from two destroyers that were routed so that the force appeared to be coming in south of Jersey early in the morning of June 13th. It is not at the moment possible to say what the enemy assumptions on this traffic was. It is certain however that his troops were not moved, which was the result desired.

There has been a broadcast on the 22nd Sept. by Columbia Broadcasting Coy. with some

interesting evidence of the effect of our deception for Overlord. Matthew Dalton, of C.B.C. had been studying the captured transcripts of telephone conversations between the German Generals during the first month of the invasion. The first conversation was on the morning of June 6th, two hours after the allied landings had begun. Gen. Marx, speaking to the Chief of Staff, said he urgently requested mobile reserves for the area west of Caen. The Chief of Staff in replying states that Hitler himself orders that the bridgehead shall be completely annihilated by the night of June 6th "because there is danger of additional sea and airborne landings in other areas". On the 8th June Rommel giving instructions to his commanders to prevent a junction of the bridgeheads and the capture of Cherbourg states that he is expecting larger landings in the Calais and Boulogne area in a few days. He thought our landings in Normandy were perhaps not much more than a feint. Commanders in the field were calling day after day for support while the High Command saved the reserves in case of new landings until it was too late. Hitler entered the picture several times a week in person and always said the same thing: "There must be no retreat. Every man must fight and fall where he stands rather than give an inch of ground". Complaints were made all the time by the forward forces of the enemy that they had no air support and that our bombing prevented them from concentrating anywhere for counter-attack.

Civil Affairs report of 28th Sept. refers to certain towns in Germany which were the first to come under allied occupation. All official had been evacuated and it was necessary to appoint a temporary burgomeister. The population has so far as can yet be judged promptly obeyed the order to surrender arms and ammunition. A mixture of emotions is evident, the predominant one being indifference. It is reported that many men in the streets politely salute American troops and if asked to give information do so willingly. No evidence is yet to hand of any sullenness on the part of the civilians. Rather they are reported hesitantly to await some sign of recognition. On at least two occasions civilians have guided to American units German troops wishing to surrender. All police have been evacuated by the Germans but so far the population has displayed a notable orderliness. People stay close to their homes and business premises are closed. A good number of men of apparent military age and fitness have been seen in Kotgen. This may indicate the presence of soldiers in civilian clothes but whether they are deserters or stay-behind agents has to be proved. There is no evidence of a scorched earth policy by the Germans, in fact rather the contrary.

October 10th

to see me about SIS agents
Catalogue Reference: KV 4/195 on the continent for
work in Germany. The first case related to

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two Russians, apparently lent to , the P. Section man in France, by the French and sent over here without warning, for what purpose nobody knows. They eventually landed up at the LRC and the French now want them back. We on the other hand are pledged to hand all Russians over to the Soviet authorities. says that the French will be very upset if they do not get these people back. The other question relates to Germans, either civilians or P/Ws, found on the continent, whom it is desired to bring here for training as agents to be sent back to Germany. There are no very satisfactory arrangements heretofore vetting them. The LRC is rather unsuitable as the agents come into contact with other people. Interviews in friendlier surroundings are equally unsatisfactory. What is really necessary of course is that such people should be interrogated in the first instance in a really searching and not too friendly manner. Once they have been in the hands of SIS and lived in comparatively luxurious surroundings they regard SIS as their protectors and interrogation by anyone else has little chance of success. Lastly there is the difficult question of getting rid of such potential agents as SIS after preliminary training do not think satisfactory. I told that I would go into these points and let him have an answer as soon as possible.

At the D.G. meeting today it was decided to send a telegram to Kirby-Green on the subject of the proposed landing of Spanish aircraft at Gib. when passing between Madrid and the Canaries. This new service is to be allowed in return for a British service which will run to Madrid from this country. There is no evidence at the moment that anybody from Gib. has been consulted.

Stratton is going out to India to look after port control.

I attended the J.I.C. meeting today. Cussen's paper on bringing the terms of the Official Secrets Act to the notice of all retiring officers who had had access to confidential information was discussed. Apparently Bridges thinks that a friendly letter is likely to be more effective than the signing of a document. Cussen and I maintain that probably both were necessary. The thing would have to be done very much on an individual basis and the method adapted to the type of person concerned. It

was astonishing however how ignorant people were (a) about the penalties which they might incur and (b) about the harm that can be done through talking about confidential matters even after the war. Many of them think that once the war is over they can say what they like. This of course is very far from being the case, where the security of long-term sources and methods is of the greatest importance.

The other subject discussed was the D.M.I.s
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paper on future requirements of military security. Nobody seemed very clear as to what was wanted. The D.M.I. had not read the paper which had been drafted by Peake on his behalf, and passed the buck to Harry Allen. I said that I thought that if the Chiefs of Staff made a clear statement as to what they wanted to keep secret it would very much strengthen the hands of the Security Service and of the Service Depts infighting their battles with the H.O. whose tendency was to pull the whole fabric to pieces bit by bit. If we could say that it was the instructions of the Chiefs of Staff that certain information was to be withheld from the enemy and that unless certain restrictions were maintained their wishes could not be carried out, it would make a considerable difference. Meanwhile nothing was said about the proposal to close down the Jap Embassies in neutral countries.

Bonnefous came to see me this afternoon. He is leaving for Paris to join Paillote. He brought with him his successor, Capt. du Couedic, who will carry on the liaison with us.

Newsam rang up to ask whether we had any security objection to a reciprocal arrangement between ourselves and the Americans by which all visas would be abolished. I said I hoped he did not expect me to give him an answer over the telephone. I asked him who had started this plan. He said that correspondence had been going on between FO and HO since last

June. I said that was very interesting but that we had heard nothing about it as far as I knew. It seemed to me quite a serious matter which would have to be carefully considered. I could see quite serious objections to the arrival here of certain American Newsam then suggested that of course H.O. could always R.L.L. I said "Yes, but in practice you know perfectly well that unless the circumstances are overwhelming it would be unusual for the HO to do anything of the kind". Newsam agreed. He said the main idea was that it would be beneficial to our trade. I said "Surely nobody who wanted to do any serious business in this country would be deterred through having to pay \$2 for his visa!" Here again Newsam seemed to have no answer. The whole project seems to be that it would be less trouble to the H.O. I said that we would consider the matter and let Newsam know.

I dined with Tommy last night. He was going to Eindhoven with the King today, where they would be the guests of Monty. There has been quite a fuss on the part of the Air Force who were worried lest there should be any mishap. Monty on the other hand takes the whole thing very lightheartedly and says there is not a German plane in the sky. Winston told Portal to make the necessary arrangements. This resulted in the production of a bright blue plane which has since been changed to something less obvious.

Winston is determined to show the world that Stalin is being kept au fait with everything

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that is going on, in spite of his reluctance to come to another meeting. On the other hand I gather that the PM is a bit bored with old Joe's constant pleadings of ill-health which will not permit him to leave his country.

If a split comes in the Coalition there will not necessarily be a General Election. Winston will resign and the King would therefore naturally send for the head of the largest party and ask him to form a government. This may well happen before long.

I saw [redacted] at the Club. He says that a tremendous mess has been made oncemore over Security Co-Ordination. SIS were intending to take over Passport Control and split it off from BSC on the 15th Oct. For that purpose they had sent out Travis to discuss with O'Connor about Bailey's outfit. Nothing meanwhile had been said to Bill Stevenson at all. [redacted] pointed this out, when without further reference to him an extremely stupid telegram was sent making it quite clear to Bill that the demise of BSC had been discussed with his subordinates some time ago. Apparently Rex Miller was to take over Passport Control and Bailey's show was to come under the Chiefs of Staff. Bill has now sent a long telegram saying that as a result of Walton's visit to the HDSE in London the Security Division is to be kept going for a time, but that the Passport Control Dept. will not be able to accommodate itself in the office now used by BSC. SIS cannot break up BSC because it is not in their control. All they can do is to sack Bill in his capacity as 4800.

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He still remains as head of BSC representing the interests of SOE and the Home Defence Executive.

October 11th

I attended a meeting in Loxley's room at which Col. Cordeaux, B-W, Lord Reay and Puster were present. The subject was the exchange of spies with Germany. It boiled down to this, that Cordeaux was anxious to register that if at any time we had a German who was likely to be sentenced to death we should let SIS know in order that some negotiations could be opened for the exchange of this man for one of the many British subjects in the hands of the Germans. Cordeaux quite recognised that at the moment there were no suitable candidates.

I had a word with Loxley afterwards about GARBO. He said that if we were to forward a letter recommending him for an MBE to Cadogan this could easily be arranged. Godfrey Thomas has handled quite a number of cases of the kind for SIS. Thomas told me that if the man was put forward anonymously the application could go forward as a special one and not await the ordinary list.

I also told Peter about the request by the Danish Resistance Movement for some kind of lease-lend arrangement with the British Govt. after the war. This had been brought to me by Wibroe of the LRC. Peter thought the proposition was interesting but it would be

extremely difficult to get it answered.

TAR has just got back from France. He and Tommy went for a meeting with Wild and co. They both describe SHAEF as bedlam. Hundreds of officers, very few of whom seem to know what they are doing, no communications and no security. Wild's outfit is in the Crillon and entry can be obtained their their place by almost any waiter in the hotel. SHAEF Forward plans for the next 3 months are roneo'd in large quantities and distributed to all and sundry. Telephones are insecure and transport facilities between Versailles and Paris are lamentable. Clearly it would have been far better for SHAEF to remain at Bushey. The cardinal mistake has been to move headquarters before communications are properly established. The whole situation is complicated by the presence of "Comm.Z" (pronounced Zee), a unit under Gen. Lee which has occupied Paris with 30,000 men. Victor states in a letter to me that this organisation has its G.2 and its CIC branches. This has caused a difficulty because although the SCI unit in theory is under SHAEF, in practice the American part of it refers everyting to Comm.Z so that there is divided control. Comm.Z is responsible for the supplies for the American Army Groups. It arrived in Paris some weeks after the occupation, with a mobile regiment of 5,000 jeeps, 150 miles of lorries, an equivalent number of bulldozers, tank carriers, negroes, locomotives, gasometers and electricity generating sets. Everything else, including of course the Parisians, has been swept into

the gutter. Comm.Z has evidently been too much for Old Ike who has doled out an almighty raspberry to Gen.Lee, on the behaviour of his officers and on the undesirability of his having established himself in Paris. He has instructions to pull up his socks and rationalise his organisation in double-quick time. This order has caused consternation, and having undergone the usual roneoing process is in the hands of almost every clerk.

A Professor Doktor WACHSMUTH who was captured in Holland, has been brought over here at his own request and is I believe to be passed back through the lines. He has some interesting information about leading German personalities. He is himself an extremely eminent member of his profession with a big reputation. He says that Rommel is suffering from a compound fracture of the skull, interfering with the vision. It is doubtful whether he will ever fully recover. He was criticised by all the old type of German general in respect of his defensive arrangements for France. WACHSMUTH regards him as a courageous and efficient armoured brigade commander but a shocking strategist.

WACHSMUTH has met Hitler once. His reactions are medically diagnostic and he claims to have discovered in the Fuehrer at his first meeting a diabolically powerful personality governed by an unbalanced extrovert mind. He is convinced that Hitler would desire nothing better than to be put before a tribunal in order once more to give rein to his exhibition complex, and he is sure that Hitler will never attempt

to commit suicide but will hang on to the last in order to have his own complete and final gotterdammerung.

I spoke to "C" about the American visa suggestion that we had had from Newsam. He said he had not heard about it but would make enquiries and let me know. He was extremely disturbed about the proposition.

October 12th

"V" rang me up to say that Jeffes could give me the full facts and that considerable correspondence had taken place between Jeffes and the F.O. on a memo put up by Viv, hotly opposing the proposition for any relaxation. "C" himself intended to speak to Loxley. I rang up Jeffes who told me that the whole thing had started through laxity on the part of the HO in getting visa applications put through. Halifax had tried to give orders to Passport Control in New York but this had been resisted. Halifax had then granted diplomatic visas. Finally he had suggested to the Americans that visas should be abolished. The first suggestion was that this should be done on a unilateral basis but when it was pointed out that the Russians might ask for similar facilities, the F.O. decided that any relaxation in the existing procedure should be reciprocal. Jeffes seemed to think that we were not entirely blameless in vetting applications which sometimes took as long as a week. I then consulted Adam and Mars. They had heard of a vague suggestion about the policy of abolishing visas but had seen no papers. Mars

said that if a case was urgent there was an arrangement by which it could be vetted within 48 hours. Other cases took roughly a week. I mentioned the matter to the D.G. He has instructed me to let Newsam know that he would be glad to see the papers.

Burt talked to me about the case of STYLES. He said that a charge had been put forward on the basis of STYLES's statement that he was instructed by Major Heimpel to make contact with a German agent in the Midlands. Spooner had investigated this matter without result. He would be cross-examined in the box and would feel bound to say that he did not believe there was anything in it. This would make the whole charge look rather ridiculous. Burt thought it should be withdrawn. He proposed that he should give me a statement of what Spooner was proposing to say and I could then refer the matter to Hinchley-Cooke. The charge of course never ought to have been brought without prior consultation.

The D.G. is proposing to write to Cadogan and "C" about our continuing our liaison with allied govts abroad. I have asked him to refrain from sending this letter for the moment as Dick is trying to get this business on its feet through SHAEF. If SHAEF think that for the purpose of C.I. they require a joint 5/6 organisation in the capitals of Europe and also a joint war room, it is likely to carry much more weight than anything that we say to SIS. The D.G.'s letter if passed to E. would only get the stereotyped reply that

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SIS already have their representatives with allied govts and that we can communicate through them.

October 13th

I understand that about two weeks ago a representative of OBS and Bill Donovan's secretary were captured by the Germans while sight-seeing on the western front. This is an unfortunate incident to say the least since they may both well be conversant with ISOS.

Victor's 5th column case is becoming of increasing interest. A man called Joe BATES whose father was a German and interned in the last war, has officially joined the group. He is about as highly pro-Nazi as anyone we have come across. Further Maria LANZL has got into touch with a servant of Supt. Hatherill who has a friend who is apparently working in SOE. KOHOUT wants to have this girl followed in order to find out where the headquarters are in Baker St. This woman has also got on to B.P. which was described as some allied intelligence organisation. I have told Jack to ride KOHOUT off B.P. on the ground that headquarters which are in the country are of no real interest. The group are now concentrating very much on establishing connection with the underground movement in Germany with a view to preparation for the 3rd world war. The sentiments of these people are really astonishing.

Anthony and Burgess came to see me, firstly

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195