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about Orange who wants to go to Switzerland and cannot get a passage. We are trying to get his ambassador to support his application. Secondly they wished to discuss the questionnaire for Orange. We have put up a number of points concerning Germans endeavouring to establish themselves in Switzerland, the transfer of funds and the passing of German patents and companies to Swiss nominees.

After lunch I met a friend of Guy Burgess called Lucas who had worked his way up from the bottom of the Air Force both here and in Canada and has just been whipped out and put into the BBC. Burgess asked him what the general talk was in Air Force messes in the junior ranks. He said that their main interest were centred round their homes and their technical equipment, general conditions in different branches of the service, clothes, and food are also discussed. Outside this the main topic is Bing Crosby or Betty Grable. Nobody seemed to be the least interest in Beveridge beyond a vague hope that they might return to somewhat better conditions after the war. This only shows how wide of the mark papers like the New Statesman are.

October 14th

Anthony came to see me about a good piece of work by Duck who has got all the latest instructions from the new Spanish Foreign Minister as to how Spanish affairs are to be conducted here. Anthony took these to the special examiners for translation and found that the document had

170

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Seeing that we have produced with the greatest regularity copies of all Alba's despatches which have been circulated on an SIS ticket, it seems a bit thick that a document of this sort should not have been passed to us as a matter of routine. Clearly it is of interest as general background. David Boyle generally takes the line that matters of this sort are of the highest political importance and are wholly for the eyes of the FO. His of course is a ridiculously narrow point of view. Anthony is going to register a strong complaint.

Anthony tells me too that there has been another incident in regard to CERVELL who has got into touch with the managing director of the Armstrong Siddley group who has applied for permission to show CERVELL round the works. We knew from that this little intrigue had been going on. The Air Ministry are apparently keen that the visit should take place as they think it would be good for postwar trade. The danger does not necessarily lie in CERVELL seeing these particular works but in his establishing a close liaison with the managing director which will in the long run lead to trouble. What the Air Ministry cannot get into their heads is that any information which goes to the Swedes is more than likely to reach our enemies. If they are prepared to say that this does not matter, we had better give up looking after

Joe Archer is doing his best to keep LACHMANN out of the aircraft industry. LACHMANN is at present interned but Handley-Page would obviously like to have him back as soon as the war is over. We have rather taken the bull by the horns and have strongly recommended that he should be deported back to Germany. The Air Ministry are inclined to take the view that if we do not get him for our industry he will go to America where he will do just as much harm. Personally I think that this does not matter nearly so much as having him once more bedded down in our industry. We as a Service would like to keep our vital industries clean and if LACHMANN is readmitted his case will always be cited as a precedent. There is a certain amount of loose thinking on the lines that if Germany is not to have an Air Force for 20 years there is nothing that LACHMANN will be able to tell them which could be of the slightest use. The probability is that the Germans will be making commercial plans before many years are passed. LACHMANN was of course responsible for the slotted wing. But I cannot believe that we are incapable of producing people just as good and a great deal better.

A Jap JMA indicates that the Japs anticipate that they may perhaps be thrown out of neutral countries at Stage A. They have therefore issued instructions that some sort of secret organisation is to be left behind. In anticipation of relations being severed only with Germany attaches are at once to begin preparations for taking over German secret intelligence networks. Present subjects for enquiry

172
are Germany's ability to continue the war, peace moves in Europe, relations between U.K. Russia and America both up to and after the conclusion of the European war, strength of British, American and Russian forces in Europe after the conclusion of the European war and the arrival of forces from Europe in the F.E., British, American and Russian potential strength for war against Japan and internal conditions after the conclusion of the war in Europe and Russia's attitude towards the F.E. after the conclusion of the European war.

A Jap B.J. of the 18th Sept. indicates that the Jap Ambassador in Moscow has been able to get the Russians to maintain their neutrality, thus giving the Japs the opportunity of devoting all their efforts to the southern front. He is convinced after talks with Molotov and after Hoshima's talks with Hitler, that both Russia and Germany have rejected any efforts by Japan to bring about a German-Russian peace.

The Americans appear to have been proceeding with the cancellation of citizenship of American citizens of enemy alien origin, through a quasi-civil action in the Federal Courts. The charge is that the citizenship of the individual was procured through fraud and that his oath renouncing loyalty to his former country and declaring allegiance to the USA, was taken with mental reservations. Action has only been taken in aggravated cases where the danger was real and the fraud grievous. No action could be taken against a derivative citizen who had acquired naturalisation not on his oath

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

but through the naturalisation of a father or husband. In spite of these restrictions there have been filed as by Aug. 1st 1944 548 petitions. In these cases which have been brought to trial the courts have applied stringent rules of evidence and have been limited by Supreme court decision that the evidence in such cases must be clear, unequivocal and convincing. Nevertheless 181 certificates have been cancelled, 49 cases have been withdrawn by the Govt. and 110 have been dismissed by the courts. 6 decisions favourable to the Govt. have been reversed by appellate courts. 4 cases have been terminated by the death of the defendants and the remaining 198 are still in litigation.

October 16th

Anthony came to see me about SULZA who wishes to visit the USA. We came to the conclusion that we should have to inform the Americans owing to sources of a statement which have to be somewhat guarded.

Four SD agents have landed in Palestine.

TR came in. He thinks that the moment has almost come for disbanding his section but proposes to leave behind Stewart Hampshire, the SD expert, whose services may be necessary in guiding RSS in their interception work.

Kellar had a long talk with me about the Middle East. There is a proposal to discuss the future of CICI at the JIC. This arises from the paper which was forwarded by Courthorne sometime ago urging that if there

174
was any reorganisation of Intelligence in the Middle East, India should be consulted. Courthorne has complained that no satisfactory arrangements existed before the war in the Middle East and that there was no stay-behind network which could have come into operation had the Germans been successful in carrying out a pincer movement from Egypt and the Caucasus.

17th October

Had a further discussion on the Middle East with Kellar and Harry. We were all agreed that it was impossible to contemplate running intelligence in the Middle East except in some sort of combined organisation which would cover TURKEY, PERSIA, IRAQ, SYRIA, PALESTINE and EGYPT. We also thought that M.I.5 and M.I.6 and DIB should combine to carry out this task. If we do not look out CICI will just pack up and hand over whatever it has to "C". Since, however, CICI is primarily a defensive organisation it ought still to be based on SIME or its post-war equivalent.

I had a talk with Roger about Section IX. He is writing a note giving his reasons as to why this Section should really be amalgamated with F Division rather than that F Division go to Section IX. The real point is that such information as is obtained abroad relating to revolutionary movements is in many ways of less interest to the Foreign Office than the extent to which, for example, the Russians might be bringing pressure to bear on the Government here through the medium of the Communist Party and its outer constellations. There is a better opportunity here with all the forces of State behind us for getting to the bottom of Soviet intentions than there ever will be through the study of Communist Parties abroad. It therefore follows that the foreign Catalogue Reference KV/4/195 be assessed in the

light of the whole product before being issued to responsible Government Departments.

18th October

Burt came to see me about STYLES. He is worried about the charge preferred on the basis of a statement by STYLES that he had instructions to get into touch with a German agent named HEINZ at the Midland Hotel, Birmingham, or the Adelphi Hotel, Liverpool. If Spooner were challenged in the box he would be bound to say that he could not accept STYLES' statement that although STYLES may have been interviewed by Major HEIMPEL, and also have seen HEINZ in Germany, and that some espionage mission might have been discussed, the plan never took concrete shape and STYLES in fact never visited either Birmingham or Liverpool; the story had been put up merely because STYLES thought that if he appeared to be assisting the authorities to unearth an important agent this might to some extent mitigate the offences which he had committed in German camps. Sinclair is taking this point up with Hinchley Cooke.

Colonel Bartik, who is in charge of Czech C.E. has asked to be acquainted with our Censorship methods and also with our Port Control machinery. I have arranged with Grogan that he shall be given information on Censorship matters similar to that already given to other Allied Governments. As regards Port Control, I gather he only wishes to have a rough idea of our machinery here for catching spies, so that he can blow our trumpet when he gets back to Czecho-Slovakia.

Baxter talked to me about the two Russians whom S.I.S. want sent back to the French. SIS think that SANTERRE can claim French

176
nationality, but agree that KHRYZANOWSKI will have to be handed over to the Russians. Baxter will try to square the Immigration Officer on this matter which is really entirely a matter for them.

Renegades were discussed at the Wednesday meeting. There is still no final decision as to how they are to be disposed of pending enquiries into their cases. SHAEF have, I gather, refused to hold them in a special camp and the H.O. have refused to have them over here.

Pitt called on me about naturalisation cases. He said that his firm had a large number of such cases through their hands and he thought possibly in the future he might be of assistance to us.

I talked to Buster and Brooman White about passing French cases to the Belgians and Belgian cases to the French, etc. We had given an undertaking to let the French have all cases with an espionage bearing which we had back from the Field. B.W. thought that it might cause trouble unless we confined ourselves to passing the cases of Allied nationals to their own Governments only. He undertook, however, to see if he could not get the Belgians and French to agree on a joint distribution direct from here.

The Home Office had had a meeting about sending back alien refugees and internees. They agree that any who have been guilty of criminal offences or are pro-Nazi or have been engaged in espionage, should be deported. The return of others is apparently to depend to some extent on circumstances and probably means that many of them will remain here. It is felt that they cannot be sent back until their

countries reach a more or less settled state.

Rex Janson has brought in a naval questionnaire which was received by NID from Prince BERTIL. It asks a large number of extremely impertinent questions about our defences in this country, the movements of the Fleet, etc., etc., and can only be of German or Japanese origin. Probably BERTIL, in the absence of some competent officer, has made a Gargantuan blob.

Almost simultaneously with this incident Joe Lynch has come in with information about an En Clair telegram said to have been sent from Tokio to Stockholm, asking for information about the movements of our Fleet. We have also received documents obtained from the Italian Air Ministry in Rome giving accounts of meetings between the Japanese Attaches and the Italians. The Japs contributed a number of items which we have already seen on JMAS stating that they were obtained through the Swedish General Staff. We propose to have a full-dress protest about all this to the JIC. In my view the Swedes should be told that until they put their own house in order their attaches will be given no further information and their movements will be severely restricted. This seems to me to be the minimum. They can be shown the documents obtained from the Air Ministry in Rome and they can be told that in our view BERTIL's questionnaire can only come from the Germans and Japanese, and that it must have been forwarded here by someone in the Swedish Naval Department who is either assisting or at least conniving with our enemies. Into this pudding we shall undoubtedly introduce a little CERVELL seasoning.

Adam told me that he was in trouble for having ordered the SCO to send three French M.O.I. officers with diplomatic visas to the LRC. I refrained from comment but I have since told Harry Allan and the DG that I think such incidents are positively disastrous. It seemed to me that anyone who took the trouble to read the papers would have realised that whatever the regulations such action was only calculated to lead to trouble and to give the office a bad name. The real trouble is that SCOs are not allowed to use their discretion and that when they refer to D.4 the whole thing is regarded as a sort of game in which the object is to catch out some Government Department which transgresses the rules. Cadogan has, I gather, registered a strong protest, and since these are the only sort of incidents which give him any knowledge about what the Department is doing, he naturally reaches the conclusion that M.I.5 is a rotten show.

Victor has come back. I gather that Dick has more or less won his battel with R.J. about the transition from C.I. from SHAEP to CCMS by a gradual means.

19th October 1944.

Col. Forsyth came to see me. He is employed in CCMS and is charged with the liquidation of Nazi priests and school teachers in Germany. He had some idea that he might get assistance from the LRC. I explained to him that the LRC dealt primarily with German-occupied territory and that the chances of their having any information about either priests or school teachers in Germany was extremely remote. The only
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

possible source of information might be CSDIC who probably would have had some school teacher through their hands. Apart from this I thought he would have to rely on information that he would obtain locally. Both the padre and the school teacher were public figures and there would be many people in towns and villages from whom he could get a pretty good idea about their political sympathies.

Forsyth was formerly one of R.J.s DSOs in Tunis and is an ex-school master from Felstead. Not very impressive.

Reports by civil affairs from the field indicate that the population remaining behind in Germany are obeying orders and giving no trouble. They have no apparent sympathy with the Nazis. Isolated instances of surliness and an attitude of fear have been noticed but the only incident reported is the pouring of hot water out of a window on a soldier's head by a German woman.

Joe Archer brought Plant to see me. Plant is thinking of taking a job in CCMS. I told him as much as I could about the set-up.

Horrocks came to talk to me about the reorganisation of the department. He has telescoped B., E and F Divisions and C and D Divisions. He had put Kellar's section under subversive movements. I said that I thought it should be considered on a territorial basis and should cover all aspects of the work in the area.

He had also washed out the Irish section. This I think is wrong at any rate for the time being. Ireland must also be considered on a territorial basis, and there is an important liaison to be maintained with north and south. Horrocks had put espionage and preliminary enquiries re espionage into different sections. I said that this ought to be together since it needed the experience of those who had knowledge of the cases to pick out something in its early stages. This was in fact the most difficult job. A clear case was fairly easy to run. O.C. had been put into A. Division. I said I thought this was all right but that if it was to be so placed it must concern itself solely with administrative matters. This means that there would have to be a section in B. Division which received the reports of all DSOs who did not have a corresponding territorial section in B. Lastly, I thought that the work of D1, D2 and D3 in so far as factory security was concerned, should be off-loaded on to the regions. The regions are to remain but to be reduced to 4, 3 in England and one in Scotland. There is a certain amount of argument as to whether they should run an office in the provinces. The general opinion seems to be that they should not. They should however have their residence in the area, spend 3 weeks touring round to CCs and one week in London. I am very doubtful about this. I am inclined to think that they should have an office, otherwise CCs will not feel that their interests are being properly looked after, nor will R.O.s be able to make proper reports.

A Jap B.J. indicates that the Germans are going very slow on the question of Poland and on the question of using Vlasov's Army against the Russians. They want to be able to cash in on the differences between the Poles and the Russians and are consequently treating the Poles who surrendered in Warsaw with considerable leniency. As regards Vlasov: they do not wish to do anything that would create a further barrier to any possible peace negotiations with the Russians.

The LRC returns for September show that 863 people passed through the institution.

October 20th

R.J. has returned from Paris, and although I understand Dick's view about C.I. and its transition to CCMS has been accepted by Kenneth Strong, R.J. is endeavouring to make me think that what had been accepted was his plan, worded somewhat differently. He is obviously worried about his own position. Either he has got to be accepted as head of C.I. at SIAEF, which is almost impossible since then the British side would be over-loaded, or he has to be one the chief C.I. planner under CCMS under Gen. West, or he should resign. At present he really has no position but merely a vague charter for C.I. planning for phases 2 and 3. He put forward the suggestion that perhaps in the mean time he might be made head of the war room. I treated this suggestion with considerable reserve.

182
Toby Mathews has been made DPP, a somewhat novel appointment since he is (a) a solicitor and (b) a Catholic. I should think however the he would do the job extremely well.

Anthony tells me that he has had from Joe Lynch the gist of an en clair telegram from Tokio to Stockholm which was sent in English. It stated that units of the British Fleet were reported to be concentrating in the Indian Ocean and asked for information from a neutral military observer as to the truth of this statement. We are trying to find out more about this telegram, which has an important bearing on our case against the Swedes. (BERTIL)

Sir John Anderson has announced that so far the war has cost us £24,000,000,000.

October 21st

Victor has been over with a letter from Dick stating that it is desirable that something in the nature of a central counter-sabotage organisation and school should be set up in Paris. All information regarding sabotage will be centralised there and the necessary instruction will be given to counter-sabotage squads which may be required in the field. There is a feeling that since so much information has come to light about the burying of dumps etc. something more active should be done as a precaution against trouble in Germany. The D.G. has given his consent to Victor doing this work.

A CX. reports states that the Nazis are making out lists of non-Nazis which they would see reached us as lists of Nazis. They hope that this will lead to the arrest of a large number of innocent people and that those who propose to make trouble in the future will be left at large. To facilitate this arrangement the papers of foreign workers who have been liquidated have been taken over, and false papers are being given to Nazis who are to go to Switzerland to carry on the direction of the underground movement.

John Marriott returned today from Brussels. He has a high opinion of the work being done there by the SCI units who are, in so far as D.A.s are concerned, under the control of Christopher Harmer. The most promising characters are sent to Brussels where they are housed in a large block of flats called Wuthering Heights. After interrogation they are either used, handed over to the Belgians or sent back here for interrogation. Large numbers of agents are still being sent back from the field and many others are being handed over to the local authorities.

Both the Abwehr and the SD have been taking advantage of the stabilised tactical situation to introduce German agents through our lines. Most of them are hastily recruited and ill-trained. The return of a small percentage with limited local tactical information is apparently considered to be satisfactory by the Germans. In addition to a group operating out by Densborn, most of whom are

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recruited ~~by~~ ex-agents released from French prisons, another group operating from Mulheim has been encountered in Belgium. These agents are young Frenchmen, most of whom claim to be from the Dept. du Nord and who pose as escaped Todt workers. Preliminary investigation reveals that the organisation is similar to that of Chateau Moulny and there is evidence that some of the Moulny instructors and agents form part of the present group. Their missions are to report on the identity and location of units, particularly armoured, convoy movement, presence of Belgian, Luxemburg or Dutch units with U.S. forces, the degree of co-operation offered by civilians and on general relations between troops and civilians. An agent captured by the 5th US Corps had the mission of placing magnetic incendiary mines on our armoured vehicles. He says that others have been trained for similar work. No unusual security problems have arisen in Germany. In the occupied areas numerous German civilians have been cooperative to the extent of informing on Nazi officials and Gestapo members once their fear of a German counter-attack has been dispelled. In some areas of occupied Germany front line units have found it desirable to evacuate all civilians to the rear. This is apparently necessary but has caused some confusion in the back areas. Hundreds of German soldiers in civilian clothes have been apprehended in this manner. These soldiers are believed to be deserters rather than stay-behind agents. Not only are German civilians reported to be submissive to our orders but there are numerous reports of individual friendly acts such as

aiding our wounded and sheltering patrols from enemy observation or capture. On the other hand the 19 U.S. Corps has reported that two American soldiers who were lost were offered assistance by a civilian who led them straight into a German control post. The 9th U.S. Army has reported an incident involving the capture of 3 German soldiers wearing U.S. uniform and driving behind our lines in a U.S. jeep. One wore an American Army Captain's uniform with

a first U.S. Army patch and the other two were in war-enlisted men's uniforms. They stopped another American jeep carrying two Lt. Cols. The latter did not notice any irregularities until after getting out of their jeep and surrounding the Americans the Germans began talking in German. In the ensuing fight one American officer and two Germans, one of them the pseudo-Captain, were killed. The latter was wearing a German C.O.'s uniform under his American one, but carried no identification papers.

Independent but corroborative reports from the Ruhr, Cologne, Dresden and Hanover, point to

the existence of an organisation called the Eideweiss Piraten. This organisation is primarily anti-Hitler Jugend and it is alleged that it has not been penetrated by the Gestapo. Many of the members of this organisation are former leaders of the Hitler Jugend. There appear to be quite a number of other anti-Nazi youth movements.

Experience in the field shows that d.f.ing for wireless sets has not been really effective.

186
Attempts generally lead to giving the show away. Intelligence clues have been found to be much more profitable.

I saw Denniston today about getting Lewis and Stalbo, who are working on Ispal, 1 and 2, to read back some Hebrew records for us relating to the activities of Shertok and others.

Denniston was quite prepared that they should do this work and regarded them as 100% reliable. He thought however that as they both worked so closely together it would be a mistake to employ one and not the other. I said I would consider the position and let him have a final answer.

I had a long talk with Kellar about O.C. He feels very hotly that it should be purely administrative and should not in any way interfere in intelligence matters. He told me that Clayton was visiting Gib. and later on going to Mid East. In writing to Douglas Roberts Ede had suggested that he should discuss with Clayton future plans for intelligence organisation in the Mid East. This is clearly a matter well outside Clayton's scope. The only person to discuss matters of this sort are Kellar or myself.

The RSIC state that if we could get over sufficient XX traffic on the Madrid-Berlin route and on the Weisbaden network they may be able to break new groups which have recently come into use. Our DA material is relayed on these services and therefore provides a crib. It is necessary however to get considerable depth during a period of 4/195.

Catalogue Reference: KX/4/195.

Keith, Kenneth Strong's P.A. looked in. He talked about R.J.'s recent visit to Paris. Apparently R.J. succeeded in boring Strong, who does not really know what to do with him. There has been apparently a hint from Tedder that he does not think R.J. a very suitable candidate to run C.I. in CCMS. I believe this is based on some acquaintance with R.J. in the Mid East but what it all amounts to I don't know. Dick's stock meanwhile is extremely high at SNAEF. R.J. had apparently been to see Brig. Way, ADMI(O), about his position. Keith has also seen Way and the present proposal is that RJ should go into CCMS under Gen. West. It is a matter of some speculation however whether Gen. West will welcome this suggestion. He does not apparently take very kindly to RJ.

I dined with Peter Loxley, when we discussed at great length the possible amalgamation of ourselves with SIS. I told him about our conversations with Arnold-Forster and I showed him a copy of my minute defining what I mean by taking over Section V and Section IX. He seemed to think on the whole that the reasoning was sound but he was coming round very much to the view that total amalgamation was the thing if it could possibly be achieved. I said that I personally was in agreement, provided the political difficulties could be got over and a suitable chief could be found. I thought however that in any case there would have to be a sub-division between offensive and defensive, somewhat on the lines of my

188
note. If there could be no total amalgamation that division seemed to me more logical than the present one.

We then discussed ministerial representation. Loxley seemed to think that the F.O. was more suitable than the Minister of Defence but took the point that such an arrangement would not find favour with the H.O. who argued that since we derived our powers from them we should come under the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary would certainly not wish to see subversive movements under the Foreign Secretary. Peter said he thought that Section IX were perhaps going a bit wide. He had had a talk with Kim about this. Anything in the nature of pursuing prominent communists all over the world was, he thought, a waste of time. That sort of thing should be done on a much more selective basis. In other words in areas where the Soviet Govt. had vital interests.

October 22nd

Peter Loxley rang me up about the Spanish Consul Vidal who has been pulled in under black market diamond smuggling. He is to be sent back to Spain tomorrow. We do not propose to search him unless we have positive information that he is carrying something of security interest or that he is in fact in possession of large quantities of diamonds. We have no such evidence at the moment.

Moffatt and Wolsey of the RUC came to have a talk with me. They are seeing Halland who is to take over from Himmler in Germany. I told them all I knew about the possible set-up in Germany which in the present state of affairs is somewhat vague.

The Germans have given the Japs what they estimate to be British and American aid to Russia. They say it amounts to 9 million tons at the price of more than 5 million dollars.

Slight danger to the case of Brutus has arisen in so far as Violette, his late mistress and sub-agent in France has been arrested by the FFI on a charge of collaborating with the Germans. Unfortunately the Germans allowed Violette to learn that Brutus was working for them in England and Violette is therefore in a position to compromise the case. A full report on the circumstances of Violette's arrest is awaited and meanwhile a scheme for providing Brutus with the necessary safeguard is being devised.

Kliemann who was Dragonfly's later spy-master and who is at present in this country has now given after considerable delay an account of his relations with Dragonfly, and has in fact revealed the latter's identity to us. In order to safeguard Dragonfly should he ever decide to return to the continent, Kliemann is being given the impression that Dragonfly was in fact arrested in December 1943 but that insufficient evidence of espionage was found

to secure a prosecution and that he was accordingly interned. Kliemann has now suggested that we should run Dragonfly and Treasure as DAs. He has no idea that they have been run as such over a considerable period and that he himself is the sucker.

A party from this office accompanied by the RSLO Notts and the CC Boston visited the place selected for the parachuting of the two transmitters to Sniper. The party was there on the nights of 10/11 Oct. between the hours of 9.30 and 1.30 and on the night of the 12th between 9 and 9.30. The German plane did not arrive and Sniper had since been told that this was due to weather and bombardment, but he has in the same message been asked to name another date and time on which he could be present at the same place. We have suggested the nights of 11th and 12th November, between 9 and 9.30 each evening.

October 23rd

Curry came to see me. He is I think a little worried by the rapid development of Section IX which he thought would preclude any chance of amalgamation. I showed him the note that Roger Hollis and I had prepared on what we felt should be the functions of a defensive organisation. Curry seemed to think it was reasonable. I told him that I had read his personal note to me about his position and that while I thought ~~and~~ he had been hardly treated I did not see how I could put it all into reverse. If however we obtained wider

charter there might possibly be some position for him within his present rank.

Gort came to see me about the security of his safes in Palestine. Both of them have been in use since about 1937. I said that if this was so he must take it that the keys may possibly have been compromised. The only thing therefore was to have two new safes. I said that some people kept their safe keys always in their left hand trouser pockets. He said "Yes, that is just what I always do". I replied that other people might not have been so careful and that in any case there came a moment when he would have to have a bath. I said that we could say from practical experience that we had taken advantage of a situation of this kind to obtain high precision measurements and to manufacture a facsimile key down to half a thousandth of an inch. Gort seemed very impressed by this and has quite made up his mind that he is going to have two new safes. I told him too that we would get our experts on to devising some means of knowing whether the safe has been opened without this coming to the notice of the culprit. I thought that if we were successful in this he should test his safe at least once a week.

Kellar seems to have established a complete bond of confidence with Gort who is popping in and out of the office every day. He even rehearses with Kellar what he is going to say to Shertok. Gort is quite determined to get about the place and see everybody. I am afraid that those who are responsible for his security will have a pretty anxious time.

The Germans have made an unofficial suggestion through Switzerland on 18th Oct. for an exchange of 5 or 6 British subjects under penal sentence. We have replied to the I.O. that at the moment we have no Germans who could suitably be exchanged, but that if they like to keep the ball in play they should get away from the phrase "under penal sentence" which narrows the issue and makes exchange extremely difficult.

October 24th

The following conversation took place between Nashat Pasha and his British bride Miss Priest this morning. They are due to be married at noon today:

Pasha (in hoarse but faint voice) Hello, my darling.

Priest (in gay clear voice). Good morning, Hassan darling. Have you got your white carnation?

Pasha I don't know. Oh, my God. My head!

Priest What do you mean? I've just had my face done.

Pasha I can't get out of bed.

Priest Darling! What is it, lumbago?

Pasha No, an unbalanced head. We shall have to put it off till tomorrow.

Priest Oh, no, darling, please!

Pasha All right chérie, ma petite, I'll try to get up.

Priest Darling, I've got a boil on my chin. I warned you.

Pasha Oh, my God! My legs won't work.

Priest Please, Hassan, get better; have a nice bath.

Pasha All right, I will. I'll be ready. When do you want Mrs. Ali?

Priest Not till 10.30. It's just for packing. I can manage to dress myself.

Pasha I can't. Goodbye, darling.

As Kellar says, not a very auspicious wedding morning.

I attended the investiture at Buckingham Palace where I met Tiltman of G.C & C.S. Tiltman reminded me of the time when he and I had gone down to some firm in Southampton Row to inspect a holorith machine. This was a good many years before the war. He said he had no idea at that time that the holorith was going to be such a big factor in the work that he would be doing. He did not know what future there would be for G.C & C.S. but he could not help thinking that the difficulties of the work might become insuperable when foreign govts. realised the mistakes that they had made during

the war. Intelligence might well be driven back on the old cloak and dagger lines. Tiltman is now Chief Officer on cryptography and a Brigadier. He said that this does not prevent him from a certain amount of daily exercise in his special line, without which he thinks his usefulness to the organisation would disappear in a very short time. He says that methods change so quickly that it is absolutely essential to do a certain amount of hack work, otherwise one's usefulness will entirely disappear.

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

194

I spoke to "C" on the telephone. He said that he was open-minded about turning the Japs out of neutral countries. I said that the case from the security point of view was not a very strong one because in fact we doubted whether the Japs would do anything effective even if their Embassies abroad did continue to function. "C" does not place a very high value on GC & CS products after Stage A but points out that it is only through neutrals that we can hope to get much out of Tokio and that from time to time something quite useful comes along. There is in fact a Portuguese B.J. in today indicating that morale is very low and that the recent exaggerated claims by the Japs to have sunk many American ships in the vicinity of the Phillipines had been put out merely to boost up public morale.

"C" said he was hotly opposed to the abolition of the American visa but th t he thought the case perhaps more one for us to present than for his organisation. I said that - thought the main point was that the whole structure of the visa system would disintegrate if a precedent were created in the USA.

I spoke to "C" about the cases of LEDEBOUR and Otto JOHN, the two Abwehr or SD officers whom S+S wanted to get out of Spain and Portugal. I said that certainly we were not very keen about people of this sort coming over here since we had to look after them from the security point of view and they eventually became a charge on our organisations. From the information point of view there was nothing

to be gained since that had all been sucked dry before they started. We could not very well detain them after their past services and if we did we had to put them in different houses. They could not obviously be put into the Nazi camp in the I.O.M. "C" said that he would speak to Felix.

The D.G. has written a long memo on our relations with SIS for Lindlater-Stewart.

Personally I do not much like it but I do not know how we can stop him sending it. I pointed out various inconsistencies. He seems to be against total amalgamation and equally against taking over Sections V and IX.

I have now obtained our file in the case of SERRA. It shows that he was recruited by SOE in India, after having come across to us in Abyssinia. He was finally brought back here and examined at the LRC. who viewed his case with considerable mistrust and said so. In spite of this SOE took him on. As previously related he betrayed his colleague ARMSTRONG as soon as he landed in Sardinia. SOE

eventually had a suspicion that the transmitter was under control and suggested to us that we should use it for purposes of deception. Nothing however materialised. There was also a suggestion from SOE that another man should go out and make contact with ARMSTRONG and SERRA and see whether they were in fact under control. This man was not to be told about our suspicions that the transmitter was under control. This seems to be pretty tough.

I saw John Senter about the case of Mrs. Rita

126
BEDFORD who had an account paid from what would appear to be an SOE account, with a regular monthly instalment of £16. She also had another account which was receiving all money orders amounting to very considerable sums from an Army Post Office in N. Africa. There seemed to be some suggestion of irregularity which he might like to look into.

The Norwegians have been asked by the Russians to send a mission to join the Russian forces in Northern Norway. They are also to send 12 police battalions. Trygve Lie has gone to Moscow or Stockholm to discuss details.

October 25th

At the Wednesday meeting Mrs. Spring said that the Germans are now trying to find a means of communication between the Iberian Peninsula and Switzerland, in order that they may send messages by Duff on airmail letters. Grogan said there is a system of lorries going from the Spanish to the Swiss frontier, and these are believed to be carrying German mail, sometimes in allied vans. A scheme is being devised for a control to be set up at Lyons. I asked him to find out more about this convoy and to ensure that we see all mails found by censorship.

Shelford said, with reference to German broadcasting stations, that it was essential that records of renegade broadcasts should be seized as evidence when these people are brought to trial. Records of the JOYCES were found at
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

Luxembourg as well as many other documents, including receipts for payment for the broadcasts. No documents were received from the stations at Paris or Rome. I asked whether a directive had been sent to SHAEF pointing out how important these documents were. Mulford said a memo had been drawn up but for some reason had not reached the right people. He was looking into this.

Butler said he had been asked whether MI5 had an objection to the ban on weekly and other papers being exported. The ban was imposed before D-day for the Overlord period. It was agreed that we had no interest, but later in the meeting Masterman said that information about flying bombs had been part of B.L.A. deception and therefore back numbers of these papers should not be sent.

Bird said that there was considerable evidence to show that the enemy organised their stay-behind network in Belgium far earlier than in France.

Gavan said that Censorship wished to know if the Security List and details of how it works could be passed to the Norwegians and Greeks. F. Division has no interest and any references to ISOS addresses will be deleted.

I lunched with Montgomery, Geddes and Waller. Montgomery is a younger brother of Monty and at present a C.2 in the M.I. section dealing with Mid East. Geddes is Capt's F.A. I talked to Montgomery a certain amount about a

1246
unified intelligence organisation in the Mid East and the necessity of dealing with the whole area. He seemed to be in agreement.

Nagel and Gleditch called at our request to discuss the possibility of getting back important agents from the Norwegian front for interrogation in this country. Brook-Booth, Corin, Milmo and TAR were also present. The Norwegians did not seem to think that this presented any insuperable difficulty provided the Russians handed the bodies over to them. We agreed however that we were not likely to be interested in characters found in the north. Anybody who had been operating from Trondjæim south might however be important to us. The Norwegians doubted whether the Russians would do more than clear the Germans out of the Kirkeness area. This would leave the Germans one extremely bad road over the mountains for a distance of 250 miles. The Norwegians thought that very few of them would get away and that in any case they would have to leave their equipment behind. It was however possible that the Russians would move up the small tongue of Finland in the direction of Tromsø which would cut off a large area. They thought it most unlikely that they would attempt to go further south through the winter months, since the narrow strip would be easy to hold owing to the mountainous character of the country.

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I asked the D.G.s permission to employ Lewis and Stalbo on Kellar's special work. He has agreed.

Capel-Dunn called here yesterday to start an enquiry into the work of this dept. He said that he had been charged by the JIC to investigate all the sources of intelligence & their distribution. The D.G. asked him for his credentials which he had not got. The D.G. very politely told him that he would like to have a letter from somebody as before allowing such an enquiry to be made he might have to consult his Minister. This is I think quite correct though perhaps a little unfortunate as it rather gives the impression that we have something to hide which is very far from the case.

Field-Robinson came to see me about a man called ERGENFELD who had formerly been serving in the Adolf Hitler S.S. Division. This man is apparently prepared to bump off Himmler though personally I think he is a bit sanguine. The question arises of course as to whether this is not merely an attempt to get back to his own lines. I told Field-Robinson that I did not think that O20 or LRC could express a very good opinion. The best plan would be to get Melland or somebody in M.I.14d. who were the experts on the S.S. to express their view and it might also be

worth while asking Columbine whether he knew anything about "ENGELFELD. I undertook to get in touch with Melland.

October 26th

Harker talked to me about the RSLOs. I expressed doubts to him about the suggestion that they should have no offices in the provinces.

Lennox tells me that a Brigadier and 138 wounded officers and men have fought their way out of the hospital at Arnhem after making contact with Dutch resistance movements who laid a wire across the Waal and were in communication with the British forces. These troops held a kind of bridgehead on the bank of the river until assistance arrived. They were got back to the British lines without a single casualty.

Dykes has arrived with a letter from Dick. Allan Day is being transferred to the SCI unit in Brussels and Dick wants someone to replace him. Patrick Day and Courtney Young have been suggested. Courtney we cannot spare and Day is a servant of CCMS although working in EDS. Dykes told me that the Travaux Ruraux who are running XX in France in conjunction with Ramsbotham are setting up a wireless network. I warned Dykes that this might be extremely dangerous if their signals were not secure. They were in fact creating an ISO for the Germans. He promised to get Trevor-Wilson to look into this as soon as he got back. Incidentally Ramsbotham

204

is an unqualified success with the Fre ch
and doing extremely valuable work.

October 27th

Haldane-Borster came to see me about his future. I said that at the moment I was very anxious to get someone to assist in Kellar's section for about 2 months and that after that there was no doubt that his services could be usefully employed in CCMS. Meanwhile he has had a definite offer from Felix of the post of PCO Belgrade. He said he would have a talk with Felix and let me know. I told him what the position was regarding a possible amalgamation and that after he had completed his work in Germany there would probably be a place for him in the organisation.

Kellar and I saw Stalbo and Lewis in Denniston's office. They have agreed to work for us.

Kellar tells me that Gort saw the PM yesterday. He only spoke to him for about 2 minutes after a lunch party. His parting words were "Look after our friends and see that they are treated well. The Jews have rendered us great service in this war". Gort has no firm indication of British policy in Palestine and clearly feels that he is in for a difficult time. He also resents not being taken into the full confidence of the govt.

Mrs. Spring came to me in a great state about the case of ABADO, a Spaniard who has turned

202
up in Gibraltar. He was pulled in on a ship going from Barcelona to Tenerife. On interrogation he admitted that he had originally come from Stuttgart where he had lived for many years. He had been bombed out and had had his business destroyed. He had therefore obtained permission to leave the country. He had however left his documents in Barcelona. There seemed to be some doubt as to whether he was in fact a Spaniard. The Admiralty had asked us whether we had any trace of ABADO but had given no indication that they were making arrangements with SIS and the FO to have the man brought back here. Meanwhile an indignant telegram has come in from Kirby-Green who says that while he was interrogating ABADO the Admiral ordered him to be arrested. I spoke to Ricketts and explained to him that the Security Officer and ourselves must be the judges of whether a man is to be brought back here. We had to satisfy the H.O. that there was a security case, otherwise we cannot dispose of the body. This did not seem to have occurred to the Admiralty. Ricketts undertook to stop the telegram if possible and to give instructions to the Admiral that the man should be sent on or sent back at the discretion of the DSO acting in conjunction with the Governor. Meanwhile I am calling a conference of all parties concerned in order to get the position clearly understood. We have told Kirby-Green to send back all Germans whether civilians or in uniform and in cases of doubt to communicate the facts to us.

The RSIC report states that DA traffic must be increased to effect a break. W/T of the Militarisches Amt within Germany now consists of the following stations: Belzig (for Berlin), Krugsdorf (for Stettin), Wohldorf (for Hamburg), Cologne, Wiesbaden, Sigmarigen (for Stuttgart and Vienna). As the military position returns to the 1940 position so the stations will probably return to their former pattern. Belzig is the terminus for all traffic lines, each of the other stations being linked by direct lines. Wiesbaden as the seat of the Funkleiter West, co-ordinates the networks of Cologne, and Sigmarigen in the western areas and is responsible for a large network. For this purpose it has W/T links with Cologne and Sigmarigen. At the same time it is joined to Hamburg and Vienna, the first being the location of the Funklei ubersee and the second of the Funklei Sudost. These in their turn control particular areas. Hamburg is the reply station for agents overseas and in the Scandinavian area. Vienna controls directly and indirectly communications in Italy, Balkans and Turkey. Stettin has recently taken over some of Hamburg's commitments in Denmark for which purpose they are linked by teleprint line and possibly by W/T. though RSS no longer hear its W/T link, if it exists, but it is probable that Stettin's main task will be in the east when the Funkleiter ost withdraws into Germany from Poland.

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204

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October 28th

I sent a wire to Kirby Green giving him his instructions in the event of any further arrivals of the type of ABADO.

Grogan came to see me about the censorship of mails between Spain and Switzerland. There is apparently a lorry route and also the Luft-hansa air route which comes into Barcelona via northern Italy. There is nothing to be done about the air mail unless it is shot down, but arrangements are on foot for censorship to co-operate with the French at Lyons in censoring the mail carried by lorry. There are reports that duff is being used by the Germans on this route.

I had a talk with Melland today about WENGEN-FELD. He has seen Capt. Gache of M.I. 14d who took over his work. Gache thinks the story more or less plausible and I am arranging to put him into direct touch with Field Robinson.

Melland seems to think that he has perhaps made a mistake in putting Gache into CCMS so early.

Catalogue Reference: KV 4/195

He would have done better to have stuck to his job in M.I.14d and gone over at a later date. The actual planning he feels is much more a matter for "onnie" Taylor.

I have had a talk with TAR about the future postings of officers. He is giving Mark Johnston to Milmo, Olsen of the LRC to Bird and Macchell to Albert.

October 30th

Courtney has returned from France. The evidence with regard to Stella LONSDALE is as complicated as ever. A certain amount of progress has been made however since we have discovered an ISOS message regarding Simone addressed to Marseilles. Stella was at Marseilles at that time and was using the alias of Simone Lavalliere.

TAR, Brook-Booth and I had lunch with Lepage. He was very cordial and has keen as ever to maintain liaison with us. He was rather critical of his government. He did not think they were taking a sufficiently strong line, particularly as regards the communist resistance movement. He thought that they all ought to be enlisted in the Belgian forces. There was apparently a reluctance to do this owing to opposition from the right wing resistance movements. In fact Eisenhower's instructions are not really being carried out. He suggested that Eisenhower should ginger them up about once a week. His second point was that there was not nearly enough British

propaganda in Belgium. Now was the moment. He thought it extremely important for his country that this should be done. Lepage said that he was having very great difficulty in dealing with collaborators. He had some 30,000 in jail but could get no firm directives as to how they were to be handled. Nobody seemed to know precisely what constituted collaboration. People had become so moulded into the life under German rule that they were hardly conscious of whether they had been betraying their country or not. A fairly strong line is apparently being taken against all those who have assisted in the manufacture of war material for the Germans and the excuse that they wanted to keep their workmen employed is not accepted. The embargo on all banking accounts is apparently working very successfully. Till all accounts have been examined and sums accumulated by war industries confiscated there is to be no relaxation.

I held a meeting today with NID, O.C. and SIS to discuss the case of ABADO. Hart cited the case of Bertus HAM, a Dutchman which was on all fours with the case of ABADO. The same mistakes had occurred, there had been a meeting at which everyone had been represented and it had been agreed that the disposal of the body was at the discretion of the Governor on the advice of the DSO. Meanwhile ABADO has apparently been released and their Lordships had viewed a telegram which they had received from the Admiral with grave concern. They evidently thought that the DSO had acted in a rather unimpeachable way. I under-

stand that we had not given instructions for ABADO's release but had told the DSO to act according to his discretion after he had satisfied himself that the man was not a German. If he was in doubt he was to refer back.

Caulfeild will convey this explanation to their Lordships and will I hope prevent them from expressing their severe displeasure. It was agreed by all that a blob had been made by the Admiralty and that in future they should conform to the normal drill. Suitable instructions have been sent to FOGMA.

Tim Airy came to see me. He had just returned from Ceylon after visiting Australia. He told me that Fergie had arrived and sold himself to SEAC. He had had a meeting with Lamplough and Airy at which he had told them that the SCI units would be coming out and would look after C.I. in the field. Lamplough was therefore sitting back and feeling that he had no further worries. I have thoroughly disillusioned Tim. I said I did not know what men were in Fergie's party but unless he was recruiting talent locally it seemed to me that the SCI unit had really nothing to contribute. They would know nothing about Jap espionage organisations except what they could collect in India and they would have no practical experience of CI work in the field. Tim told me that according to Fergie 4 of their people speak Japanese. I said I did not see this was going to be much use. If they were going to run agents they would have to speak Malayan, Burmese and Indian

dialects. Jap prisoners were not often taken and they would be the concern of the regular I.B. staff. Further it seemed to me that SIFS were really doing what the SCI unit was supposed to do.

Cussen has come back with the suggestion that we should set up an office in Paris. Strong is going to write us a letter. The main purpose is to deal with renegades. It is suggested that Joe Stephenson should go and be accompanied by an officer of B.5 and two secretaries.

October 31st

I attended a meeting of the JIC, when Cav-thorne's paper was once more discussed. The meeting seemed to be more concerned about JICs to receive intelligence than about the producing agencies, which are all at sixes and sevens. It is no use having a JIC unless it has got some sort of decent intelligence to consider. I said that in so far as CI was concerned we felt very strongly that the Mid East must be considered as an area. It would be ridiculous for us to be responsible for Palestine and Egypt and for somebody else to be dealing with the other adjacent countries. It seemed highly desirable to combine all forces. C. was present at this meeting but only murmured something about his responsibilities in Persia. Cavendish Bentinck said that he thought the co-ordination of producing agencies would be dealt with in due course and I imagine that he had in mind Capel-Dunne's

The D.G. has written a long letter to Cavendish-Bentinck about Capel-Dunne in which he welcomes the visit but points out that the matters dealt with by this office have only on rare occasions come before the JIC. I think this is a pity since it rather gives the impression that we have something to hide. It would be far better to send a short note agreeing to the visit and saying that we will offer every assistance. Butler is going to see what he can do.

Ede came to see me about SIS wishing to hand over the remnants of the P. Section in Gib. to Kirby-Green. This was very tentatively discussed by the P. Section representative with Kirby-Green who expressed no definite opinion. The next thing he heard was that the P. Section officer had written to London. At that stage he wrote home explaining the position and stating that he had certain very definite reservations, particularly as regards taking over administratively as had been suggested. If he is to take over these bodies he must know what they are doing. Meanwhile a letter had been addressed to Hart signed by Rumbold for Fakenham of Section V stating that we might be interested to know that Kirby-Green had agreed to take over the bodies in Gib. This was followed two or three days later by a letter from Felix to Ede, not referring to Fakenham's letter, stating that C. had telegraphed out telling his man to hand over to Kirby-Green. Meanwhile a wire has come from K.G. asking what this all means. I have impressed on Ede that he must make K.G. clear-

ly understand that the whole of this arrangement has been conducted without any consultation with head office here by SIS. Meanwhile Ede is taking over a statement of the sequence of events which he will leave with Felix and register a complaint. He will also say that we do not propose to take over these bodies unless we know something about what they are doing.

I had a meeting with Tin-Eye, TAR and Butler about a proposal to set up an advanced U20 cum CSDIC in Belgium. Tin-Eye thought that as we had agreed to set up an integrated show in Germany after the cease fire, we should perhaps send out a token force to Belgium. This would consist of 1 major, 2 I.O.s and 10 wardens. Tin-Eye said he could do this without any detriment to his organisation here. It was agreed that I should go with him to the meeting at Beaconfield tomorrow.

Cussen has returned from Paris. We are to receive a request from Paris to establish an office there to deal with renegades. It is suggested that Joe Stephenson should be the head of it and have a B.5 officer.

Haldane-Porter came to see me. He has had an offer of the post of PCO Belgrade. I told him what I thought might possibly be the future of ourselves and SIS, that I had work for him to do in Kellar's section while Kellar was away in Mid East, and that doubtless he could work with the Control Commission in Germany if he was anxious to take this on.

apart from these two jobs I had nothing else to offer him at the moment. I could give him no guarantee that after he had completed his work in Germany he would be taken on here but I thought it was quite likely that we might ultimately be in a position to make him some firm offer. He said that he would have a talk with Cowgill and let me know the result.

The SIS representative in Stockholm, a Major Cross, has been blown, according to a Jap JMA. The Japs seem to have got to know precisely what his instructions were and the extent to which he was to deal with Russian affairs. I gather that the facts as reported by the Japs are quite correct and that the incident has caused considerable concern.

It has recently been learned that ZIGZAG has told a number of his doubtful acquaintances of his war time visits to the continent and the purpose of his coming to this country, including the fact that he has daily been transmitting messages to the Germans. In view of this breach of faith it has been decided in B.L. that we should take advantage of this opportunity of closing the case with ZIGZAG in the wrong. Michael Hyde thinks it is just possible that he had a pact with Graumann, his spy-master in Germany. Graumann is according to ZIGZAG corrupt and when asking the Abwehr for funds for his agents always puts a certain amount in his own pocket. It is just possible therefore that in his foolishness ZIGZAG may have told

Graumann of his connection with ourselves and that the two were running a financial racket between them. This of course has no bearing on the case since Graumann would not appear to report the information to his superiors. We know moreover that what ZIGZAG tells him is passed on to Berlin.

Michael Ryde has gone to Gib. to interview WERZ and his compatriots who have a safe conduct from Lorenzo Marques back to Germany. If possible Ryde will get one of WERZ's subordinates to sign a document waiving his diplomatic privilege.

Lipstick has received an incoming duff in which he is told that his family has ^{been} paid 1,000 pesetas on his behalf even during his silence. They ask him to reopen communications and give him a new cover address in case the other one has gone wrong. It is not proposed at present to re-open the case. Lipstick is preparing to return to Lisbon to take up residence there with his wife. The fact that the Germans are attempting to revive this case is an indication that Lipstick was not blown through his alleged indiscretions while last in the Peninsula. This renewed interest also indicates that when Lipstick returns to the Peninsula he may be approached by the Germans there to co-operate with them in their postwar plans.

November 1st

I attended the meeting at Beaconsfield. Crockatt was in the chair. Rawli, R.J., in--ye,

Tingling of SHAEF, Kendrick and Scotland were also present. It was made clear that the present arrangement did not in any way affect the interrogation of civilians and that the existing machinery would continue as at present. We agreed to send a token force also to provide instruction for a limited number of would be interrogators from CCMS. Tineye and Rawli are to go out and reconnoitre the site in Belgium. There is the usual difficulty about establishment. CSDIC suggested that our people, like theirs, should remain on the establishment of O20. I said that subject to the D.G.s confirmation this arrangement would be satisfactory.

Jenkins, our DSO in Egypt, came in to see me this afternoon. He is rather worried about the future of intelligence in Mid East. He wants a reliable under-study and suggests a man called Tomlinson who I believe is not particularly high-grade. I told him our views on the Mid East intelligence question. He said that he would be quite prepared to join in the combined show as deputy head but not apparently under Roberts of whom he evidently has not got a very high opinion. He likes him but does not think him sufficiently forceful. On the other hand from what I hear he was inclined to think R.J. rather too forceful. There has I am afraid been a certain amount of adverse criticism of Jenkins's reports by the various depts. which have received them. They are thought to be not too reliable, rather of the gossip kind.

I asked him about the organisation Orby which
 Catalogue Reference: KV/4/195

is run on a voluntary basis. There is no doubt that in Orby Jenkins has some valuable connections particularly in the banking world. On the other hand we have been worried about one of the members of the organisation who it is said is de Gaulle's commercial representative. I think probably that Orby ought to be broken up but that touch should be maintained with certain individuals who are likely to provide us with information.

I had a long talk with Tim Airy, TAR, Ede and Marriott when provisional proposals were made regarding our setup in the Far East. It was suggested that Airy should in accordance with Lamplough's wish be attached in an advisory capacity to SEAC instead of to GOC Ceylon. It was also tentatively suggested that Airy might ultimately become responsible for CI planning in SEAC. On this point I had certain reservations. Although Airy, reinforced possibly by Courtney Young would probably be able to put up a better plan than most of the staff at present in Ceylon he is not very qualified for the task. He has not been on CI planning here nor has he had any practical experience in the field. This however he may acquire to some extent during his stay here. What SEAC really require is someone like Niall MacDermott. Airy urgently requires a B.I.A. case officer to handle the case of Carbuncle in Colombo. It is suggested that Lee should go out to do this job. This matter is somewhat urgent owing to the illness of Patterson who will clearly have to come home but Lee cannot go until he has wound

up the case of Treasure and Brutus which are at present producing useful results. Lee is actually the operator in these cases. It is however suggested that Russell should come from W. Africa to take Airy's place at Kandy. Ede would like to get hold of Lt. Commander Ricketts of NID to take Ratterson's place as SCO in Kandy. Ricketts would be prepared to take a job on provided he can be spared. DSO Trincomalee is also leaving and there appear to be no Security Service officers who could fill this post. At the moment we are also in difficulties regarding the supply of DSOs and ADSOs for Malaya.

I dined with [redacted] when we discussed the future relations between this dept. and SI. [redacted] is quite prepared to see total amalgamation and equally agrees with our suggested division between defensive and offensive. He does not think that Section V. in their present form are performing any useful function, and is quite convinced that counter espionage ought to be under one head.

November 2nd

Cussen and Richard Butler came to tell me that Burt was in a white heat because Hinchley Cook had never taken Spooner with him to the JAG when consultations were going on about the STYLES case. Apart from the impropriety of this, it is highly dangerous since clearly Cookie cannot master a case of several hundred pages in the same way as Spooner who has done
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

the statements of all the various witnesses. The result has been of course that a charge was preferred about attempting to communicate with an imaginary spy in this country which never ought to have been preferred at all. Hilland who is actually conducting the case for the JAG has been so confused by Cookie's presentation that he has been forced to get into touch surreptitiously with Spooner. Steps are being taken to adjust matters, but the incident only shows how ill-fitted Cookie is for his job.

We are issuing new instructions to ports about the categories of people who are to be sent up to the LRC, which I hope will prevent any more incidents which in the past have led to important people with diplomatic visas being sent up to London for examination.

The subordination of various aspects of the conduct of the war to the American elections is becoming more and more irritating. Following the joint declaration of the P.M. and Roosevelt at Quebec about the reinstatement of the Italians and the granting of diplomatic representation with cypher facilities, pressure has been brought to bear upon the forces in the Mediterranean to permit the establishment of consuls. This was quite blatantly stated in the telegrams to have a political background in the United States.

The Irish are attending the Civil Aviation Conference in the USA while the Argentines have not been asked. The Irish have a German Catalogue Reference KY/4495, the Argentines, suc-

combing to American pressure, have expelled theirs.

Lastly Morgenthau's suggestion that Germany should have her machinery removed and be turned into an agricultural country is presumably a manoeuvre to obtain the Jewish vote. Declarations on the subject of the future of Palestine also operate in this sense

November 3rd

I lunched with Kim, B-W and TAR. They both seem quite prepared for Dick's recommendation for a change in the whole set up of the War Room. Kim seems to have the idea that we are definitely opposed to total amalgamation. I told him that this was not so. We had only been worried by the tremendous difficulties to be overcome and by the possibility that if alternative proposals were made the whole thing would be put into the waste-paper basket, leaving us in the present muddle for another 20 years. Apart from this we thought that even if total amalgamation could be achieved there would have to be a subdivision rather on the lines that we were suggesting. Our greatest difficulty in advocating total amalgamation was that the DG was by no means persuaded that it would be a good thing and would not advocate such a measure at the conference table. Other difficulties were the political ones which were very strong and the finding of a suitable head.

Buster has returned from Brussels. He confirms our view here that the SCI units are not receiving the support they require from the War Room. Roland Bird is making lengthy appreciations as a result of links-up in the registry but these are either filed in Section V or recline in people's trays. The SCI units are doing extremely good work but in the view of Rodney Dennis are performing functions which they were never intended to carry out. Williams of 21st Army Group seems to take the view that C.I. in Germany and the smoking out of the Nazis will be done entirely by the Army through the C.I. staffs. There does not seem to be any place for CCMS and still less for R.J. unless they are to constitute solely a liaison unit in Berlin with the Americans and the Russians.

Cussen and Butler came to talk about renegades. It is now proposed that a renegade section should be set up with Cussen as its directing head and Shelford and Seymer doing the civil and military side. This should work well. I impressed on them both that there was a certain B. Division interest in cases which had connections with the G.I.S. We were rather anxious to ascertain precisely what the G.I.S. plan was and whether it has any long term intentions.

November 4th

Burt came to tell me about his difficulties in the STYLES case which I gather have now been liquidated. Spooner is taking part in Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

any further consultations.

A Jap JMA shows that the Embassy staff in Switzerland is to be increased for intelligence purposes. This is mainly due to a fear that the Embassies may be turned out of the Peninsular before long. In fact nothing will happen to the Japs in Portugal until the attack on Timor which may not be for some time.

d'Arcy Hughes rang me up about an American called Eric KERR who has gone to the police with a story that he was captured in Italy and taken on by the Germans as an agent, and then dropped by parachute in Herne Bay. Subsequently he was picked up by a fishing boat. I said I thought that this was a most unlikely story and that KERR was probably a deserter.

November 5th

There have been interesting developments in the case of one Chris LINDEMANS @ KING KONG. An agent sent back from the front named DAMAN denounced a Dutchman called VERLOOP.

The latter when questioned gave information to the effect that LINDEMANS in order to get his brother released from prison had offered his services to the S.D. and had in all denounced some 267 Dutch Belgian and French agents working in the resistance movement. LINDEMANS was one of the leading lights of Dutch resistance and has been appointed by Prince Bernhard much against the advice of our old friend Pinto who is now on the Prince's staff, as liaison officer between Dutch

resistance and the Canadian Army. Orders were sent to the field for LINDEMANS' arrest and he is now at O20 where he has made a confession. An ISOS trace shows almost undoubtedly that he attended a meeting where agents from this country disclosed to the Dutch resistance movements the possibility of parac ute landings in the Maas area. This was fairly late in August and was probably part of the plan to seize the Arnhem bridge-head. The SCI units could apparently get nothing out of LINDEMANS who had several epileptic fits. He has had another since he arrived at O20. 'inEye's report about his confession opens with the words "This obstreperous giant".

Under date 16th Oct. the JIC issued a paper on German strategy and capacity to resist. The only exception to the general decline in the flow of production has been the production of single-engine fighters which has been steadily increasing and has reached a higher figure than ever before. The limiting factor however is petrol for the purposes of training, and pilots. There can be only two major reasons for Germany continuing the struggle the possibility that dissension and war-weariness may lead to compromise, and the belief in the minds of the Nazi leaders that Germany's future depends on her going down fighting to the last rather than admitting the fact of military defeat. She will therefore continue her secret weapon offensive against England and targets on the continent, and at sea she will press on with her improved devices for U-boats. At the end of this year

considerable numbers from Norway and Germany against ocean shipping in attempts to prevent the sending over of allied supplies and reinforcements to the continent and Russia. Some may operate in eastern waters. On the strategical side it is felt that once the allies have built up their forces in the west sufficiently to break through or outflank the Siegfried line or the Rhine in strength, the immobility of the German forces and their vast inferiority of armament and air forces will make it impossible for them ever to reform a cohesive front in the west though resistance may continue in some sectors. It is estimated that the Germans have no more than 35 full strength divisions including 67 panzer available for the defence of Germany, and under the most favourable circumstances, most of which are highly improbable, they could not possibly increase this strength to more than 46 divisions. After December it is thought improbable that there will be any substantial increase in the strength of the German forces in the west. The conclusion is that except in S.E. Europe the Germans have for the moment stabilised the position. On no front are Germany's forces strong enough for her to feel much confidence in her ability to hold off a major allied offensive. On no front except to a limited extent of the northern sector of the eastern front, in Norway and in N. Italy, can the Germans afford to give ground without sacrificing strategical positions or economic resources essential for the continuation of the war. Moreover the increasing immobility

of the German Army due to lack of transport and of oil and their great inferiority in armour and air forces make it impossible for them to engage in a war of movement without risk of irreparable disaster. At the same time by concentrating the maximum possible effort on the production of fighter and jet-propelled aircraft the Germans may hope to regain some degree of ascendancy in the air over central and eastern Germany in an all out attempt to blunt the striking power of the allied strategical bomber forces, and thus to protect German production of war material from the full effect of the exclusive concentration of the allied strategic bombing offensive on Germany during the coming winter. The Germans are thus compelled to stand and fight where they are and they must at all costs avoid a major allied break-through since if this were once achieved it would be almost impossible for Germany to re-establish a cohesive front. It seems improbable that there will be any formal German surrender at all. At some stage the German command will lack the troops, armaments and control of communications with which to hold any sort of line and in the end the German army on one front or another will disintegrate. The JIC believe that in the period before the complete collapse of Germany's military resistance, there may be a certain amount of guerilla activity behind our lines. They think however that once resistance has completely collapsed Nazi plans for underground warfare will in the main collapse with it.

November 6th

V.2 is still coming on at the rate of about 5 or 6 per 24 hours.. There is also an occasional V.1, though very few now reach the London area. On the 5th a V.2 fell at Islington, killing 22 people, injuring 80 seriously and 134 slightly. 12 small houses were destroyed. Today one fell on the Comma car factory at Luton, causing a large number of casualties. Apart from one or two incidents of this kind casualties from V.2 have on the whole been slight.

There appears to be a considerable decline in the standard of our signal security in north-west Europe. A German intercepting operator recently captured said that the British gave away a lot of valuable information in clear conversations over the air. On the Italian front prisoners seemed to think that signals security has improved but that there still exists several major loopholes. The main points in recognising a given network were speech, accent identification etc. routine calling, number of outstations on the group, frequency. One P/W states that the opinion expressed in higher quarters is that 75% of the intelligence available to German staffs is derived from interception.

A report from Italy dated 14th, October states that 7 agents have been arrested during the week, two in Rome and 5 in forward areas. The two in Rome were an Italian Lt. Col. and his W/T operator who had been despatched by the

Air Intelligence Section of the Abwehr. The five in the forward area were German agents of the usual type of whom one was sent by the SD and 2 by the Abwehr. No information is yet available about the controlling agency of the remaining two who were traced as a result of checking the visitors book at an hotel at Iesi, known to have been frequented by enemy intelligence personnel. An unusual confession has been made by the son of an Italian general who states that he was to allow himself to be overrun and then to get recruited into the allied air forces. If possible he was to return to the Germans in a Lightning. There are indications that the German Ambassador to the Vatican is attempting to start up an intelligence network in Rome. The report concludes with the rather significant statement that despite the large number of agents which continue to fall into our hands, interrogations indicate that a number are still being sent into allied territory who remain undetected. Only a small proportion appear to complete their missions but steps have been taken to improve control of travel both across the lines and in the forward areas generally. This is in fact not particularly surprising since there have never been adequate controls in Italy since the invasion.

Dick's latest counter-intelligence summary for the week ending 3rd November which is circulated telegraphically indicates a marked increase in enemy espionage. In Spain lines are being planned to France and Belgium, and the G.I.S. in N. Italy is preparing lines to be established

for post-occupational purposes on the line of the German western frontier. Line-crossing attempts are continuous along the whole front. Parachute landings of at least 8 agents are in preparation. Our counter-measures are meeting with success. Six W/T agents have been arrested on the south coast of France, two parachute agents have been captured near Metz. At Bourg and Dijon an Abwehr network numbering 24, two on W/T sets, has been uncovered and at Nancy an S.D. ring numbering 60 has been unearthed. On the sabotage front two saboteurs employed by S.D. were arrested while attempting to cross 7th army lines. Their mission was to locate and damage fuel pipe lines using previously placed sabotage dumps. It has been established that such dumps exist in -upen Malmedy and upper Moselle. The position on the Franco-Spanish frontier is slightly better, but is still by no means satisfactory. In Belgium resistance groups are now under unified control and the police and gendarmerie are being rearmed. Some 200 Surete officers are distributed throughout Belgium. Against this the economic situation is serious and the government is in disrepute. In Holland there is a serious situation due to the cessation of public utilities and exhaustion of food supplies. Vast areas are inundated and reception areas are over-crowded. The enemy has destroyed a good deal of industry and transport has been paralysed. Police forces have been reorganised.

According to a JIC report the enemy is concentrating and intensifying his naval effort on the production of KVM/195 types of small

escort draft and two types of u-boats incorporating new technical equipment, improved anti-detection devices and higher submerged speeds. The small battle units include explosive motor-boats, larger u-boats, one-man torpedoes and swimming saboteurs. The enemy is energetically training and producing these types of offensive weapons in increasing numbers to operate against our ~~communications~~ in the low Countries. The present maximum effort to be expected from air-launched flying-bombs does not exceed 40 in 24 hours and this rate could not be sustained. When further groups become operational this maximum for one day might rise to 80 or 100. The maximum recently of attack by V.2 for any one day against targets in England and on the continent combined has so far been 22, and the sustained average much lower than that. A maximum of 30 rocket launches in one day might be achieved with a sustained effort of 15 to 20 a day.

A C.I. report from the American 6th Army Group dated 18th Oct. states that on 27th Sept. a Lieutenant of the 45th Division was approached by a French civilian who told him that Tendon was unoccupied. The civilian stated that he was a French captain working for the Strategic Services Section (presumably OSS). The company commander, acting on this information, sent a 12-man patrol into the town. The town was found to be occupied by the Germans and only one man got back. An American colonel was reported by the 7th Army to have hired a civilian chauffeur who was

later found to be a milicien acting as a German spy through the interception of a letter which he wrote to his wife. The American 7th Army reports that a usually reliable informant had given it as his opinion that the Nazis have definitely organised underground resistance to the invading allied forces but that it will cease as soon as Germany is completely occupied. The Nazis realise that when the fighting ceases the only desire of the German people will be to be left in peace. Consequently any underground activity will be very unpopular. Fanatical Nazis have been told to lie low for 6 months when it is hoped that there will be considerable discontent and ill-feeling against the occupying forces.

Two German generals discussing guerilla warfare in Germany agree that they do not believe in the possibility of the successful or widespread partisan warfare for which the German people are quite unsuited. The peasants in particular would not join in. Ramcke, the defender of Brest, seems to think differently but this is not of course surprising knowing the type he is. The other day he asked his servant why he was always doubled up. The servant replied that he had had two ribs removed. Ramcke answered "That is no reason. Why a lad of 18 should be unable to stand upright, even without any ribs at all".

Corcoran of the High Commissioner's office in S. Africa was brought down by Ede. He talked in a very interesting way about the future. He thought that everything was in the hands of the United Party provided they played their

cards cleverly. The key of the situation was on the Rand where both the United Party and the Nationalists were angling for the votes of the Rand miners. Conditions brought about by the war had in many ways reacted in our favour since it had brought Afrikaans into touch with the towns and factories. Everywhere this happened they almost invariably became pro-British. The Dutch Church was perhaps the most highly nationalist institution. It endeavours to keep the peasants in ignorance, encourages the speaking of Afrikaans, to the exclusion of the English tongue, and produces anti-British propaganda. As soon however as the peasants get away from the village life and taste the pleasures of the town they are inclined to drop their religion. At the moment the church is having an uphill fight. It is a curious anomaly that the less religious the S.Africans become the more they are likely to be pro-British. At the moment there is only one successor to Smuts, namely Hofmeyer. He is a clever man and a good speaker, but has absolutely no personality. An attempt was recently made to build him up by sending him to visit the S.African troops in Italy. His shorts and shirt however were so ill-fitting and he looked so ridiculous in his topee that it will take him some time to live this incident down. Photographs of him were published in all the S.African newspapers. Corcoran thinks it likely that Smuts will remain in office until his death. He is still the great figure in S.Africa and nobody else comes near him in influence and popularity. His wife is slightly failing in health, and if she died

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

this might have a great effect on Smuts. The remainder of his family are not much of a support to him. He apparently gets a certain amount of intellectual stimulus from the Crown Princess of Greece with whom he has a very strong platonic friendship. This accounts for the agitation by Smuts in favour of British intervention in Greece and support of the Royal family. Smuts apparently does a considerable amount of work on his farm and his existence there is somewhat lonely.

Corcoran thinks that if the United Party behaves stupidly and the Labour Party were driven into the arms of the nationalists the Govt. might no longer have a majority and the direction of affairs might pass to the nationalists. There is a possibility that in such an eventuality there would be civil war. The British element would in that case almost certainly ask for British intervention. Nobody seems to know what in that case the policy of H.M. Govt. would be.

I discussed with Corcoran our position. He said that as Coetzee was dead and Baston was retiring, de Villiers would again take over the police. He would not however be able to do very much until he got back the division captured at Tobruk which consisted largely of recruits from the police. These men were thoroughly loyal and no real reorganisation of the police or elimination of nationalist elements could take place until their return. Except for the fact that he is one of about 10 people who have direct access to Smuts, Lenton's

position is rather weak. He gets on moderately well with de Villiers. Lenton is however considered to be very indiscreet. His wife leaks, his daughter leaks, and his mistress leaks.

Corcoran thinks that Michael Ryde was unlucky in having a man like Pozner offered him by Lenton as an informant. This man was anathema to the police and as soon as they knew what was happening they got on to Michael Ryde and were determined to run him out of business. Corcoran did not think that we could usefully send out anybody else for the time being. He thought however that at some future date when de Villiers was well in the saddle and had got the police organised we might tactfully make some suggestion to him if we thought it was really worth while. Far the most reliable person in S. Africa is Forsyth who deals with foreign affairs. He is thoroughly discreet and his judgment is good. Another man Corcoran thinks useful is a certain Major Ashton who is a very wealthy influential and knowledgeable man. He is of Jewish origin. Ashton has financed the censorship laboratory from his own pocket since the beginning of the war. There is little that he does not know about S. Africa and all its leading personalities. He would be quite ready to assist if approached at any time.

Christopher Harmer has arrived back for a few days. He seems to be absolutely in line with all of us about the War room.

The D.G. has almost agreed to Cussen running renegade section with Shelford and Seymer.

D.G. is I think worried about putting Cookie's nose out of joint.

Count CARADINI is to be the new Italian Minister here. The F.O. propose to give him diplomatic cypher facilities but to force him to deposit his diplomatic bags at the F.O.

We have said that from the strictly security point of view we would like to see his cypher deposited and vetted for security but that we could not say that we thought in present circumstances there was much danger of valuable information going out through this channel. I was much more likely that such information would go through the Swedes or Spaniards. I pointed out that we are in rather a difficult position. Either we allow the Italians to use poor cyphers and in that manner we become aware of what they are doing, but also run the risk of our enemies and allies knowing what passes between the Ambassador and the F.O. If on the other hand we insist on a secure cypher we are in the dark,

ourselves can deal with the situation at one end of the other.

the Italians who are to come back to their old house, although I believe the Ambassador will be at Claridges

Harker called a conference of Ede, Harry, myself and Tim Airy. After much talk it was agreed that Airy should begin by transferring his HQ to Kandy and the grounds that it was desirable

for him to be in touch with SEAC HQ in order to co-ordinate the Rangoon and Singapore DSO parties with C.I. planning. It might be that Lamps would feel that the DSOs were so much part and parcel of the whole CI set-up that they would have to be military until such time as the civil power took over. Lamps might also feel that Airy should take on C.I. planning in general. I made it clear however that I did not think that on C.I. planning Tim should hold himself up in any way as being an expert. India really had the knowledge but if they were not going to supply anyone Tim was probably a better starter than most. Harry was anxious about Tim being attached to the SEA C staff and thought he ought either to be independent or an actual member, with proper rank and position. I think he is right in this. If finally Lamps wants to take Tim on he will have to sever his connection with the GOC Ceylon.

D.G. has been to see Bridges who told him that he had seen Cavendish-Bentinck's letter about Capel-Dunn and wanted to explain that Capel-Dunn was not interested in organisational matters but solely in the distribution of intelligence. He mentioned that he had heard that there was certain friction between ourselves and S. IS and said that it had been decided that a high-level committee should investigate the affairs of both departments. The D.G. suggested that possibly one single individual of sufficiently high standing might be better than a committee. Bridges seemed to think that this was a good idea and also that Kindlacher-Stewart would be a suitable person to undertake the job.

November 7th

A spy named LANGBEIN has apparently given himself up in Canada. He was landed by submarine some time in 1942 with a wireless set. He had \$7,000 which had now become exhausted. He says that he never used his wireless set nor communicated with the Germans by other means. There is some vague trace of him on ISOS.

Courtney thinks he has caught a Hungarian spying for the Japanese. A man named BERCOVITZ. The woman in the flat next door thinks his behaviour peculiar and hears him tinkering with the wireless set. Hughes is setting the necessary machinery up, although he says it would be almost impossible for anybody to transmit from BERCOVITZ's flat. A certain amount of significance has been attached to this on account of a JMA which indicated that at onetime at any rate there had been a set in the possession of the Japs capable of transmitting information to Lisbon. Probably this refers to some emergency set which the Japs might well have had in the Embassy before the declaration of war.

It appears that the Germans have finally decided to let VLASOV come out in the open and set up a committee of liberation, in Germany. The committee will conduct propaganda and recruit for the eastern front. It was apparently thought desirable to take this step in order to reassure the Russians in Germany that they will not be let down by anything in the nature of a compromise peace. The final
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Himmler and Vlasov had previously agreed on the course of action but evidently had considerable difficulty in persuading Hitler who was not anxious to take any step which would jeopardise the flimsy chance of coming to terms with the Russians.

A report from Italy dated 21.10. states that two SD agents have confessed that they were to organise a band of partisans in the Bari area. They had both been trained in an SD school at Verona as saboteurs. Four additional agents have been captured in the forward areas, one of whom had a political mission in Rome and another in Florence. In Rome itself 4 agents have been arrested who were operating for the SD. Enquiries are in progress, to trace a P.38 aircraft which was taken from Pomigliano airport on 13th October by a man claiming to be an American 1st Lieut. and which has not been seen since. It is considered possible that this is the enemy's handiwork as a report had already been received about a mission which involved the theft of an aircraft of this type, which was to be flown back over the German lines.

November 8th

The suggestion has been made to send over 10,000 Dutch soldiers for training in this country. What has really happened is that the competent military authorities have decided to evacuate all the areas between the Maas and the Waal and the consequence is that there is a considerable congestion in the

immediate rear of the armies. We have said that while we might be able to pass the names of these people over the records and examine doubtful cases we cannot possibly do more. We also said that in view of the LINDEMANN case and others it is likely that we may get a small percentage of spies. We cannot hope at present to get much assistance out of the Dutch Security Service. They have not really got going.

I told Thomas that he would probably in future be working under Cussen, and that in some ways he might find it easier, since it ought to be possible for him in future to go down to the DPP himself in stead of being accompanied always by Cookie. He seems quite agreeable to the suggestion.

Brook-Booth is to go to Brussels at SHAEF's request. The DG wants him to see Wick before he starts. SHAEF evidently wish to have a strong representation with Lepage and also with the Belgian Govt.

The D.G. held a meeting about renegades and decided finally to set up a section under Cussen which will be known as SLB3.

At the Wednesday meeting Buster gave us a brief impression of his visit to Brussels. The B. side of work is being done at present by the SCI unit although the intention had been that the I.B. staff would do it but they have not enough staff at present. The local LRC is at Antwerp, run by Torry as chief intelligence officer. Any suspect cases go on to the I.B.

staff at 21st Army Group who decide what further action should be taken. Prison conditions are: tremendous congestion, no privacy for interrogations, no security, and not enough clerical staff. Harmer's outfit is doing excellent work. The great drawback is the lack of any guidance or intelligence from London, owing to the incompetence of the War Room, who do not send on the information supplied for use in the field by this office and others. The same situation applies to the American Army group, who have less experience of their own to draw on and have a further bottleneck in the shape of Comm. Zee in Paris (known as "Comm zee Comme Za").

Shelford said that documents found at Luxembourg has thrown light on the identity of certain hitherto anonymous broadcasters for the German radio. "Lancer" was apparently Baillie Stewart.

Cecil mentioned that the the Admiralty had had a proposal from the F.O. that Spanish merchant ships should be allowed to call at British ports, a thing which has not been allowed since the beginning of the war. Herbert said that this would mean that the crews would have to be examined at LRC and that B.I.L. activities with Spanish seamen would start up again.

Noakes said that NAUJOCKS, the chief thug in the Venlo incident, was now at 520. He had come as a member of the Austrian resistance movement but so far his story appears phoney.

November 9th

I attended a meeting at Kinnaird House, on the subject of Swedish visitors. I said that both the Germans and Japs had links with the Swedish General Staff, the visitors who came here worked to their embassy, and that the Attaches included their remarks in their despatches. These were sent out quite innocently but ultimately reached our enemies. If therefore the services felt that there was information to be picked up in this country of importance it would be better that these visitors were not allowed to come. The view seemed to be that the visits should be postponed, except perhaps those of certain timber merchants who had already been sanctioned.

I took Jenkins and Kellar to lunch. We discussed Jenkins' political reports. Jenkins was very insistent that if political reports were all bottle-necked through Killern they would just be blue-pencilled if they did not happen to agree with Killern's views. Kellar said that he thought it was important that in so far as it was possible Jenkins should get his reports discussed by BTE and PICME etc. If they were agreed by all the principal parties they would carry more weight. If on the other hand certain portions of them were not agreed, he should notify us. He apparently receives reports prepared by the Egyptian police for the Ministry of the Interior. It does not always follow that these reports are accurate. They are nevertheless the basis for action taken by the Ministry of the Interior and in this sense have a certain value. criticism of these reports

reports has arisen in the past, I think probably through a lack of appreciation as to precisely what they are. There is no doubt that Killern's reputation in Egypt is pretty bad. It is more or less common gossip that he made £1300 last year from his duckshoot. Everyone is asked to buy his cartridges through some official who acts for Killern. These are paid for at a prohibitive price. Each person then asked to the shoot is allowed to take away two ducks. The remainder is sold at a considerable profit. Killern also has the reputation of being a heavy gambler. Officials in Egypt are apt to criticise him for his attitude towards the King. They think that he should support the King even though at times the latter may attempt to act in an unconstitutional manner.

I saw Cavendish-Bentinck after lunch and took him Anthony's case against the Swedes. He took the view that the best course would be to drop the document obtained in the Italian Air Ministry on the Swedes at Stockholm with the remark that it would found in Rome and might perhaps interest them. This would have the effect of keeping them guessing. As regards the naval questionnaire he thought we should ask Bertil for an explanation about the question relating to maps. He did not think it would be possible at this stage to get the authorities to turn out the Germans and Japs. This may be due to the fact that at the moment there is some suggestion that Sweden should be asked to join the allies and declare war on Germany and Japan.

I talked to Cavendish-Bentinck about the meeting of the JIC when Cawthorn's paper was discussed. I said that what I had meant to imply was that while a good deal of discussion was going on as to where there were to be JICs, what seemed to me to matter much more was that there should be an efficient organisation to produce the intelligence which the JICs would have to consider. I thought that the whole Mid East area ought to be considered as one and that there ought to be a joint organisation of 5/6 and DIB. Cavendish-Bentinck seemed to think that something of the kind might follow if our relations with 6 could be satisfactorily established, in this country.

I saw Arnold Foster this evening. He told me that the Bland Committee had recommended that some adjustment should be made in the relations between 5 and 6. A copy of the whole report had been sent to C. but he had been told that it was not for circulation within his own dept. I gather however that the question of our relations with 6 had been discussed in a limited circle and that C. had replied agreeing to an enquiry. He had stated that he did not wish in any way to prejudge the issue. He thought that there were various alternatives; total amalgamation, the rump theory or the ACE project. There were certain points however which he would like to make (a) he thought that some adjustment of the present system was necessary, (b) he could not possibly agree to having two clandestine organisations operating on foreign territory, (c) he thought the record should be amalgamated, (d) he could not agree

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

that the collation of C.I. should be done by the Security Service along since it affected too many other depts and indeed was a vital part of his own machinery. I pointed out to Arnold-Foster that (c) was really the answer to (d). He would have the complete run of all the C.I. records and all the protection he wanted. As for the other depts. who were interested in C.I. we were already looking after them as far as it was necessary. It seemed to me rather amusing that at this later hour SIS should wake up to the fact that the defensive organisation could be of some value to the offensive. As adept. the P. Sections will have nothing to do with Section V., neither do the majority of them regard us and in particular the LRC as anything but an organisation whose sole interest is to pry into their affairs. Had they accepted the protection that we could have given them they might have been spared from making many costly blunders. I told A-F that I understood there was to be a high-power committee which was to look into the whole question of our relations. I said that I thought it would be far better for the enquiry to be made by one man who was more or less sympathetic and had some general knowledge of the running of our depts. He asked me who I thought could possibly do this job. We agreed that it was undesirable to have anyone from the E.O. We thought Creedy was too old. I then mentioned Findlater Stewart who I thought was the outstanding chairman of the war, a man of great experience, extremely sound and ready to take endless trouble to go into the smallest detail. He had already had

experience of the work of all govt. depts. and their relations with Intelligence Services, and had impressed with his infinite patience, his powers of finding a solution and of extracting from all witnesses precisely what they had in their minds. A-F said he thought that Stewart was certainly an outstanding man and probably as good as anybody who could be found think therefore that if his name comes up it will at least be favourably considered in SIS.

A-F asked me once more for a copy of my proposals for the absorption of Sections V and IX by our organisation. I said that I was in a difficult position in giving him this because in fact my own Chief did not agree with many of the proposals which I had made. It was therefore rather difficult for me to commit myself to paper. There was no objection to my discussing the whole question with him. A-F said that if he could see this minute again he would give it most earnest consideration and try to get as near to it as he possibly could. I doubt myself whether he will ever stomach the para. about our putting in a circulating section, although as I pointed out to him it was doing nothing more than inserting in his office a few chaps with MI5 experience, who would have the right to make demands upon the outstations and give us full particulars as to how they obtain their information. I told A-F quite bluntly that we were sick and tired of talking through a bottleneck, which was not even a straight one but shaped like a corkscrew. If anything got

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through at all it came out distorted at the other end. We had suffered from this for 5 years and all we were really asking was for the right to talk direct to those who were to be called upon to do the job. Had we for example been able to make contact with the SI representative in Lisbon the endless stream of blunders from which we had suffered might have been avoided. They arose from the fact that our requests were either not transmitted at all, transmitted wrongly or without sufficient background. The result had been lamentable.

a German captured in France, was sent back here some time ago from the field by SIS. We were asked to interrogate him at the LRC as SI wished to employ him, and he apparently was willing to work for them. As he had a French background we stretched a point and allowed him to be sent to the LRC. SI have left him there for 5 weeks and only after repeated requests have at last removed him.

November 10th

The D.G. held a meeting with Kendal, D.P.P. Miss Nunn, Cussen, Dick Butler and myself. The purpose was to get Kendal to let one of his officers work under Joe Stephenson in Paris. Kendal began as one might expect by digging his toes in. He seemed to think that the whole business ought to have been conducted from the Yard. It was pointed out to him however that they would have to work under SHAEF and that they might have to go forward with the T. Force. This rather shook Kendal who eventually agreed that whoever went should so to speak be struck

off the strength of the police. He seemed to think that Burt's people were not quite of the right status, that they were seconded and that they ought really for the purposes of this job to be part of the Army, in the field. We said that we had already made arrangements about suspense commissions, that we could easily put them into uniform. Furthermore that at the moment we only required the services of one man.

I said that I thought that one of Burt's people would be very ready to go. Kendal thought he had better discuss the matter with Burt, to which I heartily agreed. Burt I know is quite satisfied about the arrangement and sees no difficulty whatever. He thinks it extremely important that the cases should be run from this office under Cussen's direction. Miss Nunn was very insistent about final presentation of the case being done by the police. Newsam had taken this view as he thought that renegades should be dealt with as common criminals and not have the glamour of spies. I cannot see very much difference myself. If a man is a traitor he is a traitor, whether his case is presented by the police or the military.

Cassara has been giving a certain amount of trouble. She has written a book of her experiences with us and also with the Germans. She is proposing to get it published. Muggeridge has had a word with her but has not succeeded in getting the MSS. I believe she has been talked to by BSM. I suggested to TAR that they might put up some tame publisher and in that way obtain the MSS. This would not however prevent her Catalogue Reference: KV/46195 doing anything again nor if she had stayed here would it have been possible

204

to prevent her giving the MSS for publication in America.

Patton is apparently doing very well and it has been decided to develop the offensive all along the front instead of waiting until the port of Antwerp is in full swing. A definite attempt is to be made to finish the war in the west by the 31st Jan. It is thought that there is a reasonable chance of doing this. Little progress has been made with the sweeping of the Scheldt but it is thought that the port of Antwerp may be getting going by the end of November.

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November 13th

I had a meeting with TAR, Herbert, Buster and Kellar. I told them all that as far as I could see there was likely to be an enquiry into the relations between ourselves and SIS, either by a high-powered committee or possibly by a single individual, like Findlater. In any event it seemed to me desirable that we should get our minds clear on a whole number of questions that would undoubtedly crop up., What, for example could we say to the H.O. suggestion that we should be split into home and foreign, that our foreign activities should go to SIS and our home activities to the I.O., from we in fact derive most of our powers. Our first answer would be that the division between home and foreign was the chief evil from which we had been suffering during the whole war.. We had all of us come to the conclusion, including SIS, that the barrier between the two was a ridiculous barrier.

246
Secondly we thought that espionage, subversive movements and security were one and indivisible. Thirdly we thought it was generally inadvisable for an office like the Security Service to be attached definitely to any one department since it had to tender advice to all depts. If it were tied up with any particular one its advice would be regarded as prejudiced. Fourthly we had very definite commitments for the fighting services and we had in fact planned the whole C.I. for the second front in addition to supplying some 80 people. A very good example to quote in connection with advice to govt. depts. would be the visitors ban. We had on that occasion taken the view which ultimately prevailed and which was diametrically opposed to the H.O. view. At the outbreak of war it was K's leaning towards the H.O. that got him wrong with the Services and to a large extent resulted in his downfall. Herbert undertook to produce a paper on this matter and also to raise other points on which we should have a further discussion. There is for example the question of RSS, the question of Mid East, of special material, of whether we should have a place on the Y. Board, and lastly our DSO points. All these are matters on which we should try and speak with one voice.

I had a talk with Grogan about the suggestion to re-open the mails from this country and from America to liberated territory. Grogan tells me that there will be 100% censorship and testing for secret ink against a watch list and also in the cases of any suspicious looking texts. Grogan thinks the idea a good one since the Catalogue Reference: KV/4/195 illicit material that the situation is quite out of hand. Once

postal communication is re-established, it will in addition to being contrary by army regulations, be contrary to D.R.s. to carry letters. I mentioned to Grogan that I thought the mails of allied armies here should be looked at fairly carefully since we were expecting 10,000 Dutchmen and probably as many Belgians back in this country before long. It was not unlikely that there would be a small sprinkling of spies amongst them.

TAR, Herbert, Buster and I had a meeting about the future of the War Room. It seemed to us desirable that we should let Dick have our views fairly positively when he returns. T- who had been over to see me earlier today, said that he was not altogether in agreement with Dick. He thought that we should be making a mistake if we do not give nominal control of the War Room To C. He argued that ultimately ISOS was the only sure source, that ISK had an operational value and that its security was in the hands of C. backed by the PM. Any attempt therefore to lessen C's control over Most Secret Sources is probably doomed to failure. T-R thought that while making the gesture to C. somebody from our dept. should be placed in charge of the War Room. He told me privately that he thought Buster would be the person. Personally I do not agree with T-R's views that the only sure source of information was ISOS. In fact we had through interrogation of large numbers of people established beyond doubt almost all the facts relating to the organisation and personalities in the Abwehr and SD. Our records therefore were basically as sound as the ISOS index, as Catalogue Reference: KV/4/195r more comprehensive.

Secondly I was opposed to conceding the principle that the War Room should be an SI- concern. We had fought strongly against this. We had demonstrated beyond all question or doubt that CI in the field had to be carried largely by people of MI5 experience and what was being done in the field therefore should have its counterpart at home. To get over the difficulty I thought that the War Room should be under SHAEF control. The work would be done in both depts. but SHAEF would be responsible. Buster thought there might be a small committee consisting of a representative of SHAEF, MI5, MI6 and OSS. SHAEF would be in the chair and ultimately responsible to the head of the CI staff in the field. Various other alternative suggestions were put up. These will be noted in a memo by Buster which we shall have to discuss with Dick.

Thomas came to see me about the case of a I/W who has confessed that he was given a mission by the Germans. The man is a gunner. There is reason to think that he is mentally deficient.

Peter Loxley has replied in the case of HARPLEY saying that Codrington and Inspector Smith of S.Y. have expressed themselves as being satisfied that there is no security interest in the case. If we have any information to the contrary they would be glad to have it. It is of course quite ridiculous that Codrington should be handling a matter of this kind. He has no knowledge of investigation and no real facilities, neither had he any background. Had we been interrogating HARPLEY we should probably have

put him and his lady friend on check in order to test their reactions. Had a case such as HARPLEY's arisen in any other Govt. Dept. we should undoubtedly have been called in.

I understand that Goddington has sent HARPLEY back to Madrid. He had no right to do this until we were satisfied about the case and as a matter of courtesy we should at least have been consulted.

The D.G. has seen Bridges. He gave him some notes about the organisation explaining carefully that they were only a few thoughts passing through his mind and that if he were asked to put up a memo on the future of the office he might have done something very different. It seems that Findlater Stewart was due to call on Bridges today but for what purpose is not known. Bridges has I think already written to Cadogan suggesting that Findlater should conduct the enquiry.

The murderers of Lord Moyne are Eliahou Hakim and Eliahou Tsoury. There has been discovered in a Cairo hide-out two British uniforms, two A.B.64s, one Navy pay-book, 6 blank leave passes, and 14 cubes of cordite, 6 cases of TNT and 612 rounds of Luger ammunition. The two men were seen in uniform on Oct. 27th. Other members of the Stern Gang are said to be still at large in Egypt. I believe that the PM has been considerably moved by the assassination of Lord Moyne and that in consequence he is not quite so favourable towards the claims of the Zionists as he was.

The Tirpitz has been sunk and is lying on the bottom with her keel out of the water some 4 miles north of Tromsø. She has been hit by 3 12,000 lb bombs dropped by Lancasters.

Complications have arisen in the Brutus case owing to the arrest of Violette in France and the fact that Victoire may have to be deported to France. We may have to wind the case up.

When Burt and Cussen went to interview ZIGZAG and to inform him that we proposed to dispense with his services they found in his house the notorious McCartney, who got 10 years for Soviet espionage. ZIGZAG implied that he had a guest and suggested that they should meet in the bedroom. Burt however pushed his way into the sitting room and found his old friend McCartney. ZIGZAG undoubtedly got the impression that we were aware of his association with M. and that it was on these grounds that we were really getting rid of him. He admitted to us that he had discussed with M. the writing of his book. ZIGZAG accepted his dismissal and did not substantially dispute that the grounds for it were well-founded. We shall probably let him have a further £1,000 and two cameras which he brought over with him on his last trip. The Germans did not keep their appointment with Sniper last Saturday, probably owing to bad weather. Father returned to this country last August. It is now proposed that the transmitter in India shall be taken over by a subagent and that Father should be supposed to have returned to this country prior to repatriation to Belgium. In this way his real and notional situation will

again coincide. Father may have to resume letter writing from this country. Meanwhile we have heard that the Germans have a transmitter waiting for him in Belgium.

Notwithstanding the position in the Treasure case, the Germans seem to incorporate her messages in their high command communiques. The Germans state inter alia that reports on V2 received by them show that extremely serious damage has occurred in the Camberwell, Mitcham, Sidcup and Edmonton areas. This is taken almost verbatim from a Treasure report dated 25.10. which names these four districts in the same order as they appear in the German communique.

• V2 burst at about 8.30 pm on the 12th about 20 miles up over Westminster. Pieces fell in Camberwell, Paddington and Victoria.

SHAEF CI report for week ending 10th Nov. gives the following information: The HQ of the GIS is according to a captured agent gravely dissatisfied with the work of its outstations.

○ Tightening up has been ordered and periodic instructions promised. There are two parachute operations in preparation in Belgium and France. The GIS in N. Italy has despatched agents to work on the French Mediterranean coast. The capture of two SA agents indicates that on the Moselle front a control group directs the activities of 4 groups each of about 40 officers and men including 15 Frenchmen, each group having its own sphere of operation. Two new type of line-crossers have appeared, assassination

agents and convict agents. Two have been caught who had an assignment to assassinate two Belgians described as enemies of the Reich. The latter class are mainly ex-Vichy prisoners estimated at 150 strong based at Strasbourg. The Direction General des Services Speciaux and the HQ of the FFI have now reached an agreement according to which the FFI will have a Security Service which will be called Service Nationale and will accept direction from the Bureaux des Securities Militaires. BSM will have the responsibility of presenting all security cases to the military tribunals.

November 14th

Anthony and I went to the JIC this morning when the question of Jap Embassies in neutral countries was discussed. C. was anxious to see the Japs kicked out of Stockholm. He said their relations with the Finns were causing him serious embarrassment. Bevan on the other hand said that he had a very good line running at Stockholm which was putting his stuff direct through to Tokio. It was pointed out that in so far as security in this country was concerned the Swedish attaches here would always be a danger as long as both the Germans and the Japs had access to information in possession of the Swedish General Staff. The menace would not be halved by simply kicking out the Japs. It was felt therefore that on balance the best thing to do was to leave matters as they are until Stage A. and then press for the removal of the Japs.

I talked to Bevan afterwards. He said that SEAC did attach a certain importance to deception channels in regard to Japan. He agreed however that it was open to some doubt as to whether any channels west of Suez were of very great use.

Burt tells me that Cookie is going to Brussels to see the local JAG. on the COURLANDER case.

This is of course another insult to the CID officers. Skardon should be the one to go and in any case Cookie should not go without him. I have spoken to Cussen who thinks that Cookie will have to go but it may be possible to get Skardon there as well.

I saw Arnold-Foster. I handed him a copy of my note and read him out a letter which I had prepared in which I stated that I was giving him this information quite unofficially and off the record since it was merely a cockshy of my own, in an attempt to find some better line of demarcation between ourselves and Section V. I quite realised that if you had a dividing line at all there was bound to be a certain amount of over-lapping and friction but I thought the one I was suggesting was at least a better one than at present. I was considering the matter firstly in the event of a united organisation being thrown out by the politicians and secondly as a dividing line which would have to exist even within a united organisation. Foster still seemed worried about the suggestion that a Section should be seconded to SIS which would virtually give directions to outstations.

Foster still seemed worried about the suggestion that a section should be seconded to SIS which would virtually give directions to outstations. I said that I could see no real difficulty in this since both C and his representative abroad would have the right of veto. Such an arrangement however would ensure that the man on the spot knew precisely what we wanted, and that we were informed of the circumstances under which we obtained the answers to our questions. I think Foster agreed about our definition of CE and I think that he was perhaps more inclined than before to agree that anything outside this definition was a matter for the offensive services. He seemed very keen that if possible we should both advocate at any rate in the first instance a united show, but was afraid that we might run out on this idea. I said that we had only been appalled by its difficulties, but that I, and I thought also Dick and TAR, were quite ready to support the idea. I could not however say as much for the DG since I knew quite well that he would not.

November 15th

Wibroe came to see me and I showed him a note that I had had from the FO. They are definitely interested in the Danish approach but cannot give a final answer just at this moment. Probably in the course of a month or so they will have a better idea how Denmark is going to come into the picture. They will then reopen the matter. Haigh of the FO was very pleased to meet Wibroe who has been able

Catalogue Reference KV/4/195 about Danes and Danish

politics. It is important when the matter is re-opened that the head of the Danish Resistance Movement sees somebody of fairly high standing.

November 16th

I had a meeting with TAR, Ede and Airy this morning. It has been agreed that Airy should be attached to SEAC as our Security Liaison Officer. CASS formerly of this dept. has been appointed GSOL, IB. Airy is wanted as adviser on Civil Security matters and will be responsible for co-ordinating his DSO staffs with the C.I. staffs. Mean while Ede has had a meeting with Felix. It seems that he has given up the idea of SCI units for Burma, but that he is proposing to send them to Malaya. It looks to me as if Fergie had failed to get the services of anyone locally for the Burmese campaign and that in any case perhaps it was a bit late in the day. The SCI units are to go forward with the armies and to remain as part of the CI staff until the area is handed over to the civil government. It is by no means clear what these units are going to contribute or what qualifications they have.

I attended the RSLOs conference. They had already had a meeting in the morning and had decided that in the near future there should be only 4 R.O.s, 3 for England and one for Scotland. They would have a residence in the centre of their area but no office. They would travel about seeing C.C.'s for 3 weeks and then return to head office for a week. A record of all letters sent out to CCs affecting their areas would be kept at head office which they would also study. They would also

aquaint themselves in London with any new developments in order that this might be imparted to C.C.s. It was anticipated that they would not be able to visit a C.C. more than once every three months. I said that I rather wondered whether C.C.s would take the same view of an RSLO if he had not got an office. I thought that they rather liked to feel that the RSLO belonged to them rather than to head office and that they could when necessary use him as a stick to beat head office. RSLOs seemed to think that provided the visiting officer performed his job properly the right atmosphere could be created. I then said that I thought C.C.s would probably want to discuss cases but that on these the visiting officer might be anything up to 3 weeks out of date and in any case would not have the same knowledge as the section officer. It seemed to me that there was a risk that in consequence he might become rather a bore, just one of those people who come around to talk but having really nothing to say. Phipps seemed to agree with this and that special care would have to be taken to see that RSLOs were well informed. I then raised the question of factory security. I suggested that this might be carried by R.O.s with a small section representing the 3 services in London. Col. Barry thought that this was well worth considering.

I am told that a meeting was held today to discuss Dick's suggestion about the reorganisation of the War Room. It has apparently been turned down flat, and there is to be an

Albert Hall meeting at Ryder St. tomorrow.
Dick has just arrived.

The technical adviser on material production at MAP, a certain Major P.L. TEED, has expressed the view officially that there were four grave defects in the air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, namely (a) Germany was allowed to maintain, operate and build commercial and civilian aircraft. (b) there were no effective provisions to prevent German aircraft firms from starting or joining aircraft businesses in such neutral countries as Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden. (c) German aeronautical experts were allowed to exercise their calling in neutral countries and even in those of the allied and associated powers. (d) German firms were not prevented from starting commercial air lines either within or more particularly outside the Reich. This all seems very sound and I hope some competent person will take note. It is equally desirable to keep our own industry clear of the LACHMANNs.

November 17th

Dick arrived yesterday evening and dined with me. I told him that there was likely to be a certain amount of opposition to his plan. He feels however that there is an over-whelming case and that SANEF are quite determined that something should be done. It will not do for him to go back and say that no very drastic change is contemplated. I told him about our meeting and showed him a copy of Euster's note. He thought that our suggestion of a

small co-ordinating committee might work. I gather that Kenneth Strong has turned down the suggestion that Dick should be placed in charge of the War Room. Strong has woken up to the fact that C.I. is going to be a major problem, that he does not know much about the job himself, that Sheen knows still less and that his reputation will depend a good deal on Dick. He nevertheless is aware of the bargain he has made with the D.G. He wants to get it modified. It is I think important that Dick should come back for any discussions as regards the future relations between 5 and 6. Apart from this he could I think be spared for the time being. The latest interpretation of SHAEF is "Should have had army experience first". SEAC is "Supreme example allied confusion".

We had a full dress meeting this morning with Dick, Buster, TAR, Herbert and Joe Stephenson. We went over all the ground in order to prepare Dick for his meeting today with SIS. The meeting took place and was chaired by C. Viv, Cowgill, Arnold-Foster and the Commissar were also present. The wind was slightly taken out of Dick's sails at the beginning by a statement that had he not come over SIS were going to ask him to do so in order that he might consider the plan that they had formulated for the German War Room. Dick said he would be very pleased to consider this plan, but that he must make it clear that SHAEF were not satisfied with the present arrangements and that they wished to exercise

some measure of control over any future organisation that was set up, since they regarded it as an integral part of SHAEF machinery. C. appeared to dissent. He doubted whether he could submit to SHAEF's jurisdiction. I suppose what he means is that if SHAEF were in control he would have to abrogate his responsibility for Most Secret Sources. This he could not do as he has a mandate from the PM. The truth is of course that Section V. had performed their task properly such a situation would never have arisen. The armies in the field would have had confidence that the work was being done properly and would not wish to interfere in any way. Personally I think it is essential that there should be some sort of SHAEF control if only to settle the differences between 5 and 6. I gather that the meeting was not hostile but it was packed with people who of course were quite unaware of what had been going on within their own organisation. The only person who might have known would have been Felix who would have been incapable of appreciating how bad it was.

Kellar brought Guy Thompson to see me. He has been SIME's DSO in Istanbul since Oct. 41. There is no doubt that he worked up an extremely close liaison with the Turks, that he has through his efforts obtained photographs and particulars of all aliens passing through Turkey, quite apart from other information relating to German activities and to the running of agents. This outpost of SIME had served an extremely useful purpose. We asked how it was that Mr. Roberts in conversation

with Marhsall-Cornwall and Felix had decided to give it up. Thompson said that this was only subject to our approval. Roberts had arranged with Cowgill to hand over to SIME officers who would continue the work. The only difference was that it would come under ISLD instead of SIME. SIME would have the right to communicate direct with these officers sending a copy to ISLD. In other words once more ISLD should get the kudos for what some other organisation had done. I said that it was quite impossible for us to object in this matter except unofficially. The only people who could veto this scheme would be the organisation to which SIME was responsible, namely the Defence Committee and ultimately the Resident Minister. SIME should say that for the time being at any rate their organisation should continue. It had worked efficiently and given the armed forces the products they required. As long as there was a military responsibility therefore they could not carry out any change. Ultimately any such change would be dependent on the re-organisation of intelligence in the Mid East as a whole. It was agreed that we should communicate in this sense with Roberts and urge him to seek the support of Agent.

Thompson said that he had seen the Chief of the Turkish Secret Service before he left. The latter had made a suggestion to him that they should have some exchange of information on Russia. Turkey regarded Russia as her greatest danger and was anxious that we should keep each other informed. Thompson said that he took an indifferent attitude but said

he would inform his superiors when he got to London. Obviously I think this is a matter on which it would be difficult for us to collaborate without grave risk of incurring the displeasure of the A.O. I explained to Thompson that whatever safeguards were instituted we should have to take it that ultimately the fact that we were collaborating with the Turks would reach the Russians who were extremely touchy about our relations with Turkey. Apart from this there was probably very little that the Turks could tell us. We on the other hand might be in a position to tell them a great deal, but we should be unable to for obvious reasons. In other words the liaison as far as we were concerned would be to some extent one-sided.

Brook-Booth came to tell me that he had been offered a job by UNRRA at £13,00 a year at Luxembourg, with expenses. He had turned that down. He had now been offered a similar job in Brussels at £1,500 plus expenses amounting to something like £2 a day. He said he did not wish to take the job on even though it was more lucrative than the SDAEF job. He did however wish to know whether the SDAEF job was a firm one and whether he would be given the rank of Lt. Col. without which he did not think he could operate. The matter was urgent as Lehmann was having a meeting this afternoon and wanted Brook-Booth's answer by 5.30. I asked B-B to stall things and told him to speak to Dick.

proposal about the WarRoom is being approached from the angle of being one more attempt by MI5 to penetrate the continent. This is certainly V.Vs view.

November 18th

V.V. rang me up this morning to say that he would very much like to see Dick. He was not quite sure whether he would attend this afternoon's meeting or not. He could do so if Dick wished him to. The trouble was that he was never kept very au fait with what was going on. He thought obviously that he would have to take a greater hand in future events and it would be desirable for him to visit SHAEF and Brussels. He thought Dick was probably not aware that plans had been made with regard to the German War Room, and that the present War Room was really only improvised to deal with the transitory period. I told V.V. that I had not actually inspected the workings of the war room myself but that as he knew we had representatives there from whom I heard a certain amount. It seemed to me that an immense amount of time was wasted by all the officers who were forced to do their own registry work and that in fact some name, e.g. that of a Belgian who had turned up in France and had subsequently gone to Germany, had to be carded in 3 places. I also told V.V. that as I understood the position his officers no longer consulted their own main registry for German names and indeed for a good many other names, the reason being that they never got any results. On the other hand it seemed to me that Colin Roberts' section which dealt

with the ISOS Index was working well. I also told him that we were doing an immense amount of work but that in fact the results of our labours were not reaching the front because there was nobody in the war room sufficiently competent to realise the significance of things. V.V. was obviously in total ignorance of everything that had been going on. He did however mention one incident which had been

brought to his notice by what he described as a rather undesirable channel, namely T-R: I am sure that he does not realise that it is quite impossible to patch up the war room and that the fundamental troubles are lack of a registry and lack of experienced personnel.

Brook-Booth tells me that Lepage has been pushed out. We do not know the circumstances.

TAR Ede Herbert and Teresa came to talk about Gib and Kirby-Green, who is obviously in a rather nervy state, probably due to the fact that he has been on the rock for nearly 3 years. It seems clear that he must either get a long spell of leave or else be sent to another station. We came to the conclusion in the end that probably David Scherz could hold the fort during his absence but that if this were not possible Michael Hyde should go.

Paillole, or his successor, since I believe he too has been given the sack, is being informed about Brutus and is being asked to sidetrack any enquiries about the latter's escape from prison. Meanwhile Victoire is to remain here. Treasure is now employed near Verdun and as far as can be gathered from an obscure telegram

264
from the field, has aroused some suspicion in the minds of 12th AG. The latter have been referred to Lykes for full particulars.

Gelatine has been given a fresh questionnaire and some words of encouragement.

Capt. Gache of M.I. 14d, Brian Melland and Field-Robinson are continuing with the case of WENGENFELD, whose story has recently been studied by Columbine. Columbine has pointed out several discrepancies and thinks that the whole plan is impractical. It would be quite impossible for WENGENFELDT to gain access to Himmler's office. Columbine thinks it possible that WENGENFELDT may have invented the plan to win sympathy and pose as a hero. Either way he stood to profit. If we turned the scheme down he would have the credit of proposing it without the onus of carrying it through. If we accepted it and gave him the required facilities it would be simple to return to his countrymen and relate how he had hoodwinked the British Secret Service into giving him a return trip to Germany complete with car. Arrangements are being made for Columbine to interview WEGENFELDT.

Mail service between Switzerland, US and UK has been reopened since the 10th Nov. This service includes letter mail only and not parcels.

Two of the beavers have put up quite an interesting paper on the re-formation of the German I.S. after the last war. During the

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

last war the big industrialists had directed an industrial intelligence service which was run from neutral territory and it was they who in 1920 formed the Deutsche Überseedienst. This was an official organisation which was ostensibly to acquire commercial information to enable Germany to start up her export trade. It very soon became a cover for illicit activities, which were organised by members of the German staff. Certain officers from the last-war Intelligence Dept., known as Abt. 3(b) were given sinecure positions in various commercial houses enabling them to continue their intelligence activities. Foremost among the industrialists were Hugenberg, Thyssen, Stinnes and Voegler, who undertook to supply two-thirds of the necessary fees while the Govt. found the remainder. The ultimate control in Germany was in the hands of 3 industrialists and 3 staff officers representing the services. It is interesting to note that the air officer was Capt. Goering. There is evidence that there were many similar organisations operating at this time, for instance the Ost dienst and the Wirtschaftsdienst. Associated with these were the numerous similar concerns such as the Wirtschafts Politische Gesellschaft and many groups of journalists who had ample members and cover to run secret reporting services. Tho' these organisations were previously thought to have worked independently there are indications that they were in some way linked. It is possible that the collation of their separate information took place in the Nuntia Bureau, an office affiliated to the Überseedienst. At some date prior to 1920, the govt. took complete control of the

26⁶
Uberseedienst. Officials of the USD appear to have been on good terms with the national socialists, probably because the latter were at one time financed by the directors of heavy industry. Freiherr Freytag von Loeringhoven was at one time head of Abt. 2 of the Abwehr in this war and was reported as having been liquidated in the July 44 Putsch. Goering was one of the committee of 6 controlling the USD. Before that date, and more actively since, the position of the Abwehr vis a vis the SD has rapidly deteriorated and the whole organisation now comes directly under Hammler.

A Hill-Dillon report for November 4th states proudly that since - Day C.I. investigations in the Athens-Piraeus area have resulted in the arrest of some 40 enemy agents, sub-agents and contacts, and some 13 W/T sets, also a small quantity of sabotage material.

The Portuguese Govt. have quite spontaneously decided to hold WERTZ and his associates from Lourenzo Marques against the release of allied nationals. This action seems peculiar in the light of Portugal having given these Germans a safe conduct. I have suggested to SIS that Stevens might be a good exchange for WERTZ. Calude Dansey, with whom I spoke said he would be glad to get back a Frenchman for one of the others.

A Jap B.J. indicates that the Japs are intending to set up an office under Red Cross cover in Geneva for the purposes of espionage. Both they and the Germans have come to the conclusion

that Switzerland is a useful base from which to take action against British and American forces in France. I am trying to find out whether this information ever reaches C.I. at SHAEF or whether anybody gets any reports about German and Jap activities in Switzerland.

Joe Stephenson has written an interesting report on the "War Room in so far as it is possible for anyone to discover what goes on. Herbert has described it as a kind of jelly which oozes out between your fingers when you try to grip on to it and Joe concludes his report by saying that until the "War Room acquires or are partly or wholly replaced by the quality and experience of MI5 officers without whose work they would be lost and the field be almost completely uninformed, their function is likely to remain not merely unproductive but contraceptive.

November 19th

C.I. reports of the 1st U.S. A.G. stated that the observance by German civilians of security restrictions imposed by the military government has been completely satisfactory.

Local officials are reported to have strictly enforced our proclamations and have co-operated to the extent of arresting and turning over to C.I. persons discovered without papers or whose residence in the area was considered suspicious. A test of reliability by local informants was made in one area by checking their views on Nazis known to them against lists found at NSDAP HQ. In all cases the information agreed

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

substantially with that found on the party file. It is further stated that early detection of prominent Nazis by the military authorities tends to loosen up potential informants who are given a feeling of confidence. It is recommended that this should be done in all areas so that CIC can gain information about prospective officials prior to their appointment.

In reading a CI report of the American 12th AG I found two entries for a man called de CORTE who was wanted. It was clear firstly that the two individuals mentioned were identical with each other (though the Americans had not linked them up) and secondly with Armande deCORTE who has been under interrogation at O20 for some considerable time. There is clearly a lack of co-ordination here. What is obvious from the two entries in the American report is that the U.S. C.I. units have clearly got information from some quarter or other about de CORTE which might be extremely valuable to us in dealing with his case here.

November 20th

I had a long meeting this morning with Dick, Horrocks, Buster and TAR. Dick produced a cockshy plan drafted by Tim Milne. As a face-saving clause it was suggested that a registry should be set up on the lines of MI5. Milne I think is quite convinced that this registry will in fact have to be the RB registry. There is to be a special section for dealing with

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

documents and another for preparing general directions. There is no doubt that all the junior ranks are longing for us to take over. The chief trouble arises with the personality of Felix.

Dick is working towards certain agreed principles which he wishes to have endorsed by C. and the D.G. I have merely stipulated that in so far as it is possible it would be undesirable to uproot Milmo, Bird and Hart and place them in another office. Firstly I need them as a kind of advisory council, secondly they are doing at least 25% of their work for D. Division and thirdly if some of them have to be moved it could only result in our giving less service to the front than we are giving at the present moment and also less service to this dept. I do not think that Dick quite realises the extent to which D. Division is a unit and that if you take away all the principal heads of sections and put them somewhere else the loss of efficiency is going to be considerable. The other thing he does not realise is that unless I am intending to write all the memos and decide all the questions of policy singlehanded or with TAR, many extremely dreary problems which are nevertheless important to the office now and in the future are likely to go to the wall. This is not to say that we do not intend to do everything for the front that we possibly can, but when we are asked to damage the efficiency of our own organisation and cut our contribution to the armies in the field in order to cover up the deficiencies of Section V. I cannot help feeling a little irritated.

Joe Lynch came to see me this afternoon. He said that George Burton had resigned from the FBI in order to join the Army. This I am afraid will be a serious blow to Cyril and to us. Burton has always been extremely co-operative. Joe thinks that Cannon will probably take his place. The latter is a dear not a patch on Burton. He is a pleasant little man but not one who will likely accept responsibility.

The Jap in Berlin has spent an evening with Goebbels. The Jap seems to have been under no illusions that he was getting a set piece intended to set his mind at rest through an expression of German confidence in their plans for stabilising the situation on the various war fronts and through a frank revelation that Germany was anxious for a political settlement with Russia. Goebbels apparently intimated that Vlasov's army had to be used entirely for internal purposes and would not in any way hamper Germany's future foreign policy.

I dined with Hollis, who is very worried about Curry. Curry wants to continue dealing with ISCOT. Hollis feels that this must come within his section and that if anybody is to attend the meetings at SIS which Curry has been attending it must be someone from F. Div. In this I think he is right but it is of course a blow to the old man and he feels that his new born baby is being snatched from his arms.

I met Radgham afterwards, and had a short talk with him. He is at KV/4/195 about working for PWE

thought I believe is not very happy. He was obviously glad to talk about his work in 1939-40. He wants to go back to Germany as soon as this possible but there maybe difficulties since his property will probably be in the Russian zone. I thanked him for what he had done in the past and he seemed pleased.

November 21st

The French have arrested PG. WODEHOUSE and his wife, and Cussen is to go over to Paris to sort things out. This will precipitate some decision in the HO as to how these characters are to be dealt with in future. I imagine that this has come about quite naturally, The French who were arresting all collaborators would naturally find it embarrassing to have WODEHOUSE, so notorious a character, hanging about in the Hotel Bristol and have doubtless been criticised in consequence. The matter may in part be due to the resignation of Pailloole who knew about WODEHOUSE and agreed to his being left at large. His successor may have different views.

I was able to see Dick for a few minutes this evening. His departure has been postponed till Friday. He has to await the arrival of Keith. This probably relates to Maunsell's future. Dick, in talking to RJ, told him that he did not think he was going to get a very good deal, a point which RJ had I think already appreciated. Dick I think was rather inclined to urge him to pack up, but RJ not unnaturally replied "I have burned my boats in the Mid East and

what do MI5 propose to do for me". Actually I do not think that we are under any particular obligation to RJ unless and until the Army say they no longer have any use for his service. RJ I gather would like to have a permanent job in this office and fancies himself as DA if and when Charles gives up. I told Dick I could not see RJ in this office in any capacity. Were he prepared to take on something in the nature of DSO Singapore one might consider it. If he were anywhere nearer he would undoubtedly be intriguing against whoever was in charge. He has got much too big for his boots to sit still in an office like ours in peace time.

Dick himself is I think determined not to take on CI in Germany which Kenneth Strong would doubtless like him to do. I told him that I should be delighted to see him back at any time but if he thought he had more of a career by taking a big job in Germany he was free to make his own decision. Personally I thought he would in the long run be making a mistake. He entirely agreed and expressed the desire to return as soon as he could be released.

Dick is putting up certain positive proposals to C and the D^o about the War Room. The DG is taking the attitude that it is for SIAEF to decide and that he will not be left to wrangle the thing out with C. I told Dick that we were giving as much service as we possibly could to the front but that if we were to be uprooted and stuck in Bryanstone Sq. we should not be able to do so much and that the efficiency of B. Liv. as a whole would be seriously impaired. I could only contemplate letting

B.LB, Bird and Hart pass over in toto to the War Room if we all moved into one building. This to my mind would be the right step both for now and in the future. D.Div. and Section V could move in first, to be followed immediately by the rest of SJ and Broadway and finally by the registry.

November 22nd

At the Wednesday meeting Herbert said that a new series of Ostro reports were now coming in from West Africa, which seemed to have more foundation than his previous efforts. His sources are probably air-liner crews and passengers.

Herbert also spoke of the case of GOLENKO. He is a White Russian, rabidly anti-Bolshevik, who will work for anyone so long as it is against the Soviets. He had worked for the Germans for 4 years intercepting Russian radio-telephone traffic and is an expert on the subject. He was left as a stay-behind agent in Paris, and was taken over by the Americans. They have brought him to the U.K. and installed him at Claridges. He is 65. We propose to have him examined at LRC, but unless there is a strong case for his retention he will be sent back to Paris.

Ian Wilson mentioned the case of MIERSEMAN, who has been used by the Germans to run captured SIS and SOE agents as D.As for the other side.

Teresa Clay mentioned a captured SD agent, a Swiss called NAGEL, who is in our hands in Paris. This man has an extensive knowledge of the SD organisation, and of sabotage dumps in the Black Forest, Alsace etc. He had a mission to blow up pipe lines. It is not certain yet whether we can bring him over, as the Americans want to keep him on the spot as a reference and guide to the dumps.

Hughes said that there seemed to be an increase of V.2's over the last week, 24 out of 30 reaching the greater London area, and 12 of these landing round the docks. In some cases propaganda leaflets had come down after the arrival of a rocket.

Burt and Skardon are going off to Paris with Joe Stephenson on Friday. Burt as a Major and Skardon as a Captain.

I learn from B-W that the general tendency in Section V is to plump for an SIS representative as head of the War Room. I think C. has been prompted in this matter by T-R and Felix, for different motives. T-R wants to exclude Felix and takes the view that SIS must control the secret sources and that the ISOS index is really the most important contribution. In this I think he is wrong. The index is of course important but it is quite erroneous to say that any information not checked by ISOS has no real value, from the point of view of action. There are so many things in fact which have been checked and cross-checked from interrogation reports that their reliability is a point of no doubt whatever.

There was a certain amount of argument as to whether the War Room should deal not only with the Abwehr and SD but also with other possible underground movements. In so far as it may be possible I think that they should deal with everything affecting the liquidation of the Nazis in Germany. Section V. have handed over underground movements other than SD and Abwehr to Section IX who are putting their queries about Germans to Miss Bagot.

Curry came to see me yesterday about the history of the office which he is to write up. He was in some doubt as to the form it should take and felt that it would be difficult to make up his mind until he got all the contributions. I said I thought he ought to make up his mind and guide the sections in the preparation of the material. I was inclined to think that he should write up the intelligence of the organisation altogether i.e. he should state the position at the outbreak of war and show how each piece of machinery had been created to meet the various contingencies as they arose.

Hollis talked to me about the Ossewa Brandweg. He thought this ought perhaps to be an F.3 commitment. This is in a way a rather difficult question. The main interest in the O.B. was that the Germans were controlling it and that it was really an instrument of Abt. 2. It has however considerable local importance within the framework of S. African politics, since it advocates cessation from the Empire. This is I think one more instance of how difficult it is to separate the sub-

espionage. In point of fact we are not very well placed for obtaining much information about the OB except from what we may learn from MSS. We shall certainly not be told anything by the S. African police, until they have been properly reconstituted and the worst Afrikaans elements thrown out.

Harry consulted me about the situation in Gib. The W.O. wanted to withdraw the guards. They described them as personnel employed on anti-sabotage duties. We wired out to Kirby-Green and received the reply that all these people were employed on normal guard duties and would have to perform these duties whether or not there was any danger of sabotage. This is a thing of course that the W.O. might have found out for themselves. We have said that the sabotage risk must remain until Stage A, although the present political situation in Spain should cause the Spanish Govt. to be less inclined to condone acts of sabotage than had formerly been the case.

Niall MacDermott is anxious to get hold of Noakes who would act in a B.LB capacity vis a vis the forward CSDIC cum 020 camp. This camp is I gather to come into being about the middle of next month.

Herbert came to consult me about the case of GOLENKO. This man is in our view not a menace to security. He is quite frank about his association with the German I.S. which was based entirely on his hatred of the Russians. He has considerable technical knowledge of wireless and telephones. He has I gather

devised some de-scrambling instrument and also a special instrument for intercepting telephone conversations. We are allowing the Americans to give him a certain amount of liberty until Monday when they return him to France. He has not give an undertaking not make any visits or establish contact with anyone here without our approval; to ensure that he keeps to his undertaking we are asking B.6 to keep him under observation.

Noakes tells me that WENGENFELDT has been broken by Columbine. Columbine says that the man is not an officer at all and that his whole project was merely a blind in order to get back to Germany. Columbine was evidently thoroughly worked up about the whole case and seizing the man by the collar accused him of being a liar and made him confess in front of Gache of M.I.14. It seems that Columbine annoyance was based more than anything on the fact that a private had had the impertinence to pose as an officer.

November 23rd

TAR, Milmo, Kellar and Bird came to discuss Abwehr and SD cases in Italy and the Balkans. It was agreed that there were characters coming from both these areas who had knowledge of Abwehr and SD activities in Germany and whose cases should therefore really be examined here in the light of our information. There was perhaps a tendency to regard the western front as more important than the Italian and Balkan fronts. The situation was really governed by

the actions of the characters captured. In the case of Italy distance was a factor and it was not easy to give that from the same service as we were giving to the western front. It was felt however that the liaison should be considerably improved. Bird is to draft a letter to John Mair in order to ascertain from him whether a visit by Bird to the Italian theatre would be well received.

Hart talked about the case of GOLENKO. It has now been discovered beyond doubt that he is a stay-behind agent. Mrs. Spring happened to see a reference on an ISOS card for a man called GUSTAV. The facts fitted GOLENKO and checked up with certain information found in his diary. This led to other traces of Gustav showing that he had been working for the Germans as late as August 1944 and that his whole story about his having refused to go back to Germany was a lie. GOLENKO is now at 020 which he will find somewhat of a change from Claridges.

Barry came to see me about the screening of personnel enlisted into allied armies, particularly P/Ws who are to be sent back here for training. We are saying to SHAEF that we are prepared to accept these people provided adequate screening is done on the continent. We cannot do more than examine such cases as the allied authorities think are unsatisfactory. We can also put doubtful cases over our records.

A suggestion has recently been put forward that German P/Ws should be accommodated in N. Ireland. We are telling the WO that any of these prison-

ers who escape to Eire would according to international law have to remain at large and that it would be difficult to hold the Eire Govt. responsible for their activities. We have also pointed out that the presence of these German P/W in N. Ireland may well provide an incentive to the Germans already interned in Eire to evade parole and to extremist IRA elements in Eire and N. Ireland to attempt to rescue. An incident of this sort which might result in casualties on both sides would be most unfortunate and owing to the peculiar circumstances would have consequences out of all proportion to its own importance.

We had a meeting with the D.G. at which Dick, Milmo, Butler and myself were present. Dick put forward his main principles about the War Room. I made it quite clear that as far as I was concerned the situation boiled down to a matter of location. If my division was going to be uprooted in part we could give less assistance to the War Room and should lose considerably in our own efficiency. If on the other hand we could all be in the same building the problem could be easily solved. The DG seemed to be against a move, against the uprooting of B. Division and in favour of having the War Room. I said quite frankly that I could not see how this would work. Buster seemed to agree with me. It was agreed that we should have a further meeting tomorrow.

November 24th

Briscoe came to see me about the circulation of information regarding new inks involving
 Catalogue Reference: KV/4/195

a new process. He said that data had already gone out to the armies in the field about inks already known to us. I felt therefore that it was desirable that the field should be told of what to look for in their searches for these new inks. They are of a kind that I have already described and appear to be in fairly frequent use. They are not susceptible to bulk testing but can be tested against a Watch List or a Suspect List. The process is rather complicated.

I had a talk with Baxter, Tak, Bird and Hart about the behaviour of SIS in the case of Otto John. They first agreed with us that he should be brought back and that they would be responsible for looking after him. They have now suggested to the H.O. that if PID do not want him he should be interned. This is contrary to the undertaking which they gave and runs counter to our recommendation to the H.O. that the man is not a security danger.

Tak tells me that he has heard off the record that Lennox had recently been to Grigg about the future of this office, and has more or less suggested himself as its future head. Grigg said that this matter had nothing to do with him but recommended that Lennox should go and talk to Lindlater Stewart. It will be interesting to see whether he does this.

Leonard Ingrams rang up about LORENZ. Sefton Delmer is anxious to take him on but is apparently a little worried from the security point of view. I said we could give no absolute guarantee but that

LORENZ was trying to evade capture in France. He probably wished to desert but did not wish to give himself up to the allies. He might easily have got away with it as he spoke fluent French and had lived in the country for a long time. He was picked up by the Resistance Movement and handed over to the Americans. Delmer will I think run him with as much caution as possible. There is a certain risk that he may give his colleagues away if he gets back to Germany but he is of course himself in the same boat.

Kellar has had a talk with Stanley and is to see him again after he returns from Mid East. Stanley is apparently giving us full backing in the work that we are doing in Palestine. Apparently he is making good use of the material which we have given him and has binged up the PM to make the statement he did the other day about terrorism, and its effect on any Jewish settlement. He is working to get the President to make some similar statement.

Curt and Skardon are off to Paris tomorrow to start the renegade office.

Bill Williams came in for a moment. I spoke to him about Noakes. He will make a direct application de novo to the DG for Noakes' services, stating that he met him in Brussels when he was out there for discussions with the IB staff. Williams was very complimentary both about Dick and Niall. He said they had both done first class work. I told him that a fair wrangle was going round about the War

Room but that we hoped to get things straightened out. Whatever happened I hoped that he would complain loudly if he was not satisfied, since this would strengthen our hand in getting the necessary adjustments made..

I had a talk with Michael Ryde regarding the Ossewa Brandweg. He said that he regards the movement at any rate at the moment as of purely local significance, since van Rensbeek has more or less severed his connection with SITTIG and PAASCHE. I told him that Roger was very anxious that F3 should keep an eye on the movement. He said that he did not quite see how this was going to be done at the moment, since there was not the slightest chance of getting any facts out of the S. African police. The only other source were Denton and some of Michael Ryde's personal friends. We could not however hope to get a comprehensive picture. The High Commissioner's office should be far better informed.

November 25th

Rymer-Jones of the Palestine CID came in today. He seems very pleased that his force has at last got the order to go ahead and clean up the terrorists. His only trouble is shortage of men. I gather too that he has succeeded in getting an increase of pay. He says this will make an enormous difference to the efficiency of his force. He expects trouble but appears fairly sanguine about being able to deal with it.

Burt came to see me about a leakage case.

Some employee of Vickers who was concerned with the manufacture of the Mohne Dam bomb had been talking to a naval officer in a train and stating that this bomb was going to be used against the Jap Fleet. The officer reported the matter and the employee of Vickers has been identified. Burt says that this employee was an enthusiastic worker talking to a service officer and that although the Admiralty are very keen about a prosecution he thinks this would be apity. Something in the nature of a reprimand from Major Cussen would be more suitable. I said I agreed and that I thought that if the full facts were looked into we might find that the Germans already had a specimen of one of these bombs, details of which they would doubtless have passed on to the Japs. The fact that the bombs were likely to be used against the Japs would be more or less axiomatic. A prosecuting counsel might therefore be made to look rather ridiculous.

Tim Airy has returned from Brussels, and has acquired quite a lot of useful local knowledge.

Garbo has received the MBE from the King, who having read the story was apparently very much intrigued. The actual presentation will probably be done by the DG. The King was anxious to know what the word "notional" meant. This was explained to him by Tommy Lascelles.

Alec Kellar is off tomorrow to the Mid East.

Dick seems rather keen about TAR running the War Room. This may be quite a good suggestion.

284
TAR will I think want a certain amount of help from Milmo on the purely administrative side.

Cyril has sent me a note about what is described as a Harikari Club in one of the German P/Wcamps in Canada. It is based on the Wagnerian philosophy of the Gotterdammerung where the gods kill off each other in a final orgy of violence. When the destruction of the German Army becomes imminent, all weaklings in the camp are to be murdered. The others will then break out, murder the commandant the IO and the Sergt. major, and then commit as many acts of sabotage as they can before they themselves are killed. The information has been given by an RC priest and a Lt.Col. who is a former Bavarian police prefect. Both are described as serious mature men, loyal Germans, interested only in the avoidance of bloodshed and the salvation of their country from Nazism.

November 27th

Anthony came to see me about the possibility of getting assistance from Shillito. He thought the latter might bring his Russian espionage up to London and do part time in BLB. I am rather doubtful as to whether this would be a satisfactory arrangement, but I will have a talk with Roger.

McIver came to talk to me about the Regions. He had made a tour and canvassed a number of C.C.s who all seem to be in favour of the arrangements suggested at last week's meeting.

I said that I could well believe that they were. On the other hand certain CCs in the eastern counties seem to think differently. Probably the whole question could only be settled by trial and error. I should have thought that a preliminary step of telescoping the Regions would have been better than abolishing all regional offices. I rather feared that the whole thing might just peter out into something rather colourless.

Ede, Kirby-Green, Hart, TAR and I discussed Gib. K-G is to see Cowgill and will say that he only proposes to take over the SIS unit if he is to be responsible for running it. He would take it over purely on an administrative basis. There is one officer and a wireless set. He would propose to put the officer under David Scherr. There has been very little work in this section for a long time and the officer's sole duties is to run a couple of agents who are collecting I.A. information in Spain. In spite of our protests the officer and his wireless operator just presented themselves to K-G with a note from SIS saying that they were to report themselves.

Stopford and Purley came to talk about FLORMAN who has applied for a visa to come to this country. The matter is to be decided by the HDSE. We are saying that FLORMAN has been in touch with German agents in Sweden and that there is an obvious security risk in his coming here. If on the other hand it is thought that the commercial reasons outweigh the security risks higher authority must decide.

286
November 28th

I have received an extremely irritating letter from Arnold-Foster criticising my 5 points on which I thought we might go forward to the examining committee. He seems to think that I have gone back on everything I said. He objects to anything being said about sub-dividing the main organisation into offensive and defensive. This is a point on which I thought we had complete agreement. It could of course be left out but in my view it is the one thing that might get us over the ministerial difficulty and criticism that you cannot have one huge organisation savouring of the Gestapo. Foster puts forward again his proposals which are colourless except in so far as they advocate the rump theory which I thought he had agreed to abandon.

I spoke to Horrocks today about Mrs. Arbuthnot going to Ceylon with Courtney. He has ruled her out merely on her age and some vague suggestion that she is neurotic. I should have thought the proper decision should have been made on medical evidence. Somebody of 24 might just as likely be overcome with the heat as somebody of 48. Mrs. A has hardly been ill for a day since she has been in the office and has spent many months in Cairo both in summer and winter without feeling any ill-effects.

At the D.G.s meeting today I mentioned the question of the possible abolition of the navi-cert after Stage A. This will seriously affect both censorship from the Argentine to the Peninsula and the pulling in of agents at Trinidad.

The Chiefs of Staff at Washington are worried about censorship but had not considered the question of the agents. The DG seemed to think world trade considerations would be more important and was not prepared to discuss the matter further. It is part of his general feeling that the war is more or less over as far as this country is concerned and that security precautions may be relaxed. It has manifested itself in a very serious manner in a circular which has recently been issued to SCOs in which the statement occurs "It is not now thought that enemy agents are likely to be sent into this country or that they could do appreciable harm if they were". This circular was issued in spite of a draft circular which I had put up in which I said amongst other things that the Germans were themselves at this moment less likely than heretofore to send agents to this country for intelligence purposes. The meaning of this of course is very different to that implied in the circular. The worst feature is that a copy of the circular has been sent to the H.O. It will now be held up against us in matters affecting general security precautions and in particular cases. I spoke to Adam who tells me that the final draft circular was made by Harry and the DG and that the ground had been completely cut from under his feet.

Charles tells me that the DG is worried about Robertson of the Mid East having appeared in the office without his knowledge. Robertson is in fact on the strength of SHAER waiting to do something in CCMS. Meanwhile it was thought that he might pick something up in this office.

288
Meanwhile it was thought that owing to Kellar's absence in the Mid East TARC could put him in to help Brock.

The Govt. have announced that up to the end of June 1944 this country provided her allies with goods, service and capital facilities amounting to 1,079 millions, 648,000 pounds. This sum can be divided up as follows: USA 604 million, 730,000; Russia, £269,457,000; Poland £12,000,000; Czechoslovakia £18,629,000; France £13,600,000 up to June 1943 only; Greece £12,368,000. There were also contributions to Turkey and Portugal. This is only part of the total contribution. The remainder cannot be expressed in terms of cash value. It includes such factors as the lives of our fighting men, technical information, which has been one of major contributions, for example radiolocation, which we were the first to apply in the practical way to war and which we gave freely to America, penicillin, & jet-propulsion which we gave without thoughts of patent rights to the USA.

I had a meeting with the DG, Horrocks, Milmo and Butler at which we discussed the paper which had been prepared about the War Room. It clearly lays down the general principles on which this is to be run. The main feature is the directorate of 3, a SHAEF representative, one from M.1.6 and one from OSS. If the SHAEF representative is not a member of M15, M15 should have separate representation. This directorate will control and co-ordinate the work at present going on. It will not necessarily involve the moving of B.1B into another building. This draft is to be sent out to Kenneth Strong for his approval.

Catalogue Reference: KV/4/195

The DG does not want to give a copy to SIS. He thinks that the negotiations had better be conducted through SHAEF. This will of course take some time. Meanwhile Butler is to find out whether in principle SIS will accept a SHAEF head and whether they are prepared to have their papers recorded in our registry. If they will not accept our registry as the basis of the agreement clearly the scheme cannot work. The only thing to be done then is to give us free access to the field so that at least the work that we are doing will reach the C.I. units.

Donnie Haylor came to tell me about his visit to Brussels. He seemed very satisfied but I think inclines a little too much towards running an independent show in Germany. He seems to have persuaded or thinks he has persuaded Niall McDermott in this sense. I tried to impress upon him that it would be a very long time before anybody in Germany would be able to say that in an important case it would not be worth while passing the names over the records in London. Equally it would have to be borne in mind that wherever you put CSDIC or O20 they would for a very long time have to be briefed by London otherwise their interrogations will not get any of us very far. I quite agreed that in the course of time our assistance would be of diminishing value but I doubted whether it could ever be ignored entirely. Certainly for a good many months if not years it would be of paramount importance. There will on the other hand obviously be a number of minor cases in Germany which can be dealt with in the same way that a Regional Officer has dealt with cases in

290
THE PROVINCES WITHOUT REFERENCE TO London.

Bronx has been invited to visit Madrid.

Zigzag has left London and there is some suggestion that he has gone to consult Compton Mackenzie about writing his memoirs.

November 29th

The D.G. discussed with me and Butler the various candidates for head of the War Room. We agreed that it would be wrong to try and get Dick back. We did not wish to object to Colin Brook if SIS thought him a suitable candidate and could obtain his services with SHAEF. We thought TAR or Milmo would both do the work well and failing them, Joe Spencer about whom none of us knew a great deal but who makes a good impression. Butler is to find out from Arnold-Foster whether SIS accepts SHAEF control and whether they are prepared to use our registry. He may also try and get agreement about the head of the War Room.

At the Wednesday meeting Teresa mentioned that a saboteur had been captured in Paris who is the first example of one with a mission to do damage by poison. He had been supplied with tablets like aspirin, one of which could poison 50,000 litres of water. It is not yet known what the poison is.

Baxter told us of the case of PARKS, a British subject now in Brixton. He had been working for SIS and according to his own story, their arrangements for receiving his messages were so

inefficient that he was obliged to transmit more often than he should and as a result he says the Germans DF'd him and arrested him. They then turned him round and from February of this year he was sending under control. He says he warned SIS through certain channels that he was under control. The Germans appear to have allowed him a certain amount of liberty to visit Paris each week, and through another SIS organisation he arranged with SIS for his escape. He got down to the Pyrenees, but says he was not satisfied with the arrangements for picking him up there, so returned to Paris where he hid until the city was liberated, when he gave himself up to the allies. He was brought over here and is under examination at Brixton. There is a check on his story through a man named MEISSMAN now in the hands of M.I.19. M. says that he knows PARKS was under control much earlier than he admits, in fact from Oct. 1943 and that he had been captured by the SD and handed over to the Abwehr who had intended him to be a stay-behind agent. Baxter wondered whether he should go to O20. Buster thought not, but that he should be re-examined on MEISSMAN's evidence and if necessary confronted with M. himself.

I mentioned the proposal to stop the navicerts, and Grogan said that there had been a misunderstanding, that Washington had got hold of the wrong end of the stick, and that there was no intention of stopping navicerts until the end of the war in Europe and the termination of censorship.

There have been 40 V.2's in the last week. A bad incident had occurred at Deptford when a

292
Woolworths was hit at midday and 157 people were killed and 130 seriously injured. V.1's had tailed off, only 12 having been launched during the week.

Walker said that one of the pigeons he had had dropped in Belgium with phoney rings and markings had been picked up by our people, and seemed to have been used by the Germans as it had another mark on its wing which had not been put there by us. There was however no message on its leg.

Adam talked to me this morning about a request from Harry that he should consider cutting down on SCOs and FSP and handing over some of their duties to I.O.s. Both Adam and I disagreed with the general tendency to pack up and if we did not look out we should find ourselves high and dry without any controls at all. Harry talked to me about this later, when I expressed to him my anxiety. The trouble is that Adam has thoroughly antagonised Perks and the I.O.s. and until this atmosphere blows over we are not likely to get much support from the H.O. quarter. Harry is I think going to have a talk with Perks.

Chambers of P.I.D. came to see me this morning. I handed him a copy of LORENZ's article on Ribbentrop. He wanted to discuss what safeguards would be necessary. There are various degrees in the restrictions placed on people working for PWE. Chambers thought that in the case of LORENZ it would suffice if he were kept within 5 miles of the premises and compelled to be in barracks by 10 pm. I said that I did not think he could do very much harm provided it was ensured that he never got access to any wireless

Catalogue Reference: KV/4195

transmitter. Col. Chambers assured me that all his broadcasts would be put over on a recording which would be carefully vetted before going on the air.

I told Chambers that although we were inclined to believe LORENZ's statement that at a certain stage he decided to desert, we were not certain whether he had not had it in mind to fade into the French landscape rather than give himself up. It was impossible to be certain in cases of this sort but we felt on the whole that the risk in using LORENZ was worth taking.

Only en passant and very mildly did Chambers mentioned the incident which took place when Bagge of O20 took LORENZ along to see Sefton Delmer at Bush House, according to the arrangement I had made with Leonard Ingrams. Chambers wished to convey politely to me that in cases of this sort he would prefer that the matter were dealt with through himself rather than direct with Ingrams and Sefton Delmer.

Chambers told me that the Germans had now given up trying to jam the BBC and had concentrated all their efforts on Delmer's black senders. He felt that this was a very sincere tribute to Delmer's work.

November 30th

Briscoe came to talk to me about some devices for ensuring that a safe had not been opened. He thought that the best thing was to put a paper weight on top and then take high precision measurements which can quite easily be done.


Alternatively he thought you could put sheets of paper and draw some lines across in saliva across the overlapping edges. These could be brought up by iodine and would show if they had been moved. Probably either method would be quite effective as long as the person responsible does not get bored with making tests. I rather had in mind a piece of paper sensitive to light but Briscoe pointed out that that would on the whole be more troublesome & since it would have to be developed.

Vickery brought Smith who is head of DIB when Pilditch retired. Unfortunately I did not have time to talk to him for very long but I hope to see him again. He seems a pleasant sort of fellow.

We had a conference today called by the DG at which Horrocks, Milmo, Pulter and I were present. Butler gave an account of his talk with Arnold Forster yesterday. SIS do not appear to have made up their minds about anything. C. seems to think that the War Room ought to be under his control but there is a general feeling that MI5 would like to have one of their people at its head although of course he would be sold to C's organisation for the purpose. It seems likely that SIS are reconciled to the use of our registry but reservations are apparently being made as to the ultimate disposal of the documents. In other words when the war is over SIS will want to have them back. Horrocks said that he could not possibly undertake to do the job in those conditions. We agreed to accept Robin Brook if SIS could get him released and wanted him. Alternatively

Catalogue Reference: KY/4/195

we suggested Joe Spencer and then TAR. The suggestion of TAR was not very well received for some unknown reason. Milne we said quite definitely we did not think was a big enough weight. As regards Dick we were quite certain that he should remain at SHAEF for the time being. To remove him would merely be pulling down one house to build up another. Foster is going to try and get some positive answer from about the registry, about SHAEF control and about the head of the War Room.



296

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Jim tells me that there is some suggestion of his taking over E.Division. He is not very keen as he wishes to extricate himself from the office at the earliest moment.

December 1st

Joe Spencer came to see me about the paper put out by the JIC in which it is recommended that M.A.s with our various missions, particularly in the Balkans, should have greater freedom in their liaison with the Russians. It was stipulated however that they should report back for the information of London and Moscow precisely what information they had passed in order that duplicates could be handed to the Russians. Joe Spencer was all in favour of greater freedom of action but agreed with me that while it was necessary for our representatives to keep headquarters informed of the information they had given to the Russian it might be a mistake to pass duplicates to the Russians. I felt and he agreed that if we could create a slightly bootlegging atmosphere in the outstations we should be more likely to penetrate the hard crust of Soviet Intelligence.

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

Walker came to tell me about the interrogation of a P/W who had been looking after Wehrmacht pigeons. It seems that the Abwehr sections of the Wehrmacht have made use of pigeons and that during the invasion time and since they attempted to train pigeons to work from this country. Incidentally one of Walker's pigeons with special rings has been picked up dead in Belgium or Holland. The P/W when questioned

about the possibility of our putting the Wehrmacht stamp on pigeons in order to cause confusion in the German ranks said that this was impossible as we could not fake the rings without the soldering which would be apparent. He is wrong of course because this is precisely what we have done.

David Doyle came to talk to me about a translator of the armistice terms. The F.O. had discovered various discrepancies in the translation and wished to get it checked up by a real expert. D.B. says and I think rightly that what is really wanted is both a British and a German who are by-lingual. A man called HOMEYER had been suggested. Our records showed nothing against him except that he has an aunt by marriage who is right wing, pro-German and anti-British. I said I thought this point could be settled but we were a little worried whether it would be wise to put a matter of this kind within the reach of any Germans. The vetting would have to be on quite a different footing to the ordinary vetting. Our files might show nothing against him but he might be one of those Germans who dislike the Nazis intensely but still remain faithful to his own country. I suggested as a prelim-

298
inary step that Jopson should be approached. He would probably be able to advise as to precisely what is required. He could check the German translation by translating it back into English. In this he would probably be as good as anyone since his grammatical knowledge would be first class and moreover, which is always important in these matter, he has a really classical knowledge of the English language.

I talked with Vickery about his Indian CSDIC in Norfolk which had produced a rather bad interrogation report about two Indians who had been trained by the SD in sabotage. A list of further questions by Edwards of IPI has been prepared, the first of which is "What is the RHSA?". This seems to show a rather lamentable ignorance and I wondered whether IPI would get the best out of these Indians if they did not employ someone with a fair knowledge of the Abwehr and the SD. I gave Vickery specimens of the interrogations done at O20 and by CSDIC. He is going to have a look at these and will let me know later whether he wants any assistance from us. I told him that we could not send anyone from O20 but that I might possibly get Miss Clay to go down to Norfolk.

Thomas came to see me about escapers and evaders who were being sent back here by the Americans unheralded. They arrive at any landing-place and there is subsequently a very difficult job in tracing them. It would be quite easy for an enemy agent to get into the country

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

in this way.

I had a long discussion with TAR and Ede about O.C. I cannot say that we got very far. Personally I found it difficult to see any place for O.C. except on the administrative side in A.Branch. This however means that there must be some place in B.Division where the intelligence products of all stations not already covered are received. Ede as an ex-DSO still feels that there is merit in keeping all overseas stations centrally controlled by one person. I am afraid that this may lead to trouble particularly in places like the Middle East, where Alex Kellar knows the intelligence product, knows the personalities and has a very good grip on what is required as regards organisation. Certainly O.C. have nothing to tell him on any score. If therefore they attempt to perform any of the functions which he is now carrying out there is bound to be a rub.

December 2nd

Buster came to talk to me about the forward
20. Stephens is suggesting that he should spend half his time in Brussels and half here. Buster points out that this will reduce his usefulness to about a quarter. He has a very forceful personality and during his absence things are all apt to get held up. Meanwhile he has increased the staff that he proposes to take overseas. This is presumably due to the fact that civilians are now to be interrogated as well as P/Ws. He also wants to take registry staff. Buster thinks that this should

300
be resisted since it can only lead to separatist tendencies. He should rely on home records. Cases in the field should be filed in PFs but not carded. Carding has been allowed at U20 to meet the demands for certain bodies to be interrogated who might for example have a knowledge of some individual or locality. This has led to extensive carding and to a tendency in U20 to rely more on their records than on the central registry. We do not wish the same thing to be started in the field. Apart from this we want the registry staff ourselves.

B-W discussed with me and Buster the question of passing reports on captured agents to the French, Belgians and Dutch. It was decided that we should pass these reports in duplicates to each service and that if they did not notify us within 24 hours we should assume that they had passed a copy on to their opposite number in the Belgian or Dutch services.

I saw Niall McDermott. He has had a talk with C. which does not in fact get us much further. He has made it quite clear to C. that SHAEF control is necessary but I do not think this point has been finally accepted. As regards the records he thinks that SIS will agree to use our registry.

Will of OSS has just returned from America. He came in to see Buster and obviously wanted to ascertain our ideas about the War Room. He is clearly favourably disposed towards us as an organisation. At the same time O.S.S. are indebted to SIS for having given them access

to ISOS. There is therefore something in the nature of a contract between them. Donovan on the other hand has had his battles with SIS as he told me when I was in Washington. He is expected here next week, and is apparently to be consulted about the War Room's future. Will seems anxious to avoid SHAEF direction for the War Room. This is probably because he does not want G.2 to have a finger in the pie.

○ We must I think be prepared for OSS to weigh in with SIS on the question of SIS control for which C. is standing out. Niall McDermot on the other hand is quite adamant about SHAEF control and so is the D.G.

December 4th

Col. Cox of SOE who is working with Victor in Paris, came to see me about the possibility of getting his secretary put on M.I.5 strength. His Establishment Officer is jibbing at having to pay SOE personnel abroad working for other organisations. I pointed out to Cox that he and his secretary were really working for the Army and not for MI5. Rothschild was working for the

○ Army. Perhaps if he explained this to his Establishment Officer he might be more sympathetic. I told him I could not possibly put his proposition to our Establishment Branch who were already complaining that we had to pay too many people who were working for the Army. I would however be very pleased to talk to his Establishment Officer if he thought it would do any good.

Guy Thomson came in. I told him that we had had a wire from SIME requesting his return. Hill-Dillon wanted him for security duties in Greece owing to the disturbances likely to result from the disarming of E.A.M. Thomson was not very keen, and asked me to reply that he would be leaving on the 18th Dec. This will be after he has had a fortnight's leave. He evidently dislikes Hill-Dillon.

Briscoe and Grogan came to discuss a request from SHAEF Censorship to hand over the new secret ink devices of the SD to the French. We came to the conclusion that there would be no advantage in giving this information to the French until we had discovered a satisfactory means of development.

Tangye came to tell me that Cowgill had approached him some time ago to find a job for VEHREREN in some press office. Tangye informed Harker who told him to get into touch with me. Apparently it is proposed to put V. as a kind of adviser on German affairs to the "Daily Mail". This arrangement seems to me most peculiar and most dangerous. There is no earthly reason for thinking that V. is anti-German. What sort of advice therefore is he going to give the Daily Mail and in a years time he will probably have very different views about this country and its attitude towards the German people. By that time he will be bedded down in a press office with all the facilities that that entails. On further enquiry I was told that SIS ultimately hope to send him to Madrid. The idea that they have in mind is presumably that he would make contact with local Nazi groups.

which is of course quite futile since he is entirely compromised.

The Germans have informed Sniper that a transmitter is waiting for him at Tunrhout in Belgium

India have provisionally agreed to let us have the operator who has been working the Father transmitter. This will enable us to use the transmitter, which the Germans say they have waiting for Father in Belgium.

SHAEF C.I. summary for week ending 1st Dec. states as follows:

Signs of increasing activity in all German S.S. work under Himmler and new leaders. Attempts are being made to ascertain allied weak points particularly communist activities including Spanish, maquis in France, dissatisfaction, among workers, and relations between French and allies. An enemy sabotage action is to be concentrated on ports, lines of communication and fuel. Two of the most active W/T agents in the Havre network have been arrested in Normandy. An agent of Schuchmann's naval espionage network has been arrested. This should effectively aid the break up of Schuchman organisation along the channel coast. An SD agent arrested by the FFI near Paris has been found to have a long history of penetrating resistance movements. He was sent through the lines to contact a W/T operator in Paris and report on 8 high German officers suspected of desertion. As regards future plans, an attempt is likely to be made from Spain to contact by courier a number of Germans believed to be

504
hiding in Paris. The Abwehr agent captured by the American 7th Army states that important agents are now flown to Spain by Lufthansa to be pushed across the Pyrenees into France. Junkers planes are also used for similar missions on flights from Berlin to Barcelona. Collated information from captured saboteurs emphasises the increasing scale of Skorzeny's plan for sabotage and subversion. In addition to the sabotage commandos formerly run by the Section 2 of the Abwehr, he has created certain new units apparently for para-military use. Skorzeny is also increasing subversive movements behind the allied lines. In Germany he is planning maquis operations. The leader of the Jeanne organisation in France has been arrested. An important sabotage school and centre has been identified near Doorn in Holland. Lepage has been replaced by Bihin, Pierlot's former Agent de Cabinet. The Surete now has 200 officers. In France military security is now under the Minister of War and directed by Col. Vavarre, the former leader of the Precurseurs. Counter-sabotage is still under the head of the Services Speciaux and now directed by Col. Cretien assisted by Col. French. Paillol has been promoted Lt. Col. and given a post in the Gendarmerie Nationale. By special act of amnesty Marcel Thorez has been allowed to return to France from Russia. He was enthusiastically received by political sympathisers in Paris. Resistance groups are still active in carrying out arrests and also conducting illegal trials, the latter being largely winked at by the Minister of Justice. There are indications that the Volkssturm may be the cover for Himmler's partisan army. Political level 195 and members of the S.A.

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in the Metz area and having their uniforms dyed to the same colour as those of the Volksturm. S.S. Brigade Fuhrer Anton Dunckern late head of the secret police in Alsace Lorraine and the Saar has been captured.

The Key Points Directorate have reviewed the whole series of flying bomb attacks up to the end of Sept. They show that in all a total of 3,916 flying-bombs have been destroyed by the end of August, and that of these 1,942 were credited to fighters, 1,730 to A.A. and 244 to balloons. This represents an overall rate of destruction of 48½% of the total launched but makes no allowance for the appreciable number of flying-bombs which fell in the sea from unknown causes before they could be attacked. The effects of the attacks by flying-bombs were primarily the damage to a considerable amount of property including 194 schools, 174 churches, 126 hospitals and 143 hospitals. By the end of August in London alone more than 1,100,000 houses had been damaged. It is interesting to recall that in the 9 months of bombing Sept. 1940 to May 1941 inclusive, the peak period, the number of houses damaged in London was 1,150,000. Civilian casualties caused by flying-bombs are estimated at 5,205 fatal, 15,611 serious. A total of 20,816. Of these the great majority occurred in London. The following summarised the roll of civilian casualties caused by enemy action in the U.K. up to the end of Sept. 1944:

1940 fatal 23,767
serious 30,529.

Most of these occurred in the 5 months
Aug. to Dec. inclusive.

1941 fatal 20,881
serious 21,841

Most of these occurred in the 5 months
Jan. to May inclusive.

1942 fatal 3,236
serious 4,150

1943 fatal 3,272
serious 3,450

1944 Jan-June.
fatal 3,498
serious 8,820
July-Sept.
fatal 3,714
serious 10,388.

Totals of the whole war to date: fatal 57,468
serious 79,178.

A captured document dated The Hague 26th June 1942 gives an account of a conference of Abwehr officials held in Berlin on the 15-17th June 1942. A certain Kriminalrat Klemens spoke on the British and American Intelligence Services. He said that up till the outbreak of war only 5 British intelligence agents had been captured. Then follows the cryptic remark that the Intelligence Service is simply concerned with espionage, and the Secret Service with secret service. "The English Intelligence Service is

divided into 8 sections of which the section N.I.5 is the best known. The network of English agents includes hundreds of people who have nearly all been excellently trained. One special institution is the Passport Control Officer called P.C.O. In case the P.C.O.s should have to disappear a new Z. organisation was set up in 1939." (So much for the super-underground organisation of Col. Dansey on the one hand and Maj. Grand on the other). "Counter-espionage activity in England is partly in the hands of the police and partly in those of the armed forces. The English Security Service (Abwehr) makes use of a Black List which more or less corresponds to the German one. Measures against foreign agents include forbidding entry to and exit from the country." (This means that somewhere the Germans must have a copy of old Adams Black List). "In regard to the U.S.A. Intelligence Service, it is anticipated that it works in common with the English service. Nothing definite has been established about its activity in Germany". (The answer to both these statements need not be stated).

Pentibegni, on behalf of Abt. III, said that the running of all agents had been definitely easier for England and America than for Germany. They had sufficient manpower on the continent which could be drawn into their services. The Abwehr found it distinctly more difficult. Consequently there were some remarkable characters who had to be used. He asked for understanding for his point of view as an Abt. III officer. Personally he often hesitated to put these men into action but owing to lack of other people he was thrown

308
back on any material to hand,

December 5th

At the D.G.s meeting today, the question was raised about the vetting of allied seamen.

Those who cannot produce any papers to show that they have been vetted by their Security Service abroad are automatically sent to the LRC. This is causing complaints from the Ministry of War Transport, and the matter is to be investigated by the HDSE. I said that I doubted whether any of the allied services were in a position to vet the seamen. I felt therefore that we should have to get it clearly understood that we could not accept responsibility since although we could conduct some sort of an examination we were obviously not so well placed as allied police forces who could make local enquiries, if they had the time and personnel to do so. This raised the general question of security measures which are being dropped one by one. I said that it would be quite easy to pull the whole security structure down if one considered each measure on its merits. It was the accumulative effect of all measures that was really the reason for good security. Harry said that he wanted to review the whole position and was anxious to get the views of B. Division. I said that I could easily give him a view if he could state what the forces really wanted to keep secret. We had only so far had a rather feeble document from the W.O. and no statement from the Admiralty or Air Ministry.

I then said id had been deeply shocked by the circular which had gone out in which it was stated that it was not likely that enemy agents would come to this country and that if they did they could do no appreciable harm. The worst feature of this circular was that it had gone to the H.O. I had not seen it before it had been issued but when asked my views had put forward a draft circular in which it was said that at the moment it was thought less likely than heretofore that enemy agents would be sent to this country. This was a very different thing to the statement in the circular.

Curry came to see me about his write-up of the work of the office during the war. From soundings he had taken it did not seem that the principal contributions would be ready much before April. He rather wondered therefore what he would be doing in the meantime. On reflection however he seemed to think that he would have to do a good deal of the early part himself. I said that I thought this was desirable and that he should certainly review the pre-war position and should as far as possible tack it on to the early development of German I S. immediately after the last war. I had in mind the Uberzeedienst and the research work that is being done by Miss Scoones and Miss Leslie.

I discussed with Broek and Jenkins our responsibility for the security of VIPs in Egypt. The general practice is for the Minister to call in Jenkins and ask his advice.

Jenkins sometimes used his own FSP to see whether the Egyptians were carrying out their task properly. If this is not the case he either approaches the Egyptian police or reports the fact to the Minister. This is all right up to a point but it should not be allowed to develop into the assumption of responsibilities for protection of VIPs. It is of course natural that Jenkins should be consulted in an advisory capacity since he is in closer liaison with the Egyptian police than anyone else. This whole question has arisen over the assassination of Lord Moyne and his refusal to accept protection. I said that the F.O. on the advice of the Ambassador should enforce protection on the grounds that the assassination of an important British subject is likely to have serious political repercussions. It is not therefore a matter for the individual concerned to decide but for the British Govt.

Ultra shows that a submarine is proceeding to Canada with a German agent on board. This information had been passed to DNI Ottawa who had informed the RCMP. RCMP had asked Mills for his views and Mills had telegraphed home. Being an Ultra of course nobody had thought of telling us. I am pointing out to SIS that for their own protection they would be well-advised to do so in the future since the RCMP might lay on all sorts of measures which would entirely give the show away.

Apart from this we were concerned if a German agent was going to Canada and ^{SO} was the

Commissioner who controls the armed coastal boats and the coast watchers.

December 6th

I saw Tim Airy today just before he left and showed him my draft letter to Lamplough which he seemed to approve.

At the Wednesday meeting Baxter said that PARKS, the British subject who had been controlled by the Germans and who was now at Brixton, had been confronted with MEISERMANN statement that he had been controlled from Oct. 1943 and not from April 1944 as he had confessed. He denied this but on being confronted with MEISEMANN himself he broke down and gave further details. It is a question now what to do with him, as there is no case for holding him under 18A or 18B. We shall probably release him on the understanding that he will come up for further questioning as required.

Walker said that so far there have been 300 V.2s. the last two weeks have brought 39 each.

Baxter said that Dutch seamen were still pouring in. At the moment he had about 180a on his hands which he could not possibly get through for another 3 weeks. He disliked conducting a superficial examination. I said that we should have to face the fact that the allies were not in a position to vet these people satisfactorily at the moment. We should therefore have to do the best we could with the resources at our disposal. There was to be a meeting today with the HDSE in order to present the case to SHAEF. I doubt whether

312

SHAEF will be able to do very much. At present there are about 450 people at the LRC and the number of examiners has of course been considerably reduced since the opening of the second front.

Joe Lynch brought two FBI inspecting officers, one a Mr. Gurney, to see me. They are going on to Paris. One of their jobs is to find out whether G.2 are anxious to have any FBI representatives in Germany and if so what their assignment would be. Hoover is anxious not to go into the field except at the request of G.2.

I dined with Anthony and Padgham. The latter talked a lot about his past experiences and in particular of those just prior to his departure from the Hague. He had given U35 the names of 3 Dutch collaborators. The following morning when he came into the Embassy he saw Schultze-Burnett standing in the passage and eyeing him with considerable suspicion. He then came up to him and said "Do the following names mean anything to you?" Padgham gave an evasive answer saying that he thought he had heard of one of them, but made up his mind from that moment that the game was up. The same evening as U35 was leaving Padgham's house he passed Schultze-Burnett in the garden. The following morning Padgham left by special aeroplane. He was driven to the aerodrome by a Dutch chauffeur in the employ of Stevens. He thought that this man was singularly inquisitive. He told Padgham that he spoke English with a German accent. P. replied that perhaps he had been in Germany for a long

time. The driver then asked P. whether he would like him to drive past the Lufthansa-offices. This remark was a propos of nothing and drew the reply from P. that he had no particular desire to drive in that direction. P. said that until he actually landed at Croydon he always envisaged the possibility that the pilot of his aircraft might land him in Germany. P. is of course convinced that there was a leak in Stevens office. He saw Stevens later in London but the latter pooch the idea. Six weeks later however he was kidnapped at Venlo. It may be that had he investigated the leakage more carefully this incident might have been avoided.

I talked to P. about the Seidlitz Committee. He is somewhat apprehensive lest there may be a get together with the Russians on the old lines of the postwar period. He thinks that we may suffer from Russian appeasement in the same way as we did from German appeasement. P.'s morale is rather low. He obviously feels his position acutely. He is horrified at Germany has done and thinks that he like all Germans must take his share of the blame. He was often in the presence of Hitler and could had he been sufficiently courageous have bumped him off. I said that I felt that he had done as much as could be expected of any man and that his actions had been extremely courageous. He told me how he first came into touch with the British Govt. He had known U35 from very early days and established close touch with him after he arrived here in 1934. He trusted U35 entirely and expressed to him very definite

314

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views about the Nazi regime. Through U35 he was introduced to Clifford Norton who was then Vansittart's private secretary. He felt that in dealing direct with Van he was on sure ground and that his actions would be in the best interests of Germany. He realised of course finally that his and Van's words were falling on deaf ears. I wonder very much whether K. knew about this when he took such a firm stand against the advice of his staff to take on U35. Probably he knew at that time that Padgham on U35 introduction was giving information to Van. It may even be that Van. thought it more convenient that we should run the party than that there should be anything in the nature of direct communication with the F.O.

I had a talk with yesterday about the future of the War Room. He says that SIS are much more worried about the constitutional position. They are afraid of a stampede to the continent by M.I.5. For this reason "C" wishes to maintain at least nominal control. He rather envisages the SHAEF representative as being in a semi-autonomous position like the head of G.C. & C.S. He is hoping to get O.S.S. support for this idea. A meeting was held, which "C", Arnold-Forster, Viv., Cowgill, and others were present. A small meeting had been called by Cowgill of his own people prior to the main meeting, at which those present were told that they were required to give facts and not views. This is of course typical of Felix. He is the only person who is allowed to have views, and they are invariably the wrong ones. Howey

in spite of this his subordinates seem to have spoken up at the main meeting and a very clear impression was given that the present war Room had neither the personnel nor the machinery to give the field the service they required. It was apparently agreed that SIS ought to base themselves on the M.I.5 re gistry, but no final decisions were made and no instructions issued.

There has been a very remarkable case of a Canadian deserter landing in this country. The man's name is Private F.DAIGLE. He has been absent without leave from his unit in France since the 14th August until he surrendered himself in Edinburgh on the 30th November. At that time he was wearing U.S. Army issue clothing. He got to this country with the assistance of an American pilot who offered to fly him back for 5,000 francs. He made this money in the Black Market in Paris by buying stuff from the Americans and selling it to the Parisians. DAIGLE says that while in Paris he went out with American negroes who were selling equipment to the French. They got 4-5,000 francs for a carbine and sold them to the FFI or civilians. Apparently the pilot of the aeroplane does an extremely good business on the exchange. With the 5,000 francs given to him by DAIGLE he gets £14.10.0 in sterling in England. With this sterling he can buy double the quantity of French money in Paris. The pilot whose name is LEWIS apparently supplied DAIGLE with what appeared to be a genuine U.S.Army leave pass made out in the name of Alphonso de la FUENTA. LEWIS's job ended back to England.

316

On this particular trip 24 casualties were checked into the aircraft by an American Red Cross officer. DAIGLE himself stood by the aircraft while this was being done. The crew consisted of 2 officers, a wireless operator and LEWIS himself. LEWIS merely had to say to one of these officers that DAIGLE was a medical orderley in the Air Medical corps who had missed his ship the day before and wanted to return to his base in the U.K. Nobody thought it necessary to check his identity. On arrival in England the aircraft landed near Wantage. Here the wounded were disembarked while DAIGLE remained in the aircraft and flew on to No.17 base. Here they had to report to someone in a red brick building. DAIGLE was merely asked for his name and told to draw his blankets and rations. His identity was not checked in any way nor had LEWIS to vouch for him. At a bank in Wantage he and LEWIS changed a considerable number of francs into English money. The bank merely required their signatures on a slip of paper. On the black Market DAIGLE made his money purchasing cigarettes from the Americans and selling them to civilians, and by selling gasoline.

December 7th

Herbert wants to drop censorship to Eire and proposes to have a conference with Viv. and myself on this subject. It will mean a saving in man-power of some 3,300 people. The question is a difficult one although it would be hard to say that Eire censorship produced any very

Catalogue Reference KV/4/195

I had a long talk with Ede. about O.C. While there is undoubtedly much to be said on both sides, I still feel that if Ede is built up as being the last word in all matters affecting overseas stations we shall get back once more to the old position of the administrative tail wagging the intelligence dog. We also discussed the position of Jenkins, in relation to the protection of important people in Egypt. In reply to the F.O. we have said that we consider that the Ambassador should be the person to say whether such people are to have protection and that his word should be final on the grounds that it was not so much the personal safety of the individual concerned as the political repercussions which might result from an attempt on his life. Jenkins himself could not be responsible for protection and could only act in an advisory capacity.

Michael Ryde tells me that SITTIG has started to pipe up again.

A telegram from SACSEA to Washington gives an appreciation of Jap operations in China. The Japs have succeeded in occupying or making largely ineffective allied air bases in central and south-east China and have reduced the scale of attack on their shipping. The control of the main communication system will facilitate the movement of troops and restrict movement of the Chinese. Economically the Japs have secured adequate rice to maintain their forces in China and at the same time have lowered the war potential of Free China. The object of further operations will be (a) to knock out the Chinese armies and cause collapse

318

of the Central Govt. (b) to knock out the 14th U.S.A.F. Bases. (c) to open communications to the S.E. Coast and (d) to secure a firm footing on which to fight a protracted war and to deny the use of Chinese coast ports to the allies. Japan has been trying to obtain a compromise peace with China and sow mischief between Chungking and the allies. Further military defeats might cause the leaders of southern China to change their minds. This would lead to the establishment of a new administration determined to fight on or to a sudden disorganisation or anarchy or to the establishment of a new administration prepared to come to terms with Japan. The present distribution of Japanese forces points to an advance at least as far as Qwei wang which will seriously interrupt communications between Chungking and Yunan, & a simultaneous attempt to open communications to French Indo-China. She has sufficient forces for both operations but may be delayed by supply difficulties and the reconstruction of the railway south of Chingsa. The speed of the American advance in the Pacific may force Japan to strengthen her garrisons on the S.E. coast and to construct adequate communications to them. It is thought unlikely that Japan will open rail communication to French Indo-China for at least 6 months but that she will open road-rail river routes at an early date.

December 8th

Perfect is leaving for Malta. I talked to him about my views as to the future of RSLOs and the reorganisation of the force. He agreed with me
 Catalogue Reference: KV 4/195

that there was a possibility that the job would die on us. He thought it extremely important that the good relations established with the police should be maintained.

Stephens came to see me at my request about the future of his new camp near Brussels. I made it clear to him that I thought it undesirable that he should carry out intelligence work at both camps. I saw no harm in his starting off the camp in Belgium or in visiting it once a month. I thought however that if he went beyond this much of his usefulness would go. He seemed to agree about this. He has an idea however that he could remain nominal commandant of the camp near Brussels. I personally doubt whether this would be possible since if the camp is under 21st A.G. they will want the commandant to be at their beck and call. As regards the personnel, he had included Hall and Peyer as the C.I. commitment would now be greater than at first was anticipated. As regards registry he entirely agreed that he would not need to do any carding merely filing.

Victor has just returned and is very full of everything that is going on in Paris. He says that the D.G.s visit has been an unqualified success. Victor himself had a certain amount of trouble with SHAEF before he went away but he took the bull by the horns and has received a vote of confidence from Strong. Dick I gather arrived back from his visit here in a very depressed state and with the impression that head office were living in a Catalogue Reference KV/4/105

the wider issues of the war. This I gather applied to me more than most. I had in fact gained the same impression before Dick went back to France. The trouble is I think that he does not quite see the wider issues himself and is rather tied up in the G.S. blinkers of SDAEF.

An SCI report from Paris shows that an anonymous Turk has been D.F.d in a Pas de Calais village. He was eventually unearthed through a house to house search.

The total number of Abwehr agents apprehended in France is 72. In addition there are 25 SD agents and 5 miscellaneous ones.

December 9th

Brock showed me some Istria indicating that Snake has given the Palestine Police over 500 names and addresses of terrorists and dumps of arms. The police have already made over 250 arrests. There is no doubt I think that the more moderate elements in the Zionist Movement are afraid that the actions of the extremists may jeopardise the whole future of Zionism.

Harris talked to me about the protest that the F.O. are making on our instigation about KNAPPE @ Frederico. We are drawing the attention of the Spaniards to this individual and asking for the opportunity to question him as he has information as to the whereabouts of an important agent in this country, namely GARBO. In fact Frederico does not know GARBO's whereabouts

Catalogue Reference: KV/4/195

although of course he knows about his work. It is not the least likely that we shall have the chance of talking to him but if we do we have a questionnaire which should give the impression that we are bluffing and that in fact we do not know very much. We feel it desirable to make this protest since it must be assumed that through BUENAGA and others we know about Knappe and about GARBO. If therefore we do not register some protest it would appear rather unusual in the present atmosphere. If there is an interrogation it will be conducted by the M.A. with Tommy in the offing to give him advice.

Anthony tells me that the F.O. have taken unilateral action about keeping the Japs out of Ankara. This raised a protest from the JIC who of course have been considering the matter as a whole. I do not think we mind in the least. Johnny Bevan however has raised his voice as he had asked ISLD to nurse a little deception in Ankara. How far this has materialised or is in fact of any value I don't know.

I asked Roger whether he would be prepared to let Shillito give part of his time to Anthony who is now deprived of Courtney. Roger rather petulently said he could not do this. He said that Shillito should have a full days work but that he always had to keep kicking him along. He says that he is lazy, but not without ability ~~Unless~~ she has got something that really interests him he is not inclined to do much work. He is not very good at thinking out problems and getting over difficulties, and is generally somewhat

ineffective. If this is so I don't think he is likely to be of much use to Anthony. I am bound to say that this was always my impression when he was working in B.10.

Arnold-Forster rang me up about my letter to C. concerning the German agent alleged to be on his way by submarine to Canada. He wanted to know how we had got on to the source. I said that we had rung up the Admiralty. He said that somehow or another that particular message had never been to Broadway at all but that he would look into the whole matter. Apparently Montagu should have consulted SI before sending the wire, and this may account for his having taken the whole question so light-heartedly, when Herbert tackled him about it. Whatever the circumstances it is a bad show, because not only has Mills been let down but the source of the information has been seriously jeopardised. I gather that this particular form of Ultra is high-speed morse. This means that a whole message can be included in what sounds like one dot of a morse code.

The Germans are now using a new device on their submarines which makes Asdic extremely difficult. It is a kind of extended exhaust pipe and air intake which enables the sub. to recharge its batteries under water. Formerly a sub. had to surface for this purpose owing to the chlorine fumes given off in the recharging process which would if allowed to collect, asphyxiate the crew.

Bonzo is being sent back to Italy where SIS
 Catalogue Reference 4/195

Some time ago we made arrangements for a Palestine policeman named Catling to go to the USA where he would make contact with a man associated with the Bergson Group. This group from which radiated a number of committees has been collecting funds for IrgunZwei Leumi, and transmitting them to Palestine for revolutionary purposes. It was said that Bergson was to give a signal for revolt before very long. We gave Catling introductions to the FBI and he seems to have seen the State Dept. G2 and almost everybody in the USA including Security Co-Ordination. He made contact with the agent whose story prima facie is quite plausible. I am not however altogether satisfied about this agent's reliability and feel that while he ought to be encouraged he should at the same time be closely watched. Gort now suggests that we should get Bergson and all his associates arrested. This seems impossible since I gather from the FBI that he has not committed an offence. He may be expelled by the Immigration authorities for having over-stayed his permit but this is subject to every sort of appeal and intrigue which may take months. On the other hand Bergson might join the American Forces which would give him American citizenship within 6 weeks. I doubt however whether he would do this as it would prevent him from carrying out his present task. I am suggesting that we should obtain the full co-operation of the FBI in having this man watched and in allowing us to continue to run the agent. Meanwhile we should get some checks going on the various committees in the USA and also should get on one HALPERIN said to be the

324

representative of the organisation here. On HALPERIN's arrival in Palestine on some future date it is said that the balloon is to go up. We may have some difficulty with the FBI as I understand that Bergson's affairs are technically regarded as a religious matter and therefore come within the sphere of the State Dept. There does not seem to be anything particularly religious about Bergson's present intentions.

The prices of certain commodities have reached a fairly high level. A suit from a westend tailor now costs £23, hand made shoes £10. A sponge of moderate size £5. This includes 100% luxury tax though what luxury there is in having a sponge I don't know. I should have thought it was purely utility. An old second hand Gladstone bag in good condition is £23. Antiques have risen to enormous prices. It is nothing to pay £20 or more for a small card table which before the war could be got for £4 or £5. Small cars are being sold for as much as £2-300 after considerable wear. In America there is roughly a 30% increase in prices.

Some Russian named SOKHOLINE is resident in Switzerland and is apparently a kind of unofficial Soviet representative. He has told the Chinese charge d'affaires in Berne that Krauel, former German consul at Geneva, called on him and stated that Himmler had recently sent one of his intimate associates to Switzerland with the intention of discussing an armistice with a responsible Soviet personage. Himmler had requested Krauel to find out whether Sokholine

was an accredited Soviet representative and whether he could undertake the first steps in negotiations. Sokholine replied that he could only undertake this matter if he received special authority from the Soviet Govt. He asked who the personage sent by Himmler was and what was the broad outline of the German proposal. The German consul gave no reply except to say that he could only speak if Sokoline showed that he had the necessary authority. He urged Sokholine to give an early answer. Sokholine's own view is that the affair is curiously sudden and may be merely an attempt to find out whether he is or is not an accredited Soviet representative in Switzerland and indirectly to discover whether there is a possibility of an armistice between Russia and Germany.

Recent reports indicate an increasing degree of difficulty in inducing people to suggest names of possible officials in Germany who could take control of newly occupied towns and villages. In all places however where military govt. has been established and the initial difficulty of finding the most suitable persons available has been overcome, the administration is working quite smoothly. The American first army have convicted a German for disobeying a circular restriction and sentenced him to serve 45 days and to pay a fine of 20 marks. The Inter-allied military govt. court sitting at Kornlimunster has convicted a woman for concealing records of the Frauenschaft and sentenced her to 6 years imprisonment. The reviewing authority has reduced the sentence to 2 years. A certain number of Germans are being

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/195

326
encountered who are not in possession of
identity cards. Financial conditions in
occupied areas vary. Some banks are operating
satisfactorily, others not at all. There is
no voluntary cooperation from the Reichsbank.
The archives of Aachen seem to indicate that
all records dealing with Nazi personnel
have been removed.

327

DECEMBER 11TH

At 11 o'clock I had a talk with Bill Luke. He cannot speak with any great enthusiasm about British Honduras which, though it has potentialities, is obviously a very 'one-horse' Colony. There are very few roads and passage by sea to any of the Caribbean islands is somewhat precarious. The principal industry is mahogany, which is largely marketed by the Americans who take the majority of the profits. If the Colony shipped its mahogany to New Orleans and sold it there the revenue of British Honduras might be considerably increased. The Colony also produces a certain amount of very fine citrus fruit.

After the disastrous GOUGH case neither S.I.S nor ourselves were particularly popular. Bill Luke has, however broken this down in so far as M.I.5. are concerned. On the other hand, the Governor will not tolerate any M.I.6 representative in the Colony at all. There is no doubt that Sanderson and his black wife, led by some hysterical G-2 American officers from the Panama zone, displayed a superlative degree of ineptitude in handling the GOUGH case. Sanderson has, in fact, had to leave the Colony and GOUGH does not intend to let him return.

There is practically nothing of real Security interest in British Honduras. Our interests have been handed over to the Police Commandant, Harvey Clark, and I do not think a D.S.O. point in peace time would be justifiable

Catalogue Reference: KY/4/195

4-7-8

There is a small negro movement which latterly has been rather active. Some of its meetings have been of a seditious kind. Luke pointed out to the Governor that it seemed to him undesirable that a negro should be allowed to stand up in the market square and run down the Governor and the King, even though nobody was inclined to give much support to his remarks. This seemed to be a new idea to the local authorities, but they are nevertheless considering the possibility of taking some action.

The housing problem in British Honduras is extremely serious and much needs to be done for the welfare of the natives.

The Governor, Sir John Hunter, seems to consume rather more than his share of the gin.

I am arranging for Luke to go into B.L.a

Michael Ryde and Anthony came to see me about a suggestion received from Lenton that he should see Smutts on the subject of the SITTING transmitter. Michael thinks that this would undoubtedly cause trouble with Devilliers and that the only way is to bring the whole matter to the notice of Smutts through Forsyth. It will then be for Smutts to suggest whatever action he thinks fit, either through Lenton or through Devilliers.

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At 5 o'clock I went to a J.I.C., where we discussed a telegram from the Chiefs of Staff in Washington on the subject of over-all security between stages A and B. We came to the conclusion that the Chiefs of Staff in Washington had got hold of the wrong end of the stick. They were asking for security to be maintained at the pre-OVERLORD level. It was therefore necessary to introduce modifications which will give us latitude over here.

Having got the over-all directive tied up I suggested, firstly, that it should be given a fairly wide circulation, including the Home Office since this might put the brake on the wholesale removal of security measures which was at present going on. I also suggested that, within the framework of the Chiefs of Staff directive, it would be extremely valuable to get down to matters of detail. It made an immense difference to our work if we could be told precisely what was secret. The three Services took up the usual attitude that the whole question was extremely flexible and that it would be difficult to lay down anything of a hard and fast kind. By way of explanation I asked the Admiralty represen-

tatives what their view would be of information relating to a convoy of Liverpool reaching the Japs six weeks after the convoy had sailed - at what date did the Security aspect of such an operation cease to have any significance. They began by saying that it might be extremely important to prevent the information reaching the enemy, though on the time factor they seemed to be somewhat doubtful. Later they came to the conclusion that convoys would be made up in Capetown and not in Liverpool. I then said, "Well, I suppose, then, that sailings of ships from Liverpool would really not be of much significance at all", to which the answer was "Well, I suppose they would not". Clearly the only chance of getting any sense out of the Service Ministry would be to submit to them a long list of things we imagine they might want to keep secret and to get their answers to each one. The particular example that I put to the Admiralty is quite a significant one since it affects Travel Control and Censorship and a whole number of Security measures.

DECEMBER 12TH

At the D.G's meeting today Burley mentioned the question of opening up a direct shipping route with Spanish ships between this country and the Iberian Peninsular. For some reason or other the Foreign Office think that this would be a good thing. Neither the M.O.W.T. nor the Ministry of Food are in the least bit interested in the proposed cargoes, which

in any case would be small. I said that I thought it was extremely undesirable to reopen this route until after stage A, since it would only lead to the Irish demanding the right for their line to Lisbon to be reopened. Meanwhile Herbert was suggesting the cancellation of all censorship to Eire, on which he at present had 3,200 people employed, on the grounds that Eire was a cul-de-sac and that any information reaching it had to come back through this country if it was to reach the enemy. If the shipping route was to be opened from Dublin to Lisbon then Eire would no longer be a cul-de-sac.

Bill Stephenson has telegraphed to the D.G. saying "I shall probably be bringing Hoover to London shortly. Will you send me and time you would wish to have him on anything you desire other than meetings with the Cabinet which I am arranging". The D.G. has drafted a fairly polite reply, but makes it clear that he expects to hear from Mr. Hoover either direct or through his representative. Meanwhile, if Hoover could give us some idea of the time he had available we could arrange a programme. Bill Stephenson is obviously trying to impress everyone over here that he has got Hoover in his pocket. It may well be that he has; on the other hand he may merely be angling for some wires from prominent people in this country in order that he can wave them in Hoover's face and suggest to him that as everybody wants to see him in London a visit should be arranged.

Arnold Foster has written to me making it clear that S.I.S. were at fault in not informing us about the submarine containing a German agent which was on its way to Canada. In future it is proposed that D.N.I. Ottawa should not pass anything of this kind to the R.C.M.P. except through Cyril Mills or at any rate after getting into touch with Cyril. Meanwhile it is agreed that we here should be informed in order that we can pass the information on to Cyril. Montagu apparently slipped up by not consulting with S.I.S. before sending off his wire to D.N.I. Ottawa.

Herbert has put in an excellent report on the S.D. in Belgium. The two questions involved were (1) Have we the measure of the stay-behind organisation laid down in Belgium before the German withdrawal? (2) Have we made appropriate Security dispositions to counter S.D. plans made since the withdrawal?

As regards (1) he concludes (a) that the S.D. stay-behind organisation of W/T agents, known as the I.Netz, has almost certainly been either destroyed or rendered impotent. (b) that apart from the cases of Adolf PITTERY and HOMBURG mentioned in his report, there is no evidence* that the S.D. has left behind any other effective espionage organisation, (c) that if LA HAYE's evidence is successfully exploited the S.D. stay-behind organisation of saboteurs will probably have been destroyed, (d) that un-

* and little likelihood

identified and undiscovered S.D. agents in Belgium will still be dangerous if and to the extent the Germans succeed in regaining contact with them by the insertion of new agents.

As regards (2) he concludes (a) we must expect an attempt, probably on a large scale to insert into Belgium, both as line crossers and parachutists, agents of the organisation working under SKORZENY for the purpose both of physical sabotage and preparing and directing violent disturbances - possibly on a large scale; (b) if these agents are successfully inserted into Belgium they may escape detection and find a fruitful soil for their work; (c) if our Security resources are divided and capable of re-allocation between the tasks of locating stay-behind agents in Belgium and of preventing the insertion of new agents, the latter may be regarded as of paramount importance; (d) as large and as well instructed a force of Security officers and personnel as possible should be detailed to the task of frustrating the attempts of line crossers to insert themselves into Belgium.

I had a talk with Buster about the forward CSDIC-cum-020 Camp in Belgium. I gather that Rawlie thinks that, as the camp in its early stages will be concerned largely with operational Intelligence, it should really be under the control of one of his officers. Later on it can be taken over by Tineye. I think this is right since it is obviously desirable that Tineye should remain here and look after the more important cases at 020.

334

1 If he is constantly travelling between here and Belgium a great deal of his value will be lost.

I saw U 35 today. He had just arrived back from Lisbon, where he has evidently been enjoying himself. He has been concerned with running the agent ECCLESIASTIC; a Czech girl who is the mistress of KOSICH, the I.T.L. representative in Lisbon. A room has been found for her in our Air Attache's office and she is now being used extensively for the purpose of deception, chicken-food being supplied from the Air Ministry through S.I.S. U 35 seems confident that things are working well. He has planted a number of documents and even has a photograph of KOSICH photographing the document, which was taken by ECCLESIASTIC at KOSICH's request. He evidently sees it as a frontispiece to his memoirs when he writes himself up as the master spy. Details of this document are known from Most Secret Sources to have gone on to Berlin. U 35 is also feeding information to an American agent and has weekly meetings with KRAMER and other members of the G.I.S. His main line is to disrupt the Abwehr and the S.D., to cause suspicion of their bona fides and to give them all the jitters. Recently he told an informant to say that, while at a Party at which a number of people from the British Embassy were present, he overheard one girl say to another "I wonder why it is that the German list of war criminals held by the Embassy is headed "Gold Fasanen".

035 knew from COLUMBINE that "Gold Fasanen" was the nick name given to members of the Abwehr on account of their brown uniform with yellow lapels. This piece of information got right home and was followed up by a remark that all those who had served on the Eastern Front were to be put on the Russian Gold Fasanen list. I told 035 that I had seen none of his reports since last September. He is going to speak about this. Meanwhile he tells me that Kim Philby and [redacted] are anxious to discuss long term plans with him. In other words I expect they want to offer him a job abroad. Personally I think that if they had wished to do anything of this kind they should have spoken to us first, particularly if the question of funds is going to arise. However 035 will report in due course and he will also see that I get copies of his reports.

DECEMBER 13TH

I had a meeting with Milmo and Butler in the D.G's room about the advanced Camp 020. It was agreed that Stephens should make his Headquarters in London and that it would be desirable that M.I.19 should supply the Commandant for the advanced camp near Brussels. Butler will be seeing Rawlinson and, later on, Stephens.

At the Wednesday meeting today Herbert gave a resume of his paper on the S.D. Marriott said that there was a tendency to revive old agents. He had in mind GELATINE and I think Catalogue Reference KV4/195 seemed to be an interest

336
in the movement of airborne troops, particularly Czech troops. Roger Hollis told us that a certain number of searches and arrests had been made in connection with Anarchist pamphlets for circulation within the Army.

TAR and I had a talk with Bertram Ede about the staff matters of Overseas Control. There are still a certain number of posts to be filled.

In the evening I attended a meeting at the Colonial Office with Brock. Eastman was in the chair. Kim Philby, Tony Rumbolt, Harrington, Rymer Jones and MacPherson of the Ministry of Supply Office in Washington were present. The meeting wished to discuss the running of the agent

Rymer Jones gave the history of this man; he was a member of the Irgun and had given information to the Palestine Police. For reasons of personal safety application was made to the Americans for a visa for him to go to the U.S. He had been sent there by the F.B.I., who passed him on to Major Snyder of G.2 who was interested in Palestinian affairs. He had subsequently been approached by the BERGSON group and had become associated with a good many of its members. In this way he had discovered that there was to be a plot for an uprising in Palestine immediately after the cessation of hostilities in Europe. He had therefore got into touch with Snyder who, through the State Department, had placed him in touch

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357

with MacPherson of the Ministry of Supply Delegation, MacPherson having been formerly a C.O. official in Palestine. It was in this way that , known as Y.32, came into touch with MacPherson, who has since been conducting the business from the U.S. end. MacPherson, at Y.32's request, got Catling of the Palestine Police to come to the U.S. Little transpired from this visit except that Y.32 wanted \$2000 and \$500 a month in order to continue his enquiries through Ruth KAPLAN, secretary to MERLIN who is BERGSON's deputy. The meeting had to discuss whether this money should be paid, and how, in future, Y.32 was to be operated. I said that I thought we should make contact with the F.B.I. representative here, give him the full facts, tell him that we were interested in extracting the full facts from Y.32 and also in checking up on his bona fides. We would be glad if the F.B.I. could carry out this task for us. If they felt they required the State Department backing we would be glad if they would let us know if they would prefer to ask for this themselves or to have the request made through the British Ambassador. Harrington thought that it might be a good thing if the payments were made by the Americans. This would forestall any suggestion that might subsequently be made that we had been trying to run agents in the U.S.

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235
DECEMBER 14TH

I saw Dashwood at his request. He had a story about a man called C.A. ATKINS, concerning whom an adverse report had been made by REICHENHEIM, a German refugee working for the Ministry of Information. ATKINS, who is in the Ministry of Supply, appears to be a hot Rotarian with a burning desire to get into touch with good Germans. He is obviously steeped in the atmosphere of the Anglo-German fellowship as it was in 1936. I asked Dashwood for a note about him to that we can see that he does not get into the Control Commission. He is just the type of person who can do a great deal of harm and will undoubtedly be an infernal nuisance to everybody. These sort of people are much worse than spies.

I have seen an interesting pamphlet with photographs of the MULBERRY. There is a facsimile of the P.M.'s letter to the Chief of Combined Operations or his Deputy which is dated 30.5.42 and says, "They must float up and down with the tide. Let me have the best solution worked out. Don't argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves."

BRONX is leaving for Madrid on the 19th on a Peruvian Diplomatic passport with a Spanish Diplomatic visa.

The Germans have now disclosed the location of the hidden transmitter in Belgium which was intended for SNIPER. This has been passed to Harmer who dug it up in a graveyard at dead of night.

Torry came in to see me. He has just come back from Belgium for two or three days leave. He seems to be enjoying his work and there is no doubt that, operating under extremely difficult conditions, he has produced some excellent reports. He hopes to go on as an interrogator in Germany as German is really his best language.

DECEMBER 15TH

I saw Joe Lynch this morning and gave him the details about Y.32. He is going to communicate with the Bureau and get some sort of check up on the man. He will also test out their reactions about handling the case. I promised to let him have a resume of the file.

I had a meeting with Joe Spencer this morning and asked him whether he had any ideas about his future. He would I think be very ready to come into this office after the war. He is an accountant by profession but has no commitments.

TAR and Anthony discussed with me the question of my taking the daily meeting. It was felt that this might keep me more in the picture and both speed things up and lessen the flow of paper. I am going to give it a try.

V.2 is coming is at about 40 per week.

340
A case has come to notice of a F/W splitting a postcard and writing in secret ink inside.

Cecil attended a meeting at the F.O. with Adam at which the project to start up the line of Spanish ships between here and the peninsular was torpedoed. The Ministry of Food and the Min. of War Transport did not see much advantage but the F.O. wanted to take this step as a gesture towards the Spaniards. Why it is necessary to make a gesture to the Spaniards at this moment goodness only knows. Cecil and Adam opposed the project on security grounds, Adam threatened the NEP scheme for which the soldiers pleaded shortage of man power, and Cecil pointed out that if Spanish ships could sail from here to the peninsular, Ireland would demand permission to open their line from Dublin to Lisbon. Herbert who had been warned them chimed in to say that he was trying to close down censorship to Ireland on which he was employing 3,200 people. The basis of his case was that Ireland was a cul de sac and that any information which went there would have to come back to this country if it were going to reach the enemy. If therefore there was to be a hole cut in the sack through the running of ships from Dublin to Lisbon, censorship would have to be maintained. This I think was the coup de grace.