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
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
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
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1st January 1945.

TAR, Grogan and I discussed a paper relating to the reopening of telephone communications between this country and the continent (a) for govt. service (b) for diplomats and (c) for sponsored firms or private individuals. It was not proposed that any but private calls should be monitored. We took the view that govt. depts. were much more likely to be in a position to be indiscreet than any other category and their communications should therefore be monitored. We agreed also that those of diplomats should receive similar treatment. As regards private individuals we saw no reason why they should communicate at all for the time being.

Kellar has sent a rather petulant telegram about Clayton's visit. SIME seem to be rather confused about Clayton's mission, and Kellar feels it should be made quite clear that he is in the Mid East only as a learner.

Brutus is likely to be sent in the ordinary course of his duties to Belgium early this month. The opportunity will probably be taken for arranging for the transmitter which the Germans have hidden for Brutus near Paris to be picked up by the SCI unit.

Bronx left England for Madrid on 19th Dec. It is hoped that Sniper will be posted to Belgium in the near future. The Germans have acknowledged his final letter saying that he expects to be posted overseas. They no

longer expect him to discharge his mission to this country.

When Garbo's transmissions are resumed they will take place from London and will be conducted through the new high-power transmitter with which it is hoped to establish a link with Garbo's sub-agent in Canada.

A new use has been found for Gelatine, namely to assist in the implementation of a plan for misleading the enemy about the effect of V.2.

The operator who has been simulating "over" has just died but as during his illness and absence from the transmitter the Germans have been persistently calling and have sent blind messages, we propose to take the risk of using another operator and restarting the transmission.

In accordance with the recommendation of the Twenty Committee who have considered the whole question of running Jap special agents, it has been decided to close down the cases of Peach and Joseph, the grounds for this decision were that there appeared to be prospect of the approving authorities being able to supply enough untrue information to run these cases to advantage, and that if at a later stage they desired to plant misleading information on the Japs better cases than these two would be available for the purpose.

SHAEF C.I. summary for week ending 22nd Dec. states that there has been a notable intensification of effort by enemy information and sabotage services, the principle objectives being probably field supplies and lines of communications, particularly railroads. Numbers of agents in American uniforms have been dropped behind the lines and have been recognised as belonging to a unit trained and operated by Skorzeny. There has been a large scale attempt however to drop enemy agents into France. 2 at Lyons, 8 at Blois, 1, 3 and 5 at Montpellier, Poissy and Epinay, respectively. Interrogations of 10 indicate further parachute operations probably in Champagne, Toulouse, Rhone Valley, Clermont Ferrand, Grenoble, Marseilles and Haute Savoie. Counter-parachute measures involving the establishment of telephone-linked observation posts, night watches and mobile search parties are being planned by the French. The exploitation of an enemy saboteur captured in October has led to the discovery of 19 dumps for sabotage in the Libourne area. A group of 8 parachute saboteurs dropped near Blois on a mission to sabotage pipe lines between

Cherbourg and Nancy and to plant anti-personnel bombs in the Paris metro, have been captured. It is considered that strong efforts may be made to employ political disruption tactics in France and Belgium involving the insertion of agents into political parties, particularly communists in France in order to induce them to push their parties to extremes.

SHAEF C.I. summary ending 29th December states that there is an all-out espionage and sabotage

drive planned since mid November by the G.I.S. to support the present offensive by Abwehr kommandos and troupes who were given the task of infiltrating agents by line-crossing and parachute behind the lines. The agents employed were mostly members of pro-German Fascist parties. Since Mid-December 21 parachute agents have been arrested and a further 11 are believed to be at large. The majority are saboteurs with fuel sabotage missions. The 150th panzer brigade, with an estimated strength of 1-2,500 in American uniforms and 300 American vehicles including tanks, has been engaging in harassing tactics in support of the German offensive. Under the command of this brigade is a unit known as Einheit Stielau, with an estimated strength of 120 to 150 English-speaking Germans, personnel recruited by Skorzeny. The Stielau unit has been used in small jeep parties where it was probably intended for work on the nearest defences from the German lines, where linguistic abilities and false identity papers were more likely to be accepted. The principle sabotage objectives appear to have been the Meuse bridges. So far 13 of the Stielau unit have been captured and 12 killed. Despite orders to this effect it is now evident that very few arms have been surrendered by members of the French resistance groups. Three members of a Franco-Belgian arms smuggling gang operating across the Franco-Belgian frontier have been arrested. A captured letter from Jacques Doriot gives plans of P.P.F. There is ample evidence to show connection between P.P.F. and the G.I.S. and much use has already been made of its members for S.S. work.

5

J.I.C. have written a paper on the recent German offensive. It is believed that it is part of a plan conceived as early as Sept. 1944 for the purpose of restoring confidence to the German people and demonstrating to the allies in the west and to the USSR that German powers of resistance are still formidable. They may also hope that by ensuring a striking defeat of the allies to increase war-weariness and dissension among them. Finally thought sceptical about the possibility of any compromise he may feel that a big victory would strengthen his position if it came to bargaining with one or other of the allies. Early in December the Germans had succeeded in stabilising their position without the employment of their strategic reserves. They had to face the possibility of a further attack in the west and also a major Russian offensive as soon as the ground hardened in January. To meet this latter offensive they might have to call on the strategic reserves now situated in the west. Consequently it would be natural for the Germans to attempt to prevent simultaneous offensives on the east and west. In view of the conditions on the two fronts, an attempt could only be made by a spoiling offensive in the west. Rundstedt would probably have agreed to this strategy provided the attack was not pressed dangerously far. The fact that all available German aircraft in the west and almost all the armoured reserves are being brought into the battle suggests that Hitler is striving for some really big success. SHAEF appreciate that the immediate objectives are

the Meuse bridges between Liege and Huy with other columns pushing out to one line of the Meuse between Huy and Givet and into Luxembourg to protect the flank and rear of the main attack. In SHAER's view Liege cannot be used by the allies for the maintenance of their forces in the Aachen salient. Their power of renewing the offensive in that area would be greatly reduced even if they were not forced to evacuate the salient. It is not thought likely that the Germans can maintain the offensive for more than a fortnight unless they capture large quantities of petrol. Kundstedt would therefore wish to avoid placing his forces in a dangerous position. If counter-attacked he might decide to withdraw gradually, sure of having dislocated the allies plans and having denied them many of the resources which they have acquired in the past few months. If however the Germans gain a major success Hitler might demand exploitation beyond what the OKW would consider sound strategy.

Jan.
December 2nd

Robson-Scott asked me about the possibility of the Czechs being allowed to interrogate NAUJOCKS. They are extremely interested in his case and know all about the murder in which he on his own confession was implicated in Czechoslovakia before the war. NAUJOCKS at that time was acting under the orders of Heydrich. As soon as the interrogation at O20 is finished we shall allow the Czechs to interrogate at the Oratory Schools with a British officer present.

The D.G. has suggested that possibly Paddy Barn might be a suitable head of the War Room

since SIS have refused to release Robin.

He would I think be good but of course he has not much knowledge of the particular type of work in hand.

Briscoe and Cumming came to see me about censorship testing in Germany. We have a small unit under Wolf with 21 A.G. which is doing laboratory work in connection with documents etc captured from spies. There is now a suggestion that this laboratory should be extended to deal with censorship. We think

that it should only act in an advisory capacity. There was a conference about 3 months ago with SHAEF and other interested parties about secret ink testing in Germany, when SHAEF was supposed to be going to state their terms, since when nothing has happened. If SHAEF are looking to us to train these people this will take at least three or four months and a beginning should obviously be made at the earliest possible

moment. I suggested to Briscoe and Cumming that they should draft a memo and that this should after consultation with censorship be sent out to Dick, with a recommendation that Plunt of I.C. SHAEF should come over for discussion.

I had a long conversation with Ede about the future of O.C. I have told him about my fears that his organisation might become topheavy.

I said I envisaged him travelling round the Empire staying with Governors, receiving Governors and colonial links in this country etc. He would by virtue of the position which he held

be regarded as the last word in intelligence matters within the colonies and DSO points. This however he would not be, since there would be others with a far more intimate knowledge. I was afraid that we might get to the position where the intelligence dog would be wagged by the administration tail, and this was a thing that we should avoid at all costs. Ede was

I think disturbed about this and particularly disturbed about Alec Kellar's telegram referring to Clayton's visit to the Mid-East. He evidently is completely at loggerheads with Kellar whom he thinks is too big for his boots and trying to build up too exalted a position for himself. I said that I thought the circumstances had arisen owing to a fundamental difference of views as to how foreign stations should be run. Personal differences might have arisen over individual matters but they were not the root cause of the trouble. I could not help feeling that if Ede was to move in exalted colonial and dominion circles he could only do so profitably with a full knowledge of intelligence issues. We parted still very far from any solution.

I had a talk with Milmo about Paddy Barry taking over the War Room. He thinks he would be good in many ways but I think wonders whether he has sufficient drive.

December 3rd

McLeod came in and brought me a letter from Dick in answer to one I wrote to him about the War Room. Dick is slightly apologetic for his attitude. Evidently Victor has been talking

to him though I do not think that in some respects my views have been altogether accurately appreciated. Dick is clearly very harrassed and I think wants some first-rate assistant. He is anxious that I should come out to Paris, possibly with Arnold-Forster. I am not very keen about this. I would much rather go by myself. Dick still sticks to his point about the War Room but is all in favour of making a start on the lines that we suggest. He does not of course know that Felix has been sacked.

I had a talk with Brooman-White today. He seems inclined to take Dick's point of view about starting up a new War Room. Evidently Section V are anxious to get the Americans out of Ryder St. as all their private business becomes known to them which is not always desirable. Further he says that the French might be drawn in if a new establishment is set up. I still doubt whether such an establishment would react to the advantage of the Field. Though it is clearly of great importance to bring in the Americans and the French.

Charles, Jasper, Ede and I had another long discussion about the future of O.C. which did not lead any further than yesterday's conversation between Ede and myself. I am going to try to draft a reply to Kellar which will be acceptable to all parties.

10
Dec 4th

The D.G. discussed with Buster and myself the question of getting Paddy Barry to run the War Room. He then consulted Harry Allen who was not very enthusiastic about losing Paddy's services. I said that I felt he was a suitable candidate in so far as he would clearly get on with everybody and was able. He would be somewhat at disadvantage owing to his lack of knowledge of the subject but if properly advised that handicap should not be an insuperable bar to his appointment. It would be necessary for him to use a velvet glove and also to be prepared to weigh in pretty strongly if things were not satisfactory. Alternatively there was TAR whose name had been put forward before. The D.G. said he had no objection if I could spare TAR and he was acceptable to SIS. Meanwhile he asked Harry to sound Paddy. The latter came to see me and I gave him the whole picture. He did not seem very keen about taking the job but was quite prepared to have a shot at it if told to do so.

Tangye came to tell me that he had had a further talk with about the VEHMERENS. He thought he could arrange things in such a way that would be satisfactory to all parties. He would suggest a personal approach to Horniblow of the Daily Mail, offering him half a dozen articles. If he wishes to publish he could disclose to him personally the identity of the author. This might ultimately lead to the V's being asked to write up or criticise things in Germany. The arrangement will only be a temporary one until such time as the V's

can either be repatriated or sent to the continent. They are both regarded as honest-minded people who if in disagreement with British policy vis a vis Germany would not hesitate to say so.

Horrocks, TAR, Herbert, Buster, Bird and myself had a meeting about the War Room. I was anxious to ascertain definitely whether Horrocks was prepared to bear the responsibility of carrying the records. There was an immense amount of irrelevant talk which all of us found extremely difficult to follow. ~~The reorganising~~ one positive complaint, namely that R.B. were at present doing the same look-ups over and over again. Information on these look-ups was submitted to the field but there was nothing to show what the field already had or to prevent a further look-up on information which was already in their possession. We explained that this was due to the general War Room system from which we suffered quite as much if not more than the RB registry. It was hoped to get this right when the directing staff were appointed. Horrocks then expressed some doubt as to whether we had a charter to card records which related to the cleaning up of German intelligence agents on the continent. I said that this was the whole purpose of the reorganisation of the B registry and that this had been agreed long before D. Day. I then asked for a definite assurance that he would carry the records from the field if it was finally agreed that they should be based on our registry. We had all been proceeding on this assumption

but if there was any doubt about it I should like to know now. I said that it would be extremely humiliating if we had to go to SIS at this stage and say that we could not do the job. Horrocks at once said that there was no question of this at all, that he would certainly do the job provided it was confined to SD and Abwehr and did not include all underground movements in Germany including the Nazi Party. There followed some explanation of the function of EDS, about which Horrocks was evidently in the dark. He had never seen the records himself but understood and I think wrongly understood, certain things he had heard from Potter. The position at EDS is that there were some 60,000 cards, of which 20,000 have been received from the War Room and relate to purely CE matters. As far as the War Room is concerned, EDS is merely the sausage machine reproducing cards supplied to them and circulating them to the field.

Adam rang me up about a proposal to run a line of Spanish ships from Spain to Caen. These ships are to anchor off Falmouth and proceed thence under convoy. This arrangement is not very satisfactory as it provides a means for the Germans to send their agents from Spain to France. We know already from MSS that they are laying plans to get agents across the Franco-Spanish frontier, and to dump them by ship. We are also afraid that if we allow these ships to go to France it may create a precedent for opening up a Spanish line to this country. The ships are apparently to carry a cargo of certain Spanish ores which are required by the French. I said that SHAEF ought to be

fully acquainted with the facts before they give a final decision. As far as this country is concerned it is mainly a matter for the Admiralty except in so far as a precedent is being created.

Senter came to discuss the case of WEYM. This man who was an active collaborationist but saved the lives of two Frenchmen at the request of a woman, a British subject who persuaded him that she was very influential and that if he did not see that the two Frenchmen were released he would be likely to be bumped off as soon as the British or Americans occupied his area. Her ruse was successful but only on condition that WEYM was not imprisoned and received something in the nature of a pardon from his own government.

December 5th

I had a letter from Dick this morning. He is coming over here on the 13th with Murphy. They both think that TAR should run the War Room. Dick has still got ideas about a separate establishment, and Murphy is thinking in terms of 250 people. I think this is crazy and have told Dick that one thing to be avoided is taking the Albert Hall at the outset. I think that the directing staff should be appointed and then decide where it can most conveniently work. If records are to be based on MI5 it would probably be best placed in the building nextdoor to 58. The work could then be divided up into three main sections, Milmo and Bird, Colin Roberts and research and docu-

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ments. Milmo and Bird should remain where they are and be strengthened by a staff from the present War Room. The same should happen to Colin Roberts who should remain in Ryder St. with his index and to the research section which might perhaps be centred in R.I.S. If at a later stage it is found desirable to move people across of these sections to work together with the directing staff this can quite easily be done.

I discussed with Burley and Buster the committee which is to be chaired by Lindlater Stewart and is to report on the extent to which manpower is at present employed on the protection against sabotage, espionage or access by unauthorised persons to factories, installations, headquarters, offices and other key points where vital or secret equipment is located or where secret work is carried out, and to make recommendations for reducing the employment of personnel on such duties to a minimum, taking into consideration the present labour shortage and the latest appreciation of security and sabotage risks which have still to be met. I am going to try to make a fair assessment of these risks in the light of present information.

Kim came to see me about _____, who has been taken on in his section. Jane when introduced to him recollected that he was one of the people who might possibly have been identical with the individual described by KREVITSKY as acting as a Soviet agent before the war, and as being employed in an important

government office.

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Kim was very anxious to get at the old records of the KING case in order to satisfy himself that he was on sound ground. I have put him in touch with Roger.

Pearson of OSS came in to see me with a memo that he had had from Washington asking whether we had released RINTELEN and if so why. It was suggested that this information should be got confidentially from me. I have ascertained that RINTELEN has been released during the last few months. I told Pearson roughly what I thought of RINTELEN but undertook to give him a written answer.

Pearson talked about the War Room. He seemed to be in general agreement with my view. He had been hotly in favour of putting ourselves Section V and OSS into one building.

Berbert and Buster have been interviewing a man who persists in saying that he is a parachute spy. He was apprehended in Sheffield. We have grave doubts. In the end he will probably turn out to be a deserter. (DICKEN HOFF)

A JIC appreciation of the effects of allied attacks on enemy oil plants in Europe concludes that the total oil production in Dec. was 410,000 tons of which 145,000 was petrol. This compares with the total production in Nov. of 430,000 of which 170,000 was petrol.

Whereas, at the end of Oct, repairs appeared to be outstripping production, the converse is now the case despite the handicap to the allies of winter weather. The number of plants in production for any one time is declining. Only 7 of the 23 synthetic oil plants are at the moment in production. The present rate of petrol production is only about 125,000 tons a month of which about half comes from 6 synthetic plants. If these plants could be put out of action within the next few weeks the enemy would be confronted with the most acute petrol shortage which he has yet had to face.

Tue 5 December 6th 1944

I dined with Peter Loxley last night and told

him that I heard on what appeared to be good authority that SOE had been given a post-war mandate with the knowledge and approval of Eden and that they were to remain an independent body and would not operate under C's jurisdiction. Peter said that this was by no means accurate. What has happened is that a decision has been reached that when MEW is closed down and Selbourne retires, SOE will continue under the Foreign Secretary with the same allegiance as at presents exists to the Chiefs of Staff in connection with para-military activities. It is generally agreed that certain of SOE's activities outside their para-military duties will have to continue in the Middle East, (e.g. their propaganda amongst the Arabs, but apart from this their charter is somewhat vague.

It is however more or less definite that after Stage B their activities will be very restricted indeed and in fact will amount to little more than keeping the nucleus of a staff which would be ready to to expand with all the latest devices should a crisis again arise. It is also definite that the organisation will not operate abroad except under C's direction and control.

I then asked Peter what had happened about the enquiry by Bridges into counter-espionage or the relations between ourselves and Section V. He said that the Secretary of State had received replies from all the Ministers who had been asked for their views about such an enquiry. The Admiralty and the Air Ministry had agreed to Bridges doing the job, the N.O. had suggested that the financial and organisational heads of the Treasury should form a committee with Bridges, but that the W.O. had said that their Secretary of State and the CIGS were of opinion that such an enquiry would not be likely to achieve the desired results and might do harm.


Grigg wished to discuss the matter with Eden. So far it had not been possible to arrange such a discussion but it had been decided that Cadogan should see Grigg about the matter on Tuesday next. We know that Grigg is set on Findlater Stewart conducting the enquiry and it may be that he is desirous of pressing his view on this point and that he does not think that Bridges will have the time to go into the matter in sufficient detail. F.O. are proposing to reply to Morrison to the effect that as the enquiry is likely to take some weeks he doubts

whether the Financial Secretary and the Organisational Secretary of the Treasury will be able to give the necessary time but should their services be required Sir Edward Bridges will be glad to call upon them. In fact they won't be required.

I told Peter about the discussions with Arnold-Foster and of my fears against presenting a proposal for mass fusion. I told him of my suggestion that we should have a co-ordinating head on a working level who would reorganise the two services on offensive and defensive line that both services should be put into one building and that the registries should be linked and the personnel should be inter-changeable. Lastly I mentioned the suggestion that the joint organisation should second certain personnel to Service Intelligence Depts. Peter seemed to think that this was a good idea and agreed with me that if you got the two organisations into the same building with their records linked, half the trouble would be over. He was also confident that mass fusion would not be likely to be acceptable to the powers that be. I pointed out to him that complaints had been raised about over-lapping and lack of co-ordination. It was therefore difficult for the authorities to complain about a suggestion that there should be a co-ordinator. I told Peter that in putting forward this idea we thought that it was right organisationally but that we nevertheless did it with certain misgivings since we had no sort of guarantee that all the hopelessly dead wood in SIS would

be removed. We had a pride in our show and we none of us wished to find ourselves serving under Sir Claude Dansey, Lousy Paine, Moses Beddington, Col. V or anyone else. We took the lowest possible view of them and of the organisation. He seemed to think that this outburst was reasonable.

Lastly I came to the somewhat delicate subject Johnnie Dashwood, Will Codrington and the r.o. Security Service.



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same reasoning applied in the case of the leakage at Ankara. The safe had been opened more than 2 years and 3 months ago and Knatchbull-Hugessen's important documents had appeared on ISOS. There were various theories about how these things had happened but in fact nobody knew. We had not even been told about the incident officially. We had just learned little snips here and there. Had we been called in we should have sent out somebody with a knowledge of secret sources, Cussen and Burt and should have not abandoned the case until we had tried every possible means of discovering the culprit. Apart from this we had a general interest in knowing when leakage occurred. We might be looking for some individual here when in fact he was in Stockholm, Lisbon, Madrid or elsewhere. It might be that there were no such cases but in any case we were never told about them if there were. All this arose I thought from an incident which occurred several years ago when Cussen and Burt had interviewed the P.M.'s book on a leakage case. For some reason or other Will Goddington had intervened and insisted on being present.

He kept breaking into the interrogation and so embarrassed Burt and Cussen that they had to ask him to desist. Ever since he had been hostile to this dept. and extremely cagey about all security matters affecting the I.O. I think Peter sees the point of all this but I doubt if he is in a position to do much about it.

The D.G. talked to me today about the War Room. He wants me to go and see "C". I showed him Dick's letter. He is quite agreeable to TAR running the War Room if he is acceptable to "C".

I had a talk with Herbert about O.C. a propos of a file on Gib. which apparently he has never seen. It relates to the personality of the Governor, the general state of the colony and the possibility of an invasion from La Linea if civil war once more started in Spain. It seems to me that all these are matters on which the B. division officer dealing with Gib should be informed. Lastly there is a statement in a JIC paper relating to the possibilities of sabotage which has never been passed to us at all.

I took this opportunity to discuss the general question with Herbert. He seemed to think that something on the lines of O.C. was necessary although he saw the dangers in Ede's case of the administration becoming top-heavy. He says that provided you have somebody who has not got too grandiose ideas and is quite prepared to tell Governors that he is not qualified to speak on Intelligence matters, the system

should work well. He certainly thinks that it is important that Governors should be entertained and that our own DSOs should have the feeling that someone was looking after their welfare. Policy matters he thinks should be for joint discussion.

At the 12 o'clock meeting today Hart and Buster gave an account of the man calling himself DIECKENHOFF who has been arrested by the Sheffield police and who alleges that he is a parachute spy. Both Herbert and Buster are convinced that he is not a spy in the ordinary sense, namely a man trained by the Abwehr or SD and sent here on a special mission. They are inclined to think that he is a Belgian, possibly a deserter or a criminal. Herbert thinks he is a murderer. He has long ape-like arms and large hands. Herbert feels that he could only put forward the theory that he is a spy if he had done something worse. DIECKENHOFF has said nothing that in any way corresponds to the normal form of spies as we know them. In fact he has said several things which lead us to think that he has never had anything to do with the GIS in his life. It is thought that he is possibly a Belgian racing cyclist who was here several years before the war. An attempt is being made to get him identified. It is almost certain that he has given a false name. There are no air tracks in on the night that he said he landed but air tracks are no longer as good a guide as there were since the Germans are known to use our aircraft for dropping agents and come

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in behind returning raiders. This they have done in France but not as far as we know in this country. Such aircraft would not be identified by radar as German unless we happened to get them coming out.

Mr. Riott said at the meeting that the controlled agent at Cherbourg had been asked by the Germans whether certain ships, carrying troops, from the south of England on the 22nd Dec., had arrived. In fact there was a secret convoy of troops on that date. The question arises how did the Germans know. The American SCI unit has made the bright suggestion that this information may have been obtained from a P/W, goodness knows how, or from an agent in England. It seems almost certain that the information was obtained through a lack of signals security. There has been a great deal of loose talk on the radio telephone between troops here and those in the field and also between shipping depts. I have asked Sclater to go into this particular incident.

We have defeated Herbert on the Eire Censorship. We have pointed out that we have always been in a difficulty in dealing with a question of the kind because of the very confidential nature of the real control, namely those exercised through the good offices of Dan and co. and Pandora which cannot be revealed. As long as censorship exists it is possible to say a ne has been drawn round Great Britain and in this was avoid a reference to the Irish controls.

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if the censorship of terminal mails is now

abolished, answers of this kind could no longer be given. Further the Irish Govt. will naturally be able to reply to any protest by the British or American Govts. against the presence of the Axis Legations in Dublin, that presumably as censorship of mails to Ireland has been abolished the Axis Legations are no longer considered as presenting any danger to allied interests. Whatever the views of the British Govt. may be on this point there are very good grounds for thinking that the American Minister in Dublin would be very concerned at any proposal which might affect American policy vis-a-vis the Eire Govt. in this country.

Danuary 7th

I have mentioned previously the case of one WALLITSCKE, a German who was elected, a convener of shop stewards. D. Branches thought it undesirable in principle that an enemy alien should hold such a position where if the firm were employed on a secret contract he would have access to a great deal of important information. Eventually Mr. Wall of the Security Executive, himself a prominent trades unionist, was consulted. He took the view that any suggestion that the management of a firm could decide with what shop stewards they would or would not be prepared to negotiate would be quite unacceptable to the Unions, since if the management could pick and choose on one ground they might want to do so on others. On the other hand he thought that if there was any difficulty about the employment of aliens on

secret work the Unions would be prepared to abide by any Govt. policy on the subject. This might take the form of a transfer of alien members from one factory to another if a top secret contract could only be placed with an particular factory or firm. Mr. Wall thought that before long the govt. could if it wished make a rule that aliens should always be discharged from factories before Englishmen or alternatively they could make a rule that no alien should be employed in the engineering industry. Both these questions of course have many other implications and Mr. Wall only put them forward as examples of govtrules which would prevent aliens becoming shop stewards in important factories in order to avoid the circumstances of the present case. His main object was to emphasise that the unions would not be willing to alter their rules but would be prepared to accept and adjust themselves to general govt. policy covering the employment of aliens.

Herbert has produced a memo on the present trends of the Abwehr in Belgium and he reaches the following conclusions: (1) the Abwehr stay-behind organisation of espionage agents has been rendered or become almost wholly ineffective although (a) approximately 29 W/T operators have not yet been identified as captured (b) at least 4 uncontrolled agents made transmissions since the liberation of Belgium, one at least as late as November. The single most important measure in rendering the stay-behind organisation ineffective has been the arrest of known collaborators since the Abwehr drew their stay-behind

agents very largely from members of these organisations. Further Abwehr agents may be identified among interned collaborators and priority should be given to the examination of any professional ships W/T operators, Post Office telegraphists etc. The use of informants successful in penetrating the resistance as stay-behind agents presents a danger which should be borne in mind and especially in vetting candidates for liaison work. The task of identifying further stay-behind agents is of subsidiary importance to the frustration of line-crossers and parachutists. As regards sabotage he concludes (1) the stay-behind organisation of saboteurs in west Flanders should be considered as now ineffective and subject to the results of investigation of Mareel's evidence there are no grounds for thinking that any other effective organisation exists though a number of individual saboteurs may well be at large and a number of dumps still unidentified. (2) Unidentified W/T agents and saboteurs and unidentified dumps are dangerous to the extent to which the Abwehr or RSHA succeed in regaining contact with them through new agents sent through the lines or dropped by parachute. (3) the task of identifying further stay-behind agents is subsidiary to the frustration of line-crossers and parachutists.

A C.I. report from the field gives a certain amount of information about the G.I.S. and in particular about SKORZENY. After the dissolution of the Abwehr, the Brandenburg division which from the beginning had always been closely

associated with Abwehr II, passed under the control of the Wehrmachtführungstab of the OKW. At about the same time the 5th Lehrregiment of the division was placed under direct orders of Abt. II and subsequently of Mil. Amt. D. and was renamed the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst. It has since then acted as a general training centre for the Mil. Amt. SKORZENY in addition to being head of Mil. Amt. D. and O.C. of Jaeger Bn. 502 and Leiter of Amt. 6. S. has built up units known as Jagd.verbände and Staerverbände, (harrassing units) with their headquarters in Friedenthal. These units are officially reported to have taken over the tasks of the Brandenburg Division which reverts to a military role, with the exception of the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst. Those recruited for these units must be physically A. I., suitable for special tasks, mentally keen, strong personality, fully trained in single combat, have a knowledge of the English language and also the American dialect. Especially important is a knowledge of military technical terms. German soldiers dressed in allied uniforms and in allied vehicles with correct markings and troops similarly equipped for dropping have been captured in considerable numbers. These troops form part of what is known as Stabsgruppe, under which works Einheit Stielau, named after Lt. Stielau, the commanding officer. They are to be put into the line to create havoc in every possible way that they can. They were the spearhead of the armoured attack against the Americans and operated largely in jeeps. They had to destroy head-

quarters and headquarters personnel, eliminate message centres, radio stations, communication lines etc. They were to re-enter behind our lines and to keep the approaching German armoured columns informed about our intentions and dispositions. Certain units were instructed to re-enter the command of the Meuse bridges and that of the roads leading to these bridges.

8th January

I had a talk with "onnie Haylor today about the War "oom. He rather agrees with my view that a good deal of the work can be done better in its own environment. It is fair to say however that he is not very keen about a large build-up in this country as he thinks that ultimately the schwerpunkt for C.I. work should be in Germany rather than here. I told him that I was not in entire agreement because I thought that it would probably always be necessary to some extent for the Control Commission to throw things back here. Obviously they would refer less and less as they built up their own records. There would also be a large number of cases which would be of purely local significance and which would therefore not be worth recording. "onnie thinks however that when the SHAEF period comes to an end it will probably be necessary to have some sort of rear echelon of the Control Commission in order to extract what is required from the producer depts.

I saw "C" this afternoon. I told him that if possible I wanted to get agreement on the 3 main fundamentals about the War Room. Firstly the question of the records. C said that he was quite agreeable to these being based on RB and my discussing the details with Viv and As regards the head of the War Room he said that he personally had suggested Barry whom he knew as a member of Whites, and had occasionally seen at the JIC. On the other hand I said I thought Barry would be quite suitable but would be somewhat handicapped through not knowing much about the Intelligence side of the office. I was inclined to think that TAR, whose name I had put forward, would be a better suggestion and I understood from Dick that TAR would be persona grata with Murphy. C said he had not to slightest objection to TAR and that he might be a very good choice. Lastly we came to the question of control. C said he still had reserves about SHAEF being in sole control. I said I did not think he had much to worry about since he would have final control of MSS and also of his own personnel. We should also wish to control our own personnel since they would have to continue to do a certain amount of work for the office. I then outlined to C what I thought would be the most suitable arrangement, namely a head with an American deputy both of whom would have SHAEF labels plus a representative of MI5, MI6, OSS, X2 and the French BSM. This body would form the "ginger" group and could be situated wherever convenient. The functions of the War Room as I saw it divided into 3, the work done by Milmo and Bird who would need to be reinforced, the ISOS index, and documents and research section. From my point of view it would

be preferable if Milmo and Bird remained where they were, Colin Roberts could remain in Ryder St. with the index, and research could be conducted either here, on Ryder St. or at Barnet.

C. told me that he had heard by a side wind that OSS were rather inclined to think that MI5

wanted to grab the whole War Room and that they were not too keen about this as they thought we were rather too tied up with the FBI.

I told C. that we had no intention of trying to grab the War Room. In fact had it been offered to us the DG would almost certainly have turned it down. We felt very strongly that it should be under SHAEF control subject to certain safeguards which we should both have to impose.

I then talked to C. about the HARPLEY case. He was very worried and thought the whole thing was rather scandalous. He said that Gomez Beer, Asst. Nav. 1. Attache, who was supposed to be responsible for security duties, had recently established himself in a very expensive flat and that there was some reason to think that he might have been dabbling in the exchange.

We then talked about the battle. I told C. that van Moylan, of Dutch Security, whom I had seen the other day, had told me that he was in Brussels when the attack was made on the aerodrome. It seemed that we had been caught with our trousers down. Van Moylan had seen some 40 planes burning on the ground. They were all lined up almost touching each other and must have made a perfect target. C. said that on that day we had lost altogether 165 planes on the ground. He had warned the Air Force but presum-

ably they had done nothing about it. I asked him whether any attack was expected on the Mass. He said that the Germans had planned to launch an attack there in February but he did not at the moment know whether they would be able to carry this out or not.

9th January

I have ascertained from Montagu that the submarine previously reported to be carrying an agent to Canada is identical with the one which landed two saboteurs in the USA recently. We are informing Cyril Mills.

I attended a meeting of the JIC at which deception in the Far East was discussed. Bevan wanted W/T backing but the Admiralty and I gather the other Services as well had been unable to supply the necessary personnel. Apparently those units who have been trained for the Overlord period had been disbanded owing to shortage of man-power, and drafted to various ships. I said that from our experience here we were quite convinced that it was useless to try and do deception without wireless backing. It could only result in throwing agents down the drain. It was decided to inform SEAC of the position and also I think to report to the Chiefs of Staff.

I then raised the question of the Chinese BJs which seemed to me to have a bearing on deception in the Far East. It would be difficult to carry out any useful deception unless it were possible to block the Chinese leak. Messages had been going from this country for some time

showing the disposition of our ships. These messages were either broken by the Japs or pinched in Chungking. The D.N.I. said that he was glad this matter had been raised as it was causing him considerable anxiety. There seemed little doubt that the Chinese N.A. obtained his facts from some 50 Chinese naval students who were working with the Fleet. He did not see how these officers could be withdrawn without creating a serious incident. We then suggested that the document captured in the Far East which showed that the Japs had been receiving information sent from London by Chinese attaches, might be pepped up and then used for the purpose of making a demarche to the Chinese. We would not say that this information denoted a break in Chinese cyphers but merely that the information to be leaking in Chungking and that for the sake of security it would be much better if such information were not passed to the Chinese Govt. from this country. It is to be hoped that the Chinese will not attribute the leakage to their own cyphers. We shall then be able to see whether they are acting upon the warning that will have been given them. This plan was approved and we were asked to prepare the necessary documents for the Chinese.

I had a meeting with Grogan and other D. officers to discuss the censorship progress report. The point that worries me most is the suggestion that censorship between S. America and the Iberian Peninsula should be abandoned after Stage A. when SHAEF are satisfied that the internal censorship ring is working satisfactorily. I pointed out that the internal ring would

never be particularly satisfactory, and that having regard to the possibility of the Germans building up in the Argentine and the Peninsula we should stand to gain more by intercepting their communications between those two countries. We shall have an opportunity of saying this when the time comes.

Lennox tells me that the PMS meeting with Roosevelt and Uncle Joe is to take place at Yalta. The British and American delegations will be on board ship. The Franconia is to be used. Presumably it is felt that we shall have more privacy if we have our headquarters on a ship. If we were to be on land all our rooms would be miked and our telephones tapped. The meeting is to take place about the 29th of this month. Con Boddington is proceeding on board the Franconia. There is a good deal of difficulty about these ships going through the Dardenelles. Some suitable cover will have to be found.

Hollis brought down the Canadian Major Meadley to have a talk with me. He works under Acland and is concerned with German P/W camps. He gave me some account of the raid that was made on one of the huts in order to obtain access to secret ink and other implements for breaking out of camp, concerning which information had been received. Elaborate deception plans had been worked out. Some engineers had been going into the camp daily in order to lay drain-pipes in the vicinity of the huts. On the day of the raid certain of the party were disguised as engineers. A fire was started at the other end of the compound in order to attract the majority

of the prisoners and prevent them from getting to know what was going on. This did not last long however and an ugly crowd began to collect. The camp leader said he could no longer be responsible for the safety of the party. They had to leave everything they had collected, but a sergeant managed to tuck a sample of secret ink inside his shirt. It seems almost incredible that such ~~conditions~~ can be allowed to prevail.

Prior to the recent counter-attack by the Germans an informal survey of information indicated that a further advance towards the Rhine would reveal not only a continuation of the policy of evacuation of all populations but that any persons who did remain behind would probably belong either to the Centre Party or the Communist Party. The intellectual level which would be met might well be below the general standard since the Nazis seemed to make a point in their evacuations to take the intellectuals and pay less attention to the lower classes.

On 24th Dec. the Brutus transmitter was started up again for urgent military operational reasons, but the circumstances envisaged did not in fact arise, and the traffic is therefore confined to a series of innocuous messages about the Air Force. The security of the whole case of Brutus has become somewhat imperilled as a result of the capture and interrogation of various members of the Walenti organisation, who have revealed to the French authorities that Brutus's escape from German imprisonment was

A Belgian woman who was the mistress of the Abwehr officer who recruited Sniper has under interrogation disclosed full particulars of Sniper's case. The same woman has furnished some information about Father.

Gelatine has received another letter containing two new cover addresses and a promise of payment from the Germans.

Tate has recently been used by the Admiralty for putting over deception material about the location of anti-submarine mine fields. The Admiralty have received first-class evidence that the Germans are diverging U boats in accordance with Tate's messages. Marriott tells me that Tate is being given another decoration for his work on reporting V.2 damage.

Dick's C.I. wire for the week ending 5th Jan. states that the G.I.S. remain very active and are preparing new missions of all types, generally short-term espionage, life-line sabotage attempted creation of new espionage long-term networks and sending supplies and instructions to agents considered well-established.

According to a captured agent British and Canadian uniforms are being collected from P/W camps. There is a possibility that these may be used in large-scale harrassing operations in support of further attacks. (If what C. told me about a possible attack on the Maas in February is true this information may have some bearing on the matter.) Interrogations indicate that despite many recent captures the Germans are now have considerable success with short term line-crossers. There are further indications that

the enemy is intending to land agents by submarine on the west coast of France. A parachutist captured at Perpignan was expecting to make contact with someone from Spain. He was dropped by an enemy-operated Flying Fortress which also dropped a French officer in North Africa on the same trip. It is difficult to see what advantage the Germans can hope to gain from dropping an agent in N. Africa at this juncture.

A long-standing Belgian agent was arrested in Antwerp. He had been instructed to begin the use of pigeons. Resistance groups in Belgium had up to mid-December surrendered 23,000 rifles and machine guns, 20,000 grenades and 2½ million rounds of S.A.A.

The present German forces in Norway are estimated at 300,000 men, 55,000 naval personnel manning 9 destroyers, 50 U boats and a large number of minor war vessels, 30,000 airmen manning 270,000 aircraft, 40,000 odd and police including Quisling police. The German commander in chief is General Pendulic, an inveterate Nazi.

GARBO has received a wonderful letter from Frederico dated 9th Dec. It is to some extent an imitation of Garbo's own style. It says "We have in your personality, your character, your valour, all those virtues which become a gentleman. We here in the very small circle of colleagues who know your story and with your organisation talk very often about you that it often seems as if we were living the incidents which you relate to us, and we most certain

-ly to the full your worries. On account of the I know that with the approach of Xmas you will be suffering many bitter moments with having to spend these days separate from the people who mean most in your life. I trust nevertheless that the suggestion of being able to contribute through the mediation of the organisation which you have created to a great cause which is that of the struggle for the maintenance of order and happiness in our continent, will give you comfort and moral strength to be able to go ahead with us until we overcome all obstacles....etc.etc."

January 10th

Ede, TAR and I had a talk about O.C. matters. I mentioned the case of a JIC paper on security in Gib. on which C.C. had expressed a view on the grounds that it dealt mainly with general questions of discipline and law and order. It had however been overlooked that there was a sabotage issue which had been extremely inadequately dealt with by the Navy. Attached the JIC paper was a file giving a good many details about the state of morale in Gib., and the measures which ought to be taken if civil war ever broke out in Spain to prevent undesirables entering the Rock area. I pointed out to Bertram that all this was relevant to the work being done by Herbert Hart. This had not I think occurred to him.

I lunched with Sclater. He told me about the Catalogue Reference KV/4/196 at Cherbourg had been asked to report on a convoy said to have left

the south of England on 27th Dec. Marriott had told us about the case at a recent 12 o'clock meeting; Sclater had looked into it from the point of view of possible signals leakage. A convoy had actually left, and two ships had been torpedoed. I am afraid we shall have some difficulty in getting to the bottom of this case. It does however raise the whole question of monitoring our own signals. At present we are the only people who are doing it in a very small way. The results have been quite astonishing. There are times when one wonders whether if ISOS did not contain operational material the resources of RSS might be more profitably employed on preventing ourselves and the Americans from transmitting valuable information to the enemy over the air. An interesting example of leakage occurred at the time when Monty took over the two American armies. A B.B.C. war reporter receiving his instructions by radio telephone from London was informed that there would now be 4 war reporters and that dispositions should be made accordingly. Since it is well known that there is one war reporter with each army, it obviously followed that Monty was from that moment going to command 4 armies. The information about this change was not released to the public until several weeks later.

Miss Nunn came to see me. I asked her how she was getting on. She seemed to think that she was getting all she wanted, although she dealt mainly with F. Division. I gave her the general picture of work in B. Division at the

We were having in connection with the resumption of restrictions. I did not think that it was generally realised that each restriction was part of the whole and was difficult to defend singly. It had been the cumulative effect of all restrictions that had really enabled us to maintain the security position in this country. Miss Nunn said that she did not normally get taken in on matters affecting the aliens branch with which B. Division were more concerned. If however we wanted her assistance she would be very ready to intervene. I told her that I thought the general atmosphere was better though from time to time we still got letters which seemed to imply that we were a rather irresponsible lot on whom a close watch must be kept unless we were going to get the Home Secretary into trouble.

I had a longish talk with Vivian about the War Room. I gather that the SIS objection to SHAEF control lies in the belief that if they gave themselves up to the army they would not satisfactorily be able to lay down their postwar organisation. I said I thought they would be making a mistake if they did not agree to SHAEF control and I saw no reason why the army should in any way interfere with their post-war organisation. Viv seemed to favour leaving most personnel where they were and establishing solely a ginger group, the principle reason being that Section V would not be able to make much of a contribution if they were to carry on their normal duties. They were not anxious to move into Berkeley Square with the SS whom they would really like to shake off. Felix had more or

less sold the dept. to OSS and VV feels that they will never get rid of them even when the war is over. He says they have no privacy at all and that even their most intimate matters are bound to come to the notice of the Americans.

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January 11th

John Marriott came to talk to me about the set-up of Security Control officers at ports in India which is being organised by Hewson, DMI Security, and Stratton. John thinks the whole thing is rather a racket. I am inclined to agree that it has got slightly out of perspective. We are to have a meeting about it.

Curry came to see me about a proposal he had that he should make a general study of communism and fascist matters in relation to foreign affairs. I said that I thought that this would undoubtedly bring him into conflict with E. Division. I then referred to my previous statement that it would be difficult to put the clock back and to put Curry over Hollis or Dick. He evidently feels from strongly about this and said quite emphatically that he did not agree. I confined myself to saying that I was quite certain it would not work, but that I had hoped that if there were a reorganisation there might be some other opening.

Grogan came to tell me that an agent from Switzerland had made contact with two of our D.A.s in order to arrange accommodation addresses in Switzerland for the despatch of duff. This means that censorship units in the field will have to have a staff competent to deal with this matter.

January 12th

I had a longish talk with Buster about the future of the War Room. He seems to think that the document section and the research section should be located with the ginger group and that the latter would be most conveniently situated either in this building or alongside it. If they go elsewhere they will have to have a receipt and despatch section of their own, with all the consequent delays and difficulties in getting personnel. He thinks that his section and Roland Bird's should be amalgamated and receive an additional staff from the Americans and elsewhere. Colin Roberts will have to remain where he is. The ginger group will act as a bottle neck for all information coming in and going out.

I saw the DG and gave him a brief account of my conversation with Vivian. He is quite agreeable to TAR being appointed controller of the War Room.

Harry Allen has had a meeting with the HDE at which man power employed on security duties was discussed. I had put him up a paper on the subject. It was apparently decided to turn the job over to the HDSE although the prospects manpower appeared to be very remote. The fact is that only old people are employed on protective duties in factories. They are mostly people who could not do other work. Generally speaking it seems that those who are performing such duties are required to prevent pilfering and that as this is fairly widespread

It is important that they should continue in their present employment.

I hear that Harold Scott is to be Commissioner of Police. This sounds to me a good move, at any rate in so far as personal relations are concerned. I understand that a further approach has been made to Burt who might be asked to go over to SB as Superintendent.

Foster is going with Nott-Bower to run the police in Austria.

The DIECKENHOFF case turns out to be a frost. The man is a British deserter wanted in several places for larceny. He is thought to be mental. His mother is a police matron, and his father is said to have been German, now dead.

January 13th

T-R came to see me and talked about the War Room. He was really seeking for information. I gave him a rough outline of my views.

I asked Tim to come over to talk about the War Room. He had spent yesterday at Blenheim and I gather that Horrocks is to come up and look at the records in Ryder St. early next week. Horrocks contemplates taking over or photographing the present index or indices in the French, Belgian, Dutch and German sections but has not yet finally made up his mind. I suggested to that only four points should be taken at the high-level meeting on Monday: (1) the nomination of the head of the War Room (2) the question of SHAEF direction; (3) endorsement of the policy of basing the records on RB; (4)

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the decision regarding the level at which there is to be French representation. seems to be very much in favour of having all the War Room personnel in one place. He would not in the least mind their being in SF but he anticipates that there might be difficulties from OSS. He thinks the latter will wish to control cases from their own areas. I said I could see no real objection to this although complete integration would probably be more sensible.) Tim seemed to think that the ISOS index would have to remain where it is as it is in constant use by case officers and other sections of Section V. TAR feels that the documents section might perhaps be given to the Americans. Meanwhile there seems to be some suggestion that T-R should run research.

Harry Allen talked to me about my addition to Bevan's letter on deception in the Far East which is up for approval by the JIC. I suggested that a para should be added pointing out the dangers of trying to run deception without the backing of W/T and physical objects. Not only would agents be blown but the information we provided might be put into reverse and so far from deceiving, the enemy might work out exactly what he wanted to know. This is being passed on to the JIC.

Hale came to tell me that some 300 German P/W's of Polish origin are being sent over here for enlistment in the Polish Army. As usual we have been told nothing as to where they come from or how far they have been vetted.

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nonnie Daylor rang me up to say that he did not wish to press the matter in any way but at the same time he thought there might be a certain value in his attending some of the conferences about the WarRoom. It seemed likely that the Control Commission would take over the responsibility for the War room after the SHAEF period. On the other hand the War Room as such might be abandoned. He was also interested in C's reservations about SHAEF control. He thought there should be SHAEF control not only of the War Room but also of the SCI units as at present. He wondered whether after the SHAEF period, control of the SCI units would be vested solely in C. He thought it necessary that the work of C's people in Germany should be closely co-ordinated with that of the Control Commission and that it might be well to make this clear at this stage.

Sclater tells me that according to Lt. Col. Steven-son of Sigs. 9 on Dec. 16th i.e. 2 days before the Rundstedt offensive, the enemy identified and located by wireless means the whole of the units contained in the 10th U.S. Division.

It has been found that the enemy are consistently breaking the Slidex code of the armies in the field to such an extent that an urgent instruction was sent two days ago to all chief signal officers advising them of the fact. The key is to be changed twice daily instead of once and the utmost care is to be taken in its use. Great care is to be taken that the enciphered wires are not compromised by the context. This is found to be the case in the past and is a common fault. It has been found from a captured document that the Japs have estimated the

order of battle of RAF and US Air Forces in India within an accuracy of 4% by means of W/T intelligence.

I saw Templer, who is now in charge of the German section of SOE. Since running I.B. in France at the beginning of the war he has commanded a corps in this country which he relinquished in order to command a division in Italy. There he got blown up. He is working for SOE during his convalescence. He wanted to know whether we were prepared to allow PETERSEN of the Swedish Secret Intelligence to come to this country. The circumstances were as follows: Templer had got into touch with the Danish Resistance Movement for the purpose of getting them to run a snow into Germany. In this he had been successful. Unfortunately however one of them named Nordentoft was acquainted with the arrangement and talked about his association with Templer to PETERSEN in Stockholm. PETERSEN suggested that he too might be able to help Templer in a similar way, and suggested that he should come over for a discussion. I said that provided the proposition was considered really important I did not think we should have any objection in principle to PETERSEN being sent to this country. There would be a certain security risk but not a very grave one. I asked Templer what he knew about PETERSEN. He said that he had had a talk with C. and with Dunderdale who was going to talk to Garno of the Polish Secret Service who had had dealings with PETERSEN in the past. As far as he knew PETERSEN had been rather on the fence in the early days of the war, if he had not in fact given the Germans a certain

amount of information and assistance. Latterly however he is said to have been extremely well disposed towards ourselves. I pointed out to Templer that if he was accepting PETERSEN's offer he was laying himself open to being double crossed on a big scale. If he supplied money to finance PETERSEN's projects in Germany he would never know the value of the reports that he received. Moreover PETERSEN might well give away the whole show to the Germans and take money from both sides. The worst aspect of the situation was that as far as I could see he would never have any means of knowing precisely where he stood. Templer struck me as being the kind of man who would be undeterred by considerations of this kind.

January 14th

Dick arrived from Paris about 4.30 soaked to the skin after crossing the channel in an O.boat. These are a type of motor-launch which was used to deposit C's agents on the continent. I told him roughly what were the views of the various parties on the War Room and where - thought there might be snags. SHAEF have apparently been rather standing on their heads since Rundstedt's attack. There is no doubt that the Americans were caught completely on the hop. They have had some 40,000 casualties including 18,000 missing. They had created no adequate defences and their staff work generally seems to have been bad. The redeeming feature was the magnificent way in which they had fought at Bastogne. The individual soldier seems to be good provided he is well led. SHAEF as an

operational staff is clearly very weak. Eisenhower knows nothing about operational matters but is an extremely good figure-head and a very honest man, Bedale-Smith is a pep man who would show up very well in a crisis. He expressed bitter resentment at the suggestion that Monty should take over the two American armies. This suggestion was mainly sponsored by Kenneth Strong and Jock Whiteley, who are the only people with any field experience. The move was a perfectly natural one. The line had been broken and it was obviously better to have Monty take over the northern part of the salient and Bradley the south. Feeling generally is rather bad. The Americans dislike us, the French dislike the Americans, and are generally trying to drive a wedge between them and ourselves. De Gaulle threatened to withdraw his troops from the line if Strasburg was not defended. Eisenhower had to respond to this piece of blackmail. It was at this point that Winston and the CIGS went to Paris. At a dinner at which Strong was present, the PM said that he did not intend to tie himself to France and that he was convinced that the future of the world lay in close Anglo-American cooperation. As a proof of these sentiments he was advocating the maintenance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for 10 years after this war.

January 15th

Owen came in to see me. He is one of our LRC examiners who has been working with the British 2nd Army. He is now in Brussels working on interrogations with the SCI units. He has done

extremely well and everybody speaks very highly of the reports he has sent in. He is hoping perhaps to get a job with 21 A.G. in a kind of B.L.B capacity vis-a-vis the forward CSDIC. He would like this as he is a bit tired of interrogating.

R.J. blew in this morning while I was talking to Dick. He said he had risen from a bed of sickness as he thought that he should attend today's meeting on the War Room. We both agreed to this as he seemed to be entirely within his rights.

I attended the meeting on the War Room with C. in the chair. Others taking part were Arnold-Foster, Viv. Murphey and Blum of OSS, Dick, Buster and Richard Butler. We first discussed SHAEF control. C. began by putting forward certain reasons for the retention of control by SIS, which seemed to be of rather doubtful validity, and in a way rather unnecessary since it did not appear that SHAEF would exercise any more control over C's personnel than they did over his SCI units. In fact they would exercise a good deal less. C. spoke first of his communications and secondly his position on the JIC and lastly remarked that the arrangement seemed reasonable as MI6 were supplying most of the information. He said this in all good faith but was of course totally misinformed, as by comparison with ourselves SIS are supplying very little information, to some extent because they cannot lay their hands on it when they have got it. It was finally agreed that Dick should leave the matter to the JIC. This means that there will be SHAEF control. It was then

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agreed that TAR should be head of the War Room with Bob Blum as his number 2 and that both of them should have SHAETF labels. There was then an attempt to get down to numbers and

staff. We said we thought this would be a waste of time and should be left in the hands of TAR and his deputy. After a good deal of argument this was agreed. There was general agreement on the question of the registry. The work of the War Room will in future be based on R.B.

In a longish report on German activities in the USA, the FBI state that many Germans have a strong desire to assist Germany in every way possible after her defeat. Particularly they desire to make every effort to prevent her from being completely destroyed and prevent the German people from starving and being again subjected to revolution and chaos. Coupled with this desire was a steadily increasing wish on the part of hundreds of the German community to rebuild organisational life and to attempt to procure for the German element what they considered to be its rightful influence and prestige.

Father's notionally left India on his return journey to this country on Jan. 5th and transmissions in India are now being done by the notional agent which he has recruited there. The Belgians have arrested one Adolf Robert WIFLEMANS who after interrogation was released. He has stated that he introduced two persons to HANSTON @ Dr. HACKE and one of these he claims was Father. This is not consistent

with Father's own story of his introduction to the Germans. There is I think little doubt that Father in his early days was a collaborator. When he changed his mind he probably felt that the less he said about his past the better.

Sniper has arrived in Brussels but has not yet begun operating his transmitter, as the Germans have not given him any details as to the time that they will be listening for him.

Rover established contact on the 8th Dec.

Garbo has now established contact with the high-power transmitter. Finger-print tests have been made by the Admiralty before and after modifications were made to the apparatus and they are now of the opinion that the characteristics of this commercial transmitter have been satisfactorily removed. Garbo's present situation in the eyes of the Germans is that he is still in hiding in South Wales. They are examining the possibilities of supplying him with new documentation to implement a scheme which he has put up for his escape. Meanwhile his deputy is running the organisation. A new recruit has been added to the network in Canada.

Our Ambassador in Madrid has made a protest to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs about continued espionage activities by Friedrich Knappe of Madrid and has demanded his immediate expulsion from Spain. It has further been requested that the Ambassador's nominee should be allowed to interrogate Knappe before his

departure, with a view to ascertaining the whereabouts of one of his agents in the U.K. It has been disclosed to the Spanish that this information reached the British Security Service through an ex-member of KNAPPE's organisation: KNAPPE is Garbo's assistant control officer in Madrid.

The case of Brutus has been reviewed with LCS and SHAEF. It has been agreed to accept the risk of his being compromised subject to the avoidance of publicity in the trials of Kiki and other agents who are in a position to compromise him.

January 16th

Peppermint has asked whether we can supply his uncle who is ill in Spain with penicillin. This is being looked into but there is some difficulty in getting the necessary export permit from the Ministry of Supply.

I had a talk with Horrocks and told him about yesterday's meeting. He said that he had an appointment with Section V to look at all their records and advise how they could best be tied in with our own. Mason of the German Section is apparently anxious to have his records returned to his department after the war. This I think will be impossible.

January 17th

David Doyle came to see me yesterday. I think he was anxious to find out how the problem of amalgamation was getting on. There is

obviously a certain amount of jealousy of Arnold-Forster who has now got more of C's ear than D.B.

On Monday night Dick, Arnold-Forster, Richard Butler and I talked about the amalgamation of SIS and Security Service. We finally agreed that we would recommend that the problem should be viewed on the basis of the creation of one Intelligence Service. I said that I was all in favour of this but that I still had grave doubts about the method of approach which I thought was doomed to failure. I thought my previous formula would be more likely to succeed, and that in any case it was the greatest pity that the opportunity created by the War Room to put both organisations into one building and link their records had not been taken. Had this been done we should have gone 80% on the way to fusion and it would have been a comparatively easy matter to gain the last 20%. I do not think that either Forster or Dick quite realised the difficulties of getting a proposition of this kind intelligently considered. It is one thing for us to be convinced about what is necessary but it is quite another when politics of the War Cabinet come into the picture. Some frightful red herring will be drawn across the trail and we shall either be given an unsatisfactory organisation or be prevented from doing anything at all. If we ^{are} turn down on amalgamation it will be difficult to get the registries linked or to put our two organisations into one building, at any rate until the whole business has died down.

Burt tells me that he has heard of a man who has a whole room filled with bank notes in biscuit tins. They are probably ill-gotten gains. In any case he does not wish to pay income-tax on them

Tommy came to see me about Peppermint's penicillin. We are inclined to think that our reply should be No. We could however advise Peppermint to ~~make~~ his application through the Ambassador. If we manage things otherwise it is almost certain to leak out in Spain through the doctor and there may be applications from other diplomats which would embarrass the F.O.

I had a talk with Herbert on Signals Security. He is inclined to think that if all the resources of the Secret Service had been turned on to interception of the enemy's signals and the tightening up of our own signal security we should have done better than by employing agents.. There is quite a lot in this

At the Wednesday meeting Cussen gave us a talk on the set-up in Paris dealing with renegades.

Cecil brought up the subject of the proposed relaxations on travel to N.Ireland to be discussed tomorrow by the Overseas Travel Committee. These relaxations, in themselves are not very far-reaching, but Grogan has been told categorically by the H.O. that what it amounts to is that all applications, with the rarest exceptions, will be granted. Cecil

pointed out that this will make it very difficult for Eire to retain their controls, and I said that it seemed to me that Censorship would become involved. The increase in the number of travellers will be such that the Censorship officer at the port will be unable to make a proper examination. I said that we had only agreed to the removal of SCOs from ports on the understanding that I.O.s and Censorship restrictions would be maintained. Grogan is suggesting that the matter is one for H.D.S.E. rather than the OTC. In connection with the proposed relaxation on travel to France, Baxter pointed out that if civilians were allowed to travel after military needs had been met, the boats would often be carrying 150 individuals whose examination would not be possible in the circumstances. It had been requested that we should have advance notification of those who were to travel, and it is suggested that an SCO should be on the boat to save time in taking particulars at the port. If the usual cross-channel weather prevails he will not be able to get very coherent replies from most passengers, I am afraid. It isn't easy to fill up forms and cat at the same time.

Wood, late of B.24, came in to see me. He is now working for FWE in Antwerp.

Sclater has seen D.D.Y. who has told him that G.C. & C.S. have had an inquest on the product available at the time of Mundstedt's offensive. The view is that all the information was there but that the interpretation was faulty.

This confirms what I had previously heard. D.D.Y. is very keen that we should do something to improve Signals Security which he says is in a lamentable state.


John Marriott and Stamp came to see me about the Brutus case. There are 4 people who have been arrested by the French and who know about Brutus. It therefore becomes necessary to get them out of French hands since the publicity of a trial might well blow Brutus. We cannot accept them over here permanently without going to the H.O. I am therefore proposing to have them over as special cases for 8 weeks and then reconsider the matter.

Viv. has sent over a draft of a letter from C. to Kenneth Strong which contains an account of the proceedings of the meeting we had about the War Room on Monday. It seems to me all wrong that these minutes should be in the form of a letter from C. to Strong. Apart from this they contain a thoroughly misleading impression of the amount of work being done by the respective departments. It is said in support of C. having control of the War Room that much of the material and a very considerable number of the personnel will have to be contributed by SIS. This of course is totally untrue. 80% of the information which is based on interrogations comes from the field or from C20.

Victor rang up today from Paris. He wanted to get authority to hang on to Stuart Hampshire who is giving him considerable assistance.

He also wants some SCOs for training as Fleet Base Security officers in Germany. The request has come from Ginger Lewis.

18th January 1945.



I had a meeting with Allen, Vickery, Bamford, Butler, Marriott, Ede and Adam on Brig. Howman's scheme for port security in India. We all felt that it was a bit ambitious and somewhat vague. It was agreed that we could not very well encorse it since we did not know enough about the facts of the situation or what he was trying to do. Harry would however write to him personally making certain criticisms in matters of detail. Howman in his document describes himself as the DSO representing Censtral Security London. This I think is due to some document on the subject circulated by O.C. we cannot allow this to creep in otherwise it will cause trouble with DIB who are really our representatives in India except in matters of purely military security.

Walker has raised the question of pigeons on the continent. 24/4/1964
 Catalogue Reference 4V4/196 are well informed

and have instituted the necessary measures within the zone of the armies. There are however back areas where regulations should be laid on by the civil authorities. Similar measures should be taken by the French and we should also see that SHAEF are informed and issue the necessary instructions to the Americans. Walker will prepare a memo on the controls which we enforced in this country and will embody in his report all information at present available about the use of pigeons by the Abwehr and S.D.

19th January

I spent most of the morning discussing the War Room and Horrock's attitude. This ended with a meeting called by the D.G. which TAR, Horrocks, Buster, Butler, Dick, Harker and myself attended. Horrocks took the line that the Section V. cards were not nearly so bad as they had been painted, that they contained quite a lot of information 20% of which was not recorded on our files. For this he must have been relying on the statements of Section V. Buster pointed out that a good deal of this 20% consisted of Gestapo records which were not in fact relevant to the work of the War Room. Horrocks questioned whether in accordance with our present charter we had any right to card in our files a lot of information regarding S.D. and Abwehr which in the future would hardly concern this dept. but only the German section of Section V. The D.G. was inclined to take a similar view. It was pointed out however that what we were really trying to do was to serve the field to the best advantage. None of us, not even members of Section V. themselves had

been able to get any satisfactory results from their registration system and it had been generally recognised that our registry was the only one on which the documents could be based. It will obviously take many months to build up the existing SIS system into anything like efficiency since it would have to be converted from an information card system to a file system. If and when this was completed we should have two registries more or less covering the same ground, since we could never ourselves refrain from doing a considerable amount of carding of foreign names on the ground that to combat the German intelligence system it was essential for us to have a comprehensive idea of its workings in all parts of the world and study the reports in the raw. The only real solution was of course an amalgamation of Section V. and ourselves or a total amalgamation of SIS and MI5. One of the best methods of bringing this about (although this is an idea with which I do not feel that the DG is in sympathy) was to create an approach through absorbing the SIS records in R.B. and giving SIS free access to R.B. in the same way that they gave us free access to the ISOS Index. It was eventually agreed that TAR and Horrocks between them should try and put this view across and get SIS to agree to the assimilation of the War Room cards into R.B.

20th January, 1945.

I saw Peter at the Club. I asked him what had been the result of the conversation between Cadogan and Grigg a propos of the enquiry into the relations between ourselves and Section V.

He said that Grigg had been worried about Bridges conducting the enquiry since his absence would undoubtedly have come to the notice of the PM who would have wanted to know all about it and moreover he felt that as much of the material was very delicate, particularly Roger Hollis's work, it would be ^{or} desirable to have papers relating to the enquiry floating about in Downing St. where they might be seen by the Beaver. He thought it would be infinitely preferable if the enquiry were conducted by somebody who was away from Cabinet Secretariat circles. In this connection Lindlater Stewart had been suggested though no final decision had been reached. Peter inclines to the view that anything in the nature of total amalgamation will not be acceptable although it may be desirable. I said that in my experience once things of this sort reached Cabinet level it was the toss of a coin whether they went right or wrong. Peter entirely agreed and mentioned off the record the atmosphere in which S.O.E.'s future was being discussed. There had been several minutes by Eden and by the Chiefs of Staff and the papers had come up to the PM at the end of a rather tiring day. He had written across them "Let Major Morton look into this and advise. SIS I know but who are SOE? I know S. Menzies. He is head of MI5".

Bronx has returned from Madrid. Her efforts to contact the Abwehr were unsuccessful.

SHAFF C.I. Summary for week ending 12th January states that the GIS is trying hard to improve the training and standard of agents and to

support them with the necessary local colour, documents, currency etc. Large numbers are under training as line-crossers and it is thought that they may become rather a serious problem. Reports are required on locations of headquarters, information from ports, particularly Antwerp, and details about convoys. A considerable number of agents of various kinds have been captured. A special unit of the Waffen S.S. known as Sonder kommando Heine with headquarters at Coblenz, has been identified. It is connected with sabotage and disruption and is recruited from French renegade organisations. It has posts at L'Orient and in the German-held Atlantic ports.

Up to 31/12/44 the French had arrested 2,300, passed 300 death sentences, 180 life sentences, 340 prison sentences and an additional 1800 cases are under investigation. As many as 50,000 future cases are foreseen. In Belgium there have been 495 death sentences, 167 life imprisonments and 1,027 terms of imprisonment. According to a captured document Hitler has ordered party leaders in cases of surprise occupation to leave with the civilian population and to wear army uniform, "in order to obtain the necessary protection by international law". Uniforms and equipment for this purpose have been supplied.

STIAEF Summary for week ending 19/1/45 shows that the scale of enemy line-crossing and parachute effort is being maintained and will probably increase. There is evidence of increasing German interest in ports, convoys and troop movements on the Mediterranean coast. Greater

use is to be made of women agents. There is evidence that the Hitler Jugend are being trained in guerilla warfare. In particular they are to harrass transport and attack individual soldiers.

January 22nd

Mark Johnstone is taking over the case of FURTH who will have to remain at the Oratory at any rate for the time being. Dick thinks he cannot be used for the moment but that he might be useful in non-Nazi circles after the cease fire. Alternatively he might be used by PWE. He was apparently very moved at seeing Dick again. Dick says there is no reason to think that his political views have changed since the beginning of the war.

Herbert is taking over TARS position as ADB. This has been agreed to by the D.G.

January 23rd

ISOS shows that we may be getting some agents from Holland. We discussed at the daily meeting how they would be likely to come. It was possible that they might sign on as seamen in Antwerp. I asked Baxter to make enquiries as to how far we were likely to know about this and whether they would be sent up to the LRC.

Elton came to see me. He wants to take a job at the British Council. I told him to put his application in writing.

A further attempt is to be made to get Balloon reinstated in the army.

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/196

Dick Butler saw Keith, Strong's P.A. who is in hospital over here. It seems that Strong visited Bradley before the Rundstedt push and pointed out the concentration opposite his front which seemed to be for the purpose of refitting but asked him whether he felt confident that he could be able to meet an attack. Bradley was apparently very sanguine. Neither Strong nor Bradley however on the evidence available thought that an attack was likely. There is no doubt therefore that the intelligence appreciation was inadequate. There was a frightful flap going on in SHAEF for some days after the offensive opened. It even got to the stage of planning what port should be held as a bridgehead if France had to be evacuated.

~~Among certain captured documents a letter written by JOB was discovered in which he freely offers his services to the Germans and concludes with "Heil Hitler".~~

January 24th

At the weekly meeting today Baxter said he had talked to D.4 about the possibly entry of agent. The position seemed to be that no record was kept of people entering the country. This had ceased since we had sent SCOs abroad. This is a typical D.4 decision made without consultation with the divisions concerned. The traffic index of course will show arrivals other than British subjects but we are back in the old position where if we want to know who arrived at a certain port on a certain date there is no means of knowing. I have asked Baxter to let me have a memo about this and also about certain cases which ought to have been sent to the LRC and have not gone there. I intend to use this information and also the

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fact that we are expecting spies here from Holland to get the famous circular 806 withdrawn. This circular gives the impression that no spies are expected and if they did come they would do no appreciable harm.

Major Clifton, who is to be our DSO in the Bahamas, came to see me. I told him about the FBI liaison in Miami and impressed upon him that it was desirable not to extend this liaison to matters of policy which should go either through London or through Cyril Mills. Clifton seems a sensible chap though somewhat green. He comes from the Mid-East and terms like OSS mean nothing to him. His job however in the Bahamas should be a simple one.

Capt. H. M. Smyth, late Commissioner of Police in Shanghai, came to see me on the introduction of Gooch. He is apparently thinking of getting a job with Halland in Germany or else a C.C.s job. Neither of these jobs may however come off and he would like to be considered for anything here if we have a suitable opening. I said that I knew of nothing at the moment but if anything turned up I would let him know. He seemed quite a pleasant individual though he might be rather difficult to fit in. I imagine that he would want a rather senior position.

A report from Italy states that a high-class agent captured recently attempted to enter on his second mission. On his first, for which he had been dropped by parachute in South Italy, he had made his way northwards by various means collecting information on the way, Catalogue Reference KV/4/196 and interrogated. He

He told the story that he was endeavouring to join his family in South Marino and he was accordingly released. Possibly being short of money, he obtained employment in a British officer's mess where he worked as a waiter for a week and duly received his wages. He then obtained his release by saying that he was suffering from malaria, and proceeded on his way to join the Germans.

A section V report referring to the Italian front states that two agents were arrested in Rome who have been transmitting since last June. They were a German serviceman, a Luftwaffe sergeant and W/T operator, and a private who gathered the intelligence. These men were installed in a flat in Rome at the beginning of 1944. They took good security precautions, working entirely on their own. Their arrest resulted directly from the sending of a courier to them. The courier was an Italian who was dropped near Rome and who promptly surrendered. He subsequently kept a rendez-vous with the two agents who were immediately arrested.

Another agent has started operating in Naples and one in Florence and have not so far been located. Owing to the absence of ISOS information it is not apparently possible to assess the line-crossing situation. A smaller number of arrests have been made recently. One Fascist Republican line-crosser was, according to a captured agent, completed 5 operations and set out on a 6th on Dec. 20th. Air operations are again on the increase. It is known that 10 agents at least were dropped during the month of December. All have been accounted for except one. In addition a reliable source reports the parachuting of 5 W/T agents in the Pesaro area and that the number of agents ready for parachuting in the near future

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is between 50 and 60. A total of 45 agents had been arrested between 17th Dec. and 11th Jan. The general impression given from the above is that C.I. is somewhat lax in Italy. It is of course due to the fact that Hill-Dillon has never established the proper controls. He has a far easier frontier to control than SHAEF has in the west.

The JIC have considered the possible use of chemical warfare by the Germans. They say that there is no recent evidence to show more than an increasing German interest in gas warfare. One item of evidence indicates that this interest may be operation and not merely precautionary. The routine for gas preparedness has been energetically maintained and even slightly stepped up which conforms with either offensive or defensive intents. General strategic factors do not show any immediate likelihood of the initiation of gas warfare by the enemy but a turn of events on lines in favour of the allies either in the east or west would produce a situation in which the use of gas by the Germans would have to be regarded as possible. German preparations for gas warfare justify close and constant watch against a move of which their might be little warning.

January 25th

V.2 is continuing on an average of 12 to every 24 hours and on one day reached the record figure of 16. A fair percentage are falling in the London area, the remainder mostly in Essex.

We have been trying to establish contact between GARBO here and the notional agent in

Canada., but owing to atmospheric conditions at this time of year we have had very great difficultie. The Germans of course had been kept informed of what we were doing and noticing that we were not being successful in establishing contact they chipped in and passed our messages on to Canada from Madrid. This has been followed by a frantic telegram from Cyril Mills, who thinks it is us talking, saying that he is completely baffled as he had not got the code. We were intending to let him have it of course as soon as communication was established.

At the weekly meeting today Herbert told us the SOE, Gen. Templer again, had got a wild scheme for getting the Abwehr and SD employed on all sorts of useless tasks which would distract them from their normal business. He proposed various means to get them to think that groups such as railwaymen, etc. were plotting against the State. He had however chosen those categories of people who would be most likely to be of assistance to us when we get into Germany. There seemed to be no point in getting these people into trouble, even if the Abwehr and SD reacted as it was hoped they would. If the scheme was worth while at all it would be far better to persuade these organisations that certain of their own personnel were betraying them to the enemy and start a heresy hunt within the organisations. Alternatively they might be persuaded that the Army Generals were preparing to betray their country.

Cecil talked a out the case of Karl MARCUS concerning whom SIS have had reports since the end of last month and who was brought over here on the 23rd under very peculiar circumstances

An enquiry shows that _____ approached Adam stating that this was a very particular case and that SIS wanted the man over here for

interrogation. It was eventually decided in consultation with Hill of the H.O. that he should come in as a Czech. His real name is I believe JAHNKE in whom we were interested in the early days of the war, vide Vol.1. This man appears to know all about CLISSMANN and certain expeditions which were directed against this country. Jane had been asked by Viv. rather mysteriously some time ago whether she knew anything about a man called CLISSMANN, which was as good as asking her if she had heard of the P.M. and also whether she knew about an enterprise known as SEEHUND. This is a code name which has been referred to in ISOS but Jane was not aware of this. She has since got hold of the report which she says is very interesting but it is surrounded in a veil of mystery and secrecy which we are endeavouring to penetrate.

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Wibroe came to see me today. He said that he would like if possible to say some thing to the Danes to give them the impression that their request had not been forgotten. A letter signed by someone in the FO asking about their credentials might fit the bill. I told Wibroe to see Haig at the F.O. and ask him whether he could supply such a letter.

Sclater tells me that the assistant director of Signals, W.O., when approached by D.D.Y.

Brig Verman, on the question of Signals

Security and possible leakages, stated that in his opinion information in regard to the embarkation of troops from this country was leaking to the enemy through spies. I shall have to do something to dispel this idea.

Dick went back to France today.

AR is flat out on the War Room, and Herbert is doing his work here.

January 26th

Joe Lynch came to see me about the case of

He showed me the F.B.I.'s letter which stated that Catling described generally the activities of terrorist groups in Palestine to the F.B.I. in Washington but that at no time did he reveal the real purpose of his visit to the USA or that he had interviewed, or intended to interview a British informant residing in the USA. The terms of the agreement between the State Dept. and Security Co-Ordination are then quoted to make it clear that this action was contrary to that agreement. The letter concludes by instructing Lynch to ascertain from my (1) why Mr. Catling at the time of his visit to the Bureau did not reveal the identity of _____ and (2) why other British authorities did not subsequently advise of the present of _____

_____ in the USA after Catling had failed to do so. Joe told me that question 2 is obviously a crack at B.S.C., the suggestion being that they advised Catling not to tell the Bureau about _____. I told Joe that as far as I was concerned I had merely been an agent in this matter. Catling had come over here with the story which he knew and I had made it clear that he could not possibly

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carry out his mission without disclosing the full facts to the FBI and enlisting their co-operation. It was for this purpose that I had introduced him to Joe. I had in fact assumed that he had disclosed the full facts to Joe. Joe replied that this had not been the case but that he had not enquired very deeply into Catling's business as he thought it better that this should be thrashed out in Washington. He confined himself to saying that the Bureau did not know a great deal about Zionist matters. As further proof of my bona fides in the case, I pointed out that had I ~~not~~ been a party to sending Catling on a secret mission I should not have revealed all the facts as I had done about and the Bergson Group. I gather that Joe has already made this pretty clear to the FBI if indeed any suspicion had existed in their minds. I told Joe that I would communicate with Palestine and try and get him the answer to his question. I was however rather averse to drawing Security Co-Ordination into this whole thing again.

Joe told me that Ladd had discussed with Tamm the hint that I had given about a move to abolish American and British visas. They both have said that they are 100% behind us and will resist any such suggestion to the last ditch. I told Joe that as far as I knew I had succeeded in killing the idea stone dead. It might however be revived at a later date.

John Senter came to see me with Lt. Col. Cammaert an S.O.E. officer who is in fact ROGER, one of the 3 people who were released from the clutches of the Gestapo owing to the courageous action of a Polish woman named Christine.

We discussed the case of WAEM and the undertaking given by Christine. Cammaerts said that he too had given the undertaking which very much strengthened the whole case. In any event however he thought that owing to Christine's noble action her wishes should be respected, even though she was not a British subject. Senter wanted to get WAEM over here from Bari. We felt however that there was nothing to be gained and that the H.O. might decide to deport him to Belgium against his wishes. We thought that he should either go back to Belgium of his own accord on the understanding that we should make strong representations on his behalf or that SOE would use him in the Far East in accordance with his wish to serve the British and so purge his offence. If he agrees to do this he could go direct from Bari to Burma. He would obviously be a great embarrassment to us here.

I went to see "C" this afternoon to ask him about the case of MARCUS. He told me that in Nov. last MARCUS had come through the lines as a Volkssturm deserter. He had been interrogated by the French but said that he wished to see the British. The French, either because they did not want to pass him to us or more probably through sheer negligence, left him more or less loose in Paris. We eventually heard about him through the Chinese MA who informed our MA. MARCUS's story was that he came with a special mission from JAHNKE who is now working in close touch with SCHELLENBERG. JAHNKE might conceivably be getting out to Switzerland for consultation about a plan to dislocate industry at the moment of the British invasion of Germany. Foley was

sent over to Paris to interrogate this man and said that he had a lot of valuable information about the SD and should in any case be brought to this country. A flap then started in SIS as they felt it was necessary to get the FO, if not the PMS, sanction for bringing a man to this country who was prepared to cooperate with us in a plan of this kind. Somehow or other it seems to have got associated in people's minds with a peace proposal. There is no reason as far as I can see why the case should not have been treated in a perfectly normal manner. However, the authority of both Eden and the PM, the latter rather reluctantly, was obtained. The French then said that they would only allow the man to come here if he was accompanied by a French officer who should be present at all interrogations. It was under these conditions that MARCUS was brought over. C. I think had taken it for granted that we had been told about the whole thing but in any case made no mystery about it and was perfectly willing for us to be given copies of all papers. I then pointed out to him that there might be a rather interesting tie-up with the old case of JAHNKE and FLETCHER. I also reminded him of KREVITSKY's association with JAHNKE. C. then told me that in order to avoid any possibility of the Russians getting to hear about this and thinking that we were entering into peace negotiations a wire had been sent to Barclay in Moscow instructing him to inform the NKVD that we would give them copies of all reports obtained. C. thinks that it is probably too late to get into touch with JAHNKE but he is going to see if anything can be done. He would not I think be averse to our seeing MARCUS if we thought that any useful purpose would be served. We should have to do so however in the presence of Vaudreuil. MARCUS is

technically a French P/W. It appears that MARCUS also has details of the progress of the atomic bomb with the names of certain professors. C. says it is not a big bomb. His view is that MARCUS is quite possibly a plant by the SD to scare us and if possible to draw us into some arrangement which will reveal to the Germans the date and place of our next attack.

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C. told me that he had the gravest doubts about the Seydlitz Committee. He referred to an ISOS message from Istanbul to Sofia some time in August last in which a mention is made of the NKVD recruiting 8 divisions or 200,000 men from German P/Ws.

man in Stockholm, to the Polish 2eme Bureau here, and some confirmation had also been obtained from Switzerland. C's idea was that the Russians would use the Seydlitz Committee to run E. Prussia and their zone as they probably did not want to put in more of their own people than was absolutely necessary. Occupying troops might well become more bourgeois. This is mere speculation on his part.

ISOS and ISK material from the Peninsula to Berlin has been resumed after a gap of 2 months

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January 27th

I dined with John Marriott last night. We discussed the future of B.l.A. John thinks that outside Garbo, Brutus and Tate, there is nothing left in B.l.a which is really worth running. He thinks further that the original purpose of the organisation as largely lapsed and that the whole situation should be reviewed in the light of present circumstances. JC I gather is very much for the status quo. John thinks that Tommy Harris and Hugh Astor, with the necessary female staff, could really run the remnants of B.l.A and that the remainder of the personnel should be turned into other sections or into the running of a B.l.a-DA section in the War Room. This section would study all DA cases being run in the field and would act as a sympathetic receiving point for officers in SCI units engaged in this work. At present they seem to feel that their requests for assistance go into the void and that they are handled by people who are not really sufficiently experienced to appreciate what the officers in the field are trying to do. I have arranged with John that we shall have a meeting on B.l.a on Monday, with Herbert.

Herbert, M-E, Sclater and I discussed the question of Signals Security. M-E seems impressed by the recent revelations of insecurity and thinks that Signals Security Board representing the 3 Services and ourselves ought to be set up and that it should work in fairly close touch with the Cypher Security Board. We agreed that probably the best course would be to put up a memo to the JIC. Sclater will prepare a draft, which Herbert, M-E and I will consider. We can then consult the various

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signals branches concerned whose advice will

be sought when the memo is circulated to the members of the JIC, and I propose personally to talk to C., DMI, DNI and possibly ACSI.

According to Brig. Vernham, D.D.Y., War Office, a Lt. Col. Walter Scott of the Signals Division of SHAEF who is now in the U.K. on the question of British and American signals security, has expressed the view that with the war in its present state, the security of signals is considered to be of more importance than intelligence.

At the daily meeting today Baxter mentioned RYNSBERGER, a Dutchman who is supposed to know all about V.2. He is an extremely phoney individual with an equally phoney story that he formerly worked in a resistance movement in Holland and then decided to go to Germany in order to find out about V.2. He volunteered as a worker and according to his own account eventually got the employment on these weapons that he desired. This in spite of the fact that he started life as a fruit merchant. He eventually seems to have ended as a Sturmabfuhrer in the S.S. He succeeded in this capacity in getting back to Holland and eventually crossed the lines. It appears that his information about V.2 is at any rate to some extent accurate. He is also saying that we are bombing the wrong targets and that he can put us on to the right ones. The case looks extremely phoney to me. I think the man is either a spy or he is a collaborator who has in fact been working for the Germans in some capacity or other and now wants to put himself right with us.

I spoke to Adam today about issuing instructions to SCOs to send up to the LRC all seamen

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arriving from the Low Country for the first time. This is a precaution in the light of the ISOS information which indicates that one of the German commandos in Holland may be sending an agent or agents to this country. Adam says that he will also see what he can do about reporting arrivals of passengers and crew as heretofore. He had heard that the abandonment of this policy had caused comment at our Wednesday meeting.

I have read Stamp's note on the activities of Abwehr 3F, The Hague, against S.O.E. It is purely factual, and worded in moderate terms but is an appalling indictment of S.O.E. methods and negligence.

The story began in June 1942 when a certain JOHANNES and a W/T operator were dropped in Holland. J. had been sent to contact the O.D. an indigenous loyalist organisation. He was to tell its leaders that he had come on a joint Dutch-British mission and was to disclose to them the plan for Holland which had been worked out. He was to obtain their comments on this plan and to emphasise that the Dutch Govt. in London had approved it in principle and expected it to be accepted in substance. After introducing himself to the leaders of the O.D., J. was to make contact with its various sub-groups operating throughout the country. He would report back to London who would send out a trained organiser and instructors to the groups as and when J. reported they were ready to receive them. For the purpose of carrying out this mission J. had to organise reception committees weapons and supplies and for the additional personnel which were to be sent. The indications are that J. never operated except under the control of the Germans or that he was

certainly under control in November if not in August of that year. SOE were informed on a set which was obviously under control that J. had been arrested on the 8th Nov. 1942. It is astonishing that this arrest did not indicate to SOE that it was quite hopeless to continue the undertaking if the chief organiser with all the plans was under German control. To act upon the assumption that a captured agent has not been broken is to court not only mortal peril for those concerned but disaster to the whole enterprise.

After the 8th Nov. 1942 the part assigned to J. by the Abwehr was carried out in the name of KALE, his successor who had been sent out from this country as his No. 2. Upwards of 25 receptions were arranged over K's W/T set and no less than 10 W/T operators were despatched from this country. As SOE had failed to get back J. owing to his arrest, K. was asked to send to England some other person thoroughly well informed about the progress of the secret organisation. In face of this requirement the Abwehr determined to go through all the motions of supplying such a person. On the one hand this would serve the purpose of allaying any suspicion which might be felt in London and on the other hand SOE should be made to disclose the method by which agent could be evacuated from Europe. On 14.3.43 SOE were therefore informed that K. would send his chief assistant who was called ANTON. The Germans were asked for particulars about ANTON and gave his name as Nicolas de WILD of a certain address at the Hague. DAMEN, who was subsequently captured was in fact the occupant of the address and on instructions from the Abwehr was to say, if anyone called, that de WILD was away but would return in a few days. When SOE decided to arrange for ANTON's

evacuation through Belgium and Holland, someone was found by the Germans to fill this part and he left Holland about 12th May 1943 and travelled to Paris. The spurious ANTON was accompanied by a certain ARNAUD who has been a 3F agent since 1940 and who we also know was recruited by SOE as a passeur of theirs. In Paris ANTON and ARNAUD made contact with another SOE agent MARCEL. As soon as they had sat down in a cafe with MARCEL three German soldiers came in and started to examine the cards of those at the back of the cafe. ANTON got up and walked out. ARNAUD said "They have arrested ANTON". MARCEL looked out and saw ANTON crossing the road with a man in civilian clothes. Such was the account given by MARCEL when he arrived in this country of ANTON's disappearance. A great deal of trouble was taken to decide whether ANTON had been arrested because he had been followed or whether it was sheer bad luck as the result of a snap check of identity cards. A great deal of trouble was also taken to assess the dangers which would fall upon the organisation as the result of this arrest, regard being had to the fact that ANTON, according to MARCEL, had been carrying compromising papers. It never occurred to anyone that ANTON was nothing but a German agent and that ARNAUD was lying when he said that ANTON had been arrested. ARNAUD's stock inevitably rose in the eyes of London and MARCEL was sent back to the continent to fall into the enemy's hands. The problem raised of SOE's request for the sending to England of a man who was well acquainted with the secret army had been answered by the Abwehr with striking success.

SOE then requested the field to send another man who had full knowledge of the secret army and the reply came back that a man in close

touch with the O.D. would be sent. In stead of chosing a fictitious individual or someone who might by chance ge known as a German agent here they chose a man against whom nothing adverse could be known in London, who was in fact a bona fide patriot. This man was KNOPPERS. He had been approached at the end of 1942 or the beginning of 1943 by the 3F agent van VLIET. KNOPPERS had been doing resistance work and had been in contact with a certain Col. Coppert, when van VLIET, representing himself as a member of the resistance, asked him if he might use KOPPERS' address as a letter-drop. Thereafter KNOPPERS continued to see van VLIET regularly until he finally left Holland. Van VLIET gave himself an excellent build-up and got thoroughly into the confidence of KNOPPERS. On the 20th June 1943 he asked KNOPPERS if he would travel to England and would return with instructions for the resistance organisations. As KNOPPERS understood it the idea was that several resistance movements needed coordination and central direction and official recognition and support from London. This could best be obtained by sending an emissary from Holland and securing his return as a liaison officer with London credentials. KNOPPERS went via Paris, where he stayed some weeks and was finally brought out by SOE channels over the Pyrenees to Spain. For the purpose of facilitating KNOPPERS' mission he was provided with documents purporting to come from resistance circles. These included a note to the Dutch and British authorities concerned suggesting the desirability of establishing an escape route over which important Dutch intellectuals, industrialists and officials in Holland who without themselves acting in a rash manner had assisted in the sabotage of the German war effort, might

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be got out of Holland. When KNOPPERS arrived here there were certain discrepancies in his story and that which had been put over on the German-controlled wireless from Holland, and when the investigation was still proceeding information which had been in the possession of SIS for many months but which had not been distributed by them, was brought to our notice. This showed that Van VLIET, if not a German agent, was at least highly suspect. We came to the conclusion that KNOPPERS had been planted by SOE on Van VLIET and that the W/T agent in Holland was under control. ARNAUD however escaped suspicion and the suggestion that the SOE escape route from Paris onwards might have been blown was not accepted. According to KALE who was supposed still to be in charge of SOE activities in Holland, one STEAK, recruited in the field, had taken ANTON's place as second in command, ANTON having been reported as arrested when attempting to reach this country. SOE were determined to get STEAK over here. He was also told to bring two other agents with him. The Germans had all these people interned and were placed in the position of having either to make excuses for the failure of the SOE field officers to bring out the 4 men or to announce the arrest of these people in circumstances which would inevitably suggest that the SOE organisation had been blown. They decided to create 4 substitutes for the 4 SOE agents. These were taken to Paris where they met the 4th man. There they were handed over to ARNAUD with instructions to find out by what route they would be evacuated from France. ARNAUD handed them over to a member of the VIC espionage organisation and they were accepted for what they pretended to be.

The last stage of the journey was in a lorry across the frontier. Before they reached this

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point two of them jumped off. A little later the 3rd jumped off and hailed a car belonging to the Feldgendarmarie, showing his papers. He made this car follow the lorry and in due course his partner was arrested. The 4 German agents returned to Paris, and made their report to ARNAUD. Subsequently SOE were informed by a member of the VIC organisation that the 4 agents had been arrested while attempting to escape, in the Pyrenees. This was accepted as sufficient explanation. As Van VLIET was under some suspicion the Germans decided to make strenuous efforts to build him up. It so happened that the SOE agent APPOLLO was dropped in Belgium with BRUTUS on 18th Oct. 1943 with instructions to use the route taken by KNOPPERS in reverse and go to Holland. APPOLLO reached his contact addresses in Brussels, the house of a certain Mme. MERTINS, and was there visited by VanVLIET. The latter successfully played the part of a patriot and assisted his return to this country. APPOLLO gave a tolerably good account of VanVLIET on his arrival back here. The night after APPOLLO was dropped a Lt. HIRST, a USA airman, made a forced landing in Holland. HIRST by devious means was put on to VanVLIET who facilitated his escape. This story was also regarded as a re-assuring incident in proof of Van VLIET's bona fides. In August 1943 2 of the captured SOE agents CHIVE and SPROUT escaped. They reached this country in Feb. 1944 and at some stage the Germans became aware of this. They almost immediately closed the traffic by a message on all lines addressed to the two SOE officers by what in fact were their correct names, thanking them for their long mutual cooperation and promising them that if they came to the continent they would be received with the same care as their agents. Had the whole of the W/T traffic been under constant review in the light of all

the known facts; had trick questions been put to the agents; had each mishap been examined with a view to appreciating its possible implications on the position of themselves and the organisation as a whole; had each returning agent been meticulously questioned not because he was suspect but with a view to obtaining all possible information from him; above all had a record been kept which set out in chronological order all the known facts regarding the enterprise and the sources from which such facts were known, a record which would have been readily available for consultation in considering all the above matters; had all this been done there is very little doubt that the SOE organisation in Holland would not have met the fate that overcame it.

Bird came to see me about his position vis-a-vis the War Room. He is rather worried as he finds it difficult to express a view as to how his section can be run until he knows more about more about the facts and proposals. I told him as much as I knew and said I would have a word with TAR.

28th January

A further message has come in which indicates that the arrival of ARTHUR may be imminent. I got on to Walker and arranged that he should give an extra warning to Fighter Command. Colin Roberts of SIS has sent a message to the field to look out for line-crossers who may be attempting to get to Antwerp and sign on as a seaman.

29th January 1

I saw Nigel Watson this morning. He is just back from Yugoslavia. He was apparently situated not far from Gorizia which of course I know well. He constituted a liaison mission with one of Tito's corps headquarters. His activities have become very restricted. He could only pass on such information as was vouchsafed to him by the Partisans. He does not think that we are particularly popular. The Partisans are very pleased to get our arms but do not give out much in the way of information. There was a Russian officer attached to the Mission who was apparently quite friendly. SIS are now making a proposal to send him to N. Italy. He would be quite prepared to come back here if there was a job for him to do. He was apparently a little disgruntled about the way that he had been passed over in this office. He said that he tried twice to get away on an active job but on each occasion was made to stay with Alex. Finally when Alex went, Baskerville-Glegg took Alex's job and he was offered an Asst. DSO post in the Bahamas. Feeling that this was not good enough, he volunteered for parachutes, not because it was the job he particularly liked but because it was the only one which would get him released.

Bennett came to ask me about the atomic bomb. He is responsible for Tube Alloys who are concerned with experimental work. The DG asked him the other day what the Germans were doing in this line. He wanted to know whether I would keep him informed. I said that the atomic bomb was not really our business. Occasionally I heard about it from C., very confidentially but that I was not really at liberty to pass this on. Bennett is apparently

thinking of asking Walsh of the Naval Section of SIS for the required information as he thinks that it places him in rather an awkward position if he cannot answer the DG's question. I said that I thought probably the DG had merely asked out of curiosity and that he probably did not wish any special steps taken to discover the answer. I recommended Bennett to lay off this enquiry since if C. thought he was asking about the atomic bomb he would probably have a fit. C. is under the impression that only he and two others in his dept. have ever heard of it.

There has been a lot of trouble owing to Swinton trying to get hold of Mark Johnston, whom he met casually in the Dorchester the other night. He is taking the line that in view of all he has done for this dept. it is extremely wrong that we should not hand over Johnston at once. In his characteristic way he has handled the matter just about as badly as anybody could. There is no reason to think that Johnston has any special qualifications for the job which Swinton is offering him and we here have need of his services both in connection with the work he is doing now and what he might do in the future in the War Room.

30th January

Walker showed me the memo on what he thinks should be done in connection with the control of pigeons in the rear of the armies. This comment is based on our experiences here. It will be sent to Dick in Paris and possibly Walker may go over to talk to the Allied Govts concerned.

James Robertson came to ask me about his chances of staying in the organisation. I told him that it was quite impossible at this moment for the DG to make any definite promises because he did not yet know what our charter was to be. If we went back to our pre-war status we might even find it difficult to produce sufficient for the permanent staff to do. It was not therefore possible to take on extra personnel with any guarantee of permanency. I was quite sure however that Kellar would be very glad to keep him on for the time being as the work in Palestine was going to impose a considerable burden on us.

Martin Forrest has just arrived back. He needs a bit more leave, having had a break-down in Cairo and would then like some more or less light duty at a desk, after which he would be prepared to do anything provided he could go back to his normal peace-time profession at some not too far distant date.

He said that C.E. was rather winding up in the Mid East in spite of the fact that there were still two German agents at large in Palestine and two in Iraq.

I had a long talk with Stopford about his section. Elton will be leaving him and in spite of this he will only just have enough to do. He could very easily take on other work. He does not seem particularly anxious to leave at this moment. At any rate he did not suggest anything of the kind. He has a great admiration of Hooper's work. Hooper is running the Swedish agents very successfully. It occurred to me that possibly Hooper might do

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some recruiting in Embassy circles. He is extremely able in that kind of work. I said that I would have a talk with Anthony and see where our Embassy show needed strengthening.

At the daily meeting Herbert disclosed that a more recent ISOS message indicated that ARTHUR would not be coming for another 8/10 days. Apparently a moon period is not favourable. It rather looks as if he would be crossing the lines.

Mark Johnston has finally broken off negotiations with Swinton. It was decided that Mark should go for a period of 6 weeks. Swinton then rang him up and said he wanted him to come over at once. When Mark said that he could not come over till the afternoon as he had to hand over to his successor, Swinton lost his temper, and said that he would get one of his secretaries to do the job, and banged down the receiver.

Roger came to see me. He told me that he had more or less won his battle with Horrocks over the carding of communists, though in rather peculiar circumstances. He had tried to discuss the question with Horrocks before the DGs arrival but Horrocks had not been very forthcoming, beyond saying that he thought that there was a good deal of work being done which was of no particular value. In the interval before the DGs arrival he had clearly been looking up a number of cases where he had been asked to card. These were all shown to the DG before his meeting with Roger. The DG was rather inclined to accept Horrocks's view that much of the carding of lesser lights in the communist movement should be done by the local police.

Roger pointed out that this was not really a very practical suggestion since the bulk of the information on communists came from our own sources, SF, intercepted letters, telephone checks, agents etc. We should have to pass this information on to the C.C.s for which purpose it would have to be carded in, any case Horrocks seemed to feel that this was an obvious knock-out and immediately changed his tune and said that he thought that all that was really required was for F.2 to lower their 100% standards slightly. I am bound to say I find this sort of thing very peculiar.

TAR came to tell me about the War Room. He is making a certain amount of progress but cannot get on with the registry till Horrocks comes up to London. The present plan is to take Bird and leave Buster, although I believe this does not entirely coincide with Bird's views or indeed with Buster's. He is quite convinced that he must get the whole of his administration ticking over before he attempts to move anybody about.

31st January

A meeting took place on the 24th Jan. at Chungking. It was called by Wedemeyer and was for the purpose of hearing his decisions regarding clandestine or quasi-military operations in the China theatre, i.e. in China both free and occupied. Present were Bill Donovan, Miles, Taylor, Blandy, a strong Chinese delegation including the acting Chief of Staff, the D.M.I. and Tai Li. Wedemeyer said that he was speaking as the Chief of Staff of Chiang-Kai-Shek. Chiang had given his approval for all existing activities to which he had already agreed to be continued, but any

additions to staff or equipment or changes in plans must in future be reported to DMI who would consult Wedemeyer before approval is given. Chiang wished to maintain an organisation for which maintenance is logistically possible provided that they contribute to the general war effort, and that any use of personnel for any purpose other than hitting the Japs will cause such personnel to be expelled from China, and lastly provided that all intelligence collected is reported to the DMI. Wedemeyer stressed that his sole object was to obtain co-ordination in control and that his help could be entirely relied upon. He was very insistent that under no circumstances should any material help be given or negotiations be entered into with any provincial authorities or military leaders who were not directly controlled by and owed allegiance to the Central Authorities.

The Chinese DMI asked if Wedemeyer's remarks applied to any clandestine operations of which he knew but had not been officially informed. Wedemeyer replied with a strong affirmative, requesting everyone to come clean and said that he would recommend anything not already reported to be immediately closed down. Miles asked for a definition of clandestine. Having got this he said that none of his activities came under this definition and in any case he was only the deputy of Tai Li. pointed out the difficulty of a weekly report since there was at present no one in China who knew all that ISLD were doing. This last remark is certainly amusing, but not perhaps surprising.

Contrary to what was reported previously, it has now been learned from Vaudreuil that Catalogue Reference KV/4/196 information not only KIKI but the other 3 persons believed to be both

German agents and in a position to compromise Brutus are in fact unable to do so and are not German agents at all. This is highly probably at least with regard to KIKI that we shall not be able to accept the French conclusions. Meanwhile Brutus is off the air and will so remain until the position is clarified.

The C.I. Summary for the week ending 26th Jan. gives details of the new contraption for dropping agents by parachute. It consists of a bomb-shaped canister 2½ metres by 1 metre in which 3 agents and equipment can be dropped together. Four parachutes support the canister which has shock-absorbers and is self-destroying.

There are indications that German agents may represent themselves as allied airmen who have been shot down. A captured agent said that the type of information being received by the Germans indicates that they may have some control of telephonic communications across our lines. Interrogations indicate that line-crossers may make increasing use of pigeons. One has been caught with a message for a saboteur. Four members of the Hitler Jugend have been arrested, two while getting across the Roer. Preparations for guerilla warfare are said to be proceeding apart from Wehrmacht activities. The men trained are all volunteers, party members and mostly S.S. Training takes place in the Berlin area Wannsee and in Bavaria at Bad Tölz.

January 31st

Briscoe came to see me about the difficulties he was having in getting information out of B.I.B. He mentioned the case of der SMIDT.

The final 020 report had come out at the end

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of October but he had only just heard about the man's secret ink.

Blunt came to see me about the case of CHOW. It is proposed that we should suggest that the only feasible approach is to quote the captured document as a reason for having examined Chinese messages and discovered that they were insecure.

Roland Bird talked to me about the War Room. He is not very happy about being separated from Buster and is still more worried about the possibility of getting papers. He thinks that files are to be fed both to the War Room and to this office and that there will be consequently very serious holdups on both sides. A check-up shows that out of 400 files which are out at the moment, one third are being dealt with by Buster and Bird and the rest by the remainder of the office. If you have the two organisations in the same building or in adjacent buildings, it is always possible to get on with one's work by having a look at the files or borrowing them for 10 minutes. If the offices however are widely separated the tendency in each case will be to hang on to the file and no administrative arrangements will get over the human element. TAR joined our discussion and feels somewhat worried about the position.

I lunched with Sclater and Brig. Wheatley, D.D. Sigs. W.O. and Brig. Vernham, D.D.Y. W.O. Wheatley had remarked a short time ago to Vernham that he thought information leaked from this country through spies. I felt sure that it would be a good thing to explain to him that this was most unlikely and that what was far more probable was that information was going out over the air. Wheatley was

I think easily convinced that we had an extremely strong case since he himself had been for some time trying to tighten up signals security in Italy. To do this he had arranged for the monitoring of the signals of a whole corps. He had caused all O.R.s who had committed blunders to receive reduction in rank and pay and had submitted the indiscretions of officers with a request to know what disciplinary action was being taken. In one case a Brigadier lost his job. Wheatley said that the indiscretions were beyond belief, and there had been cases where whole attacks had been given away several days before. He expressed very great interest in the examples of lack of security that Sclater had obtained and is all in favour of having a drive on the lines that we suggest. We are putting up a paper to the JIC and I shall talk to the DMI and to C. before the matter comes up.

Milmo came to see me about the War Room. He feels that the War Room should be divided up into sections dealing with subjects and that the case officers and research workers should work together on that basis. He is very emphatic that all the machinery should be a going concern before any moves take place since it is his firm belief that if you make any move before that has been accomplished the registry, which is already complaining, will break down. He is very worried about the location of the War Room. He is quite convinced that if it is not in the same building as ourselves or adjacent there will be endless hold-ups both in our work and the work of the War Room.

I spent an hour and a half with Charles talking about the pay of the female staff. He

showed me the file. He told me that he, Horrocks and the DG had had a meeting and that Horrocks and the DG had expressed their views on the file which he gave me to read. Horrocks's minute refers frequently to the Committee thinking this or that about members of the female staff and the work they are doing. The fact is that nobody represents the division on the Committee and that therefore

the Committee cannot possibly know what value attaches to the work of anyone in B. Division. The only person who can give a proper appreciation of Mrs Spring's work is Herbert Hart or myself. I expressed this view very strongly to Charles. He did not say much but I rather felt that he was not altogether in agreement. I told him that there was a feeling in the office, of which he was apparently aware, that Horrocks was in the habit of doing his own people pretty well. I cited to him the AAs in charge of registry sections, whose work certainly could be of no greater importance than the creative work done by Miss Wadeson at the LRC. After reading the minutes on the file I told Charles that I frankly could not feel that their answer was a good one. It would be possible to say to Mrs. Spring that for better or worse the grading system had been instituted, the establishment laid down and could not be altered except by Treasury ruling. If therefore the AA grade was full up ~~up~~ it was impossible for anybody to be promoted unless as in the army you gave acting unpaid rank. That at least would be an answer with some element of logic in it. It would however completely fall to the ground if it could be said that the establishment was not in fact rigid but elastic and that although we had started with so many G.1s or AAs the numbers had in fact been increased. It could further be argued that where women

were doing work of equal importance and responsibility they should get equal pay. The Treasury could I should have thought be told that they were extremely lucky to get the services of women in many jobs which were formerly done by men and that they least they could do if they did not wish to pay them on an equality basis would be to promote them to the highest women's grade. However arguments such as these cut no ice with the Treasury, who are extremely difficult and cheese-paring. Only the other day they cracked down on us because a girl was foolish enough to say in her income tax return that she was getting a language allowance. In another case a girl of 18 with ~~no~~ ^{language} qualifications was offered a higher rate of pay here than the one offered her at the F.O. She happened to mention this at the F.O. who reported it to the Treasury. Apparently it was more a matter of age than anything else. No matter what their qualifications are girls below the age of 21 have always to be paid less. I gather that as compared with civil service rates of pay for women ours are on the whole slightly higher.

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February 1st.

Adam showed me his draft circular to ports about ~~senior~~ from the Low Countries. He has thrown the onus on the SCO instead of giving

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orders that those who sign on in the Low Countries for the first time were to be sent automatically to the LRC. He said that he had done this as he thought the MWT might make trouble. I asked him if he would kindly arrange for a return to be made showing the number of seamen in this particular category arriving per day. We might then decide whether it might not be better to have them all sent to the LRC.

February 2nd

Commander Johns came to see me. He is now employed by SOE in Brussels. He had been dining with Prince Bernhard who had told him that two sorts of rumours were circulating in Dutch circles in London, one to the effect that Bernhard himself led a very dissolute life; this rumour had been going on for years and he was quite prepared to laugh it off. The other however was more serious, and suggested that information passed to LINDEMANN @ King Kong by Bernhard had led to the failure of Arnhem. This he said was manifestly untrue since he only met LINDEMANN for the first time 6 days after Arnhem. I told Johns that I was aware that in Dutch circles there was a belief that LINDEMANN had betrayed Arnhem. We had told the Dutch Security but as a result of our enquiries there was no possible foundation for this belief. I had never heard any suggestion that Bernhard was involved. I agreed that we would do our best to counteract any such rumours in Dutch circles. Jim Hale was present at this meeting.

Johns is on loan to SOE and works in close touch with SHAEF Mission. He told me that there was a great deal of French propaganda going on in Belgium. It was not specifically anti-British but might perhaps be so by implication. It was

all in favour of a close Franco-Belgian alliance. This has of course always been traditional French policy although the French nation has always held the Belgian in contempt as an individual. The Belgians are expressing a somewhat cool attitude, as they cannot quite forget the extent to which the French let them down in the early days of the war.

I talked to Harry about the DMI's letter to the DG which had arisen over Harry's appointment as adviser on military security to the DMI which took place last July when he relinquished his post as DDMI(S). The DG had written a long letter to the DMI about the part we had played on the Second Front. The DMI had replied cordially acknowledging our contribution and saying how valuable our assistance had been in building up the military security organisation at the War Office which was non-existent at the outbreak of war. He made it clear however that it was his intention that that organisation should in future stand on its own feet while still using this dept. for purposes of advice. He made no reference however to civil security and to the major problems of C.I., catching spies etc


Lennox has just told me that the last plane out for the Yalta conference carrying 12 passengers including Peter Loxley has come down in the Med. off Lampedusa. 9 bodies have been picked up, 5 are said to be missing and 7 injured. This is quite the worst bit of news I have heard. I saw Peter the night before he left at the Club. He told me he had just been to Oxford to see the doctor who is looking after his wife. She had just had a still-born child. He said that he could quite easily have avoided going to the conference but

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that the doctor had told him that his wife would probably be more worried if he had stayed than if he went. This is a curious turn of fate.

I saw "C" later in the evening. He told me that a wireless message had been received from the plane, which was a York^{Coming}, which said "Running out of petrol, down in the ditch". It seems incredible that a plane of this kind could run out of petrol.

Anthony accompanied me to Broadway and we discussed with C. the case of CHOW. We decided that the best line of action would be through the use of an intercept letter to try and check CHOW from calling for reports from the Chinese naval cadets. We would then refer to the document captured in the Far East which indicated that Chinese telegrams from London were being intercepted, state that our cryptographers had verified that the Chinese cyphers were extremely easy to break and suggest as a way out of the difficulty that we should re-encypher them. This might have the effect of enabling us to continue to read the Chinese cyphers while securing them from the Japs. It would also enable us to control the volume since we could say that we could not encypher more than a certain number. It would also ensure against the buying up of cyphers in Chungking by the Japs which according to reports from Chinese sources in the Far East is almost common form. The cyphers are low-grade because the cypher clerks are so poorly paid that they can only get men of inferior quality to do the work. Similar action would of course have to be taken in Washington, Ceylon, Delhi, Sydney and Melbourne

February 3rd



Curry came and left with me the introductory chapter of his book on the office. It deals mainly with our functions and responsibilities I promised to read it and then talk with him about it.

Buster came to take to me about the return of SEMMELBAUER to Germany. He said that he was not certain whether he was in the Nazi Camp adjacent to Camp WX but that in any case there was no real security interest involved now either from a B.1B or B.1A point of view.

Alec Kellar has returned from the Mid East and appears to have had an extremely successful trip. I am hoping to hear all about it before long.

February 5th

J.C. came to enter a caveat about a report which John Marriott has prepared on the work of B.1A involving drastic cuts. He says that he disagrees with it entirely and would like to have a n opportunity of expressing his views, when I have read it. I assured him that this would be done.

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I had a talk with TAR. He is getting on to some extent with the War Room. Having seen C. it has been agreed that T-R shall run the research side of things. TAR had been doubtful about employing him as there had been so much opposition from Section V. officers. C. with whom I discussed the point said that if there was any difficulty with Section V he would deal with it. He said that he had always backed T-R and that it would be a great mistake to leave him out of the organisation.

Herbert has completed his analysis of the Stockholm K. reports which we have picked up on Jap JMAS. The information relates very largely to the strength and dispositions of British and American air force units. In some cases the information appears to be quite important and a large amount of it is accurate. The fact that most of the information relates to air matters and both British and American air matters, are a pointer towards the CERVELL-Turner combination although there is no positive proof. Meanwhile a study of reports by Kraemer the I. Luft man in Stockholm seemed to show that the information reaches the Japs through one of Kraemer's agents in Swedish Govt. circles. There is a possibility that some of the misinformation may be invented by Kraemer or by the Japs.

February 6th

Since yesterday there have been no reports on ISOS or ISK from Berlin. On the other hand there has been no operator's chat to show that the Berlin station is closing down. In the circumstances it would not be surprising if it was.

C. rang me up today about certain of Kraemer's reports which have been got by an SIS agent in Stockholm. One which was obtained on the 26th Jan. related to a change in their plans. It was said that the offensive which was to take place early in March had now been put on to early or mid Feb. owing to the Russian offensive. It stated that the attack was to come on the British sector and gave the units. Though the information is not strictly accurate it contains a certain amount of truth and is generally regarded as dangerous. The report in possession of Kraemer was teleprinted on to Berlin on the 31st. C. had wanted to let me know that it had appeared on MSS on the 28th. He thought it might have been telephoned from Stockholm and then confirmed by teleprinter, or that the agent might have got his dates wrong. What of course would be of interest to us would be to see precisely the text of the MSS and to learn how far it coincides with the text of the letter transmitted by the agent from Stockholm. If there is identity then I think we must at least envisage the possibility of a leakage from this country, in which case we should regard CERVELL and Turner as good starters. It might moreover be argued that since in any attack the air force in this country would obviously be taking part the air service would be better informed than army circles.

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Anthony and I attended the JIC today when his paper about the Chinese was discussed. The plan was generally agreed but DNI thought perhaps it might be better to launch it in Chungking rather than here. Wedemeyer the American new broom who is a kind of Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai Shek, was thought to be the best channel. This would ensure American co-operation and clear the American interest in Jap BJs. which may be in jeopardy. I agreed to this course of action but did issue a warning that it would be extremely important to see that the Chinese got the story right. Otherwise they might say something in telephoning their instructions to their various stations abroad which would invariably lead the Japs to think their telegrams were being decyphered.

Bevan and John Senter came to see me about the case of one James PONSONBY who had formerly worked for SOE in Tangier where he had done an extremely good job in which Dudley Clark and Bevan had been interested. He had in fact posed as a disgruntled British official in Tangier and had sold the Germans a bogus document which was to mislead them at the time of our attack at Salerno. It was proved from ISOS that the plan was completely successful. PONSONBY had since been given a job in Lisbon, the exact nature of which I do not know. Through his own indiscretions and rather odd behaviour it had been decided that he was not the man to carry out the task, particularly since he no longer had the confidence of his subordinates. PONSONBY had taken this very hardly and had made all sorts of threats (a) regarding disclosures and (b) demanding a sum of £110,000 in compensation.

The general impression is that he is the type that goes off into a tantrum and subsequently regrets what he has said and done. He was ordered to go home and threatened to commit suicide saying that he thought he would probably be shot when he got to London. He is obviously in a very unbalanced state. He has now agreed to come. The object of Senter's and Bevan's visit was to prepare me for the possibility that there might be some necessity to lock him up if he really became troublesome. I urged on them the view that if this could possibly be avoided, it would be a good thing, since once you lock a man up there always comes a time when you have to let him out. As soon as 18B was abolished, and it would be at Stage A, there would be no powers under which he could be held. It seemed therefore desirable if possible to find him some kind of employment that will give him the outlet he requires. On the other hand if his threats do really appear to be serious and he contemplates giving away his past activities both SOE and the Controller felt very strongly that he will have to be locked up, if only temporarily. It is very much hoped that this limit will not be reached.

I saw Seymer and Hollis about a case of an agent of M's who is connected with German Communist circles here. These circles are anxious to penetrate the internment camps. They presumably feel that if they can recruit some good left wing agents they will be able to operate as soon as they get back to Germany. We all thought that the project should be encouraged in order that we could see how it developed.

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TAR came in to talk about the War Room. He wants to get Buster and his whole outfit transplanted in due course. He also feels that Roland is perhaps unsuitable to run the section in the War Room as he is rather at loggerheads with Horrocks. He does not think however that the necessary accommodation is likely to be found for some time, and that therefore most of the work will have to go on in its own environment at any rate for some weeks. I said that I would prefer that Buster and his minions remained here but if it was found absolutely impossible to arrange things otherwise I would see what could be done. There was no harm in the meantime in building up Buster's section here with personnel from the War Room. Buster came in later to discuss the same subject. He still thinks that the section should be in some building which is connected with ourselves and that any other arrangement will be very inconvenient.

Marriott and Astor came in to tell me that the French, with whom we have been looking into the case of GILBERT, have now come forward with an accusation against Boddington of SOE who they think was working for the Germans. We have said that they should state their full reasons in writing when we will of course conduct the most careful enquiry. It may moreover be necessary now for numerous other witnesses to come over from France. The accusation will presumably be based on statements of people held in France and if we are to bring a charge against Boddington we ought to have their first hand evidence.

Dick Butler talked to me about the plan for amalgamation. Somebody, I think Charles or Harker, has suggested to the DG that a good of unrest is being caused in the office owing to our discussions with Arnold-Forster. DG has rather cracked down on all our discussions and is apparently fundamentally opposed to total amalgamation. We shall I think have to inform A-F about this as soon as he comes back from America. I shall also have to tell him that from a conversation that I have had with C. I have the impression that he is regarding himself as the future chief of any combined organisation, if such an organisation is to come into being. He did not however appear to be very sanguine about the merits of the fusion. He is still scared about getting into the limelight. As I see it it is more and more difficult for us to agree to total amalgamation unless we get some guarantee that a purge will take place in SIS and that the head will not be selected from personnel of either MI5 or MI6.

February 7th

Cypher instructions have now reached Mills in Canada. He is therefore in a position to decypher the message received from Madrid by MOONBEAM. Wireless contact between Madrid and Canada continues to be maintained and Madrid is supplying GARBO in London with copies of the messages passed.

Bronx has received from the Germans a further 2 months salary amounting to £197. She also has received a letter despatched before her visit to Madrid.

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SHAEF C.I. Summary for the week ending Feb 2nd shows that the Abwehr are at the moment concentrating on meeting the tactical intelligence requirements of the armies whereas the SD are concentrating on long term and stay-behind organisations by the use of potential personnel from liberated countries. The G.I.S. continues to add to a large-scale espionage, sabotage and propaganda network. Incoming agents are being instructed to prepare to receive future ones and captured German agents and German sympathisers. It is thought that the Germans are urgently creating a stay-behind network on the left bank of the Rhine. Meanwhile considerable line-crossing activities are going on by the Abwehr in the direction of Leiter I West. The Hitler Jugend have been used as line-crossers and more are expected. The parachute operations have not been taking place lately owing to bad weather but there is evidence that fairly large numbers of people are to be dropped in future.

I had a long discussion with Curry on the opening chapter of his book. It ranged mainly round the question of executive functions. I was maintaining that in practice we do not have any executive functions since everything we do is on the authority of someone else. The argument is I think rather academic and of no special importance.

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C. rang up to tell/that a telegram had come in showing that steps had already been taken in Delhi to tighten up Chinese cyphers. He thought Anthony should see this before putting up his letter to the JIC. I took the opportunity of asking C. to let me have the relevant MSS in connection with a leakage about forth-

coming operations. He subsequently sent this over on the understanding that I would return it to him personally. He has not even shown it to the unfortunate who is struggling with the other end of the case. There is no doubt from the text that the MSS refers to the same information passed on by Kraemer in Stockholm. It even mentions that it was obtained from an agent. The probability is that the plan which was known here on the 20th was passed to Air Force circles both British and American, as they would obviously be collaborating. It may be therefore that it reached Kraemer through the CERVELL-TURNER combination. CERVELL would have got it from Turner and would have cabled it or sent it by courier to Stockholm. He would have had anything up to 6 days to do it. Kraemer had it on the 26th it appeared on MSS on the 28th and was teleprinted from Stockholm to Berlin on the 31st. The message said that our attack had been put forward to the first half of Feb. and would take place between Veno and the Aachen village. It named the various divisions which would be taking part. The change of plan was said to be due to the success of the Russian offensive. QIM

Alec Kellar had a talk with me about his differences with O.C. I told him I thought he had got a little neurotic about Edel and that Ede had got the same way about him, but in the main I agreed with his view that O.C. should keep out of policy. QIM

At the weekly meeting Grogan mentioned that Censorship had compiled a report showing the efficiency of the Watch List system. The number of addresses misused was only about 1.6

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I had a long discussion with Herbert and Sclater. We redrafted the memo for the JIC on Signals Security, recommending that an Inter-Services Signals Security Board should be set up and should be provided with the necessary equipment and personnel to run half a dozen transmitters, for the purpose of monitoring service and civilian signals. We are putting in the most flagrant examples of lack of security which have recently been obtained. When we have got the final draft I shall try to canvass the various Ds of I.

February 8th

Peter Dwyer of Security Co-Ordination came in to see me. I arranged for him to have a look at B.I.A. Unfortunately he is going back on Monday. Had I known earlier he could have seen the whole office.


Milmo came to talk about the case of SCHLESING-ENSIEF. There is some difficulty about this man's status. He is an SD man but apparently was captured in uniform. With a view to establishing his status he was by arrangement with MIL9 sent first to 020. Stephens has already extracted from him a considerable amount of information about agents in Switzerland, whom he was operating. I am afraid we shall have to pass him on to MIL9.

Cecil has just heard that JUPP HOVEN has been traced in the USA. He is a captain and a P/W. He was captured at Brest.

Monty launched his attack at 10 am today east of Nijmegen.

Ned tells me that his enquiries regarding Rosie SCHMIDT are quite interesting and it seems that in both cases the remittances and money one in 1940 and one more recently in through the Banca Espirito Santo in Lisbon were from people who according to SIS have at least some kind of connection with the Abwehr. I suggested to Ned that before interrogating her it might perhaps be worth while to see what her connections are in this country and if possible get our hands on her out mail. The chances of getting anything interesting are I think remote. What seems most likely is that she was at one time a pay-mistress for the Abwehr like Mrs. KRAFT and that the Germans feel it incumbent upon them to keep her alive in view of her past services

Ned has also told me that according to LEDEBOUR, the SD or Abwehr agent brought back here from Madrid, a woman called O'BRIEN connected with the Abwehr or SD is the mistress of a hanger on at the Madrid Embassy who has been doing something by way of British film propaganda and is connected with Ellis REECE the Financial Adviser.



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Duck rang up to say that she had seen a roll of tape. She had tried to get through to someone here but without success and she felt that it was no too late for her to go back and collect it. She was full of regrets that this opportunity should have been missed. I told her not to worry.

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Milmo and Wilson came to talk about the SCHLESINGENSEIF case. They have not got Stephens' report/which the man says that he does not wish to be treated as a deserter but as a former SD official who has run agents but had not been an agent himself. We all felt that this statement might have been made under a certain amount of pressure and without a full knowledge of its implications. We also realise that if the man was treated as a civilian the French could if they desired lay claim to his body. He could only remain here as a P/W who had been passed back by the Americans. We decided therefore to hand him over to M.I.19.

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/196

I had another session with Curry about the first chapter of his book.

I lunched with Joe Lynch. He told me that according to the "Stars and Stripes", Edgar Hoover has been offered the job of Commissioner of Baseball and that it is being kept open for him till after the war. Joe said he had heard some rumour about this when he was in the States and that he had tackled the boss who had said that he could not possibly leave the Bureau during war time and rather implied that he did not contemplate taking the job. He did not however close the door entirely. The job is worth \$75,000 a year.

I talked to Jim Hale about the case of James PONSONBY. He got into touch with John Senter who is already in difficulties. PONSONBY on arrival here today said that he had left certain papers in Lisbon and that on a word from him they would be handed over to the Germans and would blow the whole of SOEs scheme on which PONSONBY was engaged. The man is obviously mad.

I had a talk with JC about the Boddington case. I wanted him to take it over but he is evidently reluctant to do so. He advances the view that we should not be mixed up with it more than is necessary since it is a matter between the French and SOE. I explained to him that we could not altogether take that line since it had always been our policy to assist SOE in any enquiries particularly in the case of a British agent who was thought to have gone wrong. It was left that we would see what the outcome of our meeting with the French would be.

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Vaudreuil, Kressman, Hugh Astor, Herbert, Marriot and I took part in the discussion on Boddington, this afternoon. I said that our only course in this matter would be to present the indictment to the Security Division of SOE and to co-operate with them in any enquiries that were necessary. Much of the work however would have to be done by them and we should be entirely dependent on them as to who was brought into the case. We could not for example prevent them from consulting Buckmaster. Had the French any objection? Or would they like to be informed before anything was done? They placed themselves unreservedly in our hands and said that they perfectly understood that SOE would have to be the judges. We undertook to let them know as soon as possible whether we wanted any of the bodies in the case brought over to this country. We thought SOE should have the opportunity of expressing their views on this point. It was agreed that there was at the moment no evidence against Boddington and that the theory that Jeannette was the culprit fitted all the facts. The French felt however that Boddington was so linked with Jeannette that if she were wrong he must have known something about it if indeed he was not a party to her activities. There is no doubt that some very curious facts have emerged and that Boddington has quite a lot to explain. I undertook to see SOE tomorrow and let the French know the result. It was agreed that in so far as Brutus was concerned we could renounce any interest in the bodies at present under arrest. All we asked was that their cases should not be tried publicly in the near future. An assurance on this point was given.

n 9

February 10th

John Senter came over. I showed him the memo which Kressmann had prepared in which it is suggested that Boddington may be the culprit in the GILBERT case. He said that he would like to have an opportunity of examining the document and consulting other members of his office. Meanwhile he thought that the suggestion might have been prejudiced and that on the whole they seemed to him most improbable. I explained to him that the matter was somewhat urgent since the French wanted to know as early as possible whether the presence of BARDET (Roger) was required in this country. There is no doubt I think that the French rather have it in for Buckmaster; partly I believe because certain SOE people have made a proaches to their former agents and asked them to continue working for them in France. This has got to the ears of the French, who naturally resent it. Buckmaster has been making a tour of his various circuits with a view to giving rewards, and the French have been placing considerable difficulties in his way. They probably regard his visit as a tour for the purpose of giving instructions to his people on the work that they are to conduct in France in future. In this of course the French are entirely mistaken, though their attitude is understandable. There is no doubt that in some ways they would be rather glad to prove not only that Buckmaster's circuits were blown but that his head man, a British subject, was a traitor. Boddington is apparently a rather curious character, who has lived most of his life in France, and the possibility of his having acted as an agent cannot be entirely ruled out although so far there does not appear to be any concrete evidence.

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/196


I talked to Roland Bird. TAR had at one stage suggested that he should control the case officers in the War Room. Buster for one reason or another did not agree with this suggestion not least because he evidently wants to do the job himself. He put forward various reasons why Bird would not be suitable the principle one being that he did not get on very well with Horrocks. Roland did not wish to go into the War Room but was somewhat flattered by the offer and did not see that he had any valid excuse for turning down. He would therefore have accepted it somewhat against his own inclinations. He is on the whole quite relieved to remain here and deal with the special cases formerly handled by Herbert.

I had another session with Curry on the first chapter of his war book.

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Anthony has picked up on the details of a memo which CERVELL has dictated to Nordenskiöld. In this he refers to a conversation that he has had with Maycock. Maycock has told him that he has recently visited the secret service and had discussions with them about Karl FLORMAN and his son who are suspect, and that the British and Americans are trying to eliminate them. On enquiry we find that Maycock did at the suggestion of Herbertson and Malet, our Minister in Stockholm, have a conversation with in order that Maycock and the Minister might know the general background of the FLORMAN case. The latter had been refused a visa to go to this country and considerable pressure was being brought to bear on the Minister to get the decision reversed. There is no doubt that Maycock's

disclosures are highly embarrassing both to ourselves and to SIS and that his action really constitutes a court-martial offence. In view of the source of the information, however, we shall have to proceed with considerable caution. I have sent a copy of the information to C. and suggested that we should make a joint approach to Inglis. Maycock we think should be removed from his post and sent to some distant land. It would be disastrous to have him wandering about here. This is the second time he has blotted his copybook. On the previous occasion he wrote a letter to CERVELL which he sent by the bag for Air Ministry approval, and delivery, in which he warned CERVELL that the Security people were interested in him. The only inference to be drawn on that occasion was that Maycock was of the lowest order of intelligence. On the other hand as a dealer in Rolls Royce engines he doubtless wishes to keep in well with the Swedes.



d then talked to me about Hill, the SOE man in Moscow, who is ~~apparently~~ very well in with the Ambassador and very much in the latter's confidence. There are rather unpleasant rumours about the reasons for this association. It is thought that Hill may be rendering certain services which, if known to the Soviet authorities would place the Ambassador in an extremely embarrassing position. This may be all idle gossip, but there is no doubt that Hill sees a great many

papers in Moscow. There has recently been a suggestion that Hill should take over the SIS liaison as well as the SOE. C. has definitely turned this down. It would be by no means surprising if Hill was giving more than he got. He certainly gets very little. The Soviet people brought back his mistress from Siberia and she is now living with him for obvious reasons.

I spoke to C. about Hart's memo on the JMA. He said he would very much like to see the memo. He thought that possibly the best course would be to put the matter up to the JIC coupled with the information about the leakage of operational information through Kraemer. I told C. that we thought that the leakage in this country was probably through the CERVELL-TURNER combination. He suggested that we might try and put through a piece of hot information and see how it came out in Stockholm. This seems a good idea.

Gen. West has seen the DG on the subject of Maunsell. West said that unless the DG thought Maunsell was not suitable for the appointment, the present proposal was that he should join the Control Commission and be responsible for all future C.I. planning. The DG said that he had heard various rumours about Maunsell but that in his view, if he was under proper control he was capable of running the organisation. West intimated to the DG that if Maunsell came in Ronnie might wish to go. The DG has since asked me to use my influence with Ronnie to get him to stay. I have already seen Ronnie who has expressed to me his anxieties about being able to work with Maunsell. I told him that while I sympathised with his views, it would be a very serious matter for the Control

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Commission and also for ourselves if he did not stick to his post. I am inclined to think that in the long run he will, or at any rate he will give the job a trial.

February 12th

I saw Charles Butler about the payment of agents in Gib. SIS who agreed to pay the Section V agents who we took over, are now laying down that we must supply them with all sorts of details. This will obviously be very troublesome from the point of view of accounting and of work. I have suggested to Charles and he and the DG have agreed, that we should pay for all the agents except the two P. section agents who are administratively under our control.

I spent the whole morning at Broadway at a meeting with Vivian, TAR, Buster, Pearson and Wynn Scott of OSS and We discussed TARs plan for the War Room, which is to obtain its final approval this afternoon from C. and the DG and Murphy and later from Kenneth Strong and Dick. TARs arrangement seems to be quite sound. He wants Milmo to run the case officers, which is really the bulk of the job, since a good deal of the research work will be done in the case sections. The other sections deal with administration, communications, Pair, documents and publications. I made it clear that while I was quite content to let Milmo and all his people work in the War Room as long as they remained at SJ, I had to enter a caveat that we should not be able to give the same contribution if they were to be placed in another building. I also made it clear that our people working in the War Room would be

under our administrative control and would also be responsible to us for a certain percentage of their work.

I asked Teresa about the agents in Gib. and whether those taken over from Section V. performed any different functions to the ones we had recruited ourselves. She seemed to think that there was no difference.

Kellar brought in Gen. Fraser, our MA in Teheran. We had quite an interesting discussion, particularly on the attitude of the Russians. Fraser thinks that they are quite genuinely suspicious of our intentions. The subsidised Persian press constantly publishes articles about our designs on Baku after the last war. Whether this is merely to create an atmosphere or due to a genuine belief that we shall make some attempt on similar lines after the present war, it is not absolutely certain. Before long we propose to make a suggestion that armed forces should be withdrawn from Teheran. This will only be done on a reciprocal basis. Fraser told me that Brocas-Burrows lost his job on account of a lecture which he gave in Cairo to certain officers. He was very critical of the attitude of the Soviet Govt. towards his mission. This got back to the Russians who declared him persona non grata. He was therefore sent to W. Africa, and given promotion.

John Senter came in. He had read the memo about Boddington and had come definitely to the conclusion that there was no real substance in the allegations made. We decided that Kressmann should have a meeting with us or him tomorrow and that at the

conclusion of this meeting they should decide whether it was desirable for Bardet to be brought over. Vaudreuil would be informed by telephone in Paris on Wednesday morning. Personally I think that Kressmann is quite sincere in his belief and quite open-minded. The French do not wish to proceed with their end of the case until they have cleared the ground over here.

February 13th 1966

Burt talked to me about sending two more officers to join Skardon. Apparently Cussen has approached the DG regarding this matter. Howe I think would send two more from the Yard but this might upset our officers here who would be glad of the opportunity to get into their uniforms and go to Paris. I told Burt that I was somewhat apprehensive about sending too many of his people away as I thought we might be having quite a number of sabotage cases committed by disgruntled seamen who did not wish to serve in the Far East. We have had two such cases this week, both of which have been solved.

Cookie came with Spooner and Davies to read me over his evidence in the STYLES case. With regard to the incident where STYLES alleged that he had met an agent at Birmingham, we are taking the line that enquiries were made but that as they were carried out 9 months after the event it was impossible to say whether STYLES' information was correct or not. This course was thought desirable since if we try to suggest that there could not in fact have been any agent in Birmingham we should have to give a course of lectures disclosing everything we know down to MSS.

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At the 12 o'clock meeting Mrs. Spring said that the ARTHUR project was still on but there is no indication of the exact date.

I discussed with Sclater and Hart the memo on Signals Security which is now I think in excellent shape. I suggested to Sclater that he should have a word with Wilson of Admiralty Signals who may be able to give some useful advice as to the best way of getting the Signals Security Board on its legs.

J.C. and Marriott came to see me about the telegram they have had from Dick about the establishment of the 212 Committee, which is the SHAEP equivalent of the 20 Committee. The suggestion is that the latter should send over a representative every Friday fortnight. J.C. and Marriott are doubtful whether this is necessary as all their traffic goes to the Controller here and is seen by the Controller's representative who is constantly travelling between Paris and London. We have sent a telegram back in this sense and suggested that Dick should talk the matter over with TAR who is at present in Paris.

I said that I was afraid that one day things might recoil on our heads. It was obviously desirable that the work should go on but it was nevertheless important that we should take every precaution against its being made public that we have been associated with them. In fact we are only acting as the agents of others.

February 14th

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Milmo and Mark Johnston came to talk on the case of FURTH and I subsequently saw

and Crofts of SIS. The suggestion is that FURTH should go to the I.O.M. and that his wife should be got over from Belgium to join him there. His attitude will be that he is a disillusioned Nazi, which in fact is true. When the armistice comes SIS will get him back to Germany and endeavour to make use of him.

I asked Burt to arrange for the transmission of any information relating to ROWEKL to the CID officer who is investigating the case

I attended the HDSE with the DG. The opening of an air route from Stockholm to the USA via Iceland was under consideration. I said that the primary interest of the Germans in Iceland had been firstly weather reports and secondly the possibility of its being used as a base for an attack on Norway. Several agents had been sent there from time to time. It seemed to me that it depended on future operations. If it was intended to use Iceland for an attack on Norway, it would

certainly be inconvenient to have an airline running their from Stockholm. The Air Ministry said that they did not want aircraft in that vicinity who might get advance weather reports, and the Admiralty said that it would be undesirable for the aircraft to see convoys operating in those waters. It was thought possible that if the line could not operate via Iceland it might want to operate via this country. We said that we were not keen about this but that possibly it was the lesser evil. The general feeling of the meeting was that the proposals should if possible be turned down, on security grounds. There were other grounds of a commercial kind which made it desirable that neutral countries should not be given an unfair advantage for being allowed to get into the field of commercial aviation before we had time to manufacture the necessary planes. For the purpose of civil aviation Iceland is in our zone but from a military point of view it is under American control. If the Americans chose to allow Swedish planes to touch down in Iceland we could probably retaliate by refusing them facilities in Newfoundland.

Sclater told me that he had seen Wilson of Admiralty Signals. Wilson thought our plan a good one but said that Firth's Committee which is the successor to Reid's committee, is still in being. I therefore suggested to Sclater that he should see Firth and try and get his blessing for our scheme.

There is a proposal to bring over 1000 sick refugees from the Channel Islands, and to repatriate 200 sick German soldiers. This is I think something quite new in the annals

of war. We have already discovered that the doctor on the ship, WEISS-DUNAN is a German agent. I discussed this matter with Herbert Cussen and Barry. It was decided that Herbert should attend the H.O. meeting tomorrow with a representative of D.4.

Anthony, Noble, Ryde and Shanks, the latter now working with Liversidge, came to see me about a story of a French Stockholm named . This man is giving information to the Japs which is appearing on JMAs. Moreover it is almost certain that he has a questionnaire from Kraemer to which he intends to obtain answers through a forthcoming visit to Paris via this country. It is extremely difficult to know what to do in this case. If we assume that is the man and there seems little doubt, our only course would seem to be to tell the French that we are almost certain that is working for the Germans and that they would be well advised to keep him under close and complete observation while he is in Paris, since he will almost certainly try to collect information which will go to the Germans as soon as he gets back to Stockholm. It will be impossible to disclose the sources since JMAs are under the joint control of C. and the Americans and the Stockholm source is of the very greatest value to SIS.

Anthony has brought me in a telegram from the Chinese air attache which indicates that he has visited an American Air Force on the continent on the invitation of the General Commanding. I have drawn C's attention to this and after he has seen it I would send the telegram to Gen. Strong, stating the full facts. The danger is of course that this officer will get the benefit of his report.

I saw John Senter, Soskice, Kressmann. They had an all night session about Boddington. Kressmann is I think fairly well satisfied that Boddington is not the culprit and I think somewhat shaken on the question of Jeannette. Soskice does not think that either are guilty, but is still open-minded. It is suggested that if possible Bardet and Kiki should be kept in cold storage until the case can be further probed. An endeavour will be made to persuade them that it is in their own interests that this should be done. They would almost certainly be murdered by the FFI if they were let out unless they were completely rehabilitated, given promotion and a decoration for gallantry with the French maquis.

Anthony, Herbert and I had a meeting with the DG and explained to him about the JMAs, the K. case and Maycock. He asked that he might be kept informed of any developments.

Buster came to see me about the cases of certain agents sent over here for examination, whose return to Belgium was now objected to by 21 AG. It looks as if there had been a real muddle and he is going out to Brussels tomorrow to try and clear it up.

Lennox tells me that it was decided at the Crimea Conference that the Russians would ultimately come in with us against Japan, and would give us the necessary bases for bombing Tokio. This is a very important and significant decision. Old Joe told Winston that he would give him the approximate date on which he intended to pick a quarrel with Japan. Roosevelt has stated that he intends to withdraw all American troops from Germany within 2 years. This is obviously going to complicate matters to a very considerable

degree.

I saw Stephens for a moment. His camp in Brussels is evidently not progressing and he thoroughly sick of the whole business. He is beginning to think that 21 A.G. are as inefficient as SHAEF.

February 15th

I had a word with Jim about the possibility of a Pole attempting to assassinate the PM. in the light of recent decisions at the Crimea Conference. I rather wondered whether the Poles had considered this although it might be that they could not do much more than they are doing already. I thought too that we were under a certain obligation to keep our ears-down in Polish circles. If we knew the kind of people who were likely to make trouble we might try their telephones. Jim said he did not think they would be likely to talk about this sort of thing on the telephone. I pointed out that telephone conversations rarely gave direct evidence but that they did at times convey something to those who had knowledge of the general setup. When speaking on the telephone people generally are in the habit of guarding their conversation against the operator but not against the informed listener.

C. talked to me about Herbert's memo on JMAS and about the K. reports. He thought that we should certainly go ahead in an attempt to plant something on CERVELL. Meanwhile he thought it might be profitable if I discussed the report with Cavendish-Bentinck and got a firm reference to the Air Ministry.

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We then discussed the case of C. said he had decided to warn the French without disclosing sources. He thought it important that should not be allowed to go back to Stockholm, and that if any attempt were made we should refuse him leave to land on his return journey.

Talking to Anthony afterwards, he pointed out that in view of our information about Maycock we might have to look for the leakage in his office and in that of the American Air Attache. Maycock at any rate seemed to be sufficiently indiscreet to tell anybody anything.

Grogan discussed with me certain censorship matters which are coming up at a censorship meeting. They relate to the monitoring and sponsoring of communications between this country and the continent. Firms sponsored either by the British or French Govts. will be able to communicate but will be monitored 100%. Foreign legations, army circles and the FO communications will also be monitored 100%. We came to the conclusion that it would not be possible to vet the sponsored firms. I thought however that it might be useful for us to have a list of them so that they could be looked after by the sections concerned.

Sclater came to tell me about his meeting with Firth, the new D.D. Sigs at the Admiralty. Firth began by rather pooh-poohing our fears about security, but when he saw the examples he nearly had a fit, pressed bells and sent for people right and left. He is very gravely concerned and is prepared to back us 100%.

Sclater has got another complete message about the formation of a convoy.

Charles Butler told me that he had seen Viv. about the agents in Gib. It has been agreed that we will pay all C.E. agents whether they were originally recruited by us or Section V. and that SIS will pay for the P.section agents.

I have been told about two further secret decisions at the Crimea Conference. One is that the Dardenelles are to be internationalised. What precisely this means I don't know, unless the area is to be taken away from the Turks and come under international control. Winston has apparently undertaken to break the news to the Turks, although Joe originally offered to do so. The other point is that apparently Alexander is to command our troops for occupation, instead of Monty.

In a letter from Cyril, he explains how things went wrong over the cases of COLEPAUGH and GIMPEL, the two German agents who proceeded to the States in a submarine. Having heard nothing from us Cyril had assumed that the information he had got from DNI Ottawa was merely of the gossip kind. He had left

Ottawa before getting our reply, and consequently when in Washington mentioned the incident to Mickey Ladd. He thought possibly the US Navy might have been the source. The FBI had heard nothing nor did they hear anything till about 3/4 Dec. when ONI told them that a Canadian tanker had been sunk off the US coast and that one or probably more agents had been landed. From then on the FBI tried to secure further information from ONI and were eventually told that the statement about landing agents was pure supposition. Under interrogation COLEPAUGH and GIMPEL stated that on or about 22nd Dec. the sub-

marine received a message giving instructions that the landing was not to be effected at Frenchmen's Bay, as another submarine had been sunk there. These instructions were however disregarded. From the above statement the FBI assumed that the actual place of landing, namely Frenchman's Bay, was mentioned in Ultra and that had they been told they would have got on to the spies much sooner. Cyril has told them however that there may be a flaw in their argument since it is quite possible that Frenchman's Bay may have been selected before the departure of the submarine and that in their message the German commander may only have been told to avoid the previously selected place. The only reason that COLEPAUGH and GIMPEL were caught is that they had a row and separated. COLEPAUGH who is an American was stupid enough to let his presence be known to a friend of his, and was eventually given away. He then gave a description of GIMPEL and said that he had some kind of Peruvian background and read Peruvian newspapers. The FBI therefore covered every newsstand in New York where Peruvian newspapers were sold and caught GIMPEL in one day.

The C.E. summary of AFHQ for Dec. 1944 shows that 56 agents had been captured excluding two parties of saboteurs in uniform numbering 13. Altogether in the campaign 82 cases have been tried, 29 executed and 29 sentenced to imprisonment.

A document captured recently emanating from the OKW in Berlin directs all Abteilungsleiter in North Italy to prepare for the eventual liquidation of Italian collaborators who have had access to secret information about the German intelligence organisation since

experience has shown that they cannot be trusted. This liquidation is to take place at a given signal, when the Germans withdraw from N. Italy. It is hoped to put these documents to good use in the near future.

There is increasing evidence of over-all SD control. The SD have been engaged during the last two months in attempting at intervals to penetrate allied intelligence organisations by sending agents across the lines with instructions to surrender at once, say that they have been forced into the German service against their will and then attempt to get recruited by an allied secret organisation. The moving spirit is Dr. RAGAN @ BEGUS of the SD at Verona who is also preparing a stay-behind network in N. Italy.

February 16th

Burt came to see me about the two more officers required for Paris. He thought that Spooner and Fish ought to go, if it was really necessary. He said he would have a better idea about this when he saw Skardon who was returning tomorrow.

I saw Bill Stephenson. He was very friendly and we discussed things in general. He then said "That was rather a snooty telegram you sent me about Hoover." He said he was only concerned about getting Hoover over and tying him up with ourselves for all time. I said that I thought this would be an excellent thing and asked him what prospects there were of Hoover coming over. He said that he thought he would be coming in March or April. He was anxious that we should work out a detailed programme and that we should more or less take charge as

Viv. was running round in circles. I said that we should be very pleased to show Hoover over our own establishment and that if he could give us 3 or 4 days he could probably see quite a lot that would interest him. Bill does not think Hoover will take the job of Commissioner of Baseball. He thought it might be a good thing if we gave him a decoration. It should be nothing less than knighthood as a similar decoration was being given to Bill Donovan.

Jim came to talk to me about E.Divn. He rather thinks that it ought to go into liquidation, and was wondering how far this was possible. E.1 Western European Govt. liaison was obviously a necessary section also E.2 which dealt with Poles. E.3 was virtually working for Blunt E.4 was AWS permits and might go to D.Division, while E.5 consisted now only of two officers who could perhaps join B.1. The main snags are as usual personal.

Heard came to tell me that he had just had a letter from Cyril Mills saying that a Swede in the RCAF was in Mills' view wrongly suspected of being concerned in an alleged leakage to the Japs. The was only alleged since the information was inaccurate, and was to the effect that there was one Canadian battalion (parachute) in Canada and this was intended to go to Australia in Jan. 1945. DMI Ottawa had learned of this from Brisbane who had passed to him a message from Tokyo to Manila dated 24th Nov. which ran approximately as follows: "Special report Swedish Air Attache (Swedish -Bakan) one parachute battalion now in Canada is due to go to Australia in Jan. 45" This is apparently a verbatim relay by

Tokyo to Manilla of aJMA dated 20th Nov. which adds that 40 other Canadian battalions are in the U.K. but does not give the description or source, pointing to CERVELL, which has been added by Tokyo to Manilla, no doubt to add to its veracity. We are trying to get G.C & CS to give us an interpretation of "Sedish Bakan" This is I think one more nail in CERVELL's coffin.

February 17th

Martin Forrest has returned from his holiday but is not yet fit. I intend to put him on to some case work and later perhaps put him into the War Room.

Ronnie Haylor came to tell me that he had decided to stay in CCMS provided he was made R.J.s deputy and was released as soon as someone suitable could be found to replace him. He only wanted to stay if he thought he could be of any use. Unless he was deputy he did not think this would be worth while.

The Daily Mirror has published an account of a Dutch officer traitor confined in the Tower. The story obviously relates to LINDEMANN but is completely half-baked. Press and Censorship say that the Sunday papers want to open the flood gates. Can we give them any line on which to censor press submissions. After consultation with SIS we decided to say that we wanted the story confined as far as possible to its present limits, that we thought it desirable not to publish LINDEMANN's name, his former contacts or the names of those whom he had given away. Apart from this we did not wish to be drawn into any criticism of what had already appeared.

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TAR has returned from France and tells me that there is already an efficient document section which is translating captured documents and issuing them to units in the field where there is an operational lesson to be learned. The head of this organisation is a man called ZINTZER, an American of German origin who left Germany in 1941. He appears to be running the show with marked efficiency and is in fact doing exactly what the War Room here is proposing to do.

At today's 12 O'clock meeting it was disclosed that Ostro had submitted information relating to the movement of some 5 Canadian divisions from the Italian front. As this information is true it seems more than ever desirable that Ostro should somehow be torpedoed. The Controller is taking this matter up with C. This is the third time we have tried to get Ostro removed, and the present suggestion is that we should try and buy him up or bump him off. The transmitter from Bavaria known as Phoney has come to an end and is clearly in the hands of the Gestapo. Meanwhile one of the party seems to have got into Switzerland. He says that Rhode has been arrested. It now transpires that SOE have been communicating with this transmitter for some considerable time. They have come forward quite naively with a story about the arrest of a man called Rhode who was operating a clandestine transmitter with which they had been in touch.

I went over to see Cavendish²Bentinck and handed him 12 copies of our memo on Signals Security which he will arrange to put before the JIC on Tuesday. He read the paper and thought that the situation was serious. He doubted however whether the JIC could solve

it on Tuesday. He thought the best thing would be to submit the paper for consideration as to ways and means to the ISSB with the necessary signals personnel co-opted.

We then discussed the Turner-Cervell situation and also the case of Maycock. Cavendish Bentinck thought that the best line would be for C. and myself to make a direct approach to Inglis. He thought Inglis would be reluctant to get rid of Maycock as they were personal friends. He agreed however with us that something needed doing. As regards Turner and CERVELL he thought that TURNER was much the worst offender. CERVELL was only passing on information which he received from TURNER but Turner was recklessly giving away information to a neutral. I said that as soon as we had verified certain facts we wanted to raise the whole question either with the JIC or with Inglis.

Senter and Thornley came to see me about the case. Senter had learned about it from his contact in Stockholm who in fact had handed over the agent who obtains the information about KRAMER to SIS. Both Senter and Thornley have had a conversation with Liversidge who seemed unaware of the fact that

I said that this was news to me and I thought it might be news to C. It obviously created quite a new situation. SOE are collaborating with the French here and in France in the training and despatch of agents to Germany. Some of these may be going via Stockholm. If moves in these circles he may very well be told a lot while he is in France. If so, the whole of SOE plans may be disclosed to the enemy. SOE are therefore anxious

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to say something to their French opposite numbers in this country by way of a warning, and also to Col Viat who runs the training camp at Rambouillet. I said I would speak to C. about this as soon as he returned on Monday. is I believe expected here on Tuesday.

A Section V report from the Mediterranean indicates that in Sicily SIM have confirmed previous indications that there is an espionage network communicating with the enemy. The SIM officer established by radio D.F.ing that there were four uncontrolled W/T sets transmitting regularly from the areas of Palermo, Catania, Agregento and Enna. The control stations are probably in N. Italy. Messages written in secret ink referring to clandestine anti-allied activities have been discovered in letters written from Sicily to P/Ws in one particular camp in Germany. The messages mentioned a W/T station and it could also be deduced from the text that a courier service links these stations. Investigations are being conducted and it is proposed that a D.F.ing van with a British Signals officer or NCO should be sent to Sicily to cover the technical side.

The number of captured agents arrested on the Italian front during the fortnight 26th Jan to 8th Feb. has fallen to the unusually low figure of 8, 6 line-crossers and 2 parachute saboteurs. Whether this is due to bad weather conditions or a sudden improvement in the security of the agents is not certain. It does not seem however that security in Sicily can be particularly good if 4 agents can operate W/T sets with impunity.

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An enquiry has recently been made into the German measures for operational security and deception. There was no doubt that before their Ardennes offensive the enemy had an excellent security plan but nothing has been discovered so far which might indicate the use of deception prior to and during the offensive.

SACSEA has telegraphed to say that he is convinced that his future operations will require W/T cover and deception on a large scale starting as soon as possible. He considers that the lack of facilities for such deception is likely to jeopardise the success of his deception operations. He requests therefore that Washington will send him as many facilities as possible for all 3 services and approach the American army Air authorities for U.S. assistance. He regards the only really satisfactory solution is to

send units already experienced in this type of work, preferably those employed in Overlord.

SHAFF C.I. Summary for week ending 9th Feb. states that GIS parachute operations have been resumed and are taking place closer to the battle areas than heretofore. Incomplete specimens have been found of the new parachute pappratus.

An OKW letter received in Switzerland expresses dissatisfaction with the quality of military information on France reaching Germany through Switzerland and gives the German estimate of the stay-behind organisation in France, i.e. 50% captured, 35% afraid to operate, 15% operating. Captured agents claim successes in recent line-crossing activities.

AFHQ C.E. Summary for Jan. 1945 shows that 58 agents have been captured during the month in Italy, 30% of whom were parachutists. Of the remainder approximately 32% were line-crossers and 38% stay-behinds. Of all these 8 were women and there is some evidence that these 8 may be followed up in future by a number more who are in training. 7 of those captured were provided with W/T's. Although virtually no damage attributable to saboteurs has been noted, 13 of the agents have had sabotage missions. 4 agents surrendered, 17 were caught by routine checking at forward control points, 21 on the basis of information received from other agents captured and 6 from enquiries arising out of the information circulated in the C.I. bulletin.

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Joe Archer has produced a highly interesting document showing the extent to which "Air Force P/W" leak under interrogation or talk indiscreetly among themselves. This is in spite of careful instruction. The view is that the steady flow of this information from Dulag Luft to the German Air Ministry and to Intelligence Officers through out the Luftwaffe must have been of inestimable assistance to them in their task of assessing the strength, tactics, technical development, plans and order of battle of the RAF. The view is held that the fundamental cause of the majority of the indiscretions springs from irresponsibility and indiscipline. There may admittedly have been isolated instances in which individual prisoners have given away information because they had received inadequate security education before capture. There may also have been instances in which a prisoner has talked because undue pressure was brought to bear upon him or because the tricks used against him were more clever than he was mentally capable of withstanding or because of other extenuating circumstances. But a general survey leads definitely to the conclusion that the majority of the prisoners talked openly and with little restriction and that they did so because they were irresponsible and thoughtless and because they refused to obey the simple rules which had been given to them or to put into practice the security lessons which they had seen so frequently taught. In the captured documents such phrases occur as "P/W learned the following details through his private contacts e.g. in conversations with engineers in Rolls Royce, Derby, or with the officials in research station at Farnborough. There follows details of the structure and performance of all the various types

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of Spitfires. This I think proves more than ever that we were right when two years ago we attributed the leakage of information about the Spitfire 21 to a P/W. Fish carried out the investigation and was strongly of opinion that Father was responsible.

February 19th

I have just got Alec Kellar's report on his visit to the Mid East. He begins by saying that it is no exaggeration to say that on the British Govt.'s present handling of the Palestine problem will mainly depend our ability to retain the predominating influence we enjoy in the Mid East, an area where our interests, political and strategic, are being increasingly menaced by both Russian and French designs and by an accumulating xenophobia in the Arab States fanned by a growing belief that our policy in Palestine consciously favours the Jew in preference to the Arab. As that belief grows - and the fact that we too have no punitive toll in Palestine for the assassination of Lord Moyne is turning belief into conviction - so are we correspondingly losing from the very considerable reserves of Arab goodwill which we have acquired for ourselves during the war years. It is the view of the authorities on the spot that more trouble must be expected in further and increasing acts of terrorism inspired as it may soon be by Arabs as well as by Jews, and that organised rebellion, following any announcement of policy, is a possibility that cannot be discounted. The Arabs within Palestine are admittedly disunited and lacking in leadership, separated into no

less than 6 different political parties, they show little evidence of political maturity or of any present ability to sink their differences. The Arab line is to warn us against the encroachments of Russia into whose arms the Arabs will be thrown if we do not satisfy their aspirations. If the British contemplate partition, the indications are that the Arabs will not be entirely united. Ibn Saud's belated and reluctant agreement to join the newly-formed League of Arab States and his recent meeting with King Farouk are considered as being less concerned with a desire to achieve Arab unity as with securing an alliance with the Egyptian King against the Hashimite house now ruling in Iraq and Trans-Jordan. The Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan too is more concerned with his own dynastic ambitions than with more ambitious schemes for Arab unity. He covets a Greater Syria with his capital in Damascus and to secure this prize from our hands he is prepared to see Palestine west of the Jordan in Jewish suzerainty. Again, Nuri Said, ex-premier of Iraq, anxious that the Arab countries should continue in close and friendly relations with the British, has now indicated that he is prepared to do what he can to persuade his own colleagues that they must face the fact that the ultimate partition of Palestine is inevitable.

On the Zionist side Dr. Weisman, during his present visit to Palestine, has warned his fellow members of the Executive that if terrorism continues the Zionist cause stands in grave danger of losing not only much of the moral support it enjoys outside

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Palestine, but more important of all, the political and very practical sympathy of Mr. Churchill. So it is that the Agency is now co-operating with the British authorities security, policy and Secretariat, in an attempt to stamp out terrorism. This co-operation is however conditional and limited. The Agency will only continue as long as they believe that their ultimate demands will be met. Meanwhile they are only passing to the police lists of names for the latter to make the arrests. The police who have no adequate records feel bound to act on the Agency's information. They receive very little information from the AGENCY ABOUT THE ORGANISATION EITHER of the Stern Group or the Irgun. This is because the agency are only too well aware that the police have signally failed to penetrate these two organisations and that the CID are now to a very large extent dependent on the Agency's security officers for most of the evidence upon which the arrest of terrorists can be effected. The more the police become dependent on the Agency the more authority the Agency consider they acquire and in indeed do, in the civil administration of Palestine. This extra-constitutional action which the Agency is now allowed to take in Palestine has in fact given it something of the status of an imperium in imperia. It kidnaps or openly arrests terrorists with its own personnel, usually seconded for the work from the ranks of the Agency's para-military and entirely illegal Hagana organisation. These suspects are interrogated in Jewish settlement hide-outs by methods admittedly unorthodox but fruitful of result. Some of these suspects are later released, others are handed over to the police, while the remainder continue in

Agency custody largely because they are in a position to supply information which the Agency prefer to vet before passing to the police, or wish to exclude from the latter altogether. There is a certain amount of cooperation between the Agency and SIME in Egypt. Trusted Arabs of the Agency are serving in the British forces in units where terrorists are thought to be. Enquiries in Palestine have shown fairly conclusively that the Polish Army Intelligence has been deliberately building up the Irgun.

the names of 5 ~~Arabs~~ Revisionist Jews, among them Begin the leader of the organisation, who were released a year ago by the Polish Army in the Mid East for political propaganda purposes in Palestine. The Stern Group according to the Agency appears substantially untouched. There is now positive evidence that it is receiving support from French officials in the Levant, both in the matter of arms and finance. French support is being given firstly in retaliation for the part we played last year in supporting Lebanese and Syrian attempts for independence and secondly because an Independent Jewish State would work in opposition to the Greater Syria scheme which if brought about would undermine French influence. The Greater Syria scheme includes Trans-Jordan. There is a certain amount of evidence that the Irgun and Stern Group may be planting agents abroad for the purpose of political assassination. Kellar does not think much of the Palestine Police or the quality of their work. Through their own ignorance of the situation they have virtually been thrown into the arms of the Agency

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The revelations about the true state of affairs has come as rather a shock to Rymer Jones whose head of CID, Giles, is regarded by everyone as a difficult personality with whom to work. He is a Cypriot married to a Maltese and suffers from an inferiority complex. The Deputy Supt. Catling, who is in charge of the political Intelligence Section, stated quite openly that his dept. resented the activities of the DSO. The fact is of course that Catling is sitting on a volcano and does not really know it. Kellar clearly thinks that Hunloke should be withdrawn when he has concluded his extra year. The question of his successor will need careful consideration. As regards SIME and CICI and the future there is considerable talk. All those in authority are concerned about the disintegration of their organisations which will inevitably take place unless some decision is reached.

On his way back Kellar saw Hill-Dillon who seems ready to come into the War Room scheme provided he does not give any offence to SIS. He is of course bound by the agreement he made with SIS. and the W.O. in which gave the charter to Section V for all matters of C.E. Ever since he has obstinately maintained that C.I. should not be planned but improvised. This has resulted in the catch as catch can basis in Italy which has given somewhat indifferent results. He has at last rather reluctantly agreed to let Crean do some planning.

Kellar closes his note with an appendix on future policy in Palestine in which he mentions that the Minister Resident, Sir E. Gigg is advocating a scheme in which the actual administration of the country would be

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run by a representative of 3, an Englishman, an Arab and a Jew, who would be subject to a supervising Commission constituted by the United Nations and open to both Arabs and Jews for representation. No provision however is made in Grigg's scheme for safeguarding British Imperial interests in the new state and this being so Lord Gort stresses that the proposals if implemented would gravely endanger British strategic requirements in the Mid East. If Gort thought that Griggs's policy had the official backing of the Govt. he would hand in his resignation.

J.C. came in to tell me that from private and reliable sources he had learned that the Nazis were already getting hold of certain hostages, presumably as a guarantee of their personal safety. These include Linlithgow's son and also an officer called Alexander who they wrongly believe to be a relation of the General.

I had a talk with Alley, Craufurd and Herbert about Craufurd's report on diamond smuggling. The report centres round SLHICKI who has been previously mentioned. The conclusions are that the Polish 2eme Bureau are fairly deeply involved. The Poles have asked us to let them know the results of our enquiry and Craufurd has prepared a memo. He has however based it rather on the possibility of the diamonds reaching the enemy than on the improper conduct of members of the 2eme Bureau. Herbert thinks that the latter is sounder ground. Craufurd is going to amend his memo accordingly.

I saw John Mair. He is over here with Hill-Dillon. He was much impressed by the large number of MI5 people he had seen in

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Paris, all of whom appeared to be in commanding positions. I asked him how far H-D was prepared to work to the War Room. He said that provided C. was agreeable he thought that he would go a fair way. The only difficulty is the communications.

I talked about C.I. activities on the Italian front. Mair admitted there had been very little planning. M-D apparently is opposed to any planning and prefers what he calls improvisation. He had got away with it all right in N. Africa as he had cleverly exploited the French through Trevor-Wilson. He had no right to assume that he would get similar co-operation from the Italians but in this respect he had again been lucky. SIM had in fact become integrated with intelligence staffs in all the higher formations. They even had their representative in Lisbon, France and Switzerland. On the whole this had worked extremely well, although there had never been any very efficient screening. I asked about the agents in Sicily. Mair said they had only just arrived and he doubted whether their sets had even piped up. As regards the two sets rounded up in Rome, these had been heard first by RSS and then tracked down with snifters.

Mair is still determined to get into into the FO if he can possibly manage it.

February 20th

Milmo talked to me about the King Kong case. During the night two Press representatives of the Daily Mail found their way to Camp 020 where they got a cool reception. As they went away they took a flashlight photo of the gates. The matter is being taken up by Press & Censorship. We have been in touch with Niall MacDermott who did not wish anything

published ~~until after the trial.~~ In the light of recent developments however it was suggested that we should tell the Press that towards the end of last year a Dutch subject suspected of treachery was brought to this country by SHAEF, that early in December he was handed back to the Dutch authorities in Holland and that he is now awaiting trial there. The man was not a Dutch officer and is not in the Tower. Lastly there is no evidence that he betrayed or had any advance knowledge of the Arnhem operation. We shall then say that in the circumstances it will be appreciated that many of the statements which have recently appeared in the Press have been not only unfounded but mischievous and apart from causing pain and anxiety to the relatives of the men who took part in the Arnhem landings have been well calculated to prejudice the further investigations of the case. The case being sub judice no further statement can be made at present.

C. talked to me about — He has seen Passy and Manuel and told them that he is 75% certain that — unless he is one of their D.A.s, is a spy. The French have taken the matter very seriously. They suggest that we should watch — here and search him when he leaves. I said that we would be quite prepared to do this provided the FO agreed. The French will search his — on the other side.

At the JIC meeting today our signals security paper was discussed. It was decided that the matter should be thoroughly investigated by the Fifth Committee who are to report to the JIC what machinery they thought necessary for dealing with the situation. Meanwhile

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the Services were urged to monitor their own signals and RSS was asked to give a larger contribution towards the monitoring of civilian signals. The Air Ministry representative pointed out that the Air Force were intentionally committing a certain number of indiscretions in an attempt to get the Luftwaffe into the air. Their signals therefore had to be looked at in the light of these tactics.

Ede came to talk to me about a letter which the DG had asked him to write to Henderson in which Henderson is told that he is to get into direct touch with the FBI and try and obtain their approval for circulating the reports on negroes both to ourselves and to BSC. This on the grounds that he is acting for both MI5 and MI6. I told Ede that nothing could be more disastrous. Once the FBI thought that we were passing their reports to BSC they would dry up completely. This was a regrettable state of affairs but nothing that I could see could alter it.

As regards Ceylon and C.I. planning in the Far East Ede was rather anxious to take the bull by the horns and discuss the whole matter with SIS. I said that in view of a telegram I had had about para.9 of Courtenay's letter it was clear that Lamplough did not wish us to take this matter up and he intended to do so on his arrival in this country.

I sent a rather stuffy telegram to Cyril complaining that the FBI have not let us have a comprehensive report about COLEPAUGH and GIMPEL. A report that has reached us from NID on the case indicates that the agents were to use the 1942 amateur edition of the Radio Handbook. From this they were to use standard Catalogue Reference KW/4/196 for the heading of their messages, such type signals as might be used

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by aircraft in communicating with the field or by outlying stations of coastguards or lighthouses. The men also carried letter-drops in Lisbon and Madrid as well as the names of American P/W in German hands, to whom letters could be addressed.

I saw Tommy last night. He had a rather different story about the decisions at the Crimea Conference. As far as he could recall the question of the Montreux agreement was rather shelved. On the whole the view is that we got more than we gave. The Russians were persuaded to take reparations to some extent in kind instead of in cash. They were also made to agree that only two of their federated states should have representation at the Peace Conference. The P.M. before the Crimea Conference telephoned to Roosevelt saying that everything would be done to assist his passage. He concluded: "From Gibraltar to Malta, let nobody falter. From Malta to Yalta, let nobody alter".

February 21st

Fish came in to tell me that in spite of the fact that the Yard had rung up the F.O. twice every day to know whether ROWELL had arrived, the F.O. had denied it although ROWELL had been in the country for 5 or 6 days. I believe the F.O. have now lost him.

At the Wednesday meeting Grogan made a statement about the weakness of French censorship. It is clearly impossible to place any reliance upon the Controle Technique, particularly in so far as any testing for secret ink is concerned. Belgian Censorship is to be withdrawn after the cessation of hostilities.

Brock mentioned that on the 13-14th two agents had handed themselves over in Athens and 14

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/196

others had been dropped S.E. of Patras. 7 had given themselves up.

Walker stated that 790 rockets had been dropped up to date, ~~xxx~~ an average of about 12 per day.

Hill-Dillon and John Mair came to see me. H-D wants an officer here to represent him on the Austrian Control Commission. H-D himself will be in charge of C.I. and in that respect Maunsell's opposite number in the German Control Commission. He will be doing planning in Italy but wants someone to hold a watching brief here. I am suggesting Dykes.

Sclater and I had lunch with Capt. Firth who is head of the W/T Security Committee and has been charged with looking into the question of Signals Security. He seems an excellent fellow and is very conscious of the need for tightening things up.

After lunch I saw Passy, Manuel and Vaudreuil. This was purely a courtesy visit. They were extremely friendly and said that they would always welcome the presence of MI5 in Paris. There was a general feeling that they have far more confidence in us than in anyone else.

I talked to the D.G. about the publication by the Mirror about an alleged Dutch officer in the Tower. It refers of course to the LINDEMAN case. He seemed to be rather opposed to a prosecution but was all in favour of a question in the House, which would damp things down and indicate that the Mirror had probably caused a great deal of pain to the relatives of those who fell at Arnhem by stating that the disaster was due to a betrayal by a spy. The allegation is of course untrue.

Herbert has produced a note on O.C. Having read Alec Kellar's memo on the Mid East he has come down heavily on my side that O.C. cannot interfere in policy and must be confined to purely administrative matters. He recommends that it should be divided into 5 blocks, Mid East, Far East and Australasia, Mediterranean (Malta & Gib), Africa, East West and South, Caribbean, Canada and possibly United States. He thinks there ought to be a corresponding section in B.Division to control these areas in the same way as Kellar controls Mid East.

Dev has agreed to the establishment of Radar at Malin Head. The apparatus us used to enable our Air Force to locate their position when dealing with U-boats. The station will be run notionally by the Irish ostensibly for the guidance of aircraft. The RAF are to be in control until peace time when the Irish trainees will take over.

Cecil and I dined with Wickham. He has been offered the job of reorganising the police in Greece. He had a very ^{un}satisfactory interview with Orme-Sargent, who could tell him very little. It was not clear whether he was to be an adviser or was to take over complete control. He has suggested that he should go out there for a fortnight and then return. He would then say whether he was prepared to take on the job and if so state his requirements. This idea did not very much appeal to Orme-Sargent whose sole wish seemed to be to get him out to Greece, whether there was a job to be done or not. Eventually he agreed to telegraph Wickham's proposals to Rex Leeper.

Tommy told me more about the camp Oilag 4C where George Lascelles and other notables are now interned, presumably as hostages.

He was anxious to know whether a message of encouragement could be sent through to them. I advised him to apply to the DMI who would arrange it through M.I.9

D.B. came to tell me that there was a proposal on foot to make Cavendish-Bentinck Peter Loxley's successor in so far as the receipt of S.S. material was concerned. I said that I thought it was important that he should also control the job as Cadogan's principle P.A. Otherwise 50% of the value to us of the job carried by Loxley would go. It was essential to have somebody who was looking at all the stuff going through to Cadogan, in order that he could keep us informed and pass to us anything that concerned us.

February 22nd

I saw Maxwell about the LINDEMANS case. I explained to him the position and that we proposed to get W.J. Brown to withdraw his question and to put down another asking the Minister for War to make a statement. I then read over to Maxwell the statement which we proposed to make and told him that Hill of the H I. was rather opposed to our mentioning that LINDEMANS had been brought to this country. Maxwell said he did not really mind about this but that if we could avoid it so much the better.

I had a long meeting with J.C., Herbert and John Marriott with regard to the future of B.1A. J.C. was very obstinate about our getting rid of any of the B.1A agents. We had suggested that Gelatine and Bronx could go. He felt however that they might come in useful in circumstances which we could not perhaps foresee. He did however agree to a considerable reduction of the staff and to the continuation of the

traffic analysis which now seemed unnecessary. This should release two officers and perhaps three female staff. He felt in general that the XX Committee would have to go on.

I had a talk~~xxx~~ with Charles and Harker about O.C. I think they are fairly convinced that a reorganisation on the lines of Herbert's memo is necessary.

I went over in the evening to see Mr. Lanyon, who deals with P.Q.s in the W.O. I suggested to him that he should get W.J. Brown to withdraw his question and put down another. He seemed to think the idea a good one.

In the evening I saw John Booth, who was extremely interesting about his work and wants me to visit the 11th Armoured Division if I go to Belgium. He has a tremendous admiration for his own unit and in fact for Monty and the British as a fighting force. He has unfortunately very little to say for the Americans. He says their staff work is bad, they're grossly over-organised and haphazard in their methods and they have little drive except when Patton is behind them. He quoted an instance where after bombardment on two successive days they failed to advance at all. A brigade of the Armoured Division then went into action and drove south 3 or 4 miles. In the Ardennes they were caught completely on the hop, having taken no precautions whatever. John told me there was no possible excuse for not knowing what was going on in front of them. They clearly had no recon parties out in front and no air recon, otherwise they would have been bound to see the panzer tracks. One of the excuses for the debacle given by Bradley that he was moving his headquarters. This John says is typical.

They have wonderful equipment but no idea of how to use it. Whereas our armoured divisional command is in permanent touch with all his units if not with every vehicle, the Americans are generally out of touch. He described to me on very rough lines how an attack was made. First of all there is air bombardment for half an hour, then an artillery bombardment. The infantry then advances and takes the first line which of course is not a line at all but merely a series of posts. Tanks then go through and endeavour to break up further lines to the rear. As soon as they come up against difficulties, the infantry are brought in in relays and deploy for a mopping-up operation. Sometimes they will carry out as many as 6 in one day. This involves the capture of anti-tank guns etc. and is done under a fairly stiff barrage known as a stonking barrage. In the big advance to Antwerp the Armoured Division got on to a straight road and went hell for leather, until they were stretched to their furthest limit. They did on one occasion go as much as 50 miles in a night. They could almost certainly have gone on from Antwerp if they had received the order. Unfortunately they were kept hanging about for 6 days until it was too late. It was generally felt that had they got across as far as Arnhem they could probably have turned the Rhine.

February 23rd

I had a talk with Burt about the Black Market. He is still very worried about Ned Reid passing his type of information to the Police. Burt himself is likely to remain here until the end of the war when he may well be posted as C.C. to S.B.

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J.C. has come in to tell me that Drew wants Bronx and Gelatine kept on to act as back-ground for his rocket deception. He believes that this deception has succeeded in moving the main point of impact about 6 miles in a N.E. direction.

At the daily meeting we discussed the question of O.S.S. agents going out of this country under control. It was decided that Herbert should deal with the matter on the SOE panel. He should also ascertain the conditions under which they are trained.

Tate has been told to report on V.I. which may indicate that an improved form of this projectile is to be sent over at some future date.

The Spaniards are asking for a Consul at Trinidad. We are recommending strongly that this should be turned down.

Garbo has been told to render a report about alleged concentrations on the east coast for an invasion of Holland, Denmark or elsewhere. The Germans appear to be extremely windy about this.

We have learned that Brandes has been instructed by Berlin to send £2,000 through one of his agents to the Wings Club to be collected by Brutus. As we believe that Brandes' agents are all notional it is not surprising that the money has not so far been received. Brandes himself will probably be on the spot in consequence.

Sclater and I had lunch with M-E, when we discussed W/T security. I told M-E that we would be quite prepared to see a committee of representatives of the Service Depts. RSS and

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ourselves, with a decision that RSS should allocate 6 sets for search of civilian traffic and for taking a cross section of service traffic. I felt however that RSS should go further than they have hitherto. The two sets that we have now are only allocated to look after civilian traffic as and when they can be spared from other duties. This I did not think was good enough. We ought to have a positive guarantee from RSS that all the sets would be permanently employed on our work. No variation of this should be made without our consent. M-E is prepared to recommend this but anticipates considerable opposition from Maltby and G-P.

The Norwegian resistance have during a house search in Norway obtained the photostate of a letter from Viv. to Harker in 1937 asking about a Jap named Byken Matsuaka, and his set-up as an agent. There is no doubt that this document is a photostat copy of the original which is still in the SIS files. It is not our copy. We are trying to find out precise details about how it was obtained.

SHAEF C.I. summary for the week ending 16th Feb. states that according to captured agents numerous parachute operations are in readiness and only awaiting suitable weather and aircraft. A Flying Fortress operated by the G.I.S. was stated to have the American signals code and American method of establishing identity with the ground. The Fortress has compartments to prevent contact between the different grades of agents to be dropped. There is an agency for saboteurs to be parachuted and then passed through the lines. An increased effort is being made to activate and extend the stay-behind network, with a possible long-term aim. This type of operation is now thought to have perpetrated further short-term military tactical missions. Many

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agents are now given as an additional mission the assassination of persons of importance. The use of dogs as couriers is considered probable. One has been caught in the 6th Army Group area. The use of carrier pigeons by agents is considerably increased. There are many instances of parachutes and equipment being found, the latter including small printing presses, mattresses and marked maps. Reports point to greater G.I.S. activity from Spain. The Germans are relying increasingly on the Spaniards Intelligence Service to run agents for them. There are indications that the G.I.S. are utilising sources in neutral legations in Paris for espionage purposes. The interrogation of captured 15 year old Hitler Jugend reveals that he attended a school near the Dutch border where 400 similar members were in training. Gestapo men are being introduced into the Kripo so that they can continue to work under its cover.

February 24th

Burt talked to me about the STYLES case which seems to be going very well. STYLES has apparently admitted that his story about a spy at the Midland Hotel in Birmingham was a mares nest.

Ribbentrop has told Hempel to circulate through trusted British and American sources a long story about the horrors that will befall Europe if the Allies allow Russia to overrun the country. This happened about the 16th, but 4 days later Hempel was told to do nothing until he got further orders. The statement was interesting in that it alleged that Molotov had said positively that the USSR claimed control of the Skagerack and the Kattegat. There was also a definite statement that the Germans were in possession of certain

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telegrams between Moscow and Sofia indicating sinister intentions by the Russians. It is impossible to say whether this is true or whether telegrams have come into their possession by interception or through the hands of an agent.

ISCOT discloses that the Russians are proceeding on precisely the same lines as they did before the establishment of the Lublin Committee. They are preparing an Austrian Committee which is to take over the reins of government.

The DG has seen Cadogan and also Findlater. I gather that the latter is to conduct the enquiry into the affairs of this office and SIS but that at the moment he is examining the question of the return of Gibraltarians from N.Ireland to the Rock. He is going to Gib. this week but will be back in about 10 days.

26th February.

Ronnie Haylor came in to talk about his relations with the War Room. He thought that he ought to tie up a little more closely with their affairs as they might well affect the control commission at a later stage. I told him I would speak to TAR about this.

I attended the Firth Committee. It was generally agreed that the present machinery was satisfactory but needed official sanction and an increase of monitoring facilities. The responsibility for co-ordinating activities for monitoring the civilian circuits and also for taking something of a cross-section of service transmissions will be with us. M-E said that he would recommend our being allocated 6 sets for this work. I asked whether we should have any guarantee that these sets

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would be permanently employed on that work. I thought this was absolutely necessary, otherwise we should never know where we were. I had in mind of course Maltby's habit of using these sets for all sorts of purposes without consulting us and doing so freely in the past.

February 27th

John Marriott has just come back from Paris. He tells me that Bardet and Kieffer of the GILBERT case have both been released and that Bardet and several other toughs have been round to Dick Warden's office waving revolvers and demanding DSOs. They have evidently been told by the French that their continued internment is due to the British. John thinks that we must really write off the Brutus case.

I talked to Kim Philby who came to see me about the amalgamation project. I told him quite frankly that what ~~we~~ really worried us more than anything was the prospect of being placed under the extremely unsatisfactory people who held the directing positions in SIS. We felt that this would be a positive disaster. Unless therefore they all handed in their resignations with some prospect of their being accepted, it was difficult for us to contemplate a merger. Kim asked whether I should mind his passing that on to Arnold-Forster. I said that I could see no objection whatever. I had already mentioned it to Arnold-Forster and so had Dick Butler.

A telegram has come from Tim Airy to say that he has been appointed head of the War Room for SEAC, with Cass as his deputy. It looks therefore as if we were virtually in command of C I. for SEAC.

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February 28th

J.C. came to confess that he had been to see Drew and Findlater Stewart about the suggested dissolution of B.1A. He has I am afraid created such an atmosphere that before getting rid of any of these people we shall probably have to refer the matter to the W.Board. This is a frightful bore.

Stewart Hampshire came to see me. He is just back from Paris where he has been working with Victor. He was anxious if possible for Teresa to work in the publications section and not under Milmo. He had been talking to TAR about this but had evidently not made much headway. I said I would speak to TAR. Clearly Milmo wants to control sabotage. He has always tried to get his fingers on it before but without success. On the other hand if Victor has not got his tentacles on the cases it may be that certain matters of importance will not see the light of day. What Victor's position vis-a-vis the War Room is ultimately to be I am not quite clear. He is running a training school and he has to supply the field with all information of importance which he may get from the interrogation of prisoners in the forward area. Many of these prisoners will never be sent back, either because the French or the Americans do not wish to hand them over. Hampshire was full of admiration for the work Victor was doing and for his tireless energy.

March 1st

I had a long talk with Burley about the arrival of seamen from the Low Countries. explained to him that I did not think the present situation was satisfactory. I had asked Adam for statistics as to the numbers of

arrivals per day but these had not been forthcoming. In order to cover the situation satisfactorily we ought to see all Dutch and Belgian seamen signing on for the first time.

Blunt and Brooman-White came to see me about Arrangements have been made with the French for us to search his baggage before it reaches the air port.

Anthony has had a look at baggage. There is a letter addressed to himself containing a number of British £5 notes and also American dollars. It may be that the notes are forged. In any case an infringement of currency regulations has been committed. This will put on the wrong foot when he is interrogated. The French are collaborating quite well in this case

I had a long session with Bertram Ede about the future of O.C. I told him that in reaching a decision I had been governed mainly by a feeling that it was impossible for O.C. to know more about the Mid East than Alec Kellar, that personnel and policy, intelligence and administration, were all inextricably mixed up. If therefore O.C. did more than pure administration, namely the procuring of equipment and so on, when requested, they would be going out to see governors etc. with half-knowledge, and would be bound to be drawn into discussions on matters concerning which they would not be competent to speak. All this seemed to me to ring quite true. I had therefore put the matter to Hart, who had at first been inclined to think that an O.C. section carrying some of the present functions was necessary. After reading Kellar's report however he had come definitely to the conclusion that if O.C. handled policy and personnel in an area where the intelligence was of any

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importance, they would be certain to come to grief. Ede pleaded that there was merit in having a section which knew how to handle men and how to conduct them round the office, that there were certain activities going on which linked up one colony with another and that O.C. could circulate information from D.4 and other departments which had general interest for DSO points. I said I thought all this could be done if you had corresponding sections to cover Mid East, Far East and Australia, Caribbean, Africa and Mediterranean. Ede did not think that Kellar was the sort of person who could handle individuals. I told him that he was very much mistaken, that Kellar had got on extremely well with everyone in Mid East from Gort downwards and nearly every one of them had written in appreciations of the work he has done. We agreed finally to differ. Ede will put up his views and I shall then put up mine. I expect the DG will refer us both to his original circular which does not in my view provide a proper solution.

March 2nd

I had a talk with TAR. It appears to be quite impossible to obtain any accommodation for the War Room. He is also rather worried about getting information back from the French. There is evidently considerable difficulty also endless troubles between the Americans as to what body is allowed to see what type of information. TAR welcomed ONI but this was immediately opposed by OSS as was also a suggestion that the FBI might be brought in. Meanwhile G.2 won't let OSS see DEGS which means that they cannot see certain of the ISOS cards which have DEGS on the back.

At the daily meeting today Mrs Spring read out a message indicating that Ostro has been interrogated by some British subject in con-

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junction with the International Police. Ostro informed his masters that he has got clean away with it and that the charges were considered by the police to be totally unfounded. We are trying to find out what all this is about. If it is SIS's method of liquidating Ostro it does not seem to have been very successful.

D.G. gave a lunch today to the DMI. We discussed the future of I.B. The DMI seems content to leave the training of C.I. staffs to us. He was not unreceptive to the idea of a very small nucleus from the Intelligence Services in M.I. to give continuity to the work. He thought however that as MI as a whole would be so small the numbers from the secret intelligence organisations would have to be very strictly limited, unless the department was going to be thrown out of balance.

I talked to the D.G. about Ede's draft letter to Henderson. The DG had instructed Ede to tell Henderson to get into direct touch with the FBI and to ask them whether they objected to their reports going to BSC. The DG also intimated that he did not think that Cyril Mills should have anything to do with the negro problem. I pointed out to the DG that Cyril himself had made it very clear that having fixed up the liaison he wished to fade out of the picture and that Henderson and Seal-Coon would in future deal direct on negro matters. Only if things went wrong would Cyril step in again on account of his very intimate relations with the FBI. As regards BSC, Cyril had made it clear that when he discussed the matter with Ladd, the latter would not countenance any of his reports on the negro movement going to Stephenson. I thought therefore that it would be foolish for Henderson to re-open

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this matter. The D.G. seemed to think that Cyril was exaggerating this point and is evidently anxious for Henderson to go to Washington and thrash it out. I think however that he has finally decided to drop this idea.

I discussed with Milmo the question in the House about the number of spies convicted. It would be awkward to give the figure with the nationalities, since for example MENEZES was convicted but no publicity was given. We want the Germans to think that people can be executed here without anything appearing in the Press, and we wish to keep them ignorant or guessing about the numbers. We would therefore like the Minister to say that it is not in the public interest to give either facts or figures. If he is asked whether there are others whose names have not been published in the Press, he could answer Yes. This would create the right atmosphere in the minds of the Germans.

I had a meeting about the LINDEMANS case with Cookie, Cussen, Hart, Stamp, Sinclair. It was decided to give the facts of the case to Admiral Thompson and recommend a prosecution under the D.R..

March 3rd

Dick has sent me the M.I.R.S. report which gives the German views of the allied landing in Normandy, based on an analysis of 23 German accounts of the invasion operations. Referring to secrecy and the factor of surprise it is stated that these were strictly safeguarded in all preparatory work and in the landing operation itself. In general security appears to have been successful. Even though a report mentions that information filtering through from England on landing exercises gave the German High Command a hint about alterations

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in allied landing procedure, nevertheless time and place of the Normandy landing evidently took the defenders by surprise. The exercise referred to was presumably the one carried out in the Channel when it is known that the proposal to land at low tide was given away by bad wireless discipline. reports had apparently reached the Germans from agents which stated that 300-ton cement-carrying boats were being built. The Germans believed that these were to be used for blocking the entrances to harbours. They were of course the Mulberries. I am inclined to think that this deception was put across by ourselves although the building of Mulberries might easily have come to the knowledge of the Germans through Irish workmen returning on leave. The fact that they were being made was widely known in this country.

The Germans anticipated large-scale operations only where the following conditions were fulfilled: 1. in the neighbourhood of at least one good harbour. (2) in an area with a wide foreshore (3) in deep water without reefs or shoals (4) where strong currents and surf were absent (5) in fair calm weather (6) with a rising tide, and (7) at new moon. In fact the landings commenced at full moon, away from harbours, at some points on sheer cliffs and in water stated by German naval experts to be impassible by reason of under-water reefs and strong currents. Lasty the operation was carried out in a strong wind with low cloud ceiling, a rough sea and at low ebb. Bad weather proved no obstacle nor did the difficult water which was navigated with excellent seamanship and probably, in the German view, with the help of local Breton pilots. Cliffs were overcome by means of rope ladders which were fired by shells, stuck in the cliff and unrolled. By landing on the

ebb tide it was possible to pass foreshore obstacles almost without casualties while bright moonlight facilitated the previous dropping of airborne troops on terrain which had been considered unsuitable for air landings and had not therefore been blocked with obstacles. The paratroopers alarm was not given as the landing was not believed possible. The first paratroopers dropped were taken for baled out airmen. Thus it came about that in spite of all subsequent attempts at denial by the High Command,, the force guarding the coastal fortifications were taken by surprise. Indeed in the sector of the 716th infantry division not even the command to stand by was given when the first landing troops came ashore. Local and divisional reserves were still building defences and suddenly found themselves in the midst of an engagement.

The evacuation of labour units and civilians as planned proved impossible. British air operations up to a distance of 130 miles to the rear, caused a shortage of ammunition at strong points and by the second day all centre of resistance had run out of ammunition. Mine fields in front of the shore were mostly blown up as were also all position-finding installations.

The air-borne landings which protected the flanks of the operation and begun at night around 1 am. on the 6th June were at first mistaken for target marking operations, although no bombing ensued in the area. The first allied naval formations were sighted between 3 and 4 am., 12-16 miles north of the Orme Estuary. With the first light, 5 am on the 6th June, there began a terrible bombardment by naval guns of all calibres, combining with the air bombing which if possible had reached even greater intensity. All reports agree that the concentration and effectiveness

of the naval and air bombardment were far greater than previous experience in Italy. the number of guns employed was estimated at 400 to 545 pieces. The naval bombardment which opened at various points in succession lasted for about half an hour, and from then on smoke shells were employed. The effect of this bombardment was to destroy all mine-fields and barbed wire, all field works and most of the concrete emplacements, all flame-throwers, goliath remote control tanks, which never came into action at all, and all signals communications, searchlight cables and position-finding installations. The moral effect of the naval guns was tremendous and gave the defenders a feeling of utter helplessness which in the case of inexperienced troops caused fainting or indeed complete paralysis. The instinct of self-preservation drove their duty as soldiers to fight and destroy the enemy completely out of their minds.

Disembarkation took place on a broad front at ebb tide, leaving the foreshore dry for about a depth of approximately 700-850 yds. The marine commandos and Rangers battalions were the first to land, remove the remaining mines and open lanes through the foreshore obstacles, marking them with flags. They are said to have suffered fairly heavy losses. A quarter of an hour later came the landing craft with infantry and tanks. The divisional sectors covered about 2½ miles. In some cases considerable gaps were left between the different divisional sectors. The first armoured divisions were already landing by the evening of the first day. The Germans had calculated that heavy material would be unloaded only after several hours so that the main role for smashing the invasion would fall to the long-range coast artillery, while local and strategic reserves finished off the troops

who landed. In reality most of the coastal batteries were eliminated by the bombardment and those surviving were paralysed by smoke screens. The starting fire of the warships was extremely accurate especially when they were at anchor and made movement of strategic reserves impossible within range of their guns, 20 miles inland. It is true that as is emphasised the ships were very vulnerable to fire and had to change their anchorage or their course immediately they themselves were fired upon. Naval guns, through artillery spotting aircraft, captive balloons etc. were in a position to eliminate every important target and individual heavy weapon. Co-operation between allied air and ground forces was complete and the allies' absolute air mastery remained so unassailable that the German soldiers felt completely helpless and kept on asking where the GAF had got to. High praise was given by the German 6th parachute rifle regiment's commander to the marksmanship of the American parachute airborne troops. It was not until the German regiment was later opposed to ordinary American infantry whose shooting the German Commander considered to be unusually bad, that his men regained their self-confidence. Dummy parachuters filled with explosive had some measure of success in misleading the Germans. The dropping of real parachutists in the middle of a panzer division just as it was developing a successful counter-attack was extremely effective. German W/T traffic was closely observed and battery headquarters was located through the detection of their W/T stations by allied direction finders. "Our separate attempts were made, according to the Germans, to interfere with the fire control of heavy weapons and the tactical handling of tank forces by means of false orders given by W/T. The Germans complained about the

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state of their troops many of whom were suffering from overstrain as a result of incessant labouring on field works. The 17 year old recruits even went to sleep with weariness. In the front line a high percentage were convalescent or recruits with only 4 weeks training. Commanders could not rely on their sub-ordinates and in many instances themselves evinced a remarkable lack of initiative and decision. One of the panzer battalions employed as a fighting unit was equipped with old French tanks not more than 32 of which were in running order when the invasion started. The battalion had French light guns without sights and obsolete rifles. 70% of the M/T could not be used on account of tyre-shortage. The German front line troops did not appear to have a very high opinion of their close combat weapons.

Most battle reports express a feeling of complete helplessness in the face of allied superiority which the Germans attempted to combat by quite inadequate make-shifts. The frequently misused "point of main effort" was recommended as a universal remedy. The point of main effort originally conceived by the Germans as an offensive concept, to build up over-whelming local superiority at the point intended for a break-through, is in defence a confession of German inferiority in all fields, and attempts to gain equality at a few points at least. On the question of tactics the German commanders seem to differ considerably. Some of them think that the defence ought to have been more in depth, with strong points which should hold at all costs and provide a convenient starting point for local counter-attacks. Some approve and others decry connected trenches. It would appear that in general the Germans were taken by surprise not only in regard to time and place of the

Normandy landing but also by the unprecedented allied superiority against which they have not yet found any satisfactory counter-measures

Bronx has received a payment of £200 over and above her normal salary and it is probable that this represents a bonus to compensate her for her trouble and expense in making her recent fruitless visit to Madrid.

The message received by Tate last week instructs him to report in detail upon the effects of attacks and defences against V.I. This has been regarded by the Service Depts as of first class importance, since it affords confirmation of evidence from other sources that the Germans contemplate the renewed use of V.I. In fact, V.I. started against last night.

Sniper who is being run by 21 A.G. has established contact with the Germans.

Lipstick was allowed to leave for Portugal en route for Brazil on 20th Feb. Immediately prior to his departure he was instructed and himself undertook ^{not} to approach the Germans unless the Germans first approached him. ISOS showed however that immediately on arrival in Lisbon he addressed a letter to the Germans in Madrid. It is unlikely that any harm will be done since ISOS shows that the Germans propose to have nothing to do with him on the grounds that he is suspected of having been in touch with the British.

On Feb. 3rd the engine room of HMS Harrier, a Fleet Mine Sweeper Flotilla Leader, was found flooded to a depth of 3 ft. After a Board of Enquiry had failed to trace the culprit, Edwards of B15 boarded the ship at Leith and secured an admission from a member of the crew who had done it in an effort to delay the ship which was due to sail for the Far East. The

man whose name was Victor CLAEDINGBOEL, a stoker, was sentenced to 3 months imprisonment and dismissed the Service. On 29th Jan. there was a previous case, where a quantity of sand was found in the gear case of one of the main engines of H.M. L.S.T. 368 as she was approaching Ryde. On the following day Davis of B.5. started an investigation aboard and after an interrogation of 6 hours obtained a confession from Alfred BLISS, a stoker. BLISS also wished to delay the ship sailing to the Far East ostensibly for family reasons. He was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment with hard labour. More trouble of this kind is expected as more ships are being sent to the Far East.

In Feb. further sabotage agents trained by Skorzeny's organisation were dropped in France. One party which landed in the neighbourhood of St. Quentin had a considerable amount of sabotage equipment including new types. Samples of the German explosive Nipolit disguised to look like rubber shoe soles were included.

The C.I. summary for the week ending 25th Feb. says that at the request of the 12th Army Group the 9th Air Force bombed a training school at Hundsback and completely destroyed it and started fires. The training school at Kloster Tiepenthal was also attacked. A further target was Leitstelle 2, Bad Ems. A party of 20 Abwehr saboteurs landed by boat on the Adriatic coast, sabotaged the railway bridge and withdrew. A proportion of enemy line-crossing activities continue to be successful. An S.D. agent arrested in Paris had a network of some 20 Action Francaises collaborationists. These have all been arrested including a W/T link in Montpellier. The exploitation of documents discovered at an S.D. post in Antwerp resulted in 26th arrests. Considerable line crossing activities in Holland are reported.

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Passy, who has been vigorously attacked by the Left, has returned to France and has been appointed Directeur Adjoint of the D.G.E.R. He thus becomes technical head of intelligence activities in France.//The Belgian Communist Party has entered the new Government with the following programme:

1. foundation of national army with immediate mobilisation of new classes for war against Hitlerism;
2. firm alliance with the allies including commercial agreements with the USSR;
3. factory committees to assist in reorganisation of Belgian industry and maximum war production. Strong measures to be employed against saboteurs and go-slow workers;
4. strong epuration;
5. more food to be supplied to Belgium from outside and Government to organise new and more adequate system of distribution.

Reorganisation of the Netherlands Military Administration separates security intelligence work from the Police. Dutch Security Service is to be organised by Lt.Col. Dirksema, the Police by Capt. Broekman who has a high police reputation and the confidence of resistance groups.

The C.I. Summary for the week ending March 2nd states that a staybehind agent, a member of VNV has been arrested in Belgium, working as a Post Office telephonists. He has transmitted since the liberation. An Algerian has been killed parachuting south of Lyons. He had on him a list of call signs, identity cards, Swiss and Spanish money. A G.I.S. unit in Germany has appointed a postbox in France in communication via Madrid. In France a considerable network is believed to have been left behind which is prepared to shelter line-crossers and parachutists and to facilitate their missions. PPF network concerned is said to number 250 and to be reorganising. Miliciens present a danger as they are training in camps in Germany which are well organ-

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ised and recruits are more fanatical than those trained by the Abwehr. The Belgian Security Intelligence has been reorganised. The Surete 2eme Bureau are under Bihin. Under him is Major Manpuys in command of counter-intelligence and the special intelligence sections but responsible to Bihin on matters of policy connected with them. The C.I. Department is distinct from the Judicial Police Service.

Guster's review of all cases handled at Camp 020 during the year ended 31.12.44 shows that the number of cases admitted has been practically doubled, namely a total of 116 bodies. Of this number no less than 71 have been sent to us by the Armies under SHAEF command, all of them in the latter 6 months of the year. The remaining 45 bodies which have been admitted to 020 have been derived from the usual channels. 31 bodies were admitted prior to D-day. During the year there have been 12 enemy agents charged with espionage or sabotage missions against the U.K. Only 3 of the above agents could have been regarded as having been primarily charged with anti-invasion assignments. In the second half of 1944 there were no known cases of the enemy sending an agent with a mission against the U.K. The reasons for the above may be (a) that the general ban imposed early in the year on travel of recruits for the allied forces and others to the UK effectively blocked one of the channels most frequently used by the Germans. (b) that there was a lack of facilities open to the enemy for despatching agents following upon his loss of control of the Franco-Spanish border. (c) that the enemy was generally satisfied with his existing organisation with the country. 20 cases were investigated of persons captured abroad, this figure contrasting with corresponding figure of 30 in the previous year. The DSO control

points have ceased to provide the same yield of espionage bodies as heretofore and in particular there has been a noted falling off both qualitatively and quantitatively of the product from Trinidad. We have had 7 agents from Iceland whose advent strongly suggested that the Germans were expecting at least diversionary or subsidiary operations to be launched from Iceland against Norway. A small number of cases have been sent to us from AFHQ. The case of MANFREDI was of outstanding importance in as much as AFHQ, having failed to break this man, were at a particularly critical moment beginning to doubt the information that derived from ISOS. Two bodies were borrowed from the French in N. Africa and one of them, SCHARF, proved himself a mine of valuable information much of which his French interrogators had failed to extract from him. 50% of the bodies sent to us by SHAEF have come from 21 A.G. whose geographical coverage covers only $\frac{1}{3}$ of the total area involved. The failure of the American Armies to utilise our services to the same extent as our own is of course understandable. The Americans in France are assisted and sometimes obstructed by a formidable French organisation and the French do not tend to look with favour upon bodies being sent to this country for investigation. They are inclined to regard the practice as a reflection upon themselves. In connection with our SHAEF commitments arrangements were made to adapt Camp 20 to the handling of women. It is now possible to send a female prisoner to Holloway where she is specially segregated and can be taken daily to Camp 20 for interrogation as required.

Enemy activity against this country in the past quarter has consisted of attacks by

V.1 all of which were launched from carrier aircraft, and by V.2. A total of 88 key-point incidents were caused of which 4 were of material significance and 1,256 fatal and 2,774 serious casualties were caused, of which the considerably greater proportion were due to V.2. The total number of V.1 plotted in operation during the quarter was 771 and the total number of such incidents 306. The highest number in any one attack was 62 on the night of 18/19 Dec. Except for one morning, 31/10, all the activity took place at night. Usually the aircraft approached up to about 50 miles off the coast of East Anglia and despatched the bombs at London. Exceptionally they came up towards the S.E. coast and the estuary. When the quarter began marksmanship with carrier-borne flying-bombs was estimated at approximately 16%. In the attack on London during the 3 months reviewed, marksmanship was 20% in October, 10% in Nov. and 9% in Dec. 15% for the whole quarter. On the night of 23/24 Dec. the enemy suddenly switched his attack to the industrial area of Manchester and met with some success. No incident occurred in Manchester itself but out of a total of 29, 16 were located within 20 miles of the centre of the city. The toll which our defences took amounted to some 334 V.1 out of a total of 771 reported in operation i.e. about 43%. The attacks had no effect on the essential war effort. The total number of houses damaged during 1944 was estimated at 1,454,000 of which 1,255,00 were in London. During Oct. Nov. Dec. the total number of V.2 incidents was 357. 162 fell in the London region. Rate of fire varied but reached its peak during the week ending 3rd Jan. when the fall worked out at an average of 48 incidents a week. The most serious incident

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occurred on the 25th Nov. when a rocket fell at New Cross, demolished the local Woolworth Sotres, killed 160 people and seriously injured 108. The eastern section north of the river received about $\frac{1}{3}$ of the total incidents in Greater London and the eastern boroughs south of the river together received slightly less. But before the quarter closed incidence of attack was showing a tendency to move further westwards. On one occasion rockets and flying-bombs were used alternately to maintain activity intermittently throughout the night.

The W.O. wireless deception unit is being made available to SACSEA after the defeat of Germany. It consists of 35 officers and 264 O.R.S. One company studies characteristics of our own formations for subsequent simulation, another company which deals with recording and reproducing, is capable of simulating complete wireless network for a corps of 3 divisions of infantry or armour, down to rear links of battalion and regimental headquarters. The equipment enables one station to simulate 6, with corresponding man-power economy. Magnetic wire recorders are used to record speech and morse by actual officers and operators of formations. Recordings are reproduced through 19 sets elsewhere as required by the deception plan.

March 5th

I saw a CICI Major from Teheran who has been running the Russian cases since Joe Spencer left. We discussed the Kiss case. It seems fairly clear that the Russians decided to discontinue collaborating owing to the final question put by the Germans as to what the

Russians were doing in Azerbaijan. As they are up to all sorts of monkey-tricks, including propaganda for the inclusion of Persian Azerbaijan in the USSR, the question is clearly an awkward one. The Russians had no objection to our continuing the case since they have the cypher keys. It has been decided to attempt to draw them back into collaboration if the opportunity arises. Meanwhile relations are perfectly friendly, though somewhat tentative.

Craufurd, Ede, Russell of West Africa and I discussed the diamond investigations. There are tremendous wheels within wheels. SOE sent out a representative to enquire into diamond smuggling in W. Africa. So far from making enquiries he spent his whole time trying to buy up all the companies or to force them out of business. He had a long talk with Swinton, the results of which were not vouchsafed to our DSO and the new Governor is connected by marriage with the Oppenheims who are connected with important diamond syndicates. The real snap is Mathias of the Diamond Control who is so well in with all the diamond merchant that nobody can really discover what is going on. There are however a number of indications that he is showing favour in certain quarters.

S.O.E.s part in all this business is not particularly healthy. It rather seems that in the guise of preventing diamonds from reaching the Germans all the various operatives are grinding their own axes. Russell is going to see if he can find out anything more from Charles Binney and will then submit a report.

I lunched with Brooke-Dooch, Bihin and de Ganzhof. They were both extremely friendly and anxious to co-operate with us. B.B. evidently has them well in hand and they look to him

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for guidance and help. All security matters as between SHAEF and the Belgians pass through his hands.

HEWITT, our first renegade, has been sentenced to 12 years imprisonment.

March 6th

We have got out a final draft of the minutes of the meeting of the Fifth Committee, those prepared by Bull were extremely unsatisfactory. M.E. has had difficulty with G.P. as he expected about the allocation of 6 sets. G.P. does not wish to relinquish control over any of his equipment. M.E. told him that if he did not come to scratch the Security Service would run their own monitoring service.

Marriot, J.C., Hart and I discussed the case of Brutus. We decided that Brutus would have to be kept on for a time although we could not see very clearly at present how he could be used for deception. We thought it just possible that he might be of value. We decided that Luke should take over the case and thereby release High Astor to join D.I.B. who wants a case officer and a wireless operator. Burton, who is Brutus, will have to remain until the case is closed down but may go to India later.

March 7th

Kim Philby came to talk to me about Victor. He was anxious that Victor should work for Section 9 while in Paris. He appeared to have certain very valuable contacts. Kim has had the necessary approval for this. Certain information which Victor has already given him has apparently proved quite useful. I said that I would enquire into the whole