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matter and find out who Victor's contacts were and how he proposed to operate. I should then be in a better position to put the proposition up to the D.G. The only possible objection that I could see was that we should not wish to run the risk of this office being accused by the French of engaging in any form of espionage.

J.C. came to tell me about the new development in the Brutus case. Wilde having said that he would not wish to use Brutus for deception has now made a proposal to employ him for a scheme in connection with crossing the Rhine. Meanwhile Hugh Astor says that Cavendish-Bentinck would like to see the case closed down for political reasons. It looks to me as if there is a good deal of lobbying and counter-lobbying going on. J.C. is now going to see Cavendish-Bentinck. I have told him that he and Herbert can make any decision they think best. / Meanwhile I have seen High Astor who is not particularly keen to go to DIB or to go on running D.A.s. He rather wants to go to China for SOE. I said that while I was in favour of letting people do what they wanted within reason, the D.G. might not take this view. So far as I was concerned I was sorry he did not wish to go to D.I.B. because from a general office point of view it was desirable that we should give any help that we could to D.I.B. Meanwhile I promised to have a word with John Senter as to what Astor's prospects might be in China. It seems to me possible that we might send Hughes to India after giving him a course with B.I.A. The other alternative is Luke. It would seem rather hard however to send him out again after he has concluded 18 months penal servitude in British Honduras. Ryde unfortunately cannot go owing to his father's illness. A possibility is Peter Hope.

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I am off to Paris tomorrow.

March 19th

I returned from Paris yesterday. Last night I dined with Rivatt-Carnac. He has come over for a month and wishes to see all he can. He has not been in England for 22 years. He started life by running away from home and joining the French Army as a medical orderly in the last war. He then went to his family in India where at the age of 19 he got a job as a business organiser with 1,600 men under him. He then became secretary to the manager of a very large business. At this stage he got crossed in love, and in his own words "painted the town in blood and glory". What had happened I do not know but evidently he incurred the displeasure of his family, packed up and arrived in Canada with \$30 in his pocket. He joined the RCMP as a trooper and after serving in the Arctic and all over the country he is now head of the RCMP Intelligence Dept. He seems to have a certain nostalgia for this country and I am inclined to think he would not be averse to getting a job in England. He did in fact make some suggestion at the beginning of the war, although it was obviously better that he should remain where he was. I asked him about our representation in Canada in the future. He seemed to think that it would be of considerable value if we could keep an officer there, quite apart from any relations that he might have with the FBI. Such an officer would probably have more to do in connection with subversive movements than espionage. Communism seems to be the great bogey in the western hemisphere. I cannot help feeling that a somewhat exaggerated view is taken of the whole thing.

At the daily meeting today, Baxter said that during the last month 900 people had passed

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through the LRC. Most of them appear to be coming from Stockholm not by the American route but by the ordinary route and many of them are quite unitted for service in the allied armies. I told Baxter to put forward a note so that we can take the matter up. Probably if Passport Control were to tighten up their standards this would meet the case.

During my absence there has been a possible revival of the Arthur project. The suggestion is that he may now be coming by midget submarine. There is nothing really definite, only that some operation is contemplated by the same truppe as was concerned with Arthur.

I have spoken to the DG about Dykes. He is quite agreeable to his going to the Austrian Control Commission. I have wired to Hill-Dillon telling him that Dykes would be available in 10 days time and that he could also have the services of Miss Sherer and another girl.

The D.G., John Noble, Curry and I lunched with the Czech Minister of the Interior and other Czechs who are departing for Prague. There were compliments on both sides about the co-operation which had existed during the war and hopes that it might be continued in the future. Sloane is remaining behind for the time being. I sat next to a major Zetchnik who had had a rather remarkable career. He was fighting with the Poles at the beginning of the war and when the collapse came decided to get out through the Russian front. He said that it was already quite clear that the Russians realised that they would be fighting the Germans before long. They kept him in some internment camp for a short time and then allowed him to join the Czech forces in France. When France collapsed he escaped to England.

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I saw Ruston after lunch. He is getting a job with the American Air Force in connection with the examination of documents. He is leaving tomorrow for France.

I had a talk with Charles about expenses. He is not very anxious to issue a circular as he thinks it too difficult to define. We are to have a further talk about this. I also talked to him about U35 salary, which has been over-paid by £10 a month for the last 8 months. He is quite prepared to write this off or to come to some compromise if necessary. I also talked to him about Victor's expenses in Paris which are very considerable.

I saw Cussen about Joe's office in Paris. Two things that were worrying Joe were the increase in staff for Ger Germany and his future location. As regards the staff I said he ought to have another police officer who spoke German and I told him that possibly he might get Caroe although this presented considerable difficulties. We agreed that when Joel moved forward it would be desirable to keep some sort of an office in Paris and that French Corin might do for this.

Cecil is going over to Fire to discuss various matters including the question of a U-boat which has been sunk off the coast of Cork. The crew all came ashore and have been interned. The most important part is a box which was floated ashore and contained the cyphers and how to work them.

I had a talk with Kim Philby about Victor. I told him that I had seen Bobby Mackenzie and that in his view there was nothing to be done with the French officials until things settled down. This however would not be

Victor's line. If he did anything he would merely have personal contacts, a good many of whom would probably be unconscious agents. I thought however that he might have an even more important field here in London and that there was much to be done in working up the intelligence organisation. In the past no one had been responsible for the collection of intelligence in this country. I said I thought it was particularly important that Victor should not run paid agents in France, not because he would not do the job admirably, but because it would spoil his usefulness if there was any sort of come-back.

I had a talk with Brooman-White and told him about the set-up in Paris and the prospects of giving him either Peter Hope or Granville Byrde to succeed Ramsbotham who is going to 21st Army Group. I think he would prefer Byrde as being the steadier individual.

I had a word with Buster and explained to him that there was a slight grievance in Paris about our unwillingness to accept certain captured agents for interrogation at O20. I had explained to Paris that our object in getting agents here was two-fold. One was to obtain information from the more important characters from which important lessons could be learned, and the other was to get back here any individuals who tied up with existing cases or had known about espionage projects in the UK. I thought it was possible that we did not always consider the interests of Paris who sometimes thought that information of value to them could be better extracted under O20 conditions. Buster said that the real trouble was that O20 could not get information already been mucked

about by the French and that it was on these grounds mainly that cases had been turned down. I suggested to him that he should make this clear to the SCI unit in Paris as there it appeared to be some misunderstanding. Lennox tells me that elements of two panzer divisions have been withdrawn from the Wesel front and sent down to Remagen.

March 20th

I talked with Herbert and Sclater (now Lt. Col) about the lines that we should take at the JIC on our Signals Security paper. We thought it best to accept all the clauses and to suggest that our requirements should be reviewed at Stage A. As regards our link with SHAEF I should suggest that that could best be carried out by direct communication between ourselves and Col. Walter Scott.

I subsequently attended the JIC meeting. All our recommendations were accepted including the allocation of 6 sets. There was a slight demur on C's part with regard to Walter Scott as the link in SHAEF although what precisely had to do with him I don't know. I shall ask him when I see him.

J.C. tells me that according to Montague Tate was probably responsible for the sinking of the U-boat off Cork. He has been giving quite a lot of misleading information about minefields.

Drew and Findlater have gone to Gib. to deal with the question of the return of Gibraltar subjects from N. Ireland. While there Drew

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to Kirby-Green's people being used possibly
for deception.

It has been decided that there is no point in
a representative from the XX Committee attend-
ing regularly the 212 Committee in Versailles.
If necessary an officer of the Service con-
cerned from the XX Committee can attend ad hoc
meetings.

It has finally been decided that can go
back to Spain.

A blackmailing letter to Ostro has been drafted
and despatched. So far there have been no
reactions.

Butler tells me that it has been finally
decided that Findlater shall conduct the
enquiry into the overlapping between ourselves
and Section V. The letter he has received
from the FO suggests an enquiry into MI5 rather
than into SIS. Findlater is not accepting
this, and will probably reply that he cannot
possibly deal with the question without the
examination of the affairs of SIS as well as
MI5. I must say I rather resent the fact
that the FO should have put this matter up
if MI5 were on the mat. In the long run
of course the facts will speak for themselves.
You have only got to look at the CI map to
see that we are not only doing our own job
but a good deal of SIS's as well. The two best
people, in fact the only ones who are doing a
really solid job of work in Paris are Victor
and Ramsbotham, and Dykes within his limits
has also done well. In Brussels we are carrying
the whole of one SCI unit with 3 or 4 officers.
We are doing the bulk of the work in the War
Room, and now B-W has just come over to ask
whether we can let him have Rothschild or James

Robertson to control the SCI units in the Far East. Section V are also asking us to replace Ramsbotham in Paris. I have let B-W know that I am doubtful whether we can help in the Far East. Victor has got heavy commitments already at any rate until things settle down in Germany, and James Robertson is fully occupied with Middle East affairs.

March 21st

I saw John Marriott and Vickery about an officer and a wireless operator for DIB. I explained that the difficulties of getting Burton out were almost unsurmountable from the administrative point of view, he being a servant of the Prison Commissioners, and that Hugh Astor, with whom I had a talk, was not anxious to take on the job. I had however heard of a Lt. Sheers who I subsequently saw. He had done all the wireless maintenance work in the Mid East for James Robertson's DAS but has just got back under the Python scheme and may not be anxious to go out again. I have asked Sheers to think the matter over. He is rather bitten by the job.

The D.G. talked to me about the programme for Hoover's visit which has been drawn up by an F.O. Committee under Cavendish-Bentinck. The whole thing is on a very grandiose scale. Hoover might be the President or Mayor La Guardia. Three days of his stay are given to us. D.G. thinks it is all out of perspective. It is true, although it may be advantageous to pander to some extent to Hoover's vanity. Anyway the matter is not in our hands. I told the DG that I was doubtful from what I had heard whether Hoover would come. I am

quite certain that Bill Stephenson has made these elaborate plans in order that before giving up his job he could show everyone that he is on friendly relations with Hoover. It is however questionable whether Hoover will fall into this trap, if it is a trap.

Victor and Dick arrived back for a few days last night. Tess Mayor has got the MBE for gallantry in dismantling booby traps at Rocquemont.

At the weekly meeting Cussen mentioned the recent proposal to prosecute the Daily Mirror for publishing details of the Lindemans case. The JAG had however decided not to prosecute, as the articles had in fact, owing to a misapprehension, been passed for publication in other papers by the press censor, who had been under the impression that the edition of the Mirror in which it first appeared was one which was printed for sending over to Ireland. He thought that if this was so, the information had already escaped from the U.K. and there was no purpose therefore in stopping further articles on the same subject. The Daily Mirror was however being warned.

Hughes said that two V.2's had not acted up to form lately. One had not exploded on impact, and another had simply disintegrated in the air also without exploding.

Gisela has got an offer to take a look at Treasure's book and I am trying to arrange for her to go out to Paris to do this.

Jimmy Dickson came to talk about the future of his section. M. wishes to discuss the amalgamation of Rodney and Keyes, also a second in command for Dickson. I told the latter that

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I thought it desirable that his organisation should remain separate and ultimately come under Blunt's section and that I did not feel that anyone in M.S. would be suitable as his deputy. He would of course like to have Jack but he is already too much occupied with other things. He is a little worried about his agents and their doings and thinks that some of them should be given extra pay to keep them sweet. I agreed to his doing this.

Burt came to tell me that he was anxious that the COURLANDER case should be put on its feet. Cookie said that the JAG had turned the case down though when asked if he had seen all the reports replied in the negative. A comprehensive report is now going to be submitted, when I hope prosecution will result. STYLES has got 7 years and a very complimentary note has been received by the DG from the JAG about the work done by Spooner and Davies.

Bertram Ede came to talk to me about a letter he had had from Tim Airey. He thinks Tim is a bit depressed and rather unbalanced. He says that he does not think there is enough work for any more officers, it having been proposed to send out Downs as an assistant to Russell, DSO in Colombo. Ede thinks that there ought to be plenty of work, and that it will be valuable to have an extra officer in case anybody falls sick. I said that I was most worried about the general CI set up and also about the DSO points at Rangoon and Singapore. These latter were real commitments and it was important to have officers to fill them. On the CI side I felt that we ought to have a conference with Cass who is arriving here in a few days, Penney, who is already here, and is to take over from Lamplough, and Tim Milne.

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We might then get down to what was really required. There had never been any explanation as to why we had reverted to the SCI conception after the decision to have merely C.I. advisers.

The B.I.A report for the 8th March states that a very long incoming letter has been received giving the promised details of the wireless traffic plan for GARBO's Canadian sub-agent, in his direct contact with Madrid. Cavendish-Bentinck has decided that owing to the diplomatic dangers attending the running off the Brutus case and the lack of urgent military reasons, it would be better to close down. This is being done.

Cecil who is in Ireland, told me the other day that he had heard from Tommy that serious peace proposals had come from the Italian front and that a meeting was taking place between certain SD officers and representatives of Alexander in Switzerland. Russian agreement has been obtained.

Sclater has produced another serious breach of security relation to the movements of a ship called "Liseta". This ship, which is a Dutch one, was torpedoed and towed into Southend on March 5th. This is hardly surprising.

SHAEF C.I. summary for week ending 16th March states that the Abwehr have continued their efforts to build a stay-behind network on the left bank of the Rhine, particularly in the Eifel area, and to maintain contact with it through line-crossers. Staybehind network is also being prepared on the right bank between Mainz and Mannheim. Quite a number of line-crossers and a few stay behind agents have been arrested.

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One S.D. agent had a mission to penetrate allied intelligence services. 5 agents were dropped at St. Quentin. They were destined for Holland. Three were dropped in Lille and were destined for Belgium. Those dropped at St. Quentin are important as they have information about NEBEL's successful arrival in Germany. NEBEL has been awarded the Kriegsverdienst Kreuz in gold.

March 22nd

I had a long talk with Wibroe. He came to tell me about the SHAEF Mission to Denmark, which is headed by Major-General Dewing, who is popular with the Danes. His No. 2 is a Lt. Col. Braithwaite, head of G. 2. and said to be first-class. The other members of the mission however are not so satisfactory and have caused a certain amount of alarm and despondency among Danish circles. The Danes do not think that their affairs are being taken seriously enough. The rest of the Mission consists of Major Brammer, British, second in command of the PWE Section; he is I believe a rather doubtful company promoter. Major Rohde, an American who was thrown out of the Danish Guard before he went to USA. There is no particular harm in him but he was rather a rolling stone. Major Christian, a Jew and an American citizen, who is son of a man who went bankrupt in Denmark. His real name is Gluckstadt. Major Bayliss, British, a pleasant man who has to advise on political matters but has no special qualifications, except that for a short time he was at our Embassy in Copenhagen. Lastly Major Ray, SOE's man in Stockholm, who we threw out of the LRC in the early days of the war. Nobody seems to have a good word for him. He is trying to become liaison officer between Danforce and Gen. Dewing. He is universally disliked and

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it would be a disaster if he were allowed to muscle into the Mission. Wibroe himself is I think browned off with the LRC and could probably do with a change. I said that if he got an offer to serve on the Mission he ought to let us know and if it were possible to release him we would do so. He asked whether there was any objection to his giving a lecture to the Mission on conditions and the method of government in Denmark. I said that provided Baxter could spare him there would be no objection. I had a word with Baxter about him. He likes him and says that his work is very thorough and conscientious. On the other hand he frequently falls out with people. This is not surprising as when people have been working 3 or 4 years at the LRC they get somewhere near the breaking point. The work is very strenuous and the conditions and surroundings not particularly congenial. Wibroe has just completed his thousandth interrogation today.

Marriott and Harris came to see me about Mrs. Garbo who is in a somewhat neurotic state. Garbo cannot quite make out what is wrong with her, but both he and Tommy think that she would be all right if she could be got back to Spain with the children. We decided to adopt the previous plan discussed some months ago. She will ostensibly be deported from here on the basis of certain letters picked up by us from Spain from her husband.

Tangye came to talk to me about the VERMEHRENS. After tremendous labour he has in conjunction with them produced one article which is acceptable to the Daily Mail. He says that the Vermehren's are being paid £600 p.a. He cannot see what use they can possibly be to SIS in the future.

Joe Lynch looked in to say that he had sent a wire to Washington about Hoover's alleged visit to this country and had received a reply that Mr. Hoover was not at the moment contemplating any such visit. Joe said that he had tracked the origin of this project down to Bill Stephenson through a conversation that he had had with Howe. Howe had attended the meeting at the FO under CavendishBentinck's auspices, and had said to Joe that a big programme was being laid on for Hoover. Joe said that this was the first he had heard of it and wired accordingly to Washington.

At the daily meeting Walker explained that there was considerable activity in the pigeon world. Staybehind networks were being planned. This has been revealed on ISOS. While there have been cases of agents crossing the lines with pigeons there have so far been no agents dropped with pigeons. This may however come later. Staybehind agents will have 8 pigeons with a range of approximately 200 miles. They cannot be kept for more than about 3-4 weeks without considerable risk of their not homing.

Herbert mentioned that the M.O.I. was touring a Belgian Mission concerned with housing problems around London. Their purpose was to show them the latest V.2 damage. As this seemed not to be a very good idea from the point of view of deception plans, J.C. saw the Ministry and arranged that they should be kept to the West End.

Dawson-Sheppard from CICI is here undergoing a course with Roger whom I have already seen. Dawson-Sheppard was formerly in the Palestine Police as a constable but has been working

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in RAF Intelligence in Iraq since 1937. There is an SIS representative in the territory who works in very closely. He only came out in 1939 or 1940 and subsequently RAF Intelligence was incorporated in CICI. There is a good deal of speculation going on as to whether CICI will be dissolved and intelligence revert to the RAF. CICI have a certain watching organisation, but as they are bound to employ natives it is not always very reliable, the watchers always being ready to sell their services to the highest bidder.

C. rang me up about a new Kremer message which indicates a leakage about forthcoming operations. He thinks that once more it points back to CERVELL. He is suggesting that we should both go on Saturday to see Inglis or Eastwood. We will at the same time deal with the Maycock affair.

MARCH 23rd.

BRONX has received a letter in which she is urged to make another visit to Madrid after Easter and promising the presence there of her Case Officer. She has also been asked to send a telegram in plain code indicating the point of attack for any new landing. This code is modelled on the one given her before D. Day and suggests that her message then was considered of importance by the Germans.

Dick's Counter Intelligence Summary for week ending 16th March states that despite retreat and consequent reorganisation the Abwehr have continued their efforts to build a stay-behind network on the left bank of the Rhine, particularly the Eifel area, and to maintain contact with it through line crossers. A stay behind network is also being prepared on the right bank between Mainz and Mannheim.

Feeling in Belgium has improved owing to better food, more confidence in the Government, good war news and high coal production figures. This is to some extent offset by difficulties of distributing coal and the failure of the Allies to meet scheduled Civil Affairs Imports for February.

In Luxemburg, despite the French promise of support for Luxemburgers territorial ambitions on its Eastern Boundary, the Government fears French political and economic penetration of the country.

Conditions in Holland, particularly in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the Hague, are deteriorating. Many are living on as little as 600 calories a day. While the population is united against the Germans, the general feeling is that conditions are in part due to the fault of the Allies for not having undertaken the liberation of Holland. There is a certain fear of widespread pilfering when the Allies enter the country.

GELATINE has been offered a part-time job as translator in the American Embassy. We informed F.B.I., and will not give our consent unless they approve.

According to a Spanish report from Tokyo, public opinion there does not hide its disgust at the inefficiency and of the signs of marked disorder and lack of method governing the civil and military activities of the Japanese Empire. The Prime Minister declared at a full session of Parliament that the Philippines operation would be decisive but when the Americans entered Manila he said that it was of no importance.

There is a shortage of raw materials etc. Administrative disorganisation and corruption, the short rations, and high cost of living, the military catastrophe in the Philippines, the bombing of the interior of Japan and Tokyo, the manifest lack of aircraft and the apparent disappearance of the fleet, have given rise among all sections of the country to a great feeling of uncertainty and insecurity, resulting in sharp criticism

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Dick's Summary for week ending 23rd March indicates that parachute operations have considerably decreased, but that the German Intelligence Service is very active in other fields. There is at present no sign of dis-organisation in face of the successes of the Allied Armies. Line-crossers have had some successes, and the enemy appears to be concentrating on the northern part of the front. An increased use of pigeons is expected and Russians are believed to have been trained as line-crossers.

The Abwehr W/T training centre at Sande near Baden Baden was effectively bombed on 16th March. There is good reason to believe that a large number of trained agents concentrated there were killed.

Interrogations reveal increasing German interest in Southern France and particularly in the Cannes-Nice area.

A woman agent who had crossed the Rhine was arrested in Cologne. She was to establish sites for W/T sets and to make contact with 4 agents. In addition she is said to have had an assassination mission. Her female companion is believed to have been drowned during the crossing.

Three swimming saboteurs were captured by the 1st U.S. Army on 19th March with a mission to destroy a pontoon bridge with charges in metal container mounted on a wooden platform. The swimmers were picked out by search-light beam.

Clams, uncammouflaged high explosive, and oxygen cylinders similar to those used in acetylene gas torches, but filled with high explosives, have been found in an electricity-generating station at Trier. These were to have been initiated by stay behind agents.

who is going out to Candy to represent Section V, came to see me. He indicated that he had had a certain amount of difficulty with his own people and that his departure had been postponed several times. He was determined not to go out just as a M.I.6. flag-bearer. He had carefully reasoned out what M.I.6. had to sell in the Far East and had come to the conclusion

that they had very little. Firstly, they could try and supply bodies, but in this they would have very great difficulty. Many would have to be obtained from Army sources and would need instruction. (2) More important, they could provide independent communications both back to London and forward to I.B. staffs. Thirdly, they might be able to provide a certain amount of information through their communications in Washington. All this

I thought was very nebulous and he was determined to make this quite clear to his own people here and to the I.B. Staffs when he got to Candy. He felt that it was ridiculous for SIS to make out that they had little information of the type supplied to the Western Front and they had no secret sources. I told that I entirely agreed with his view. I explained to him what our set-up was and told him that I was sure that he would find Tim Airey thoroughly co-operative.

I had a word with Peter Hope about his going to Paris to take up Ramsbotham's job under Trevor Wilson. He seemed very pleased at the idea and expressed the hope that he would regain his majority. I said that I could give him no guarantee about this but that I would mention the matter to SIS. Actually I think they are prepared to make him a Major.

I discussed with Joe Lynch the case. We decided first to wire to Palestine and ask whether the sums mentioned had been actually the subject of agreements or whether they were only limits within which the FBI could operate. We thought that the money should be paid over by Security Co-Ordination to the FBI or by us to Joe Lynch. The introduction of C to the FBI should be done by Macpherson after point one has been cleared. As regards reports we see no objection to their being passed to Security Co-Ordination who would probably want them if they had to pay. We feel however that copies should be sent direct to Joe. The FBI have agreed to run

Major General Penney who in 1940 was DDMI and has since Catalogue Reference KV4/196, has now been posted as DMI SEAC vice Lambough. He called here today and was

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seen by Harry Allen, Bertram Ede, and myself. Cass, who had left Karachi the day before yesterday, was also present. I explained to Penney more or less what our functions had been on the Second Front, and what our contribution could be on the Eastern Front. He was obviously not au fait with C.I. matters as he has not yet taken over. He seemed to agree with our views and while here is going to make a careful study of the War Room and EDS procedure. Later we all went down and saw the D.G.

24th March.

and Pakenham came over to talk to me about U35. They want him to stay in Lisbon for another 3 months and produced a letter from Ashley Clarke of the Embassy, saying how valuable his services have been. I said that I thought the D.G. would agree to this, but that he was certain to ask me what U35 had been doing. This placed me in a rather difficult position as we had received no reports from SIS on U35 activities since last September. I promised to send over the file and I said that I would put it up to the D.G. with a recommendation. He undertook to let us have copies of U35 reports in future.

26th March.

At the Daily Meeting today Cecil gave an account of his visit to Ireland. In connection with the sinking of the submarine off the coast of Cork and the box containing the cyphers etc which had been washed ashore, it appears that McKenna on his own initiative, had decided to transmit the contents of this box to us. This had raised certain difficulties as his act was obviously unneutral and had been carried out without the knowledge of External Affairs. It was therefore necessary to get the documents photographed as quickly as possible and returned to Ireland in case any questions should be asked. The documents, instead of being put

to be gained since that had all been sucked dry before they started. We could not very well detain them after their past services and if we did we had to put them in different houses. They could not obviously be put into the Nazi camp in the I.O.M. "C" said that he would speak to Felix.

The D.G. has written a long memo on our relations with SIS for Lindlater-Stewart.

Personally I do not much like it but I do not know how we can stop him sending it. I pointed out various inconsistencies. He seems to be against total amalgamation and equally against taking over Sections V and IX.

I have now obtained our file in the case of SERRA. It shows that he was recruited by SOE in India, after having come across to us in Abyssinia. He was finally brought back here and examined at the LRC. who viewed his case with considerable mistrust and said so. In spite of this SOE took him on. As previously related he betrayed his colleague ARMSTRONG as soon as he landed in Sardinia. SOE

eventually had a suspicion that the transmitter was under control and suggested to us that we should use it for purposes of deception. Nothing however materialised. There was also a suggestion from SOE that another man should go out and make contact with ARMSTRONG and SERRA and see whether they were in fact under control. This man was not to be told about our suspicions that the transmitter was under control. This seems to be pretty tough.

I saw John Senter about the case of Mrs. Rita
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in an iron box according to the normal procedure, were in an old ammunition box. It seems probable that the Captain and crew who had come ashore and had been interned, were quite unaware of what had happened. In addition to the cyphers the box contained details of the latest type of torpedo, which are of great interest to the Admiralty, and also charts of our minefields.

Cecil also ascertained that the Irish had been intercepting certain wireless signals between Germany and the U.K. which they had decyphered. These signals are almost certain to be phoney I, II or III.

Alec Keller and I saw the D.G. The D.G. does not want Ryan and Douglas Roberts to come back here at the moment to discuss the affairs of CICI and SIME. He approves, however, of the training here of any likely D.S.O.s for work in the Middle East.

Lothian brought in Mr. Robertson, C.C. Glasgow, to see me. Robertson was very enthusiastic about the talk which Roland Bird had given to the Liverpool S.B. on German espionage activities on the Continent.

21 A.G. have sent us a captured document marked "Confidential" and issued by a local NSDAP HQ in Germany. It alleges that two officers, one from the SS and the other ^{an} Reich national, succeeded in landing in this country in a midget submarine and proceeding to Burton-on-Trent where they observed, it is said, the extensive damage done by a V2 on a large ammunition dump. It is further alleged that they succeeded in returning to Germany. There follows an account of the effectiveness of the V2 weapon. It is stated that the exploit of the two agents cannot of course be published for obvious reasons. There is nothing to show what happened to the midget submarine while the two officers were proceeding to Burton-on-Trent and returning to the east coast; quite obviously the whole story has been invented in order to boost up the morale of the Party members. There is no evidence whatever to show that any V2 has reached Burton-on-Trent

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The explosion there is thought to be due to natural causes, and has been commented on both in the press and in the House of Commons.

According to a report shown to me by Lennox, the large concrete sites at Mimoyecques and Wizernes, were for a large six inch gun said to be 400 ft long and firing a shell with a 40 lb warhead. There would be 50 of these guns, which may have had several barrels and would have fired ten rounds per gallon per minute. The site at Watternes is alleged to have been for the purpose of making hydrogen for use in VI and V2 and possibly also in connection with the long range guns.

27th March.

I attended the JIC Meeting at which the leakage through Chinese B.Js was discussed. The Chiefs of Staff in Washington had turned down the JIC's proposal, firstly on the grounds that they might jeopardise ULTRA; secondly, that the channel might be used for deception, and thirdly that our proposals might not be effective. Altogether they seem to have taken the whole matter rather lightheartedly. The JIC are referring the matter back to Washington again, pointing out that there is no real risk to ULTRA; that the deception plan cannot make sense as long as there are Chinese Naval students in this country who can observe things on the ground and report to the Naval Attache; and lastly, that any plan to get the Chinese to improve their cyphers would be of no real value since we know that they are sold with regularity to the Japanese. The only effective measure therefore is to re-encypher the Chinese messages in One Time Pad and unbutton them for the Chinese in Chungking. Chiefs of Staff are asked therefore to reconsider their views. This is a typical instance of how difficult it is to get over any point in Washington, where things are not really understood. I suggested that it might strengthen the case if it were explained to the Chiefs of Staff that as long as the present system of Chinese telegrams continues there can be no hope of carrying out any effective deception in

in the Far East. As arrangements had just been made to send out deception personnel and equipment, this has probably impressed them.

I discussed with Herbert his minute on Overseas Control, to which I have added several paras. This has now gone forward to DDO and DA.

I told Burt that while a high level contact might be all right, one had to bear in mind that ultimately somebody would have to take action on the information and that this would be done on a much lower grade. Further, that the action on this kind of information would not be confined to one man, but would eventually spread all over the CID. Burt replied that in his view the whole suggestion was most unwise. He said that even if Howe did the job himself, it would not be long before the whole of the CID was talking about it. They would get to know that such information could be obtained and one would tell the other how this could be done. Something would eventually go wrong.

I said that this also was my fear. While we had no wish to put a stop on Scotland Yard getting information of that kind, we did feel that there was a chance of their spoiling the market. Burt said that he would speak to Howe and side him off.

Commander Stone of Security Co-Ordination called on me to make a friendly visit, as he had seen the children recently at Norfolk. He talked to me about the bad time that American Shipping went through when the United States first came into the war. This was due to the fact that they refused to profit by our experience of diversional routing. They had some idea that submarines could not operate in 10 fathoms and they therefore sent all their ships through the 10 fathom channels. The Germans just laid up in the 10 fathoms channels and sunk them like clockwork. It was not until 400 had gone down that they decided to adopt our methods.

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When they decided to make a change, they insisted on escort vessels, which, had our diversional tactics been employed, could in considerable measure been avoided. The result was that a ship from Tampa to New York, instead of taking 8 days, often took 3 weeks, or a month, as it had to wait at the end of each naval area for a new escort. The consequent hold up had appalling results. So much for American efficiency.

John Marriott is going to F. Division, somewhat against his will. He is to take over from David Clarke.

Burton is being released from the BRUTUS case to go to DIB as a W/T Maintenance Officer. We have managed to square the Prison Commissioners whose servant he is.

The question of Hugh Astor going to DIB is still in the balance. If DIB will accept a attachment from SEAC, a Deception Unit, Astor is prepared to go. It is interesting to see how these young people think that they can make terms and conditions. Strictly speaking, he should be told where the DG thinks he could be most useful. On the other hand, if he gets to DIB and does not like the work, he is the kind of person who, through influence, would get himself out and into another job. I have warned Vickery about this. Astor also wanted to go as a G.S.O.2. It makes me smile a little to think someone of his age thinks that his first appointment in the Army should be of G.S.O.2 rank. It took me four years hard work on active service to become a captain.

De Valera has been making some peace feelers, both in his conversations with HEMPEL and with Maffey. He evidently wants to pose as a mediator. This would certainly suit his vanity.

"C" came in to see me. I talked to him about Victor and the possibility of his being of use to us both. I had in mind that he might

be a collector of overt intelligence . "C" seemed quite sympathetic to this idea.

"C" told me that peace feelers were going on in Switzerland through a man called WOLF who was a General in the SS and had gone to Switzerland from the Italian front. The Russians have been informed. "C" was sceptical about the motives. He thought possibly that the Party might be engineering this move in order to show that the Generals had let them down. On the other hand, as this man was a S.S. General it would not look too well. "C" thought that the OKW, who were living in a kind of dream world, imagined that the wheels of the German Army machine were still revolving in clockwork fashion, and were issuing orders accordingly. Hitler was constantly saying that this bridge and that bridge was to be destroyed at once. In fact, however, nothing is happening.

"C" said that it was just possible that there would be a change of government in Japan, and that the Japs, on the collapse of Germany, might sue for peace. This, however, was a very tentative view, and there was no positive evidence.

I had a word with Buster on the future of the War Room. In his view the tempo would gradually increase and they might be working at fairly high pressure for the next six months. After that he thought there might be a decline when the Control Commission got really in the saddle and were doing a lot of their own interrogation work.

28th March

At the Wednesday Meeting today Grogan gave an account of French Censorship. Up to a short time ago they had no Watch Listing system for letters coming in or going out, to foreign addresses. They had, however, an IB List for internal use. We have now reinforced them and supplied them with most of our Watch List addresses

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They have not been given those from MSS except where we have already got the information from other sources.

I had a talk with Dick who is returning to France to-day with Victor. I have arranged with him that he will write a Memo on the part played by this office with the Armies in the Field.

I have also asked him to write a letter to the DG about Harmer's transfer to SIS as a Controller of their stations on the lines of communication in Belgium and Holland.

Ede talked to me again about Overseas Control. Kellar had drafted a letter to CICI/SIME suggesting that they should supply us with information whenever individuals were sent from the Middle East under the auspices of the British Council. Ede thought that all such matters ought to be dealt with by O.C. I said that while there did not seem to be very much objection to this, things might go wrong even in a case where no trace was shown on our records. Kellar's section might have information about the organisation for which the man was acting, which would be relevant and which would not necessarily be carded. It seems to me therefore that it would be far tidier for the section to answer any queries of that kind. Ede then talked about the personal correspondence between Kellar and CICI. He wanted to arrange with Roger and Dawson Sheppard that their correspondence should be addressed to the DG and not personally to Kellar. This would mean that ~~the~~ letters would be opened in O.C. and copies kept. I said I thought that a decision in this matter might really await the DG's review on the future of O.C. It seemed to me of no use to tackle the matter piecemeal. Personally I saw considerable advantage in personal correspondence. People knew where their letters were going and who would handle them.

29th March.

Curry talked to me about the DG's Memo on the future of the Office, which he was sending to Findlater Stewart

Curry thought it unsound in certain matters and generally discursive and lacking in conciseness. He had made some 20 criticisms of which the DG had accepted 10. Curry felt that this was not bad. The DG is I am afraid not quite on what I should feel was the Party line.

Milmo came to talk to me about making enquiries abroad on behalf of the War Room. In some cases these could be made better by OSS. Was it right that OSS should make them or should they be conducted solely through Sect. V. He had heard that there was a tie-up between and Pearson of OSS. I said that if this was so it was probably desirable since they were the best people to know whether the enquiry could be better conducted by Sect. V or by OSS. It was certainly desirable that both parties should not make enquiries, otherwise they would be falling over each other and getting into difficulties. As regards an enquiry at a British Consulate abroad which was the particular case he had in mind, I said that he could quite properly write direct to the Foreign Office. He wanted to know whether in fact some German under detention had, as he said, had an interview with the British Consul in Switzerland.

At my lunch with Walter Scott and Solater we discussed the future of Radio Security. Walter Scott thought that RSS should be amalgamated with G.C.&C.S. since in his opinion it would be impossible to maintain an organisation in peacetime sufficiently large to police the ether. We should have to rely on all the Y Stations which could only be maintained on the basis that they were providing intelligence of a I A rather than a I B nature. It was apparently Walter Scott who was responsible for tightening up Signal Security in the Middle East. He said then that we could probably only maintain the lead over the Germans for about a year or 18 months. He has apparently proved more or less correct since as a result of our preventive measures, the Germans have learnt many lessons and have tightened up their procedure to such a degree that G.C.&C.S. are having a really rough time. He told us that in France he had discovered an appalling leakage of information by the

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Americans. Strong, on the basis of ULTRA had told him that the Germans were aware of all movements of our troops. His American opposite number either could not or would not offer any helpful suggestions, but one of his junior officers on looking into the position discovered that the American Military Police were communicating by Slidex Code, the origin, movements and destination of all troops passing through their positions. Slidex only has a life of a few hours; it was not surprising therefore that the Germans were fairly well-informed.

Dick Butler is worried about a report which Capel Dunne has put in on the future of intelligence. He thinks that there should be a clandestine service consisting of an amalgamation of M.I.5, M.I.6. and an overt service. The DG is apparently indignant that Capel Dunne should have made such a suggestion without ever having visited this office. I said that I did not think that there was any need to worry much about this report since Capel Dunne was only concerned with general sources of information and how they should flow to the JIC.

30th March.

I learnt through Lennox that the Chiefs of Staff when asked for a review by the P.M. have said that they expect to be in Bremen on 4th April, in Hamburg on the 12th, and to move or less wind up operations by April 15th. This is of course only a very tentative estimate. There is at the moment an official black out, but yesterday we were reported in the vicinity of Munster and it may well be that by now we are in Hannover. Being Good Friday, there is no Evening Standard and Lennox has not been able to make up his maps.

Eisenhower, without reference to the Chiefs of Staff, has sent a message to Joe Stalin asking him where they should meet. I think this has been suggested. This has not apparently been very well received.

Cecil has had another interesting PANDORA message indicating that the Germans are being persecuted in Dublin by the press, owing to a message from Radio Rome, that peace proposals are being put out to the American Ambassador. This seems to be based possibly on a PANDORA message of about 26th February which contained a long directive to HEMPEL. There are various possibilities as to how the leakage has occurred. It may be that De Valera has been consulting with the Papal Nuncio and that the latter has radioed from Foynes to the Vatican. The Vatican cyphers were broken by SIM before the Italian capitulation. It may be therefore that they have read the message and passed it on to Radio Rome. The alternative is that the PANDORA message of February 26th was obtained by OSS from Gunpowder and that they are trying to be clever in Rome. A last alternative is that there has been a leakage in Rome from Vatican circles. I have suggested to Jane Archer that G.C.&C.S. should monitor the Vatican Radio which from now onwards is likely to be of considerable importance. She is getting this done.

I had a long talk with Cass. He told me that they had had considerable trouble with Fergie who wished to impose the pattern of the SCI unit in the Eastern theatre, which was not really suited. He had gone off to ALFSEA on his own and sold the idea to them in their ignorance. This was only discovered some weeks later when he was tracked down and summoned to SEAC headquarters. Cass who himself has had considerable experience of IB work with a corps in the field, says that communications, and particularly later communications are so difficult that the procedure on the western front will not really work except in a very modified form. He says that the units dealing with C.I. cases will have to be much further forward and operating with divisions and corps rather than with Army Group. For this purpose he thinks C.I. advisers who will indicate to the existing staffs precisely what is wanted will perhaps be more advantageous. I asked

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him therefore why ~~this decision~~ had been reversed as it now seemed that we had gone back to the conception of SCI units. He said this was purely an establishment matter. Establishment had been provided for SCI units and any attempt to change this would only lead to endless delays. He therefore intended to get the bodies under the existing establishment and then split them up and redistribute them. I urged upon Cass the importance of Signals Security. From what I had heard it was lacking as much in the east as the west. This meant that any form of deception would not only be impossible but positively dangerous. He said that he intended to pay special attention to this matter. He knew that the Japanese had considerably improved their monitoring system and that they knew quite a lot about our order of battle.

Roger Bert me a report by Jane based on ISCOT which rather amplifies and simplifies Curry's previous report. There have been considerable developments, and there is not the slightest doubt that the Comintern in the form of the Communist International Liquidation Committee continues its former activities. There are already the makings of a Lublin Committee in Austria. A further development of very considerable interest is that one of the ISCOT messages is in fact a quotation from ISOS. I have asked Roger to find out precisely what this message is and where it is going to and coming from. It may of course be a Russian D.A. or even our old friend Max whom we have always suspected as a Russian double. Another point of interest is that certain German intercepting stations in Spain are picking up ISCOT although there are no signs of their having been able to break it.

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1st March

rang me up about KREMER in Stockholm. The Swedes have decided to expel him and are arresting certain of their own nationals who have been associated with him.

is telegraphing to Stockholm suggesting that a deportation order should not be served provided Kremer gives us full information. He doubts whether this will be successful as the Swedes, in view of the publicity which would be given to the case could hardly allow him to remain at large. They cannot intern him as he is a diplomat. An alternative suggestion is that the Swedes should tell Kremer that if he prepared to make a full statement the British authorities would exempt his name from the list of War Criminals. We have asked that the interrogation by the Swedes should be submitted to us for comments before Kremer is released, in case we might have supplementary questions to put. We have meanwhile drawn up a questionnaire which is being sent out to Stockholm.

The D.G. spoke to me about John Marriott. I told him that there was a good deal to be cleaned up in B.I.A. and that it would be difficult to spare him for at least another fortnight. The DG seemed anxious that he should go to Blerheim at once, but I think is prepared to compromise..

V.1 and V2 ceased last Thursday presumably owing to our successful advance into German and the possibility of Holland being cut off

I have read an interesting report on German P/Ws views on the Russian army and its bombard one sector of the front heavily

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in the hope that reserves will be brought down. They then attack in another sector without any artillery preparation at all. Sometimes they concentrate as many as 60 tanks on a front of 200 yards. They rely almost entirely on weight of numbers and equipment, and their methods are extremely costly although they have been greatly improving. It is not unusual for the first wave of infantry to be sent over merely as a means of touching off a minefield. The infantry advance generally in extended order at a distance of 3-5 yards under a tremendous concentration of guns and mortars. The 72-barrelled mortar is much feared by the Germans. The largest Russian tanks carry a 210 mm gun which is heavier in calibre than any gun used by the Germans. The Russians have made a certain amount of use of dogs. These dogs are always fed underneath a tank and when an attack takes place are sent forward with an explosive strapped to their backs and contact canisters. They rush under the tank and blow it up. The Russians are very good snipers and guerillas. They also carry out extensive night patrols mainly with a view to capturing prisoners.

3rd April

I had a talk with Anthony and Mrs. Pitt. During the weekend a complaint had been received from a woman in Birmingham to the Birmingham Police that she had been followed. The Birmingham Police believe that this was a censorship enquiry about which they had not been informed. In fact the enquiry has been made by an ex-CID inspector who is following associates of Negrin on behalf of Alba. I got hold of Burt who knows the CID man well and precisely what it is all about. I asked Mrs. Pitt about Negrin's

He is apparently going shortly to Mexico to make contact with the Republican Group there. Moscow's attitude to Negrin's party appears to have recently undergone some change. La Passionaria, speaking recently in Moscow is advocating a rapprochement with Negrin's party. Negrin himself is dependent for his funds on the Soviet Govt. At the time of the civil war most of the gold was removed from Madrid to Moscow. Negrin has an account at the Moscow Narodny Bank in London and is therefore presumably held by the Soviet Govt. at the end of a string. In view of La Passionaria's statement and Moscow's control of funds, it must be assumed that Negrin is more or less prepared to dance to Moscow's tune. This all fits in with the conception of Russian long-term policy which I heard the other day, advanced by a friend of Walter Bell who has no access to inside sources. He thinks that the Russians, taking a long view, intend ultimately to get control of all the narrows. We already know that agreement was reached at Yalta on the question of the demilitarisation of the Dardenelles. The Russians are extending their influence in the Mid East by the establishment of consulates and are definitely taking an interest in Arab movements. They will therefore be in a good position to fish in troubled waters and if they so desire make difficulties for us with regard to the Suez Canal. In the Baltic Pandora states if this can be believed that when Molotov was last in Berlin it was Russian policy to control the Skagerrack and the Cattegat. If it is Russia's intention to build a large Fleet after the war she would naturally wish to have certain access to the Atlantic either through the Baltic or the Mediterranean.

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At the D.G.s meeting today Horrocks complained that hewas being very hard-pressed with vetting, particularly in connection with travel. He asked if it were possible to discontinue the vetting of people wishing to visit protected areas. Harry said he would see what could be done. This is precisely what I always felt would happen. With the relaxation of restrictions more people are travelling, categories are abolished and each case has to be treated on its merits. We are gradually working back to the vetting strain of 1940. Adam asked whether it was still necessary to take particulars of British subjects arriving in this country from Germany or from occupied territory. I said that while I did not think that the security risk in these cases would be rated very high, infact it is almost negligible, we should be very severely criticised if British subjects had been collaborating with the Germans were allowed to return to their towns and villages without any examination. It would soon get about that they had been working for the Germans and there would be questions in the House. It seemed to me therefore necessary that we should continue the present procedure. Adam also complained about the number of people coming from Stockholm either by the normal routes or by the American special route. I said I thought the only remedies here were the once that I had suggested, namely (1) to get Passport Control to step up their standards; in this connection a telegram had already been despatched; (2) to make representations to the allied govts. whose representatives were responsible for selecting their nationals in Stockholm for military service and in many cases performed their duties extremely badly; and (3) to bring the whole matter to the attention of the H.O., since

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many of those arriving were turned on to the labour market owing to their unsuitability for military service. All these people will dig themselves in, probably marry British subjects, and have British-born children. This will lead to endless complications when troops are demobilised and find their jobs taken by foreign nationals whom the H.O. will be reluctant to turn out.

Melland rang up to say that Gache would be pleased to see Columbine. Gache has been briefed by Melland as to what he is to say. We have put Holt of PWE in touch with Gache.

Joe Lynch came in to see me. He is off to Washington tomorrow having been summoned home for a brief visit. He said that he had gained the impression that SIS were trying to build up BSO again as they were now suggesting that all their enquiries with the FBI should go through BSC and that FBI enquiries for them should pass through the same channel. Cimperman had produced figures to show how difficult it was to get answers out of SIS and pointed out that it would be all the more difficult if the FBI did not have a man here on the spot. I rather sense in this a move by Viv. to effect the removal of the FBI from here and thereby to force canalisation of all information from our dept. through SIS. This would certainly be in accordance with his previous policy of a return to the status quo ante.

I talked to Milmo about the case of Raymond LEE. The latter has made an appeal against the decision of the Court Martial to cashier him. Mrs. Lee is taking the blame. She poor woman has had to hand in her resignation to the H.O. which has been accepted. Buster thinks Lee is a thoroughly bad man and

deserves all he has got. He feels however that we should not intervene in this case except to give the VCIGS any information resulting from the interrogation of Kraus, which we think is sufficiently reliable. Such information however can only be given with the greatest reservation and should not be in such a form as to exaggerate its significance in any way.

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Ramsbotham came in to see me about his new job. He is to be in charge of the Information Section which comprises also documents, registry, collection and distribution. 21 A.G. has obtained a large establishment and are now looking round for the bodies. They evidently intend to do the whole of the cleaning up work themselves. If this is so, there will clearly be no place for the Control Commission except as a purely liaison body in Berlin. Under the GSO IB there are to be 3 GSO2s, one in charge of the special services, one on call work (this will be Noakes) and one on information (Ramsbotham). There will also be a GSO1 with appropriate staffs to deal with purely military security.

SHAFF CI Summary for the week ending March 30th states that the German IS are concentrating increasingly on central Germany and particularly Weimar and Plauen area. The OKW are dissatisfied with the meagre success of their stay-behind network west of the Rhine and with their line-crossers. There seemed a shortage of W/T operators and equipment which is hampering the activities of the kommandos and truppees. Greater attention is being paid to papers and cover stories of agents, and captured agents state that more

espionage. If captured the latter may pose as deserters and claim P/W status. Luftwaffe W/T operators are being attached to troupes as short-term stay-behind agents, and German refugees are being sent back across the Rhine to operate in their own areas of residence. The SD is continuing to train members of Darnand's police for espionage and sabotage. More agents are being given missions to penetrate allied intelligence services. Captured agents state that others are being issued with camouflaged poison for assassination. There is evidence that the enemy still hopes to exploit sabotage dumps in Belgium. Despite numerous hardships and increasing warnings of ultimate defeat, the German people show no sign of internal collapse, and frightened by the Yalta decisions and with no anti-Nazi rallying point, will probably support the crumbling Wehrmacht to the last. This attitude is helpful to GIS improvisations and guerilla preparations. For guerilla activity the Werewolf organisation was formed under Himmler in November 1944. This organisation is predominantly S.S. with regional control by higher S.S. and police leaders. It is intended to operate on all fronts and training with special emphasis on W/T is proceeding in special localities. There are many Hitler Jugend trainees. Some are being selected from men whose homes are in allied-occupied territory.

In view of the war situation Tate is asking for an alternative method of communication in case W/T contact should be broken, and also for an assurance that no records disclosing his identity will be allowed to fall into allied hands. Garbo's domestic situation is once more causing a good deal of trouble and it appears that Mrs. G. is now anxious to be reunited with her husband. It is proposed to

send Mrs.G.back to Spain as soon as this can be conveniently arranged.

4th April

I had a talk with Cussen about the case of Raymond LEE. Cussen agrees that we should not go further than explaining to the VCIGS that KRAUS did not come here with any mission from the Germans and that as far as we know LEE had no knowledge of KRAUS's former connections with the G.I.S.

Des Graz came to have a talk about the future of . . . has recently been making contact with various diplomatic officials abroad regarding this matter. He has also had a talk with Cavendish-Bentinck The F.O. wish to continue as a permanent service in so far as this may be possible. We came to the conclusion that it was difficult to say precisely where we should have stations until we knew exactly how the . . . We anticipate however that it might be necessary to have anything up to 10 to 15 stations throughout the Empire. For this purpose it would be necessary to train a certain number of personnel and to see how many of the existing personnel would be prepared to stay on. Des Graz undertook to go into this and to get out an establishment list. We thought that wherever we had units they would have to be complete and ready to deal with any situation. When we had got this data together it would be necessary for someone to travel round and take stock of the local conditions and the various personalities whose co-operation might have to be enlisted.

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5th April

A report by CIOSS states that the SHAEF Japanese Section would be obtaining information on operational matters in the intelligence field and would be working with OSS in regard to certain intelligence targets which they had in mind.

Two infra-red receivers have been found in the University at Bonn. This is the first captured of this special type of equipment which had been made and represents something new for allied research and development in that field. A Dr. Richter had been interrogated and had given considerable information.

At the Deutsche Edlstahlwerke at Krefeld documents of the highest secrecy were secured. They relate to the steel programme for tank production for 1944-1945. At the Mors Homberg Fischer-Tropsch Plant samples of catalysis were obtained. An installation which manufactured synthetic lubricating oil was discovered at Homberg using processes unknown in the UK and USA. At the Wilhelm Smidding Plant at Cologne, the documents were found on rocket and turbo-jet propulsion, a substance known as myrol which is both a propellant and an explosive, and aluminium alloy mine shells etc.

The JIC have tried to estimate the likelihood and possible forms of a last desperate throw by the German naval and air forces. The German Navy has available the Lutzow, Admiral Catalogue Reference:KV/4/196.

Hipper, Prince Eugen and 3 or 4 light cruiser and up to 16 destroyers. To these may perhaps be added the Admiral Scheer. These forces might be used (a) to break out into the Atlantic via the northern route and to cause the maximum damage possible to our trans-Atlantic shipping. Such action would entail a lengthy operation at sea if it were to achieve any worth while results, but would probably end either in the ships being sunk or in their finding refuge in internment in Spain. If lucky they might be a serious problem for a time. (b) to attack convoys off our East coast and on the Thames Antwerp route, possibly also carrying out bombardment of coastal towns. These would be feasible operations especially under conditions unsuited to our flying operations. The Germans might appreciate that they would have a fair chance of returning without heavy damage. (c) to break through the Straits of Dover and proceed down-channel attacking our shipping whilst passing through the channel, subsequently emerging into the Atlantic. It is considered highly unlikely although it is just possible that one or more ships might be prepared to make the attempt, preferring suicide to surrender. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the foregoing operations are being planned. With the exception of one large cruiser

all the heavy ships and most of the destroyers are now in the Baltic and engaged in supporting the land fighting and in the protection of military shipping and evacuation movements. Operations of the kind described would have to be conducted either from Norwegian or North German ports. At the moment the enemy disposes of about 170 U-boats, operationally effective. Of these about 65-70 are at sea on any one day from bases in Norway. The total at sea at any

one time could be raised to 150 and could be maintained for a period of 6 to 8 weeks. It is thought unlikely that U-boats will attempt to engage in any but normal operations but it is possible that some might attempt to penetrate local harbours, estuaries and inlets and to do as much damage as possible before scuttling. The morale of U-boat crews is considered still fairly good.

Operations by the German Air Force are dependent (a) on the availability of airfields (b) on the ability to assemble aircraft, crews, fuel, ammunition etc. and (c) capacity to plan and execute an operation of this scale, in a period of military collapse. These factors would make it impossible for the Germans to employ more than a small proportion of their present estimated first-line strength of 5,700 aircraft for a last desperate attack on London, even if Hitler were prepared to abandon tactical support of the battle front. There are very few aerodromes within a range of 400 miles of London from which jet-propelled AR 234s could reach London carrying a bomb load. They could not however return. Jet-propelled ME262s could no longer reach London from any airfield even on a non-return basis. The forces available would be limited to some 200 fighters representing a total bomb-load of less than 100 tons. None of these aircraft could return to their bases after bombing their target. The above refers to day operations. Detailed planning would be necessary which might take as long as 3 weeks and there is no evidence at the moment of any such preparations. Night operations against London by twin-engine night-fighters carrying bombs and long-range bombers are possible. Not more than 50 long-range bombers could be employed and night-fighters would number about 150. Combined they could

not drop more than 200 tons. This would be increased to 300 tons if an additional 250 night fighters were employed on a non-return basis. The morale of the G.A.F. is low and the training of the crews poor. It is unlikely therefore that more than half the aircraft engaged would reach the target area. This estimate takes no account of the losses inflicted on the attacking force by air and ground defences which are increasing in depth as the allies advance eastward. The use of chemical or bacteriological bomb cannot be altogether excluded. The Germans might appreciate that the allies would be unwilling to undertake reprisals in kind against an area which they were about to occupy. In conclusion the AIC think (a) there is no form in which Hitler could make a last desperate throw comparable in strategical importance with the naval operation planned at the end of the last war, (b) the last desperate operation by the Navy or Air Force against London is thought improbable but still feasible. (c) there is no evidence to suggest that such plans for naval or air operations are being made.

Sclater showed me the minutes for his ad hoc signals security committee. The Admiralty state that after Stage A they propose to conduct a good deal of their communications with ships in the outer zones en clair. This would not in any way compromise the order of battle. It was the opinion of the meeting however that normal vigilance and monitoring should continue at any rate for a time.

Jim Hale brought Col. Chretien and Capt. Vaudreuil to see me. It was merely a friendly visit.

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Marriott has just returned after 2 days with F.2 at Blenheim. He thinks the show is extremely well run and that the job will be quite interesting. He thinks too that the personnel are efficient. He wonders a little however whether things are not being done in too much detail. I told him that while it might be that concentration on certain individuals with B.Div. tactics might be profitable, a good deal of detail work was inevitable, if only to debunk scare report received from SIS and from people in this country. I could recollect many occasions on which we had been told by SIS that certain communist had attended meetings abroad and when from the carefully-compiled history sheets Miss Saunders and Miss MacCulloch had been able to say that the man was in this country. There were times when negative information of this kind was even more valuable than positive information.

Charles had the directors of divisions at a meeting to discuss expenses. He is drafting a circular for heads of divisions only to communicate to their officers. It says merely that incidents have come to light where expenses could not justifiably be a charge on the office, that entertainment of one officer by another within the dept. could not normally be justified although there might be exceptions. I suggested to Charles that we should have a regular meeting of directors to discuss postings either inside or outside the office. I thought OC should also be present. Charles agreed to this and we are to meet at 11 on Thursdays.

Kellar and I had a discussion with Wood, and Dawson-Shepherd on CICI. The general conclusion seemed to be that the

head of CICI should be an Air Force officer dressed in Air Force uniform with independent or quasi-independent status. This on the assumption that Iraq should revert to Air Force control. The organisation might have a perfectly open security officer attached to the Legation in Teheran and elsewhere who would work through Air Force Liaison Officers as at present. It should look to London for general guidance and should I think be an MI5 or joint MI5/6 commitment. DIB should have a liaison officer with the organisation. It was felt that SIS should operate from outside the area. Their present set-up was quite absurd. They had a vice-consul performing no vice-consular functions in a place where he is not needed. The building had a huge wireless mast on top of it, two of the flashiest cars in the area in which its agents were frequently seen, and the officers dined with their agents in public places. Added to this they were constantly getting across the tracks of CICI by trying to penetrate the Russians in the most foolish and obvious way. At the same time they were trying to keep up a pretence of not being interested in Russian affairs. When they were in difficulties they nearly always went to CICI and very often CICI had to do their work for them. They meanwhile sent the reports back as their own. Latterly Section V in the person of Nick Elliott had been out there with obvious intentions of building up an organisation for CE purposes. This seems clearly absurd since CICI have been doing the work for years and have very good record. CICI have built up quite a good show and have tapped all the resources that they possibly can, apart from running a certain number of agents. Person-Shepperd mentioned to me that the police advisers are due to

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retire. They had proved very useful in the past as they could send for any police records they wanted without causing any comment. It seemed desirable for something to be done to replace them. We all agreed that it was almost impossible to get any further until the question of the relations between MI5/6 had been decided.

I saw Peter Hope and explained to him the delicacy of his mission. He had had but did not feel very clear about what he was supposed to do. He thought that his principal job was a quasi-political one. He was to try and discover who was reliable, who was likely to stay and what the general trend was in French intelligence politics. I impressed upon him that he should not be rushed into poking his nose into French domestic affairs since this could only end in disaster. He should do everything he could to assist the French and establish the best possible relations with them. If he could do this he would probably learn free gratis and for nothing anything he wanted to know. He is rather worried about his pay since if he cannot go out as a major he will drop about £250 a year. I gather that is seeing what can be done about this.

in the evening to say that he understood that there was a fellow called doing some sort of a course here. He thought it might be a good thing if he saw him with a view to his future employment. I said that we had already got designs on him and that if he contemplated building up a CE section in Iraq I thought he was making a great mistake, since this work was being done pretty efficiently by CICI. I then told him off the record that the P. Section work in

those countries was not very highly thought of locally. He did not know who was in charge of the P. Section at Broadway.

Blunt and Caulfeild came to see me about a prospective Yugoslav agent who stands quite well with the Partisans and wants to stay on here to study at the University in addition to his work at the Legation. He could only do this if he received a subsidy. I said I thought we ought to contribute. The method of payment is however somewhat delicate. Caulfeild is going to sound the ground.

Harry Allen told me that he had been having a talk with West, Rommie Haylor and Bill Williams. They were all very anxious for Dick to stay on at any rate during the transition period. I told Harry that I had already discussed this with Gen. Strong and Dick. He could probably be spared until about August or Sept. but if he wanted to stay longer he might be jeopardising his career in this office which would by then I hoped be beginning to take shape. It was open to Dick to decide but personally I felt he ought to be here. I gather too that this is his own personal wish.

April 6th

I had a long talk with John Gwyer today. He told me that the position of the Austrian Control Commission was a bit fluid. It had been their function to run the British zone which comprises the southern part of Austria from Vienna where they would probably have an airfield and a

Latterly however the Russians had shown signs of not being altogether content with their zone which they wished to extend the whole length of the Hungarian frontier. The

Jugoslavs too were laying claim to Carinthia, which they say is ~~xxx~~ ethnographically Yugoslav territory. If the Russians and Jugoslavs walk in there will not be much left of the British zone. The Control Commission proposes to divide their work up into Section 1, under John Mair, detection, investigation, collation and SCI; Section 2, possibly under Hooten of SIS, who is not thought to be very suitable. This section would perform the executive function of rounding up whole categories. Section 3, under Crean, travel control, and Section 4, Information, under Gwyer. Gwyer thinks that the Austrian Control Commission ought to have someone in the War Room who would look after their interests, both there and with EDS. until it moves. They do not intend to pile up duplicates of EDS records as they will at best be comparatively small as a zone and would not justify the work involved.

April 7th

Burt told me this morning that the Commissioner was reluctant to give a German-speaking officer to us for the purpose of dealing with renegades in Germany. Burt wanted to know my views about sending one of the B.5 officers presumably Spooner. I said that provided he could handle the work on sabotage cases I had no objection but that although things were a bit slack at the moment they might very well become quite lively. Secondly I did not think that Spooner, good as he was, would really fit the bill seeing that he knew no German. It is not so much the interrogation of British subjects that his services were wanted for but for the interrogation of German witnesses.

Wren came in to pass the time of day. He is now back with his own firm on civvy street. He said that when Springbock arrives he would do his best to get him some sort of a job on a temporary basis with his firm.

I talked to Marriott, Cuthbert Hesketh and Ian Wilson about certain reports found on a German P/W who has been in the hands of CSDIC. These reports relate to information received from the Abwehr under what appears to be a daily summary sent out by Fremdeheere to Gruppe West. Some of them appear to be identical with reports put across by Garbo but this is being checked. It raises the more important point as to what arrangements there are for the interrogation of representatives of Fremdeheere. That organisation is in a way a closed book. We know that it receives Y-material on the one hand and agents reports, recce reports etc. on the other. It would be of great value to us to know what importance they attach to an agent's report and how far they integrated agents reports with Y-material also whether they got details from the Abwehr about their agents and the history of the agents. Furnival-Jones thinks this should be a SHAEF matter and that some sort of directive should go out, indicating that when intelligence officers were picked up steps should be taken to ascertain whether at any time they served in Fremdeheere. I have asked that similar steps should be taken with CSDIC who may have quite a number of intelligence officers in the cages.

Charles and I saw the D.G. who has agreed in principle to Courtenay Young coming back provided we can produce a substitute. We also tackled the D.G. about O.C. I think he will be prepared to issue an order that the

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Middle East, the whole of its intelligence product and its personnel problems, should be a B. Division matter, pending a final settlement as to what shape O.C. should be. The D.G. for some reason does not wish to tackle the major problem until Findlater Stewart has been round the dept. Personally I should have felt that it would have been a good thing to get the situation tidied up before Findlater's visit.

I had a talk with Tommy Harris, Herbert and Marriott about various queries that Cyril Mills had put up about Moonbeam. We decided that the best thing to do was to get Cyril back and put Moonbeam into cold storage by telling the Germans that he is going down to San Francisco to try and pick up information about the conference. The D.G. has agreed to Mills' return.

O35's agent, has declared himself to the Americans as a British agent. I do not know where he was found but the news comes from OSS in Paris. We are taking steps to get him back here. Meanwhile I have suggested to _____ of Section V that O35 should be got back to talk to him.

April 9th

I had a long talk with Rivett-Carnac. He has been asked to spend the 12th and 13th with SIS. It was also suggested to him by Arnold-Forster that he should meet Cavendish-Bentinck. Carnac is a bit chary about this as he thinks that it might involve him in political matters, on which he is not authorised to express views. I explained to him generally what our feelings would be about amalgamation with SIS. We saw many great advantages but certain disadvantages. We were however quite convinced that Sections

V and IX should be amalgamated with D. and F. Divisions on the grounds that C.E. and subversive movements of an international kind are one and indivisible. They cannot be investigated partly in this country and partly on the continent. I said too that in my view since both these subjects were ultimately the responsibility of the D.G., he should have some control over the investigation of such matters abroad. He should at any rate have people posted in certain capitals for the purpose of overt liaison with our opposite numbers. It would be logical too for any defensive service to have a footing in Passport Control.

I told the daily meeting that I had read through the case of GRUNDELL, a Swedish seaman who was an agent of Einz Marine in Athens and had been picked off a Swedish boat at Gib. It seemed to me that this case was a classic example of the present cumbersome procedure for dealing with C.E. in two halves. The man had featured on ISOS last December. of Section V. who keeps a record of agents and the ships on which they are serving, notified us that GRUNDELL's boat was proceeding to USA or Canada. With our agreement he communicated with BSC New York asking them to notify RCMP and the latter to bring in Cyril Mills. Gavin Young went up to Ottawa and told the RCMP that the original information came from a secret informant of the FBI and asked that observation might be kept on GRUNDELL when he arrived. This covering-up of the ISOS led to considerable difficulties and ultimately of course the RCMP learned that there was no FBI informant in the case at all. RCMP mixed a number of conversations between GRUNDELL, another seaman named BERG and an American called ARROWSMITH. The conversations were

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certainly of a suspicious kind and indicated very clearly that GRUNDELL was up to no good and that possibly ARROWSMITH had been spying in America for the Germans and Japs. In any case ARROWSMITH was violently pro-German. All this information was sent down to BSC New York, transmitted to Section V. who passed it on to us. Meanwhile GRUNDELL had left on his ship for Gib. He was interrogated by the DSO who according to custom reported to Section V. as the original information was MSS. Section V. consulted us and we advised that the man should be taken off. By this time however the ship had left for Athens. GRUNDELL was pulled off on the return journey. There was no real reason for SIS to come into this case after communicating to us that GRUNDELL was on his way to the western hemisphere.

Robb came in to say goodbye. He is going back to his solicitor's business in Glasgow. He has done a very good job of work for this office, as an SCO Glasgow and in charge of Travel Control at SHAEF.

Cecil and I were taken over the Admiralty War Room. We saw all the plots of enemy submarines. All information both from Y. and other sources relating to enemy submarines is brought to this room by the speediest possible channel. There is a teleprinter service direct with Bletchley. When a submarine is reported on its outward journey an estimate is made from all the facts available as to the course it is most likely to take. An average speed is taken and day to day the position of the submarine is recorded. It may be that after some days a piece of further positive information will pin-point the position. e.g. a weather report. The number of submarines at sea is computed fairly accurately from Y. sources.

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It averages at the moment something round 60. This figure is fairly high there having been a very marked increase in submarine activity in recent months. It is therefore true to say that the submarines plotted on the map are on the average fairly accurately placed. It then remains to route the trans-Atlantic convoys in such a way as to avoid any submarine action. These convoys are being routed and re-routed as the information comes in. Shown on the map were about 8 submarines which it was known were due to start from a particular point to carry out a westerly sweep on a route which the Germans thought was used by our convoys. In fact this route was not being used. The Americans operating on a similar basis from the other side of the Atlantic had sent forward certain warships to deal with these submarines. We apparently went over and helped the Americans to set up their War Room which is on similar lines to our own but of course on a much more grandiose scale. The two War Rooms are in constant communication. There was a scare some time ago about our mine-fields having become known to the Germans, and the suggestion was made that there was a leakage at the Dublin Shipping Office. Although Sigs. denied it at first it was subsequently ascertained that they were sending out directions to ships in a code called Mersig which can be easily broken. We were told that Tate's work in connection with submarines had been most helpful. The Germans apparently use different codes for different areas. A submarine operating in the Bristol Channel would have a different code from one operating in the English channel. This is a fairly recent development and is thought to be due to a fear by the Germans that captured U-boat crews might give away too much. Capt. Wynn who showed us round, said

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that the box that had floated from the German submarine off the west coast of Ireland had been quite helpful in the matter of codes. It is anticipated that quite a number of German submarines may continue to operate after hostilities have ceased in Germany. The morale of U-boat crews is in general fairly high. The capture of Bremen and Hamburg will not have very much effect except perhaps to increase the number of U-boats operating in the Atlantic. There will not be special shelter for them in Norwegian ports and they will therefore have to go to sea. There is no lack of diesel oil or of torpedoes. SOE apparently did a good job in blowing up a certain number of torpedoes but exactly where I cannot remember.

Cadogan has sent in the suggested terms of reference for Findlater Stewart. They really constitute an enquiry into the affairs of MI5, the only reference to SIS being par. 2 which is concerned with CE in the UK and British Colonial territories. It is said "for this purpose it may be necessary to investigate the section in SIS concerned with these matters."

10th April

Burt came to see me about Spooner going to join Stephenson in Paris. I said that in all the circumstances I thought we should have to take a chance and let him go.

I spoke to Smithers M.I.19 about COLUMBINE. He told me that Kendrick had no vacancy as his own S.P.s were not fully occupied at the moment. I pointed out to him that COLUMBINE was rather exceptional and had been used with very great advantage for the

purpose of direct interrogation. Smithers said he would speak to Kendrick again and let me know.

I had a talk with Patterson who might like to stay on here. There are various jobs that he could do at the moment. He could go to Seymer's section to help with P/Ws, he could go to Paris to help Joe, or he could go into the War Room.

Harker spoke to me about the case of BOLSOM. It has apparently been decided by the DPP to let the Yard loose on all concerned in the hope of getting individual evidence but in any case of frightening everybody. He wondered whether it would be desirable for Burt to interrogate the military personnel. BOLSOM's racket is faked medical certificates for exemption from military service. I said I thought Burt should be given the report and we could then get his views.

Charles, Richard Butler, Horrocks and I considered the draft terms of reference for Findlater Stewart. We all agreed that they took the form of an enquiry into MI5 and that any investigation into the affairs of SIS would be strictly circumscribed. We thought therefore that some para. at the beginning placing the enquiry more on a functional basis might be appropriate. Meanwhile I had a discussion with Herbert who drafted a much shorter and much better terms of reference giving Findlater Stewart all the powers he requires to ascertain how security and CE are at present being conducted by the various departments concerned and to recommend amalgamation and redistribution of duties or reorganisation if the present machinery is considered inadequate.

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April 11th

The Times today gives the war casualty figures for the Empire, to February 28th this year, since the outbreak of war. The total killed among U.K. forces is 216,287, missing 30,967, wounded 255,142, P/Ws 183,242, total 685,638. The total for the British Empire is made up as follows: Killed, 306,984, Missing, 70,872, wounded 422,476, P/W 326,470 total 1,126,802. The casualties among merchant seamen were: deaths, 30,179, internees, 3,982, total 34,161. The U.K. civilian casualty figures compare as follows: killed (including missing believed killed) 59,793. Injured and detained in hospital, 84,749. Total 144,542. The figures of U.K. civilian casualties is nearly 3,000 higher than the highest number killed among the dominion and colonial forces.

I saw Jimmy Dickson who is rather concerned about his agents, many of whom wish to take on other more permanent employment. I told him that this was a thing that we had to face but that where it was a question of guaranteeing employment for another year or increasing a weekly allowance by a small amount he could go ahead.

Grogan talked to me about Censorship. There is a move virtually to cease censorship of telegrams within the Empire and USA after Stage A. While it would be difficult to make a case for the maintenance of such censorship at the moment, I am rather reluctant to agree to this course until we see precisely what is going to happen.

Milmo and Barry came to see me about the case of KRAUS. There is a question down in the House and the Press are working up a story that a man they call "Captain KLAUS" had arrived here under somewhat similar conditions to HESS and that he is being kept under special conditions of luxury, because he is related to Mrs. Reginald Fellowes. In actual fact he is at 020 and according to Stephens has recently been privileged to scrub lavatory seats.

I had a long discussion with J.C. and Marriott about B.L.A. Marriott thought that Bili Luke could run the section after he goes to F.Div J.C. thought on the other hand that he himself must remain in charge and if he does so he cannot complete the B.L.A War Diary. In fact I have for a long time felt that he was not anxious to complete this work. John thinks it would be far better if he did, and that Luke took over the winding up. It is true however to say that there are a number of tangled ends which cannot very easily be handed over I told J.C. that I should have to say to the D.G. that if Marriott went to F. J.C. would either have to remain in control of B.L.A in which case he could not do the War Diary, or that he would have to do the diary in which case a number of matters which demanded his presence in B.L.A could not be carried out.

Stopford came to tell me that he had just recruited one

who is apparently both anti-German and anti-Russian. He will not however be able to operate as the Swedish air line is being closed down till August unless hostilities cease in the interim. SIS do not wish to make contact with him in Stockholm because this might cause trouble with the

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Swedes who are playing very well over KREMER.

On the 17th March Ribbentrop had an off-the-record conversation with the Japs. He had come to the conclusion that while there might not be any possibility at the moment of separating the USSR from Britain and America, there was considerable anti-Russian feeling amongst British and American officers who had been taken prisoner. He thought therefore that there was a possibility at some later date of an anti-Soviet crusade in which Germany might join. If this were known to Stalin, as he thought it probably would be, Russia might be prepared to do a deal with Germany. He thought that with the exception of former German territory, Hungary and Croatia, the whole of the Balkans could be given to the S.U. and if the USSR wanted to penetrate to the Dardenelles and even further, for instance as far as Suez, Germany should support it. If contact could be established he would be quite ready to fly to Moscow and negotiate with Stalin. The first thing was to find out what Stalin's feelings were and it was suggested that this might possibly be done through the Japs in Stockholm. The Jap MA Onedara came to Berlin on the 27th March. He said that although he was not on intimate terms with members of the Soviet Legation he was acquainted with the Charge d'Affaires. He would have however to proceed very delicately. Ribbentrop said that he had just had a discussion with Hitler who still held that there was no reason to suppose that Stalin would at present consider peace with Germany and thought they must at least secure a military success, of which he thought there was a chance. Hitler stated however on the 28th March that he adhered to his view that it would be to Germany's disadvantage if either she or

Japan approached the USSR. The matter would therefore have to be dropped until Hitler thought the situation was ripe for negotiations. He had no objection in principle to coming to terms with the Russians although he categorically refused to entertain such an idea with Britain and America.

Ribbentrop had a further conversation with the Jap on the 5th April. He said that although the Fuhrer had originally intended to launch a big offensive in the east about May or June, the deterioration of the situation in the west had made this extremely difficult. The reason given was the collapse of the Luftwaffe. Ribbentrop had mentioned again to Hitler the subject of making peace. Hitler had however looked annoyed and replied that he had already made the matter quite clear to Ribbentrop not once but twice. There was therefore nothing to be done except to have the machinery ready and to approach the Russians in Stockholm if a suitable opportunity occurred.

SHAEE C.I. Summary for week ending 6th April states that there is evidence of further concentration of G.I.S. H.Q. in Thuringia and a general eastward move by kommandos and truppen. While kommandos and truppen are urgently engaged on tactical espionage missions and may also be used to fill gaps in stay-behind networks, the G.I.S. as a whole is increasingly engaging in sabotage and terrorist activities. Interrogations show that the main terrorist activities concentrate in werewolves and are being planned regionally under high S.S. and police leaders. Recruiting for this appears so far to be indiscriminate and inefficient. Line-crossers are now operating in small

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bodies and field units may be used for espionage purposes in view of the increasing difficulties in transport and communications of kommandos and truppees. A German P/W states that agents are being trained to attack allied personnel in order to secure identity papers and insignia. Since the occupation of Germany 27 Abwehr and S.D. schools have been overrun. In France a PPF round-up recently occurred in Paris with the arrest of 18 members believed connected with the G.I.S. In Belgium there are extensive strikes in the mines in the Liege district. Only 3 out of 22 pits are working normally. It is considered that Socialists and not communists are the instigators and that the former are exploiting the discontent of miners for electoral purposes.

12th April

S.I.S. now say that they cannot give Peter Hope the rank of major in Paris. They suggest however that they should put him on the strength of their SCI unit for Germany. I about this and intimated to him that we were a little tired of being used as a recruiting ground for SIS and that I was not at all sure that it would not be better for Peter to join either the Austrian or German Control Commission. He asked that Peter should see before reaching any decision.

JC came to tell me that he had spoken to the DG who had said that all he wanted for Currys report was an 8 page document from B.1A since Curry's office report was to be no larger than Gwyers book. This of course is quite fantastic but presumably there is nothing to be done. JC intends to continue the report as Catalogue Reference K/4/106 while to initiate Luke into the mysteries of the XX Committee.

We had our first staff meeting today, under Charles' auspices. Jim has undertaken to get particulars of personnel in the I.O.M. We thought they might first be trained here in the War Room and then fed out to 21AG and AFHQ.

The rest of the meeting was taken up with Roger's difficulties. He says that Shillito is no good and that Bagot wants a change and is anxious to go to the Austrian Control Commission. I suggested that Roger might have Patter on when he has finished his job with SLB3, and Horrocks suggested that Colledge might be transferred. There was a discussion about the importance of Russian espionage and how little is at present being done about it.

Roger is very inclined to think that Russian espionage should be handed back to B.Div. I said that I would be quite prepared to take it on but that I did still think there was a good deal to be said for running it in its own environment. There were two ways of getting Russian espionage, one through contacts abroad or through close observation on Soviet citizens here, and the other was through the Party, which in the last resort probably had to do the work. In the past we had always worked back to a Soviet agent through the Party.

I mentioned Hill-Dillon's demand for 12 girls 6 of the officer class and 6 secretarial. The view is that permanent staff cannot really be spared but that anyone who cares to resign can of course get jobs if the Control Commission is prepared to accept them. Mrs. Spring is a case in point. Horrocks said that if they resigned they would run the risk of being referred to the M/L. This I learned later was unlikely, since Miss Sherer and Miss

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Mackenzie have been kicking their heels for 3 months because the M/L could not find them anything to do.

Curry brought me an NSDAP file, OF.22/1 vol.2 on which was a minute signed by K. dated 22.1.34. It was written as a result of a HOW which I had put up on the NSDAP at Hamburg. "Spoke Sir Russell Scott as to whether he expected us to take any special steps about Nazis in this country. He said that unless we discovered in the ordinary course of our work any case of subversive propaganda or other inimical steps against the interests of the country we were to leave them alone. There fore no HOW at present". Six months later I put the warrant up again on the rather flimsy evidence that a man thought to be connected with the Gestapo was trying to get into touch with Otto BENE, and stressing the connection between the NSDAP and the Gestapo. This apparently did the trick and the warrant was obtained. This was the first warrant we obtained on the Party abroad. It was only much later that we were allowed to intercept Party correspondence going to addresses in this country.

Burt came to see me and told me that he had read through the report on BOLSON and that he did not wish to have anything to do with the case. I pressed him to give me his reasons but he refused to be specific. He said that he thought whoever was in charge of the case at the Yard should interview the soldiers and that it would be wrong for us to interfere. I think that from what he has seen he is quite convinced that the case will come to nothing, and that those concerned will be warned by the police. He therefore prefers not to get mixed up in it. I asked him

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point-blank whether he thought anything would be achieved and he was clearly doubtful. He realised however that those concerned would at least receive a bit of a fright and that possibly someone might be induced to turn King's Evidence.

He then told me about the case of Rosie SCHMIDT. He and Spooner had interviewed her at Hastings. She said that shortly before her father died in 1911 he loaned the sum of £250 to Emile KICHLE at 5% interest and that on her father's death the credit was taken over by her mother. The latter died in 1931 but beforehand arranged for the debt and interest payments to become acknowledgeable to Rosa. Miss SCHMIDT then said that she received from KICHLE the sum of £12.10.0 by way of interest due on the £250 loan regularly each year till 1937 when they were suspended presumably owing to the difficulties created by the civil war in Spain. The payment of £50 received by Miss SCHMIDT represented the payment due to her from 1937-1940. In respect of the £100 remittance she said that owing to her property in Blackfriars being destroyed by enemy action she found herself in somewhat straitened circumstances. She had therefore written in Jan. 1944 to KICHLE requesting him to repay part of the loan. This produced the £100 remittance comprising £50 principle and £50 accumulated interest. She could not produce the letter from KICHLE. Asked if she had any documents evidencing the loan from her father to KICHLE she said she had something in a deed box at the Midland Bank in Hastings. She produced one letter from KICHLE dated 21st Feb. in Spanish. Despite the fact that both the writer and addressee are Germans. This merely referred to the interest payments. The name and address of

the addressee had been typed on to this letter on a different machine after the typing of the letter itself. She could offer no explanation as to why KICHLE had not liquidated his loan. Burt was not favourably impressed by Miss SCHMIDT who was undoubtedly pro-German in sentiments despite her British birth. He did not regard her explanation about the two remittances as entirely satisfactory particularly since the £100 which was said by her to have been sent by KICHLE more or less in compliance with her request was in fact sent by a person named COSTAR. Burt requested SCHMIDT to write to KICHLE expressing her need for money and soliciting payment of the £200 loan outstanding. She promised to do this and to write today. KICHLE's address is 21 Pasco del Recoletos, Madrid.

April 13th

An announcement was made this morning of Roosevelt's death yesterday afternoon. The effect of this may be considerable since it will be hard to achieve the same measure of co-operation that was due entirely to the sympathy which existed between the P.M. and the President. Nobody seems to know anything about Truman, and there is no reason to suppose that he has any intimate knowledge of Roosevelt's policy. He has only been with him 3 months, and in any case the vice-President forms no part of the executive machinery of the government. I doubt whether in future, in view of what has happened, the Americans will be much help to us in the reconstruction of Europe. One effect may be that Russia will be driven into our arms since now that the President has gone there will be less toleration towards her in the USA.

At the daily meeting Burne announced that we may have to receive some 3,000 Danes. There is evidently some possibility of Danish ships making a bolt for it if there is any attempt by the Germans to destroy shipping. We came to the conclusion that the matter would have to be handled by the ports and any doubtfuls sent to the LRC. Crew lists would be obtained and checked against records.

Burne also read out a letter from about a man called an Austrian agent of OSS who had been here and, according to the informant of Dansey's, engaged in political propaganda. Dansey has written to Cavendish-Bentinck complaining. I understand that this has aroused the anger of Donovan, who produced a file to SIS showing that the whole thing had been arranged beforehand. Our papers show that the man was brought in as an unaccredited agent. Meanwhile Dansey has telephoned to OSS. I cannot quite make out what is going on, but it looks as if Dansey made a fool of himself.

Curry told me that he has seen the DG's letter to Findlater-Stewart on the office. He intended to tell the DG that he thought it would be better that he should not send him a letter but hand him some considered memo compiled by the staff. The best thing of course would be to tear it up since it is for many reasons not very good. On the other hand. It may be better to have it as an informal letter than as a memo which may be circulated.

Von Papen has been captured in the Ruhr pocket on his own estate. There appears to be no the pocket and on the extreme southern portion of the front and in

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the north in Holland. The Americans are near Leipzig, have bypassed Magdeburg and are not more than about 50 miles from Berlin. The Russians are said to have started their offensive in the Berlin area.

Bronx has received another payment of £197. It is not yet clear what this is intended to cover since she was last paid a month ago and in the ordinary way we should not have expected another payment till next month.

The Germans have been trying for some time past to deliver some jewellery to Gelatine by way of paying her. We thought at first that it would be delivered by Bronx. The Germans have now announced that they are going ahead with the delivery by some other channel.

Mrs. Garbo is once more causing trouble. Her attitude to the proposal that she and her 2 children should return to Spain continues to be changeable. Having eventually agreed to the journey and the administrative steps having already been put in train, she has unfortunately learned that a Naval Officer for whom some considerable time ago she married an attachment, and who subsequently became a P/W, has been released and is due to be repatriated in the near future. She is being told that it is now too late to change her mind and it is hoped that she will accept the position. Meanwhile arrangements are going ahead for carrying out the long-discussed project of Garbo's escape from hiding in this country in order that he may meet the Germans in Spain and discuss his future.

in Turkey and the Turkish Intelligence Services are prepared to connive at this so long as Germany resists the Russians.

Reports from MSS have recently become available showing that the RSHA is in W/T contact with several parties of agents in Russia. One of these parties is working in the neighbourhood of Rybinsk. 3 further agents were dropped in this area to join the party already there. The second party also controlled from Danzig appears to have had an agent in Moscow. The party was apparently landed by plane near Moscow with the task of settling down there and reporting back to Danzig, on the position not only in Moscow but in the Kremlin itself. Danzig in fact became very querulous when a report was received saying that it was not possible to get information within the Kremlin. This group had been instructed to get in touch with members of the Committee for Free Germany inside Russia and was also given the task of the reporting on the formation of a Vlassov Committee. Danzig was still in touch with this group in mid-March. The third group exists in the Orel-Bryansk area which has also been in touch with Danzig.

April 14th

Hart and Blunt came to see me about Columbine. Pending some solution I said I thought we ought to put him in one of the B.1A houses or house him with Padgham. He has already met Padgham and they both appear to like each other. Meanwhile I have written to Dick to see if there is any chance of employment on the continent.

Burt came to ask me whether it was possible

to get a small rise for Fish. Spooner who is going to join Joe Stephenson will get an extra allowance of ~150 like Skardon as he now has to run two homes. This leaves a wide discrepancy between Fish and Burt. Fish is perhaps a little disappointed at not getting a similar opportunity of service abroad. I told Burt I would see if it were possible to do anything. Hart came in and we discussed the letter which Rose SCHMIDT has written. She has asked KICHELE to sent the £200 but in her letter has explained to the position exactly. Her letter rather leads one to think that she has put all this in in order that KICHELE may be precisely informed as to her predicament, and play up to her story. We are considering substituting a letter which may have the effect of making KICHELE deny her story. We are not making any decision until we have seen Rosie SCHMIDT's documents relating to the loan which are stored in the bank at Hastings.

Adam rang me up to say that he was calling a meeting of the Executive to deal with the question of the Danes as there were so many interests involved. He also told me that the Travel Committee was proposing to have a discussion on Friday about travel of British subjects after Stage A. It is being suggested that they should be allowed to travel freely. I pointed out to Adam that as long as there were Jap Embassies in Stockholm, Lisbon, Madrid, Dublin and Berne I did not think it would be in conformity with the Chiefs of Staff's directive if we allowed all and sundry to travel to these countries without permits.

I had a word with Bill Stephenson who is going back to America tomorrow. He thinks

that Washington will be in an appalling mess. Truman he thinks will be a yes-man to Wall St. Security Co-Ordination is to be split up at Stage A. Burley's communication section will come under the Chiefs of Staff, Connop Guthrie's outfit may come under similar auspices or under consular officials. Section V will come under Passport Control. Bill is counting on being out of the whole business by the end of May.

Roland Bird came in to talk about ^{the} radio-telephone system between this country and Switzerland. It has been open to the press to use this service until they found it was unsatisfactory so they dropped it. While it is difficult to see in the present state of the war and of security generally that the opening of this service is likely to incur grave risks, we feel that as the Japs have entrenched themselves rather firmly in Switzerland the service should not be reopened for the time being. Roland Bird will try to put this across at the meeting on Tuesday.

April 16th

Victor has returned from Paris for a few days and he has been asked by Ed Saxe of 12th Army Group (USA) to come and organise their counter-sabotage section. This will probably take a few weeks. He may then go to other army groups.

John Marriott came to discuss his future. He had heard of the Civil Service scheme for taking on personnel with the rank of principal and above. He wondered whether this would not give him greater security of tenure. I said that in a sense it would but that it might not necessarily have such good pros-

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pects. In so far as security of tenure here is concerned he could I thought feel fairly confident. As regards prospects, much would depend on the shape of this office which we should not know until Findlater Stewart had report and some decision had been made on his report.

Herbert, Baxter, Milmo, Cecil and I had a discussion on a paper prepared by D.4. asking what duties performed by SCOs at ports were still necessary from a B.Dimn. point of view. We came to the conclusion that it was extremely difficult for us to say anything definite at the moment and that a decision should really be postponed until a month after VE day. Much depended on the future of the LRC. If the LRC were to be regarded purely as an organisation for the prevention of espionage in this country it was difficult to justify its existence at the present stage. On the other hand if it is regarded as an organisation which will assist our laws in dealing with collaborators and generally cleaning up the continent, it still has a definite function. Lastly it to some extent protects the H.O. against the observation here of undesirable aliens, a function which the Immigration Dept. on its present strength and calibre could not very easily undertake. We thought therefore that a paper should be prepared for the HDSE on the future aims and objects of the LRC, if any. Meanwhile we could say to D.4 that it was certainly desirable to have machinery for checking listed persons at the ports and for dealing with British civilians and P/Ws on an SLB3 basis.

The case of SETH was discussed at the daily meeting, an SOE agent who is to be brought back here from Brussels. We had originally arranged that he should be delivered at 020

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daily for interrogation until we could get to the bottom of his case. It now seems that a good deal of telephoning has been going on about him on a high level between the British Minister and the F.O. I suggested that we should find out precisely what the position was, by obtaining copies of the telegrams from the FO, also those from the MA from the W.O.

Ostro is suggesting to the Germans that they might give him and his network 3 months pay in advance in order to safeguard the organisation against a possible hiatus due to the military situation.

Alex Kellar has had a wire from Palestine that a revolt is possibly being staged for V-day. Palestine have asked that they may have 24 hours notice of the Supreme Commander's declaration that all organised resistance has ceased.

Hollis tells me that the SCI unit in Belgium has picked up a German named BOEHNKE who is described as a line-crosser. On interrogation he has said that he was part of the communist underground movement in Germany and that he had been in touch by wireless with the Russians. He also claims to have information about U-boat signals. I talked this over with Roger and Buster and it was suggested that the man should be brought back as an ordinary category A prisoner for interrogation at 020.

Walker has returned from a visit to Paris and Brussels. He found about 3 different French organisations dealing with pigeons but finally got them together and in future will work through D.S.D.M. The French are going to insist on the registration of all

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pigeons. In Belgium Walker found that politics came into the question. Apparently the association of pigeon fanciers is a powerful body. They are however quite ready to co-operate provided they are allowed to exercise their own pigeons. This point has been conceded. Meanwhile they have undertaken to go through the list of all their members and ascertain whether any of them have been collaborating during the last 4 years. There will be an exchange of information on pigeons between ourselves, the French and the Belgians, probably through the War Room.

The W/T Security Committee wish that the report to the J.I.C. on W/T Security after Stage A should go through themselves. Originally of course they said they did not wish to have the responsibility for W/T Security. Now however that an ad hoc committee has been set up with their concurrence, they seem to be anxious to get control of it. Personally I am quite indifferent provided they do one thing or the other.

John Senter rang me up to say that he was rather worried about the case of SETH. He thought that possibly some expert ought to interrogate him on his peace mission from Schellenberg of the SD. If as at present arranged SETH wrote out his story and was then cross-examined on it several weeks might elapse, and the great ones might be asking what conclusions had been reached. They were aware of the existence of SETH and his story since there had been a great deal of telephoning between the F.O. and Berne. I said that I thought the first thing to do was to get SETH's whole story. Only then would it be possible to say what importance should be attached to any proposal

that he had to make. On the face of it it looked as if he was pitching a tall story to act as a kind of smoke screen for his own misdemeanours. The one thing to be avoided was that the case should get into the hands of the high-ups before it had been properly sifted. We had already had a bitter experience of this in the case of MARCUS. Senter thought that possibly SETH might be interrogated by Section V. but I felt that if Mason got hold of the case he would be certain to go off the deep end with possibly disastrous results.

April 17th

Harker showed me a rather peevish telegram from Airy asking that any telegrams sent by Cass should first be approved by the office. He referred to a telegram recommending Courtney's return and his replacement by someone called Shorto. It had been arranged that we should be the first to inform Airy about Courtney's possible return but our telegram and Cass's were sent off within a few hours of each other and evidently Cass's arrived first. I gather from Harker that Airy is rather trying to work his passage home. He in fact suggests that he should come back for a short visit in the telegram. He seems to be rather a rolling stone. No sooner does he get settled in a job than he gets browned off and becomes phlegmatic. The D.G. is not inclined to pander to this. The suggestion is therefore that Ede being ill MacIver should go out and take stock of the whole position. As a replacement for Courtney I have suggested Watts. I think he would do the job extremely well. It really involves carrying MI5 representation in the Far Eastern War Room.

The D.G. and Jim Hale returned from the IOM. Jim is to let us have a list of officers and NCOs, some of whom have very good language qualifications. If we do not grab them they will go into the Intelligence pool. The right course is I think to train them and send them out to the Control Commission.

I had a long talk with Adam and also with Paddy Barry on the question of travel control. The Chiefs of Staff's ruling about security between Stages A and B has been changed. Washington say that they are not concerned about the identity, location or movement of Anglo-American forces on or from the continent of Europe after the cease fire. They are however still concerned with the despatches of forces from this country or from the USA to the Far Eastern theatre but naturally in a rather half-hearted way. They say for example that even if the Japs did know that certain divisions were leaving this country for the Far East there is very little that they could do about it in the present state of affairs. This of course has a considerable bearing on a discussion which is to take place on Friday at the Travel Control meeting on whether there are any real grounds for restricting travel of British subjects abroad after Stage A. If the rather half-hearted declaration of the Chiefs of Staff is to be implemented to the letter, we should presumably continue to restrict travel to places where there are Jap Embassies or Legations. These are Stockholm, Lisbon, Dublin, Madrid and Berne. Lisbon and Madrid are likely to disappear before long. Meanwhile we know that the Japs are building up Berne in anticipation of trouble in the Peninsular. Even though we take a low view of Jap espionage activities I presume that we should maintain

not only restricted travel to these countries but also censorship of mail and telegrams. Censorship of mail is to go 3 months after Stage A. That is as soon as the allied censorships are well in the saddle.

Cussen, Buster, Bird and I had a meeting on the case of SETH. It was agreed that Cussen would speak to SETH on arrival, explain to him the delicacy of his position and urge upon him the necessity of co-operating fully with the authorities in clearing matters up. He would then tell SETH that he should report at the LRC daily until further notice. His case will be examined there in detail and copies of the reports will be circulated to SOE and SIS. We shall then be in a better position to judge at an early date whether any attention at all should be paid to his rather sensational disclosures of peace terms, etc.

SHAEF C.I. Summary for week ending 13.4.45 states that the headquarters of the G.I.S. attached to military formations are moving north-eastwards from Thuringia. The general movement of other headquarters of the G.I.S. is to the Bavarian Mountains. Three depts. of the RSHA are now in Munich. The Germans espionage however is dwindling but it is possible that there are reserves of foreign collaborators and that these may now be used for tactical mission covered as foreign workers. The connection between Bruegzmann's S.S. organisation for guerrilla warfare and Skorzeny's s.s. jagdverbaende is not clear but may be closer than was at first believed. The real distinction seems to be that Bruegzmann's agents are organised by higher and police officials and are left behind to be overrun while Skorzeny's are parachuted or infiltrated. At least this jaeger battalion are now known to exist.

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An S.D. W/T agent has surrendered at Saarbrücken. He states that he deserted from the German Army in 1942, was dropped on Berlin by the Russians, captured, and turned round by the S.D. A party of 18 Germans landed in Cherbourg area from Guernsey on 5th April with demolition charges on a sabotage mission. One only, an officer, is still at large. Further operations are considered probable and imminent. Some French members of a reconnaissance party for Jagdverbaende operation involving 100 to 150 men were arrested by the French 1st Army and killed trying to escape. They had plastic raincoats and walking sticks. A PPF round-up has revealed a network of 14 men and 9 women which had been established by the leader since the liberation. Additional to their Werewolf and espionage activities a German document shows that the Hitlerjugend are expected to volunteer to guard and finally set off demolitions prepared by the Wehrmacht.

April 18th

At the Wednesday meeting Baxter mentioned a Pole who had come here from Stockholm.

had represented him as an accredited agent while Section V were now suggesting that he should be arrested as a German agent. The man is evidently undesirable and were it not for the fact that he knows something about Kremer it would be much better if he did not come here at all. It looks as if SIS were trying to get rid of a dud agent from Stockholm. I asked that cases of this kind should be very carefully scrutinised in future.

April 19th

Kellar suggested to me that possibly we might take on George Kirk in his section. It is possible that Hunloke may have to come back under the Python scheme in November in which case Kellar suggests that James Robertson might succeed him. It would then be useful to have someone who could take Robertson's place at any rate for the time being. I am putting this up to the D.G.

At the Staff Meeting today the case of Miss Bagot was discussed. The D.G. apparently does not want her to go and has said that if she insists she will have to resign. It was decided to wait and see whether her application was accepted. If it was we would do everything possible to persuade the D.G. to second her to the Control Commission. While Roger could ill afford to let her go he did not wish to stand in her way. Everyone agreed that the change would probably do her good. As regards Colledge going to F.2. it was decided to ascertain whether his application for the civil service had been accepted. I mentioned the case of Miss Gask. An attempt is being made to clear the position with the M/L who have, according to Horrocks, put a freezing order on permanent staff. I asked once more that Mrs. Arbuthnot's case should be considered and was told that this would be done this afternoon. It was decided that in all the circumstances it would be a good thing if McIver were to visit Kandy and find out precisely what was required and why Airy was so troublesome. It was also agreed that Watts would be a suitable candidate to replace Courtney Young, although Watts may be in a category for fairly early release.

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I took Rivett-Carnac down to O20 where we had lunch. TinEye put on a tremendous show. Once more I had to go through the embarrassing performance of inspecting the guard. TinEye seemed a little concerned about the O20 camp which is ultimately to be established in Germany. He thinks that it will be necessary to leave a small nucleus here and he is anxious to come back from time to time in order to supervise its activities. He thinks however that the majority including himself could go over to Germany in about 2-3 months time.

At 3 pm we had a meeting to discuss the abolition of 18B in the colonies. We came to the conclusion that it could be abolished but that 18B(a) would have to be retained. The situation in Palestine would be covered under the emergency powers of 1936.

Hughes came in to talk to me about a transmitter being operated by one of the voluntary interceptors. This man had been sacked and his set taken away. Another V.I. with whom he had been communicating had however been left at large because the Lancs police refused to take out a warrant, and the local Post Office were reluctant to act. The police were apparently saying that having got a warrant on the statement of the other V.I. the wireless set might in the meantime have been removed. This seems to me rather chicken-hearted. They want a warrant from us. We could of course give one but we are only supposed to issue an 88A if the matter is so urgent as to prevent us from getting a magistrate's warrant. The case has no security interest but a misdemeanour has been committed which should be dealt with. I have asked Hughes to try and move the Post Office who can go and ask whether there is a wireless

transmitter but have in fact no right of entry. The whole situation is rather farcical.

The D.G., Harker, Charles and I discussed the question of MacIver going to Ceylon. It was agreed that he should be sent out with a letter from the D.G. to Tim Airy. It was also agreed that Watts should replace Courtney Young, if this can be arranged domestically.

Sclater came to talk about the decision of the Air Ministry and Navy to operate enclair after Stage A. It rather alters the position in regard to signals security. I suggested that he should go and discuss the matter with Firth.

Yesterday I had a talk with Cyril Mills and explained to him our difficulties in the cases of COLEPAUGH and GIMPEL and the GRUNDEL case. I said that I wanted to discuss later with him the future of our station in Canada.

April 20th

Lennox came to talk to me about his section. He has prepared a memo on its future. He suggests that while Watts could be spared from the point of view of the work he is likely to be in an early category for release as a journalist. Marcus is likely to wish to return to his firm after Stage A and Lennox would evidently be quite pleased to see Boddington get some job with the Control Commission. This would leave Lennox with Mackney and he would be prepared to remain as long as his services were required. Between Stages A and B Lennox conceives his duties to cover looking after secret armaments, the verification of suspected leakage and looking after the D.M.s movements. Secret trials might

keep Hackney intermittently employed, checking up on suspected leakages could very well be carried through other channels and cannot possibly amount to very much after Stage A, and the PMs visits constitute a job which we should never have taken on.

I discussed with Harker and Charles the position of Watts as a possible substitute for Courtney Young. It seems that Watts is in an early category for release and that if we send him to the Far East we might cause him to lose his job. Ingram's name has therefore been suggested.

Marriott is joining F.Division on Monday.

Claude Knight, who has been working in PWE in Belgium, came to see me on Brook-Booth's recommendation. He is very keen to obtain employment in this dept. He is not a very impressive character but seems to have had quite a career in Intelligence. I promised him I would bear his name in mind.

I had a talk with Tommy Harris and Mills about Garbo and Moonbeam. Mrs. G. is for the moment at any rate agreeable to return to Spain and has got her marching orders. Cyril will have to fly back the week after next in order to get Moonbeam on the air.

Cussen came to see me about a telegram from the British Mission in Odessa which relates that 4 women either British born or married to British subjects, who were in an internment camp in eastern Germany when it was over-run by the Soviet forces, were raped by Russian soldiers and generally treated very harshly. They have all made signed statements. If they come to this country and the press get on to them a pretty serious inter-

national complication is likely to arise. It is suggested that we should make sure that the F.O. are thoroughly acquainted with the circumstances. I am suggesting that Anthony should go over and have a word with Cavendish-Bentinck.

April 21st

Burt came to talk to me about the documents that he had found in Rosie SCHMIDT's safe deposit at Hastings. On looking at them more closely they do not seem to agree with her statement. Herbert thinks they only denote an evasion of Income Tax but we are going to submit them to closer scrutiny.

Richard Butler told me that Arnold-Foster had rung up somewhat concerned about the terms of reference for Findlater Stewart. He wanted to have a talk with me. I rang him up when he said that he had been proceeding on the assumption that we were still of the opinion that the question of amalgamation should be reviewed. I said that broadly speaking we were, but that I personally had received rather a shock when I saw the original terms of reference. It seemed to me that they merely constituted an enquiry into MI5. Quite frankly I had been somewhat irritated and wondered what was going on. Arnold-Foster said he did not like the terms of reference because he did not think they were wide enough or that they would give Findlater Stewart full scope to look into the affairs of both depts. I said I was very glad he felt this way and that I should be very pleased to discuss the other points with him as soon as he felt fit enough to dine with me. I told him that while I was quite prepared to say that I should welcome the whole problem being reviewed from the point of view of amalgamation it was quite

hopeless to think that the DG would do the same. He had come down heavily on the other side and nothing would shake him.

Paddy and I attended the JIC to discuss the Chiefs of Staff telegram from Moscow. This telegram related to security arrangements after Stage A. It was extremely badly worded and there was consequently a great variety of opinion as to what precisely they meant. My own view is that they see no point in maintaining secret the identity, location and movement of Anglo-American forces on and from the continent of Europe back to England and the States, but that they did attach importance to maintaining secret the departure of units from this country and the States for the eastern theatre. This apparently agrees with the view of the ISSB who have very definite arrangements with SEAC for covering the departure of troops from this country. It was generally felt that until we got this point cleared up it was difficult to comment beyond pointing out certain other inaccuracies. The Chiefs of Staff in one of their statements had said that the Japs knew the order of battle already and that therefore we should not be telling them very much. Bevan who was there pointed out that although the Japs knew the identity of the actual units engaged in the western and eastern theatres they did not know the identity of a number of notional units which had been created through our deception policy. It was important therefore that in giving any publicity we should avoid any suggestion that we were revealing the identity of all units which had been engaged in Germany. It was also pointed out for the Navy that the movement of our ships which the Japs believed to be in the Far East and which were actually in European waters, was an important factor particularly where capital.

ships were concerned and should therefore be kept secret. The Chiefs of Staff in Washington did not appear to have taken the Navy into consideration at all. One of the difficulties about co-ordinating plans of this kind between ourselves and the Americans is that the mention of any component part of an American division immediately gives the whole division away whereas if we say that a battalion of the West Yorks has come back to this country there is no indication as to the number of the division or even brigade to which it is attached.

Glover came to see me about Ingram. He said that he was an extremely pleasant individual who got on very well with everybody. He is intelligent, hardworking and very keen. He handles all his cases extremely well. If he has a fault it is that he is perhaps inclined to take too charitable a view of those with whom he is dealing. He is anxious to stay on with us after the war. Personally I think he is well worth a trial and that we should get him up for training in order that he may take Courtney Young's place in Kandy.

Kellar and I had a talk with the D.G. about George Kirk. The D.G. has agreed that Kirk should be allowed to work here in Kellar's section. He will certainly be useful.

Kirk does not know whether to go back to his old employment but I think that in due course he may well do so. Meanwhile he is prepared to remain on with us on a kind of temporary basis.

Thomas came in to tell me that he had met SETH and had made him a little speech, pointing out that he had a good deal to explain, and to attend at the LRC at 10 am tomorrow. SETH said he had a code and time frequency for

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the receipt of messages for the Germans. This has been passed on to RSS. I subsequently telephoned to Baxter and asked him to find out from SETH early tomorrow precisely what the code was, what message he is expecting to receive from the Germans and how he was proposing to communicate with them.

April 22nd

I had a talk with Baxter on the phone this morning. His examiner has ascertained from SETH that he was expecting the Germans to give him an address in Switzerland with which he was to communicate. He was also to communicate by wireless if they could make arrangements to deliver a set to him in Zurich. I gather that something is a propos of this is going on. SETH had with him a medical certificate stating that he was subject to paranoic tendencies. From the sensational nature of his story this indeed seems likely.

I had lunch with D.B. He is staying on in SIS for a year or two till

This he says he is doing on the special request of Cadogan who feels he is the only man capable of setting the show on its feet! However he is very well disposed towards us and I am sure that soon as he is there he will give us full co-operation. He thinks that all special material should be done by us in the postwar period and that the secret ink side should also be controlled by us on behalf of both depts.

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April 23rd

I had a talk with Cass who is leaving for Kandy tomorrow. I told him about Ingram who is to replace Courtney. He seemed quite satisfied. He said that he had had one or two illuminating interviews with SIS who had been talking to Fergie since the latter's return. SIS blames the whole thing on Felix. They say that Fergie was sent out on a wild-goose-chase and that he was not properly briefed. They admit that in fact they have nothing to put in the kitty except a few bodies. These are and one other.

I lunched with Cyril and Tommy when we discussed the Garbo case. It is agreed that we should keep Moonbeam at any rate for the time being and that if Cyril had to leave Canada we should either replace him by Ronnie Reed or arrange that he should go out once every 3 months to send a communication by letter. He would work in the interval on the Canadian press and then get the Ds of I in Ottawa to pep the information up to some higher grade. As regards Garbo himself we discussed quite seriously the proposition of selling his own organisation to the Russians. Tommy's plan is to get him to write to the Soviet M.A. in London anonymously before he leaves for Spain. He would tell the latter the whole of his story and give them his code. He would tell them that he had been working for the English against Franco and that if they liked they could monitor communications between ourselves and the Germans to get what information they liked and incidentally to satisfy themselves as to his bona fides. He would then leave them entirely alone for about a year when he would write referring to his previous correspondence and suggesting Catalogue Reference KV/4/196. I think this may be worth going into in some detail.

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Dr. Page came to see me about who helped us considerably over the CALVO and other cases. has now become somewhat mental and suicidal on account of the part that he played in bringing about the downfall of CALVO and ALCÁZAR. Page thinks he ought to see Brown, a psychiatrist of considerable eminence. I have got Charles to agree that we can spend up to £100 on this as we may to some extent be responsible for mental state.

I had a talk with Charles about our staff discussion which is to take place on Thursday. The DG wishes to decide whether offers can be made to certain people of postwar employment. I said that I thought before we could do this two things had to be decided (1) what our charter was to be, and (2) what should become of a number of useless members of the permanent staff. If they had to be fitted into the postwar organisation there might not be enough work for the new staff to do.

I had a talk with Ingram who is keen to go to Kandy and seems a suitable candidate.

According to a BJ the greater part of the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been moved from Berlin to Kitzbuehl, Bad Gastein-Lake Constance area, Garmisch and Salzburg. This is described as being necessary owing to the "burdensomeness" of the situation. Judging by the number of bombs, shells etc. loosed on Berlin during the last few days the situation might well be described as burdensome.

Discussions are now going on between the F.O. and the British Minister in Cairo on the question of the Suez Canal. The War Cabinet are being asked by the Suez Canal Committee whether negotiations could be opened on the assumption (1) that responsibility for the

defence of the canal should be vested in H.M. Government and the Egyptian Govt. in perpetuity and (2) that H.M. Govt. for political and strategic reasons regard it as desirable that Gt. Britain should play a predominant part in the defence and control of the Middle East. Killearn thinks that we should proceed on these assumptions but advises that it would be well if possible to obtain the tacit support of the USA. He is very keen to avoid any discussion by the three Powers as to the future of the Canal, even though this may be unpalatable both to Egypt and to Russia.

The German Generals here have declined to broadcast. While they admit defeat and are anxious to avert unnecessary bloodshed they feel that their hands are tied because of the reprisals that would be taken against their families. Moreover they did not think that any pronouncement by themselves would be likely to affect the situation at this stage, since the generals were really powerless, neither could they recommend the Wehrmacht to surrender when the prospect appeared to be that German soldiers would remain prisoner for years to come and perhaps 10 million might be sent to Russia as slave-workers. Having seen how the Russians treat their own countrymen employed in forced labour they considered that most German soldiers would rather die in battle than face such a prospect. If some promise could be made to the German soldier that those who had committed no crimes would be released early to resume their normal occupations, in particular urgent agricultural needs, the situation might assume a different aspect. They considered that the only way of averting chaos is for the Wehrmacht to seize executive power from the present German Govt. and then allow allied armies to march through.

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SHAEF JIC do not believe that any mass rising or large-scale attacks are likely to take place in Germany on the lines of communication. They think they can prevent any serious attempt at espionage or sabotage but they regard the Werewolves as the most serious threat to security. They think that they may engage in assassination of allied personnel and German officials working for the allies, attack supply columns etc. and destroy aircraft and fuel supplies. Personally I do not think there is much justification for this fear.

SHAEF JIC have examined the possibility of a stand by the Germans in the redoubt. They say that numerous reports indicate that there is in preparation a fortified area in southern Germany and northern Austria, the purpose of which is not yet clear but which may well be for a 1st Nazi stand when Germany is overrun. Fanatics are likely to be used, but the most that could be employed would be 10 divisions. It is possible that the progress of allied operations may not permit a planned occupation of the redoubt, since many of the forces may be cut off before they get there. It is recommended that energetic steps should be taken to do this by the allies.

April 24th

I had a talk with Mrs. Pitt about the three Charlies. They were got out of Spain as their lives were in danger. We were very much indebted to them as they had been responsible for double-crossing the Germans in failing to blow up four of our ships in southern Spain, a couple of years ago. They were registered here in false names and in their income tax returns had failed to show that they were married or had children. The result is that they have paid £210 too much income tax.

I spoke to Charles about this who thought that it would be simpler to pay the money out of B.Divn.funds, otherwise we should get involved in endless explanations which would be embarrassing.

SIS and SOE are having their part in resistance written up for publication. We have asked to see the MSS before it is printed in case there is a security aspect affecting this dept.

At the DGs meeting Adam said that in loosening passport control for British subjects at Stage A should first be discussed by the HDSE. Jim said that most people would be released from the IOM shortly. 100 Italian Fascists would be held until they could be dumped on the beach at Naples.

At the daily meeting Mrs Spring said that Stuttgart had gone off the air, Berlin was also off the air and nothing had been heard from Hamburg for two days. The station that was at Stuttgart is operating again but it is not yet pinpointed.

Adam discussed with me the case of the OSS agent who had been dabbling in Austrian politics in this country. SIS had said that they now wished to drop the case but had given no reasons. I said that I thought SIS had agreed to this man being brought here without passing through the LRC and with knowledge of what he was going to do or they had been double-crossed by OSS. In either case I thought that we ought to know the truth.

I had a talk with McIver about Ceylon, and gave him all the information I could. He is going out to see Tim and size up the position.
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Richard Butler tells me that Cavendish-Bentine

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has sent a suggestion to the DG that Findlater Stewart's terms of reference should be widened to include a survey of the whole field of SIS and MI5, and to see whether fusion is possible or desirable. It suggests also that those parts of MI5 which perform duties other than purely intelligence duties should also be examined. This is of course Arnold-Foster's suggestion and oncemore we have the old rump theory coming up. I have said that while we should welcome the extended terms of reference we should make it clear that any breaking of the component parts of MI5 is out of the question. Having read Curry's excellent memo about the origins of this office, I am more than ever convinced that it would be a mistake to separate security from our other functions.

I had a word with Gisela about her future. She seems to have failed all along the line to get a job. I propose to take up her case with Leonard Ingrams and see whether we cannot get her into UNRRA.

April 25th

Rivett-Carnac came in to say goodbye. He seems to be thoroughly satisfied with his visit here.

Anthony came to tell me that according to a Jap B.J. a Swiss journalist named AESCHMANN had applied for a visa to come to this country and was in fact to collect general information of a political kind for the Japs. Having Orange in mind Anthony thought that we might possibly allow him to come and fill him up with whatever lies the FO or the Controller wish to put over, e.g. there is no rift in the Anglo-Russian lute and Japan may shortly expect a major operation on the Far Eastern front. Unfortunately Cavendish-Bentinck is away at the San Francisco Conference. I therefore got Anthony

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to go round and see Johnny Bevan who seems to be rather taken with the idea.

I had lunch with Perks, Baxter and Herbert. I put over to Perks my suggestion that I.O.s should do a course in this office and that generally speaking we should work much more closely in the postwar period with the Immigration Service. I suggested too that our Regional Officers should make fairly frequent visits to the ports. Perks seemed quite taken with this idea. We also discussed the immediate future of the LRC. While he quite agrees that the LRC must go on he thinks that certain categories should be included. I pointed out to him that the main flow was coming from Sweden and that many of those who were sent over here were entirely unsuitable for enlistment in allied forces. They therefore got thrown on the labour market. This was creating a problem for the H.O. in the future. Our own soldiers would be returning and finding Dutchmen, Norwegians, etc. doing their work. H.O. would then be confronted with letters from firms saying that the alien's services were indispensable, that he had married a British wife and had a British-born child. I thought that the real answer was for Passport Control to cut down the visas and the allied Governments to exercise far greater scrutiny, in putting people forward for the forces. At the moment they seemed to be regarding this country as a kind of dumping ground for their nationals who were an embarrassment to them in Sweden. Baxter also pointed out to Perks that there were certain inaccuracies in Carew-Robinson's letter about the handling of aliens. Perks explained a thing which I did not know before, that what is known to I.O.s as I(1) of the Aliens Order is the clause on which they mainly operate. It states that the alien must satisfy the I.O. that he is a suitable person to be allowed to

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land. This clause does in fact give the I.O. complete discretion although it is doubtful whether it was really drafted for that purpose. All the other clauses specify particular types such as crooks, share-pushers etc. There is no doubt that the attentions of the I.O.s in the past have been mainly directed towards people of this sort and that it is only in looking for crooks that they occasionally come across a spy. If they were better informed about what a spy looked like and what he did they would probably be able to produce better results. Perks said that it would have been far better if at the beginning of the war he had handed over his best I.O.s to us and put them into uniform instead of appointing a lot of SCOs who for a long time had not the slightest idea what they were doing and who after 6 months began to think that they knew everything. Personally I am inclined to agree with this view, since the I.O. who has been working for a good many years should have a far better nose for an undesirable alien than anybody else. The service is however rather a low-grade one, in fact Perks let slip that he had recently been interviewing prospective I.O.s who were being offered a salary of £6 a week. This is of course quite absurd. It transpired too that the I.O.s have very heavy responsibilities and did not get a great deal of direction from the H.O. He quoted the case of an Austrian footballer who came 4 times to this country in order to join the Arsenal team. The H.O. told Perks who was then at Dover that it was quite useless for him to ring up and ask for guidance. He should exercise his own discretion. He did, and the man was R.L.L.

Garbo has received a rather peculiar message telling him that the Abwehr and S.D. in Spain

cannot give him any help with the Spanish authorities. They will do everything they can to help him in the way of documents and finance in France but he will have to make his own arrangements about getting back into Spain. They say they are in difficulties because the authorities to whom they would normally look for guidance in this matter are "in distant lands". What precisely is meant by this is not clear. It may be the Redoubt or the Argentine.

April 26th

PWE wish to bring over here a Hungarian MP called FABIAN, a German called MEYER, a Czech called KOMANN and a Greek called EZRATTY, who allege that they are ex-internees from a German gas chamber camp in Silesia. The idea is that they should broadcast. We have said that we will grant them RBL on the understanding that they will be returned to the continent as soon as their job is finished. They will be examined at the LRC.

Spooner is leaving as a captain to join Joe Stephenson's office in Germany.

Teresa tells me that NEBEL @ OSTRICH has been overrun with two others and is now being interrogated.

Ronnie Haylor came to tell me that a decision had now been reached to effect a merger between 21 AG C.I. and C.I. of the Control Commission. Both authorities are to be in Berlin under Bill Williams, during the SHAEF period, and until the appointment of the MGI. At the end of the SHAEF period it is a matter of speculation whether R.J. will come in in charge of C.I. under the M.G.I.

Tommy Harris showed me an SOS message from Madrid to Berlin dated 19.4.45 showing that on the orders of Lequerica the Spanish Foreign Minister 33 Germans were being ordered to leave Spain. This included Knappe @ Frederico who has been running Garbo and Kuhlenthal. A further list of expulsions is expected shortly. All those on the list are for the time being to go to some place near Barcelona. This move is probably the result of the various protests that have been registered and to the last F.O. reply to Franco's overtures, which was to the effect that Spain had actively assisted the Germans until there was some apparent change of heart. Full cooperation would be a different matter. We are trying to get the Spaniards to pipe down on Kuhlenthal which may be useful to Garbo later on. This will however have to be done without it being apparent that we are in any way interested. The above telegram probably explains previous messages about the difficulties to be encountered by the Madrid Station and the statement that the controlling authorities were in distant lands.

The D.G. called a meeting at which Harker, Charles Horrocks and Dick Butler were present, with myself, to discuss the lists of officers who wish to stay on after the war. There appear to be quite a number who do, but the difficulty is to make them a firm offer until we know what our charter should be. It is however possible to tell those who want to stay on and who are not in fact wanted that there is not likely to be an opening for them.

April 27th

During the month of March 995 cases were released from the LRC. Arrivals totalled 1,158. 598 were Scandinavians, 217 Dutch, 194 Polish, 167 French, 32 Belgian, 21 Czech. 12(5)A orders were applied for against 4 people. 3 escape boats arrived, 2 Norwegian and one Danish.

According to the Swedish Foreign Minister the German Minister Dr. Schnurre now in Stockholm had instructions to make certain peace proposals but Schnurre did not think that any good would be done by acting thus owing to the catastrophic developments in the military situation.

A report by JIC SHAEF dated 14th April states that nearly all reports continue to speak of the docility and apathy of the German civilian population. Violations of curfew orders were few, military government meets with very little opposition and the swift and strict punishment meted out to all offenders by military courts has made a great impression. Cities which have suffered most are now the most friendly as in the case of Cologne. The only exception would appear to be Bad Kreuznach, where a considerable number of troops had to be diverted to eliminate sniping which had broken out after the occupation. German officials have so far proved on the whole satisfactory. They seem to show little desire to take office. No sound evidence as yet exists of the existence of any widespread anti-Nazi organisation and the Germans in most cases take little spontaneous action against the Nazis. Nevertheless there are already signs of bitterness and resentment against the occupying forces, partly on account of the stern attitude of our troops,

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partly due to extensive requisitioning and partly due to the fact that the first careless rapture of being released from bombing, shelling and the horrors of total war has now expired. There have been scattered cases of food shortage, but in most places some stocks have been found. The German authorities are being compelled to provide food for displaced persons before feeding the German population, but at the moment the food problem is not acute. In spite of a certain apprehension, I should say unjustifiable, about werewolves, it is felt that no mass risings or large-scale looting and attacks on lines of communication by the population are likely. In France it is expected that there will be a swing to the Right rather than to the Left in the forthcoming ministerial elections. The impression is formed by the fact that the Left Wing parties appear irresolute and undecided as to the course of their campaign while the C.P. is still adhering to its policy of support for the Govt. The Right Wing parties are taking advantage of this situation and gaining ground. The return of French prisoners is considered a potential source of unrest. There are no new developments in Belgium. In Holland there is a feeling that the Dutch have been forgotten in the great allied invasion of Germany. The great thing is to provide food and fuel as quickly as possible for the starving population.

SHAEF C.I. summary for week ending 20th April states that despite extensive efforts during the last 3 months by enemy intelligence kommandos and troupes of army headquarters to establish stay-behind espionage networks on German territory the results to date are considered negligible. Failure has been due partly to shortage of W/T sets and petrol which have hindered training and recruiting, partly the speed of

the Allied advance and partly to the low morale of agents. In attempts to retrieve a desperate situation permission has been given for the use as stay-behind agents of W/T personnel of Kommandos and truppe and foreign workers previously intended for work abroad. These are likely to pose as allied collaborators or try to obtain jobs as interpreters. For communication pigeons and couriers are to supplement W/T. G.I.S. Control Station continues to change location almost daily. So far no Kommando or truppe in Germany has been reported cut off or captured. Captured documents and interrogations support the general theory that the office of Obergruppenführer Pruetzmann provides under Himmler's authority central administration for the whole resistance movement, co-ordinates the work of the RSHA terrorist units and the local networks by higher S.S. and police officials.

Mrs. Garbo is due to leave for Spain on May 1st. One of Garbo's agents has had to be cut out of the organisation. He was watching the 1st airborne division and as SHAEF cannot give any release of information about this division it has been necessary to get rid of him. Garbo has explained to the Germans that though the agent pretends that he ran into trouble Garbo feels sure that he has concocted this story in order to provide an excuse for deserting the cause. In consequence of the last message from the Germans Garbo's organisation here will probably be further reduced, as he is advised to give leave to his agents unless they can provide political information.

Tate has received a questionnaire identical with one given to Ostro which indicates that the Germans propose to use their submarine reserves to the utmost.

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At the daily meeting Herbert gave details of the analyses of the American JMA information which shows that most of the identification of American units was done from the press. There are a few correct identifications which cannot be attributed to press sources. The same applies to both western and eastern theatres.

Buster gave details about the case of SPECK, a German P/W who had former Abwehr connections. He has thrown considerable light on the case of "a Galle whom we detained here but who was never completely broken. Le Galle has recently been sent over to the French who say they have got a confession from him. This was a case on which Buster and I disagreed with 20 who were inclined to white-wash LeGALLE.

Rawlinson came to see me about the future of CSDIC here. Buster and I told him that we expected an increasing number of P/Ws connected with the Abwehr whose examination in this country was essential owing to records and general background. We hoped therefore that his camp would continue for some months. He seemed to think that it would be possible to keep a small nucleus here roughly until the end of the year. He had a useful suggestion to make about COLUMBINE whom he thought might be given a commission in the British Army as a pioneer and then conduct interrogations in the field. He quoted a precedent for this which would have to be arranged on a high level if w/ A G. agreed. Buster will discuss this case with Noakes next week.

April 28th

I saw Burt today. He told me that the sale-breaking job carried out in Hampstead had involved a loss of £2,000 in notes. He is fairly confident that ZIGZAG, to whom he handed over £1,000 and £100 for two Leica cameras, was responsible for the Hampstead burglary. ZIGZAG is at present living in a flat in Knightsbridge for which he pays £5 a week and sub-lets a part for £7 a week. He has recently visited Compton MacKenzie and also Macartney regarding the publication of his book which he has promised to submit for censorship. Burt is fairly confident that the book will be written by Macartney.

Burt told me that he was assisting in the BOLSOM case by passing any information or reaction which we got direct to Chief Inspector Barrett. At the moment BOLSOM has a rather pleasant little sideline. One of his friends wishing to get rid of £3,000 in notes has handed them over to BOLSOM in exchange for a cheque. Before paying the check over BOLSOM sent round a bogus revenue inspector to interview his friend. The friend then became scared and went to BOLSOM for assistance. BOLSOM said that probably for the sum of £1,500 he could bribe somebody in the inland revenue to lay off. The £1,500 of course goes into BOLSOM's pocket and his friend receives a cheque for £1,500 instead of £3,000.

A document has been captured in the field dated 22.3.45. It is addressed to the Front Aufklarungskommando 306 from the Commander of the Security Police and the Security Service for occupied Holland. It relates to the interrogation of Anton SCHRADER who was apparently taken on as an OSS agent and

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apprehended at Groningen on 10.2.45. He gave a lot of information of very little significance concerning his training by OSS and also a good deal of information about the Dutch Security Service. He attempts to explain the organisation of the British Secret Service but breaks down rather badly. He says that the equivalent of the Dutch Intelligence Service and the British P.I.D. is the American F.B.I. He says that the British Secret Service is P.I.D. He quotes a Brig. Dunne who according to our records was at one time proposing to get him a job in P.I.D. The dept. engaged in the search for enemy agents as well as doing counter-intelligence work in co-operation with the Middle East Service is Dept. G.5. of Scotland Yard. The officer who interrogated him says that his information may be treated as confirmation of already-known facts about the Dutch and British Secret Services. SCHRADER spoke of differences between OSS and the British. He says that OSS was formed because the Americans wanted to get their own information about military matters in the European theatre which until then they had had to request the British service to provide. Also the Americans disapproved of the British having first choice of agents from the Patriotic Schools where all emigres arrived. The British did not fancy this idea of an American Service in Europe and it appears that there exists a certain rivalry which has led to discrepancies in France already. SCHRADER mentions his means of communication by W/T. He had a telephone apparatus described as a horizontal transmitter receiver set, with which he could communicate to aircraft. His voice was recorded in the aircraft during his training for the purpose of identification in future operations. This case is interesting since

we had a good deal to do with SCHRADER and we discovered that he was interviewing SIS and SOE agents. We came ultimately to the conclusion that there was nothing really wrong with him, but we advised against his employment as an agent.

I have read Curry's chapter 3 which is an extremely good document. I have suggested to the DG that Findlater Stewart should be allowed to read this memo on the origin of the office and its work up to the outbreak of war. I thought that in many respects such documents would of greater importance to him than those which related to our work since the outbreak of war.

April 30th

I talked to Miss Barnes about the case of one DODGE, a repatriated P/W who was one of the air-men in Stalag 3B who escaped and was recaptured on the occasion when the Germans shot a number of British officers. He was sent subsequently to Oranienburg where conditions were pretty bad. Later he was released and at large in Berlin where he was placed in touch with a number of Nazi officials. Subsequently he was put across the Swiss border with something in the nature of a peace mission. There is no reason to suppose that he is a renegade. Arrangements have been made for him to be given a gentle side-door interrogation by the LRC. There had been some suggestion of his going to the FO and it seemed desirable that we should see him first and sift his story.

Kellar talked to me about Simonds who is proposed by Douglas Roberts as the successor to Hunloke. Hunloke is due to come back under

the Python scheme and Roberts does not think that on the security side he is very efficient. Simonds is from what we can gather from other sources not a very attractive character and apt to be quarrelsome. There have been allegations that he was partial to the Jews. This however seems to be unjustified since under the orders of SIME he had ingratiated himself with a number of leading Jewish personalities in the Middle East. Having collected all the information we can I think we shall probably recommend against Simond's appointment.

Cussen came to tell me that he had seen Dick and that he wished me to know that he did not intend to accept any appointment as co-ordinator between Control Commission and 21 A.G. until he had discussed the matter with me.

I lunched with Mills. I told him that all things being equal I should be glad to see him remain in Canada until the Findlater Stewart committee had promulgated its views. If we were to be allowed representation in America I would prefer that his successor should go out and overlap a few weeks rather than that there should be a hiatus.

- * Cayzer came to tell me that there was a certain amount of anxiety about British Honduras about a possible attack by Guatamala, backed by Mexico. Guatamala has included British Honduras in its new constitution and apparently wants half of Belize, the other half to go to Mexico. It is said that there has already been a raiding party. The Governor wants air support. The C.O. do not appear to take a very serious view of the situation.

Carew-Robinson rang me to say that he was expecting a visit from Sam Hoare. There is to be a debate in the House of Lords on the

admission of aliens before the war. Sam Hoare thinks that as the prewar Home Secretary he may be attacked for his policy. He would like to be able to say that there had been no cases of spies amongst those who were admitted, I said that this would not be entirely true since a certain number of spies in the strict sense of the word had come in and gone out again and that there might be one or two cases of people who had actually settled here, but that in any case it was desirable for a number of reasons to continue to keep the Germans in the dark. There was however another aspect of this whole problem. Before the war German activities took the form of propaganda and the collection of information quite legally about the state of our rearmaments. This had been due to a number of causes. The result however had been that the Germans had very nearly succeeded in blinding this country to the possibilities of war and that they had been placed in the position of knowing the state of our rearmaments from month to month.

Milmo came to discuss the cases of de RAPPART and de GRAAF. Both these people are confessed spies and de RAPPART is a Belgian naturalised Canadian, de GRAAF Canadian born. They are therefore interned in the I.O.M. under 18B. At Stage A 18B is likely to be abolished. We shall therefore have two proven spies wandering about this country without any powers to detain them. The most that we can do is to make them report to the police under 18A which will continue until Stage B. Milmo thinks and I agree that since they will have to be released in a few weeks time we may as well proceed at once in order to avoid their collecting and distributing messages from other internees.

Robson-Scott came in to say goodbye. He is going back to London University. In his quiet way he has done quite a good job on Germans and Austrians in this country.

May 1st

Burt came in to ask me about Fish who has had an offer to go to BOAC. I said that as he had handed in his resignation to the Yard I felt it difficult to object, sorry though I should be to lose him. Obviously the job in BOAC offers him quite good peace time prospects. This leaves us with only 3 sergeants. Burt told me that he had seen Rosie SCHMIDT but had not really succeeded in getting any satisfactory explanation out of her. She took the line that she was ignorant and did not know that the original loan was paid by her aunt LUDWIG. We have to consider whether we will send off the letter written by SCHMIDT or another letter or whether we will have enquiries made by SIS direct in the Peninsular.

Dick Butler tells me that Stron has sent another invitation to the DG and that the DG wants him (D.B.) to accompany him. I suspect that Kenneth Strong wants to persuade the D.G. to allow Dick White to remain in Germany to co-ordinate the Control Commission and C.I. of W1 A.G.

Adam came in to ask whether I could give him an answer about the duties of SCOs at ports and whether they could be cut down in such a way as to release personnel. I said that I thought that at the moment SCOs had more responsible work and more difficult work than they had had since the beginning of the war and that as long as the Chiefs of Staff wanted security maintained and

as long as the LRC remained in existence, our requirements from the B.Divn. ~~an~~ angle would not change.

At the 12 o'clock meeting today Herbert raised once more the frightful question of the Black List. He thinks that if the list is to be done properly it should include not only future cases but past cases for which purpose it would be necessary for sections to review their files.

This will of course be a stupendous job. Firstly I think we should get D.4 to let them have a list of the people that they have put on the CWS Black List. They could then review these and say whether they are for inclusion in the postwar Black List. For the rest they will have to rely largely on their memories. The LRC can of course make a considerable contribution.

The Chiefs of Staff in Washington have decided that they want Censorship maintained between Latin America and the Peninsular until the conclusion of hostilities in the Far East. This will be rather a blow to Herbert. When this question was raised several months ago we entered a caveat on this very point.

Curry, Allen and I saw the D.G. about the future of the I.O.s. It was agreed that the D.G. and I should go and see Maxwell and try and get him to put the service as a whole on a higher level. We would also put forward proposals about co-operation with the I.O.s in the post-war period. My idea is that we should give them a course here and that our Regional officers should visit them.

Briscoe is anxious to collect specimens of ink for documents typed in a German soluble ink for use in warships. If these documents fall into the water the ink is immediately obliterated

He thinks that such specimens may be found in I.G. Farben. I put him on to Professor Lindstead of CIOs.

We have obtained Orange's co-operation in the AESCHMANN case.

Viv. rang up about the case of Crocker who has been paying notes to a man called BURNETT who runs a string of night-clubs and whose account was brought to the notice of Ned Reid. Crocker apparently handles all the finances of RSS and is regarded by Gambier-Parry as reliable. Viv. is proposing to see G.P. about this matter. I told him how delicate the matter was and that I did not wish on any account the information to go back to BURNETT. I would speak to Ned Reid and see how far we could go. It was not surprising if BURNETT was supplying RSS with Black Market products.

May 2nd

On 20th April our MA in Madrid telephoned to say that instructions had been issued for the Germans to cancel their Lufthansa service to Spain owing to lack of landing grounds in Germany. A pilot of the last German plane which left Barcelona had instructions to report to the Personnel Luftstaffel of Hitler and Himmler consisting of 8 planes with flying radius of 9,000 kms which had been prepared for a flight to Japan or Manchukuo.

A Civil Affairs report dated 14.4.45 states that at Idar-Oberstein the Germans are reported to have risen against the Volkssturm when it was planning to defend the city against allied occupation and in Seligenstadt the burgomaster was beaten by the populace because he failed

to wave the white flag as tanks approached the town. He later killed his family and committed suicide. In Bretten-Baden, the "azi burgomaster and all but one of his family committed suicide with the idea apparently of posing as martyrs to the "azi cause.

The same report, under the heading "Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives" states that 7 direct hits by bombs were "scored" on the cathedral at Cologne.

An interrogation report of a P/W named Rudolf RATHKE, a member of the Gestapo concerned with the detecting of illicit wireless and running D.A.s is of rather special interest as it shows that the Gestapo did quite a lot of D.A. work with captured Russian agents. One of these controlled agents asked Moscow what he should do in the case of an allied invasion of France. The answer was that he should remain at his post. During 1937-38 the Russian Intelligence Service organised an espionage network in France, Belgium and Holland. The original mission of this network headed by an agent known under the cover name of General GILBERT, was to furnish information about political and economic trends in those countries. After the outbreak of world war 2 the entire system was transformed into a military intelligence network. In Nov. 1942 the Gestapo succeeded in raiding and arresting the entire network including GILBERT. This round-up started with the arrest of Hermann WENZEL a Russian-trained radio operator who was operating a transmitting station in Belgium. Several minor agents were shot and among them a Russian woman named SOKOL who was shot in Brussels on the personal order of Himmler. Other agents were taken to

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Paris for further investigation. Goering is said to have taken an interest in this organisation, and followed the disclosures with much attention. The Gestapo decided to utilise this illegitimate radio communication with Moscow and to turn the traffic into a Funkspiel. Most of the operators were to continue their transmissions under Gestapo control. This new set-up was known as Rot Kapelle and was subdivided into a Paris and Belgian branch. All information transmitted to Moscow had to be passed by Abt. 4A2B of the RSHA in Berlin. Most of the information was true as it was anticipated that the Russians would have opportunities for checking up. The transmission of military information however become more and more difficult owing to the un-cooperative attitude of the military authorities. When in early 1944 one of the transmitters made a request for funds Moscow gave directions to contact a Czech citizen named CHERVINKA residing at rue Edison in Brussels. CHERVINKA was married to a Russian woman who had a son employed at the Russian Embassy in Kabul. This son was allegedly supposed to furnish \$5,000 to be paid to WENZEL. The P/W was ordered to impersonate WENZEL and to establish contact with CHERVINKA but his repeated efforts to extract money from her met with no success. The station was known as Weide, and was closed down in Feb-March 1944, but for 3 months afterwards Moscow continued to call. Another station known as Tanne was operated from Amsterdam by one Tino WINTERINK, a native of Arnheim. He and several others, among them a Dutchman named NAGEL, were arrested by the Gestapo in Nov. 1942. Two others evaded capture. Owing to various bungles by the Gestapo, Moscow advised in March or April 1944 that the station should discontinue. They told the agent to join an active resistance group. Another station known

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as Buche-Pascal was operated by a Soviet army captain who in 1937 came to Belgium with a false Finnish passport using the cover name of Erich JERNSTROEM. This man broadcast alternately from Liege and Brussels. He was induced in Nov. 1942 to work for the Gestapo. When he asked for funds he was directed to a timber merchant in Charleroi who had an account of 50,000 French francs in Russia.

Pascal was to ask for a loan bringing greetings from a Russian business friend. The merchant however remained indifferent and told Pascal that he had recovered his loss from an Italian insurance company and was not in a position to grant a loan. Another station known as Buche-Bob opened in Nov. 1942 and was operated by a Russian army officer. The officer was captured and shot as he refused to cooperate. The station however was taken over by another agent operating from Paris. It discontinued in mid-July 1944. In Paris GILBERT was induced to continue transmissions to Moscow but he succeeded in escaping in November or December 1943. The Gestapo are said to have found out that he had also been working for the British intelligence in collaboration with a brother of the Belgian Minister SPAAK. This station continued till the allied invasion. The Germans claim that they obtained a considerable amount of money from the Russians and also information covering French resistance groups by infiltrating them with Gestapo agents. The codes used in these transmissions are on record.

SHAEE C.I Summary of 27th April states that the H.Q. of the German military espionage service now seemed to have completed withdrawal into Bavaria, the main concentration being at Munich. It is perhaps noteworthy that no high officer of the RSHA has so far been captured and identified. One unconfirmed report says that

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Kaltenbrunner has been superseded as head of the RSHA. Captured documents now prove that willing recruits for a stay behind espionage organisation in Germany were difficult to find. This may explain the use of personnel of Kommando and truppe for agent work and of foreign worker cover for foreign collaborators originally intended for work outside Germany. In the political field a wave of unrest is passing over Belgium. Despite lack of encouragement from Russia communists are fanning this unrest and jockeying for influential positions when war ceases. The position is regarded as potentially dangerous owing to the large number of arms dumps known to exist in Belgium and to others being smuggled into the country from France. In Germany the work of C.I. teams has been affected by the speed of the advance. There have been difficulties of processing suspected persons and securing C.I. targets. There has also been a shortage of personnel to cover ever-increasing areas. Work has been facilitated however by the docile attitude of civilians. There is no evidence that any anti-Nazi movement is in existence in Germany or emerging. Activities of werewolf organisations appear so far to be negligible.

We are threatened with the arrival of 3,500 interned and some 10-13,000 uninterned British subjects. Efforts are being made to set up a camp in order that we may effect the necessary screening. We shall only be able to look up those who are suspect and to check the party against our list of renegades.

Bertram Ede looked in to know what had happened about the controversy over O.C. I told him the position. He said that according to Charles the D.G. did not wish to discuss the matter until Rindlater Stewart had given his findings. Bertram wondered whether we could agree that

Kellar should send copies of his personal correspondence with the Mid East to O.C. I said that I did not believe that there was very much of this which was not of a highly secret nature but that I would much prefer not to raise the issue until the whole question had been settled. I said that I thought the DG's going to rule that for the time being Mid East should not be in any way an O.C.

commitment. This without prejudice to any future decision. If however the DG was not prepared to consider the matter at all it could only make trouble to raise it on a lower level. Apart from this Eue told me that he himself would be away for another 2 months. It seemed therefore rather pointless to insist that Kellar should send all his personal correspondence to Clayton who could obviously make little contribution.

Dick Butler came to tell me that he had had a conversation with Arnold-Forster which at time had become rather peevish. A-F evidently resented our decision to advise against the inclusion of the SIS clause in the terms of reference which focussed the limelight on the total amalgamation of the 2 organisations. Did this mean that we ~~were~~ no longer believed in an amalgamation? Butler replied that in the DG's view the terms of reference that he had drafted gave ample scope to Findlater to enquire into this particular matter and that the additional clause was therefore unnecessary. Butler also discussed with C. the question of a number of male and female German cryptography whose presence was desired in this country.

I talked to Herbert and Sclater about the latter memo on Signals Security which he was intending to send to ADNI. I said that I thought this

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would be a mistake. The memo alleged continued indiscretions by naval wireless which was leading to the sinkings of ships by submarines. I said I thought a more profitable line would be to show it to Montagu and ask his advice. It would be unfortunate if we gave Firth the idea that we were going behind his back.

Kenneth Younger came in. He has just been placed in charge of all C.I. matters at 2nd Army and will shortly be a Lt.Col. This is a great triumph for the office, as we now have the leading C.I. posts at SHAEF, 21 AG and 2nd Army not to speak of many other posts in France, Italy and elsewhere. He was quite interesting about the attitude of the Germans. On the whole they had been quite cooperative. At Osnabruck a keen Social Democrat had walked in offering to give information. When he was asked if he would like to be contacted at some less conspicuous place he said that he did not care in the least and that he would continue to come to H.Q. There has not been a flood of informants but quite a number of collaborators. Kenneth told me that the SIS man had already had a raspberry from Bill Williams who does not intend to allow him to operate except under strict control. Even that seems doubtful. Kenneth is rather apprehensive about the ability of many of the regular officers and of the Civil Affairs officers to handle delicate political questions. Many of the regulars are bone-headed except on military matters and the Civil Affairs officers are generally cast-ors, in fact rather the equivalent of the Town Majors in the 1st war. Kenneth was full of praise for Niall MacDermot who he said had done a very fine job. It was however to some extent a one-man job. It was difficult to deputise for Niall as he liked doing things himself. The great thing was however that he had the capacity and energy to do them. Kenneth thought that as long

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as he and Bill Williams were at 21 AG things would not go very wrong on the political side.

I had a meeting with Herbert, Jim and Roger about the post-war Black List. We agreed that D.4. should send sections the names of all those that had been put on the CWS B.L. to see whether they should go on to the new black list. E and F Divisions thought that they could go back on their records fairly easily in order to get suitable subjects for the list. The task of B. division however would be more difficult. The LRC would give considerable assistance to E. Division. We all had grave doubts about the usefulness of the list as it is extremely difficult to say who really should go on it. If you confined yourself to important people they may not necessarily be those who will travel. However it may be necessary to make something of a start and then prune and shape the list later on.

A German bomber has landed in Scotland with a crew of 5 deserters.

Dick telephoned me to say that he would be coming over next week to discuss with me his future. I think he can stay with SHAEF until August but no longer.

May 3rd

At the staff meeting today Horrocks said that he had heard from the M/L about Miss Gask. She can be released if we can manage to cover the work within the office. It was decided that a tentative offer of permanent employment would be made to Kellar, Courtney Young, John Marriott, Sands, Baskerville-Glegg, Colledge and possibly Hill. All that can be said however is that their services will be retained for 12

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months and that there is a reasonable chance that they will be asked to stay on permanently. They will however still be like all other members of the staff subject to a months notice. Such notice however would only be given if the circumstances were exceptional and demanded such a course. It was thought desirable that in an office of this kind the DG should maintain powers of summary dismissal. Ten years service gives pension rights. Only a proportion of the war service counts towards the ten year. I mentioned the case of Tess. Horrocks and Charles said that provided Noel-Baker could square the M/L which he presumably could there was no objection to her going.

Brandes has been given 12 months pay for his notional agents and Ostro 6 months pay.

On 1.5.45 Garbo received a long message thanking him for his service and that of his organisation. It is hoped that in the course of a few days he will receive the necessary documents to enable him to travel to France. If not, he will either have to remain where he is or make his own arrangements. A remittance is being sent. The message then states that in order to leave open the possibility of making contact should circumstances make this necessary, with agent No 13 or with Garbo himself, if he remains in England, "you should let us have by message the name, surname and address where we could send a plain postcard which would be sent from a man Fernando Gomez who would communicate to the address his intention to travel on a given date. On this date the wireless should start up contact in accordance with the yearly plan which is in your possession". It is left to Garbo's judgment or that of agent 5 to make similar arrangements with the network of No. 5. The

message concludes as follows. "We do not think it is necessary for us to reiterate in these bitter hours our proven sentiments of gratitude and appreciation. We firmly hope that providence will inspire the leaders and build resistance for the future in order that we may avoid at the last moment a definite chaos which would envelope Europe in defence of whose ideals we have struggled together. We will be listening daily from tomorrow so that J can communicate his approval of our suggestions and send the above mentioned address as soon as he has consulted with J. Before definitely suspending the present contacts with Almura (the wireless station) we await our instructions in this connection. Very cordial regards from us all

Trevor-Wilson rang up about Verneuil coming to 20. I said that this would be arranged. He also wishes to see the D.G.

Milmo told me that there was to be a meeting of the JIC tomorrow to discuss the liquidation of CSDIC here, in the very near future. Our arguments are that this would be undesirable since we could have no place of interrogation for prisoners in uniform who were likely to increase and were of more importance as the controllers of Abwehr and SD activities than many other agents already captured. It would be difficult for this work to be done abroad since it needed daily briefing from records here if not actual examination of the records by the interrogation staff and on occasions reference to most secret material which could not easily be transmitted abroad.

Kellar showed me the notes of information she

Catalogue Reference: KV/4/196 at the Hagana are inclined to take the law into their own hands

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They had apparently castrated a man who was
alleged to have committed rape.

I went over to see C. about the case of
He entirely agrees with our view
that she should be allowed to go after having
been spoken to on the lines suggested. He
suggests however that in order to keep some
hold over her at any rate for the time being,
somebody in his office should, if she seems
to be the right sort of type, offer her a
small salary to keep SIS informed about any
activities of Germans in Spain after her return.

We talked quite a lot about the Russians. He
thinks that they are going to present us with
tremendous problems and he is anxious to get
ahead. At present his hands are somewhat
tied. He is proposing to try and get some
definite instructions from the Chiefs of Staff.
The moment may perhaps be opportune as everyone
is getting a bit tired of Russian behaviour,
particularly the last move in setting up a
provisional government in Austria. I told him
what I thought about the possibilities of their
trying to build a big Navy and to control
the narrows in the Baltic and Mediterranean.
As regards the Baltic I referred him to the
Pandora telegram in which Ribbentrop had
stated that Molotov had said on his last
visit to Berlin that the control of Cattegat
and Skagerack was a cardinal point in Soviet
foreign policy. He had forgotten this and
was extremely interested as he had been issuing
strong warnings about the urgency of our getting
to Lubeck and thereby controlling the Kiel
Canal. He had done this on the basis of
reports that the Germans were desperately
anxious for us to seal off Denmark as they
were expecting the Russians to drop parachute
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tists in the area.

Lastly I discussed with C. the Findlater Stewart enquiry. I said that when we received the original terms of reference we got the impression that the purpose of the enquiry was to establish whether M.I.5 had done their job properly during the war. This had struck us as being somewhat insulting. C. said that he did not know who had drafted the terms of reference or why they had been drafted in that form. They had struck him in exactly the same way. He was particularly anxious that we should not think that SIS were behind it or that they in any way questioned the work that we had done. He then outlined to me the various moves which I already knew and told me that their amendment to the terms of reference had been devised in order to focus Findlater's attention on the question of possible amalgamation. I said that the DG had taken the view that the amended terms of reference adequately covered this point, but I was sure that if C. really attached importance to it the DG had no objection to the enquiry taking that form, although he personally would not agree that total amalgamation was desirable. I then asked C. what his own views were. He was he was completely open minded and that he could argue a case either way. He thought however that nothing but good could result from a thorough and intelligent enquiry and he agreed that in order to come to a decision Findlater would have to make a careful study of the machinery of both depts. I strongly emphasised the point that in my view it would be entirely wrong to split up MI5, that if there was to be amalgamation it would be desirable to not to separate what was sometimes referred to as pure intelligence from security measures, since

if some control over security matters was not retained, a great deal of intelligence work would be difficult and much of it would be entirely negated. I instanced the various controls which had been set up and in particular the control of radio communication which had been responsible for giving more information to the enemy than they had got from any other sources. I said that I did not think that the retention of these powers or controls need in any way embarrass a secret intelligence organisation and that they provided many opportunities, eg. the work of the D. Branches for picking up valuable intelligence free, gratis and for nothing.

Before and after I saw C. I had a talk with Arnold-Forster to whom I explained what I subsequently said to C. I told him that I had suggested to C. that he should weigh in if he was not satisfied about the terms of reference and I did not think he would meet with any opposition to which he had replied that he thought this might be better done by Cavendish-Bentinck as the F.O. had made themselves responsible for the terms of reference.

The DG gave a dinner to Dick Butler, at which Creedy, Charles Russell, Toby Mathew and Newsam were present in addition to certain members of the staff. Newsam was obviously I think pleased at being asked, and was extremely friendly. He made a short speech in which he outlined the H.O. point of view in the early days of the war. He said that they were forced to some extent to follow public opinion but that as soon as they could they came down on our side. It had therefore been inevitable that we should be at logger-heads in the early days of the war. He was glad that that period had passed rapidly and he

felt that relations were now on a very satisfactory basis. He hoped for this cooperation in future. I talked to him privately on the same lines. He was very complimentary about many officers of the dept. and the satisfactory way in which they had worked with the HO. He mentioned that there were occasional incidents in the H.O. of people writing stupid letters. I think probably he was referring to the hint in this respect that I had given sometime ago to Miss Nunn. I had had Hill particularly in mind. Newsam thought that dinners of the kind that we were having were extremely good value and helped a great deal towards getting people to understand other points of view and to know each other on more personal and intimate lines.

I talked to Creedy about Findlater Stewart's enquiry. It was satisfactory to find that he believed strongly in a co-ordinator who would re-adjust the spheres as between MI5 and MI6 and work direct to the Ministry of Defence, if there was to be such a minister, if not to the C.I.D. He agreed that it was wrong for either dept., being advisory, to work to one particular departmental minister.

May 4th

The war seems to be winding up and we are expecting V.E. Day probably on Monday. Everybody seems to be taking things very quietly, including the assassination of Mussolini, the liquidation of Hitler, the surrender in Italy and the fall of Berlin. The end of the war is falling rather flat, and V.E. Day is undoubtedly going to be a colossal bore, with no food and no transport. The only thing to do is to tie a union jack to the bedpost and go to bed.

Verneuil came to see the D.G. with Trevor-Wilson and Vaudreuil. Verneuil is head of Travaux Ruraux and wants to set up an U20 in the French zone. We are sending him down to Oxford.

Burt came to tell me that Smith had had a heart attack at Scapa and that he is probably to be out of action for some considerable time, and would certainly not be available for travel, on any scale. Meanwhile there is a suggestion from Cussen that Fish and possibly Burt should go to Italy to deal with Amery who was detained there a few days ago. This would leave us with only two sergeants. I said to Burt that we should either have to get some assistance or we should not be able to fulfil our commitments. In so far as his going to Italy is concerned I personally have no objection provided the work can be done. I am to leave this to him.

The D.G. called a meeting about 18A and 18B(a) in the Colonies. There was a case of a man called de NORMAN in Kenya who would have to be set at liberty if 18B is abolished. As he is an Indian of S.African origin we are suggesting he should be sent to S.Africa. We think that 18A should probably be retained in the Colonies as they will obviously have the same difficulties as we have in keeping track of people who have to be released under 18B. This however is largely a matter for the Colonies themselves. As regards 18B(a) we think it should be retained in all Colonies until we get some idea about attempts by Nazis to get away to S.America and elsewhere. It gives us power to take them off the ship and bring them back to this country.

I talked to Milmo about the case of BRODERSEN. The Norwegians want somebody from O20 to give evidence at a Court Martial. It is unlikely that such a Court Martial can be held here if the death penalty is involved. The officer would therefore have to go to Norway. The old objection about O20 officers giving evidence, namely that it might lead to awkward revelations about the technique etc. at O20 has largely gone, but it would clearly be extremely inconvenient if not impossible for O20 or LRC officers to be travelling to various countries in Europe to give evidence. BRODERSEN's case might quite easily create a precedent. Many of the officers might be in Germany and others might have left us altogether.

Baxter came to talk to me about the 14,000 returning British subjects. We agreed that they need only be checked the list of renegades and looked up if the circumstances seemed suspicious. This should ease the registry problem. Albert's W.S. form should undoubtedly be filled in by all.

J.C. came to tell me that Canada were anxious to release the story of Watchdog. Had we any objection. I said I could not say off-hand but I thought that the case should be looked into to see whether there was any B.I.A aspect. We should also consider whether we might not be creating a precedent in the release of such stories.

Kellar showed me a report about the strength of the future British Army. The regular army is apparently to be about 300,000 plus a militia of 150,000. The militia will be formed from youths who will do a years service between 18-19 and then go on the reserve for 5 years.

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Hugh Astor came to see me. He said that he had a tentative offer from SOE who are carrying the duties of PWE in the eastern theatre. He would act as deputy to some PWE officer in Kand. He seemed to think that this job would interest him and he was quite definite that he did not want to join DIB. I pointed out to him that as the whole of his training had been here, it seemed rather a pity that he should not continue to do something on the lines for which he was best qualified. However I was generally against trying to persuade someone to do a job which he did not feel he had got his heart in as he would be struggling all the time to get out and that in this case DIB would then be stranded. I thought therefore that he had better go if PWE were prepared to accept him.

Grogan talked to me about a variety of censorship matters. There are a number of rather trivial relaxations with regard to telephone censorship to which we can easily agree. Herbert is resisting the suggestion for reduction of censorship between Latin America and the Peninsular at Stage A plus 3 months. One of his arguments is that the Navicert system even if it is impossible to maintain it would by no means cover the situation, as there are many ships which could evade these restrictions. The Chiefs of Staff in Washington are being asked to state more specifically what they are trying to safeguard. SIS are being asked for their views. There is also a suggestion to cancel the Control of Communications Order in so far as northern and southern Ireland is concerned. This means that printed matter can go between this country and Ireland without a permit. This seemed to me to depend on two things (a) what printed matter is allowed to be published here by Press & Censorship which could be of use

to the Japs and (b) how long will Ireland remain a cul de sac. This whole question seemed to depend on the ruling of the Chiefs of Staff about security after Stage A. and on the dissolution of Jap Embassies in neutral countries. If Ireland ceased to be a cul de sac there would seem to be little point in maintaining control of communications order so far as the continent of Europe is concerned.

May 5th

I went with the DG this morning to see Maxwell about the future of the Immigration Service. Maxwell was very receptive to our idea of giving IOS a certain amount of training and visiting them at ports. He thought it important that they should act with greater knowledge. He would have a talk with Ferkas and Carew Robinson and hoped that when Findlater Stewart had finished his enquiry we should be able to arrange periods of attachment or courses.

Last night I dined with Verneuil, Vaudreuil and Knock. Verneuil gave an interesting account of his experiences in working with the French Resistance. There is no doubt that he had many narrow escapes. The outbreak of war found him in Belgrade as M.A. He eventually got back to France via Austria and later started his underground activities. Incidentally Verneuil is not his real name. He knew at least 2 months before that the Germans were going to attack the Russians and he told me that the Russians had given the Jugoslavs an undertaking that when they were attacked, before long they would come to their assistance. This seems to imply that even if they had not been attacked, the Russians would sooner or later have attacked the Germans.

2986
Bird brought me a draft memo which Hill of the H.O. is proposing to submit to the Home Defence Executive. It relates to travel by British subjects anywhere without a permit in the near future. It is once more a question which depends on what the Chiefs of Staff lay down for security between stages A and B. If Censorship is to be maintained in neutral countries presumably there should be some control over travel particularly to those parts where Jap representation exists.

At the daily meeting Mrs. Spring spoke about the case of EIDENBERG. This man who is a Czech is resident in this country. According to a report received from OSS from Bucharest, which has been given by a P/W EIDENBERG was working for the German I.S. in Vienna in 1935 and had a mission to this country. A check-up shows that he did in fact visit the UK at the time stated and that his last arrival was in 1940. He is now in prison doing 6 months for black market offences. I recommended that we should get fuller details from OSS, examine his H.O. and police files and then take a look at his banking account. We should then be in a better position to know how to clear the matter up.

Sclater came to tell me that there had been a meeting under C's chairmanship on the question of the future of Y. units. The idea is I gather to bring them under G.C & C.S. though whether this includes RSO I don't know. Sclater will have a look at the report a copy of which is in possession of D.D.Y.

At the weekly meeting last Wednesday Herbert mentioned the case of SCHURCH, a Swiss born in London, who has now been taken prisoner by OSS in Rome. He states that he worked in London from 1936 onwards till 1940 as a spy for the Italians, and later continued to spy for

them in Jerusalem and Egypt. His father is a waiter at the Savoy. As he is a British subject his case may have to be dealt with on the lines of those of de GRAAF and de RAPPART, as after Stage A when 18B is abolished we shall not be able to hold him except under 18A. As however he has served in the R.A.S.C. at one time we may be able to deal with him as a deserter. If his story is true this is the first case of an Italian spy that has come our way.

John Senter came in to see me. He is going away on 3 months sick leave and will then leave SOE and go back to the Bar. He was full of the co-operation he had received from this dept.

May 7th

John Marriott gave me his impressions of F.2. He thinks that there is a lot of important work to be done, that there are some good officers and that they are fully stretched. He doubts however whether the work is altogether being conducted on the right lines. He instanced the procedure by which each Party member was notified to C.C.s and the information passed from one C.C. to another when the man moved. The only case for this is that if Party members are to be prevented from getting into positions where they have access to confidential information, somebody has to keep track of their whereabouts and occupations. John points out however that this system is by no means infallible and someone succeeded in getting into Tube Alloys the other day. This arose from the fact that Birmingham Police and some other police forces, including the

Metropolitan, did not when notified take

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way Birmingham did not report that X had entered Tube Alloys until some enquiry arose over his wife. All this work reporting on Party members, whether they are important members or not, diverts a considerable amount of energy which might be better employed in investigating more important cases. John thinks that if a close tab is kept on the work of the centre it would be possible to relax to a considerable degree the enquiry about those on the periphery. Another point which he raises is the running of informants,

He thinks that MS should be much better informed about what is going on and should do a great deal more than at present in sowing seeds for the future. While he thinks that the work of David Clarke was good, a great deal of it was in his head and neither he nor Roger appear to have given their subordinates much scope. The atmosphere of the Division is not therefore very good.

~~For some reason or other nobody seems to like Roger very much.~~

Burt came in to ask whether I would agree to his going to Italy with Fish. It seems necessary that 2 officers should go as Amory's case will undoubtedly be an important one. DPP intends to prosecute him under the Treachery Act. He is not however to be brought back here until statements have been taken. It may be of course that Amory will refuse to make a statement without his solicitor. Meanwhile B.5 machinery will be reduced to two officers, Edwards and Davies. This is rather a serious matter if, as may be expected, we get a number of sabotage cases. Burt however has evidently set his heart on going to Italy.

and I am reluctant to refuse him leave to go. I think therefore we shall have to take a chance.

Inspector Coveney of SB came to see me with a letter that he had had from Cimperman. The latter asked whether SB had any information which would lead them to believe that the Russians were using micro-film or dot films, for communication. I said that I wondered a little why Cimperman had not asked us this question. It may be of course that he does not know the form. Coveney also asked me whether I would be prepared to give him a recommendation if he put in for a job as C.C. I said that these matters were not normally referred to us but that if in his application he liked to suggest that reference should be made to the DG and to mention that I had known him both at S.Y. and here, I should be prepared to do anything I could to help him.

Lennox came in to say that the surrender terms for all German armed forces had been signed at 1 hours today and that the PM would probably be making a statement.

C. and Tommy came in to talk about Garbo's future. A message has come in from the Germans indicating that they would welcome his arrival in Madrid in order to discuss future plans. This is eminently satisfactory. The difficulty is in getting GARBO to Madrid. Notionally he will get a lift by American plane under a false name to France and make his way across the frontier. Actually he will have to go by air or sea to Lisbon with a transit visa on his own passport. It is important that he should enter Spain with proper documentation. The only snag is that he left

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Police there might conceivably question him if they have put his name on a Black List. Tommy suggests that his landing card should be in the name of GARCOA instead of GARCIA, a difference which would prevent his name being traced in the T.I. on the other hand, the SIS man, says he will have no difficulty if he is in transit.

Tate has remained in contact with Hamburg right up to the evening of 2.5.45.

At the end of April peace negotiations were going on between the Japs and the Chinese in Nanking; Nanking having apparently having a very tenuous link with Chungking. Whereas Nanking apparently wanted to bring about peace by conversations with the Japs, Chungking was reluctant to act without the consent of America. But even this attitude of Chungking seemed to be somewhat doubtful and there seemed no immediate prospects of a move.

The War Room monthly summary for the 15th April states that for the past month the energies of the Milamt, both at headquarters and at regional stations within the Reich, have been absorbed in the administrative task of evacuation. At the end of Feb. certain planning sections moved from the vicinity of Berlin to Thuringia. During the month of March this movement continued. The sabotage and subversive section of Mil.D. would be the rear party near Plauen and the Signals Section Mil.E moved to Eisenberg near Weimar. The regional staffs at Wiesbaden and Cologne withdrew towards Thuringia and later to Munich. Since May 1944 a section of Milamt in neutral countries has been going on. In Catalogue Reference KV 14/196 had to draw all Milamt activities under one head and ensure against

further allied attacks by directing the detail-
 -ed administration of this work from the cover
 of the Embassy. At the same time arrange-
 ments were made by which a few high level
 officers would be incorporated in the Embassy
 with diplomatic status in order to direct
 the work on the policy level. The head of
 KDM in Spain now exercises a general control
 over all Milamt work in the country, though
 former agents still work independently and
 without his knowledge for KDM's within the
 Reigh. The day to day administration has
 now been removed from the office working under
 Embassy cover to 3 shadow organisations which
 are now under the control of head agents
 using commercial cover who have also adopted
 Spanish nationality when possible. At the
 same time the number of low-level Milamt
 officers using diplomatic cover is being
 steadily reduced, mainly as a result of
 allied pressure for their expulsion, but also
 as part of a conscious policy by which the
 organisation for the future has been planned
 under cover of the dissolution of the organ-
 isation of the past. Meanwhile there have
 been difficulties about the directorate of
 sneior officers as fully fledged diplomats
 and little assistance is being obtained from
 the Embassy in Madrid. This whole plan is
 however based on the assumption that a centre
 of resistance and therefore a centre of
 control will remain in Germany, and the catas-
 trophic turn of events along the western
 front has to some extent thrown it off its
 balance. It was always assumed that in the
 even of the pro-German elements in Spain
 being forced into opposition by the democra-
 tic revolution within, the benefits of this
 plan, particularly on its subversive side,
 would be shared with them. For this purpose

sabotage material has been dumped in Spain and arrangements have been made to drop arms and ammunition should the situation demand it. But it was also an essential feature of the plan that it should not be known in detail to the Spanish authorities lest as a result of a change of sides on the part of the latter it should be suppressed at birth. In short the Milant's shadow organisation was only envisaged as working with the extremists in Spain if and when they lost power. In spite of this and possibly as a result of panic, at least one section working with KDM Spain has handed over part of its reserves funds and details of its stay-behind network to the Spanish Chief of Staff. Even the head of the KDM is now pursuing a waiting policy with regard to further incorporations and has prepared for the worst by removing from the Embassy sufficient funds to pay his whole station for 3 months. There is therefore a possibility that in the event of a German collapse the whole of this plan may fall into the hands of the Spanish General Staff for use in their own interests but it would be wrong to count on this. An identical plan appears to have been worked out by the KDM in Portugal.

May 10th

Stamp came to talk to me about certain articles which the Press wish to public about LINDEMANS. He agreed with me that it would be impossible for us to censor these articles. We could merely say that the case was sub judice in Holland and that we were not in a position to say how far publication would embarrass our allies. They alone could be the judges. In the present state of their country it seemed undesirable that anything should be done which might conceivably hamper them in their own work quite apart from the

judicial aspect of the case.

At the W.Board meeting today J.C. gave an expose of the work of the XX Committee during the last 16 months. He began by explaining the 6 purposes for running D.A.s and then explained how our organisation had gone gradually into liquidation since Overlord owing to the military situation. We had been left with 5 agents who would continue to communicate, but only one of whom, namely Garbo, would be likely to survive in the postwar period. J.C. then asked for leave to dissolve the 20 Committee but to retain the various links in Service Depts., Controller's office and H.D.E. who would act as approving authorities for any messages which we might wish to send over in the future. The Board passed a vote of thanks to M.I.5 and M.I.6 for the very successful work that had been done during the last 5 years. D.M.I. expressed his intention of writing both to M.I.5 and M.I.6 on behalf of the Board. The future of the Board was discussed. It was decided that on C's recommendation it should be kept in being and to have ad hoc meetings as heretofore. A general write-up is to be made of the work of the Board. This would not occupy much space but it is to include a write-up of B.IA and the Controller. A copy is to be kept by ourselves and by C. After J.C.'s speech I drew attention to the very valuable work done by the Services in wireless deception which backed up the movements of all Garbo's notional units. It seemed to me that probably the fact of Y. material supporting agents' reports had been decisive in misleading the Germans during the Overlord period. One was complementary to the other. The Controller mentioned evidence of the success of our deception plans. Not only had we got the map showing our positions in this country on the 15th May but the recent

report by P/W employed at Ic Gruppe West had given an account of how the Germans thought that we had concentrations in the south east of England which were likely to be used against the Pas de Calais. A Col. Arnst had recently given himself up with a suitcase of documents and had led the authorities to a special cache at his own home which he had buried in his garden. He had kept these documents as souvenirs and he clearly gave them up in the hope that his wife and family might be allowed to remain in their schloss. These documents are OKH daily intelligence reports and I believe contained a good deal of the stuff which we put through Garbo.

Hastings rang up about the German cryptographers including 4 women who had been sent by the I.O. to Holloway. We subsequently got them out to Nightingale Lane. Hastings says he wishes to keep this party for at least 3 months. I said I did not think the Oratory Schools or Nightengale Lane were very suitable places even if we could get the H.O. to agree. I recommended him if possible to find other accommodation. He is trying to get the use of Praewood.

May 11th

At the J.I.C. today we discussed the paper by Cavendish-Bentinck on his visit to America. It did not contain in fact very much that was not known already. The future of American Intelligence is still in the balance although efforts are being made to unify it under a Minister of Defence. O.S.S. are presumably to play some part. I gave my views about the FBI and the RCMP.

I lunched with ^{Lee}Anthony and Long, formerly of M.I.14b, now in the Control Commission. Long had just been to Munich to deal with civil intelligence targets. He had been accompanied by Patrick Day. He said that the Americans were not really tackling the problem at all. In the short time that he was there he had not been able to achieve very much except to convince himself of the necessity of sending out qualified interrogators and German-speaking research workers. A good many of the documents had found their way down to that area and there was a mine of information. The danger was that the documents would either be destroyed or be dispersed by people who did not know anything of their contents. He described the German people, including the Gestapo prisoners, as being extremely docile. They were all saying that their consciences were clear. He had one rather remarkable experience with a woman who had implored him to shoot her. She evidently thought that he was a Soviet officer, but when informed that he was British she withdrew her request and handed over some antiquated ivory flint-locks etc. which were taken away.

I attended the H.D.E. this afternoon to discuss a paper put up by the H.O. on de-restriction of travel control for British subjects.

Herbert outlined the decisions reached by the Chiefs of Staff regarding Censorship. It had been decreed that censorship to all European countries should be maintained for 3 months. It seemed therefore that travel should follow suit. I outlined the position as far as we knew it with regard to the remnants of the G.I. S. and Jap organisations. At present the situation was in a state of flux, although there were signs of the GIs trying to reorganise under commercial cover in Spain, Portugal and Sweden. There was a possibility that it might assist the Japs who were active in those

countries and also in Switzerland. There was also pending a proposal to the JIC that the Jap Embassies should be closed down in neutral countries. This could not however apply to Switzerland who were a protecting power. It seemed desirable that for the time being travel by British subjects should continue to be controlled in conformity with Censorship and until the position became clarified. Stafford emphasised that the vetting of travellers would be increased probably by 100% and doubted whether we should be able to serve the Passport Office without long delays. I said that this was a commitment which we should have to accept. It transpired later that even if permits were issued not much travel could take place owing to lack of accommodation which would be likely to continue for another 15 months. As soon as this became known applications would probably decrease.

Hughes, Selater and Howard of RSS discussed with me the possible re-licensing of amateur wireless operators. I said that I thought they ought to be off the air if possible until the end of the Jap war or certainly for the next 3 months. Otherwise regulations about censorship seemed to be rather silly. We agreed that when licences were reissued amateurs should be asked to report any suspicious traffic and that they might perhaps be visited either by RSS or by our R.O.s. from time to time. Wireless parts can now be bought but it is an offence to piece them together in the form of a transmitter.

Tommy discussed with me the plan for Garbo. It now seems that his return via Portugal is fraught with danger and that the only method of getting him back to Spain is to send him round via some South American republic where he could get a new passport, his old one

having expired. This may take some time which is a pity since it would be convenient forusto have him in Spain while the G?I.S. is reforming. We feel however that the risks of sending him direct are too great.

May 12th

attended the JIC today when the last telegram from the combined Chiefs of Staff on security between Stages A and B was discussed. Various proposals were put forward in reply. The general view was that while the dispositions of units on or from the continent of Europe was of no great importance, re-deployment to the Far East should be held. Admiral Thompson who was present pointed out that the Admiralty were somewhat inconsistent. He had instructions about keeping the movements even of merchant vessels secret in the Med. area whereas the Admiralty were now rather inclined to take the view of the Americans that movement of convoys was not of any very great importance. There is of course a certain amount to be said for the view that Jap submarines might naturally lie up at the bottle-necks from the Red Sea and Panama Canal, and that convoys are so continuous that notice of their impending arrival is not likely to add very much to the enemy's knowledge. The general feeling however was that this was a slightly exaggerated view and that a more cautious policy would be advisable. It was also insisted that base censorship to and from the continent of Europe was necessary and must conform to civil censorship. A telegram in this sense is being sent off.

The Americans have proposed the taking over of the German Embassy in Dublin. The effect has been to make Herr von Bülow burn his documents and retire to a private house. Presumably we

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or the Americans will be saddled with the maintenance of the Embassy premises. Whether similar tactics will be employed elsewhere I don't know but a wire from Eisenhower went out on 3.5.45 to the combined Chiefs of Staff indicating that his plans were not to inform neutral governments of our intentions until the surrender of Germany was announced. On that day the allies would inform neutral governments of our intentions, inviting the to co-operate in taking over all German diplomatic and consular offices and to participate in exploiting all records, files etc. The allied representatives and representatives of neutral governments would proceed to German Embassies and order surrender of the premises, their contents and their personnel. Allied officers would not be armed, and if force were needed it should be exercised by neutral authorities. All important documents thus captured would be distributed both to the allies and the neutral governments if desired. Neutral governments would be requested to arrest all German secret agents who might be uncovered as a result of the scrutiny of documents. German nationals would be returned to Germany and placed at the disposal of SHAEF. KREMER and his mistress have been captured in Denmark and are being brought to U.K. He will go to 020.

I rang C. about the case of MEISSNER concerning whom had telephoned to Bird. MEISSNER has been in charge of Abwehr activities in Switzerland and has also operated in Lisbon and Angers. spoke as if the whole war depended on his being brought to this country. C. after making enquiries told me that a rather tentative approach had been made by MEISSNER through an S.I.S. D.A. He agreed with Catalogue Reference KV/4196 gave some proof of his

bona fides we lost all hold on him immediately he was brought to this country under conditions of freedom as outlined by. It seemed to me desirable that we should first get a fairly comprehensive statement which we could check and this had apparently already been asked for but not yet received.

was evidently trying to rush us on the grounds that if the man did not come here he would be grabbed by the Americans. Later I heard that the Swiss had kicked him out and that he had gone back to Germany.

evidently thought that this was a disaster of the first magnitude. The chances are of course that MEISSNER will be picked up in Germany and we shall then have a much better hold on him.

Adam rang me to say that Swedish fishing boats were coming into British ports. The Ministry of Food were anxious to get the fish. Adam had quite rightly refused the crews leave to land. I said I thought that this ought to be maintained. Otherwise it would be possible for a regular courier service to be set up between here and Sweden which would make nonsense of Censorship. Adam pointed out that the incident might be a useful bargaining point for the FO in getting the Japs expelled from Stockholm.

May 15th

Vickery has now got a request for Burton and we are arranging his passage.

Harker has had a request from Admiral Thompson for the publication of spy stories. His decision is that we cannot release any more than has already been released concerning proceedings which have been held in camera without the Judge's authority. We might of course be able to get this authority but it Catalogue Reference KV4/196 for us to write the stories. We have other things to do at the

moment than write bed-time stories for the Press. If we told them to submit their stories we might be forced to blue-pencil and thus indicate to them just those points we did not wish disclosed.

At the DGs meeting today Horrocks complained that he had been asked to look up traces of some old woman aged 85 who was being repatriated to this country from Switzerland. This caused the D.G. to say that he thought looking up of British subjects returning to country from enemy-occupied or neutral territory was a waste of time and merely creating paper. It was clearly useless for me to argue with him and I shall have to try and get the problem back on the rails by other means. It seems important to me that British subjects who have dodged the war in enemy-occupied or neutral territory for no valid reason should at least be told to fill in the W.S. form which we have carefully prepared. They have to go to a repatriation officer and they have to be examined however cursorily on arrival. It was therefore convenient to the SCOs and Immigration Authorities to know something about them. Apart from this we may well be criticised if collaborators are walking about free in this country if their cases have not been investigated. This is just one of the things that it is extremely difficult to get either the DG or Horrocks to understand.

Kellar and I went over to see Canning and handed him a memo on Zionist organisations in Palestine and the possibilities of an attempt by some terrorist to assassinate a prominent personage in this country. It seemed to us desirable that we should have the names of all Jewish seamen and civilians arriving here from the Mid East and if necessary we should obtain their particulars from Mid East. There

was notification regarding seamen but a time lag of a week or 10 days existed and very often the man had left before we heard anything about it. We suggested that the ports should be asked to telephone direct to ourselves and S.B. I undertook to make the necessary arrangements with H.O.

TAR, Sclater, Hughes and Herbert discussed with e the future of RSS. We all agreed that there were 3 principle Services that we required from the organisation: (1) information regarding any international clandestine network of a potential enemy or of a subversive kind affecting this country: (2) satisfactory means for the detection of illicit wireless from this country: (c) sufficient resources for policing the ether by a cross-section. I said that before the proposed meeting of the Security Committee I would try to ascertain from Sir Herbert Creedy why it had been called.

May 16th

I talked to Miss Clay about the case of PRIVETSKY who has come within the orbit of the Marita organisation. Having read the file which has been handled by a good many people, I came to the conclusion that PRIVETSKY was either a charlatan and a crook, a Soviet agent or a German agent. He is however the kind of person whose case should not be left in doubt. There is a great tendency for this to happen unless you get an energetic investigator.

J.C., Herbert, Cussen, Sinclair and I discussed a leakage case connected with ZIGZAG. Through a girl in SIS we had heard that a Col. Wardell had recently seen ZIGZAG in the company of Frank Owen late of the Evening Standard, to whom ZIGZAG had evidently related his story.

It was decided that Cussen should see Wardell and that perhaps he might see ZIGZAG and give him another warning.

Tommy Harris and I drafted a wire to Cyril Mills about Garbo, asking Cyril to go down to Washington and obtain Ladd's co-operation in getting Garbo's transit visa via USA to S. America. This seems to be the only way that we can get Garbo back to Spain without arousing suspicion. When in the USA he will fill his passport up with S. American visas and then apply for a new one. He cannot go via Lisbon as he left that country without an exit permit and he cannot go direct to Spain from here without the circumstances appearing suspicious.

I talked with Stewart Hampshire about getting important characters back to this country. Dick had suggested to him that U. 35 might be available. I said that I would sound Section V. 'later agreed to get him back if necessary.

May 17th

I have seen an interesting SHAEF report on the interrogation of a P/W who was a clerk in Ic section of the C. in C West from June 1942 to 27.11.44. when he was transferred to a signal battalion. P/W is described as an intelligent man whose knowledge about strategy is necessarily limited to the talk current among the enlisted staff personnel, although he appears to have enjoyed the confidence of several staff officers. His story is perhaps not as interesting. P/W stated that agents who were C. in C Wests main source of information prior to the invasion forecast April as the month. Later they thought early May and then

late May. In June the general information was that no invasion was to be expected until August or September. D-day came as a surprise. Col. Mayer Detring of Ic picked Normandy as the landing-place as early as August 1943 when he expounded this view in a training course. He persisted in this view but his was only one voice. Reports from agents and other sources caused doubt and confusion. A landing in southern France was thought possible in March 1944 and persisted after D day. A landing in the Bay of Biscay between Bordeaux and the Spanish border which was associated with Spanish troop concentrations along the Pyrenees and the possibility of a push through Spain was also given certain amount of credence. Fear of a landing in Holland caused the evacuation of civilians from the coastal areas after D day and the flooding of the Lowlands. There was a certain amount of talk about a landing in Norway and Denmark. Manoeuvres and exercises in England were watched with apprehension. Huskey, the main exercise, caused particular nervousness, and a special map was kept up to date by agents reports and signal intelligence as well as inability to locate the British 51st and 52nd Divisions, which were looked on as crack troops. Periods of radio silence were often considered a bluff. Finally the atmosphere was so tense that everybody hoped for the arrival of D-day to get it over. When it came it was taken fairly calmly at first. Rommel and Mayer Detring were both in Berlin. At first the attack was regarded as a feint and further landings were expected of a more serious kind elsewhere. The situation map of England showed only few units along the south west but heavy concentrations in the southeast. (This is of special interest owing to Garbo's pre-D-day build up of the Order of Battle. A good many of the units in the southeast were in fact notional). P/W continues that

C. in C. West expected an allied drive east along the Normandy coast combined with renewed landings in the direction of Havre, Dieppe and Calais. This evaluation coupled with the fears of a landing in Holland kept the 15th German Army in the Northeast during this period. Reinforcements were drawn from south-west France. The accuracy of intelligence on the Order of Battle was considered a credit to the agent system. A Major Brink of Ic was concerned with deception and directed the Abwehr agencies of sabotage and subversive activities. Some of his plans entailed confusion through new divisional insignia which he personally originated. Misleading signal traffic and simulated movement of heavy equipment to a division hitherto known as regular infantry organisations. A number of agents reports started with the phrase: "According to agents report from Lisbon" or "Madrid". In addition reports were received daily from the RSHA. These gave the agents number as their origin and specialised on damage caused by V. weapons. P/W is certain that agents were the only source of information on this matter. Reports after April 1944 usually bore the comment "Air reconnaissance was not possible due to strong fighter defence". Reports of V. damage were considered disappointing in so far as the results achieved. A Signal Intelligence Section with 100 monitors and interpreters under General Gimmier issued a 15-20 page report on intercepts daily. The situation map was based primarily on information supplied by Frendseheere west. According to P/W there were special interrogation units in the field. He learned from the officer in charge that if the enemy had launched an attack in which his intentions or strength were not known and if no prisoner volunteered information, then one knowledgeable prisoner would be selected and any

methods used to make him talk. This prisoner was then to be shot.

Pate last made contact on 2.5.45 at 1635 GMT. Bronx last wrote on 3.5.45 and received 2 letters on 7.3.45. Rover last made contact on 1.5.45. Gelatine last wrote on 30.4.45 and received her last letter on 23.3.45.

According to a Jap B.J. dated 4th May, Alcazar de Velasco was then living somewhere near the German-Swiss frontier and trying to get into Switzerland. The Japs were doing their best to look after him on account of "his devoted service". This is not without humour since he double-crossed them by filling them up with junk.

On the 7th May the Spanish Govt. informed the Germans that they had been compelled to demand the closing of the Embassy, consulates and offices of the NSDAP in Madrid and the provinces as from the 8th May. Personnel were not to leave their places of residence until they received further instructions.

Wibroe came to discuss a note which he had written on his conversations with the Danish Underground Movement. As the FO had not found themselves able to make concrete suggestions and as the various personalities here with whom the Danes had been asked to deal were not persona grata, things had drifted and ultimately the Danish Minister in Moscow and another Dane in Stockholm had started conversations with the Russians. There was a suggestion that active negotiations had been going on for a fairly close liaison. Christmas Moller seems to have taken rather a prominent part and is now persona non grata with the Underground Movement. It is likely that he will not survive very long and his place may be taken by Kauffmann the Danish Minister in

Washington who was an underground worker himself and is well thought of. Coupled with this the occupation of Bornholm, the Danish island at the mouth of the Cattegat, may have more than ordinary significance, particularly since the cable to Denmark has been cut and a civilian plane which went to the island has not returned.

At the staff meeting today we discussed the Intelligence Officers who will be available from the camps in the I.O.M. It was arranged that Woolf was to see Kellar as he might be suitable for Mid East and that Piehler might go either to 21 AG, Control Commission or O20. Strang is to come and see me, and also Piehler. There are in addition some sergeants whose qualifications I have asked for. It was decided the Aembal Johnson should be demobilised as soon as his age group was reached. It was agreed that Springborn from the LRC should go on loan to 21 A.G. and be put on their establishment if necessary. Horrocks said that there was no employment for Mrs. Lindsay who according to him creates trouble wherever she goes. I felt somewhat sceptical about this.

- I gather from Hill and David that the BOLSON case is developing satisfactorily so far although the interrogations have not yet begun. Hill is anxious to get back to his business part-time.

Hughes came to talk to me about a man named JONSKI who had come up on the air from Czechoslovakia, saying that he had certain information relating to wireless DFing and also asking for a message to be transmitted to his wife, an Indian. He gave certain people as references whose bona fides had been checked through IPI and he had also stated that he was connected with certain patents the partic-

ulars of which he gave. It turned out that he was a wireless engineer of some standing. He was anxious to give his information to us and not to the Russians. All his messages were en clair so we had to be very cautious in our replies.

I saw Woolf from the I.O.M. He seemed to me good type and very keen to work for us. He has had considerable experience in the Mid East in the running of agents etc. I have arranged for him to see Kellar.

At the D.G.'s request I spoke to Cavendish Bentinck about the proposal to bring KALTENBRUNNER to this country. He did not seem very clear as to who KALTENBRUNNER was but saw no objection to his being housed at 020. His view was confirmed by Oliver Harvey, Eden's principal private secretary.

I then asked him about the Jap Embassies and Legations in neutral countries. I reminded him that this matter had been left in abeyance until Stage A as it was felt that no useful purpose could be served by kicking the Japs out of Sweden if the Germans would have to remain. He made a note of this and said that he would raise the question at the JIC.

Finally I asked him whether the terms of reference for Findlater had been decided. He said that he had seen Findlater and that the latter was quite clear that he had complete scope to investigate whatever he liked in MI5 and MI6 and this with the full agreement of C. and the DG. He was therefore starting work next week.

I went to see C. and showed him the note about JONSKI. He thought that the best course

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would be to reply that the matter was under consideration and that we would endeavour to make contact. Meanwhile we might approach the Czechs, explain the story and get them to act. I then showed him the report about the OSS agent. He told me there had been a row about this with Donovan but that he did not quite know the circumstances. He suggested I should have a word with Dansey.

I then showed him Wibroe's report on Danish relations with the Russians. He was quite interested although he had no confirmation of any conversations with Kollontay. He reminded me however that the Germans have been desperately anxious for us to seal off Denmark by the occupation of Lubeck as they anticipated Russian parachute landings. In fact we only occupied Lubeck about 3 hours before the Russians arrived on the outskirts, when their tanks were told to withdraw. C. thought the occupation of Bornholm was quite significant. He asked me to show Wibroe's note to Kim Philby. I told C. about the terms of reference and that Findlater was starting next week. He seemed quite satisfied. I also told him about KALTENBRUNNER. He told me that the cryptographers brought over here from Germany were no good and could now go back but there was another party who had been working on the atomic bomb, who were to be brought over.

May 18th

The Chiefs of Staff in Washington are pressing for the opening of Spanish air lines from Madrid to the Canaries without censorship at Gib. This may well be due to pressure from Pan Air who want to get air lines to Madrid. It is said that the Spanish Govt. have given

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assurances that they will not transport Axis nationals or nationals of countries now occupied or formerly occupied by the Axis except when approved by the British and US Embassies in Madrid. This of course is not worth much since Axis nationals or Quislings may easily obtain Spanish or S. American papers. The Chiefs of Staff also say that they find it difficult to sustain a military objection owing to the Spanish civil air service from Madrid to Tangier which is uncensored. There is a certain argument here but there is of course no regular route on from Tangier unless the Spanish provide private or military aircraft. It seems to me that if we maintain Censorship to S. America for the next 3 months we should maintain control over the air routes in so far as this may be possible. Lastly I am told by Pakenham of SIS that there is some question of a joint occupation of Tangier by British and American forces until its previous international status is settled.

The D.G. talked to me about KALTER BRUNNER. He seemed very annoyed with TAR for asking the field to send him back without prior reference to himself. I told him that I had seen Cavenish Bentenck and had spoken to Oliver Harvey. The matter was clear from the F.O. point of view. I should be seeing Maxwell later.

I attended the J.I.C. when the question was discussed as to how far it would be possible to maintain some sort of nucleus of CSDIC and Q20 and its technical equipment for expansion in the event of war.

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As regards personnel I thought that we might as was suggested by CSDIC keep in touch with certain people whom we had employed on interrogation work both at the LRC and at O20 and that we might perhaps select a certain number of reserve officers with the necessary language qualifications, who would be available to give us support in the event of war. It would not however be possible to give these people anything very much in the way of training since interrogation work was very much a matter of practical experience which could not be obtained unless one had the subjects to deal with.

We also discussed the letter of the W/T Security Committee to the JIC expressing the view that they could not say what was required in the matter of W/T security until they knew what the over-all security policy was to be between Stages A and B and after the Jap war. I interpreted this as meaning that if govt. and commercial publications were to be issued as in the prewar period, W/T security would have to adjust itself accordingly. I suggested that the HDSE might examine this and also that Desmond Morton might have views. I was asked to consult Creedy.

I went to see Maxwell about KALTENBRUNNER. He saw no difficulty in his being brought back to O20. He rather pertinently said that he did not think the Russians would consult us if they got hold of an important character in the SS and wanted to take him back to Moscow.

Col. Jackson of OSS came to see me. He was formerly employed in C.I., 12th A.G. but is a lawyer by professions. At the request of Gen. Donovan he was detailed by Gen. Omar to

to help in deciding what part that organisation should play in peace time. He had been more concerned about the operational side of their activities than the defensive side. I gave him my views at some length and afterwards lunched with him, Blum of OSS and TAR. He was a little puzzled as to how the FBI ought to fit into the general scheme of things. I said that I thought that any intelligence organisation should at any rate in the home field use the FBI as their executive arm. At present of course the FBI correspondsto ourselves and to the police forces. I said that I thought that OSS should work in the closest cooperation with the FBI, knowing full well of course that they were both at daggers drawn.

Michael Ryde came to talk to me about Alois MUELLNER, a German from Lourenco Marques who had been actively associated with German activities in S. Africa and who was on the Drottingholm at Liverpool. There were other Germans too who would be going back to Germany, including WERTZ. Seeing that as the FO had given these people safe conduct, the only thing that we could do was to pick them off un Germany and have them sent back to this country. This was of considerable importance since Lenton is now agitating for a comprehensive report on Germany activities in S. Africa, presumably for the use of Smuts in any forthcoming election. Ryde thought that if we managed to lay our hands on the right people we could cover most secret sources by getting statements involving van Rensberg, Pirow and Malan.

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Dick rang up to ask me to let him have my views about his future. I have written to him to say that apart from a short visit to see Findlater Stewart I thought he could remain on to co-ordinate CI and the Control Commission until the beginning of August as we should not be allowed to do any reorganisation until after Findlater had issued his report.

I went to see Creedy and explain to him the request of the J.I.C. that his committee might report on publications, official and commercial, in peace time and what should in future be kept secret. He said he would be having a meeting next week at which this matter could be raised.

I also talked to him about the suggested meeting of the Radio Security Committee. He said that the issue had been forced upon him as G.P. was asking for an increased grant at any rate until next January. As Creedy was already authorising a yearly payment of up to £600,000 p.a. he thought that RSS. should make some statement about the position. Creedy said that quite frankly he had not the slightest idea how the money was being spent and he felt as I did that he was not likely to get far if he got a statement from G.P. In fact the only way he could know whether he was getting value for money would be to appoint an entirely independent and reliable person to go into the whole activities of RSS. He thought however that this was a matter for Findlater Stewart. I said that we proposed to say that our requirements were (1) the detection of illicit wireless in this country (2) the monitoring of any potential enemy clandestine service and (3) the policing of a cross-section of the ether to ensure that serious leakage

As regards the future of the organisation and the best manner in which these tasks could be carried out, we could not fairly say until Findlater had issued his report. At the same time I made it quite clear that although we had the highest regard for the work done by the discrimination section under M.E. and the work done by R.I.S., we were by no means satisfied with the management who controlled not only RSS but C's SLU communications and his communications between his agents. They had been in the habit of making use of RSS resources for their strictly MIB functions with the result that we never knew precisely what the position was. In fact we had no confidence in either G.P. or Maltby.

I dined with Victor last night. He was full of his experiences at Wiesbaden and with 12th Army Group. He was instructing them in counter-sabotage work. He and Stuart Hampshire who was also there referred to the case of NEBEL @ OSTRICH. NEBEL was over-run and got back to Paris. They both thought that he was an extremely sinister figure, and may well have double-crossed both the Germans and ourselves. He would however always remain at heart a Nazi and a thug. They both thought he ought to be bumped off and under certain conditions seemed to be quite prepared to do the job themselves.

Stuart gave an account of Dick's visit to 21 A.G., who were evidently somewhat in disgrace for having allowed Doenitz to broadcast. The fact was that the Germans having surrendered refused to allow British troops free movement in their area, and persuaded 21 AG that they were the only people with the necessary administrative machinery to demobilise their forces. When Dick arrived to enquire about the whereabouts of Himmler

he found that the morale of the Germans was quite high, that they were full of spit and polish, heel-clicking etc. and were generally taking up a rather arrogant attitude. When he asked about Himmler he was told that he had been in the area but that he had been told to get out and go south as he was an embarrassment to the military authorities. Moenitz and Jodl did not know of his present whereabouts. Some Panzer General took a great delight in showing off his tanks and made his latest models perform for Dick's edification. This may be a slightly libellous story but I hope to get a full account from Dick in due course.

May 19th

I went to see Newsam about the situation in Palestine and the possibility of terrorists coming to this country to assassinate the PM or some other high personage. I explained to him that we were anxious to speed up the information received at the ports about the arrival of Palestinian seamen and that we wished in future to have notification of all Jews arriving from Mid East whether seamen or civilians. He gave me a note to Perks and Prestige whom I subsequently saw at the Old Bailey. Perks has laid on the necessary arrangements. We shall receive telephone notification direct from the ports.

Cavendish Bentinck rang me to say that SAORZENY and his assistant had been captured and that SHAEF were proposing to send them over here. I spoke to TAR about this and warned him that before anything happened he ought to notify the DG.

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I had some talk with Le Bosquet about extracting information from P/Ws about Frende Heere. I explained to him precisely what we wanted to know, namely how reports were received by that organisation, how they were assessed, and whether Y. backing played a large part in the value attributed to any particular agent's work. Lastly any indication of whether the best agent's reports were coming from and their nature. He said that he had already had a certain amount of information on these points which he would let me have.

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May 20th

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May 21st

Warre of the F.O. rang me up about the case of Ernst BREMER, a Swedish merchant captain who is at O20 and has confessed to being a spy. The Swedes want to talk to him. I explained to him that if we allowed them to do this we should have to do the same for our allies and for other neutrals. This would present endless complications. We had rigidly opposed any visits to O20 and wished to continue to do so until we could liquidate the camp. This we could not do until the camp was liquidated and their documents either captured or burnt. I anticipated this might take 6-8 weeks. He said that the Consular Dept. were taking the line that their hands would be weakened in dealing with any of our interned people abroad if we did not grant concessions to the Swedes, and that they were proposing to put the matter up to higher authority. I made it quite clear that we should oppose the F.O. strenuously.

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Stamp and Forrest came to see me about PFEIFFER, ex-assistant naval attache at Ankara, a long-standing agent of the Abwehr, who was

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at the back of the Rumrich case in America. This man and Gen. Wolfe, who was attache for all the German Services in B.A., are on board the Drottingholm at Liverpool. They will probably go on to Germany and then be sent back here. The question arises as to where they should be put. For Intelligence reasons it is desirable for both to go to O20. I spoke to Rawli about this. He was quite content and said that if we got into difficulties CSDIC would act as long-stop. I spoke to Brock about the checks on the Zionist agencies here, in Jerusalem and USA. There is always a certain risk with letter checks but it seemed to me that in this case it was one that should be taken.

JIC SHAEF has produced an interesting note on the policy of the present leaders in Germany. In future the Germans will take every opportunity of licking the allies' boots in order to make us acknowledge that their behaviour is correct. At the same time they will do everything they can to hinder the Russians thus encouraging the Russians to be suspicious, into thinking that the allies are behind this German trickery. They will appeal to the allies whenever the Russians do not stick to the letter of the surrender agreement. They will give the impression, whenever possible that the allies are protecting the Germans, a western race, from the barbarians of the east. Since Russians negotiations are often ponderous and seldom speedy, they will try to come to quick agreements with the allies and then face the Russians with a fair and perfectly calculated campaign. It springs moreover from

determination to prove that Hitler's conception of history was true. The German argument is now as follows: "The Nazi Party which was responsible for losing the war, was a wicked institution since it forced the Anglo-Americans to destroy Germany. It has now been spirited away and its place in the struggle against Bolshevism has been taken by the allies. Germany must therefore help the allies and the Russians. By fooling the allies into rebuilding Germany as a bulwark against the Russians, Germany will regain her place as a great power".

Jane has produced an interesting report on ISCOT and a short note of it was given to the PM. She states (1) that the open activities of the Comintern ceased with its published dissolution on 15.5.43. (2) that the headquarters personnel, secret agents and clandestine communication system of the Comintern are still used by the Soviet Govt. for the direction of Communist Parties abroad as instruments of Soviet foreign policy. (3) it was through this organisation that the Soviet Govt. gained control of the National Council of Poland, formed in Warsaw in 1943, engineered the transfer of its leading members to

Moscow and formed therefrom the Polish National Committee of Liberation. The Committee moved to Lublin on 3.8.44 as soon as it became the provisional government of Poland.

(4) the present Fatherland Front Govt. of Bulgaria is the outcome of direct instructions from Moscow through the Central Committee of the Bulgarian C.P. in August 1944. The policy and tactics of the communist ministers is laid down by Moscow. Relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavian Govts. are regulated from Moscow through Soviet agents in Sofia and Titov's headquarters (5) in Yugoslavia Moscow has engineered to maintain control.

It is carefully fostering a policy to drive a wedge between Tito and the British Govt. (6) In Austria the Soviet Govt. through the same clandestine means maintains strict control over the Committee of the Austrian Freedom section in Carinthia and Styria. A special emissary was sent to northern Slovenia in Oct. 1944 with instructions for the formation of an Austrian battalion within the Yugoslav National Army, and with the formation of a committee of the Freedom Front. The personnel of the Committee are all either nominees of Moscow or non-communists appointed locally after consultation between special Soviet agents for the area and their control in Moscow. The formation of a provisional government for Austria was laid down as a main plank in the programme of the C.P. of Austria which was printed at Slovene headquarters about June 1944. Franz Honner, appointed minister of the interior is one of the two special agents who have been operating in northern Slovenia under Soviet instructions, while Johan Koplenik, minister without portfolio, was the Austrian representative on the Comintern up to its alleged dissolution in May 1943. The minister of Education, Ernst Fischer, was broadcasting regularly on Austrian matters over the Moscow radio up to April of this year.

The U.S. JIC has given an estimate of Japanese defensive capabilities. It is not assumed that any landing will be attempted on the home islands before Dec. 1945. Meanwhile the Japs will do all they can to strengthen their home defences. The Japanese ground strength in Manchuria and Korea may be increased by the creation of new units and by withdrawals from China. It is estimated that in Dec. 1945 Japanese ground strength in the main island

would total about 2,000,000 men. It is impossible for them to strengthen to any degree the defences of all prospective landing places. They will only be able to concentrate on the most vulnerable areas and many points will be found less well fortified than numerous island positions heretofore attacked. In the air it is estimated that the Japs will have a maximum of 2,000 combat aircraft of which 1,400 would be based on the home islands. The remaining strength will be located in Manchuria, Korea and North China. Further development of suicide attacks including the use of piloted bombs, is expected but many limiting factors may qualify the effectiveness of such weapons. Production and combat efficiency should be expected to decline further. By Dec. 1945 the Jap air force will be capable of only one last all out and short-lived effort to repel invasion of the home islands. On the sea it is possible that by Dec. 1945 a few heavy and some light naval units will have escaped destruction but they should be eliminated quickly if the attempt to oppose the landing. A maximum effort by the Navy will probably consist of harrassing tactics by a limited number of destroyers and submarines and suicide attacks by some surface craft and midget submarines.

According to JIC SHAEF, the Germans remain apathetic and docile towards the allies. No large scale security problems are anticipated in the immediate future. These are first impressions. Second impressions are more serious. The German people are utterly unrepentant and they are sunk in inconceivable ignorance of the deeds of their leaders and the hatred with which Germany is regarded in Europe. In happy indifference of the plight of foreign workers and displaced persons and

in arrogant indignation that Germany is held responsible for the war and that she should not suffer for her misdeeds. The average German realises that Germany is militarily defeated but he does not admit that she is conquered. Indeed many regard themselves as liberated from the horrors of war which were imposed on them from above and for which they were in no way responsible. Children give the V sign to our troops. At Duisberg and Essen US troops were received with cheers. During 10 years of Nazi rule the Germans have acquired the habit of shutting their eyes to what went on in the next road. Many pretend never to have heard of concentration camps and SS atrocities abroad, and they disown responsibility for these things. In their eyes the only crime Germany has committed is to lose the war. They feel aggrieved when foreign workers whom they have enslaved loot their things and have to be fed by them. Men like the Bishop of Munster who contemptuously referred to all displaced persons as Russians, arrogantly demand that the allies should give Germany protection from these people. Much of the above holds good for the educated classes. They however are more prepared to stipulate about the future. They will do all in their power to poison allied - Russian relations. They believe that the principles implicit in Nazism, such as the conception of Germany as the master race, will survive their defeat and that Germany will once again emerge as a European power.

The JIC, reporting on the Japanese strategy and capacity to resist, state that on present evidence the new Cabinet may be prepared to limit their ambitions in China and attempt to buy off Russia, but shows no immediate intention of trying to negotiate a compromise peace with Great Britain and America, as they do not believe that such a peace could at

present be obtained. It was thought feasible however that the defeat of Germany and the prospect of invasion by Russia might influence the Japs to accept a peace tantamount to unconditional surrender though not necessarily so described to the Japanese people, rather than see their entire country laid waste. They have no delusions about the steadily deteriorating situation of their country. The predominating features in that situation are the threat of imminent invasion, the likelihood of Russian invasion, the mounting allied bombing offensive, the severance of the near from the outer zone, their acute logistic defects and the hopeless inadequacy of Japanese land, naval and air forces and of their war production.

A SHAEF report on the mentality of the German Generals is interesting. Since the invasion of France we have captured over 300 German Field-M Marshals, Generals and Admirals and from their interrogations and behaviour it is clear that they are still the breeding ground for dangerous political ideas. They blame Hitler for the army's downfall but deny that they can be held responsible for carrying out Nazi orders. Indeed they complain that the Anglo-Saxon conception of International Law was unfair. This refusal to acknowledge responsibility for Germany's crimes is not due to mere stubbornness. Its roots lie in a perverted morale sense. Success if right, what does not succeed is wrong. It was for example wrong to prosecute the Jews before the war since they set the Anglo-Americans against Germany. It would have been right to postpone the anti-Jewish campaign and begin it after Germany had won the war. It was wrong to bomb England in 1940. If they had refrained Gt. Britain would they believe have joined Hitler in the war against Russia. It was wrong to treat Russian and

Polish P/Ws like cattle since now they will treat Germans in the same way. It was wrong to declare war against the USA and Russian because they were together stronger than Germany. That it is wrong to exterminate a race or massacre prisoners hardly ever occurs to them. The only horror they feel for German crimes is that they themselves by some monstrous injustice may be considered by the allies to be implicated. This complete amorality is combined with the most punctilious regard for the formalities of life. They are obsessed with their oath to their supreme commander Hitler and the word Ehre is seldom absent from their lips. The word of course does not mean what is in general fair and honourable but on the contrary what is of advantage to Germany and can conveniently be used to justify any blackguardly act. They plan to watch for the moment when sooner or later political events will prompt them to seize the opportunity to rebuild the German Army. Even the anti-Nazi Generals applaud Nazism for having re-created the German Army. They emphasise that they are professional soldiers, practically comrades in arms with US and British officer, who understand their position. They conveniently forget that they are imbued with a love of war for its own sake and consider it as the finest means of demonstrating that they are the master race. Both the reports I have quoted on Germans generally and on the Generals seem to confirm everything that Vansittart has said.

Harry has drawn my attention to the problem of German scientists, of whom there are about 60 in a special camp. They are to be brought over here periodically to see fellow-scientists and industrialists. Meanwhile their documents have all been examined and they are being carefully questioned. Harry thinks there is a danger of leakage. This I think is true

because all scientists speak the same language and let their professional interests get the better of them. This sometimes results in their giving away more than they get. I doubt however whether there is very much that can be done to stop them. The other danger is the desire of profit seekers to make use of any development for commercial purposes. The Americans will undoubtedly obtain a good deal of information which they will pass to interested parties in the US. The ultimate disposal of these German scientists presents a very difficult problem. If they are to remain in internment they will be lost to the scientific world. If on the other hand they are to be grabbed by the allied govts. they will be a thorn in our side like LACHMANN was in the next war. I have said that in peace time we should concentrate on the protection of scientific developments or inventions involving some entirely new principle or process and also on the application of such principles and processes to war industries, and for this purpose we should have the services of someone in the scientific world to keep in constant touch with scientific developments in all its branches. If then anything like radar is brewing we could take immediate steps to institute the necessary safeguards. Once equipment has passed the experimental stage and is issued to the services there is very little to be done to prevent the information becoming available to any interested foreign power.

May 22nd

I attended the meeting of the SE today to discuss the proposal of the combined Chiefs of Staff that a Spanish air route should be opened from Madrid to the Canaries without censorship at Gibraltar. The feeling of the meeting

was that the arguments put forward by the Chiefs of Staff were not really valid. Firstly, any assurances by the Spanish Govt. that we should be allowed to vet axis personnel or people from formerly-occupied territory was really worthless. It did not include neutrals and even if it had it was always open to the war criminals to purchase papers from some other country. The other argument about there already being in existence an air line from Madrid to Tangier was equally invalid as there was no regular means of onward transport except through French territory. Apart from this, the elastic arrangement suggested by the Chiefs of Staff would be contrary to Censorship policy until A + 90 and would clearly lead to demands for the opening of shipping routes and for the running of the air line from Foynces to Lisbon. This is another case where if you pull away a brick from the general security structure you are likely to bring down the whole house.

I saw Wibroe who is leaving for Copenhagen on Thursday. At C's request I have arranged for him to have a talk with Section 9.

Hughes brought Graham of RSS to see me. He is taking Gilbert Ayle's place and will thereafter be the sole remaining member of R.I.S. At present RSS are concentrating very largely on general search and on the analyses and classification of all signals they pick up. This should prove very valuable in the future.

D.G. has got all excited about the possibility of Tommy Harris going with Garbo as far as the USA. He has been given a note on the subject which he will consider.

ADNI rang up about foreign domestic servants in the employ of naval officers. He proposes that the ban should be removed except for Axis nationals. I said that in sending out a signal I thought he might be well advised to say that this did not absolve N.O.s from the responsibility of taking the necessary precautions when taking documents to their homes. The new ruling does not apply to naval establishments.

Hunter came to see me about his staff. He thinks that all the old police officers should go after the war. He would like to keep Kitchener and would have liked him as a successor but Kitchener wants to retire. He suggests as a possible substitute Hackney of Ops. I said I thought the idea quite a good one.

At the DGs meeting today at which I was not present I understand that the policy about exit permits for British subjects which had been decided at Findlater Stewart's meeting last week was reversed. Horrocks did his usual stuff about only having a small percentage of traces and only two people being stopped. This is of course a completely fallacious argument as we never work to more than a 1% basis. The DG who is now in a perpetual state of rolling up the map and reaching for his bowler hat, decreed that we were not interested. The only suggestion to counteract this decision is that Hollis should add a few of his 18B cases to the Black List.

May 23rd

Adam came to talk to me about the exit permits for British Subject.s. He said that he was proposing to cover exit permits to the British Empire and the USA by a check against the

Black List and that this would reduce the total number of references from P. & P.O. by about two thirds. Even if therefore the number of applications to proceed to the continent and S. America were doubled the Registry would still have less to do than they were doing now. We shall therefore continue to vet British subjects going to the continent and S. America and shall thereby conform with the censorship regulations until A.+ 90.

I saw Piehler from the I.O.M. I do not think he is suitable for 20 but he should be very good as a worker under Noakes in 21 AG. He knows Noakes already. I have written to MacDermott.

Tommy and I saw the DG about plans for Garbo. The DG seems quite amenable to the suggestion that Tommy should go with Garbo but thinks that they had better go by sea as an air passage might be considered peculiar seeing the difficulties that there are about priorities.

I saw Anthony and Kemal Johnston and arranged for Mitchell to carry the liaison with Orange with Johnston leaves., since a good deal of the stuff affects F.3. Kemal Johnson thanked me for the letter I sent him some time ago and expressed the view that I was quite right in the advice I had given him.

May 24th

Vesey told the 12 o'clock meeting about the case of a woman called MOKKENTELLER, formerly of Amt 6 in Berlin and captured in the field by the Americans. She said that while in Berlin she had been the recipient of photo-

graphs received from Ankara relating to information obtained from the British Embassy. She said that the Germans had recruited the Embassy chauffeur and through him the Ambassador's valet, a Turk. The Ambassador thought this man suitable (a) because he spoke no English and (b) because he had a good voice. The valet was given a Leica camera by the Germans and photographed all the documents he could lay his hands on. In fact he photographed some when the Ambassador was in the next room playing the piano. He thought this a good plan as he had the necessary warning as soon as the piano stopped. The documents that he photographed were of considerable importance. They included some relating to the time and place of the Teheran Conference, to the proceedings at the conference, to plans for the attack on Rhodes, and to other Balkan plans (which had in fact appeared on the ISOS). Lastly there was a document from the FO or SIS warning the Ambassador that there was a leakage of information from the Embassy. The effect of this last document had been that the valet was instructed to cease operations for a week. He recommenced after this period. He finally left in the summer of 1944 and is now believed to be in Germany. He started operations in the autumn of 1943. I do not think that any incident during the whole war has caused me so much pleasure. C. too his highly delighted. The D.G. is rubbing his hands. Herbert attended a meeting in Codrington's room with a representative of SIS. Codrington was rather inclined to treat the whole incident lightly and made a very bad impression on Herbert. This is perhaps the most glaring example of the inefficiency of the F.O. Security organisation and the futility of sending out people like Johnny Dashwood to investigate cases of this kind.

At the staff meeting today it was suggested that I should take on College and Poston as learners. I should probably put Poston into R.Bird's section and College in with Anthony. As regards the F.E. I said that the only people that I knew who could replace Air/ would be either Kirby Green or Russell. If Kirby-Green went Strang of the I.O.M. might be a possible substitute as he knew the area and spoke Spanish well.

I had a meeting with TAR, JC, Marriott and Luke about the future of Harry Tate. The difficulty is that he is known to all his friends and in his business as Harry Williamson and he cannot without our assistance obtain the necessary documentation to travel abroad except in his own name. JC was therefore in favour of getting him naturalised. He thought that we should have a better hold on him. I pointed out we should have no hold on him at all if he is a British subject whereas if he remained a Dane we should always be able to deport him. It seemed to me that anybody had the right to call himself anything he liked and that we should try and get Tate registered as a Dane and in the name of Harry Williamson. I spoke later to Markbreiter who thought this was quite feasible. If Tate wants to travel and he would be well advised to remain here for the next few years, we could probably arrange matters with the Danish authorities. If he went to them now they might institute enquiries and it might be found that Harry had been carrying out active work for the Nazis before he came here. If he went back on a visit, which he appears to be anxious to do, he might well be picked up and put on trial. We could do nothing for him except say something in mitigation.

I spent an hour with Curry on Chapter 4 of his book making various suggestions. I advised him to cut out certain controversial bits and to confine himself purely to factual statements. As the DG had given him the opening he could in his concluding paras. express his opinion on whether the machine had been adequate in all respects to carrying out the job.

May 25th

I told Anthony that I was proposing to give him Colledge as a learner. He seemed quite pleased about this but would like to have a word with Noble first.

I had a long conversation with Tommy about the necessary cover for Garbo. Mills has suggested a commercial cover but as Garbo is described as an author this will not quite do. We have thought of possibly getting Walter Bell to give him a letter from Lunns Travel Agency and we thought also of providing him with a banker's letter.

At the daily meeting I raised the question of watching the interest of Dominions and Colonies in Germany. It was possible that a good many documents might be found. I thought that these documents could come here and we could distribute them to our links. I asked Roland Bird to make enquiries with EDS.

Baxter said that he had got two Danes who had been operating a wireless set on trawlers on behalf of the Germans and had made a confession. I decided that they should go to the Oratory Schools pending deportation. There seemed no point in sending them to O20. I also decided that a man called Albert BENGAS, a Frenchman who had been

responsible for PPF activities in the bridge-head should/come back from France and go to 020. The French wanted to send him here because he was going to talk about their agent GILBERT. If he did so it would have to be explained to a large number of people that any action against GILBERT was undesirable. This might well blow the case. I said that I did not think that we should take this case on as it really concerned French internal politics. I asked TAR therefore to speak to the French again and without giving offence persuade them to deal with the case themselves. We decided that with F.O. authority we should pick off the Drottningholm Erich PFEIFFER, Gen. WOLF from B.A., Bruno WOLFE from Turkey and Alois MUELLER who has a good deal of knowledge about South Africa. The other two know the whole of the B.A. set-up.

D.G. told me today that he was writing to Strong about Dick whom he thought should return. He agreed with me that Dick could remain until the beginning of August. I showed him a copy of Dick's letter.

Dick Butler tells me that Findlater Stewart is reading various documents relating to the office before he starts his enquiries next week.

Cimperman came in to see me. He wanted my assistance in getting access to War Room information. Apparently Gen. Donovan has barred his entry to the War Room. He is nevertheless trying to fix up a liaison in order to ensure that such documents as concern him reach the FBI. If he fails I said I would see what Roland Bird could do for him. He showed me a telegram from Ladd instructing him to give every assistance with regard to

Garbo. He also showed me a telegram from the FBI expressing anxiety about the release of 20 prisoners who had been operating in S. America or in the Peninsula. I told him that we already had this matter very much in mind and that at the moment we were only getting rid of allied nationals. We would certainly ^{not} take any steps with regard to the others without giving them the opportunity of expressing their views. A telegram from the FBI also asked whether it would be possible to hand over any of the S. American cases to the American authorities. I said that we would have to look into each case as the matter might be a somewhat delicate one.

I talked to Stamp and Miss Stiebel about getting allied nationals cleared out of O20. This is a matter which has been causing Stephens anxiety. The prisoners are beginning to want to write letters to Ambassadors and to lawyers, and to their relations. Before long we shall have a good deal of trouble with habeas corpus proceedings. The sooner we can get rid of these people therefore the better. Miss Stiebel tells me that the French are practically all gone, that a good many of the Belgians have gone and that the Dutch and Norwegians will be going in the course of the next 2-3 weeks.

C. rang me up to say that he had heard from Bridges that the King was going over to the Channel Islands on the 6th June to knight the bailieff of Jersey, one COUNTANCHE, and the bailiff of Guernsey, CAREY. He wondered whether these people were all right and suggested that possibly we might send someone over. I consulted Stopford who told me that the C.I.s were southern command area, and that he himself had in fact been over there during the weekend. The I.B. staff were

working very hard and doing their job extremely well. There was a good deal of ill-feeling apparently on account of Morrison's eulogistic speeches about Coutanche and Carey. Carey had written several articles in the press, one in particular about the cutting of telephone lines, in which he seemed to have trimmed his sails in the German direction to a very marked degree. Jersey were extremely irritated about the references to Coutanche who is regarded by the local inhabitants as a collaborator. All this will be cleared up sooner or later but it will probably take 2 or 3 weeks. I subsequently spoke to C. who will tell Bridges that the King would be most ill-advised to knight either of these characters until further investigations have been made. Further that it will not be possible to complete these before the King's visit.

I had a word with Chris Harmer who is now in charge of the Section V units in Holland and Belgium. He has come back to find out what precisely he is expected to do. He gave me an account of the surrender of the German forces in Holland and Denmark. Apparently Monty decided that the demobilisation and disarming of these forces could be done most rapidly and efficiently by the Germans themselves. In this he was undoubtedly right. The whole manoeuvre was carried out in the most orderly and rapid fashion. During the process however the German officers were driving about in staff cars and being saluted and British Tommies and German soldiers were both walking about the streets in towns and villages, although the Germans had an earlier curfew. The only blunder in all this seems to have been due to the facilities given to the Germans for broadcasting in Denmark. Had this not happened it is doubtful whether anybody would have known how the manoeuvre had been carried out. Monty's plea was that a long

delay in the demobilisation of these forces would have imposed an unnecessary burden on his own troops and would have delayed their demobilisation. SHAEF apparently take a different view and ordered the arrest of all the Generals which took place the other day.

The news has come through that Himmler committed suicide under circumstances which are perhaps excusable and even desirable. His death will certainly save everyone a great deal of trouble.

I saw Stuart Hampshire for a moment. He has been at 12th AG briefing the interrogators of Kaltenbrunner. He was not allowed to see K. neither has Victor been allowed to see Skorzeny. Victor of course is hopping mad. The Americans are pathetically ignorant but feel that as the man was captured in their zone they have got to put up a show. They are quite prepared to accept assistance in the matter of briefing which has been freely given. They have tried mixing Skorzeny and Kaltenbrunner together but both of them are clearly well aware of what is going on. Very little has been extracted from Kaltenbrunner so far. He is taking the line that he is really a lawyer and politician, that he did not know anything about the atrocities committed under the orders of MULLER. He has given a certain amount of political information which is true but is not being drawn into talking about the SD or about the planning of the underground movement. In due course he is go come back here when we shall be rather put on our mettle.

The JIC are considering the establishment of an organisation to deal with scientific and technical intelligence in the postwar period. Prof. Blackett has written an interesting memo

on this subject. One para strikes me as being eminently sound: he says "The fundamental difficulty of intelligence work is that input is by sources and output is by subject. A change-over has thus to occur inside the intelligence machine, which therefore has to act as far as possible as a single perfect human mind, absorbing, remembering, criticising and correlating different types of information, and then giving expression to the result. No card index can do it, although indices are useful adjuncts. The larger the organisation the less can it resemble a single mind. An intelligence organisation should therefore consist of as small a number as possible of individuals with abilities as great as possible". "Ideally" he says, "the collection and collation of information should be the responsibility of a common head".

The DG gave a dinner for Trygvie Lie, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, to which Nagel was also invited. Lie had just returned from San Francisco. He told me that he had an agreement with Molotov that the Russians would clear out of Northern Norway as soon as we and the Americans left the south. Meanwhile they were exercising a very rigid control over the frontier between their zone and the rest of Norway. He is evidently somewhat apprehensive as to what the Russian's ultimate intentions may be, and has very much in his mind their desire for a warm Atlantic port. Nagel, with whom I also spoke, has similar apprehensions. He told me that some time ago he approached the Russians with a view to getting agents through Russian territory into northern Norway. They agreed to this provided they could be allowed to put agents into the south. The ostensible purpose was of course to get information about German activities. In actual fact

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Nagel knows from at least one of the Soviet agents who subsequently came into his hands that the Russians were less interested in the Germans than in political intrigue among the Norwegians, particularly members of the C.P. Meanwhile it seems that from public announcements the Russians will ultimately evacuate Bornholm but on what conditions we do not know. I think their intentions there and in Denmark were definitely aggressive and called off as a matter of prudence or they were apprehensive lest we should have the intention of getting bases on the continent which would affect their exit from the Baltic. There had of course been talk of this among the Danish Underground Movement and the information may well have leaked back to the Russians. The Russians have always been opposed to the idea of a European bloc and have already to some extent driven a wedge between it by making a treaty with France. Their reason may well be that they are ~~not~~ in opposition to any move which might give us continental bases and impede their exit to the Atlantic either from the Baltic or the Mediterranean. As regards Germany their declared policy of magnanimity is interesting and evidently put out to contrast strongly with our non-fraternisation regulations. It looks rather as if they were out to win over the Germans and that ultimately this situation may develop into a struggle between ourselves and the Russians to get Germany into our respective spheres of influence. This may again all be due to apprehension on the part of the Russians.

May 26th

Stamp came to see me about the passengers on the Drottningholm. I had had some conversations with Dunn of the F.O. Apparently when

the list was originally submitted to SIS they said they were not interested. On being prompted by us however they declared considerable interest in a number of characters. This led to a change of arrangement and to the F.O. feeling compelled to take these characters off in this country instead of after their arrival in Germany. The position was complicated by the Swedes saying that they would not sail to Copenhagen owing to mines and must go direct to Gothenberg. Finally the F.O. decided to take 6 of the principle members of the GIS off the boat and hand them over to us. This aroused a great deal of trouble with the Swiss but as Dunn said they could no longer be a protecting power, and the whole business was no longer a game of cricket but a rat-hunt.

Tommy Harris came to talk to me about Garbo. He has now arranged that he will be provided with letters from the Courtauld Institute indicating that he is making a study of the influence of Spanish art on S. American countries. Anthony will be giving him some lectures before he goes and he will carry with him plenty of literature and photographs.

Stopford came to see me about certain information that he had obtained from his agents indicating that two of the pilots of ABA might possibly be working for the Germans. He seemed to think that they might have been responsible for the leakages. He had approached Michael Ryde and offered him the dossier but Ryde had said he would not be able to find time to go through it. He had passed copies to Aembal Johnston from whom he had got no reaction. He had approached John Noble who had said he would be pleased to

look at the papers but had never turned up. I said I thought there was something wrong and I would look into the whole matter, which was of course complicated by the fact that K.J. was in the country and not under me. The mistake was of course having Swedish and Swiss affairs in E.Division. Apart from this of course K.J. dislikes Stopford, and Stopford dislikes Blunt. Also Stopford himself suffers from a slight superiority complex which irritates everybody. I told Stopford that he was inclined to be cagey, that I had had no idea he was going to the Channel Is. the other day, that he never came to see me more than once a month and that he never came to my meetings. He said that he was coming now to the meetings but that he had been prevented on one or two occasions owing to other business and that apart from that he did not like to bother me. I said that everybody else bothered me and I somehow managed to put up with it.

I told Hunter that he could make a tentative approach to Hackney, who he thinks would make a good No.2 in B.6.

We have made another approach to the JIC about the liquidation of the Jap Embassies in neutral territory.

May 28th

I saw Poston and told him that I would like him to sit with Bird and pick up whatever he could. He could meanwhile do whatever odd jobs he had for the country by going down there once a week.

I talked to Stopford about the advisability of sending d'Egville as RSLO to the Channel Is. I said I thought he might perhaps work with the IB Staff for a short time and establish suitable contacts in the islands. I

did not however think that there was a case for a permanent RSLO in the Channel Is. in peace time. He agreed.

J.C. came to talk to me about a letter he had received from Gwyer. H-D is apparently leaving. He was asked to sign on for another year but refused on grounds that he was too old. He said however that he was perfectly prepared to sign on for a year or more to do a specific job in Austria. He did not however wish to lay himself open to being posted to the eastern front at his age. Basil Crean is apparently trying to get out and Gwyer himself is not anxious to stay as he does not feel that he will be persona grata with the new head of C.I. Gibson who incidentally appears to be unsuitable for the job. I have written a personal letter to Dick about all this.

Bridges rang up to thank me about my letter about the bailiffs in Jersey and Guernsey. He wanted to know if he could show it to Maxwell. I said there was no objection.

Vivian rang me to say that the archives of the German Embassy in Lisbon were being examined but that a need had arisen for guards in case the International Police might try to pinch some documents. I have sent a wire to Kirby Green to see whether any of the Counter-Sabotage Squad would be suitable for such a job.

Wethered came to ask me whether he would have any chance of permanent employment here after he had finished his work with the Control Commission. I said that it all depended on the enquiry but that I was hopeful that there might be something.

Luke is taking Victoire over to Paris on Friday to hand her over to the French.

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May 29th

I attended the JIC today when we discussed the Joint Intelligence Bureau on which a paper had been written. This Bureau is really for the purpose of studying certain specific matters relating to topographic and economic conditions abroad. The Bureau would receive intelligence from existing depts but would have the right to collect overt intelligence of the kind collected by NID. It would be under the JIC from whom it would receive its general policy lines. The matter is to be put up to the Chiefs of Staff.

We also discussed a proposed interrogation centre for various people like Niemöller and Schushnigg who have been released from internment. The general view was that it would be undesirable to bring these people back to Washington and that some sort of centre should be established under SHAEF. There is no question of dealing with C.I. personnel.

I lunched with Harold Scott. He is I think pleased about getting his new job though he realises that it is going to be pretty tough. He said that he could not have very well refused it as for years he had been telling the H.O. that they ought to appoint a Civil Servant as Commissioner of Police rather than a Service man. I gave him a brief sketch of what we had been doing and warned him not to listen to stories which had been rather maliciously put out by Kendal who really knew nothing about our work. I told him how excellent Burt had been and said that I hoped that if the suggestion came up that he should run Special Branch he would in fact be given the job. I asked him not to say anything about this but merely to wait until the matter came before him. I then told him

something about our Black Market activities and explained how we had come into the whole business. I said that we had given information to the Yard about corruption in the police but that I did not think that Kendal had really got down to the job. I told him particularly about the case of Ch. Insp. Greeno. He seemed to have heard something of this already. I made it quite clear that we as a dept. did not wish in any way to appear in the role of a Gestapo

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think appreciated this point. Scott I

It has I gather been decided by the DG that we will liquidate our Security Control Officer in the autumn of this year, and hand over to Immigration. It was wisely decided I think that it would not be worth while taking on new personnel to replace those demobilised since the job of an SCO would be much more difficult and delicate and inexperienced people would be certain to put their feet in it. Any benefit that we might derive would be more than outweighed by the odium we should incur if things went wrong.

I spoke for 2½ hours with Findlater Stewart and Drew. Findlater seemed worried about the Catalogue Reference: K/4/1966 on the subversive side. He had in mind that somebody like