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Dalton or someone even more to the Left might insist on examining our records and that if they were not confined strictly to people advocating the overthrow of the constitution by violence the whole dept. might be in serious trouble. I said that this was a problem which people had constantly in mind for the last 25 years but that such difficulties as had occurred had been overcome fairly easily. The general form was that the Labour Party were far more interested to make use of our services than the Conservatives. As regards the records it was true he might find a trace of James Maxton who was at one time on the executive committee of the League against Imperialism. This did not however mean that we were following James Maxton about all over London. We were merely interested in the organisation which financed by Soviet money was working for the disruption of the British Empire. If we did not follow the outer constellations of the Comintern we should not really be informed about the major part of its work. I then said that in so far as dynamite in records was concerned he would find far more explosive material in the General Registry at Scotland Yard than he would in ours in the sense that if it were a case of using blackmail the Commissioner could do far better than we could.

Findlater then asked about my experiences at the Yard and was anxious to know precisely why I had left it. I explained to him the difficulties we had about the records, and how Sir John Anderson had finally ruled that they were all to be kept in a special secret registry not open to S.B. This had come about owing to two S.B. officers having sold information to the CP and the Russians. I also explained that the police by their upbringing and training were not particularly good at

appreciating the background of movements like the CP and the IRA. They were much more concerned about individuals who had broken or were likely to break the law. The other main reason for our transfer was that MI5 were studying subversive movements in the Forces and to do so properly they had to make a study of the whole movement. There was therefore considerable duplication. I then told Findlater that in my view the best solution for the proper collection, collation and distribution of intelligence would be to put SIS and ourselves under the same head. I realised the difficulties but I thought that in any case we should have to sub-divide within the organisation on offensive and defensive lines and that this sub-division should give us some status on the continent. My views on this have already been recorded. I also discussed the question of ministerial control and gave my reasons for thinking that both ourselves and SIS or the joint organisation should come under the CID or the War Cabinet. Findlater thought possibly the Chiefs of Staff might be better. Lastly I told him that I thought CE, subversive movements and security should hang together. On the question of security I told him about the case of MOLKEN-TELLER pointing out that if there was leakage of information in Ankara it could make nonsense of our work here.

May 30th

Melland came to see me about his future. He felt that perhaps he ought to sign on for a year but wondered whether at the conclusion of that period there might be an opening for him in this dept. I said that we should be very pleased to consider it when we knew precisely what our charter would be. If it was merely the former one I did not think there would be a career which would recommend

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itself. On the other hand if as I hoped we could get a wider charter giving us some scope on the continent it was highly probable that there would be an opening.

came to see me about Viv's old agent. He has taken out naturalisation papers in Canada and cannot get them for another year. Meanwhile he wishes to retain his bogus status as a British subject. I suggested to B-B that he should go and see Hill of the H.O. who already knows about the case.

Air-Commodore Merer came to see me. He has succeeded Buss, as Security Intelligence, Air Ministry. He struck me as being good. I had previously met him on a Junior JIC committee meeting which he handled very well. I told him that it would be helpful if from time to time he could let us know precisely what the A.M. wished to keep secret, both as regards the order of battle and secret weapons.

U 35 came in. He is back from Lisbon for a few days. He thinks that within the next month he ought to reap a fairly good harvest from those Germans who are anxious about their future. As regards interrogation of prominent Nazis he said that he did not think he could do any good in a military area but that back here he might in semi-official surroundings be able to extract quite a lot of information if he were left alone for a couple of hours with some of the leading personalities. He told me many stories of his deception work in Lisbon.

D.G. held a meeting to discuss the future of the LRC. Baxter had prepared an analysis showing who were at present in the LRC and Catalogue Reference KV/4/196 quite clear that

many people are still being brought here who need not really come to this country at all. Quite a number arrive illegally on America aircraft. Only a very small percentage are of interest, though quite a number have been collaborating with the Germans. We came to the conclusion that we wanted a camp to hold these people until they could be deported to their own country or some means of preventing them from coming. We should still however require the Oratory Schools. We are to discuss the whole question at the H.O. tomorrow.

Tommy Harris has got his OBE which will be a great source of pleasure to all.

Cavendish-Bentinck rang me up about the case of Carl von LOESCH who was formerly attache to Ribbentrop's Dienststelle in this country. He has come into possession of the secret archives of the German F.O. They had been photographed and at the last moment it was decided to burn them. Von Loesch managed to bury them and the SD who were doing the job merely burned the empty boxes thinking they were burning the archives. The films are now in this country and von Loesch's presence is required to elucidate them. He is by birth a British subject. I explained to Cavendish Bentick that if we wonce got him here we might not be able to get him out again and he might be an embarrassment. He is going to find out whether by virtue of his service in the German Army von Loesch loses his British nationality, or whether he would be liable to prosecution as a renegade. In actual fact we should not proceed against a character of this kind but his presence here might cause difficulties.

Keith came in to see me about the case of von LOESCH. He asked me to let him know Caven-dish Bentinck's final decision. He told me that he had been up to Berlin for the signing of the armistice with Keitel. He had had to fish Keitel out of the dining room where he had been having a heavy lunch of caviar and champagne. He was not clear whether he had been lunching separately or with the Russians. The Russian Commissar haggled for about 3 hours over one word in the final document. Keith in his usual rather uppish way expressed some surprise at this. The Commissar replied "Russia has been fighting Germany for 3 years and therefore 3 hours was a matter of no significance." Keith replied "We have been fighting the Germans for 6 years and the sooner we get it over the better". Kenneth Strong I gather was a little shocked by this remark. At Flensburg there was an amusing interview with Jodl. We had issued to our troops an elaborate plan relating to their conduct in Germany and giving full details as to how the country was to be occupied and governed. The code name for this plan was "Eclipse". Jodl apparently opened the conversation by saying "I have read your plan Eclipse. I think it very good and I shall see that it is carried out to the letter". A copy of the document had evidently been captured somewhere in the field. The joke of it was that Jodl had clearly read and studied it very carefully whereas our officers knew very little about it. The French I gather are behaving extremely badly. Le Juin wrote such an insulting letter to Eisenhower that he passed it on to the Chiefs of Staff in Washington. They decided immediately to stop all further lease lend for French rearmament. The French are constantly writing rude notes to the effect that they are now entirely in control of affairs in France and that the things about which we

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ask are none of our business.

May 31st

Burt came to tell me that Fish would be leaving shortly to join BOAC.

I attended a meeting at the H.O. with the DG Baxter and Dick Butler. We had an analysis of the cases at the LRC. It was decided that we would first attempt to get the FO to stop the nationals of allied countries coming here to join allied forces. It was accepted however that a certain number of people would continue to come and would have to be segregated until we could get rid of them. In future allied govts. would be told that anybody released to them who did not join their forces should be returned to the LRC to be held pending repatriation. It was agreed that we should only wish to examine a very small percentage of people and our instructions to SCOs should be amended accordingly. Newsam took the view that it was undesirable in future to allow arrivals at the LRC to drift on to the labour market, and that until we could arrange for them to proceed direct to their countries instead of going via the UK they should remain in semi-detention at the LRC. Meanwhile efforts would be made to get those already there away as soon as possible. We gave notice that the SCOs would start being demobilised as from June 18th. This apparently came as rather a shock. The H.O. who have never liked the SCOs and who a short time ago were pressing for the liquidation of the LRC are now rather worried about the future, as they will be thrown back on their own rather meagre Immigration staff. Lastly we discussed the question of establishing closer co-operation between M.I.5 and I.O.S. This was generally

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wecomed. We shall begin by giving a short course to senior I.O.s. and then include the ports among the places to be visited by our RSLOs in their areas.

Milmo came to talk about SCHELLENBERG whose arrest is expected. He plans to bring him back here. We thought that in all the circumstances probably O20 treatment would be the best, and that U 35 might possibly have a go at him later.

Hampshire whom I saw later thought that possibly he and Caroe might have a preliminary canter in Germany. This will be considered.

June 1st

I went over to see Cavendish Bentinck with Harry Allen. The JIC have put up a memo on their proposed combined Intelligence Organisation for approval by the Chiefs of Staff. It is rather a one-sided document and there is a proposal to form a Security Committee between the 3 Services to advise the JIC on security matters. We said that we thought there ought to be a Security Service representative on this committee. The document is to be altered accordingly. I took the opportunity of saying that in general I thought the memo was a bit one-sided and that there was a general tendency to regard security as merely the imposition of restrictions of one kind or another. In actual fact the Security Service was to a large extent a producing agency for intelligence. I told him of the LRC and U20 products, and other sources, and that on the CI front they had really produced the bulk of the intelligence. I also emphasised that military security did not really amount to anything at all. What had really counted in this war was civil security which we had covered for

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the 3 Services in this country and on the continent as members of the CI staff. All the leading positions in SHAEF were held by our officers, and we had in all provided some 80-100 people. These were matters which obviously had never dawned on Cavendish Bentinck before. The main trouble is that we have never been properly represented on the JIC,

I lunched with Garbo today to whom I said good-bye and thanked him warmly for the services he had rendered. He is leaving about the 6th or 8th of this month, having got his Bolivian visa. Incidentally it cost him £18, although it was marked "gratuit". The sum was said to be due to the Bolivians on account of telegrams etc. Quite obviously the whole amount was sticking to the fingers of the Consul, who had only had the opportunity of issuing 13 visas since the beginning of the year and obviously wanted to make the most of any opportunities coming his way.

Roskill is leaving us. He seemed to think that our policy with regard to the Italians had by and large been justified and that had there been an invasion here quite a number of them would have been on the side of the enemy, including the 100 confirmed Fascists still in the I.O.M.

McIver has just returned from Mandy and brought Tim Airy back with him. Tim is clearly a sick man. McIver thinks he has done extremely well and set up a very good show. The position out there was misunderstood by OC and there is in fact very little to be done in Ceylon from a security point of view. The place is not a base for operations as had previously been thought. It is merely a headquarters.

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Courtney is apparently an unqualified success and has been made acting head of the War Room by common consent and approval. Unfortunately however he cannot be promoted and some figure-head will have to be found. Dixon is suggested. I do not feel very enthusiastic about this proposal after his performance with COSSAC but if Courtney was at his elbow he might be all right. Finney is to join the party as liaison with DIB. Relations with SIS appear to be extremely good.

The Jap Minister in Berne seems to be very agitated about the future of Japan and is urgently counselling his Govt. to make peace and save what is possible out of the wreckage. Otherwise he thinks Japan will inevitably go the way of Germany. He warns his Govt. against wishful thinking about allied designs.

According to SHAEF C.I. summary of the 27th May the approximate totals of arrests reported to date are: GIS, including Gestapo, 1636; S.S. and para-military, 1087; police including Kripo 270; Party officials 3139; other officials 196. According to Skorzeny, only in parts of northern Germany had there been time to establish any semblance of a Werewolf organisation. Screening of large numbers of P/Ws and displaced persons returning to France, Belgium and Holland has been handled superficially. Consequently the number of suspects and collaborators discovered has been small.

The final report on flying bombs and rockets indicates that there were 663 incidents due to rockets and 92 due to flying bombs during the first quarter of 1945. The rocket incident at Orpington on the 27th March was the last incident of its kind and the flying bomb attack on the 29th March was the last

attack of any variety during the war. The cause of this was the allied advances in Germany and Holland. On the 3rd March when activity was renewed after a pause, the mark 2 flying bomb was used, apparently partly constructed of ply-wood and having an increased range, launched from landing bases in Holland. Most of these had radio-ranging apparatus.

During the whole period of the flying bomb attacks 9251 bombs were reported in operation, 5890 crossing our coasts, 4242 destroyed. There were 2420 incidents in London and 3403 elsewhere. Civilian casualties are reported as: London 5375 fatal, 15258 serious. Elsewhere 462 fatal and 1504 serious. Service casualties were: London 207 fatal, 280 serious, elsewhere 95 fatal, 197 serious. The worst incident was at Wellington Barracks on 18th June 1944, where 58 fatal and 20 serious civilian casualties were caused and 63 fatal and 48 serious Service casualties. During the whole period of long-range rocket attacks, 1,412 rockets were reported, 517 falling on London, 537 elsewhere, on land, and 58 in the sea. Civilian casualties are reported as: London 2511 fatal, 5869 serious. Elsewhere 212 fatal and 575 serious. Service casualties were: London 30 fatal and 56 serious, elsewhere 1 fatal and 23 serious. The worst incident was at New Cross Road, Deptford on the 25th Nov. 1944 when 160 people were killed and 108 seriously injured. During the period 12th June 1944 to 29th March 1945 enemy action of all kinds caused the following house damage: London, 29400 destroyed and 1,255,000 damaged. Elsewhere 2,202 destroyed and 165,000 damaged.

The JIC have issued a paper on our future conduct in relations with the Russians outside the diplomatic field. No longer is information to be given gratuitously. We are to say as the Russians say, that the question will

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have to be referred to London. There will be a delay of several weeks at the end of which we shall say that provided the Russians are prepared to show us so and so, we shall be prepared to let them see similar equipment of ours. The same will apply to captured documents, German war plants etc.etc. It is emphasised that only in this way can we command any respect. The present policy of just handing out information does us no good whatever. It ends by our being treated with contempt.

I am going on leave tomorrow till June 17th.