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June 18th 1945

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ACT 1958
June 18th JUNE 2010

I looked in yesterday and had a talk with Herbert. The only outstanding event during my absence was the discovery from a German P/W that W.J.HOOPER or B.I.L had just before the war been working for the G.I.S. He had sold them information about the Russian agent Hans Christian PIECK and he had also sold them further information for which he received on one occasion £50 and on another £80 through Feldmann of the Abwehr in Colog. The most sinister aspect relates to an agent called Dr. Kruger who was employed by SIS. The P/W, whose name is GISAL or GESKIS, says that this agent's name was given to the Germans by HOOPER and that he was subsequently liquidated. seems to recollect that a rendezvous was appointed with this agent early in the war and he never turned up. It is thought that Felix Cowgill may have a certain amount under his hat and it is proposed that Herbert should have a talk with him when he goes to German on Thursday. It is possible, and indeed the SIS files show, that HOOPER was in touch with the Germans and that he did submit numerous reports to SIS about his contact, admitting that he was receiving money for information supplied. This however was at a time when he was out of favour with "C" who tore the reports up and put them in the WPE. "C" had the impression that HOOPER was trying to buy his way back into the service.

John Marriott came to talk to me today about his work in F.2. He is still rather worried about the handling of affairs and finds it difficult to get on intimate terms with Roger. I told him that Roger had spoken to me before I went away and that I had expressed the view that in dealing with the rank

and file some discrimination seemed necessary. I appreciated the point however that trouble blew up it was on the industrial side that we should come into contact with Govt. circles rather than on the espionage side. If we could not give a fair estimate of the percentage of party members in any particular unit and chapter and verse to the effect that certain officials negotiating with the Ministry of Labour were in fact members of the Party, it might well be considered that we were not doing our job. There was also the vetting side. I thought that this might be covered by what I understand already exists, namely a White List of people employed on highly confidential work (this list includes all our own personnel and that of SIS amongst others) against which any Party member coming to light should be checked. It seemed to me unnecessary that we should follow minutely the careers of those who were swinging picks and shovels.

I asked Charles about Findlater. He has not shown up very much lately. It was therefore decided that I should ring up Brew, which I did. I told him that there were various people in B-Division that I would like Findlater to see and that I was available if he wanted to have any further discussions. He is I think going to SHAEF next week, to study C.I. position and will be available the week after. He anticipates that his report may be ready early in August.

Dick/^{WHITE} came in to discuss his future with me. There is a strong move by Gen. Wheatley who is to be Monty's Chief of Staff, to keep Dick and I gather that the suggestion has even been made that he should leave this office and stay on permanently in Germany. This he does not wish to do. He thinks however that if he could set the Control Commission on its

feet and leave Ronnie in the saddle it might be to the advantage of all. We agreed that I would make the supreme sacrifice of leaving him in Germany until the end of Sept. on condition that if a reorganisation scheme came into being earlier he would be released on a fortnight's notice.

I broke the news about HOOPER to Stopford. While realising that HOOPER was bad about money he was reluctant to believe that he would betray his country. He seemed to recollect that on some occasion HOOPER had mentioned that he had established contact with the GIS.

Burt came to tell me about William JOYCE. He is on the whole inclined to admire him for having the courage of his convictions. JOYCE said that he was never really trusted by the Germans. There is a possibility that he may call a man called Hughes from S.B. also Max Knight, to give evidence that he gave information to the authorities about Communists in the pre-war years. In his evidence he will probably say that he conscientiously believed that we were making a mistake and that what he did was in the best interests of this country. This will not of course in any way help his case.

Fish is clearing up 4 or 5 cases in Italy and will then be leaving for BOAC where he is to run an organisation for the prevention of smuggling.

I had a talk with Kirby Green. He is anxious to stay on with us if possible and says that David Scheer wishes to do the same. I told him quite frankly what the position was and that I very much hoped that we should be able to make some offer towards the end of Sept. He said that meanwhile there was

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quite a lot to do in Gib. and that he was quite content to remain where he was. If he served with us in the future he would like to go abroad as his wife cannot stand the severe winters.

I saw John Booth. He has become bitterly anti-Russian. He was very pleased with the FO answer to the Russian accusations that we are treating their P/Ws badly, and were causing delays in sending them back. The fact is that the Russians will only receive 3,000 a day and if they arrive on the front after 3 pm they are not accepted till the following day. They are billeted and fed by us but behave in a perfectly shocking manner. They are dirty and ill-disciplined to an incredible degree and mess up all the clean German farms where they stay. Their morals are beyond all belief. The impression upon our troops is very marked. The whole idea of "wonderful Russia" is completely vanishing into thin air. They think the women are unspeakable and the men just like animals, which in fact they are.

The Russians who came to take over do not seem to be able to do very much. The only way they can get their people to obey orders in tidying up their billets before they leave is to tell them they will have no food until the work has been done.

John had run into Arnold RECHBERG while on a visit to the Swiss. RECHBERG was full of anti-Russian propaganda. Non-fraternisation is obviously breaking down and is quite unworkable.

June 19th

I had a talk with the Immigration Officers this morning before Hebert gave them a lecture. This afternoon they are visiting the LRC. They seemed very pleased about the present arrangements for co-operation but are loud in their protests that what we are doing now should have been done 3 years ago. This is of course a long story with many pros and cons. I hope that relations will be better in the future.

FINZELL of the Australian Security Service came to see me today. He is very anxious to get over to the continent in order to examine all NSDAP documents relating to Australia. I hope Dick will be able to arrange this.

Kremes is proving rather difficult at 020. He now has a long story about information received through a Hungarian named FULOP in Madrid. Information is said to have reached him via the Yugoslav diplomatic bag. There are however certain parts of this story which do not ring very true.

MALONE, who is dealing with the Mid East and Far East in M.I., came to see me. He has taken over from Montgomery.

Roger came to tell me that he had a telephone check on a communist called BARNETT in the Admiralty. The check had revealed that this man was a personal friend of Roland Bird. John Marriott thought that Roland ought to be told. I am however inclined to agree with Hollis that there is not much point in saying anything for the following reasons:

(a) Roland Bird may or may not know that the man is a communist but would not disclose anything of a really confidential kind; (b) he will in any case be leaving in the course of a month or so; (c) he would feel embarrassed if he were at BARNETT's flat and BARNETT started to telephone to one of his communist friends; (d) Roland might feel, in view of his somewhat strong Left Wing tendencies, that the office was engaged in a heresy hunt and, worse, that he himself was not trusted; (e) Roland's present work is not really of a confidential nature; (f) if he has the intention of disclosing secret information to BARNETT he could already have done so. John Marriott apparently thinks that as BARNETT is a Govt. official Roland might inadvertently say things which he would not say if he knew BARNETT was a Party member, and that he should therefore be warned.

Walker came to see me about his memo on pigeons. I said that when he had sounded SIS, SOE, MI14 and the Air Ministry I would put forward his memo to the JIC. The JIC may think it desirable to keep some small nucleus for practice purposes and for expansion in war-time.

Sort wants Kellar to go out to Mid East again. He was not quite sure whether this was necessary at the moment. Meanwhile I understand that the P.M. has told WEIZMANN that he is postponing the Palestine issue until the peace conference. This is apparently a great blow to WEIZMANN.

Hill-Dillon came to see me. He is being demobilised. He was full of praise for all his MI5 staff and for the office as a whole, and thanked me warmly for everything I had done. Crean, Gwyer, Ffoulkes and Mair are

carrying on at any rate for the present under their new chief

Fripp, the prospective DSO for Singapore, had a talk with me. He seemed quite sensible although his appearance is a little against him. I gave him an outline of Jap activities in so far as we knew them. It does not seem that he is going to get much assistance in the early stages and there will be no local police force. He has lived a good many years in Malaya and knows the country well.

The Jap Ambassador in Moscow had a long interview with Molotov towards the end of May. It seems doubtful whether in spite of the abrogation of the treaty the Soviet Govt. will declare war upon the Japs, at any rate this is the impression given by Molotov.

The Shael C.I. summary for the week ending June 9th states that cumulative arrests to date by 6th, 12th and 21st A.C.s are: G.I.S. including Gestapo 2991, S.S. and para-military, 2442. Others will bring the total up to 13551. The insignificance of all resistance so far encountered underlines the inadequacy of German preparations for postwar disruption and the present lack of essential organisation to direct them. The large cache of British money and apparatus for counterfeiting allied credentials of all kinds originally located at Oranienberg is being held at Friesing.

June 20th

I gave a talk to the first batch of I.O.s. who are being given a 2-day course. They have a lecture from Hart on the work we have been doing during the war and on the general structure of the office. They then visit the

LRC. On the second day I give them a talk about relations between our 3 main functions, espionage, subversive movements and security, explain to them what we think the postwar form is going to be, and in what way we think they can make a contribution. They then go down to see the registry at Bienheim. In my talk I told them why we had set up the LRC, the reason being that we were dealing with a centralised organisation and, more important still, it was necessary to have time thoroughly to sift a man's story. Such facilities do not exist at the port in wartime and still less in peacetime when visitors would resent being extensively examined. There is no doubt that the I.O.s appreciate the new development by which they are being placed in closer contact with ourselves. They have however a good many complaints against SCOs and somewhat resent not having been brought into the picture 3 years ago. I skated very lightly over this by saying that we realised that mistakes had been made in the past but that we hoped that in future relations would be on a different basis since we should now be relying entirely on I.O.s in the first instance. This did not mean however that we expected them to do our job. They could however make a very big contribution by letting us know of any cases where they could not find a plausible excuse for a man's visit and were quite certain that he was not coming for the purpose stated. They asked particularly that they might be informed about cases which they reported. I said that we hoped to be able to meet this request through our Regional Officers who would be visiting ports from time to time. We were however up against certain human difficulties. One of them was that the investigation of reports was in a large percentage of cases

inconclusive and there was rarely a given moment when we could give them a proper answer. Another difficulty was that we did not wish to discourage I.O.s, and generally a report that looked very promising in its early stages would turn out to be a mare's nest. We were always reluctant to point this out as we felt it might be discouraging but with regular personal contact this difficulty should be overcome.

Dick looked in to tell me that he had had a satisfactory talk with Findlater who was going out to Germany early next month.

Baxter had a talk with me about his staff. At the moment he has only about 20-30 aliens at the LRC and he has a number of people kicking their heels. He thought it was probably necessary always to keep a small nucleus. A few could be discharged now. Others might be found employment with the Control Commission and a small number were anxious for permanent employment. When Baxter goes he thinks that Vesey will be able to carry on.

Tommy Lascelles asked me to go and see him. He is anxious to know what I thought of Nicholas Elliott, who is being considered for an offer of employment as 3rd secretary to the King. I said that I had only known him for a short time in the hurly-burly at the Scrubs. I thought he was a pleasant personality and he had been highly recommended by Neville Bland who could give more intimate details than I could. I would however try and find out something about his recent work and what his superiors thought about him. He then asked if I knew what was behind the refusal of the PM's to allow

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certain scientists to go to Moscow. I said that I had been away but that it might well be that people of the type of BERNAL, who was a member of the C.P., were not considered suitable to send to Moscow as they had been right in the middle of scientific development here and would probably spill the beans. I promised to find out more and let him know.

He then showed me Ribbentrop's letter to Winston which had been handed to Monty. A curious thing in the covering letter was that he referred to the P.M. as Mr. Vincent Churchill. This seems almost incredible for an ex-Foreign Minister, and it has been suggested that possibly it was not Ribbentrop at all who had written the letter. The letter stated that Ribbentrop wished to convey personally to the PM what he described as Hitler's last will and testament. He said that in fact neither he nor Hitler had ever wanted a war with England and that he himself had always regarded England as his second home. He was sure that the only future for Europe lay in close collaboration between England and Germany. The letter was full of inconsistencies but in the present distorted state of the German mind may conceivably be sincere.

I talked to John Marriott about the case of Barnett and Roland Bird. I think he is more or less persuaded that it is better in the circumstances to say nothing. He has, as I have, complete confidence in Roland's integrity.

Buster tells me that he is quite ready if his practice allows to put in half time from Sept. onwards and I wished him to do so.

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Luke and Marriott discussed Tate's case with me.

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Cecil came in to tell me that John CODD who arrived at Cannons Park with his German wife Irma, and who he believes is identical with the renegade Shaun COLLINS, has slipped through to Ireland. He was expected here as a P/W. This has disclosed a loophole but steps will be taken to close it.

June 21st

I spoke to Kellar about some of his private letters to Mid East, particularly those to CICI. It seemed to me that if these letters by any chance got into the wrong hands we might well be accused of intriguing with Ryan's subordinates behind his back. While these things should be said in conversation it seemed to me undesirable that they should be on paper. Kellar said that he would take the opportunity during his forthcoming visit to Palestine to speak on the telephone to Alan Roger and Dawson Sheppard with a view to getting the letters destroyed. These frank and personal letters are useful as they give one a good idea of the atmosphere but in their present form I think they are dangerous.

Wibroe has returned from Denmark. He is less worried about the Russian side of things than he was. He thinks however that the Russians intend to stay in Brownholm until we leave Denmark, which is at present scheduled for the end of August.

At the daily meeting Thomas mentioned the case of a P/W who had ultimately turned out to be a German. His story which is generally believed is that he got mixed up with some British P/ws and being clad in a khaki shirt he got into a P/W camp where he had remained for 18 months. He seems to have satisfied all his colleagues that he was British although he has spent most of his life abroad. We have now got to take steps to round him up and get him back to Germany.

I had a short talk with Hill about his work and congratulated him on what he had done. I gather that the BOLSOM case is going quite well and that two more confessions have been obtained. BOLSOM himself is extremely rattled. The War Reserve policeman who was getting £2 a week for watching BOLSOM's house has been sacked. Chief Inspector Barrett who is handling the whole business appears to be doing very well and as far as we know there has been no leakage through police channels. Barrett however takes all papers home with him and if anything is typed in the office it is done in his presence. Hill wants David to stay on with him for another month. He is anxious to return to his own business fairly soon but would stay on on a half time basis until we know what our reorganisation is going to be. If at that stage we could make him a reasonable offer he might be prepared to remain on permanently.

I lunched with Kocher-Lund of the Norwegian Intelligence and another representative of his organisation who is going to Roumania. Kocher-Lund has returned from Norway for a few days. He says that everything is going quite smoothly and that he does not anticipate any trouble from the Left. There is evidently a reunion of the Communist and Labour

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Parties which may produce a slightly leftwar trend but he thinks no more. He is very anxious to remain in close touch with us and would be very pleased to see a representative of this office in Oslo.

I saw Ronnie for a moment. I impressed upon him that in my view it was a good thing that Dick was going to do the co-ordinating of the Control Commission in its early stages as there was otherwise a risk that a regular soldier would be put in. Dick might be able to prepare the way for Ronnie although I quite saw that he might feel that if he was going to do the job he might prefer to do it from the start. He said that if it was finally offered to him he had not quite made up his mind whether he would accept it or not.

A Mr. R.A. Clyde of the British War Crimes Executive, No. 1 Entrance, Church House, Gt. Smith St. S.W.1. came here today accompanied by representatives of SIS and SOE. He explained that he had been im charged by the PM and the Solicitor General to collect the necessary evidence to mount an indictment of 8 or 10 of the principle leaders of the Nazi Party, for criminal conspiracy. This is apparently the first stage and the trial is to take place in Sept. The Court will be a special one and will have its own rules of evidence. The prisoners will be defended. An attempt is to be made to show that the whole Party and all its works have been conceived on aggressive lines. The Prosecution of the Jews is to be shown as a movement to eliminate those who might be opposed to aggression. I asked Clyde whether he had considered the Auslands Organisation, which as far as we could see had worked towards a

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policy of aggression through minorities. Where minorities existed they were stimulated and where they did not exist they were created. He did not know about the A.O. and was particularly interested in this aspect of the case. I told him that I would let him have a copy of Curry's memo. I also recommended to him that he should consult M.I.14 who knew a great deal about the S.S. and Gestapo and the para-military organisation. It is felt that once criminal conspiracy is proved the other problems of individual brutalities will fall into line. Personally I think the whole procedure is quite dreadful. The DPP had recommended that a Fact-Finding Committee should come to the conclusion that certain people should be bumped off and that others should receive varying terms of imprisonment, that this should be put to the House of Commons and that authority should be given to any military body finding these individuals in their area to arrest them and inflict whatever punishment had been decided on. This was a much clearer proposition and would not bring the law into disrepute. Winston had put this forward at Yalta but Roosevelt felt that the Americans would want a trial. Joe supported Roosevelt on the perfectly frank grounds that Russians liked public trials for propaganda purposes. It seems to me that we are just being dragged down to the level of the travesties of justice that have been taking place in the USSR for the past 20 yrs.

A notorious British renegade named COLE has been run to earth in Paris as an American Captain in C.I.

Colledge came to talk to me about a prospective French agent named [redacted] with whom he has got into touch through a German agent being run by E.Division. The case looks promising.

June 22nd

Finzell came in to see me again. He wanted to know about documents in Italy relating to Italian Fascist activities in Australia before the war. I said that I knew that certain archives had been seized and I undertook to find out whether there was likely to be anything of interest, and if necessary what arrangements could be made for a visit to Italy.

Joe Lynch came to see me. We talked about CHILEVICIUS. He said that he had not unfortunately had occasion to find out what the Bureau thought of CHILEVICIUS. He would however get a full report from them and let me know. I told him the latest position as far as we were concerned namely that Palestine had now said that they were no longer interested. I told him that I was considerably annoyed about this seeing all the trouble that had been taken. I did not doubt however that the F.B.I. were quite right in declining to employ CHILEVICIUS. Doubtless they had discovered that he was unreliable.

J.C. drew my attention to a statement in the Daily Express that the alleged 4th Army which the Germans expected to attack in the Pas de Calais had never really existed and that the way in which the Germans had come to believe in it was a secret. Wild and Fletcher Hasketh were apparently worried as to whether this might affect Garbo's return to his own country. I said both to J.C. and Wild that I had telegraphed the message out to Tommy Harris who had expressed the view that on account of the disintegration of the G.I.S. I did not take a very serious view of the publication. I have asked Tommy for his views.

I attended the JIC when a proposal was put forward for the continuation of CSDIC here in order to deal with certain characters at present in Ashcan. The position is that CSDIC are closing down one of their camps. They think however they can deal with any important prisoners in the other. In some cases however it may be more suitable for the people to be interviewed in Ashcan. When SHAEF is abolished Ashcan has I think got to be in charge of the Americans or course or become part of the quadripartite Control Commission. The meeting felt that it had better remain in our hands or those of the Americans.

The D.G. spoke to me about the Capel-Dunne report on overt intelligence and suggested that I should show it to Findlater-Stewart.

He also talked to me about Courtenay's report on CICB, and the proposal that it should form the nucleus of some production agency in the post-war period. He was quite agreeable that I should discuss this with Vivian.

Grogan talked to me about the future of Censorship. He thinks that as from August 6th onward his section can withdraw from the Prudential. Meanwhile he is not very satisfied with the progress being made by the allied govts. He would be visiting the continent shortly to report. As regards his own future he would like to pack up some time in August but would be quite prepared to work on a half-time basis or quarter-time, attending any meetings relating to censorship which might arise.

Brock came to tell me that SCHULTZ, a German Mid East spy who was exchanged for a British agent (incidentally the only occasion where

such an exchange has been effected as far as I know), has been over-run and fallen into the hands of the Americans. After his return to Germany SCHULTZE did apparently take up the German end of the transmitter in the KISS case. I said I thought it would be better not to question him about the KISS case in the first instance. After we had got his first reports we could consider the matter.

Cecil came to talk to me about Irish detainees concerning whom he is having a conference at the D.O. There is apparently agreement that the P/Ws shall be sent back either direct by air from Ireland or via this country, when they will be dealt with in the ordinary way. As regard the spies, there is considerable difference of opinion and a suggestion by the Americans that we should interrogate them in Eire. This would probably be agreed to by the Eire authorities. Cecil does not however think that this is a good plan and I agree. I have suggested that we should ascertain from SHAEF whether they would be prepared to give the Irish liberty and merely instruct them to report to the FSP periodically, if they satisfied the British authorities that they had disclosed all information in their possession. If they were ready to accept these conditions they could be put to the detainees who would be handed over by the Irish provided they were in agreement with the terms.

"C" rang to say he has written a strong letter to the F.O. recommending that strong steps should be taken to remove all Germans connected with the G.I.B. from Spain and have the interned temporarily in Gib. and finally sent back to Germany.

A meeting has been held about the future of the

War Room. When SHAEF disbands at the end of this month it is thought that the War room should not become part of the Control Commission but should continue to function as at present, OSS, SIS and Security Service accepting responsibility jointly for the work.

June 23rd

Burt is going out to fetch Amery back in about 10 days time.

Millis has telegraphed about the future of vetting personnel for allied armies. As Connop Guthrie's section which formerly dealt with this matter is packing up there will be a bit of a loop-hole as visas will not in future be required. I do not know that this very much matters in individual cases. What I cannot see however is why many cases of allied personnel joining allied armies should still come to this country. We have more or less succeeded in stopping them coming from Stockholm. It seems absurd to allow them still to come from America. I should have thought that they ought to stay where they are until they could be received by their own countries. The only exceptions are of course the Poles. I have asked Lee to arrange a meeting with Diplock, Barry, D.4, Baxter and Byrde.

At the daily meeting we discussed the question of Polish transmitters. If the Polish Govt. in London is to be disbanded they can no longer go on transmitting although there may still be a case for the Polish Forces of which there are some 120,000 here, in Italy and in Germany. The position here has never been satisfactory since the P.M. years ago gave Sikorski permission to transmit in his own cyphers. SOE through whom they had been trans-

mitting to their underground movement, had an arrangement where all messages were deposited with their en clair translations but there was of course never any guarantee that the messages so-deposited were the ones sent in cypher.

"C" always accepted responsibility for the Poles 2eme Bureau messages although I do not think any proper steps were taken to monitor the communications. Whenever this matter was raised by us we were always brushed aside by G.P. and SI~ who said that they had everything in hand. We raised the matter again when Polish transmitters started up in the Mid East, but still got no satisfaction. Lastly there were messages transmitted by the Polish Minister of the Interior. Presumably these will now cease.

Alley came to see me about the Poles. At present they receive a grant from the British Govt which is more or less visé-d by us, of some £50,000 a year for Polish security duties. The renewal of this grant will come up again before long.

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Buster tells me that Erich PFEIFFER is likely to produce quite interesting material. He has also told us about the French Naval Officer who was corresponding with a cover address of Mrs. BRANDY in Dublin. This cover address came to light through the Jessie JORDAN case and was passed to the French who intercepted the N.O.'s correspondence. For a short time the French tried to play the N.O. back but this apparently was quickly realized by the Germans. The N.O. was finally executed. PFEIFFER said that he was one of the most blatant spies he ever came across. He first went to the German Embassy and was finally passed on to PFEIFFER who thought he was a plant. He then sent French naval cyphers to PFEIFFER through the ordinary post, but when these were found to be genuine a meeting was arranged at an hotel in Antwerp. The officer turned up at the meeting in full French Naval uniform. PFEIFFER could hardly believe his eyes and avoided the rendezvous as he thought it was probably a trap. Later he made contact with the officer in his room and received the whole trunk of documents of considerable value, including a good many details of naval secrets which we had passed to the French. Incidentally the French never told us anything about the case at the time except that the man had been caught and executed.

June 25th

I had another interview with Andriat Stewart the main purpose of which was to hand him papers relating to the suggested combined Intelligence Services proposed by the JIC to the Chiefs of Staff on the basis of Capel-Dunne's report. Andriat ran through it and was I think rather shocked to discover the immense number of intelligence organisations of one kind or another. On the other hand he felt that anything which tended to prevent the immense amount of overlapping that went on between the three Service Intelligence depts. was all to the good. This matter led us to discuss the relations between overt and clandestine intelligence. I said that I felt it wrong to study clandestine intelligence without the background of overt intelligence. For example, if you were making a study of communist activities either qua communism or qua espionage, it was of considerable importance to know what was being said in certain organs of the Russian Press. This applied particularly to totalitarian regimes where the Press was controlled. Very often clandestine intelligence could only be properly assessed or interpreted with this background. Equally it was necessary to check clandestine intelligence against overt intelligence otherwise you might find that you were paying an informant for information that he was really making up from the newspapers. In the past it had been necessary for each dept. to attempt to do a certain amount of overt intelligence work according to its particular needs. There have been no depts. of Govt. to which you could turn for the information you required. Neither the F.O. nor any other dept have a translation bureau nor was it the practice for the F.O. to receive copies of the foreign Press except in

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exceptional cases. They relied entirely on the Ambassador's staff to translate and send home whatever they considered to be of interest, but of course they only looked at these from the R.O. point of view. We had on occasion obtained extremely useful information from the Institute of International Affairs which was really the only body to which we could turn.

Findlater asked about our representation on the J.I.C. I told him that I thought that organisationally this was wrong, that Harry Allan was as he knew responsible for the factories and for port security. It followed therefore that many of the things discussed at the JIC did not really concern him. He was however extremely good about this and whenever he felt that there was a matter in which I was interested he would suggest that I should go instead of him. Findlater asked about factory security. I said that in many ways this was one of the most civilian jobs that the office did and that it could well have been carried out by our Regional Officers. There was however an important function to be performed but it could ~~xxx~~ in my view be considerably rationalised. We ought to concentrate on new principles and new processes particularly when they were applicable to war industry. It was of vital importance that we should get early intimation so that we could institute safeguards and provide the necessary cover. This meant constant badgering of the Service Depts. who were only too ready to put everything on the secret list and dissipate our energies on things that did not matter. It was in my view quite useless to try and protect armaments which had already been issued to the troops.

We then discussed Port Security. I explained to Findlater that our Port Security officers were being demobilised and that very shortly port control would revert to the H.O. immigration staff. To provide for this we were now engaged in giving lectures to I.O.s. I explained to Findlater that the I.O. Service could not be wholly satisfactory as long as it was down-graded as at present. For example, I pointed out that you could not get a man of very great intelligence if as at present they were recruited at £6 a week. Findlater seemed to think this was a serious matter. He told me that the horizon of his enquiry was extending almost daily as he kept on coming across related problems. He intended however to cover the whole ground and not confine his report to generalities. He was going to get down to concrete facts. He said he would be very pleased to talk to the other officers of B. Division after his return from Germany.

Hughes and Alley came to talk to me about Polish transmitters. I now have a list of some W/T sets which have at one time or another been in use here by the Poles. I propose to take the matter up with C. since presumably if Lublin is recognised the majority of these sets will have to close down.

Strang, one of our officers in the I.O.M. came to see me. He wants to return to Spain where he was formerly adviser of a British firm in Barcelona. He is not going to resume his former post but will probably take a holiday for a few years.

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Klop came to see me last night. He is going to interview Schellenberg in Germany.

June 26th

Vivian asked me to attend a meeting between himself, Tim Milne and Ionides on the future of CICB. Ionides had rather ambitious plans for the future with regard to CICB and apparently wondered whether Dixon was heavy enough guns. He mentioned the fact that Dixon had had trouble with COSSAC on Second Front planning. I said that quite apart from anything else Dixon was literally the only man we had. If we had anybody of the calibre of Dick White and could spare him we should send him out. We had thought of Kirby Green but he had a certain amount to do still in Gib. and also had a sick wife who would not be able to stand the climate and who needed looking after here. I said that I had rather been given the impression by MacIver that all the planning work had been done and that Dixon would only be required from time to time to put a certain amount of oil in the wheels. Ionides seemed to think that something rather more than this would be necessary and that it needed an astute politician, and that the passage might not be a very easy one. I said that Dixon had done well as an RSLO, had survived Swinton in W. Africa who was very sorry to lose him, and had since done well in E. Africa. The incident at COSSAC I did not think was altogether his fault. There were certain basic matters on which it was quite impossible to get any decision either out of the BGSI or the W.O. and without which it was very difficult to do any serious planning. Dick managed eventually to drive through this but of course he had very exceptional qualifications. I was very anxious that Dixon should not start off on a bad wicket and I thought it quite likely

that everyone would find him adequate for the job. If on the other hand he failed we should have to think again. I said that I thought it would be important ultimately to draw the Australians into CICB. They already had a Security Service and might well have a Secret Service of their own.

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June 27th

I gave another talk to the I.O.s on the same lines as last week. They all seemed very pleased with the course and the trouble we were taking to put them in the picture.

I went to see Cavendish-Bentinck about 3 matters. (1) The Poles, what was to be the future of the 22 transmitters which they now operated in this country? C-B said that within 2 weeks the British Govt. would recognise the Lublin Govt. and that therefore all transmitters except for representatives of the Lublin Govt. would cease. He was a little vague about the armed forces. I told him I would be talking to C. later about the transmitters which from our point of view had never been very satisfactory. It had always been held to be Gambier-Parry's business and he never vouchsafed any information. I took the opportunity of pointing out how unsatisfactory our position had been vis-a-vis R.S.S. They were supposed to be our technical tool but we never really knew how their forces were disposed. (2) I left with C-B Walker's memo on pigeons. He is putting this up to the JIC. (3) I then discussed the case of Negrin and explained that some time ago we had wanted to carry out observation on his activities here but had been prevented by Morrison. The case had been strongly backed by the F.O. and had I think reached the ministerial level. I gave C-B a memo showing what the position was and the extent to which Negrin was now being backed by Moscow. In this connection I outlined to him my theory about Soviet intentions to build a big fleet and to control the various Narrows in the Baltic and the Mediterranean.

He thought this was quite plausible. He then asked me how Findlater was getting on. I took the opportunity of giving him my views about the future set-up, and was surprised to find that in his view there should certainly be amalgamation on the C.E. front and possibly also on the subversive movement front, though in precisely in what form he did not say. He also thought the idea of both SIS and ourselves being responsible to the Minister of Defence was undoubtedly the right set-up. He entirely accepted the view that, being advisory, it was undesirable to be under a departmental minister. Generally speaking he felt it inappropriate for SIS to be under the FO since much of what they did really concerned the defence of British territory.

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Victor brought Sergrts. Schwarzer and Schoetan of 12th A.G. Interrogation Group to see me. He wanted me to talk to them generally about C.I. which I did. I then arranged for them to go down and see the records at Bienneim, as I felt it might be helpful to them to know what was behind them in this respect. The tendency of 12 A.G. has always been to think that they could conduct interrogations in the field and that there is nothing to be gained from sending people back. B. and S. entirely agreed however that once tactical intelligence had been extracted there was every advantage in tackling the problem where the briefers and interrogators could consult with each other.

June 28th

I had a talk with Airy and Dixon. I told them what Ionides had said. Tim seemed to think that Ionides was rather inclined to build castles in the air and to be a little vague when pinned down to concrete facts. I did not give any indication that SIS were a little doubtful about Dixon's suitability for the job. Later I saw MacIver and Ionides when we discussed the CICB job and Dixon's suitability. I think in general that Ionides' views are sound although I am a little doubtful whether at the moment we could do more than make preparations. I impressed upon him the vital necessity of CICB or its component parts concentrating on the production of information.

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Hart returned today from Germany. He said that he had had the most interesting 6 days of his life. The set-up at SHAEF at Frankfurt had to be seen to be believed. He had nicknamed it "Kur-ort SHAEF" or "Ober Belsen". The Americans were of course in full force strolling about their grounds hand in hand with their girl-friends, eating ices and listening to the jazz band which blared incessantly all day. Hart could not imagine what the Russian Mission could be thinking of all this. The thing that struck him most was the stream of German P/Ws, demobilised, and returning to their homes, all in fairly clean, orderly fashion. He said that Speer who was in charge of the German MAP, had been interrogated and a good many of his documents examined. Our estimate of German production had been grossly exaggerated. Production had been steadily declining for several years. The only points where our estimates had agreed was where our mounting graph crossed their declining graph. Speer had had regular reports from American sources giving not only their production figures but also a good many of ours. When asked where the information came from he said that he was on the distribution list! Presumably he got it from one of the American embassies abroad.

A.F.H.Q. monthly C.I. summary for May states that 300 arrests had been made in Italy alone. It is already clear that in Italy as in the West, no plans were made for subversion in the event of surrender. All plans were based on the assumption that directions would continue to be given from one centre of organised resistance. Local plans therefore for Werewolf and similar activities became the function of counter-resistance work. Little has yet been learned of such undertakings. In conclusion it may be said that important

officials have been identified and are being arrested in sufficient numbers to make it possible (a) to define accurately post-occupational aims of the G.I.S., (b) to identify the bulk of the G.I.S. in Italy and (c) to dislocate any possible attempt at survival. The networks of post-occupational agents are for the most part broken or incapable of independent action. So far there is no evidence either of G.I.S. survival or attempts on the part of captured officials to double-cross allied counter-intelligence. Lastly there are no cases of subversion directed by elements of the G.I.S. since the surrender.

A P/W officer captured in Paris on the 24th August 1944 has given a certain amount of information about 3F activities. In particular he talks about Roger who appeared in the GILBERT case and about Boddington. He says this underground group under Paul had liaison with London through a Capt. Elie or Ely, and the Abwehr had daily reports on the object and missions of this group. The Abwehr did not molest this group due to the fact that the information obtained was too valuable. Besides that the English were parachuting weapons and equipment to this group which the Abwehr either intercepted or kept track of so that they could lay their hands on them at any time. Through Roger the Abwehr was successful in shadowing in the summer of 1943 a British colonel Bottingham (obviously Boddington) believed to be the leader of the British I.S. section for all of France, who was in Paris for 3 weeks. It seems that when Col. Bottingham arrived in France he needed a carte d'identite which Roger got for him through the Abwehr Bureau I.G. The Abwehr in this way was able to get the colonel's picture and trace his

movements while in France Maj.von Feldmann the leader of 3F, wanted to arrest the colonel in order to impress Berlin. However Sonderführer Furbeck talked him out of this by showing him that if the Abwehr captured the colonel it might jeopardise some of their other agents. In Oct.1943 the head of the group,Paul, went to London for a conference. During his absence Roger took over the leadership of the group. In this way the Abwehr got possession of all the orders and reports made in London by this group. This source was particularly interesting to them since some other resistance groups availed themselves of the radio facilities of the Paul group. Paul returned from London on 19th Mar 1944, and brought back the news that the invasion date had been set for the end of May or beginning of June. Shortly after this Paul went to central France to organise all the existing resistance groups into the FFI. Amongst other things this same agent states that the whole production of the wellknown porcelain factory at Sevres was going to Hermann Goering, who had ordered a special 17,000 piece service to be made for his lodge, Karin Hall.

A P/W named Richard Gerken, who had many aliases and was in command of FAK 213, states that sometime after the capitulation of France the Abwehr was engaged in extensive reorganisation to cover the Lowlands and France. He insists however that Abwehr activities in the USA and UK had never really been contemplated before and that the problem had then to be tackled from scratch. This of course entirely coincides with our experiences here. The Germans had never thought it worth while to establish an underground organisation here of any extent and when they reached the channel ports they were extremely ill-equipped in the matter

of obtaining information from the UK. It was this that led to their hastily-prepared and inefficient exploits in 1940 and 1941.

June 29th

I saw Ingram before he left for Andy.

Kellar brought Gort in for a discussion. Gort is here for a few weeks undergoing treatment for some form of dysentery. We had a long discussion about the Palestine Police. Gort is clearly anxious that Giles should be brought into the Ispal picture, particularly owing to the cases of police corruption which crop up from time to time. Apart from this Giles is a very sensitive person and if he were to suspect that information was being withheld from him he would be even more difficult than he is already. We pointed out to Gort that once information of that kind was in the hands of the police it was very difficult to control and their whole upbringing would be conducive to their doing something which might well jeopardise the source. The view taken by the military was that it was more important to keep a source which at the time of a crisis would give an indication of the time, place and scope of a possible D-day, which should on no account be sacrificed for the lesser advantage of being able to deal with a corrupt policeman. We then discussed the new proposal that the DSO should no longer have the same independence but should come more closely under the I.B. staff than he is at present. I think the I.B. Staff feel that they want to get their plans well mapped out on the basis of ISPAL in preparation for the coming crisis. This would mean that the Army would be the controllers of this source more than the DSO.

I think the army needs can be met but I doubt whether "C" or anyone else will agree to their having unrestricted control of ISPAL. Kellar will have to try and sort this problem out. He leaves for Palestine in a couple of days time.

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I had a talk to C. about the JIC proposals, for scientific intelligence and suggested to him that there might be a place in all this for Victor, both on the offensive and defensive side. He said he would certainly give this careful consideration.

He told me that in Switzerland OSS had been completely penetrated although there was nothing to show that the Wood material had been planted. It had also come out that there was an American officer who had been working for the Swiss representation in the USA, who had been passing information to the Germans. This officer had got to know

that we could deal with U-boat Ultra. The Germans had been informed but did not believe it.

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I told C. the present state of affairs with regard to Hooper and that as soon as we got all the cards in our hands we should be interrogating him.

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June 30th

Curry left me part 5 of his report to study during his absence on leave.

S/R 2/75
I lunched with Kim when we had a further discussion about CICB. It seems to me that we are more or less all in line and that it is entirely accepted that the head of CICB shall be an MI5 officer. I gave Kim to some extent my views on the future defensive set up involving the passing over all enquiries on foreign territory to the clandestine service. These seemed to fit in entirely with his own. He seemed also to be of the opinion that SIS agencies

abroad should not be divided up into defensive, C.E. and subversive movements. All members of the staff of an organisation on foreign territory should be able to deal with all these subjects. This is rather C's view.

There appears to be no chance of getting the Japs out of Stockholm as Sweden is apparently the protecting power for various European interests in Japan.

The Turkish Ambassador has been having long conversations with Molotov in Moscow about future alliances. The Russians are pressing not only for military bases in the Straits area but also for a revision of the 1921 Treaty in which Russia ceded certain Armenian border territory to Turkey. The Russians are saying that this treaty was concluded at a time when they were weak and that it must therefore be revised and the territory returned to the USSR. The Turks say that the treaty was not one which the Soviets were forced to accept and an unjust one, but rather a remedy of a former injustice done to Turkey. It was Lenin himself who saw the injustice and repaired it. Molotov said that an unjust treaty between Soviet Russia and Poland which had been signed in 1921 had now been rectified by the present friendly Polish Govt. and that thus a long and customary friendship between the two countries had been consolidated. The Turkish Ambassador refused to consider this request, saying that the Soviets were neither in need of a few more square metres or a few thousand more people and that their request was therefore an expression of a policy of prestige. Molotov then discussed the question of the Straits. While he could not complain that the present situation had in any way embarrassed Soviet Russia during this war, he felt that while Russia might have confidence

in Turkish goodwill she might not be completely confident of Turkey's capacity to defend the Straits. The Turk said that he could only envisage a situation in which Russia and Turkey were fighting together and that the defence of the Straits would in such an eventuality be a matter of discussion between their General Staffs. The difference between Molotov and the Turk is that the Turk wishes to have a treaty of alliance which in itself would he feels give the Russians all the guarantees they require since in the event of war they would be fighting on the same side. Molotov on the other hand is making the treaty an alliance conditional upon military bases and the cessation of parts of Armenia and Georgia. In defence of his request for territorial concessions Molotov said that the Soviet Union are a great and powerful country but that this could never be a reason for sacrificing the rights of the small Armenian and Georgian republics. It seems that the Turks at the moment are not prepared to do more than consider the promise of modifications of the Montreux Convention alongside a treaty of friendship after the former had been discussed among the contracting parties. Meanwhile there appear to be rumours that the Soviets are conducting suspicious military activities on the Turkish eastern frontier.

July 2nd

Craufurd talked to me about his future. He is in no hurry to leave the dept. and would be quite prepared to stay on if the conditions were favourable. He apparently has some alternative offer from ICI to organise their intelligence section. I told him it would be impossible to reach a decision in this matter until probably about the end of

Sept.

I have a note from Aembal Johnson on liaison with SID. He begins: "I have found it difficult throughout to find in Section V. (a) a responsible person who can give a quick decision in any matter; (b) a person who is conversant with their own files. As a result of these deficiencies cases after case has been a sequence of events of which the following is typical. A. rings me up and asks for information about a certain case. I reply that I will draw our file and ring him back. When I ring, A. is away but B. who knows nothing about the case, takes a message. In due course C. of whom as far as I have never heard, telephones me and asks me what the whole matter is about*. This is I am afraid only too true.

A report on Amt 6 of the RESHA based on information supplied by certain of the leading personalities states that on 3 occasions documents were stolen from the British Embassy in Sofia. These raids were organised by one BUREFF and were carried out with the assistance of the Bulgarian Police and an employee of the Embassy. However, the captured documents could not be de-coded.

*The American 9th Army have interrogated Viscount Hidemaro KONOYE, brother of the ex-Premier of Japan Prince KONOYE. The family is related to the Emperor, i.e. to God Himself. Of this closeness to divinity KONOYE is amazingly humble. He refers to his age-old family history as so much nonsense and derives all his pride only from his merits as a musician. His whole family apparently has artistic leanings. Another brother was a poet who died from drinking too much wine. He started drinking every morning while sitting

in a bath-tub writing poems. There was a second bath tub next to him and when a visitor came he had to get into it, was served with food and wine and had to listen to divine poetry. The third brother is a painter and sculptor and Hidemaro himself composes and conducts operas and symphonies. He has apparently toured America and other countries in this capacity. He has offered to collaborate in the matter of psychological warfare against Japan. He says "Short wave broadcasts are useless since the Japanese are prohibited from having short-wave receiving sets. If such a set came in from abroad the parts were taken out by the Customs. Medium wave transmissions from as outpost as near to Japan as possible would be the only solution. All propaganda should be avoided which will have the effect of hardening Japan's determination to fight to the last. No mention of capitulation, punishment or unconditional surrender or offending statements about the Emperor should be made. Propaganda should stress that we are fighting not the Japanese people but their criminal war lords. Propaganda should dwell on the pleasantness of peace and should be contrasted with the reality of over-increasing bombings. Propaganda should however exploit the belief of the Japanese in the mystical and supernatural. KANOYE had in mind a special broadcast pretending to come from the next world, from the ghosts of dead soldiers. Intelligence in Japan is directed mainly against communists and is well organised. Abroad it is an inefficient service. Its main weakness is that it is split up in entirely independent services of the Army, Navy and F.O. without any effort at co-ordination. The only section which was working well and producing results was the

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Naval Espionage Section against the USA.

Kremer of Stockholm had admitted that whilst there he had an arrangement with ONADERA the Jap MA. for an exchange of intelligence information. Somewhat reluctantly Kremer is beginning to supply particulars of the sources which provided Onadera with strategic and tactical information regarding the disposition of allied forces in this country. Particulars of troop movements and allied movements on the western front, of the French Army and Air Force, of British aircraft industry, conditions in the Far East, disposition of Anglo-American Airborne units, Russian code books and USA raw material position. Onadera's information was considered more valuable than Kremer's and the Germans paid liberally for it. Onadera got information direct from Major Kempi, described as Chief of the Attache dept. of the Swedish W.O., and Major Petersen, Swedish Intelligence Officer. Kremer got his own information indirectly through Hepp, the German Press Attach in Stockholm, from Gyps, correspondent of the Svenska Dagblad who visited England, and reported on bomb damage. He also got information from other Swedish journalists as well as from Col. Blatt and Commander Oebert of the Swedish General Staff. Political information came from Swedish M.P.s and certain officials. The above more or less confirms our view that any information which reached the Swedish General Staff was likely to go on to Berlin and Tokio.

A document has been captured which gives the minutes of a meeting held by Hitler with Blomberg, Fritzsche, Raeder, Goering and von Neurath on Nov. 5th 1937. The meeting appears to have lasted 4 1/2 hours, Hitler set out before his commanders in chief and foreign

Minister his plans for Germany's expansion and his views on how European politics would develop. Germany could not undertake a policy of economic autarchy in the sphere of raw materials, principally copper and tin and in the case of food. Nor, due to lack of foreign currency could Germany buy food in foreign markets in years of bad harvest. "We live" he said "in a period of economic empires. Economic motives lie behind the will of Japan and Italy to expand and economic need will drive Germany to expand. Germany must obtain agricultural space and since Britain controls the sea this space must be sought in Europe and not by colonial expansion."

The main question for Germany was how to achieve the greatest possible conquest at the least possible cost. Hitler went on to say that German politicians must reckon that its two hateful enemies, England and France, would oppose the rise of Germany at all costs. But both these countries had their weaknesses. He did not regard the British Empire as unshakeable. Ireland and India were both struggling for independence, and the U.K. had little power over the Dominions. France might be plunged into civil war and was political unstable. Germany's task would have to be carried out between 1943 and 1945. After that date the German lead in rearmament would decrease, resources would be limited to current recruiting age groups and the Nazi leaders would be older. If Hitler was still alive it would be his irrevocable decision to solve the German problem of lebensraum not later than 1943-45. Hitler believed that Britain and France had already written off Czechoslovakia. Poland would not attack victorious Germany with Russia at her back and the speed of German operations would probably deter Russia herself from intervening. Hitler foresaw war breaking out between

Britain and France on the one hand and Italy on the other in 1938 when the situation in the Mediterranean would come to a head. He would not enter into a military agreement with Italy but he would act independently to attack Czechoslovakia and Austria once the Med. war started and all participants were too busy to intervene. Hitler stated that the German question could be solved only by way of force and that this was never without risk.

A note of caution was sounded both by Blomberg and Fritzsche. They repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as enemies of Germany and they stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French to such an extent that they would not be in a position to commence operations on Germany's western frontier with superior forces. The lead which France had got in mobilisation and the small value of existing fortifications in the Rhineland would render the four motorised divisions which would be operating in the west more or less incapable of movement. Special attention was drawn by Blomberg to the strength of the Czech fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a Maginot line and which would present extreme difficulties for attack. Hitler thought that the operation against Czechoslovakia might take place in the summer of 1938. In reply to statements by Blomberg and Fritzsche regarding England and France's attitude, Hitler repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain's non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany.

In view of Hitler's information Goering thought that the military undertaking in

Spain should be abandoned. Hitler agreed in so far as he believed that this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.

According to Meissner, a member of Hitler's Chancellery, Hitler was anxious about Russian intentions in the Balkans and these considerations together with Soviet troop dispositions persuaded him that a Russian attack on Germany was inevitable. Dr. Brandt, Hitler's personal physician, estimated the total loss from air raids as between 5 and 6 hundred thousand. He had no statistics for German Army losses but he understood that Meitel's estimate was between 1,300,000 and 1,400,000 killed. Steengracht, questioned on Germany's attack on Russia, stated that in his opinion the deciding factors were Russia's intransigence her troop dispositions and a statement by Churchill in the fall of 1940 that surprising events could be expected soon in the East.

July 3rd

Stopford came in to discuss his future with me. He thinks that probably by the end of this month he will be able to wind up his affairs. He thinks that however takes over his show ought to take over one or two of his secretaries, who know all about the agents. I told Stopford that as regards Hooper he should get the latest dope from Herbert. It seemed to me that there was at least a fairly strong prima facie case.

^{see above}
Anthony and Mrs. Pitt came to see me about 6 so-called Spaniards who had been repatriated from the British zone in Germany and were on their way to Spain. One of them, according to Peppermint, is an ex-Blue Division man and another may not in fact be a Spaniard at all. His "panish is very peculiar and he has to

some extent the appearance of a German. Unfortunately 3 of these people have already left. One of them is reported to have given a letter to Sartorius, the Spanish Air Attache, for posting in Germany. Sartorius is going on a conducted tour to the British zone. Sartorius examined the letter and came to the conclusion that it contained a code. He had therefore expressed his intention of handing it over to the M.I. conducting officer. We cannot get hold of the officer to ask whether the letter was in fact handed over. It was therefore difficult for us to provide any suitable grounds for interrogating the other 3 journalists going out. We considered whether we could not perhaps hold them up but in the end came to the conclusion that it would be best to get rid of them.

July 4th

I gave my final talk to the I.O.s today. They seemed as pleased about their conducted tour as the previous parties.

Milmo and I went to see Newsam about the case of HIRSCH, an O20 internee who had on his own admission worked for the Germans. HIRSCH is applying for an injunction to restrain the Home Secretary from deporting him to the allied military zone in Germany where he will either remain interned or be released according to whatever policy prevails locally. Newsam thought that there might be an easy way out by letting him go to the Argentine. We pointed out that this was undesirable for the following reasons: (1) it is allied policy to prevent members of the GIS from operating outside Germany. Argentine is a danger spot for such activities. (2) it is allied policy to return all such individuals to the British zone in the case of Germans and Austrians or

to allied governments. (5) the FBI would be seriously concerned as they have specially asked us at least to get their views before any people interested in the Peninsula or S. America are released. Newsam saw the position at once and entirely agreed with our views. He asked us to let him have a letter.

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Bacon talked to me a lot about the difficulties of his job. He said he had 165 personal contacts who held an immense variety of views about how CP members and people connected with other subversive movements should be dealt with. The Control Commission standards were very strict both as regards the right or the Left. Of other government depts. some were inclined toiling a man out if he was only even mildly communist. Others said they did not see why it mattered.

Bacon had had a long talk with Findlater to whom he had given his views in considerable detail.

I had a long talk with Morton Evans about the future of RSS and about his own future. He told me that there was a move to amalgamate RSS with GC & CS, and a welter of intrigue was going on in higher wireless circles. In the midst of all this he thought that the best thing was to go back to the first principles of the job and consider how it could best be done. He said that RSS at the moment

had compiled very considerable records identifying ether traffic. As an organisation it was in fact the only unit dealing in general search and discrimination. It differed from the other Y. units as it was going from the unknown to the known whereas they had a definite instruction as to what lines of traffic they were to intercept. M.E. was afraid that the effect of amalgamation would be (a) to place what he felt was a good organisation in spite of its chief, under another head who was not reknowned for his powers as an organiser. Nobody denied that GC & CS had done a wonderful job but this had not been due to the organisation but rather in spite of it. Had the organisation been better the results would have been obtained with far less labour and might have been more intelligently used. On the credit side he thought amalgamation would certainly effect economies in the engineering field and might give his section a better chance of obtaining the by-products of the work of other sections. The real danger he thought was that if RSS once got in to GC & CS it would be cut off from the outside world and not have the access to intelligence branches which was so desirable. As regards his own position nothing would induce him to continue to serve under Maltby. He would however be prepared to run RSS as a separate organisation or to go into GC & CS provided he were granted a certain measure of freedom. I told him that I thought Findlater Stewart would be taking a look at RSS and I had already made it clear that he should not fail to have a talk with M.E. Meanwhile I should put him wise again to the general position.

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July 5th

I had a long talk with Baxter and Hart about the personnel of the LRC. We have agreed that a small nucleus should be kept on to deal with cases either at the Oratory or Wimbledon if and when the LRC is closed down. These people would be under Vesey when Baxter goes. We required for immediate purposes 2 or 3 Polish speakers to sort out the documents of the Polish Security Service which are now concealed in trunks under beds all over London. 4 people would like to stay on in any post-war organisation. I shall be

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seeing these when I visit the LRC. Others are to take various jobs, 2 in Passport Control, one in the E.O., and one for the Control Commission.

I went through Dixon's charter with McIver, Airy, Dixon and Cayzer. We made a number of alterations to parts which might have aroused suspicion in Penny's mind that we were trying to go behind his back. I was very anxious that we should not give the impression that we could appeal over his head to SACSEA and that in so far as CICB was concerned he should consider himself to be directly under the DMI. There is no particular reason why this charter should ever be produced, but if it is I do not think that any exception can be taken to its terms. Dixon is responsible to the D.G. in his capacity as SLO, to SACSEA and to DMI for the work that he does as Superintendent of CICB. DSOs Rangoon and Singapore will be regarded as part of CICB until they go over to a civilian or quasi-civilian status.

July 6th

I had a talk with Perieat who is back from Malta. I gave him my ideas about what I thought might be problems in the Med. He did not seem to have any particular problems of his own except a number of cases where agents were complaining that they had performed valuable services and had not been rewarded. The Maltese are going to have some form of self-government within the Empire.

After a long conversation with Alley about the Poles I went to see C. to try and get the position somewhat clarified. I told him that Kloczek of the Polish SS had one or two others would be prepared to carry on but

that this might involve us in fairly large commitments. Meanwhile the documents had been farmed out on a number of individuals with the exception of some 40,000 cards which were still at Polish HQ. C. said that as far as he was concerned he had taken over all the documents and the cards and had given a letter signed Wilski demanding the return of these documents in accordance with a mythical agreement of 1940. The offensive Polish Service had been receiving about £250,000 a year in 6-monthly instalments. They had banks about £55,000, £10,000 of which had been withdrawn against a rainy day by Gano. The remaining £45,000 being paid back into the Anglo-Polish Fund recently formed to hold all subsidies to Polish organisations in this country. Gano wanted something like £80,000 in addition to the £45,000. C. thinks it may be possible to get £100,000 in all, including the £45,000, but no more. Amounts to Gano would only be paid out with his approval. It is possible that we too might be able to draw on C's funds for Polish Security. C. however was not anxious to do very much until it became clear which Poles were going to stay on and who was going back to Warsaw. He thought we should be well advised to hold our hands in the meantime. He was also uncertain what Gano's organisation would do in the future. They had been valuable in the past and it might be that he would still continue to use them. I gather that Gen. Anders had some kind of Intelligence organisation operating from Italy and that Gano was also thinking of operating against the Russians from occupied German territory. C's feeling is the less he knows about this the better. The Poles seem to have a complex about setting up Intelligence Services all over the world with no very positive idea as to what they could do with the information when they got

They

it. / will probably eventually come to see the futility of their operations, since there seems little likelihood of their getting back into power for a very considerable time if ever.

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C. advised against our putting an officer with the British Military Mission at Polish H.Q. as it might saddle us with the responsibility which was really an W.O. one. The W.O. have to see that the Polish Ministry of National Defence does not engage in anti-Warsaw activities. We have advised them to have Polish cyphers deposited with an exact copy of any message sent. In addition they should have communications monitored and periodically checked. Only in this way can they effect security.

We then talked about the future organisation of both offices. I outlined to him my views on ministerial control and also about a dividing line between offensive and defensive. He was not convinced that it would be right for the organisation to come under any dept. than the F.O. He felt that they did more for the F.O. and were more dependent on them for assistance than any other dept. I said that I did not think this was necessarily an obstacle. He was equally responsible to the Services for what he did for them and to any other dept. for which

he worked. ~~Since 1958~~ he was advisory and should therefore come into some neutral point. He did not seem to be convinced that SIS should divorce itself entirely from the Passport Control, although he thought that the old rule that PCOs did not operate in countries in which they resided should be rigidly enforced.

C. said that he was considering the amalgamation of RSS and GC & CS, although G.P. had put up a large scheme for the continuance of RSS as a separate entity. If RSS joined Sigint he was thinking possibly of making GP its technical adviser or placing him in charge of SLU communications for the F.O. It is realised however that if the FO have SLU, foreign governments will want reciprocity. C. is rather in favour of SLU as it may give him the necessary cover for interception work abroad.

A pension scheme in SIS is apparently meeting with opposition from Anderson. SI may fall back on some benevolent fund. C. thought Charles might like to know about this.

I told C. about our enquiry about Hooper and suggested that it might have some bearing on the leakage from PCO Hague. C. warned me about Hill of SOE who is now the Liaison Officer with the Control Commission. He has nothing concrete but cannot understand how Hill is persona grata with the Russians. C. has recalled [redacted] from Moscow. His final act was to hand over a complete set of the SHAEF cards, to receive the reply from the Russians that they did not want them. This I think must mean that the Russians have no set policy about liquidating the GIS as such. They are merely concerned with

the liquidation of people of a certain class.

July 7th

Keith came in see me for a moment and tell me that Kenneth Strong has accepted the job of PWE vice Bruce Lockhart, in preference to getting command of a brigade. He did not think that as a brigadier he stood any chance of getting a division as during the war he had had no fighting experience. It was therefore better for him to retain his present rank and remain in the intelligence world. He is I think a very disappointed man and certainly no lover of Monty.

Alley has ascertained that the cards of the Polish Security Service are still at St. Paul's School. He is arranging to get these out as soon as possible. We will then have the cards and documents looked through and see what needs copying and what can be destroyed. Alley showed me a copy of the letter signed Wilski which is an alias for Dunderdale, asking for the return of all documents by Gano in accordance with a mythical agreement of 1940. I do not think that this document is likely to do SIS much good if Lublin ultimately decides to bring an action for the return of their property. After consultation with Jim Hale I am very confirmed in this opinion, and we must certainly avoid doing anything on similar lines.

Tommy Harris has just arrived back having left Garbo in Venezuela. Garbo's prospects are fairly good and a provisional passage has been booked for him on July 17th.

July 9th

I had a talk with Lee and Mars about the proposed meeting at the H.O. to discuss the abolition of the exit permit for British subjects. It is intended to rely solely on passports. There is a small gap in that there will be no check on various people who already have passports. Since however most people have not travelled for the last 6 years, they will presumably have to get their passports renewed. It could then be checked against a black list, for what it is worth. The real point however is that it will be virtually impossible to stop people from travelling. It is one thing to refuse to grant an exit permit but quite another to refuse a passport. The one implies that a certain journey is not in the national interest, owing to the war situation and the limitations of travel, and the other that the individual is not a fit and proper person to receive the protection of H.M.G. In practice a passport is never refused unless the case is an overwhelming one.

Two Lublin Poles arrived here on the 6th July although there is no trace of them in D.4. They apparently landed at Northolt Aerodrome and were accompanied by a Mr. WINCH. We have since ascertained that Winch is an employee of the British Embassy in Moscow who was formerly with FWE and MOI. He was apparently told by the Polish F.O. in Warsaw that everything was in order for him to bring the Poles with him. I gather that the F.O. are not too pleased. Meanwhile they have asked us to keep an eye on them.

Harris has received a wire to the effect that Garbo has got his visa for Spain and his passport. Harris will be meeting him in Madrid early in August.

I spent the afternoon at the LRC. I thanked them all for the splendid work they had done and endeavoured to give them a short re-view of what our conclusions were, based on captured documents and interrogations. It seemed to me that they had done a magnificent job and that as far as information went at present we could say that no spy of any consequence had been operating here since the beginning of the war. There had of course been a certain amount of leakage through neutrals and through signals channels but this didn't amount to a great deal. I then interviewed a number of people about their future. I arranged for Vesey and Marshall to join B.I.B. and for Scott, who speaks Polish, to come up and assist Alley with the Polish documents.

Brian Melland came to see me and left with me an interesting memo about Germany written by Gache of M.I.14. Gache emphasises that the problem of intelligence in Germany will be largely political, and that it is clearly of value to liquidate the GIs and fill in any gaps in our wartime intelligence. The problem of keeping our finger on the pulse of German politics and guiding them in the right direction is far greater and more important. Melland came specially to stress how important it was for us to get hold of good people to work in our organisation in the future and to staff the Control Commission. Unfortunately the W.O. do not altogether see the point of this. They have appointed Lethbridge as MGI., a very nice fellow but his whole experience is of tanks and jungle warfare. They are now proposing to appoint in Dick's place General Holland, who was at one time head of M.I.R. and has no experience of C.I. matters. They cannot see that C.I. is a very highly specialised job needing a great deal of experience and that

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appointments such as Dick's successor cannot just be made on the "old boy" basis.

July 10th

I had a word with Burt about the Park Lane Hotel. Unfortunately there is no house detective there. Burt could get an introduction to the manager but frankly I do not think this will get us very far. It would mean informing several reception clerks and telling them to keep a list of callers. This would be useful but the risk is I think too great. Observation on the Park Lane Hotel is extremely difficult as there are two exits.

I attended the JIC meeting with Harry Allen primarily to present our paper on pigeons. The Air Ministry expert Rayner held forth at great length about the necessity of maintaining a small unit. He did not think that our proposal to appoint some civilian on a part time basis would be adequate. The general view of the meeting was that Rayner himself was the nearest thing to a pigeon that anybody had seen and that he was clearly trying to make a job for himself. It was decided that since the main use of pigeons was for intelligence purposes SIS should hold a small meeting and express a firm view to the JIC as to what was required.

Alley has made arrangements with Burt for a van in which the cards will be removed from St. Pauls. I have told Alley to ascertain from the F.O. precisely what information they require as I do not think that observation is really going to be very profitable. I have told Alley to arrange to get a telephone check working on the Park Lane. This will probably be

much more profitable.

July 11th

I told the weekly meeting the present position with regard to the granting of visas by PCOs. This will be left to their discretion but only genuine applications from business people whose bona fides are known to the PCO will be granted without reference. This procedure is already in force in Lisbon, and the other neutral countries will be soon brought into line.

I have arranged with Walker to see Arnold-Forster on the question of pigeons.

Dick rang me up to know if I could give him anyone to assist Christopher Blunt with cable censorship. He suggested Hughes. I doubted whether Hughes could be spared and would be suitable. I would ask Grogan if he knew of anyone. Grogan later told me he could not suggest anyone at the moment.

I discussed with Dick on very broad lines his memo on the future of the office which is really a reversion to the old DOCE plan. His one idea is to get a grip on the SIS organisations abroad. He had discussed this in great detail with Stuart Hampshire. I told him of my misgivings and that I would let him have a full criticism if possible by Saturday. Meanwhile I discussed the whole problem at length with Hampshire, Hollis and Hart. I particularly told Dick that I did not wish to muzzle him in any way as regards his conversations with Lindlater, although I thought that before doing so he might like to see what I had to say.

Jimmy Dickson came in to ask me about the future of one of his agents and to give me certain documents in Arabic which he had obtained from an Egyptian source. I told Brock to get someone to look at this and express a general view as to whether we wanted any more.

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July 12th

The D.G. has returned today. I told him about the more important events that had occurred throughout his absence. I also told him that I was going to be very short-handed by the end of the month. He clearly does not understand how much work there is to be done. While it is true to say that most sections are on half-time or some at less, if the experienced people go most of the work will devolve on me. It is very difficult to see how this can be avoided in present circumstances. I have already had to handle the affairs of a number of matters which are no concern of mine but are A and D questions. e.g. the Poles, and the war in the Far East, not to speak of the conferences with the H.O. and all sections concerned in this office in the exit permits.

At the staff meeting I discussed the letter I had had from a [redacted] father-in-law of one [redacted] who was employed here in the early days of the war on the recommendation of Crocker. There is the usual complaint that he has, in consequence of his deferment for work in this office, been placed in a low demobilisation category. Records show that he came to us as a Sergt. from the HAC in Dec. 1939 and rejoined his regiment in Nov. 1940. He worked under Curry but was very little use. Charles is dealing with the letter.

Allen and Vickery came to talk to me about permits for India. Vickery is very concerned as the Govt. of India are strongly opposed to people coming out unvetted. If the exit permit system is to go and we are to revert to passports as the only check, Vickery insists that no Empire-wide endorsements should be given without reference.

Torry came in to see me. He wanted to know about his future. I gave him the usual answer. He is now at Rotterdam but is being posted to 30 Corps. Brummarius is with First Corps and Owens at 8th Corps. Smith is with 30 Corps. In other words our people are in charge of all the camps in 21 A.G. The Canadians Corps is going home.

The following is the Censorship position. After the 31st July postal censorship will discontinue examination of all mails except those to and from Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, China, Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania. Censorship on the first five countries will continue indefinitely, probably for the duration of the war with Japan, while in the case of the three others, it will only go on till the beginning of Nov. It will consist of 100% watch-listing and partial examination. Examination of certain transit mails, e.g. Eire-Europe, will also continue. Telegraph censorship will continue to examine during the Jap war all outward telegrams with the primary object of routing by cable instead of wireless those messages which might be of value to the enemy. Censorship of radiotelephone conversations will continue during the Jap war. The Information and Records branch of censorship will maintain a section for the purpose of issuing directives to British and Allied Censorships in Europe and any other overseas censorship stations which are still operating

and, in the reverse direction, for distributing material from British and allied overseas censorships to the interested depts. in the U.A.

A P/W named HUEGEL has stated that the SD received from OKW Chi. (the cryptographic section) copies of wireless messages between the American Ambassador in Berne, and Washington, as also those of the American Consul General in Zurich. Other messages seen by Hugel were from the British Embassy in Berne to London. These were less frequent, shorter, and often of a technical nature, e.g. enquiries about people. Also intercepted were messages from British Ambassador, Turkey, those of the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow to his Govt., those of the Papal Embassy in Lisbon to the Vatican, those of the Roumanian and Bulgarian Foreign Ministers to their Ambassadors, the American Ambassador in Lisbon to Washington, the Jap Ambassador in Moscow to Tokio, messages from Helsinki probably to Washington, and French messages addressed to Diplo France, from Syria and Algiers.

A document in a German Air Ministry file from IC/3A Division dated 20.8.41 contains an appreciation of certain documents received by the Air Ministry from the Abwehr. These are in fact documents which we put through G.W. They were a number of HDE summaries plus the minutes of an imaginary meeting. The purpose was to draw the enemy's bombing off towns and on to aerodromes. The minutes of the meeting stressed the lack of defence on aerodromes and our apprehensions about a possible attack. This point was evidently appreciated and presumably some action was taken on it. The German commentator on this document mentioned among other things the following: "Apart from the actual content

the minutes of the meeting are also interesting because of the typically English "vereinmaessigen" treatment of military questions." The idea that military questions could be dealt with by a committee of all interested parties seems to be a new one to the Germans.

July 13th

I spent the morning at the flat dictating answer to Dick's memo about the future of the office.

This afternoon I attended a meeting at the H.O. taken by Carew-Robinson at which representatives of Immigration, Treasury, M/L, Registrar-General, were also present. The H.O. want to abolish the exit permit for British subjects, and substitute the passport. I said that the proposal meant in fact that nobody could be refused exit unless there was an over-whelming case. To refuse the exit permit merely implied that under present conditions travel was not justifiable except in the national interest. Refusal of a passport however implied that the holder was not a fit and proper person to have the protection of H.M.G. This meant in practice that a passport was not refused unless the case was over-whelming. By falling back on the passport we should only be able to check a man's departure once. If he got into trouble after the issue of his passport the only thing that we should do would be to get him stopped at the port. Even if such action were to have official support, which seemed doubtful, it was uncertain whether the I.O. would be able to stop the individual concerned since there would not with the increase of traffic be any really close

scrutiny of British passports. Lastly it seemed to me likely that cancellation of the exit permit for British subjects would be the thin end of the wedge for its cancellation of allied nationals. In fact the scheme proposed really involved the abandonment of all check on the exit to neutral countries where there were Jap Legations. Censorship might well say that it was useless for them to open letters if travel was unrestricted. The meeting proceeded on the assumption that the Passport and Permit Office would break down because the Treasury had refused them the necessary increase of 75 personnel. It was therefore necessary to devise means for getting down the work of the dept. Various schemes were suggested and will be referred back. So far as we are concerned these are confined to waiving the security check on Americans who get transit visas to the Continent. I said that I could quite easily argue a case for saying that even if the Japs did get information from here there was nothing they could do about it and that it would in fact in no way alter the course of the war. At the same time there were arguments on the other side and the Chiefs of Staff had laid down as part of th their policy that certain standards of security were to be maintained and that censorship of neutral countries was also to be maintained. Unless they altered their view it was very difficult to see what could be done in a major way. This meeting lasted 3½ hours.

July 14th

Luke came to see me about the Tricycle group. He is trying to get them settled into some sort of job. At the moment Tricycle

himself is the only man who has got any money. He does not feel however that he can go on financing the other members of the group indefinitely.

Vivian told me on the telephone that he was coming round to the view that some sort of amalgamation between Section V and ourselves was probably necessary. We talked about CICB when he said there had been a certain amount of opposition from Arnold-Forster who was very insistent that it should not in any way be executive. This is of course the old complex. I told Vivian that I thought Forster's idea was sheer nonsense and that the security risks from having contact with outside authorities were negligible.

Joe Lynch came to see me. He has been to Germany to look into the work of the F.B.I. representatives. He told me confidentially that from conversations he had had with the boss the FBI were likely to take over secret service work in the future. There were of course political objections about the FBI becoming too powerful, which might throw the scheme out. He thought however that as things were moving at present they might very well get the charter for espionage abroad. He is going to keep me informed. If this is the case we shall I think have backed the right horse, although in fact we really backed no particular horse. We have merely offered to assist anybody who had a proper charter.

Herbert, Cussen, Stopford and I had a meeting about HOOPER. Herbert saw Perry Gordon, the British renegade in Brussels. Perry Gordon said that he had introduced Hooper as early as 1937 to his principals in Berlin. He

had in fact proceeded to Berlin with Hooper. From that point he had rather faded out of the picture but he had understood from Feldmann that Hooper had been in regular employ of the GIS from that date onwards. Hooper had in fact reported on this journey to Berlin with Perry Gordon to SIS but he had never said anything about the introduction to Feldmann. When he came over in August 1939 he made the suggestion that he should get behind Perry Gordon and establish contact with his principals. In fact he must have known at that time that he was backing one certainty, and he may have misled SIS on this point in order to impress them more and get himself taken on. He might have thought that his previous connection with the GIS in Berlin would have scared them from taking him on in 1937, and therefore withheld the information. A difficult point for him to get over is however his denunciation of "Arl Krueger about which Giskes has spoken. There is no doubt that Hooper knew about Krueger when he was working at PCOs office up to 1936 and there appears also to be no doubt that at the beginning of the war Krueger did not turn up at a rendez vous. According to Giskes he was picked up by the Gestapo and executed. It is also significant that about that time Hooper had told SIS that he thought that the Germans knew about "Krueger. We decided that before interviewing him, Herbert should have a talk with Stevens who is now back in this country, and might throw some light on the case. Hooper should then be interviewed by Herbert and Stopford, starting in a friendly way, but telling him that there was certain information which had been received from Germany which needed clearing up. We all felt that a prosecution was probably undesirable.

Hunter came to see me again about his staff. He will be losing certain policemen who have been attached to the FSP unit. I said that I thought that if we wrote to the CCs we could probably keep them on for a bit. Meanwhile I thought it desirable that he should take active steps to get recruits. I said I would write to Dick White and find out if there were any FSP being demobilised who might wish to take on the job. Hunter's main difficulty is that he does not know what he can offer. He put forward a scheme some time ago to A.Branch and has had no reply.

July 16th

I discussed with Tommy Harris about his going to Madrid. The question is whether he should go under business cover or as a Govt.official. I told him that if he was taking his wife I thought he would have to go as a business man and we should have to support her application on the grounds that she would give him the necessary cover. If he went officially it would be impossible for us to make a case for his wife. He is going to think it over.

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Grogan came to tell me that a decision had been reached to maintain Travellers' Censorship to all neutral countries. That would mean that travellers in transit via Lisbon would have their papers looked at and that all travellers by ship would have their papers examined if it were known that the ship was touching neutral territory. If this possibility is not known to the travellers, there is not much purpose in looking at their papers, and not much risk.

Kenneth Younger came in. He has just been fighting the Grimsby election for Labour against Womersley, Minister of Pensions. He thinks that he stands a good chance of getting in, as Womersley's job is not of a kind that is likely to make him popular, although Kenneth generously states that he thinks he did as much as he could. Kenneth says that he thinks the strength of the Labour Party chances rests in the fact that most of the elder men at any rate during the period between the two wars felt that they had a raw deal and that that is too long a period in a man's life to wait for improvements. They therefore prefer what they believe to be a short cut through nationalisation.

Kenneth, if he does not get his seat, is anxious to come back to the office till he is demobilised.

I saw Holt of PID. He wants to send a certain number of Germans, Austrians and other aliens out for PID work in Germany. The H.O. are promising them that they will be allowed back here but has told them that they will be subject thereafter to any decision of the H.O. regarding ~~xx~~ their ultimate repatriation.

Mathieson of the Registrar-General's Dept. rang up to ask whether we should back a suggestion that identification card numbers should in future appear on passports. I said that while I did not think we could press for this if it gave a great deal of extra work, it would in fact be an additional identity check which might be of value. He said that it would give no extra work as the special space would be made in the application form for this number, which would automatically be repeated on the passport.

Anthony and Mrs. Pitt came to talk about the future of B.16. Mrs. Pitt is probably leaving sometime in September and even if she were to stay on after the reorganisation she would like a change. Since there are quite a number of important agents it is necessary to find a successor. David Sch. Scheer's name was suggested. I have since spoken to the DG who approves, if Kirby-Green can spare him.

Curry asked me about the final form of his report which would in fact be an implied censure on the DG and perhaps on others for agreeing to the carding of foreigners resident abroad by SIS. There would also be an implied criticism of the mechanical nature of our registry and of the decision to split off E and F divisions from B.

I said that I thought that if he was objective in his approach, there was no harm in his expressing these views.

Viv. rang up about a proposal to exchange information between American and British PCOS. He saw no objection provided certain categories of information were not passed. On this matter he would issue an instruction to PCOS. I have also spoken to Hollis who sees no objection. I did however make it clear to Viv. that it was of paramount importance that if an American PCO refused a visa to a traveller, he should not say that this had been done on the basis of information received from the British.

July 18th

Tommy Harris came to tell me about a proposal by SIS that [] should put Garbo au fait with the political situation in Spain when he touches at Lisbon. His ship is at present at Trinidad. We have therefore wired instructing our officer to tell Garbo that we do not think this is a very good idea & that Tommy will meet him in Madrid as arranged as soon as he gets there.

Two Americans came to see me from 12th Army Group interrogation centre on the recommendation of Victor. I was asked to give them a talk on intelligence generally and the work of the office. They are to go down to see the registry on Friday.

DG has approved the arrangement for the liquidation of LRC personnel. Nightingale Lane is to be closed down shortly as well. We shall retain 6 officers under Vesey to do interrogations as and when required at the new camp at Wimbledon or the one for women at Cannon's Park.

Alley came to tell me that he wanted assistance in reading back Polish records. I told him to arrange with Baxter to get Buzzard.

C. rang up to say that he had no objection to S/Leader Beaumont being appointed as Air Attache to Bucharest or Belgrade, but that he still thought that his wife was undesirable and that her presence in Russians spheres of influence might be embarrassing.

Briscoe came in to tell me that on the recommendation of one Davis or Rouda he had been placed in touch with Richter, an American who is Chair an of the American Institute of National Research, Chemical Branch, and is in fact responsible for all secret experimental work on links for the various American services. The question of exchange of information arose. Richter said quite frankly that there were probably 4 categories of information and that it would be possible to do no exchange on category 1. There might however be an exchange on Categories 2, 3 and 4. Briscoe said that probably the same conditions would prevail here. Richter is going to consult his chiefs when he gets back. I told Briscoe that I would speak to C. about the matter, as it might have a disturbing influence on our present relations with various American organisations. They might feel that we were going behind their backs.

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Archer came in about the case of LACHMANN. There is to be a high level meeting at the H.O. on Friday to decide about his future. It is our intention to say that he should go back to Germany.

Montagu came in to tell me about Plan Mincemart. The documents have been discovered in the German Admiralty records with Doenitz's signature on the appreciation made by the German Naval Intelligence. They came to the conclusion that the documents were absolutely genuine and of course we know that they acted on them to the extent of sending 4 divisions to Greece, including one armoured division. The documents had been extracted and photographed by the Spanish General Staff, an officer of which had passed them on to the Germans. There seems no reason why we should not use the fact in our protests to Franco about the continuation of GIS activities in Spain. It would be a fitting end to the case.

Two points which apparently deeply impressed.

the Germans were (1) a mention in a letter from Mountbatten to Alexander about sending him a tin of sardines as these were difficult to get and how on points. The Germans deduced from this that the target of attack was Sardinia and they did in fact insure to a considerable extent by sending reinforcements. According to Keitel's records they anticipated an attack on Sicily but thought it was ^{un}likely to be the main attack. (2) the fact that the officer had in his pocket the counterfoils of two theatre tickets which gave the date of the day before his aeroplane was supposed to have left the UK for Africa. We are getting photographs of all the documents for our file..

Additional apprehensions effective during the past quarter in the USA have brought the total of alien enemies apprehended to 16,073. Of this number 2,875 are at present interned and 5,000 are at liberty on parole. 2552 have been released. As a result of over 25,000 searches of alien enemy premises 3988 were apprehended and held for action by Alien Enemy Hearing Board.

By May 1st 1945 the total of denaturalisation petitions had been filed in the USA, 100 certificates had been cancelled, 195 cases were dismissed and 82 cases are still under litigation.

A P/W has given an interesting account of the explosion in the Munich beer-cellar in 1940. Apparently a man called ELBER did the whole business on his own. He made the infernal machine and cut a hole in a pillar just under the gallery where the Fuehrer usually sat. He made a dummy wooden casing to cover the hole in the pillar.

and worked nightly for about 6 months. It so happened that on the particular occasion Hitler made a much shorter speech than usual as he had to go on to Berlin on urgent business. The whole meeting was over half an hour before time and Hitler had gone. Had he been there he would undoubtedly have been killed. ELSER was caught crossing the Swiss frontier. He would not have been if he had not rather foolishly gone back to have a final look at his apparatus. This gave the Gestapo time to get on his tracks immediately after the explosion occurred. They did quite a smart piece of detective work and simultaneously ordered that all the frontiers were to be closed.

A report on an interrogation of Goering about Hitler's mode of living is of interest. Goering does not believe that Hitler allowed himself to be shot. He last saw him on the evening of April 20th about 8.30. During the last 2 or 3 years Hitler's day was as follows: he was wakened at 9 am. He read the newspapers and slept some more. At 11.30 he got up and the daily routine was begun. Then came the discussion of the military situation which lasted generally from 3-4 hours during which Hitler would get terribly excited. Everybody, including Goering, had to remain throughout the conference. Then he would eat dinner and during the evening he would talk to some officer from "H.Q." After discussing the situation he would go to bed at 9 and at midnight he would get up again. He would then hold a 2-hour conference on the military situation. Everything was brought up there to the last little detail and numerous decisions were taken.

The minutes of a conference held in Hitler's study in the Reichschancellerie on the 2,nd May 1939 have been captured. Present were Goering, Raeder, von Brauchitsch, Keitel, Milch, Huhse and other officers. Hitler began by giving an analysis of the situation and said that he saw no solution without invasion of foreign states or attacks on foreign property. His regime had already achieved considerable successes but further aims could not be reached without the shedding of blood. Danzig was not the subject of the dispute at all. It was a question of expanding Germany's living-space to the East and of securing food supplies and of a general settlement of the Baltic problem. He had no use for colonies. He said "If fate brings us into conflict with the west the possession of extensive areas in the east will be advantageous." The Polish problem was inseparable from the conflict in the west. Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism was doubtful. Thus Poland was of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia. He thought it questionable whether a military success in the west could be achieved by a quick decision but he was convinced that an attack on Poland should be launched at the first suitable opportunity. Hitler did not wish a simultaneous conflict with the western powers but if it were not certain that a German-Polish conflict would not lead to war in the west then the fight must primarily be against England and France. He thought that the isolation of Poland was a matter of skillful politics. (He may at this moment have had in mind the alliance with Russia). He doubted the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. It was therefore necessary to be

prepared. "England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy and the conflict with England will be a life and death struggle". The following are extracts from his speech:

"The Dutch and Belgian Air Bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous. There is no such possibility. We must burn our boats and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice but life or death for 80 million human beings. Every country's armed forces or Govt. must aim at a short war. The Govt. however must also prepare for a war of 10-15 years duration. The moment England's food supply routes are cut she is forced to capitulate. Considerations of right and wrong or treaties do not enter into the matter. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously and the lapse of time of a few minutes will evoke defensive counter-measures. The aim will always be to force England to her knees".

The JIC have reviewed the Japanese situation up to the 6th July. They believe that the primary preoccupation of the Japanese High Command at present is the defence of the home islands, especially Kyushu and Honshu. For this defence they may dispose by the end of 1945 more than 55 active divisions plus 14 depot divisions, which with army troops will total over 2 million men. All available aircraft will be employed in the defence of the home islands, mainly for suicide operations. Their air effort might amount initially to 4-500 sorties by combat-type aircraft and 2-300

of trainer type aircraft during a 24-hour period. This effort will however decline rapidly. Similarly all remaining naval units will be employed in suicide operations in defence of the home land. The secondary preoccupation of the Japanese is to build up their forces in Manchuria, Korea and North China against the Soviet threat. They might have about $1\frac{1}{2}$ million men by December of this year. They are unlikely to have much air support. All other areas will be regarded as of minor importance only. Politically Japan will make desperate efforts to persuade the USSR to continue her neutrality, if necessary by offering important concessions while at the same time making every effort to sow discord between the Americans and British on the one side and the Russians on the other, and may even make a serious attempt to use the USSR as a mediator in ending the war. The Japanese ruling groups are aware of the desperate military situation and are increasingly desirous of a compromise peace but still find unconditional surrender unacceptable. The Japanese people would probably prefer national survival even through surrender, to virtual extinction. They believe however that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent of national extinction. The idea of foreign occupation of the home-land, foreign custody of the person of the Emperor and the loss of prestige entailed by the acceptance of unconditional surrender are most revolting to the Japanese. To avoid these conditions if possible and in any event to ensure survival of the institution of the Emperor the Japanese might well be willing to withdraw from all territory they have seized on the Asiatic continent and in the southern Pacific and even to agree to the independence of Korea and the disarmament of their military.

forces. For surrender to be acceptable to the Japanese Army it would be necessary for the military leaders to believe that it would permit the ultimate resurgence of a military Japan.

July 19th

I saw Jim, Buster and Corin about the Danish detainees and their return to Denmark. It was suggested that Corin should deal direct with the Danes here. This was generally agreed to be the correct line.

Major Selwyn came to see me on the introduction of Cass. He has had 2 months leave but wants a permanent job of a post-war kind. I told him that we could not make any definite offer at the moment but that we might be able to do so later. Meanwhile it occurred to me that he might do an Asst.DSO job possibly in Singapore. He would I think be prepared to take this on provided it was likely to lead to something. He does not want to stay on in the Indian Police after the war. He is now on loan to the Army and has operated a task force on the N.W.Frontier and also on the Arakan front. He creates quite a favourable impression.

I had a word with Cavendish-Bentinck. He is I think quite pleased with his appointment as Ambassador to Poland. Some F.O.man from Mid East is taking over his job.

I handed him a letter about Burns the Press Attache in Madrid which he promised to look into. Burns apparently knew that two of the Spanish journalists, so-called, who were sent back to Spain via this country were in fact Germans.

Hart and Stopford have been interrogating Hooper all day and have gained a very unfavourable impression. Hooper has admitted the meetings with Glickes whom he knew as Dr. GSHANDT, but states that they were in response to letters that he wrote to various firms about a deal in aircraft engines. He had discussed only engineering matters. The dates he gave for the meetings were precisely those given by Glickes. There were a number of discrepancies which were not satisfactorily explained and both Hart and Stopford are convinced that Hooper did work for the Germans and was paid by them before the war. They did not think that he intended to work for them after the outbreak of war, or that he has in fact done anything during or since the war.

I had a word with Fish who is leaving. He has promised to look into the diamond smuggling case and to give us any help in the future that he can.

D.G. has written a very fulsome minute on the B.I.G. report by Mrs. Pitt which shows how completely the Spanish, Portuguese and South American Embassies have been covered since the beginning of the war largely due to the ingenuity of Brooman-White. The D.G. thought that it was a really great achievement.

July 20th

I attended a meeting at the H.O. with Joe Archer, Newsam, Lockspeiser of RAF Farnborough, Merer, Air Ministry Security, and Carew-Robinson, were present. We had to decide about the future of LACHMANN. We came to the conclusion that his case was really bound up with that of German research

workers and scientists who were to be brought over here to work on various projects such as rockets on which they had made a great deal of progress. Lockspeiser thought that on balance we stood to gain even if these people had unrestricted access to firms and other scientists and were able to travel abroad. Their brains would put us anything from 5-7 years ahead and the risk of their imparting some of their knowledge either during or after a period of work here would be worth taking. He then thought however that it would be for consideration when we had picked their brains and trained other people in their line of thought whether at that stage they should not be sent home. It was pointed out however that such a course would on general H.O. grounds be extremely difficult and would doubtless meet with a good deal of abuse. LACHMANN's case was slightly different as he was more in the nature of a designer than a scientist. Lockspeiser said that he would obviously be useful to any firm but that he would not put him in the same category as the scientists. It was generally agreed that in the position of chief designer to a private company a man was generally speaking more dangerous as he would have access to the government's programme for the next 5 years. While we all agreed that it would be better for LACHMANN to go home, it was felt that the action could not be justified to the public if German scientists who had been working against us during the war were allowed to settle here, even for a limited period.

Jenkins is back from Egypt. He is rather worried about the suggestion for setting up Passport Control, about which one came out to see him. He gathers that is going to say that the DSO is

already covering the ground and that a PCO would be superfluous. I told Jenkins that I did not see that it was possible to do very much about the future of Mid East until we had got the basic questions settled of our relations with M.I.6.

Hart and Stopford have confronted Hooper with GIBBS. Hooper brazened it out and said that the whole thing was a German frame-up. GIBBS told him what the fate of Karl KRUEGER had been. He had been denounced to the Gestapo and had committed suicide. Hooper denied that he had ever told GIBBS about KRUEGER although he had previously admitted that he was thoroughly au fait with the case.

July 21st,

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A report from SHAEF JIC gives an account of Hitler's last days. Hitler had already worn himself out before the end came. He may have suffered a stroke after the 20th July plot, for his left arm began incessantly to twitch. When he spoke to the Party Leaders last winter he alluded to his health for the first time. Frederick the Great, he said, on return from the wars was a broken man and this war had left its mark on him. "My hand shakes, and I hope this will not spread to my head, for a shaky head would be a handicap, but of this you can be sure, my brain will remain ice-cold." The speech had a depressing effect, his health grew worse and by April he was in a very low state. The crisis came on the 22nd April. A conference on the situation was to be held. Himmler attended by his chief of staff, Borger, came down from the north. He had been playing a peculiar game and

shortly before leaving had been putting out peace-feelers to Bernadotte. Already Russian shells were falling near the Reichs Chancellerie and the Tiergarten when the conference assembled, a small group of tired men. Hitler came in at 8.30 a completely broken man. Only a few army officers were with him. Himmler urged Hitler to leave Berlin. Suddenly Hitler began to make one of his characteristic speeches. "Everyone has lied to me, everyone has deceived me, now one has told me the truth. The armed forces have lied to me and now the S.S. has left me in the lurch. The German people has not fought heroically. It deserves to perish. It is not I who have lost the war, but the German people". Then he is said to have wept, and said "Only Goering can save us now", meaning Goering might pull off some diplomatic coup in Sweden where he had strong contacts. Then his face turned purple, his twitching left arm became quiet, and he could not put his left foot to the ground properly. Throughout that night he suffered from a nervous collapse and kept on raving that he would meet his end in Berlin. Next day, 23rd April, he had recovered. He remained adamant in his decision to stay and if he it would in Berlin and Goebbels who was Gauleiter of the city, immediately announced that he would stay at his side. Bormann is also believed to have remained in Berlin. Eva Braun who had flown from Munich to join Hitler on the 15th April was also resolved to die with him. That night Speer, Minister of Armaments and War Production saw Hitler for the last time. He said that Hitler was calm and had at last realised that his star had set and the war was lost. He told Speer that he awaited his death as

a release from a hard life of difficulties. He said that he could not go out and die fighting on the barricades as he was afraid of merely being wounded and being captured by the Russians. He would therefore shoot himself and he had made arrangements for his body to be cremated so that the Russians would not use it for propaganda purposes. No one yet knows how Hitler met his end. He was not as some Germans imagine poisoned by Morell, his doctor, since Morell had left Berlin before the end. He was according to the OKW transmitting messages up to the 28th April. Between then and the first of May he probably met his death either by taking poison, shooting himself or by ordering his dug-out to be blown up. The Russians still persist in saying that there is no evidence that Hitler is dead.

Col. Bartik called here this morning. He has come back to collect certain documents which will be required for the trial of the "Acha Govt. He says that things are beginning to settle down and although a number of his old colleagues were liquidated there are not nearly so many as he had anticipated. A good many of them were working for the underground and are now back in their old jobs. The Russians are leaving matters more or less to the Czechs and only have a small number of garrisons in some of the provinces. From time to time they ask for a German to be handed over. This is done if the offence has been carried out on Russian soil. Otherwise the man is interrogated and returned to the Czechs. Transport is very difficult, but a synthetic oil plant set up by the Germans is being used with great advantage. Apparently the head of

the Gestapo and about 20 others were working for the Czechs. The head of the Gestapo who had formerly worked under Heydrich, offered his services almost as soon as he arrived in the area in 1941. He could not of course save everybody but he did save the lives of hundreds by delaying tactics and by destroying documents. He is in consequence now at liberty. All the Germans and Hungarians who formerly had Czech citizenship have been de-naturalized. It is open to them to apply for Czech citizenship again if they so desire. I suggested to Col. Bartik that he might like to establish contact with Dick. He cannot do so on his present visit but said that he might be able to meet him in Dresden or if Dick could go to Prague he would of course be delighted to see him. At present he is working through the Legation and Passport Control.

July 23rd

Caulfield brought Phillips, the new ADNI to see me. Caulfield is retiring in about two weeks time.

Furnival-Jones came to see me. He is leaving before long for the British zone. He had heard from Ramsbotham about the incident of the SHAEF cards having been offered to the Russians and was anxious to know the facts. I told him that I did not think the Russians were really interested in the liquidation of the GIs as such and I doubted whether in any case they had the necessary staff to handle a complex matter of that kind.

Dick rang up about 3 things: (1) recruiting of FSP personnel for Hunter. He has spoken

Ryder who says that there might be some suitable people provided the pay conditions were good. He thought that we should pay the equivalent rate of pay and allowances for a sergeant. I said that I would look into this and let him know. (2) He then spoke about Storm-Rice, who is wanted by Kellar for work on ISPAL. Dick said he had had an offer from SIS. Actually of course SIS want him for the same purpose. He wants to know the precise terms and the nature of the work that he is going to be asked to do. This will be explained by Kellar when he visits 21 AG. (3) He wondered whether the Control Commission could have the services of Leggett of the LRC. I said that I had thought of getting Leggett into this office although I believe he wanted to go to the P.O. I would however talk to him when he came back. Possibly he could go to the Control Commission for a time and come to us later.

I had a talk with Cayzer about postings to the Far East. I suggested that Selwyn might make an assistant DSO to Singapore. He suggested that Downes might go as assistant to Hunt at Rangoon and later be replaced possibly by Selwyn. Meanwhile have the services of Ricketts for Singapore or Rangoon. We are cabling our suggestions to Dixon. Two girls have left for Rangoon but more are required. We are having the usual difficulty with W.O. establishment branch with the result that we have to go on paying for army commitments. Kirby-Green I gather is very anxious to stay on with us but Charles feels a certain responsibility in allowing him to do so unless we can get the police or the Treasury to let him have at least a portion of his police pension. Normally he would lose this if he joined us. I

told Charles that I thought it was extremely important to keep Kirby-Green's services as he was quite exceptional as a DSO. He would be quite prepared to take on the Caribbean station.

July 24th

I had a long discussion with Curry both about the future of the office and about his chapter 5. By and large he thinks that the proposals on the lines of Hart's memo provide the best solution. I told him that 'indiator's mind seemed to be working in the same direction. According to a letter that I had from Dick he seemed to be sold on the idea of one organisation dealing with Security Intelligence and one set of records. He was also impressed by the position of Brook-Booth working alongside SIS.

Kemal Johnston came in to say goodbye. He is going to the JAGs Dept. He seems quite please and does not as far as I know bear the office any ill-will.

July 25th

Tommy Harris is having considerable difficulty about getting suitable cover to visit GARBO in Madrid. A new suggestion has however been made that he might go for MEW in connection with the tracing of art treasures.

Tim Milne rang up about the Ankara leakage case. The F.O. are apparently rather worried about the distribution of the information and are asking how many people in MI5 knew about the case. I told Milne

that he could tell Bromley that quite a number of officers in B. Division knew about it because no less than 5 people had volunteered information under interrogation. Milne said that he would be showing a copy of the report to Pearson of OSS since most at any rate of those interrogated had come from the American zone and had already reported to the Americans, though not of course in any great detail. Milne told me that McKentellier report and the Moysisch report had both been sent to the FO. I told him that we were preparing a consolidated report and it was proposed that C. and the DG should write a joint letter of protest to Cadogan.

Alley came to talk about the Poles. It is going to be arranged that we approve the payment of certain sums of money through Gano for the liquidation of Polish organisations here. Alley thought however that we ought to set up certain of the Poles here who would keep us informed about their compatriots who were working for the Russians. The cost would be something like £7,000 a year. I said that I doubted whether we could justifiably do this, quite apart from the political dangers. On the other hand I saw no objection to having contact with certain Poles who could give us useful information. They ought to try and settle themselves into jobs and we would pay them a certain amount on results. There was a great difference between this and having an organised Polish whole-time Counter-Intelligence Organisation financed by the British Govt. In any case I thought it unwise to commit ourselves at the moment since we really did not know who of the Poles would be returning to his own country. We could

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however keep the pot boiling meanwhile by
approving grants for liquidation.

Teresa and Hollis had a talk with me
about Jack. We all agreed that it would
be too much to set aside the sum of
£20,000 to pay him a pension in certain
eventualities. We thought however that
there should be some sort of compromise.
The DG I believe thinks that he ought to
go back to his bank and do what work he can
for us in his spare time. This may be
rather difficult.

Luke came to talk about the proposal of
Censorship to send on all letters condemned
in the last 6 years. He thinks that this
may lead to considerable complications,
although all B.I.A letters of any importance
are actually in our possession. I am
trying to find out whether the task of
reviewing all condemned letters is a
manageable one.

July 26th.

I saw Sir Findlater Stewart ~~this afternoon~~ for
about an hour alone, and was then joined by
Herbert. Findlater went over the charter of
B.Division and asked me various questions about
the duties performed.

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It seemed to me that
apart from the inefficiency of the present organ-
isation and indeed the dangers of its inaccuracies
we, as a Defensive Service in this country, should
really be doing the work. The output was very
small and rarely included the things which we

wanted to know. It was in my view necessary to have an automatic system covering the 24 hours which would enable us to sort out all the various personalities and eventually to concentrate on those who appeared to be engaging in peculiar activities. Findlater agreed about this and I think will look into the matter when he starts enquiring into S.I.S.

I then talked to him about R.S.S. and its future. It was proposed, I understood, to place it under the G.C.&C.S. and so under the Sigint Board it would just become another monitoring station. I explained to him that the approach of R.S.S. was quite different to that of other Y Stations. R.S.S. was engaged now almost exclusively on general search and was therefore proceeding from the unknown, whereas other Y Stations had different tasks allotted to them on certain fixed schedules, e.g. Jap-Military from Stockholm to Tokyo. R.S.S. had built up an extremely efficient library under Morton Evans, who was really the directing head of the organisation and the person responsible for its efficient running. His ultimate aim and object was to create a library where all types of traffic would be catalogued and to which reference could be made if someone wished to find out what the communications were, for example, the Argentine Police; they would find details of the time schedules, frequencies and procedure. This analysis of the ether had been carried out for some time and undoubtedly there was a tremendous advantage in enlarging it and keeping it up to date. It was however, vitally important that a person in control of this general search should be in the closest contact with all branches of the Intelligence Services in order that they might receive the fullest guidance that any intelligence clues could provide. Provided, therefore, R.S.S. was given quasi independence under the G.C.&C.S., there would be no objection to the amalgamation. In fact, there might be certain advantages in that R.S.S. would be more likely to get the by products from their other

Y Stations. The danger was, however, that R.S.S. might become swamped and that the old practice of keeping them apart from ourselves, which during the last year had been to a considerable extent broken down, might be instituted again. Hart then joined us and gave Findlater his own experiences of where Section V had fallen down and how important it was for a quasi executive department to know the full facts of any case from the outset, otherwise it was impossible for us to give reliable advice to government departments who were ultimately responsible for the action taken. I told Findlater that I should like some time to talk to him again, particularly about the Foreign Office Security Service, which had let us down badly on a number of occasions. Hart is seeing Findlater again tomorrow at 3.

Dick rang me up to say that he had received my letter giving information about Colonel BARTIK's experiences in Czechoslovakia and that he entirely agreed with my views that a station in Prague on the lines of the British Military Mission in Brussels was highly desirable. He wanted to make contact with BARTIK and is going to write him a letter which I will pass on through SLOAN.

July 27th.

Hart has completed his report on HOOPER and I have today submitted it to the D.G. The conclusions are:

(1) That by March 1939 at the latest HOOPER had become an agent of the German S.S. working under Major von FELDMAN & Dr. WEICHELT.

(2) That on two occasions in the spring or summer of 1939 HOOPER met Oberst Leutnant GISKES at Cologne and ^{by} knew him to be an officer of the German S.S. disclosed to him:

(i) That Dr. Karl KRUEGER, Bad Godesburg, a German subject, was a valuable agent of P.C.O. The Hague and that he HOOPER had learnt this fact while in the employ of P.C.O.

(iii) That Henry Christian PIECK was a Russian agent who had connections with the British F.O. through which he had obtained secret information. HOOPER accompanied this information with the suggestion that the German S.S. should take steps to obtain from PIECK information which the latter obtained from the British F.O.

(iii) That on at least two occasions in the spring and summer of 1939 HOOPER was paid sums of money by the German S.S. for his work as an agent.

(iv) That HOOPER deliberately concealed from S.I.S. in August 1939 and subsequent the fact that he had had any previous contact with the German S.S. other than with Gordon PERRY himself and deliberately misrepresented to S.I.S. that he had any such contact.

(v) That HOOPER's report to S.I.S. dated 23.8.39. on a meeting with Dr. WEICHELDT at Cologne on 21.8.39 and by his subsequent reports to S.I.S. of his connections with the German S.S. were designed by HOOPER to mislead S.I.S. into believing that he had had no connection with the German S.S. save that disclosed therein and that for this purpose he either fabricated himself or evolved with the German S.S. the letters which he represented to S.I.S. had been received by him from Dr. WEICHELDT.

Probable conclusions are:

(1) That HOOPER became an agent of the German S.S. as early as March 1938 and that he received sums of money from them at or about that time.

(2) That in disclosing to GISKES the information about KRUEGER, HOOPER may have believed that he was not telling the Germans anything which they did not already know, since HOOPER had probably realised from reading a book by Landau "All Fair" that considerable information about KRUEGER had already been published and may have been known from sources in P.C.O. The Hague's office that

KREUFER had been searched by the Gestapo. Similarly, HOOVER must have known that in suggesting to the German S.S. that they should exploit PIECK's source in the F.O., he was making a useless suggestion, since the connection between PIECK and the British F.O. had at that time been broken. Stopford, who endorses these views, states that it is his firm opinion that there is not a shred of evidence that HOOVER has been disloyal during the time that he has been employed by this office, even if some of his financial transactions have not been entirely satisfactory. These transactions relate only to rather heavy expense charges. Stopford adds that he has found HOOVER to be of outstanding ability and that he has done first class work.

Packenham and Tommy come to see me about the latter's visit to Madrid. We have finally decided that Tommy's cover should be that he is going out to Madrid to examine some of the German archives which have been taken over from the German Embassy.

The D.C. came to talk to me about HOOVER's report. He thinks that in the first instance it should be submitted to "C" for his observations.

Grogan is examining the question of the fate of condemned censorship letters. He is telling Censorship that in our view all letters condemned by the Security Service should be re-examined by this department and a decision reached as to whether they should go on or be destroyed, or retained. All letters which might constitute evidence in the future should be retained. All letters from or to enemy occupied territory should either be retained by us or destroyed. Other letters should be examined in the light of circumstances. Grogan points out that there may be grave objections to the publication of certain letters which refer to military equipment and might have a bearing on the Far Eastern war. He is also

pointing out to Censorship that if they send all letters on they may find it extremely difficult to explain why any particular letter was held up: in most cases owing to the lapse of time, the reason will not be apparent, and in other cases, even if it were, it could not be explained in public.

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Caulfeild has passed me a letter from Haldane Porter, who is now in Belgrade. He gives rather a depressing picture. He says:-

" I cannot see at the moment any alternative to a completely totalitarian regime, kept in power by the traditional ruthless methods of communism - as evinced in Russia, allied to the natural cruelty of the Balkan peoples. Everyone who really thought that there was something fundamentally good as well as new in the Partisan movement is now very disallusioned. At the time any possible alternative was worse, and I think that still holds good - there is really no alternative except chaos, and one can only hope that as the present regime gets more sure of itself, it will become more tolerant. At the moment it becomes daily more intolerent - all the young communists who hold key positions are out hand. I still think that many of its top men are, within their limits, "men of good will" but the political commissars in the army, the heads of police departments, the secret police officials in other government departments - all the middle bloc of managers, managing clerks, captains, majors and colonels, superintendents, etc have the bit between their teeth. Daily we come across instances of these people ignoring orders from above, and underneath, the peasant, crafty, ignorant and suspicious, lives as he has always done. Democracy here is meaningless, and if it could be applied as we understand it would lead immediately to chaos. Benevolence, a year ago, would have seemed possible; now one can only hope for tolerance. I can see that before long we shall all be a bit on each others nerves. We cannot go outside Belgrade now without a permit. There is no social life - a few fearful official parties. No amusements, only one restaurant and that dangerous owing to large numbers of drunk Russians, usually armed. But politically it is very interesting. Such a chance for something really new and good, and getting daily slenderer. "

SHAEF J.I.C. in their official report dated 9th July give an interesting account of Russia's policy in her zone. Their propaganda, which is directed to showing that conditions in their zone are far better than those in the Allied zones, is probably largely due to their own inferiority complex. It has achieved a certain success but is rather vitiated when the facts ultimately become known. Food is in fact very short in Berlin, as also is coal. Meanwhile German machinery is being moved to Russia and large numbers of the male population are being rounded up for reconstruction and agricultural labour in Germany. Large numbers of them have also been moved to Russia, including specialists who are required to rebuild Russian industry. The Russians have been ruthless in their round up of leading Nazis in their zone, but seem to have been willing to accept the small fry, who could claim that they were party members only in order that they could hold their own jobs, to fill minor administrative posts. This is not unlikely since the Russians do not possess any large numbers of competent administrators. They therefore have to rely on the Germans governing themselves with a minimum of administrative supervision from the Red Army. There are no signs as yet of the Russians sponsoring a strong communist party in their own zones. They encourage political activity and are permitting trades unions to reorganise. A Combined reconstruction committee has been formed including members of the communist and socialist parties. The Red Army and the millions of homeless Russians and Poles live off the land. In Berlin itself, everything transportable has been stripped from the U.S. - British zone. Out of the 36 telephone exchanges in the area, only 8 remained when the British arrived and furniture and fittings have been treated in the same way. Russian policy appears to be simple. German industry is to be used as a means of rebuilding Russia, and of eliminating all possible political opposition in their own territory. It remains to be seen how far

they will continue the economic policy which they have instituted in Eastern Europe by eliminating all large land owners and collectivising farms. They seem to be in different as to whether the Germans have a bare subsistence to live upon this winter and to regard them merely as a useful source of cheap labour whose future is unimportant. Since this ruthless policy is clear, they do not worry unduly about such moral policies of non-fraternisation.

In Germany no case of overt resistance traceable to an organised resistance movement has been reported. The rapid collapse of Germany and the thoroughness of counter intelligence methods have broken up all efforts of the S.D. to form resistance groups and encourage werewolf activities. Subversive activity now only means scattered and unconnected instances of sabotage. If in fact active resistance develops in the future it will arise more from disaffection during the prolonged occupation than from the original werewolf planning.

Ribbentrop has been carefully interrogated by two political officers from SHAEF. Asked why Germany had invaded Russia, he replied that it was the greatest mistake in history and was a complete reversal of his fundamental foreign policy. He had never been able to determine precisely why and when the Fuhrer had decided on invasion. There were various elements in his decision, ideological grounds, and Party and Army influence. It was also provoked by certain incidents such for example as the report that some 21 or 22 Russian divisions were massed along the border of East Prussia. There was the fact that the Soviet trade delegation had shown more interest in obtaining offensive than defensive armament. The Army felt

that Russia was becoming dangerously strong. The Fuhrer had been angered at Russia's occupation of Bessarabia and Bukhovina without German knowledge and approval. Bukhovina had a large German population. There was no doubt he said that Russia had ambitions to extend her influence through the Balkans and the Army feared that if the war went on in the West and greater Russian support became necessary it would be gained only at the price of expansion of Russian control ~~xxxxxxxx~~ over areas necessary to German security. When the decision to attack Russia had finally hardened Ribbentrop had delivered a strong warning against such action to Hitler, but, he said ruefully, "Hitler was a very strong personality who could not be changed." Ribbentrop said that he had always been in favour of a rapprochement with the Russians but had met with considerable opposition from the Fuhrer. Finally he convinced him that the incident which apparently decided the Fuhrer to attempt a political rapprochement with Russia was a motion picture of Stalin reviewing a military parade. The film had been sent by the German MA in Moscow. Hitler took a fancy to Stalin's face, and remarked emphatically "He looks like a man with whom one could do business. He thereupon gave Ribbentrop permission to try to come to a political understanding with Russia. At first negotiations were started with the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin but progress was unsatisfactory. Finally Hitler agreed to send a telegram to Stalin asking him to receive Ribbentrop. Stalin's acceptance was immediate. Stalin came right to the point and said that

while the two countries had been pouring filth over each others heads (the Russian expression was "l'mquid manurâ") there was no reason why they could not come to an agreement and before midnight of the day of his arrival he had drafted and signed a non-aggression pact. Ribbentrop proceeded unctuously to say that his policy of rapprochement with Russia was designed to establish peace in Europe and to enable Germany to come to an understanding with the British Empire on a basis of equality and carry out Hitler's plans to get nearly all the Germans into one Reich. These last remarks seem to give the tone of the whole conversation and indicate how little importance it is possible to attach to anything Ribbentrop says. His sole object was of course to make out that as a good German he was forced to carry out the Fuhrer's orders but that he had always used his influence in England's favour and indeed that the Fuhrer in that respect was largely of his own opinion.

July 28th

I talked to Buster, Tommy and Mrs. Pitt about the case of Onofre GARCIA, who has written a rather blackmailing letter to the H.O. He wants to be given complete freedom and compensation to be allowed to go to Mexico and re-establish his life there. We propose to say to the H.O. that we have no objection to his going to Mexico or indeed back to Spain. We do not however feel that he could be deported to Spain against his own wishes as he would undoubtedly be interned if not worse on arrival. He was originally interned on account of certain indiscretions and there was also a certain amount of rather tentative

evidence that he might have been made use of by ALCAZAR. I have asked Mrs. Pitt to go through all the files and put up a note showing exactly what the case against him is. We will then take the matter up with the H.O.

Jim Hale came to ask whether he could have the services of College for a week to examine two parties of Germans returning from Canada and Australia. These Germans were interned here and deported to the Dominions at the beginning of the war. Cyril Mills has sent us records of the Canadian lot but I do not think we know anything about the other party. Some of them will have to remain in internment until the Control Commission is ready to receive them but others may possibly be given their liberty pending the return to Germany.

Herbert told me that he had had a long talk with Findlater yesterday. He had told him about the working of the GC & CS and also a certain amount about RSB and in particular RIS. He had left with Findlater a copy of his memo about the re-organisation of the office.

Certain documents in the Heeresarchiv have disclosed various projects by the Germans before the war to penetrate SIS abroad. One of them refers to HOOPER and to a meeting that he had with two agents sent from Hamburg in Sept. 1937. The document which is dated Oct. 1937 shows that a further meeting was to be held at Innsbruck in Dec. 1937. HOOPER when questioned admitted that he had been to Denmark but that he had gone there in order to carry out a deal in smuggling marks out of Germany. He was

doing this on behalf of a Dutchman named de Vries. The negotiations had come to nothing. He also admitted that he had been to Innsbruck but for the purpose of finding a suitable hotel or boarding house for himself and family who wished to go there for winter sports. This visit had also been abortive. He had however while in Innsbruck tried to check up on some individual staying at a hotel there who had been connected with the PIECK case. When confronted with the evidence he was quite unable to explain how the GIS had prophetic knowledge in October that he was going to Innsbruck in December.

Joe Lynch came in to say goodbye. He is going back to America with his wife on account of the serious illness of his mother. He is not quite sure whether he will return. If she dies he will probably have to try and get the Bureau to recall him.

July 30th

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Klop came to see me. He wondered whether there was anything further that he could do. I said that I thought there ought to be some Ashcan characters whom he could very well see. He then asked whether by any chance we knew the whereabouts of HILGER, formerly a representative of the German Embassy who had been in Moscow roughly from 1920 onwards. As it seemed to us both that it would at least be interesting to discover precisely what led the Russians to make a pact with the Germans in the early days of the war and what caused Germany to attack Russia in 1941. We ascertained from Stewart Hampshire that HILGER is at present held by the Americans. Stewart is going to try and find a plausible excuse for getting him over here.

I saw the DG about HOOPER. He thinks that we should send a copy of the dossier to C that as soon as he has read it we should have a joint discussion as to how the case can best be liquidated.

July 31st

Victor is back for a day. He has fixed up an arrangement with Wing of the LRC who is preparing exhibits for the MI5 museum. We discussed the joint intelligence scientific committee and agreed that we should be permanently represented. Victor feels that

we have rather allowed this to go by default. If we are not represented we are not likely to know about developments either from a defensive point of view or of any which might have a bearing on our own technical appliances. I have recommended to the DG that we should stake a claim for permanent representation and that Victor should be our nominee.

The DG, Hale and I lunched with Passy, Manuel and Knock. They were all very friendly. Passy told me that he would try to work out some system by which he could use the holorith machine for the detection of 5th column activities in France. I told him that we had tried the holorith machine for censorship material but that in fact we had got very little out of it. That might be because by and large we here in England had not had much trouble from letter-writing and as far as we knew no evidence of extensive use of codes, etc. We had however a very elaborate registry system which had served us well and it might be that his problems could be more effectively dealt with in that way. I said that if he cared to send over an expert we should be very glad to place him in touch with the officer here who had run the holorith and also with the head of our registry.

I had a talk with Bill Stephenson who is over here with Donovan. He said that our election result had been a great shock to America. The Americans had given us a very good forecast of their election results and it seemed to him a pity that we could not have forecast our own more accurately. This would have considerably lessened the blow. As it was, there was a tendency to

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alarm and to freeze up on Lease-Lend.

Milmo and I had a talk with Rawli about the future of CSDIC. He will have to make recommendations this month about the closing down of all camps in this country. We said that in the present state of affairs we did not think it mattered since we could now send military personnel to O20. It was however essential that one or other of us should keep some sort of camp open here for the more important cases; as they would be of CI nature it seemed to us that O20 should probably carry the obligation.

I saw Maltby for a moment. He talked a little about the future of RSS but told me nothing I did not know already. He is I think anxious that the organisation should continue on its present lines and not be merged with GC & CS.

Peter Hope came in to see me. He is now attached to Joe Stephenson's office in Paris. He is from all accounts doing very good work and I gather that the British Embassy are very pleased to have us there.

Stopford tells me that Hooper's colleague from CO The Hague who was evidently a party to Hooper's operations with the Germans, died in 1943. We shall not therefore be able to get any corroborative evidence from him.

August 1st

Stratton came in to see me. He has just returned from India on demobilisation, only to find that his firm will not have very much for him to do for the next year.

Ricketts of NID has now joined us and is ultimately destined for Singapore. I talked to him about the office. He is to have a short course here and then go out to Kandy pending the re-occupation of Malaya. He is anxious to stay with us permanently.

I had a talk with Herbert and Roland about Gwyer, who may be coming back to us at the end of this month until his demobilisation. It seemed to me desirable that there should be some sort of positive line of demarcation between Bird and Gwyer. Bird suggested that Gwyer might look into all cases of penetration including the latest evidence obtained about penetration attempts from the Heeresarchiv.

Dick turned up this evening for a few days leave. I think he is fairly convinced by the arguments that we put forward against his SID or DOCE memo, although I admit that his point about getting some sort of control of SIS stations abroad is extremely important. I do feel however that this may be achieved if we can get some sort of permanent representation abroad, and a close liaison with whoever is the SIS representative in the local Embassy.

Dick had an interesting meeting with the Russian General in Berlin who is in charge of CI matters. He confirms my view that the Russians are not interested in the liquidation of the GIS as such and have not in fact got the staff or the records to deal with the problem. They are working on much broader lines, i.e. removing the machinery and putting certain classes on manual labour and liquidating others. They

were particularly interested in the werewolf organisation and Dick told them that he would give them all the information in our possession. The Russians are concentrating on the Hitler Jugend as they think during the winter months they may become active. The atmosphere was a bit stilted at first but gradually softened under the influence of different kinds of vodka and immense quantities of food. The Russians are still sceptical about Hitler. Dick was shown all the evidence, namely what were alleged to be Hitler's teeth and the charred remains of Eva Braun. He told the Russians that in his view Hitler was almost certainly dead and in any case it was a mistake to broadcast anything to the contrary since the illusion, if it were an illusion, that Hitler was alive would stimulate the underground movement. Actually Dick had a report the other day that Hitler was residing somewhere in the British zone. A raid was staged but without any results.

The whole incident is being kept very quiet

August 2nd

I had a talk with Alec Kellar who returned last night from the Middle East. He has had long discussions with officers in Palestine and Cairo about the possibility, subject to very rigid safeguards, of the Palestine Police being put in the know about OATS. The danger about having anybody like Giles, a somewhat ambitious policeman, au fait with inflammable material of the kind, is obvious. At the same time the military feel that the identification of certain personalities which can only be effected by a certain amount of knowledge being imparted to the police, is of paramount importance, since in the event of an upheaval it would

be possible to effect a greater number of arrests. Previously they had been afraid of compromising the sources lest it might jeopardise their chances of getting prior notice of D day. All have now agreed,

that the police should be brought into the picture, but whether C.himself will approve is another matter. Roberts has had two representatives of the Jewish Agency working with him in Egypt. The other day when a convoy of food-stuffs or other material was proceeding to Palestine, one of the lorries broke down. While it was being repaired there was a slight explosion and ultimately 25,000 rounds went off. The driver of the lorry was a member of the Hagana and the Jewish Agency representative was in the driving seat with him. It is not known however how many other lorries contained ammunition.

Kellar went to Cyprus and is convinced that we should have a DSO there. A possible candidate is Klingopoulos who has served with SIME under James Robertson, and knows Greek.

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At the staff meeting today I raised the question of girls leaving the office who might possibly get appointments abroad. Horrocks said that he had a list of such people and that he would never be at a loss to find a suitable person since the staff would have to be considerably

reduced before long and a large number would consequently be available. Four more girls are to go out east.

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I suggested to Charles that I might approach Harold Scott and see what could be done. He was quite agreeable to my doing this. I pointed out that our overseas commitments would by and large be bound to stand whatever Findlater Stewart said, but I undertook to review them all and try to put up a comprehensive survey for the DGs approval.

I attended a meeting in the DMIs room with Aellar, Marshal-Cornwall, Viv., Ryan of CICI and certain other M.I. staff officers.

Meanwhile CICI would continue to run these agents in a semi-overt manner and would also collect overt intelligence as before. CICI's main office would retire to Kermanshah but would leave four good officers in Teheran who would either be a British Military Mission or be attached to the Military and Air Attaches. It has already been decided in Potsdam that both ourselves and the Russians will evacuate Teheran. I suggested that we might perhaps do a deal with the Russians and suggest to them that as our liaison in Teheran had been

mutually beneficial we should suggest to the Persians that we should both retain a small nucleus in the capital. Nobody seemed to feel that this was a good idea although I am by no means convinced that it would not work. I expressed the view too that we might even, after the total evacuation of Persia, retain some sort of overt security liaison officer who would be in touch with the local police authorities. As regards Abadan it was decided that the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. should provide their own security, but that CICI should not ask them to engage in any intelligence activities outside their area as this might possibly queer the pitch for SIS in the future. Actually the oil company are not at all anxious to get mixed up in intelligence matters as they fear that such activities may compromise their position vis-a-vis the Persian Govt.

Speer, the Reichsminister for Armaments and war production, has been very carefully interrogated on the effect of our bombing policy. He said that our first attack on Hamburg in August 1943 made an extraordinary impression but that it was not followed up at sufficiently short intervals or sufficiently extensively to have any really serious effect. It did however affect morale rather strongly at the time. Gradually however the Germans became used to these attacks and stood up to them extremely well. Indirectly they affected the country in that man-power had to be diverted by the ARP Depts and evacuation and dispersals had to take place. By far the most effective of our raids were the

planned assaults on industries, particularly bottle-necks such as ball-bearings and chemical industries. The attack of the 12th May 1944 caused the first serious shortages of indispensable basic products and was the greatest anxiety for the future conduct of the war. From August 1943 onwards, Speer and Milch had pressed for the construction of fighters. Nevertheless the High Command ordered bomber production to continue as they were of the opinion that it was only by means of retaliatory attacks that the allied assault on German towns could be slowed up. This accounts for the fact that even in 1945 the construction of 4-engine bombers was ordered once again. Moreover considerably more importance was attached to the Ilak programme in the battle against the bombers. It was given higher priority than the fighter programme. This was switched on the orders of Hitler himself. It was not until early 1944 that air attacks became decisive. The attacks on the chemical industry were most difficult to deal with since before activity can be recommenced at a chemical factory the entire plant must be restored in at least one phase of manufacture in order that the chemical processes which form a self-contained unit might pass through all its stages. The American attacks which followed a definite system of assault on industrial targets really caused the break-down of the German armaments industry. Speer believes that strategic bombing alone, if it had been directed at the chemical industry, would have sufficed to render Germany defenceless. Further targets of the same kind were to be found in the ball bearing industry and in power stations. In the armament and war

production industries the conduct of the workers could be measured in terms of output which right up to the end of the war did not diminish; despite all the raids the production figures improved. Moreover the will to rebuild the factories remained unimpaired right to the end. Neither of these results could be achieved by means of compulsion but only by virtue of the voluntary response of the German workers. In the Luftwaffe the shortage of liquid fuel became insupportable as from Sept. 1944 onwards, since as from that date the allocation was cut down to 30,000 tons a month, whereas the monthly requirements amounted to between 160,00 to 180,000 tons. Attacks on synthetic oil plants by night were more effective than those carried out by day. Until the last stages it had been possible to start a plant up again within about 6 or 8 weeks of an attack owing to the very efficient repair measures. Armament products would have been materially weakened over a period of two months and would have been brought to a complete standstill at the end of about 4 months if (1) all ball-bearing plants had been attacked at one and the same time, (2) the attacks had been repeated 3 or 4 times at intervals of 14 days (3) each attempt at reconstruction had been attacked every 8 weeks by two consecutive heavy raids, and if the execution of this total bombing policy had been continued for 6 months. Bomb plots are deceptive and should be disregarded in a policy of this kind. The manufacture of U-boats would have been stopped if we had concentrated on the electrical industry which supplied the motors and the factories manufacturing batteries.

The largest of these factories at Hanover remained intact. If it had been destroyed construction on U-boats would have been abandoned 4 weeks later.

Speer states that an attack on electric power stations if on a sufficiently comprehensive scale, would have had devastating effects. The failure of 60% of the total electric power production would have sufficed, and is the most effective means of bringing the whole of industry and public life immediately to a standstill. This and the gas industry are the only spheres where it is impossible to create reserves and build up stocks between the producer and the consumer which can postpone the effects of bombing for several months.

As a result of the breaching of the Mohne Dam the Ruhr Valley was flooded and the fresh water pumping station in the Ruhr was put out of action by mud and silt. Despite this however adequate supplies of water were restored after a lapse of a week. The simultaneous destruction of the other Ruhr Valley dams would have resulted in a considerable drop in output in the Ruhr. For the year 1943-44 it is estimated that 1 million to 1½ millions people were employed in ARP and bomb damage repair work. Speer thinks that mixed bomb loads of H.E. and incendiaries were the most effective both from the point of view of destruction of property and morale.

According to a Jap BJ, the Jap Ambassador was informed on the 18th July that unless something definite could be said about the purpose of Prince Konoye's mission as a special envoy from the Emperor, it was not

possible for the Soviet Govt. to give a reply. To this the Japs have stated that Prince Konoye is to seek the good offices of the Soviet Govt. with a view to the war being brought to an end by their efforts, to set forth definite plans in this connection and at the same time to discuss the establishment and implementation of a co-operative relationship between the USSR and Japan as the basis of the latter's foreign policy both during and after the war.

An American citizen of German origin named Walter Henry John LOHRY has recently been arrested in the USA. LOHRY's father left him in Germany in 1924 for his education. In 1933 LOHRY joined the Hitler Jugend and in 1936 he returned to the USA where he is reported to have organized a Nazi Youth Centre in the New York area. In 1937 he enlisted in the U.S. Army and was sent to Hawaii, where he continued his pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic activities. He was given an honourable discharge from the Army in 1939 and proceeded to organize Hitler Youth movements on the American west coast. With the assistance of Frederick Kurt LUDWIG and in company with two others LOHRY left New York in July 1939 for Berlin on the understanding that he and his friends would offer their services to the G.I.S. In Feb. 1940 LOHRY returned to the USA where he told his father that he had been trained to work for the H.I.S. and that he was instructed in the use of secret ink, radio codes and the operation of short-wave radio equipment. He had to watch British shipping entering and leaving Philadelphia. He forced his father to acquiesce by saying that his aunt in Germany would be penalised in the event of his failure. He purchased a hallicrafter short-wave radio transmitter

with a wide range of frequencies. In April 1940 he was suspected of complicity in a burglary and his house was searched. He was found to be endeavouring to eat a torn-up card which he had pulled from his pocket. This card was a print of an enlargement from a micro-photograph of wireless cypher instructions. Also a plain-language code and instructions for the use of secret ink. In the house was found a mathematical slide rule which had been converted into a simple substitution cypher of a type familiar to us in early espionage cases. The New Jersey police released LOHRY apparently without comment as he was not connected with the burglary case. LOHRY was then employed by the Arundel Corporation which was constructing an American Naval Base at San Juan in Porto Rico. While there he was found on one occasion to be leaving the works in possession of a detailed blue-print of the dry dock area and railway communications. He was ^{detained} as his explanation of the legitimate interest was accepted. In Jan. 1943 he was automatically drafted into the US Armed Forces. It is said that he announced his intention at this time of deserting and passing his information to the enemy. On November 28th 1944 he was interviewed, apparently for the first time, by the FBI when he denied then whole of the above story but nevertheless committed himself. The father when interrogated confirmed many of the details.

According to statements by General Blumentritt and a Naval Captain Assmann, Rundstedt was concerned essentially with an assault in the area of O.B. West. They supposed that the main point of contact would be at the Strait of Dover, aiming at both sides of Calais. The points in favour of this supposition

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were (1) that it was the shortest sea route to the continent; (2) here were the main areas in which the Germans had their V.1 and V.2 sites; (3) the shortness of the crossing facilitated the provision of air support and supplies; (4) after a successful landing a quick advance by armoured formations could drive along the shortest route to the German frontier and threaten the Ruhr. It was however clear to the Germans before D day that another landing in Normandy would take place, and possibly also one in Brittany. There was no information about the precise spot for Normandy. Some attempt at deception was carried out, the purpose being to show that the west wall was far stronger than it actually was. This was done in the form of maps and reports passed through agents in Paris and Switzerland. Similar attempts were made to lead the allies to believe that there were more divisions in France or more coming than was actually the case. There were not even sufficient troops to meet an attack in strength in both Normandy and the Pas de Calais. The Germans therefore had difficulty in the disposal of their reserves, if it were necessary to send them to both fronts. Rommel fought for the principle of having the bulk of the mobile reserves close to the threatened coastal areas so that they could be thrown into the battle at once. Von Geyr (ex-M.A.London) was of the opinion that the mass of operational reserves should be kept in the area of Paris. This was proved later to be unsound for the advantage of mobility was lost due to the state of the railways. It was known, according to these P/Ws, during the first weeks of the invasion that another Anglo-American Army Group was held in readiness in S.E. England. P/W states that 14 days after D day he and

Rundstedt no longer reckoned with a second landing near Calais because, according to their appreciation, the British and American had no need to take this risk once the landing on Normandy had proved successful and they were of the opinion that all available troops should be moved into Normandy. This was not approved by the OKW who were still afraid that the main operations would be in the Calais area. The above is of course further proof of the efficacy of the Garbo-Brutus deception plan. P/W states that information about England was extremely scanty. On the evening of the 5th June there was an important announcement to the Resistance Movements from which the Germans realised that immediate danger threatened. Owing to this announcement Alert Stage 2 was given in the 15th Army area between 8-10 pm. The Army, Navy and Air Force "Y" Services produced better results about the Army and Air Force units but could not follow their movements sufficiently clearly to draw any definite conclusions. P/W did not know anything about the Dfing of formations as this was not within his sphere. The bombing of the bridges over the Seine between Paris and Rouen and the bridges over the Loire between Orleans and the river mouth signified to the Germans that the area of Normandy and Brittany was being isolated. Travel bans were fairly quickly known. They were partly regarded as deceptive measures, above all the diplomatic ban. News of the renewed diplomatic traffic between England and Sweden caused some interest as it was thought that this indicated the conclusion of allied invasion preparations. This may refer to the proposal that the air line should be reopened.

According to P/W the proportion of Allied front line planes to German planes was 20-1. Later the proportion increased in favour of the Allies to 30-1. Recce flying became impossible.

The visit of F-M.Montgomery to the Mediterranean early in 1944 was regarded as a deceptive measure. It was also thought that Monty wished to keep in touch with divisions to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean area to UK.

On the third day of the attack the Germans captured the whole plans of an American Corps giving the targets to be reached by the allies on certain days.

The German estimate of divisions in this country prior to D-day was about 70. A diversionary attack against Norway was considered a possibility.

The German failure in the west was considered to be due to (a) too rigid a defence, (b) complete allied air superiority, (c) destruction of railways and bridges (d) allied superiority in material, training and mobility and (e) lack of proper operational direction. No freedom of action was given to O.B. West after the landings had been successful. (f) too much reliance on the Atlantic Wall and no substantial defence in depth.

3rd August

The DG summoned me and Harry Allen to discuss our representation on the Joint Scientific Intelligence Committee. It was agreed that a letter should be written pointing out our interests and suggesting that we should have a seat on the committee. It was also agreed that Victor could fill this job very efficiently.

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Vesey talked to me about accommodation for the LRC personnel. When Baxter goes he would have to waste his time kicking his hee at the LRC. I am trying to see if it is not possible to fit the LRC stair into SJ. Malcolm Cumming finds it convenient to keep them where they are as a lever against the Office of Works, from whom he is trying to get accommodation for the transfer of Blenheim.

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Buster is a little worried about the interrogation of SCHELLENBERG at 020. There have been so many changes owing to the approaching transfer of 020 overseas on Aug.15th that the interrogation has not been very productive and questions put by the War Room have not been answered. Buster has taken this up with Stimson in Tin-Eye's absence on embarkation leave.

Harker tells me that the Jugoslavs want to give us all decorations. The difficulty is that as from June 9th Tito has cancelled all previous orders and announced a series of new ones. It is doubtful therefore whether the King's orders are still valid. In any case, as the DG put it, the whole business in relation to its importance to us is not worth the time and trouble caused by the correspondence it entails. Personally I am not aware of having done anything for the Jugoslavs. I should not be surprised if the whole thing were not inspired by Tricycle. It may be too that the Jugoslavs hope for reciprocal treatment.

I saw Maxwell about Tricycle's naturalisation. He is prepared to exercise in Tricycle's favour a clause which waives the statutory period for those who have done good work in the service of the Crown. He cannot however consider the application until naturalisation is re-opened as a whole in about 6 months time.

Roland Bird tells me that the question of getting Germans out of Spain is rather hanging fire and may need a rocket from C. to the FO who do not appear to have done anything.

I spoke to Haylor about Wibroe. He said that he wanted him for a G.2 job in Oslo connected with security and involving liaison with the Germans and Norwegians. He did not think the job would last more than 2-3 months at the outside. I said I would speak again to Wibroe and let him know the result.

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I had a long talk with Clayton about the future of O.C. I have asked him to get out a memo showing what on present evidence our future organisation should be. He should also state the number of officers required. I regard as firm the commitments in the Caribbean, Malta, Gib., Rangoon, Singapore, Egypt, East Africa covering West and South, Aden, and possibly Cyprus, Ceylon and HongKong. It seemed to me that there was no particular point in waiting for the result of the Findlater Stewart enquiry. If we could get a DSO scheme approved by the C.O. we could then go to the Treasury. This would enable us to make firm offers to people like Kirby-Green. I told Clayton that I doubted the advisability of having other than a purely A.Branch administration officer to deal with colonial matters. If we had an O.C. on the lines envisaged by Ede it would I think have to work on the basis of limited knowledge, which would be unsatisfactory, or ultimately absorb most of the office. It seemed to me that we should have an intelligence section to deal with the Caribbean area, with the Mid East, Far East and African areas and that the produce of DSO points should be fed into these sections. By and large I think Clayton agreed with this. He understood that it was essential that the person responsible for the area should know his DSOs and all the people with whom they had to deal in their area, and that this work could not be divorced from the purely intelligence product.

We have received a paper from the J.I.C. with proposals that German scientists and technologists should be allowed to establish themselves here with their wives and families under certain safeguards. It is felt that

since we are some 3 years behind the Germans in certain developments, the security risk of bedding down Germans in our armament industry should be taken. The argument is that we have little fear from Germany in the future and that she will not have the opportunity of benefitting from any information that these scientists might ultimately carry to their own country. This view I think postulates a good deal. I would say that it was by no means certain that Germany would not have a government of her own within the next two years and that she would not have opportunities of manufacturing armaments either in her own country or abroad. There is also the possibility that she might come into the Russian orbit. Apart from this it is quite illusory to think that the German scientists can work here in vacuo and that if as is proposed they should on occasion be placed in touch with industrial firms they will not get to know everything about our armament development, both now and in the future. A knowledge of our armament programme for the next 5 years is perhaps of more value to an enemy than anything else. It is equally an illusion to make distinctions between Nazis and Germans. Germans abroad are not fundamentally loyal to the country in which they reside and they do not become assimilated until the 3rd or 4th generation.

August 5th

JIC paper of 31.7.45 states that the Soviet Govt. had refused at Potsdam to relax their demands for bases in the Straits and it is even suggested that they will claim the four Aegean islands guarding the approach to the Dardanelles. They continue to put forward

their claim to the two provinces of Kaz and Ardahan in N.E. Turkey. This attitude, combined with continued press and radio criticism of Turkish pro-Fascists etc. suggests that the Soviet Govt. ultimate aim may well be to bring Turkey, like Russia's other neighbours, within the Soviet orbit.

Meanwhile Yugoslavia's press and radio attacks against Greece and in particular against Greek treatment of the Slav minority in Greek Macedonia have recently increased in violence. Bulgaria, Roumania, and Albania have now joined in with similar attacks on Greece and this gives the impression that the concerted campaign is under the direction of Moscow. The Yugoslavs accuse the Greeks of having been responsible for frontier incidents and shooting on the Yugoslav-Greek frontier. Even if the incidents have in fact taken place, they were of minor importance though the danger exists of more serious clashes at any moment. The Yugoslavs have sufficient forces in the area to invade Greece along her northern frontiers and to seize Salonika. The Russians have forces in Bulgaria estimated at 15-18 divisions, and the Bulgarians about 17 divisions. They could easily seize Greek Thrace and eastern Macedonia. Moreover a considerable number of Russian troops have been reported in Bulgaria along the southern frontier. It is doubtful whether Yugoslavia or Bulgaria would undertake an act of aggression without Russian encouragement. The problem therefore is mainly one of Russian intentions. It may well suit Russia's book at some given moment to encourage Yugoslav and Bulgarian aspirations to the Aegean coast either separately or as a ~~striking~~ supporting action coinciding

with Russian military operations from Bulgaria against Turkey and Turkish Thrace. It is not thought that any such action is imminent.

UNVERSAFT, who has been a prominent member of the Abwehr since 1940 has under interrogation admitted that he was concerned with the despatch from Brussels of no less than 16 agents to this country. He states that the only two successful agents whom he ran were Neukemans and Fanto. The latter was a D.A. The former was hanged after he had spent 6 months sending out fabricated and worthless information in secret writing from this country.

Hugo BLEICHER @ VERBECK is producing valuable information, particularly with regard to the penetration of SOE and SIS networks. Through KIEFER @ KIKI he penetrated the Walzenti or Brutus organisation and subsequently used Victoire in rounding up all the members. He then used Victoire to control the SOE agent Lucas. He arranged that they should both come to this country, the idea being that Lucas would receive instructions to unite all important resistance activities in France and that BLEICHER would then through Victoire uncover all the organisations. This plan came to light when Lucas and Victoire were in England and in fact Lucas returned secretly to France while efforts were being made by false W/T traffic to persuade the Germans that he will still taking part in discussions in England. This was successful but Lucas was subsequently betrayed by one of his assistants. Subsequently BLEICHER completely penetrated another large SOE organisation and by turning round an agent continued to run it for some time and

even to satisfy Doddington who himself paid a visit to France. This visit was deliberately facilitated by BLEICHER who was able to persuade his superiors that it was wiser to permit the SOE officer to return to England thinking his organisation was in order, than to arrest him and bring the organisation to an end. Under the alias of Col. Henri, BLEICHER suggested to members of this SOE group that he himself should be brought to England. It is not as yet clear whether this was an attempt on his own part to get favourable terms with the British, who he believed would win the war, or whether it was a bold penetration move authorised by BLEICHER's superior officers. BLEICHER also ran with similar success at least 2 W/T agents for SIS who were arrested in 1943.

The Japs have opened tentative peace negotiations through their representatives on the Bank of International Settlements at Berne, the Swedish Adviser to the Bank, and Dulles, said to be a representative of the US President in the capacity of special adviser to the American Legation. The Japs are pressing for some guarantee for the safety of the Japanese Imperial family and the national structure. The Americans are still sticking to unconditional surrender but are throwing out hints that this would not necessarily imply the removal of the Japanese Imperial family or the national structure.

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SCHELLENBERG's interrogation has been of very considerable interest, largely due to the fact that nobody dared speak of post-war intelligence or underground movements. Nothing of a practical nature was done. No word was said about the possibility of contact with foreign countries, the real centre of gravity of secret service work. Schellenberg is of the firm opinion that apart from measures for the evacuation, which by then had degenerated into flight, nothing systematic has been done for post-war work. In neutral countries there exist Meldekopie provided with money and technical equipment. A condition was however that the central office in the Reich should function. The Abwehr, particularly in the pre-war years had close connections on a personal basis with prominent German firms. Schellenberg had intended the systematic penetration of these firms but the war ended too soon. When he took over from the Abwehr he found that there was no deception policy for the whole Reich. Everything was being done on an ad hoc basis. He had just begun to set up a special department for overall deception but

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he never really got going. The different departments showed little enthusiasm for co-operation as they were very reluctant to offer and release their high-grade communications for the purposes of deception

In Yugoslavia the German Minister Dr. Neubacher intended to provide arms for about 40,000 volunteers of Mihailovic in order to win the movement over to Germany and to use it as a fighting unit against Russia and Tito. This plan failed owing to the strong resistance of the Wehrmacht which had no confidence in Mihailovic and his organisation, though it was increasingly inclined to trust to information that Mihailovic was pursuing not so much a pro-communist as a pro-British policy. As regards Russian espionage Schellenberg mentions the Rotekappelle. This was the name of a wide-spread Russian organisation for espionage working in Berlin from the end of 1942. to the middle of 1943. Some high German officers and officials occupying important positions were involved in it. A Major on the General Staff of the Luftwaffe called Schultzer-Boysen was the principal figure. There were others in the Air Ministry, the Economic ministry and the F.O. One Semenov in the Russian Legation in Stockholm was concerned in putting over deception material under the direction of a central office in Moscow. This was eventually discovered by W/T monitoring by Amt 6 specialists at Wannsee Institute. There were two Hungarian agents called Lobmeyer and Eltze working under diplomatic cover who were in W/T contact with London. (Source Nero). Many reports were received from the Spanish SS and FO including all the Duke of Alba's despatches. Schellenberg always suspected Mueller, head of Amt. 4, of being a Russian agent and spoke about it

with Himmler who did not trust Mueller. Schellenberg thinks that in the end Mueller went over to the Russians. He also believes that many members of Amt.4 were prepared to do the same. This is interesting in view of what Bartik told me about the head of the Gestapo in Prague. Ostro was regarded as the best agent in military intelligence in Portugal and according to Schellenberg had a group of from 10-12 men working under him in London. (Our assumption was that all these people were notional). Schellenberg however maintains that he could inform us how much of Ostro's reports were invention and how much was allied deception. He himself had great doubts but the Army backed Ostro. Johnnie Jebson was kidnapped at the Portuguese-Spanish frontier. Hansen had given the order. He was taken away in a trunk by Kubarth and another officer. Schroeder in Lisbon aided and abetted the scheme. Jebson fell under suspicion because he sent conflicting reports to different departments, amongst them Amt.4. He was handed over to Mueller and was accused of working for Britain. Schellenberg does not know his fate.

A Polish General Staff Colonel who worked in W/T first from N.Africa and then from de Gaulle's headquarters in Versailles, was an agent of the Germans. He is said to have transmitted a good report about the impending invasion of Europe.

O'Ryan in Berlin helped Schellenberg in parachuting two Irishmen over Ireland. Ribbentrop and Veesemeyer who were just preparing a revolt in Ireland, were furious owing to this interference with their plans. (We have no evidence of the preparation of a revolt).

The head of the Turkish Intelligence Service, Naci Perkel, collaborated with the Germans in running agents across the Caucasus into Russia; through the interception of Turkish telegrams the Germans learned that the Russians had protested to the Turks about these activities. Schellenberg alleges that in the middle of 1944 two men were sent by Mil.D (sabotage) to S.Africa. They each received \$5,000. Both were Germans and had lived in S.Africa before. Their task was to sabotage ships. They set out from Spain.

The British Soldatensender West was very successfully directed and had a most demoralising effect at the end of the struggle on German civilians and soldiers alike. The famous Richard KLATT who was in charge of the Sofia Meldekopf was never wholly trusted. It was found that he got his intelligence from a Slovak lawyer and Prince Turkul. The latter had a White Russian line to Moscow. Schellenberg asserts that he a contact inside the British Embassy in Madrid. He has the highest admiration for the British Intelligence Service but clearly knows absolutely nothing about it.

August 8th

I discussed with Harry Allen the Dudley Clarke proposal that we should not only publish some official document about our deception during the war but also put out a film on the subject. Dudley Clarke argues that a good deal is already known about deception and DAS and that the truth will leak out and that it is therefore much better to get the credit for what we have done by ~~xxxxxx~~ issuing some official publication. To my mind this

is no argument. People will never know what is true and what is fiction. If however the official government seal is put upon publication the document will go into the archives of War Ministries and Intelligence Depts. everywhere, to be pulled out at the appropriate moment. The running of DAS is as important in peace as in war. Even if the practice is known, the less said about it the better. We do not want the Germans to rate us too high in intelligence matters. The more stupid they think we are the easier will be our task in dealing with them and other countries. For this and other reasons we shall strongly oppose Dudley Clarke's suggestion.

I had a talk with Roger ^{to him} about the dividing of F. Division between Russian and German blocks. He seemed to think the scheme was a good one.

I had a talk with Leggett of the LRC, who has been in Potsdam interpreting for the PM in his conversations with Russians and Poles. He seemed to think that the Poles had put forward a fair case for the occupation of Germany up to the Neisse. They say that even with this territory they will still be about 20% short and will have to reorientate their whole economy. Ethnographically they claim that there are a large number of Poles in the area and only about 1 1/2 million Germans. A large number of Germans have of course already gone and will probably not be permitted to return. The Russians evidently intend to run their zone as a separate unit imposing their own administration without any regard to ourselves. No final decision seems to have been reached on this matter. The Russians are stripping the country and conscripting labour from the younger men,

requisitioning whatever they want, and leaving the rest to the quasi-communist German regime. Leggett thinks that they may well decide to stay in Germany permanently. There are still 3 million people in Berlin out of a population of 4½ million and house and food problems during this winter are likely to be appalling. Leggett is quite determined to take the F.O. exam. If he fails however he might like to consider a job here. Meanwhile he would like to go to the Control Commission either to the Economic Dept. or to C.I.

I had a word with Joe Archer about the proposal to bring German scientists and technologists to this country. He thinks it important that they should be confined to research and development and not allowed to stray into the field of design, which would inevitably lead them into contact with industrial firms where they would learn our future programme.

The DG has agreed to my getting Scherr back to take over the contacts in B.I.G. Meanwhile there is a drive to get Kirby-Green to run the International Police in Tangier. This is being resisted. Kirby-Green does not want to do the job and cannot be spared from GIB at the moment. Ultimately he would like to be DSO Caribbean.

Hughes talked to me about the laxity of the Post Office in prosecuting people who use wireless without a licence. In 9 cases out of 10 they condone the offence by giving the man a licence in order to regularise his position. I have suggested to Hughes that he should get out a memo on the subject

which we will either discuss with the GPO or put before the Security Executive.

The first atomic bomb fell yesterday morning at 1 am on Hirshima. As yet there is no reliable estimate of the damage. It is said however that tests carried out in New Mexico resulted in two men being knocked over at a distance of 6 miles. The bomb is 400 lbs. and is said to have the same explosive value as 20,000 tons of TNT.

I have just been reading a report based on the evidence of Huntermann and Giskes from what is known as the Nordpol affair. Under the cover name of Nordpol 3F of the Abwehr obtained almost complete control of SOE's activities from Sept. 1941 to August 1943. As a result of this a very large number of agents were parachuted straight into their hands, when they were turned round or some plausible excuse made for their liquidation. It was only when two agents known as Sprout and Chive succeeded in escaping in 1943 that SOE really tumbled to what was going on. When we previously looked into this case on their behalf we came to the conclusion that they ought to have wound it up at least 6 months after it began on the evidence that was available to them at that time. It is interesting to see that the Germans had the same difficulties in faking sabotage as we did ourselves. They finally gave it up when they adopted the policy of taking hostages when an act of sabotage occurred. Even the Germans' conscience seems to have rebelled against taking hostages for acts which they had committed themselves, and failure to do so would of course have made it clear what was going on. They finally made up their minds that there was no organisation controlled from London about

which they did not know which might bother them so they confined themselves to reporting any real acts of sabotage and many imaginary ones to SOe, who expressed themselves as being thoroughly pleased with the results. Many of these reports presumably appeared in Sitreps. (The Germans also penetrated SIg to some extent by allowing to remain at large two of their agents, called Apollo and Brutus (Not our Brutus). Brutus was finally arrested but Apollo was allowed to think that he had got away with it. In Dec. 1943 or Jan. 1944 he was allowed to go back to England in order that he might inspire confidence.) 3F arranged for a careful watch to be kept upon the Wireless Signals of aircraft operating from the station whence agents were despatched. They knew almost invariably when an agent was coming because there was always a trial flight during the afternoon. Like ourselves, the Germans scrutinised carefully the tracks of all low-flying aircraft.

August 8th

I attended a meeting of the JIC at which the paper on German scientists was discussed. Generally speaking our compromise suggestion was accepted, namely that the scientists should come here for a limited period during which British scientists would be working alongside them. The idea would be that they should absorb their ideas and when the Germans had been sucked dry we should eliminate them from the picture. We also suggested that the Germans should be kept out of design and not permitted to visit factories where they would get access not only to the work that is being done but to our future programme. It was suggested

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that the whole position should be reviewed again in a month's time. I was asked to communicate with the H.O. and obtain their views.

We also discussed the telegram to Mid East regarding the taking over of certain functions of CICI by SIS. F.O. are apparently apprehensive about CICI leaving 4 officers behind in Teheran after our troops have withdrawn. They think this may be regarded as evidence of bad faith although they admit that the Russians are certain to leave people behind in one guise or another. The matter has therefore been left for discussion between the Ambassador and GOC Paiforce who will be badly placed as regards information if CICI has to close down in Teheran.

Stopford came in to say goodbye. He will be available if required. His Swedish contacts will be maintained through Miss Glass and the general direction of the section will come under B.1B.

Grogan came to tell me that there is a move owing to representations made by Brazil and China for the restoration of the privilege previously granted to consuls to communicate in cypher with their Ambassador or with their Govt. direct. The FO are afraid that if we do not give these facilities the Chinese will refuse them to our consuls in China. This would be a very serious handicap, owing to the enormous distances involved. Chinese consuls here are at Liverpool, and Glasgow, and since their cyphers are probably extremely insecure the Admiralty may not

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be very anxious to have them in a position where they can report the movements of ships. I suggested that this matter should be dealt with other than through Censorship channels.

Milmo came to talk about his successor. He thinks that Martin Forrest should take over his section and the duties of B.I.W. I am arranging this with TAR.

I went to see Newsam about the German scientists. He began by saying that the HO could not express views to the Chiefs of Staff and they could only talk through the Home Secretary at a Cabinet Meeting. I pointed out that this was not likely to be very effective and that it would be far better if the HO views went forward in consolidated form to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. I suggested therefore that Newsam should come to the next meeting of the JIC which he agreed to do. I have so informed King-Salter.

Serpell of F.Division has made an interesting discovery with regard to Mrs. de PFEIFFER about whom we had a certain amount of trouble. She was employed in PID and had had access to B.J.s. She wanted to rejoin her Spanish husband of German origin in Spain who had been threatening divorce if she did not return. It now seems that through one Mervyn BELL in PID she was placed in contact with Claud COCKBURN who asked her to collect information for him on her return to Spain.

It has further transpired that Mrs. de PFEIFFER's sister, Miss Paul, married

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J.H. Williams, who has a long history in the underground movement of the CP and is closely associated with Reginald Bowles. Mrs. de Pfeiffer has in fact been staying with the Williams's for some time. I do not think all this could have affected the decision that Mrs de Pfeiffer should go back to her husband, but SIS are being informed.

August 9th

I met Arnold-Forster at the club last night. He told me a lot about the history of the atomic bomb. Although our scientists had made considerable progress up to 1940 there was a wide gap between the theoretical possibility of making a bomb and the practical application of what had been discovered. It was due to Akers of ICI and some of his subordinates that an entirely new line of approach to this problem was discovered. At this stage the PM arranged with the President that owing to the dangers of continuing operations in this country, future researches on a combined basis should be carried out in the USA and that British scientists should go over for this purpose. He also renounced all future rights in the military or civil application of the atomic theory. Later Niels BOR the Danish scientists considered to be one of the most knowledgeable of those concerned with atomic research was got out of Denmark and went to the USA. About a year later he returned with a message from the President to Winston saying virtually that he (the President) was prepared to tear up the previous agreement, the validity of which in any case seemed doubtful, and substitute it by something on a 50-50 basis. The PM for some unexplained reason was reluctant to receive BOR. However efforts were made

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to get him to change his mind and Prof. Dale went so far as to say that he would blow the whole business if in a matter which affected scientific development throughout the world the PM persisted in maintaining his attitude. Ultimately the PM was persuaded to accept the message from EON and agreement was subsequently reached with the President. Meanwhile we and the Americans have concentrated on buying up all the stocks of uranium on which we could lay our hands. There were apparently certain stocks in Austria for which we made a bee-line when the Germans collapsed. We got this stock and also all the leading scientists and their papers. 12 of them have been brought over here. Prof. Darwin thinks that all, with the exception of one, have extremely valuable contributions to make. Probably if the Germans had been able to make the jump that was made by ICI they might have produced the bomb in a far shorter period than the USA. The real important factor in the whole matter was the new approach to the subject discovered by ICI. Other stocks of uranium are in Canada and in the Belgian Congo. There are also certain mines in the Urals, but nobody is very clear as to what they are capable of producing, or in fact how far the Russians have got with the whole proposition. About 18 months or 2 years ago the question arose of bringing the Russians into the whole scheme. There was a good deal of argument for and against, and finally it was decided against, and the first that the Russians knew about the successful development of the atomic bomb was at Potsdam, where they were told that one of the bombs would shortly be dropped on the Japs. They had in fact, prior to this, agreed to come into the war against Japan,

which they did last night, on the somewhat cynical grounds that the "aps had refused to respond to the Anglo-American ultimatum. It is doubtful whether even if they were given the results of our experiments, the Russians could get into production in 2-3 years. During that period therefore we should have the whip hand if we cared to use it but clearly we shall not do so.

Arnold Forster said that he was rather disappointed by the Labour Govt's performance at Potsdam. They had talked a lot about the Atlantic Charter and apparently had very strong views about the suggested Polish western frontier. They did not raise their voices beyond saying that they would not give de jure Recognition to the new Poland until the Peace Conference.

I gather that an offer has been made to Sinclair the present DMI to take over as second in command to C. I had in fact already heard this from another source. A.F. does not I think feel very sanguine about this appointment, particularly since C. has asked him to stay on in order to deal with the policy side of the office. He does not quite see how his position is going to fit in with that of Sinclair who would be C's Deputy. He wonders whether he will be able to make his influence felt. Although he has a good business to go back to he is attracted by the work of SIS and is evidently rather anxious to stay on. He told me about Findlater having interviewed C's people abroad. I said I thought that probably what happened was that Findlater met them in some mess and was introduced to them by our officers. It would have been rather unnatural if he had not asked them about the work they were doing. I thought

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it would be a pity if this were misinterpreted as trying to pull a fast one over SIS, tactics which were quite out of the question in a man like Findlater.

Cecil had a long talk with C. who was also in the club and curiously enough had no idea who Findlater was. He did not know that he was head of the Home Defence Executive or indeed what the Home Defence Executive was nor did he realise that Findlater sat on Chiefs of Staff Committees and attended Cabinet meetings when proposals affecting his work were raised.

I saw Leggett and told him that he had the opportunity of taking what would probably be a G.2 job with C.I. on the Control Commission as liaison officer with the Russians, or going to the Economic Branch of the Commission as a G.3. He prefers to take the CI job.

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I spent the afternoon at Barnet. M.E. showed me over his excellent general search dept. Hd is aiming at having a complete library in which will be recorded by countries the various types of traffic on the air. The record will give the times, frequencies, stations and peculiarities. In this way it will be possible to monitor at a moment's notice. His methods of indexing are very elaborate and provide at least 4 or 5 chances

of identifying any particular message picked up. He tells me that B-P have now set up a dept. on similar lines but of course with considerably less experience. This is a clear waste of time, money and man-power.

While I was there Maltby rang through to say that that Findlater Stewart was coming down to RSS next Wednesday. The whole circus was going down with him and the line was to put the emphasis on mobile units. I do not know on whose instructions this order was given but it is obviously an extremely stupid one. F.S. already knows about the work of RSS and will ask many pertinent questions. He will not be impressed if he observes any attempt to cover up.

Hollis showed me the Mussolini-Grandi correspondence discovered in Italy. It made it perfectly clear that Mosley was being subsidised to the tune of £60,000 a year. It also deals with the period when Rothermere came out for Fascism. He had apparently been won over to a large extent by Ward Price after the latter had had an interview with Mussolini. The association between Rothermere and Mosley did not however last very long. His first quarrel was over the organisation being named British Union of Fascists. He wanted them to be called British Blackshirts. Grandi in one of his letters gives a description of life in this country and his estimate of the decadence of the British race. He concludes by saying how stupid we are in the light of all the developments of modern warfare to place any reliance on the English Channel. It would do him a world of good if he were told to learn his letter by heart and recite it 6 times a day. Little did he anticipate that nothing less than the channel saved us from destruction in 1940.

August 10th

I have asked Jim Hale to take up the case of Emma LINDHORST with the H.O.

I attended a meeting at the FO with Howard in the chair at which Viv., A-F, Rex Leeper and Bromley were also present. It was to discuss the proposal that we should assist Greece in setting up a Central Information Service to deal with foreign intelligence and home security. I had pointed out that the Greeks had so far asked more for advice than an adviser and that with all the political complications it might be better to deal with the question on an ad hoc basis. We could then feel our way to some more permanent liaison. This was generally agreed and Viv. is to go out with Leeper at the beginning of Sept. for a preliminary discussion in order to ascertain precisely what is required. I gather that there is a move to get the Greek PM over here at the time of the first inter-allied conference in order to show the Russians that the present Govt. intends to pursue the same policy towards Greece as the previous one. We evidently intend to retain our hold on Greece and to see that it does not come within the Russian orbit.

At the 12 o'clock meeting Cecil mentioned two individuals, COOK and CREAM, who according to a report from the field were trained in sabotage activities by Groening, the same man who trained Zigzag. It is not known what their mission was. They returned to the Channel Islands in 1943 possibly to report something about them from some of the characters in Ast Nantes who have passed

through our hands. Meanwhile they are to be prevented from leaving the island.

Brook-Booth came in to see me. He said that as far as he could gather Findlater's visit had been a great success. He expressed himself as being thoroughly satisfied and as having learned all that he wanted to know. During the conversation SIS came up and Brook-Booth very properly suggested that Findlater should see some of their local representatives. He actually saw Harmer and Harmer had asked that [] should be present as he himself was an ex-MI5 officer. A report had been sent to C. on the interview and C. had protested to Findlater.

The position as regards the King in Belgium is to remain in abeyance. The real case against him is connected with his visit to Berchtesgarden. Brook-Booth went with Van Achere to see Schmidt, Hitler's interpreter who was present at the interview. The King's sister had urged her brother to collaborate fully with the Germans and he ultimately had agreed to do so although he had never put his signature to an document. This collaboration included the ceding of Antwerp to Germany and also Eupen-Malmédy. In return for this the Belgians were to have Dunkirk and Lille. The King had asked as a condition that all Belgians deported should be returned to their country. Hitler had flown into a temper and the meeting had broken off without any fixed agreement being signed. The Flemish Catholics support the King as they feel not without reason that the Socialists and Communists, are trying to get rid of the monarchy altogether. If the King were to abdicate this might very well come about. The

ultimate solution may well be that a Regent will continue for the next 5 years until Prince Baudouin can succeed, on the King's abdication. If the King were to return now there would undoubtedly be civil war. A plebiscite would probably result in a 50-50 vote. De Ganzhof is on the side of the King, who has on several occasions been very near to abdication. He apparently agrees to abdicate in the evening but reverses his decision on the following morning.

There is to be a meeting this afternoon on contraband control at MEW. The idea is to cease control in Gib. the W. Indies etc., and we are opposed to this until we have got the GIS remnants in neutral countries back into Germany. As luck would have it an agent of the GIS who was at one time destined for the USA was on his way to the Argentine and was picked up at Trinidad today. He was identified by a member of the FSP. This will considerably strengthen our case.

Baxter came in to say goodbye today. He will be a great loss to us, although the LRC is now reduced to very small proportions.

Kellar is having long conversations with Gort who apparently likes his new Minister. He says that like himself he is not an intellectual and that they therefore get on well.

Crean came to say goodbye. He is on his way back to Canada and hopes to get into External Affairs. He is still however open-minded and might be glad to join us.

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Thornton (Tremayne) came to see me about his future. He does not want to go back into the Pool and kick his heels. Brook-Booth may be able to find him a job as there is a chance of a G.I. vacancy on his staff.

Luke talked to me about Fanto who wishes to go back to Belgium and become a Belgian citizen. We have warned him that he may be in trouble with the Belgians but he seems quite confident. Brook-Booth on the other hand says that the Belgians take a poor view of him. We can only say that he has worked well since he came over to our side.

News of the Jap offer through the Swiss and Swedish Ministers to surrender on condition that the Imperial family was preserved came through on the 1 o'clock news.

August 11th

Dick Ellis came to see me in order to examine a report we had received from the War Room about documents of the Abwehr or Gestapo found at Bad Blankenberg. They related to various enquiries rather of a B.I. nature which have been carried out in pre-war years even before the Nazis came into power. They give the impression that forgeries were being planted on ourselves and on others by a number of Russians. Ellis said that he knew quite a number of the personalities. Without any training he had been thrown into Europe to try and build up an organisation. He had met these Russians in Berlin, Riga, Belgrade, Vienna and other cities. From some of them he had obtained useful information but he was aware that they were in certain cases making up documents and selling them to the highest bidder. He knew that the Germans were on

his tracks and he had to pull out after the revolution. By and large however he regarded the work as unprofitable.

August 13th

Dick came down to Tring on Sunday, when we had a long talk about the future of the office. He seems fairly satisfied that most people in SIS agree that overt liaison should be carried by ourselves on C.I. matters. I outlined to him the suggestion that in future the office should be divided into territorial blocs, the Russian bloc to include not only the Russian sphere of influence but also the CP and movements of the Left and the German bloc to include Fascists and movements of the Right. The other blocs should be I think a Mid East, a Far East, a Carribean and possibly an African bloc. O.C. would disappear, DSOs coming into the appropriate territorial bloc. This did not mean of course that any Russian activities in the Mid East would not be passed to the Russian section for information and consultation. Equally it would probably be necessary to maintain Anthony's section dealing with the Embassies and Legations on a technical basis. Dick seemed to agree that this was the best arrangement.

I talked to him about the CP and the differences of view about keeping a close watch on all Party members. We came to the conclusion that it would probably be necessary to continue this work on as detailed a basis as manpower would allow. Dick himself has recently been faced with a very difficult case. An officer or sergeant in the FSP who had been doing extremely good work and was very keen about his job

had been found to be a member of the C.P. Ramsbotham spoke very highly of him and wished to retain his services. Dick felt that this was a case in which he simply could not take the risk. There would obviously be a good many papers in the Control Commission which if they leaked might seriously jeopardise the relations with the Russians which he was trying to build up. He would have no guarantee that this officer when on leave would not report his activities to King St. He had therefore decided to transfer him elsewhere. Hollis had told me only a few days ago about a case of an SOE officer who had been given an important job in the Mid East against our advice, and had quite recently come back to this country and reported everything to the C.P. headquarters. He made it quite clear that he had succeeded in bluffing John Senter Maunsell and everyone else. From numerous cases that we have had it is fairly clear that whenever you try and take a liberal view about C.P. members you are invariably let down.

Dick wants Klop to do a tour of Germany in order to get the Stimmung and while there to have a talk with Hilger who should be able to give a great deal of interesting information on Russia from 1920 onwards.

Walker came to take to me about a broadcast that was to take place on the use of pigeons in war and counter-measures with hawks. It seems impossible to prevent this broadcast which is to take place at 4 pm today. While it will not do much harm it will certainly do no good.

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Luke came to talk to me about Mrs. Paulson, the widow of Paulsen who worked for B.1A. He has been looking after one of the B.1A houses in which Mrs. RUSER has been living. Mrs. RUSER is now going to stay with a relative and will go back to Spain as soon as her son can get her there. Meanwhile under agreement we have been looking after her. Mrs. Paulson on the other hand and her son cannot remain a permanent commitment. I have suggested to Luke therefore that he should have a talk with her and find out what her plans are for the future. She will have to leave the present B.1A house which we are giving up on the termination of the lease.

Lee tells me that the H.O. contemplate the total abolition of the exit permit not only for British subjects but for aliens as well. I said that as far as we were concerned the only danger spot would be Palestine after the termination of the Jap war. I have got Alec to wire out to Palestine in order to discover whether they have any entry permit system. The only other possible alternative would be to declare Palestine a military

area under the military permitsystem.

I saw Atkinson, who is leaving as assistant DSO Malta.

August 14th

I attended a meeting of the JIC to discuss Dudley-Clarke's paper on deception. Our view on this matter were accepted in toto. It was decided to compile two memos, one for the personal use of the Controller's successor and the other for the use of high-ranking staff officers only. There was no be no document issued to the Press and no documentary film.

Grogan rang up to say that there would be a Censoship meeting in a few days to discuss the winding up of Censorship. I said that I did not think we had anything to say. It would mean of course that allied censorship would cease and that in so far as Germany was concerned we should in future have to rely entirely on Censorship by the Control Commission for both inward and outward mails.

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I saw D.M.I. about the proposals for dealing with members of the Jewish Brigade who wish to take their leave in this country. We were prepared to accept any British subjects after reference in the case of Jews. Foreigners in the Brigade should however in our view take their leave on the continent. DMI was prepared to accept this arrangement provided it had the backing of the Colonial Office.

I spoke to Dick about a request that had come to us from M.I.1 for a GS01 to be employed with the British Mission in Holland. Dick said he already had a man called Rhodes earmarked for this job. He thought he would be an excellent candidate for a job similar to that of Brook-Booth, and that he would probably be prepared to stay on as MI5 representative in Holland if we were ultimately given the job of conducting overt liaison.

August 15th

Today and tomorrow are announced as V.J. days

Gort came in. He had seen findlater Stewart and given his views about the Security Service. He will undoubtedly have expressed his appreciation of Kellar's services but apart from this I do not think he is very sound about the organisation.

A propos of the Jewish Brigade we agreed that it might be of value if we could get some representatives from the Agency posted to the Brigade in order that they might keep us informed about terrorists.

I saw Bill Stephenson at Claridges. He had Gubbins with him. Gubbins was holding forth about the wonders of SOE. He said that they had not lost a single plane in any pick-up operation. I do not feel able to throw a spanner in the works. There was however the obvious answer, that the Germans allowed things to go on for their own purposes.

Bill told me that he had had a long talk with Findlater and that he had been very frank on the question of Section V. He said he would like to have a copy of the report or at any rate of his evidence. I said that I could not promise this as I did not know whether I should have a copy of the report myself. If I could get him a copy of his evidence I would do so. He then said that he thought that the DG ought to write him a letter, as he had had a very nice one from Herbert of Censorship. I undertook to mention this to the DG although I felt that any such letter would have to be very carefully worded as it would probably be waved in Hoover's face.

^{Blunt}
Anthony has returned from Germany and has brought with him Queen Victoria's letters to the Empress Frederick. They are only on loan.

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The interrogation of Herbert WICHMANN, at one time Einz Marine in Hamburg, has given us some interesting information. He first joined the Abwehr at the end of November 1934. He says that Canaris was displeased with the work done against England during the 2 years prior to 1939. In WICHMANN's view they had done practically nothing. Attempts that he made to get hold of members of British crews sailing to Hamburg were unavailing. A certain amount of information was apparently obtained from the publications "Rudder" "Yachting" and "The Navy" which were of interest to the construction dept. of the OKH. He refers to a Dutch art dealer named REICH who made 2 trips to England in 1938 to recruit agents but failed. The Germans apparently studied the papers very closely for the names of people wanting German business connections. For their internal communications in Holland they used newspaper kiosks which provided uncontrolled delivery for mails. Expressing his opinion on officers in the German Navy, WICHMANN says that the young ones are inclined towards Russia who they think will need them as they have few sailors at a moment when they would obviously expand their Navy. The older officers incline towards this country.

SCHELLENBERG's interrogation has been interesting. There is no doubt I think that partly owing to fear of being regarded as defeatist, no adequate stay-behind plans were made. Those that were made were very much on an ad hoc basis and have probably been broken up entirely through the work of C.I. Anything that emerges in the future will probably be largely new in conception. Not only were there no adequate plans for Germany but the same applied to the neutral countries. There exist however in Portugal, Spain and Sweden so-called I networks provided with money and technical equipment which were meant to come into action if relations with the country in question were severed or if an invasion took place. The primary condition was however that the Central office in the Reich would continue to function. The relations between the GIS and German industry were never on a very organised basis. Certain officers of the Abwehr had their own private connections. SCHELLENBERG had envisaged a systematic penetration of German industry with both the spirit and the flesh of his dream child the Geheime Meldedienst, which never in fact came into being. There is no doubt that firms like I.G. Farben had their own intelligence service but it was never systematically tapped or tied up with the Abwehr and SD. SCHELLENBERG likewise had big ideas about deception which never really took shape. There had been a good deal of local deception but it had never been highly centralised. SCHELLENBERG therefore in cooperation with the different General Staffs arranged for all reports concerning invasion to be entered graphically in special charts. He thought that by so doing he could recognise the planned work of the enemy's secret

services. At the same time he asked himself the obvious question "What was being done on the German side in the deception of the enemy?" The answer was disappointing. Neither on the political nor the military field, not to mention the economic, could any trace of deception be found. The fundamental cause was the absence of a Reich General Staff which worked on a global basis. The execution of SCHEELENBERG's plan was still completely in its infancy by the end of the war and the different departments showed little enthusiasm for co-operation, as they were very reluctant to offer and release their high grade connections for the purposes of deception. In Turkey SCHEELENBERG said considerable support was received from the Turkish Secret Service who supplied Caucasians, Georgians etc who were smuggled into Russia by the Germans through the Caucasus. This led to violent protests by the Russians through the Turks. Fritz Kremer in Sweden he believed had some men in England, mostly Swedes, who reported on the aircraft industry. (This may be a reference to the reports from CERVELL) which reached him through the Swedish General Staff.

August 16th

I had a talk with Ryan about the future of CICI and its officers.

August 17th

I talked to Milmo and Forrest. It was agreed that Forrest should take over Milmo's job until he was demobilised.

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we have been asked to supply DSO Hong Kong and are working on the idea of getting Alan Roger and Carstairs from CICI.

Miss Glass has written quite a good report on the Channel Islands for the Home Office. By and large the attitude of the local population to the Germans seems to have been quite lamentable.

M.E. talked to me about the visit of Findlater to RSS. G-P and Maitby were both there, and M.E. did not get much of a look-in. Neither did Findlater get a very clear view of what was going on. M.E. did however succeed in showing him his General Search section.

I saw C. at the club this evening. We talked about the future of SOE. He said that as a matter of policy he had not opposed their continuance, though he thought it could lead to nothing but trouble. I asked him about the future of RSS. He said that SLU would go to the FO who would be establishing wireless links with all their Embassies, while RSS would be absorbed in G.C. & C.S. and come under the Sigint Board. He knew that there was some research going on in GC & CS but was obviously misinformed about its extent and efficiency. I impressed upon him very strongly what an excellent fellow he had in M.E. He agreed with me in this and said that he was proposing to offer him the job of second in command of General Search. I doubted

whether this would be enough to retain his services. I said that I thought whoever ran General Search should have freedom of access to intelligence depts and I outlined to him precisely what our requirements were, namely (1) a knowledge of the intelligence network of potential enemies (2) the detection of illicit wireless from this country, (3) some sort of policing of the ether against leakage of our information services. Lastly we were interested in the breaking of certain services which had a bearing on security in this country. For all these reasons I felt that we ought to be represented on the Sigint Board. C. did not seem to be convinced about this, as he said that the Sigint Board did not assess priorities. However he will think it over.

August 18th

A character called MULACK has been reported on by one BISCHOFF of the Abwehr. MULACK was despatched to Canada in 1940. He is a naturalised Canadian of German origin. On arrival in Canada he told the RCMP he had been back to Germany to settle a claim against the German Govt. He was closely interrogated and owing to his past connections with the NSDAP in Canada was interned for the duration of the war. The police are now anxious to prosecute him if they get sufficient evidence.

Newsam rang up to ask whether we would agree to aliens who were on a visit or temporary visa being allowed to go out of the country without an exit permit. British subjects would have to have similar facilities. I said that as far as I could see there was no objection, but that I would have to consider the matter and pass the enquiry

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to Adam.

One Dr. Fritz KRANEBITTER has given some interesting information about the penetration of SOE and SIS in Italy during 1943 and onwards. There is no doubt that SOE in the Milan area was fairly well wide open

August 20th

Kellar has got Ryan to agree to release Ala Roger and Carstairs. SIS do not apparently require Roger's services. They are appointing someone entirely new, and provided there is an officer in CICI who can explain the network and any other information of value, that will be all that SIS will require.

Springborn of the LRC came in to see me. He has come back for a few days from Holland. He would like to continue working there but does not wish to sign on for another year if it means his transfer to another country. I told him that I would write to Dick and let him know the answer. His present work as interrogator at the Dutch Interrogation Centre, where he has two Dutch Captains under him, will come to an end in November when the camp will be handed over to the Dutch authorities.

I spoke to C. about the KLUGMAN case. He was extremely worried to hear that was involved since the latter is at present employed. I told him that he really ought to read the report himself. He promised to see that it reached him.

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I attended a meeting at the Admiralty where we discussed the abolition of Press and Censorship and the system of D.Notices which presumably have to come into force again. I pointed out all the inefficiencies and dangers of the system and said that I much preferred the Air Ministry method of telling the press what they could publish rather than what they could not. It seems however that it will be necessary to give the press some broad directive as to matters on which we should like discussion with them before publication.

Thornton rang up to say that the DPR had jibbed about the refusal to grant leave to this country to alien members of the Jewish Brigade. He thought there would be trouble if Palestinians were excluded. I explained to him that Palestinians were not legally British subjects though they were British-protected subjects. Most of the Brigade however consisted of aliens, Poles, Germans, Austrians etc. We thought that a division between British subjects, irrespective of the shape of their noses, and aliens, might very well be made. Thornton thought that making a distinction between Canadians and Palestinians might lead to trouble. He did not seem to realise that Canadians were British subjects, and when I told him that they were he asked me whether this was purely a war measure. He seemed astonished to hear that Canadians could not be refused entry to this country whereas citizens of the U K. could be refused entry to Canada.

We had a meeting in the DGs room to discuss the abolition of certain DRS. The only ones that we were seriously concerned about were SOA which we thought would have to go unless

unless it was supported by the Ministry of Food and BOT, and 88A and C. We did not think we could make a case for either of these. As regards 18E(a) we thought that this should remain until we had got rid of detainees from British Colonies held under this order. Thereafter any similar cases would have to be dealt with under the Aliens Order.

We had van Angeren, the General Secretary to the Dutch Minister of Justice, and van Moylan to dinner. Van Angeren was very full of cooperation in the future on a completely frank basis. He hinted that before the war a good deal had been going on in Holland and a great deal of money expended in the running of useless DAs. The Dutch knew the Germans better than we did and would have been only too glad to collaborate. Van Angeren seemed quite sincere although we had the impression that he might possibly have been hinting that cooperation with the Ministry of Justice might have been more profitable than with the military. This has a bearing on the suggested visit of Col. Einthoven on Dick's recommendation.

August 21st

I saw Merritt, who is suggested as candidate for asst. DSO Egypt. He seemed to me to have a pleasant personality and to be well qualified for the job. He has been an asst DSO in the Canal Zone for some time. He has a certain amount of money of his own and no commitments.

Cussen and I went to the meeting called by Admiral Thompson to discuss the abolition of Press and Censorship and the importance of indicating to the Press what we wished to keep secret. It was decided that each Service should issue a broad directive and that the old committee of P.U.S.s should be reconstituted.

Cayzer and Clayton discussed with me Clayton's memo about the future of our DSOs abroad. I said that before proceeding further we ought to arrive at some estimate of the cost of our DSO points and of the personnel required to run them. These figures and the pre-war figures would give us some sort of estimate.

Milmo talked to me about getting KALTENBRUNNER interrogated by Klop at some suitable place. We agreed that this should be done with full safeguards.

I dined with Barty. I asked him for his estimate of the balance sheet of SOE on his experience in Italy and elsewhere. He said that he thought SOE had done some good jobs and some very bad ones. In Italy they were wide open in the Milan area but had other stations which survived until the advance. Broadly speaking however he thought that the supply of arms and ammunition to partisans unco-ordinated with an immediate military operation was a waste of time. Partisans could not hope to operate against regular troops or ever be more than a slight irritation. The only effect of our operations in Yugoslavia had been to build-up Tito, who was now a thorn in our sides. His activities at the very most

might have diserved the attention of a division and a half on a part time basis. He was not in any way responsible for the German withdrawal which was part of a general strategic plan. Fitzroy McLean an F.O. character and the PMs special nominee with Tito, had got the whole thing completely out of perspective. He was directly responsible to the PM and created enormous difficulties for military staffs who really never knew wherethey were. In Italy SOE had done some very good jobs in conjunction with military operations. Having filtered in agents and partisans to towns which we proposed to occupy they were able to hold these until our troops reached them, and also to some extent to harrass the enemy's rear. This had been of considerable value.

August 22nd

Scott came to see me about his future. He would like to stay on with us. I gave him the usual answer. Meanwhile he is trying to see whether there is a job for him in the consular service. I said I would make enqiries but I doubted whether on account of his age he was eligible except on a purely temporary basis.

I had a talk with Hunloke who has just returned from Palestine. I liked him personally and it may be that there would be some DSO job for him in the future. We are under no obligation to him.

I had a talk with Klop and Milmo about the interrogation of KALTENBRUNNER.

I spoke to Dick about HILGER and about Springborn. He is ready for Klop to come

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out at any time. He wanted to know the precise date on which I expected him back. He thought it should be either Oct. 7th or 17th. The extra days were on account of the leave he had taken in this country.

Denis Page came to see me. He is going out to "andy to take Ionides place. I gave him a full account as I could about CIGB and the various personalities in the area.

August 25rd

The DG saw Harry Allan, Eriscoe and myself and asked us to draft a further letter to the DNI about our suggested representation on the JSIC.

The DG and I saw Maxwell and Newsam about the proposal to bring over German scientists. We covered the ground very carefully, giving all the arguments already enumerated. We went further and discussed the desirability of getting some policy about incorporating aliens into industries such as the machine tool industry where they could obtain full information about our war potential. Newsam undertook to raise this matter also at the Chiefs of Staff meeting.

I had a talk with Horrocks about the future organisation and outlined to him my ideas on the subject. He did not seem to be in disagreement and said that he could not get the DG to make any move until after Findlater's enquiry.

Ian Wilson came to say goodbye. He has put up a note on the Tricycle group with a recommendation that Tricycle, Dreadnaught and Freak should be given some sort of award.

I had a meeting with Viv., Cussen and Park when we drafted a note on the aspects of intelligence and the C.I. that we do not wish the Press to talk about, without prior discussion. It is proposed that this note should be included in the W.O. memo which is being given to the press.

I saw the DMI and coached him in our arguments about German scientists for tomorrow's meeting of the Chiefs of Staff.

Hughes talked to me about radio amateurs, who will be allowed to operate after the abolition of DR8. The bad feature of the whole thing is that the GPO never take any action when people transmit without a licence. We may have to take this up on a higher level.

Wascenes August 24th

Queen's Inv. Sec.
I saw Tommy at the club last night. He asked me to go back with him after dinner and take a look at certain papers on which he wanted advice. These papers were in fact German F.O. telegrams which had been found at Marburg. Presumably they were micro films which von Loesch had taken out of their boxes and buried in the ground. The order was finally given to have them destroyed but in fact the SD unwittingly had destroyed only the boxes. The telegrams in question were dated about June-July 1940 and sent by Stohrer and Hoyneigen-Huehne, the German Ambassadors in Madrid and Lisbon respectively to Ribbentrop. There were also some from Ribbentrop to the Ambassadors, and one I think either to or from Abetz. The fact that Abetz had

something to do with the scheme subsequently revealed in the telegrams might suggest that BEDAUX was behind the whole thing. The telegrams showed that the Germans had made a very determined effort to lure the Duke of Windsor back into Spain from Portugal and to prevent him from taking up the post that had been offered to him in the Bahamas. The Germans never appeared in the picture but through the Spanish Foreign Minister and the Spanish Minister of the Interior they sent agents to the Duke who was staying in Lisbon as the guest of Esperito Santo SILVA, the head of the bank of that name which of course is known to us as an agency for the transmission of funds to German agents. Various statements are attributed to the Duke by these agents which are not of a very savoury kind. Although it seems doubtful whether the Duke was scheming for his own restoration, it is fairly clear that he expressed the view, which I understand he has expressed elsewhere on a number of occasions, that the whole war was a mistake and that if he had been King it never would have happened. He clearly rather felt himself in the role of mediator, if his country had finally collapsed, but he did not think that the moment was opportune for any sort of intervention. He seemed to believe that he understood the German people far better than anyone else. The Germans went to very great lengths to persuade him not to embark for the Bahamas and SCHELLENBERG, who was in Lisbon at the time, was reporting to the Ambassador and organising acts of intimidation such as the sending of anonymous letters with bouquets of flowers to the Duchess warning her that the offer of the appointment in the Bahamas was merely a plot by the British to do away with him.

The Duchess's maid was allowed to go to Paris to collect things from the Duke's flat and the Germans intended to get the Spaniards to delay her return as long as they could. Meanwhile Walter Monkton, was sent out to persuade him to leave at the earliest moment, a matter in which he was ultimately successful. Before the Duke left he fixed up, according to the telegram, some kind of code with Espirito Santo SILVA in order that he might fly back to Portugal from Florida if his intervention was required. It was further stated that about the 15th August a telegram had been received from the Bahamas by Espirito Santo asking whether the moment had arrived. My advice to Tommy was to check up as far as possible the telegrams, some of which would be verifiable from records; this would enable him to get some sort of appreciation of the reliability of the reports which were ultimately reaching the Germans. I warned him that in our experience agents in Spain and Portugal had throughout the war shown a strong tendency to report to their masters precisely what they thought their masters would like to hear. Apart from this, the information in the telegrams has probably been subjected to translation into 2 or 3 different languages where there was generally a fairly wide scope for error. On our side we could if he liked interrogate SCHELLENBERG who was under our control in O20 on the part that he had played in Lisbon. This might of course lead to his pouring out the whole story and the information thus would become available to the interrogator. I explained that the interrogators had to deal with highly confidential matters and that we could I thought ensure absolute discretion. He agreed that this should be

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done. The other enquiry that we could make would be to take a look at any telegrams sent to the Banco Espirito Santo around 15th August 1940 since in the light of our personal knowledge we might find the code telegram referred to. I explained that we had been interested in it is bank for other reasons and that there might therefore be a record in our files. I gather that Censorship obtained during the early days of the war a telegram from Mme BEDAUX to the Duke in the Bahamas which seemed to be of a singularly compromising nature. There were a lot of blanks in this telegram but the sense of it seemed to be that the question either of the Duke's mediation or of his restoration was discussed at some previous date and Mme BEDAUX was anxious to know whether he was now prepared to say yes or not.

I gather that the Duke is coming here on a short visit to his mother in the near future and that he will ultimately settle at Cap d'Antibes, although various jobs for him have been under consideration, such as the Governorship of Madras and Ambassador in Washington, etc. for all of which he would seem to be singularly unsuited. Bevi is au fait with all the information given above and is endeavouring to recover the copies and films of the telegrams in question, since if by any chance they leaked to the American Press, a very serious situation would be created.

August 24th

Briscoe and I have drafted a reply for the DG to send to Rushbrooke about our representation on the JSIC. We have pointed out that although the primary object of this committee is to discuss enemy scientific weapons and information received regarding them, in so doing it is inevitable that our own developments will also come under discussion and the committee provides a unique opportunity of not only keeping in touch with that work but with the various scientific sections of the Services.

Tommy Harris has returned from Spain. When he left Garbo had not yet made contact with the Germans although he had been on one occasion to the appointed rendez-vous. He will make another attempt for which he will probably try and visit the area where the Germans are at present congregated. He does not apparently wish to remain in Spain and contemplates going to S. America as soon as he has been able to ascertain what the German plans are. We have agreed to pay him £50 a month for the time being. The Germans left Garbo 35,000 pesetas in June last which seems to indicate that they still hope to make use of him.

The DG has received a reply from C. saying that he does not think any useful purpose would be served by making a protest to the F.O. about the Ankara leakage. He says that the F.O. are already fully alive to their deficiencies in this matter and that any letter can only cause irritation. Whether this view be right or wrong, I think that we should now place all the papers at the disposal of Findlater-Stewart

and ask him to go into the question as being directly relevant to the work of the Security Service.

Stopford was shown Vivian's reply on the question of HOOPER and agrees with our view that there is no possibility of our employing HOOPER in any capacity in future or of giving him an recommendation to a commercial firm.

At the daily meeting Bird produced a letter from the German N.A. here dated 1937 or 1938 to Einz Marine in Berlin or Hamburg indicating that a Mrs. Crooks, apparently cook to a British admiral, and a man called Bolt, would constitute useful agents. Our files show that Mrs. CROOKS was only in contact with the Germans by a visit to the Embassy when she signed her name in a book. She had been approached from Denmark. BOLT has so far not been positively identified, but a man of that name has just returned from Germany where he has been more or less at liberty throughout the war. If he is identical it would seem unlikely that he ever did anything, otherwise he would have been left here or sent here during the war. Another list also supplied by the Naval Attache gives the names of certain people who should form the nucleus of an Abwehr station in Holland in the event of war. The list includes Gustav LACHMANN, Hans SELIGO and others who are known to us. I have asked Bird to try and ascertain whether we could get into touch with the ex-N.A. and find out whether LACHMANN had in fact agreed to carry out this task or whether the whole arrangement was one which had not got further than the N.A.'s mind as a good idea.

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August 25th

Dick telephoned yesterday to say that HILGER was being sent back to Washington on Wednesday. The only chance was for Klop to go to 21 AG on Sunday when he would get 2 days clear interrogation. It might be that HILGER's departure could be postponed if the interrogation was going well. We decided that Klop should as arranged tackle KALTENBRUNNER today and leave on Sunday.

I had a talk with Charles and Cayzer about DSO points particularly secretaries. Two are required for Hong Kong, 2 for Kandy and 2 for Singapore. The 2 for Kandy are urgently needed. Nothing appears to have been done since Dixon wrote nearly two months ago, and the situation is getting desperate. We also arranged with Miss Constant to get out financial details about the various DSO points abroad so that we could put up an estimate in conjunction with our memo on the subject which we hope to get approved by the CO and the Treasury.

The DG showed me a letter that he has had from C. obviously drafted by Viv., objecting to Roger Hollis's visit to the USA, which he says will tend to relegate his liaison with the FBI on communism to a secondary position and cause unnecessary duplication. He thinks that the acceptance by the DG of the FBI's invitation without prior consultation is all the more deplorable owing to its being taken while the final enquiry was still being conducted. Finally he says that if he has to acquaint

Stephenson he will protest that his position with the FBI is being undermined and that there will be a protest to the F.O. by the Ambassador. All this of course is so much hooey concocted by Vivian. His distorted mind probably imagines that this is all a put-up job by MI5 to obtain a footing in the USA and to pre-judge the enquiry. The plain fact is that neither the DG, myself, Viv., Philby or anybody else can tell the FBI what they want to know. Their request for Roger's visit has been repeatedly made and is entirely spontaneous. Frankly I think that this is the most malicious, obstructive piece of work that Vivian has done since the beginning of the war. He clearly drafted the letter which C. has blindly signed. The suggestion that Stephenson would be upstage about it all is moonshine. Stephenson is only too glad to get experts out and does not care where they come from provided he effects the introduction.

I had a talk with Klop about his future plans. He has seen KALTENBRUNNER today and gets the impression that if carefully handled he might have quite a lot to say. Personally I am rather doubtful about this. KALTENBRUNNER evidently thinks that his interrogation up to the present has been directed towards proving that he is a war criminal, and he complains that he has never been allowed to talk freely. He is confident that he has quite convinced us that he had not really been responsible for the various atrocities that had been committed by the Gestapo. Klop disillusioned him on this point and explained that we were not interested in that side. We were merely interested in getting information and so far he had told us little

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about Amt 4 in which we were very interested. KALTENBRUNNER ended up by saying that he would tell us everything that we wanted to know. It was decided that Klop should leave for Germany tomorrow and that Stewart Hampshire should continue with KALTENBRUNNER.

August 27th

I had a word with Crawford about his memo on possible trends in future German espionage. I said that I would like to have these memos passed through me as I felt they ought to be considered in the light of all the information available. I felt by and large that they were of too speculative a nature to warrant distribution outside the office. Information that we have received showed that in fact the Germans had no set plans for the future or that at any rate such plans as they had were completely in the air owing to the general break up of the Abwehr and SD. It followed therefore that for the moment there was nothing really profitable to say. Matters would doubtless crystallise in due course when we could devise plans to meet the situation.

I went down to 020 where I saw Stimson and Scott-Harston. I arranged that SCHELLENBERG should be questioned about his activities in Lisbon in June and July 1940. If necessary it should be made clear to him that we had definite information that he had carried out observation on the Duke and Duchess of Windsor. I was anxious to find out precisely what he had done in this respect and what he knew about the plans of the Germans. I gave instructions that there was to be no

miking of this part of the interrogation and that I was to have the results sent to me personally.

Dick asked by telephone that a letter should be sent through the W.O. asking for his return on Oct. 6th. He told me that Klop had arrived and that the interrogation of HILGER was proceeding.

I had a talk with Harry Allen about the new JIC paper on the German scientists which is going up to the Chiefs of Staff and will be discussed at the meeting on Wednesday. The document was not a very satisfactory one, from our point of view, and did not go nearly so far as Newsam had led me to believe. I told Harry it was impossible to make comments unless we had a copy of the minutes of the last meeting of the Chiefs of Staff. In the evening after a conversation with Newsam I went round to the Cabinet offices where I saw Kemball Secoord. I drew his particular attention to two paras where the H.O. were mentioned. In one the H.O. were made responsible for saying that the value of a scientist's presence here outweighed the risks involved. This was a matter for which the sponsoring dept. should be responsible as the H.O. could not possibly assess the value of a scientist. The other point related to naturalisation. It should be made clear that it was impossible to commit the Home Secretary to any question of the naturalisation of an alien, which would have to be considered at the time in the light of all the circumstances. Amendments were made accordingly.

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Tangye came in to say goodbye. He seems to be going away quite satisfied. He has a job with the Daily Express to write Hickey's column. He has been given some slight retaining fee, and will keep in touch with the office.

Roland Bird came in to discuss the future of the War Room. It is proposed to curtail some of its functions and to reduce it to about 12 in November.

R.J. looked in to see the papers about German scientists. He said that from his own knowledge of British, American and German scientists, he could say that in pure science we were second to none and the people who were coming over were really engineers. The Germans were to some extent ahead of us in jet propulsion, liquid fuel, naval asdics and supersonic weapons. He entirely agreed with our view that these so-called scientists should not be allowed to bed themselves down here indefinitely. He could not see why they should not conduct their experiments in Germany under our supervision.

He then talked about his own future. He is intending to retire from FIAT and thinks that the office should fit him in. He is apparently writing to the DG in this sense. Personally I cannot see how he fits in.

Allen of G.P.O., Hughes and Sciater came to discuss the Post Office attitude in regard to the prosecution of people transmitting without licences. We satisfied Allen that the present position was far

from satisfactory. It seemed possible that the law was inadequate. Allan said quite frankly that he could see no reason why prosecutions should not take place for transmitting in the same way they did for receiving without a licence. He promised to look into the matter and let us know the best line of approach.

The DG called a meeting about our set-up in the Far East. It was finally agreed to send one more secretary to Colombo, 2 to Kandy, 2 to Kong Kong and 2 to Singapore. The D.G. thought that Ceylon ought to fade out of the picture, as of no security interest. He was of course thinking on purely a war basis. I said that I could see no difference in having a DSO Malta and having one in Ceylon. It seemed to me that one of the functions of DSOs in peace time was to look after indigenous movements. Apart from this there was one of the biggest naval bases in the world at Trincomalee. The D.G. was quite adamant on the point so I did not pursue it.

came over at my request. I told him that SCHELLENBERG was not likely to be here much longer and that it seemed desirable to get as much out of him about Venio as possible. This was difficult as we had never been allowed to see the papers. said that Guthrie had been making enquiries, and that he entirely agreed with our view that all our information relating to Venio, Hooper, Schultze-Bernett etc. should be pooled, since in this way we might eventually discover how the leakage in PCO The Hague office had occurred. He said he would try and get authority for us to have all the

papers although he thought he might have some difficulty.

Jim tells me that he is making a continental tour to visit our allies opposite numbers, after which he will be retiring from the office. I asked him what would happen to his division, but he had no very adequate answer. I said that in fact it meant that old Alley and co. would be coming to me.

Miss Bagot came to talk to me about a document received from SIS which indicates that the Czechs are setting up a military C.E. and E. Bureau and also a dept. under the Ministry of the Interior at the head of which will be Col. Bartik, assisted by a Capt. Pichler. It is to deal with "political and security political matters". The bureau will have representation in foreign countries, including London, under a Col. Krcek. It will report on subversive activity of all sorts and to enquire particularly into all German activities at home and abroad. Krcek works through a Major Lias. He also has a contact with Major Zhemchiuznikov, Soviet Military Mission in London.

August 29th

Mr. Howe, who has taken over Codrington's job, called on the DG today. He was formerly our Minister in Abyssinia. The DG told him that we had the impression that his predecessor thought that his work had nothing to do with us. Howe clearly knew that this was Codrington's view. The DG felt that security was one and indivisible, and made it quite clear that if the leakage in Ankara had come to our

knowledge before D day, we should have been forced to reply to various enquiries by the Cabinet that although we did not think that anything important was getting out of this country, we could give no guarantee that leaks were not taking place from Embassies abroad. This would of course have led to a serious situation. We felt that it was unfair to the Security Service to keep them in the dark about this matter since we might be conducting investigations here, the answer to which was to be found in one of HM Embassies abroad. If therefore the FO ever had cause to think that such a leakage was taking place, either through agents abroad or through cypher breaks, we should like to be kept informed. Howe entirely agreed.

Burt tells me that through a CID officer, Spponer has heard of an assessor who claims to be able to get information from MI5. The information related to the case of one Otto LUDWIG and his wife, Mrs. da Silva. I ascertained through Horrocks that the file relating to these people had not moved since 1943. It was quite clear though that the D. Division of the CID knew about it. From what Burt tells me the CID officer mentioned the fact that MI5 had been formerly interested, upon which the assessor said he could get the papers, and later, that he had not got the papers as they were in the country. It looks rather as if the assessor had some line on the dept. but it may be that his friend here has turned him down.

Luke thinks that decorations should be given to Tricycle, Dreadnaught, Freak, Mutt and possibly Father, though he is asking Chris Harmer for his view about the latter.

August 30th

Kellar has had a word from Ryan saying that Alan Roger and Carstairs will accept the job in Hong Kong and that Thistlethwaite is prepared to come to London.

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Collidge now wants to go to the Education Dept. of the Control Commission for a year and then return to his university at Liverpool. This is rather a disappointment as we have been training him for a permanent job in the dept.

Vesey tells me that Markee has had an offer to go to PCO Paris. He wants to return to the Security Service later if an opportunity presents itself. I have recommended that he should go.

Finzell, the Australian looked in. He had had a fairly successful time although he had experienced considerable difficulty in getting about Germany. His best find was at Friesing, where there were records of the Auslands Institut. The most interesting document was a recommendation by the NSDAP to the FO dated 1942 about the future of Germans in Australia in the event of a Jap invasion. It was thought that either all Germans should be brought back to the Reich or that they should be segregated in Tasmania. There were also lists of various people in Australia who were prepared to

act in Germany's interests. Finzell said that there were quite a number of files relating to this country among Hofman's papers, which I think he said were at Heidelberg.

B-W came to talk to me about the visit of Col. Einthoven. He wondered whether we should entertain him jointly or not and whether we should pay his hotel expenses. I said I thought we would give him a dinner and that we would show him round although much of our organisation had dwindled away. I was anxious however to get clear about his status. B-W says that he is head of all Security and is under the Ministry of Justice.

Seymer came to say goodbye. He is leaving tomorrow.

August 31st

I talked to Burt about Kirby-Green. He said that he did not think that there would be any chance of the Commissioner making himself responsible for 10 years of his pension if he transferred to us as this would probably be against statutory regulations. He did however think that the police would refund to Kirby-Green the 5% of his salary that has been put aside towards his ultimate pension.

Cimperman came to tell me that Joe Lynch is not returning, although his mother's health is considerably improved.

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Harry Allen talked to me about a paper which is coming up to the Chiefs of Staff about the future of intelligence. It relates mainly to JICs and to some extent to secret intelligence activities of SIS. There is practically no mention of the Security Service. I told Harry that I thought that 4 points ought to be made clear: (1) that wherever SIS had representation the Security Service or its equivalent ought also to be represented. (2) that the Service should be aware that in the last 6 years the Security Service has carried out their CI duties in this country which at times was very much a zone of the armies. (3) that when the Armies proceeded overseas the Security Service not only planned the whole of their CI for them but provided them with all the key personnel. (4) that

CI organisations such as SIME and CICI relied upon the Security Service for advice and personnel and for watching their interests in regard to information and organisation. This was due to the fact that Service Intelligence Branches could rarely give them any assistance and had no real comprehension of their problems and difficulties. Harry is drafting suitable paras to be inserted on the above lines.

September 1st

Harry showed me a draft on defensive security which he had prepared at the request of Sir Findlater Stewart. I have made one or two small additions. It gives quite a good general idea of what defence security means, and how it is related to CE.

I said goodbye to Milmo, as he goes on a fortnight's leave and then returns to the bar. He will be available if required.

September 3rd

Martin, formerly of this office, rang up to ask about his release category. I told him that we had recommended to the WO that his case was a good one, but we had no power of decision in these matters. I explained to him that there were many other people here in the same boat. They had all our sympathy and we were doing anything we could to help them.

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Gwyer arrived at Caselle but is stuck there pending an official demand for his services from the WO.

Cayzer came to talk to me about an assistant DSO for Rangoon. He has one or two people in mind. He is going to put up the case of Kirby-Green which is still hanging fire.

Craufura came to talk to me about his departure. I told him that I thought it would be some time before German espionage through commercial firms got on its feet again and that by and large I thought he would be well advised to get the ICI job if he could as it would not be possible offer him anything here of a particularly exalted kind. It was necessary moreover to let younger people have a chance. He seemed quite satisfied.

I lunched with Ronnie Haylor. He is going to take over when Dick leaves for 6 months, with the option on either side to continue. Meanwhile he will be training a successor. He told me very confidentially that the present DMI was going to SIS and had been trying to get to go with him. Whether anything has materialised with regard to I do not know. I can imagine that his presence in SIS would be very welcome as he has consistently and severely criticised that organisation ever since he came into intelligence. The Control Commission is getting on its legs but Ronnie says there is not much policy for the future. Nobody has yet considered what is to become ultimately of the many people who have been arrested

Von FELDMAN, the member of the GIS who ran HOOOPER, has been captured in the British zone. We are arranging for Hart to go out and interrogate him.

There are a thousand crates of documents in Italy relating to SIM and OVRA. They are apparently catalogued. As there are likely to be handed back to the Italian Govt. it seems desirable that somebody should go through the more important ones and collect whatever data is to be found about the Italian Intelligence system. I have suggested that Anthony who will be leaving in the course of a few days, should do this job, and combine it with a little archeological research.

C. has replied to the DG's letter about Roger Hollis's visit to America. C. is evidently rather piqued about the suggestion by the DG that his previous letter was not drafted by himself. He said that he did draft it, and that in any case the responsibility was his. He then says that the agreement of Sept. 27th 1943 means that Stephenson's agreement should be obtained before any visits were arranged, but since the DG had now made it clear that he had not yet accepted Hoover's invitation, C. felt that rather than leave Hoover with any sense of grievance he felt bound to do all that he could reasonably be asked to do to "put matters right" (It is not clear to me how matters are wrong, since nothing has happened except that we have received an invitation from Hoover). He concludes his letter by saying that if the DG proposed to telegraph Stephenson he would like to know before he did so and he would inform Stephenson

that he was prepared to waive the objection that he would normally have made, provided Stephanson with his knowledge of the whole local position was prepared to concur.

September 4th

TAR brought Lemans to see me today. There has been a little trouble between Col. Verneuil and Peter Hope. Hope had to collect the renegade COLE from the French zone, and asked Germain, Col. Verneuil's A.D.C. whether it would be all right for him to employ BST. The BST do not normally operate in the French zone which is Col. Verneuil's preserve. Germain said it would be all right if they kept their heads down. Verneuil appears to have discovered this later on and now refuses to collaborate with Hope. Lemans says it is really a matter of internal politics but that we ought not to leave things as they are. He volunteered to endeavour to straighten the matter out. I said that Trevor Wilson was going to try and do this but I thought that it might be a good thing if they collaborated. Lemans I believe is to remain behind here as the liaison officer for DSDOC.

Niall MacDermott looked in. He is on leave for a few days and will be lunching with me tomorrow.

At the DGs meeting the question of policy with regard to the admission of aliens who have collaborated with the GIs was discussed. The cases of the two Spaniards were mentioned, who were coming to the conference on civil aviation and in spite of our protests had been admitted by the

H.O. The DG said he was quite prepared to take the matter up.

I gave the RSLs a talk about the post-mortem on ourselves, SIS and CSE, about what we thought of the future in Germany and about Russian policy. I also mentioned visas, policy for British subjects returning from Germany, censorship, and CIGB Far East.

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I saw Thornton of the LHC and told him that Brook-Booth was prepared to take him and was only waiting for final sanction.

September 5-6th

Away with a cold.

Two P/Ws from the G.A.F. named Alois SCHWARZE and Hermann DEMSKI, think that the W/T espionage system and the ability and training of ~~agents~~ in this country left much to be desired. They believe that we relied on quantity rather than quality. Their criticisms are as follows:

(a) the frequency, day and time at which it is intended to re-open communication should not be announced in clear or in a very simple code at the end of a transmission but should be embodied in the encyphered text of a message. (b) where fixed times for communication are pre-arranged these should not follow a regular pattern such as for example as always appearing at 0800 hours on a Monday. (c) Procedure, choice of call signs etc. should resemble as closely as possible that most frequently used in the particular scene of operations. For example the exclusively British custom of having callsigns consisting of 3 letters stood out conspicuously in the Balkans and Italy where German Army procedure and local civilian and military procedure all admitted mixed call signs consisting of one letter and 2 figures or 2 letters and 1 figure. The practice of British agents in France and Belgium was sounder in this respect. (d) no redundant signals, greetings, courtesies or sign-offs should be indulged in. (e) agents should not be required to appear on the air as a matter of routine. If an agent has nothing to report he should remain silent. (f) in order to prevent linking of certain agents with a particular station by intercept, the practice of uni-

lateral transmission by both parties is desirable. (g) Crystal sets should be avoided. They give a characteristic tone and confine the operator to a limited number of frequencies. (h) our wireless sets are much too bulky. (i) agents should not carry more documents than necessary. (j) tendency for several agents to use the same standard procedure tables. (k) call signs and frequencies should be changed more often and should be better concealed. (l) agents waste too much time by slow transmission which is of assistance to DF. (m) agents should change their residence more often, and should live in large ferroconcrete apartment blocks preferable in the vicinity of electric mains as this hampers DF. (n) closed window shutter in a house where all other window shutters remain open have often helped to give the game away. (o) agents ought to be better warned about the possibility of DF.

A Major Friedrich BUSCH who joined the Abwehr in August 1939 and worked in the air section operating against Gt. Britain, knows a considerable amount about the agents which the Abwehr were running to Gt. Britain and the USA. He mentions first a Studentenkrieger who was trained in Holland and was working in Einz Wi. He thought this man was of poor quality and ill-instructed. He was dropped but never established communication. Busch learned later from the British Press that he had been picked up. This may be Ter BRAAK.

He followed the case of TATE fairly closely but believed that he was controlled from soon after landing. The following matters aroused his suspicion. (a) that TATE asked

for money and was sent \$20,000 through Tricycie. Busch thought Tricycie was controlled because he sent reports on the effect of bombing which could be obtained a few days later from the newspapers. Busch reasoned that if Tricycie was controlled Tate was probably also controlled. His colleagues however were quite satisfied with both these agents. (b) Busch was also rather suspicious about the incident when Tate reported that he had been in trouble with the police. Berlin only got from Hamburg Tate's military reports but on one occasion Busch managed to get hold of his file. He was horrified to find that Hamburg had given Tate the names and addresses of Mutt and Jeff, who were young Norwegians already sent to the UK. "Colonel von DAWITZ, the head of the English section at the headquarters of the Luftwaffe, apparently agreed with Busch that Tate was controlled but despite that view vouched for him on the principle that it was better to have a working agent than none at all.

Speaking of Snow, Busch decided that he was controlled and when he wired that a friend of his (namely Celery) was travelling to Lisbon and should be met. Rantzau went to Lisbon and brought the man back to Hamburg in triumph. Busch was so sceptical that he gave him the code name of Hades. When Brede went to Hamburg to meet Hades, the latter frankly admitted that he was an agent of the British Intelligence Service but wanted to work for Germany. He was given money and sent back to the UK via Lisbon, but no news was ever received from him. An interesting fact is that Busch had an order at the beginning of 1941 to forward all Snow's weather reports to the personal secretary of HESS. If HESS was spending a

weekend with his father, Busch had to telephone to the father's house. This continued till HESS flew to the UK in May 1944.

In regard to Father, he says that the experts believed in him as late as June 1944. Apparently it was Busch's firm belief that there were no genuine Luft agents in the UK and that no W/T agents could remain uncontrolled for any length of time.

Through Col. Ludwig von Böhlen Busch learned of a network of 4 agents, radio-equipped who were sending information about the coming invasion, in 1944. The network had the cover name of Arabel. There were a Polish officer, a de Gaulle officer, an officer's batman called Johnnie, and a man whose name began with D. Busch studied their reports and found an astonishing similarity between them and those of Kraemer in Stockholm and Ostro in Lisbon. He told Böhlen that he considered that they were controlled, but Böhlen tersely replied that if he informed Schellenberg of Busch's view the latter would be shot as a defeatist. There were no other agents producing information of similar value and the GIC could not admit that it had no genuine agents in the UK. Ostro was known to Busch through his case officer Dr. BECK. Ostro had worked for a long time for Einz Heer on the eastern front against Czechoslovakia. Hence his name Ostro. He was in Denmark in 1939 where he was arrested by the Danes but was released by the Germans in 1940. Dr. Beck then took him over. He was sent to Lisbon to work against the UK. He had formerly been an Austrian officer. Ostro used to send reports on British aircraft factories and their production, stating that he had a friend in the Society of British

Aircraft instructors. Busch on returning from Stockholm in 1944 was able to read the files covering the period prior to the invasion and formed the impression that Ostro's reports dovetailed with those of Kraemer. Thus Kraemer invented 5 new airborne divisions which he moved about from the Wash to Scotland, or to Italy, whilst Ostro gave news of ship movements which bore this out. Busch concluded that although Ostro had been genuine previously he was now under control. Kraemer in 1939 served with the Ribbentrop Bureau in London. In recent months he had been travelling to Stockholm once a month from Berlin, returning with information concerning allied aircraft production figures. Kraemer was finally stationed permanently in Stockholm. According to him his sources of information were Siegfried A. or Aba, an official of the Swedish Air Line in London who provided information on the need for transport for ball bearings and on the British aircraft industry. He also had a network known as Siegfried B. consisting of pilots from planes reporting on what they saw in the UK. Kraemer used German and Greek mythological names in his reports but the basic source was always the same. Joseph is a neutral diplomat in London. Busch viewed Kraemer's sources with grave suspicion, particularly when he obtained replies to questionnaires allegedly from London in 40 hours, even on days when weather was too bad to permit flying. Busch came to the conclusion that Kraemer got his information locally. When reporting on British air losses during raids Kraemer, according to Busch, made use of the Swedish press and also got access to the official reports from Berlin, from which he compiled his own. The General Staff believed in Kraemer implicitly.

An interrogation of THOST shows that in the winter of 1942 a conference took place about setting up the apparatus to intercept radio-telephone conversations in the USA and UK, and a lot of useful information was obtained from conversations between ministers on a very wide variety of subjects. The voices were very clear though occasionally fading. From a security point of view the worst offenders were the ministers themselves. The machinery was set up in a house about 6 kms south of Eindhoven. The conversations were passed through on to gramophone records and then teleprinted from Eindhoven to Berlin. Interception of the USA end was quite clear, but the British end was less clear as the wave had to go round the earth. The de-scrambling of the conversations did not apparently present much difficulty.

The JIC have considered a report on the extent to which the Germans have been successful in breaking our cyphers. They say that the Germans claim (a) continuous success against low-grade systems and some success against high-grade service systems, the latter including naval, army, RAF and inter-departmental long-subtractors. (b) continuous success against certain low-grade civil codes, (c) conclusively strong comparative inferences that success achieved on Services long-subtractors would have been equally available on similar civil systems if and when attacked. It seems clear that the German administrative structure, lack of manpower and possibly some reasons of high policy, saved some civil high-grade systems from penetration. Certainly in the early years of the war. (d) no conclusive evidence has so far been discovered of successes or

even consistent assault on Typex though what went on and why in this field is still largely obscure. (3) there is no evidence of the degree of importance attached by the OKW to intelligence from "Y" sources. A considerable number of documents relating to cryptographic matters were apparently discovered by dredging the Schliersee Lake near Munich. // A telegram from Eisenhower dated 22 Aug. states that up to date 65,000 personalities of CI interest have been arrested in the American zone since March 1945 including over 5,000 associated with the GIs. The rate of arrests shows no signs of decrease.

A P/W named Erich MANSFELD @ CZRZIBCZYK made a statement on July 30th 1945 about the death of Hitler and Eva Braun. Mansfeld was a criminal assistant in the SD and was in charge of the guard at the bunker occupied by Hitler in the Reichskanzlei on April 27th 1945. He saw a certain amount of commotion at the emergency exit at about 1600 hours on that date and went over to see what was happening. He met Hitler's personal adjutant, Gintsche, and immediately following him were 2 S.S. officers carrying a body wrapped in a blanket. Both legs were exposed almost to the knees as well as a portion of the right arm. The rest of the body was covered by the blanket. Mansfeld claims that he recognised the body as that of Hitler and that a portion of the black trousers, which colour only Hitler wore there, was also visible. Immediately behind the man carrying the alleged body of Hitler was an S.S. officer Jansen who was carrying in his arms the body of a woman identified by Mansfeld as that of Eva Braun. It was clothed in a black dress, the one which she was wearing between 2 and 3 a.m.

that same day when she came to the tower to ask for information about the shelling. Mansfield claims that he had seen Eva Braun on many occasions and that he was positive it was her body that Jansen was carrying. Following Jansen were Goebbels, General Burgdorf, Bormann and Linge, Hitler's aide. When he returned to the tower Mansfield says he saw a huge column of black smoke coming from the direction of the emergency exit. A few minutes later when the smoke had partly cleared he could see two burning bodies about 2 metres to the left of the emergency exit. He claims he recognised the body of Eva Braun and that he recognised the other body as being that of a man but could not be certain that it was Hitler. From time to time somebody poured additional gasoline on the burning bodies. The bodies were still burning at 1830 hours. At 2300 hours the bodies were gone and according to Mansfield are likely to have been buried in a shellcrater in front of the emergency exit door. The rumour amongst the guard was that both Hitler and Eva Braun were shot by Hitler's personal doctor Stumpfigger.

By the 31st August O20 had awaiting disposal 22 neutrals and/or allies of assorted nationalities and 22 enemy nationals, the majority of whom had been brought over from Germany as military prisoners for interrogation. It was hoped to get most of them away during the next two weeks.

According to SAUR, head of the Technical Dept. in the German M.A.P., the Germans were deceived right up to the last moment about the target area in N. Africa in July 1942. He said that when 4 huge allied convoys were reported as passing through the Straits of

Gib. speculation in the OKW was intense as to what the allied objective was. Some thought the landing would be in the south of France, others thought the Genoa area. Another view was that we would land between Rome and Naples, break through to the Adriatic coast and then roll up the German forces in the south. Lastly there were some who thought that the 4 convoys would proceed to 4 focal points on the African coast and remain there, thereby pinning down all the German forces and compelling them to stand and fight. Between July 7th -8th the German submarines were concentrated between Bizerta and Sicily with a limited operational range of fighters and dive-bombers etc. Attacks on the convoys would therefore come only when the latter were approaching the Sicily-Bizerta area. Speer and Saur were at that time travelling in a train from Berlin to Munich in a large party to a meeting with Hitler and at each station Admiral Fuchs who was in the party received the latest intelligence as to the situation. The convoys appeared to be continuing southward and excitement became intense as they neared the edge of the submarine area. The leading convoy was due to enter the zone, Saur said, at 4.00 on the 7th July and shortly after that time Admiral Fuchs in great excitement was handed a further report. Instead of the expected news of sinkings of troopships however the report was to the effect that at 4.15 the allied convoys had altered course to due south and were heading for Algiers. Only one officer in the OKW with whom Saur had previously discussed the matter forecast a landing at Algiers. There was however a certain relief that the landings had taken place there rather than in Italy.

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As late as 21 Aug. the Jap Ambassador in Nanking was talking on lines of establishing a close liaison with the Chinese. He thought that Japan might assist Chinese development by sending Jap technical experts to China on large scale. In fact Japan would develop widely in China those branches of industry which would be prohibited in Japan, as well as mining and agricultural techniques. This proposal is in fact very similar to the action taken by Germany after the 1st war in establishing her war industries in Russia.

According to Kuebart, a former head of Einz Heer, the Abwehr had only 4 important sources of military information on the U.K. 3 of these were agents of B.I.A. although Kuebart does not appear to realise even yet that his organisation was being misled. The 4th source was Ostro and it is interesting to learn that the order of battle information given by Ostro was regarded by Frende Heere as mainly unusable. Kuebart confirms that the Germans had no prior knowledge of the date and place of our landing in France. They only had a general warning that invasion might take place anywhere from Norway to the Mediterranean. The one set of reports deemed by the Abwehr to emanate from one source were those purporting to come from Portuguese consulates. We of course knew these reports from MSS and in our estimation they were local and not particularly intelligent inventions in Lisbon.

September 7th

The Chinese have asked London to take immediate steps to discover and acquire information concerning the materials used

in the making of atomic bombs, and to report in detail. It is difficult to see what action we can take. My suggestion is that as soon as we get a scientific adviser we should ascertain who are in the know in this country and then get them to collaborate with us by informing us immediately if they think that anybody is becoming too inquisitive.

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I asked Cussen whether he could spare Patterson for DSO Cib. if we sent Kiroy-Green to the Caribbean. He said he would like to think it over.

Prestige rang up about William JOYCE. If the case was thrown out on the grounds that JOYCE was originally an American citizen and had committed no offence against the USA as they were not in the war until after he had become a German citizen, JOYCE should be detained under the Royal Prerogative. I said that that seemed sound but that he had better speak to Cussen.

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The DG has drafted a reply to C's letter about Hoidis. In effect he says that the agreement reached with Duff-Cooper implied that visits were to take place subject to certain conditions and that therefore C. should automatically give his permission in the absence of any strong reasons to the contrary.

September 8th

Marsée came to see me about his job with PCO Paris. I told him I thought he ought to accept it and that I was sure if in due course there was a job for him in this dept. we should be able to obtain his services.

Gwyer arrived back from Italy. I have given him the task of conducting a post-mortem on MI5. It will be his job to follow up all cases where there is a suggestion that an unidentified agent was either sent to this country or was operating here during the war.

September 9th

I saw Kellar and Douglas Roberts of SIME this afternoon, when we discussed SIME's future. We agreed generally that SIME should become a commitment of MI5. This seemed logical and in fact only gave de jure recognition to what was de facto the position. I suggested to Roberts that when he went to the JIC he should table a paper showing the origin of SIME and explaining that it was really only an extension of the DSO system. The head of SIME was responsible to the local authorities for giving them advice and

information. If they did not like his advice and information they would as in the case of the Governor General and Commander in Chief Gibraltar, complain to the DG.

September 10th

I saw Findlater about the future of SIME and the proposed discussion of the subject by the JIC. He said that this was a matter which was definitely on his plate and he was so informing the JIC. If necessary he would attend the meeting. Later in the day Roberts after a preliminary discussion with the Junior JIC made it clear that he could not possibly function as a sub-section of the JIB. It was necessary for him to report direct to the Commander in Chief and indeed Gen. Paget had insisted that this practice should continue. His views were apparently accepted and he is to attend the meeting of the JIC tomorrow.

I also had a talk about RSS. Findlater has I think made up his mind that it should be brigaded with the GC & CS with a certain amount of independence and that whoever dealt with CI should have a seat on the Sigint Board. As regards the policing of the ether he thought that he would have to consider this in conjunction with the Service Signals Dept. He asked me to write him a letter on the subject.

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I attended a D.Branch meeting to discuss whether aliens who had been engaged on secret work in this country should be carded in order that if they went abroad and came back the firms with which they had formerly been employed should be warned. Archer felt that such people might be dangerous as they would be readily accepted by all their former colleagues who would not un-naturally put them au fait with recent developments. Horrocks was apparently jibbing at what he called preventive carding. I said that I thought the difficulty could be got over by having all these people listed in one file and circulating their names to Passport Control with instructions that they should be signalled in advance if they applied for a visa. It would be no good circulating their names to ports as we should not be notified for at least a fortnight, as only by then would their cards have got into the T.I.

September 11th

I spoke to Alley this morning about the arrival of Col. Eindhoven. He is making the necessary arrangements.

I spent nearly the whole morning at the JIC. I was there principally to deal with SIME. Roberts tabled his paper which generally speaking was accepted without much demur. I explained exactly what the position had been and where the analogy lay between ourselves and the forces here and SIME and the forces in Mid East. Other analogies were the situation in Malta and Gib. C. who was present seemed to agree to our accepting responsibility for SIME. He did however raise the question of funds. If the staff were to be paid off the Secret Service vote,

the sum would be considerable, probably somewhere in the neighbourhood of £125,000 p.a. whereas if the personnel was supplied by the Services the officers could be paid from the Services vote. I said that I appreciated this point but that payment partly on a Service and partly on a civilian basis did raise most complicated administrative headaches. Rushbrooke then raised the question of SIME's equivalent in the Far East. I outlined to him our plans about the CIGB which I said had been worked out in a very tentative way by ourselves and SIS. They were however entirely in embryo, since CIGB was for the time being at any rate a military commitment. We did however see that organisation eventually in Singapore, in liaison with Australian Security and DIB, and being supplied with information from our DSOs in Hong Kong, Rangoon, Ceylon and Singapore and by C. from sources in Indo-China, China, etc. Nobody seemed to think that the idea was a bad one and I was asked after consultation with Sir Findlater Stewart to produce a paper both on the future of SIME and CIGB. It was decided that SIME and Security Intelligence generally should in no way be subordinated to the JIB. Previous papers therefore on this subject will be cancelled. There will be two recommendations, one on JIBs and the other on Security Intelligence organisations.

I saw Findlater at 3 o'clock. He explained that his enquiries had now reached a stage where he was in some difficulty. SIS were claiming that 90% of the work done by Sections V and IX related to matters abroad and had no particular bearing on affairs in this country. This was said I think with particular reference to Section IX. They argued for example that intelligence activities by

the Russians against the French would not be a matter of interest to us. It might be interesting to the FO. Or that the communist situation in Holland was a matter for the FO rather than ourselves. I said that espionage by the Russians against the French was a matter of considerable importance to us since we wanted to know about all manifestations of the Russian Secret Service, in the same way we had to know about all manifestations of the GIS. Apart from this I thought that we were more likely to get information about Russian activities against the French by a liaison with the Surete and the Zeme Bureau than by the employment of secret agents. As regards communism the activities of the CP in Holland were of very great interest to us for the same reasons. We wanted to get the wider picture. Apart from this I thought that our experiences with communists and Russian activities here were on a much more solid foundation on which to build since our sources were to a large degree 100% whereas SIS sources were based on agents whose reliability it was always difficult to assess. I quite saw however that the FO might be interested to be informed about communism in Holland in relation to the whole picture of Dutch politics. This would mean that Section IX, who procure the information, would have to pass a copy to Section I and also one to ourselves. I felt however that the collation should be done by one body on the basis of one set of records and that since the primary object at any rate of CI work was to protect British territory it must ultimately be a responsibility of the DG. If there was not total amalgamation there was bound to be a gap somewhere. I thought however it could be bridged more effectively if we carried overt liaison and had some say

in the direction of SIS agents abroad. This could be done through our seconding a circulating section to SIS. Findlater said that he proposed to have a joint meeting on this subject with SIS and ourselves next week.

We later discussed SIME, Roberts being present. Findlater agrees with all our recommendations and has asked us to prepare papers which he will consider on Sunday next.

Alec Kellar and I saw Eddie Hastings and got his agreement to giving us the services of STALBO for reading back Hebrew records. He will be putting in 3 or 4 hours a week.

^{PH 128}
Kim came over with a series of telegrams received from the Western Hemisphere on the subject of Russian espionage. The gist of the story is that there has been for some considerable time a Russian espionage organisation working under a ^{Colonel} Gen. ZUBOTIN the Soviet M.A. in Ottawa. The Russians have succeeded in planting agents in External Affairs, the High Commissioner's office and also in the atomic bomb circles. This information has come to light owing to one of Zubotin's subordinates bringing in a whole heap of documents to the RCMP. For some reason or other the informant has been held with the documents, which disclose the presence of at least 16 agents who have been identified. The principle agent connected with the atomic bomb is a Cambridge physicist sent out to Canada in 1942, named Alan Nunn MAY. We had great difficulty in identifying this man as his initials were given as A.L. May and he did not appear to have been vetted especially for Tube Alloys. The documents in Ottawa indicate that MAY is to make

contact with some Soviet agent over here, very detailed instructions being given as to how, when and where the meeting is to be effected. The question arises now whether in view of the disappearance of the agent from Soviet circles in Ottawa, the meeting will in fact take place, and whether it would be better to search and interrogate MAY after confronting him with the agent in Ottawa or whether he should be thoroughly searched and frightened on arrival here, or whether he should be let through on the assumption that the meeting will take place sooner or later and that we shall thereby unearth a Soviet network in this country. The whole case has got on to a very high level. There is a series of telegrams running between Robertson of External Affairs and Cadogan, another between MacDonald and Mechtig of the D.O. and another between Security Co-Ordination and SIS. Finally Jumbo Wilson and Halifax have weighed in. As usual with these high levels, it is extremely difficult to get down to brass tacks, and to get the right action taken. We here are in the unfortunate position of being in possession only of a number of somewhat corrupt telegrams whereas if we were in Ottawa knowing the full circumstances in which the agent came in plus the contents of the documents we should be in a far better position to come to the right conclusion. The whole thing of course is wrapped up in about 4 layers of cotton-wool as it concerns the atomic bomb. Most people have not realised quite that an atomic bomb has been dropped in Japan and that the world now knows quite a lot about it. I am going to consider the matter and we will have a further meeting tomorrow.

September 12th

I saw the D.G. and told him about the MAY case. I told him that we were having a further discussion and I would let him know the result.

I spent the whole morning talking to Col. Sinthoven on general matters affecting our work. He had two requests to make (1) that we would give about half a dozen of his men a course in this country and (2) that when things settled down we might have a Dutch officer in our records section. My reply was that regrettably it would be impossible at this moment to give a course to 6 of his officers, but that as soon as we settled down into our peace-time organisation we should be very pleased to do so. He said that his difficulty was to keep these officers on the hooks until something was finally settled about his own organisation. He had in mind that they might be kept busy doing a course over here. I told him I did not think we should be in a position to do this for at least a month or two. As regards the officer in the records section, I tried tactfully to turn this off on the Dutch liaison officer in this country by explaining that the FBI had an officer here in the capacity of legal attache at the Embassy and that he was constantly in and out discussing various problems with us and seeking information. If the Dutch wished to have someone here on similar terms we should be only too delighted to receive him.

Albert has been offered a partnership by a solicitor's firm and wishes to leave next month. I said that I thought he ought to accept the offer.

I have asked Sciater to get me out a note on the policing of our own signals in peace time. It seemed to me that there were the following considerations: (1) it was clearly desirable that wireless discipline should be maintained in peace time as far as possible otherwise we should be faced with the same regrettable laxity in war. (2) It seemed necessary to ascertain how far leakage of information either through service or civilian indiscretions constituted a serious problem in peace time. In this connection it was important to bear in mind that bad procedure might lead to a cypher break. (3) We should ascertain whether the services would welcome the establishment of some small body which would take an independent cross-section of their signals from time to time, or whether they would regard such activity as an interference in their internal affairs.

I spoke to Miss Southam about Markee. Passport Control would like to have him on the understanding that he might ultimately return to us afterwards if there was a job for him. It was stipulated however that he would not be withdrawn from Passport Control for about a year and at any rate not until somebody had been suitably trained to take his place.

A.C. came in to tell me that he was seeing Findlater about SIME. He will have a talk with Douglas Roberts first.

He would very much welcome a visit by Victor to Germany so that he could ascertain what German scientists were likely to be of interest to us in the future. He could also get a first-hand appreciation of how valuable scientists were whom it was proposed to send to this country.

We had a meeting with the DG today to discuss a rather petulant letter from Russell. DG was rather inclined to agree with Russell's view that Ceylon could be written off as a DSO point in peacetime. I said that I could not see how Ceylon differed from other fortress areas such as Gib. and Malta. It had one of the biggest naval bases in the Empire and there was moreover a considerable amount of unrest in the island. DG seemed to think that it was not our business to carry out any investigation into such movements. I made it clear that normally DSOs did not do this but that they did stimulate the local police and on the information they received could make the necessary adjustments in security measures. DG finally agreed that if we were to be only concerned with the security of the naval base he saw no objection to keeping an ADSO. He thought however that it was desirable to get Russell back for consultation.

I had a talk with Dick on the telephone. He seemed to be a little worried about the future of the Findlater Stewart enquiry. He had rather got the impression that SIS were building themselves up and that things were getting rather off the rails. I said that this was not my impression. I thought that Findlater was sold on the idea of one responsibility for C.I. activities and for overt representation abroad. The only point that was worrying him was the bridging of the gap between overt and clandestine activities. He had evidently had a volley from Viv. who had given him the impression that 90% of the work done by Sections V and IX abroad was no concern of M.I.5. This however was merely the old narrow conception, that unless an agent of a foreign power was coming to this country MI5 were not interested. It was proposed to

have a round table conference with SIS on this question with Findlater in the chair. This will not take place until Oct. 8th.

Brian Melland came in to talk about Columbine and Padgham. He wants to put Columbine into an official position in the police and will let me know details as soon as he gets back. As regards Padgham he did not see any immediate prospect of employing him. I have since learned however that Padgham is quite ready to go into any civil administrative job in the German Govt. and is not afraid that his past will get him into difficulties. I have written to Melland in this sense.

We gave a dinner to Einthoven who seems to be thoroughly satisfied with his visit to us.

September 13th

I talked to Cussen about the possibility of MAY coming over here and the prospects of getting a case against him. He agreed with me that the difficulties would be very considerable.

AS REGARDS Patterson, he said he would be prepared to release him but he was a little doubtful whether in fact he wanted to go.

I also asked him about the B.5 officers who wanted promotion owing to the fact that they constantly came up against other D.Y. men who were of a lower grade in the police hierarchy but of higher grade in the military hierarchy. This led to considerable difficulties. Cussen after consultation with Joe is putting up a case to the D.G.

I have had a talk with Herbert who has returned from Germany after interviewing FELDMANN. FELDMANN confirms almost everything that Giskes said about Hooper. Feldmann did not apparently altogether trust Hooper and thought that although he had ostensibly been dismissed by SIS he was in fact continuing to work for them.

I saw Kim and John Marriott about the Soviet case. Certain additional particulars have come in although we are still in the dark on many points. We finally agreed amongst ourselves that MAY should be allowed to come although we thought that the meeting might well be cancelled. Meanwhile Halifax and Jumbo Wilson thought MAY should not be allowed to leave Canada. We drafted a telegram for C. to send, the terms of which he agreed to on the phone, and the project was finally given a blessing by the D.G. although he took the view that more might be gained by knocking MAY off in Canada and confronting him with the agent. Personally I there there is much to be said for this course of action but Marriott and Philby were so keen about trying to develop things at this end, where little progress has so far been made, that we felt on balance that it was better for MAY to come. I pointed out however that the difficulties of ever getting a case against MAY would be very great since unless we actually caught him passing the documents to an unauthorized person no action would lie. Meanwhile MAY would be collecting further information from his various contacts in this country, and passing it on.

Trevor Wilson looked in to tell me that the incident between Verneuil and Hope had been

satisfactorily settled. It was fairly clear that a good deal of the blame rested with Verneuil's ADC Germain who had more or less given authority to Hope to proceed with a BST car to the French zone to arrest the renegade Cole. The trouble had arisen from BST taking credit for the whole action and circulating areport on the matter to various offices in France.

When I saw C. the other day at the JIC he told me that it had been decided that it should ~~not~~ be the co-ordinating authority between SIS and SOE. This meant in effect that he would severely rationalise the SOE charter which had recently been put up to the Chiefs of Staff. He would still remain more or less the active controlling head of SIS but would have Sinclair, late DMI, as his Deputy. Politically he thought that this was a good move as he regarded Sinclair as a man who had the confidence of military circles. Although Sinclair is a very pleasant honest chap and a forceful character there is no doubt that he has a great deal to learn about intelligence matters, and he can hardly be regarded on present showing as having more than an average brain.

September 14th
10th 15

I saw the DG about the MAY case. Kim has pressed SIS to let Roger go out and take charge of the case and this has been agreed. Roger is coming up today from leave.

Cayzer brought a Major Hughes to see me. He is going out as ADCO Rangoon. He struck me as being quite suitable. He is anxious I think to stay with us after the war.

I had a talk with Roger, John Marriott and Kim. I suggested that possibly Herbert might go out for a week or 10 days while Roger finished his holiday. We came to the conclusion however that as we were committed to sending an expert on Soviet espionage Roger ought to go. I had

Morton - Evans

I had a talk with ~~M.E.~~ He said he presumed he would be leaving on his demobilisation in 2 or 3 weeks time. It looked to him as if his organisation would be broken up and in any case he no longer wished to stay with SIS. I asked him if he would be prepared to accept a job with us if we were in a position to offer one. He said quite emphatically that he would. He was looking round for other work but so far had had no attractive offers. I told him that at the moment we were precluded from saying anything definite but that I felt fairly confident we should have a job for him to do. He seemed quite pleased at the idea.

I had a talk with Harry Hunter and discussed the shadowing of MAY, who is due to arrive on Monday. It was agreed that Hunter should send someone up to Prestwick. If MAY broke his journey and went to Cambridge we would on notification from Prestwick send someone down to Cambridge to house him. It seemed however likely that he would come to London as he had booked a room at an hotel.

Einthoven came in to say goodbye. He seemed very pleased with his visit.

September 15th

John Noble tells me that Columbine has been offered a job with PWE in Mid East but would much prefer to go back to Germany and take

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up some post with the police on the lines suggested by Brian Melland.

Derbyshire came to talk to me about a Polish Communist Group with headquarters in Cranley Gdns. He wants to get them on check. I said I thought he should do so if he could find a suitable pretext.

Scott came to tell me that he had an offer to take a post in the British vice-consul in Danzig. The salary however was very small. I told him that I could not make a definite offer at the moment and that I thought therefore that he should accept the post in Danzig if he could get the salary increased.

I discussed with Cayzer and Clayton the memo that they had put up on CICE which is to be presented to the JIC after approval by Findlater Stewart and the D.G. It is purely factual but in the last para recommends that CICE should continue on its present lines and might ultimately become an organisation in lines analagous to SIME if the need existed.

I discussed with Douglas Roberts and Alec the memo for the JIC on SIME, and despatched a letter to Findlater Stewart with a copy of the memo for his approval. Later I saw Brooman White who informed me that SIS desired to some extent to pull out of CICE. They want to hand over their SCI units to CICE and to build up their long-term organisation while still maintaining close touch with CICE. We are redrafting the memo for CICE accordingly.

I lunched with Chris Harmer and B-W. I told them as far as I could understand a sugges-

tion had been made, presumably by 'iv. to 'indlaterstewart, that 90% of the work done by Sections V and IX abroad had nothing to do with the Security Service and was concerned mainly with matters which affected only the FO. I was anxious to know how far this was true as it did not as far as I knew accord with the facts. They both said that this statement could only be made on the very narrow basis that the Security Service were only concerned in cases where some action was directed against the U.K. In fact the old Cowgill complex. This view was also confirmed by Klop whom I saw the other day. He said that the whole tendency in Lisbon was to keep information away from the local FO representative.

Dr. LIEBER has been picked up. We may at last be able to get the true story about Mrs. Kraft as he stayed with her on one of his visits before the war.

September 17th

Fish came in to pay his respects. He told me that BOAC were getting rid of Jonikas. He had discovered that Polish pilots of BOAC had been placed in charge of diplomatic bags and that one was missing and had never been recovered. I asked him to tell me the date on which this bag had been despatched as it might be that we had letters in it. I could not understand how it was that we were not informed about this incident by the W.O. whose bag it was.

I had a talk with Joe Spencer who is taking over F.2B and F.2C. He has been informed about the MAY case but John Marriott will continue with it at any rate for the present.

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Bennett came in and I gave him the dope about the MAY case and asked what the vetting situation was. He said that we had only accidentally heard about the atomic bomb in 1943 and that it was only since then that systematic vetting had gone on. He had had a list of all those concerned in the project and they had all been passed over the records. Among these names was that of Allen Dunn MAY and he had ascertained that when he got his exit permit there had been no trace. Subsequent enquiries had shown that the same situation existed today. I explained to him my anxiety about MAY being loose in this country with a recommendation from Cockcroft to atomic bomb circles here. I doubted whether we should ever get a case against MAY or that we should be able to prevent him leaking unless we were lucky enough to get evidence sufficient to put him behind the bars. This seemed to be extremely problematical. I said I was taking steps with C. to get whoever was in authority acquainted with the position as we saw it.

Desmond Orr rang up to say that a Col. Crabtree who is an expert in tanks had been studying certain German documents which he had obtained from the field. These indicated that there had been a serious leakage in connection with our tank production. He was anxious that somebody should have a look at the documents,

copies of which would be given to us if we desired them. I have arranged for Herbert to go down on Thursday next.

MAY has turned up and has been housed by B.6. He flew from Prestwick with Bayfield of the RCMP and a representative of B.6. Bayfield has given me a short note of the case. The agent whose cover name is CORBY, was cypher clerk to the M.A. A few months ago he carelessly left drafts of two confidential despatches lying round where they were found by a charwoman and turned over to the Embassy officials. He was consequently recalled to Moscow, and fearing that he might be liquidated decided to rat with as many documents as he could lay his hands on. He claims that he was sickened by evidence of intrigue and espionage directed against Canada after that country had done so much to aid the Soviet Union in her struggle against the Nazis. Be that as it may Corby decided that his salvation lay in publicity. At 9 o'clock on the evening of Sept. 5th he went to the "Ottawa Tribunal" and there spoke to a woman reporter. She thought the story too hot to handle and advised him to go to the Justice Dept. Next day, accompanied by his wife and child he went to the Justice Building and spoke to the private secretary to the Minister. He also showed him documents which he had extracted from the M.A.'s safe which he and the attache alone had the combination for. The private secretary asked Corby to wait and speak to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs. However Corby was finally turned away with veiled accusations that he was after all in possession of stolen documents. Again he tried the press, this time the Ottawa Citizen, and was referred to the RCMP. He must have become somewhat flustered by this time because the only thing that emerged

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clearly was that he wanted to become a Canadian citizen. Consequently he was sent to the Crown Attorney at the Court House. He spoke to the latter's secretary who again sensing the news value angle called up Le Droit and then the "Citizen", but luckily without success. Wearily Corby returned to his apartment and quickly noticed that the place was being watched. Soon after he got in there was a knock on the door. He did not answer but decided that it would be safer to move into a neighbour's apartment and the neighbours in question phoned the municipal police. Meanwhile Robertson of External Affairs had got in touch with the RCMP. Towards midnight a raiding party led by the NKVD man Vitali Pavlov and including the Asst. M.A. Rojov and tow others broke into Corby's apartment with a jemmy and found no one at home so hid in the room. The City Police duly arrived, found the men in hiding and took their names. They were at first inclined to take them all into custody but were prevented from doing so by the RCMP. The Russians pleaded diplomatic privilege and said that they were in search of one of their employees who had absconded with a sum of money. The next morning the City Police brought Corby to the Justice Building where he was cursorily interrogated. The importance of his information was immediately evident and he was removed to a place of safety where he has been re-interrogated on several occasions at great length. The Soviet Embassy has presented a note to the Dept. of External Affairs asking that a search be made for one of their missing employes. The police have said that he called several days previously at the Dept. of Justice about his naturalisation but that they had not seen him since. They are keeping up the deception by putting a number

of guards in the vicinity of Corby's apartment. Meanwhile Corby himself is in a shack by a lake 110 miles from Ottawa and is being constantly moved round.

September 18th

Luke tells me that van der BERG, a friend of Koessler, is in trouble with the Belgian authorities and wants Thornton and Fanto to give evidence on his behalf. Thornton apparently does not like the idea.

Martin Forrest came to see me about the liquidation of O20. I said that I entirely agreed that we would not receive any more people from the field for interrogation here after the beginning of October, when we would proceed to close the camp down as soon as the interrogation of those who remained was completed.

I.R.B. is to close down on 31.10.45 after which we shall have to make other arrangements for the receipt of censorship material direct from the theatres concerned. In Germany for example we can rely on the Control Commission.

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Further telegrams keep coming in from Canada showing that more Soviet agents have been identified.

I have a letter of introduction for Sergt. Bayfield from Commissioner Wood. From the text of it and also from what Bayfield says, the RCMP would welcome direct communication with ourselves. Indeed this seems highly necessary since all sorts of projects are being put forward by Security Coordination such as the feeding of the agent in the High Commissioner's office with deception material, and if we do not have one central control and see all the telegrams in and out we shall undoubtedly get into a muddle. I have asked John to prepare a memo giving the circumstances of the case and now it arose, pointing out that the authorities have got May here on purpose to see if we can develop matters over here through the man who is going to contact him on Oct. 7th but that in the absence of any supporting evidence or documentary proof we shall be very lucky if we can find a case against MAY. Meanwhile we have the anxiety of his moving in atomic bomb circles and transmitting information by word of mouth which will be impossible to control. He might if he became alarmed attempt to go to Russia. It would perhaps be possible to refuse him a passport but it would be a comparatively easy matter for him to leave the country by Soviet boat. The potential value of his body to the Russians would be far greater than anything he could transmit by contacts here or in Canada. It seems however that we have to take a chance on all this at any rate until Oct. 7th. Before that date however a decision must be reached between the British, Canadian and American Governments as to what action they are ultimately going to take in this case as

a whole. If we find MAY passing documents on Oct. 7th we should normally feel bound to arrest him since it might be our only chance of getting a case and so preventing him for a considerable time from proceeding to Russia, which he knows and visited in 1936. This means that simultaneous action will have to be taken in connection with some 15 agents in Canada and America unless they are to be allowed to burn any incriminating documents that they may have. (All this is of course on the assumption that they and MAY have not already been warned by the Soviet authorities. If arrests are made Corby will be required as a witness and it will be impossible even though the case could be heard in camera here to keep the matter out of the press. Do we therefore want to have a show-down with the Russians or not? Personally I think it would be very salutary. If they had rounded up a gang of our people in Moscow they would without question stage a huge prosecution or else demand their pound of flesh in some other way.

Sciater talked to me about his memo on signals security. He is going to show it to the Signals Branches of the Services. and film out their reactions.

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Briscoe talked to me about a paper on certain of our expert chemist, going to Japan and other territories occupied by the Japs in order to discover anything we can about their secret writing technique or other forms of communication. I suggested that he should communicate with Dixon at CICB.

C. and I called on Wicketts who is deputising for Sir John Anderson in the latter's absence. Roger Maxins who apparently has something to do with these matters on the diplomatic side was also present. We gave them the story of Corby and explained to them the difficulty of having MAY in touch with eminent scientists here and in a position to communicate further information to the Soviet Govt. It was decided to call in Akers of the Research Council. He was told the story in outline and in a certain amount of detail where it affected MAY. He was clearly deeply shocked. He said that if he had been asked to draw up a list of those employed on atomic research in Canada on the basis of their integrity, he would have placed MAY at the top. MAY is an extremely able physicist. He has worked very hard and is considered extremely good in the lab. He has also earned praise for his handling of the younger students. Cockcroft suggestion about MAY are that he should return to his job at Kings College, but in a few weeks time take up a part-time job on a small committee which is to be concerned with the setting up of a Research Institution here which will be producing atomic power in a small experimental way. This institution would only be a small replica of one of those in

Canada and USA but it was of course to be kept up to date by constant reports from the Western Hemisphere to which MAY would normally have access.

Akers had not seen MAY but was expecting to do so some time this week. He would tell him that as the contract for this installation had not yet been placed there was no particular point in the committee meeting and that in any case he had not yet made up his mind what was required. He thought that MAY might then ask whether he could see any of the Montreal reports in order that he could keep himself up to date. AKERS said that although these reports contained information of value to an enemy, no particular one was likely to contain anything likely to be epoch-making. The process of development had all along been very even and gradual. I suggested therefore for his consideration that we might mark any document that was given to MAY in case it was handed over by him and photostatted. If we eventually got the photostat in the possession of the agent we should then be able to say that he must have received it from MAY. It was decided that it would ultimately be necessary to exclude MAY as far as it was humanly possible to do so from any atomic research. Makins thought that this was of considerable importance since if the Americans thought that MAY was still going to be in a position to get information on atomic research they might decide to cease collaboration with ourselves on the whole project. Makins also thought that every possible precaution should be taken to prevent MAY from getting out of the country and worse still going to Russia. I said that it was difficult to have it both ways. The man had been brought back in order that we might develop Soviet contacts

in this country. He was clearly somewhat suspicious and if we were going to follow him about closely from now until Oct. 7th there was a reasonable chance that he would discover that he was under observation. It was important that his suspicions would not be roused otherwise the somewhat slender hope which now existed that we might ultimately get him behind bars would vanish into thin air.

I then raised the question of future policy and the necessity for synchronisation. I said we were putting up a memo on this subject to Cadogan.

September 19th

I saw Newsam this morning and gave him the low-down on the MAY case. He said that he would record nothing but that when he got the warrant signed he would give the gist of the story to the Home Secretary.

I spoke to Kim and to C. about our having direct communication with Hollis. It seemed to me that this was the straight-forward way of handling the case and I hope that ultimately we could canalise everything through this channel. C. did not demur but I doubt whether it will stop Stephenson sending him long telegrams or high-level communications between the High Commission, the D.O. and F.O.

The post-hostilities planning staff of the Chiefs of Staff committee published on the 29th June 1945 a memo on the security of the British Empire. The objects of the report are to establish the strategic consequences of foreign policy and to provide a background against which our long-term plans for Imperial Defence can be formulated. The

review has been projected to the years 1955-1960. The interests of the British Empire are considered as a whole. Imperial Security is described as being in its essence a problem of preventing other powers from imposing their will upon us. This requires both political action and military strength. Under military commitments it is stated that our strategical policy must take account of (a) the possibility of war with the USSR, (b) the need to ensure against the resurgence of Germany and Japan, (c) the possibility of armed conflict with minor powers, (d) the maintenance of internal security, (e) the obligation to place armed forces at the disposal of the world organisation. The world organisation is in no way to be a substitute for the burden of maintaining our own armed forces. Conclusions of the committee are that our over-riding defence commitment is to safeguard the Empire against the possibility of a hostile USSR. Our primary objective must be to avoid a clash but it is felt that the stronger we are known to be the more likely we are to achieve this object. The Empire could not secure its world-wide interests against Soviet aggression without the help of powerful allies. In this respect the support in war of the USA is vital. We should promote close association between the British Empire and a stronger France. In order that a world organisation shall develop on lines which will provide the maximum contribution to Imperial security, we should induce the USA to undertake definite military responsibilities in those areas in which our common interests lie. The relative importance which should be accorded in peace to areas which might be seriously threatened by the USSR is as follows:

(a) first priority must be given to the defence of the UK which is the heart of the

Empire, an essential operational base and contains our main sources of white man-power and industry, and also to the protection of the vital sea communications and air routes of the Atlantic. (b) the defence of the Indian Ocean area ranks second only in importance to that of the UK. It forms a vital link in the chain of Imperial communications. India is of great potential value as a base and as a source of man-power and industry. (c) the Middle East would in war be subject to an immediate threat and the oil-fields in Iraq and Persia which constitute our most important strategic anxiety in the area would be indefensible. The sea and air communications from the middle east are less important than those through the Indian Ocean and might in any case be invalidated as a result of operations in Europe. Defence requirements in the Middle must not therefore be made at the expense of requirements in India and the Indian Ocean. (d) the defence of the Pacific area should be graded lower priority from that of Western Europe, the Indian Ocean area or the Middle East, since a threat in the Pacific would be comparatively remote. Later the paper states that the provision of a highly efficient Intelligence Service is the fundamental problem affecting the preparedness of the Empire for war which requires immediate consideration. This document was later considered by the JIC who have laid down that information on the USSR, its armaments etc. is category A. Cat.B is those countries within the Soviet sphere of influence. Cat.C is Germany and Japan. Thereafter follow the allies and neutrals.

Mills is back from Canada, this time for good.

I saw Canogan at his request. He is worried about the possibility of MAY getting away to Russia. I explained to him our dilemma. If we cannot get a case against MAY he remains a permanent menace and ultimately it will probably be impossible to prevent him from going to Russia. If we follow him about before Oct. 7th his suspicions may be roused and he may be inclined to refrain from making any contact with the Russians here. I said that we would do what we could to look after the aerodrome where the Soviet planes came in and also look into the question of ships. This has in fact been done. While we can exercise some reasonable control over the aircraft, the shipping position is almost impossible since SCO staffs have been disbanded and the ships appear to come in at almost every port. If we circulated MAY's photograph to I.O.s. the garf would undoubtedly be blown.

Cussen has just returned from the JOYCE trial. JOYCE is apparently condemned to death, as far as I can see almost entirely on a point of law. The judge ruled that JOYCE by virtue of the fact that he held a valid British passport, had been domiciled in this country etc.etc. owed allegiance to H.M. and that his allegiance was not affected by his going overseas and in fact lasted as long as the passport was valid. All the jury had to decide was whether JOYCE had adhered to the King's enemies which on evidence that had no difficulty in doing. The case will probably go to the House of Lords.

September 20th and 21st

Away for two days with a cold.

I have read a long report by SCHELLENBERG on the things which led up to the surrender. I should imagine that the account is fairly accurate, except that SCHELLENBERG's desire to build himself up as a farseeing statesman and a party to all that is good and nothing that is bad constantly emerges throughout the narrative.

I have read Klop's extremely interesting report on HILGER. Hilger was at the German Embassy in Moscow continuously from 1920 until the break with Russia in 1941. Klop happened to know him as he was partly instrumental in getting him and Nadia out of Russia at the time of the revolution. In talking with Klop I had said to him how interesting it would be to know precisely what was behind the Russo-German pact of 1939. Klop immediately said that HILGER should be able to give the answer. We then found that Hilger was in the American zone, but that nobody had thought of interrogating him. As soon as we tried to get him to the British zone however we were told that he was due to be flown to America in the course of a few days. We managed however to get Hilger up to Bad Oeyenhausen for 3 days where Klop had a long talk with him.

The first signs of the possibility of a decrease of German-Soviet tension appeared in Dec. 1938 when the German FO was authorised to prolong for a further year the existing agreement for the exchange of goods with the Soviet Union. The Soviet press piped down and Stalin in March 1939 declared at a meeting of the Party in Moscow that there were betw Germany and the Soviet Union no insurmountable differences and only dark forces who would like

to fish in troubled waters have an interest in aggravating them. Hitler was interested in this statement in which a germ existed of an idea to buy off Soviet Russia in the event of Germany attacking Poland. The Soviet Govt. was disappointed by the unsatisfactory progress of the negotiations between Britain and France regarding the conclusion of a military agreement. Russia wished to free herself from the threat of imminent German aggression moreover the prospect of a European war which Stalin had predicted for years and which he expected to create a situation favourable to the interests of the Soviet Union both from the point of view of their political aspirations and their hopes regarding the release of revolutionary movements in the countries in question, was opened up. Stalin had of course had not reckoned with Poland being vanquished within 18 days. He had however believed, according to Hilger, in a long-drawn-out trench warfare in France. Apart from these differences the Soviet Govt. would get a breathing-space to recover from the effects of the 1937-38 period when about 80% of the high Soviet Command had been eliminated. She would also have a free hand in the Baltic States and would obtain without firing a shot what Peter the Great had fought for for 21 years. There was also a prospect of getting Bessarabia.

Ribbentrop by signing this pact opened again for Russia the window to the west. It is not surprising therefore that when in the early days of August 1939 Count Schulenberg, the German Ambassador, put forward proposals for a non-aggression pact the discussion only lasted 23 minutes, and Ribbentrop was brought to Moscow to put his signature to what was already a fait accompli. When he saw Stalin

on August 23rd Ribbentrop stated that all Germany expected from Russia was that she should keep quiet. Germany did not need and would not accept any military aid. She would however like to conclude an economic agreement. Ribbentrop was only in Moscow for a day but returned again on the 26th Sept. when a Frontier and Friendship Treaty was concluded. There was a slight change in the definition of mutual spheres of interest, Russia insisting on the inclusion of Lithuania, while Germany was to have Lublin in exchange. The Russians also insisted on having Lvov, Stalin declaring that the Ukrainians would never tolerate its loss, and the line was made to run so as to include the oil-fields of Drohovytsch and Beryslav. Relations gradually deteriorated a contributory factor being Russia's arbitrary occupation of the Bukovina, until Nov. 1940 when Molotov visited Berlin. He was there only 2 days from the 12th to the 14th. He had a rather sticky interview with Hitler who was full of his conquests and making it quite clear that he regarded England as a defeated nation. He tried to persuade Molotov that the interests of the Soviet Union ought to be directed in the first instance to creating for herself an outlet to the warm open seas such an outlet existed only via Iran to the Persian Gulf. Neither the Mediterranean nor the Baltic offered such a prospect. Hitler thought the Soviet Union should go east while Germany should indemnify herself in the west. Molotov did not think that the moment for such far-reaching agreements had yet arrived. He thought that clarification of German-Soviet relations was more important. On this he could get no very satisfactory answer. After Molotov's visit there occurred an appreciable cooling-off in German-Soviet relations.

On 13.4.41 after the signature of the Soviet agreement with Japan, Stalin appeared on the railway station in order it was alleged to take leave of Matsuoka. Probably however in order to tell the German Ambassador and the Assistant M.A. who were both there that Germany and the Soviet Union were friends and must remain friends. To Schulenberg Stalin remarked further that he (Schulenberg) ought to see to it that German-Soviet friendship was maintained. Stalin's attitude was probably connected with the German military successes in the Balkans. He was obviously in a very nervous mood and thereafter did everything to meet German demands. As late as May the Soviet Govt. caused Tass to publish a statement in which the rumours about German warlike preparations were dealt with. These rumours were denounced as endeavours to poison the atmosphere between Soviet Russia and Germany. It was added that Germany was at liberty to concentrate her troops where she pleased. It was only on 21.6.41 in the evening that Molotov asked the German Ambassador to call on him, pointing out repeated and systematic frontier violations by German aircraft. On the following day Schulenberg called on Molotov in order to state that the German Govt. considered the Soviet troop concentrations near the German eastern frontier inadmissible and had decided to take counter-measures. Molotov replied that he interpreted this statement as a declaration of war in view of the fact that German aircraft had already since 12 hours bombed Russian areas such as Odessa, Kiev and Minsk.

A JIC paper on the future of SOE assigns to them the following tasks: (a) to collate, examine and assess information bearing on

future clandestine operations and to study and develop the art of underground warfare, (b) to train persons to carry out all forms of clandestine activity, e.g. covert propaganda rumours, influencing public persons and minorities and to study objectives for sabotage; (c) to study, devise and maintain small reserves of all material required for sabotage and clandestine operations of all types including communications; (d) in such cases as the appropriate dept. or the Chiefs of Staff may think fit and subject to the express approval of the FO, to serve the clandestine operational requirements of H.M.G. abroad by giving covert support to British national interests where they are threatened e.g. by influencing prominent individuals, disbursing subsidies, countering hostile propaganda and by para-military activities as appropriate; (e) with the concurrence of the FO to undertake any clandestine financial transactions required by the Treasury, and (f) to maintain an organisation which is capable of quick and effective expansion in time of war. The organisation is apparently to be a separate one from SIS but co-ordinated by someone who will have jurisdiction over both SIS and SOE. As this person is to be C. himself it is likely that SOE will be reduced to fairly small proportions and it is moreover pretty certain that the FO whose approval has to be sought will not likely countenance subversive activities in foreign countries.

According to the latest reports conditions in Berlin do not seem to be too good, although there is some improvement in the food situation. Two trends of public opinion if not countered, are considered potentially dangerous. One is a tendency for the population

to compare the good old days of the Nazi regime, with the present terrible conditions. People say that under the Nazis even in war-time ration cards were honoured, whereas now even the restricted ration scale is not met. The second theme is the emergence of the inevitable irredentism. Expressions of amazement and grief that the purest German soil should be handed over to the barbarous Poles. The German Social Democrats are quite prepared to face the present situation and to write about it but in order to put things in their proper perspective they must admit that conditions are bad and are not likely to improve for some time. Whenever they attempt to do this their articles are censored by the Russians on the grounds that they are sowing pessimism among the population.

Sciater learns from Admiralty Signals that evidence is now available to show that their book code was broken by the Germans. The enemy were able to break this after the inspection of 8,000 groups, which is a very much lower figure than it was imagined would be necessary. The Navy had to send out the whole report as to the position of enemy submarines in this cypher owing to the large distribution necessary and apparently the Germans were able to break this continuously but what they could not understand was how we made these reports so accurate. They thought that it was owing to some technical device of which they were not aware. The Germans did not think for one moment that it was due to the insecurity of their cyphers.

Kremer has now admitted that his main source of information was Count Toggenberg who had a number of special sources. His reports were passed on under the cover name of

Josephine from 1942 until the spring of 1944. Thence till Nov. 1944 under the cover "reliable agent". Onadera, the Jap MA had an agent known as Bergmann who was the last M.A. of Ethonia in Stockholm. Bergmann obtained information from the French MA in Stockholm, Col. Garnier. Kramer had no contact with Garnier and nothing to suggest that Garnier was a conscious agent although requests were frequently made for information to be obtained from Garnier.

September 22nd

I had a talk with Burt, Cussen and Marriott when we discussed the CORBY case. I outlined the whole position to Burt. After examination of the evidence in our position here they agreed that no case would lie. It was therefore of the greatest possible importance to obtain a case against MAY. If we saw him passing the document on Oct. 7th we ought to take a chance and carry out an arrest even if we might not be certain that the document passed would constitute satisfactory evidence. I thought however that there might be reasonable grounds for thinking that it would if we could plant through Akers one of the documents from Montreal, suitably marked. Cussen thought that if this document were handed to MAY a day or two before the meeting we might possibly discover where he was keeping it in the meantime and after he left his billet on Oct. 7th ascertain whether the document was still there. If it had been removed there would be a reasonable chance that he had it on him and was intending to hand it to the agent. The difficulty about this scheme was that it would mean taking more people, either at the University or elsewhere, into our confidence. We agreed that

it was necessary to telegraph to Canada arranging that action should be synchronised and asking that they should provide us with signed statements by CORMY and any other documentary evidence which might be useful in formulating a case against MAY.

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September 24th

have today sent a memo on the CORMY case to Casagran with a covering letter suggesting that he should get the agreement of External Affairs and the State Dept. that action should be synchronised and that all 3 covets. were prepared to take the rap, whether action were initiated here, in Canada or in the USA.

At TAN's request I saw Commander Johnston, Mark's brother. He is not getting promotion, largely I gather through ill-health. He is a nice chap but not very impressive. He

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knows about signals procedure and particularly what wireless can do but is in no sense a technician. I am not quite sure whether he would be suitable or not but I could only give him the usual answer.

Gwyer outlined to me his proposals for conducting a post-mortem on MI, and he evidently intends to do it in his usual comprehensive and thorough fashion.

Craighard has produced for me a memo on various industries from which we should like if possible to exclude aliens. The difficulties are immense and it is I think questionable whether we can ever hope to achieve anything effective.

Herbert went down to the School of Tank Technology on Saturday to inspect a number of German documents which they had received from FIAT. The documents contained various references to information which the Germans had received on our tank production. Certain of them referred to reports from Ivan I and Ivan II (the Tricycle group). A great many of them were completely inaccurate and may well have come from Ostro sources, but a few need further investigation, in particular a report and diagram of one of our tanks being made by Vickers Armstrong which was received by the Germans early in 1939.

Herbert and Cussen interviewed Hooper today and told him that the DG had decided to dismiss him. It was pointed out to him that the evidence of 3 witnesses had been carefully sifted and that they largely corroborated each other. It appeared to be perfectly clear that he had deliberately misled SIS in implying that he had not had close contact with the SIS before 1939, that he had betrayed

Dr. Krueger, an SIS agent, to the Germans, and that the latter had committed suicide in prison, and that he had received sums of money from the Germans which he had not disclosed. Hoover continued to deny the allegations and said that he would be writing a memo in reply. He was given one month's salary and was told never to communicate either with SIS or ourselves and to remember that that he was strictly bound by the Official Secrets Act. It was made clear to him that he would not be given a recommendation by either dept.

I saw Joe Stephenson. He thinks that it is possible Skarion and Spooner should be made majors although from the point of view of their work he regards this as unnecessary. He realises of course that he and Burt would have to be made Lt. Colis. I said that I agreed with him as I thought it important that Skarion and Spooner who had worked so well should not be placed at any disadvantage vis-a-vis their subordinates at the Yard. There was no doubt that this sort of thing counted for a great deal in the police.

I lunched with Cyril Mills today and he agreed that he should go back to civil life after his holiday on Oct. 12th.

We have had a demand from the Far East for more bodies. They want 2 GS01's, 2 GS02's, a GS03, 10 shorthand typist secretaries and 5 high-grade registry trained women. There is some idea that we and SIS are going to supply these bodies. This was not however what I had arranged with B-W. I said that it would be doubtful whether we could supply any more officers but that at the same time we wished to have a say in their selection from the Services.

Tommy Harris came in to tell me about GARBO's return. He had quite an amusing time. He followed rather obviously two rather fat-looking Germans to Caldas where we knew that Federico and Kuhlenthal were staying. In this way he notionally discovered their whereabouts. He found Federico in a dejected state of mind and very nervous of Garbo's safety. He said he was continuously watched and he would not be seen speaking to him. He asked him to follow until they reached a wood where a long conversation took place about Garbo's various adventures. He was very worried about being deported to Germany and said that it ever got to the point he intended to go on the run. Garbo warned him against going into exile. He said that he had very bitter experiences of this course of action himself during the last year. Federico little knew what it was to be a hunted man. It would probably be better for him to face up to the situation and comply with whatever instructions were given to him by the authorities. Federico led Garbo to Kuhlenthal who threw his arms round his neck. Pathetic enquiries were made about Garbo's various agents and how they were going to live in the future. Garbo reassured them on these points. Kuhlenthal particularly wanted to know whether agent No.3 was annoyed at the repeated questions about the possibility of an attack on the south of France. We had in fact expressed a certain mild irritation in our messages. Kuhlenthal hoped he had not given offence but pleaded that he had to send on the messages which he received from Berlin. Confidence in Garbo seems to be absolute and methods of communication in the future have been worked out. At the moment there does not seem to be any attempt whatever to reconstitute the G.I.S. in the Peninsular. Garbo said that he would

be going into hiding again and leaving the country for S.America, as he did not think that at the moment Spain was any place for him. He bade his former collaborators a fond farewell. The above is I think a perfect epilogue to the whole Garbo saga.

Alley came to ask me about funds for the Polish C.I. I said I did not think that we ought to make any grant for the C.I. of the Polish forces abroad. We shall confine ourselves solely to the forces in this country.

I saw Akers again in Rickett's room. Roger Maki was also present. Akers said that he had not yet got into touch with MAY. He had ascertained that he had left his hotel on Friday and that he was not returning there. He had rung up Kings College three times yesterday but on each occasion the line was out of order. He will suggest to May that he should come along and see him. He thought he could make some arrangement to pass him a suitable document from Montreal. He would have it typed with certain errors in punctuation so that it would be positively identifiable as the one he had passed to May, whether it was copied or photographed. He asked permission to take Perrin, his assistant, into his confidence over the whole affair. Perrin sits in the same room and is thorough, trustworthy and discreet. This was agreed to. When handing the document to May Akers could quite naturally ask him whether he had adequate means for locking it up. In that way he may be able to discover whether May proposed to keep it in his lodgings or in his room at Kings College. This might just conceivably give us an opportunity of taking a look into the cupboard or desk after May leaves to attend the meeting on Oct. 7th. I explained to

to Rickett and Makins exactly what the difficulties were in preventing May leaving the country if he made a really determined effort to do so, and I told them the measures we had taken. Akers said that the Russians would undoubtedly be in production of the atom bomb within 5 years, if they were very lucky they might do it in 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ or 4. This took into account that they might have already received a good deal of information and that they may well get a good deal more. Even if they get everything we give them they would not be able to set up the plant in less than 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 years. Unfortunately the Americans are publishing a 150-page document on atomic research which, contrary to our wishes, discloses the 2 methods of approach out of 6 which are profitable. This has undoubtedly given the Russians quite a good lead. Akers himself went to America in Nov. 1942 and by December it had been decided to set up a pilot plant. When the contracting firm said that they could construct this plant, they were immediately told to construct a full size plant and to take a chance of its being successful. The plans were submitted to ICI who pointed out no less than a dozen defects which would have made the whole project abortive.

Cussen and I saw the DG on the question of the promotion of Skardon and Sponner. It was agreed that not only their promotion but that of Joe Stephenson and Burt, should go forward.

September 25th

I attended the JIC this morning when our papers on SIME and CICE were discussed. De Guingand, the new DMI was present for the first time. He said that he thought there was a slight discrepancy between the opening para.

and a later para. which indicated that the responsibility was with the Commanders-in-Chief. ACSI thought that Middle East being a zone of latent operations responsibility should lie with the Commanders-in-Chief. I said that the plain meaning of the paper was that SIME should have a status similar to that of DSO Gib. It would be responsible to the Commanders in Chief for supplying them with advice and information but the direction and administration would if the memo was agreed become the responsibility of the DG of the Security Service, to whom complaints would be made if the organisation was not considered satisfactory. The general feeling of the meeting was that they could not quite commit themselves to the paper without referring it to the Defence Committee Middle East. As regards CICB it was more or less agreed that its status should be similar to that of SIME, whatever was ultimately decided about that organisation. The Service people generally seemed reluctant to hand over control of a body which they regarded as important to themselves to a civilian organisation like the Security Service. They did not realise of course that de facto they did this 6 years ago and that they have been almost entirely dependent upon us for the build-up that they have got in the Middle East. If they had got complete control of the organisation and we relinquished all interest in it, they would very soon discover that they were handling something which they did not understand and which they were totally ill-equipped to improve. It is the old idea that C.I. is a job into which you can throw any officer on the retired list and expect to get results. It is of course really a highly

technical subject involving a lot of knowledge and long experience which nobody in the Army has ever had or is like to get.

I discussed with Harker and Charles the case of Kirby-Green. It seems that the Yard would be quite prepared to lend him to us for another 6 months or a year until we could make him a firm offer. I said I did not see really why we could not make him a firm offer now. Charles said that the Treasury rules made this extremely difficult if he was to get the benefit of his 14 years service with the police. Harker said he thought this was really a matter which should be taken up on a higher level and that it was absurd there should be no opportunity for our recruiting from time to time an experienced police officer or indeed a Govt. servant from another dept. without it being necessary for that person to lose in the transaction. Some attempt will be made I think to get the Treasury to relax its rules.

Capt. Lewis, an FSO in 30 Corps, area, in Germany, came to see me in order to get advice on the kind of organisation that he should set up to deal with any kind of subversive movement in the British Zone. I said that I found it somewhat difficult to advise him without knowing a good deal about local conditions. I could however envisage myself dumped down in the area and faced with the same problem and what I should do in the circumstances. Primarily I should try and get under my control a set of basic records showing the identity, photograph, description, date of birth etc. of the population. I should undoubtedly need these in any enquiry that I might have to

conduct. I should carefully sift the information of all informants and try to assess its reliability by any cross-checks that I could put into force. I should work up a network of informants in circles which I thought were likely to be of any importance. I should also make any use I could of various forms of censorship. Lastly I should have to rely to a considerable extent on local police authorities. It would therefore be necessary to ascertain who in the Kripo could be trusted and try him out by various means. Capt. Lewis said that he was aiming at getting two people into each dienststelle of the Kripo and that at the moment he was using their basic records. He had a few informants and others were being run by C.C.U. but so far without any very positive results. Frontier control was difficult and people could move about freely from one area of Germany to another. The strongest control was on the Dutch Frontier and on the border between our zone and the Russian zone. Censorship at the moment was purely on a catch as catch can basis. Certain mail bags were selected from time to time and examined. If however a letter looked suspicious there was no means of getting hold of any further letters to the same address. There is no telephone censorship at all. As regards personnel, he was extremely shorthanded and very few had any experience at all in CI matters. In each FSP section there were not more than two who could speak German. He seemed quite pleased with the discussion, which he said had given him a number of ideas. I told him that if there was anything else he wanted to know or if we could be of any further help he should let me know.

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Dick rang up to ask me about the JIC meeting the result of which he seemed to think was on the whole fairly satisfactory.

I told him that the meeting with SIS was fixed for Oct. 8th but might possibly be postponed a day or two.

Drew rang up about the leakage of information through Reuters on the Govt's proposals on the future govt. in Palestine. An article had apparently appeared in the Observer of last Sunday which was I gather extremely near the knuckle. Drew wanted to know whether we could discover the source of the leakage through anyone in Reuters. I said unfortunately the only two people we had with a line on Reuters were away at the moment and in any case it would be an extremely difficult thing to discover. There are of course many people in Cabinet circles of Jewish origin who must be aware of the Govt's proposals and it is conceivable that there may have been talk on a high level. It is characteristic that our proposals can appear in the Observer when we who are vitally concerned in the future of Palestine have never been given a sight of them.

I had a talk with Marriott and Later on Marriott brought over a file of telegrams some of which were dated the 22nd Sept. and on which action was required. This is a typical example of inefficiency and the kind of thing that results when two offices are handling the same subject. I said that I did not wish to upset Stephenson, or make Roger Hollis's task more difficulty but that quite frankly I could see no possible reason why the Security Co-Ordination should be having a finger in the pie at all. The matter was purely one between

ourselves, RCMP and the FBI. If we wanted guidance on matters of higher policy we could get it ourselves from the I.O. In fact we had already done so. Stephenson is apparently kicking up at the idea of our communicating direct with the RCMP and cites the British High Commissioner as supporting his view. This of course is typical of Stephenson. He came into the case through external affairs and having set himself up as the Great Panjandrum, does not now wish to be knocked off his perch. Everything that he does or does not do is a matter of personal prestige and the organisation has to suffer accordingly.

September 26th

I had a talk with Akers on the phone. He said he had dined with May last night. May's whole demeanour was perfectly normal and he showed no particular eagerness to continue with atomic research although he was quite ready to do the work if the University would allow it. Actually he said that Kings College took the view that if he wished to give a third of his time to the Committee that it was proposed to form, that time could not be taken out of his lecturing period but would have to come out of his research period. Asked about documents, May expressed no particular eagerness to receive copies of everything coming from Montreal. He did say however that it might be useful to him to see certain reports if he was going to serve on the Committee. Akers asked him what means he had for locking these reports up. He replied that he had a strong wooden cupboard with a good lock at the University but that if necessary of course he could get hold of a steel filing cabinet. Asked if he had papers coming over, he said that there

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were a certain number, including his notebooks. Akers explained that it would of course be the normal custom for DSIR to open all such packages and enquired whether he had anything of a particularly personal nature, which of course DSIR would not wish to open. He said that he had nothing of the kind and raised no sort of objection to the papers being examined on arrival. Normally Ellis, Scientific Adviser to the WO, would be his professor at the University. If however does not return May is unaware at the moment what arrangements will be made.

May mentioned that he would be staying at a friend's flat but that he could always be got at the University. Akers will be seeing him later in the week. Meanwhile he is going to look out some suitable reports.

The package addressed to Perrin, DSIR, No. 119 arrived this morning and was opened. It consisted of an attache case roughly 15 x 10 x 4½ with a lead seal but unlocked, wrapped in brown paper on which was stencilled Perrin's name. The contents will be carefully examined but there is nothing to suggest that any of them were intended for May. Akers is anxious to know whether the parcel corresponds to the description of the parcel handed in by Burcham or whether Burcham's papers were put into the attache case and wrapped up as described by the High Commissioner's office. I have told Akers that we can wire out and let him know.

May has made contact with a party member who is arranging for his accommodation. We have also identified from the records two underground party members with whom he has established contact since his return. As Akers seems to be a little sceptical after his

interview with May I have wired to Canada suggesting that we should put him wholly in the picture. He will then I think cooperate more thoroughly.

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Lennox came to talk to me about a conference which he was to attend on the question of aerial photographs. I said that it was entirely a Service matter but that if they decided that any particular area should not be photographed we should like to know what the area was and the reasons for keeping it secret. Lennox then threw out a hint that it was very necessary to have someone who moved about in fairly high circles and was kept informed on matters of this kind. I said "Quite".

Dick rang up to say that the DG had arrived quite safely and that he was spending the day

with "onnie Haylor and would be going to Hamburg tomorrow. I told him that the DG was quite sold on the question of our taking over SIME if this was agreed by the Defence Committee. Dick then asked me about his views on representation abroad. I said that as far as I knew he thought the plan was a good one and that he would not be averse to seeing us having at least a footing in Passport Control.

I am very anxious to get a proper Russian section going as early as possible. It is difficult to see how this can be done satisfactorily until we can reorganise the shape of the office.

I have arranged for Klop to see Dr. Fritz HESSE.

Finzell came in to say goodbye. He is going back to Australia via Washington where he will be seeing the FBI. He is a little doubtful about the future of his organisation although he understands that his particular branch which deals with subversive movements is likely to continue.

There is evidently a tendency in Australia to pack up on security and Evatt the Minister of External Affairs does not seem to appreciate the necessity of having an efficient organisation. I told Finzell that we should be wanting to establish contact with Australian Security from Singapore as soon as we got settled in.

WEBER-DROHL who was one of the first spies to land in Eire, wrote on 17th June a full confession to a priest. Dan has never sent us a copy of this but we have now received one from the Doc. It is quite one of the

most human documents that I have seen. W-D is a somewhat disreputable character nearer 60 than 50 who at one time used to put on a music-hall act with what were described as two sparsely-clad females. He is said to have illegitimate children in various parts of the globe. Apart from this he has a married daughter in America and a son in Eire. Ostensibly he came to visit his son having stowed away on a trawler at Antwerp. Actually he came in a German submarine which put him off in a small boat which capsized before it reached the shore. The following are some extracts from his account:-

"When I asked how I will be brought to Ireland, the man said that he does not know yet, but that it will be told to me before I would leave Bremen. A few days later, we then went to Bremen again to the last meeting, and after the meeting another man escorted me to my hotel to my room, and there I was then told that I will be transported to Ireland with a U-boat, but the ice is holding the departure up. I will have to remain yet a few days in Bremen, and during that time he will give me my full and final instructions, and all I need to know. He asked me to count my dollars in his presence, and so I did, and then he told me that I should pack up 16,000 and some odd dollars in equal packages, and put gumt paper round it to hold it tight together, and stitch those packages then in the underfodder in my overcoat, across the back so no one can notice it.... That evening then after he had left I packed up my dollars and stitched 16,000 in the back of my overcoat and the rest of the dollars I put in packages too into my hand-coffer (small suitcase) and when the man came to me the following day I then showed him how I had done the job, and he said well-done.

...Now if ever anything should happen, that I get somehow or another in trouble, or be arrested and questioned about things, how I have come to Ireland, shall I tell then, that I landed from a U-boat? For heaven seek no the man said; never tell by all means and no matter what may happen, that you were sent on this mission, or anything about being landed from a U-boat, to anyone..... An hour later the U-boat left for Helgoland, where it had stopped two days, from where I wrote my last letter home, and then it departed to destination, under water. Somewhere near Sligo, I was after the long under Water journey landed in a little boat from the U-boat by an officer. On the way to Ireland from Helgoland the U-boat and its crew went without a doubt through lots of dangers. Twice, somewhere near Norway the boat and to submerge in such a hurry to save itself from bomb, that it stood on its nose. Once, bombs cracked all round it, and the electric light went out for a long time and we had to lay still the whole day, until things had been repaired again. On its way through, it fired a good many torpedoes, and everyone it seemed to me has been a hit, because the "after-explosion" was heard every time. I prayed all the way from Helgoland to Eire and I was more than glad, when I was told to get ready to be landed in Eire. The little row-boat, in which I was brought or rowed to the shore, was overtaken from behind where I sat, by a powerful high wave, and it turned a "back-somersets" with myself and the man who rowed it in it, and as I cannot swim, I sank to the "ocean-bottom" with my little satchel, where I had my own money in it, and which I held in my hand, very quick. When I touched ground, I felt that I was able to hold my breath any longer and that I will have to drown, and I started then with all the

might I had in me, to kick with my feet and move my arms, and all certain by some kind of movements of my arms, I started to go upward again, and I felt then my head bumped against the overturned boat to which I hung on then with one arm, and was then able to get my head above water. The officer soa me then and he said, hang on to the boat, hang on, I touch ground. He had the boat by a rope in front, pulling it with me hanging on to it vomiting salt-water, towards the shore, when another big wave fell over us, pitching boat and the two of us, on the "Sacred soil of Eire".alive. The officer and I, stood there shivering, I still holding the handle of my lost and drawned satchel in the hand, and he told me then after we had put the boat into the water again, that I should disappear now as quick as I can, and he rowed then out again, towards the U-boat, and I started for inland in the dark, as quick as I could, but the stones were very slippery as if they were soaped, and I fell very near every few steps to the ground into the stones, and after I had gone about 40 or 50 yards, I fell again, and dislocated and knocked out my left knee but as I had realised right away what was wrong, I managed in the exiting state I was in, to force and set my dislocated "knee-joint" back in its proper place, and I tighed several Handezzerchiefs round it, and after I had layed there for about an hour wet and in the cold wind, I finally managed to rise, and drag myself into the nearby fields in the dark.....I stayed the whole day and night, and the following morning in twilight, I started to limp over wet fields, toward a "Church-tower", visible from beyond a hill. When I came nearer to the Church, I reached a main road and as I was limping along it, I met a man on a bicycle, whom I asked, what

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time the boss would pass by, and he said it must come now any minute, and just the time I had spoken to him, the boss came round the bent. I signalled to stop, which he did, and with it I went on to Sligo. I stayed then in the boss, and arrived in Dublin towards evening, yet wet to the skin and cold. This was on February the 8th. Right after my arrival I went to a store, and bought clothes and underwear, and new shoes and things, as the knees of my pants were all torn, and after I had changed my pants I went to Dr Cuniha on Westland row, who was very surprised at my arrival from Germany.....I have lost now since 2.1.45 my home at Nurnberg...my people have no place to sleep, they have to put up in an "Air-shelter" since, and to add to all of that I didn't only lose every thing I possessed at home, but lost every dollar I had and I dislocated my knee, and now since I am interned I have become practically a helpless subject, not even able to dress myself alone, and can only walk very little and a few minutes in the mornings and evenings, with the support of crutches, and on Easter Monday I fell down those stone steps in front of the building with my crutches, broke one rib, smashed up my Ear, and hurted my "rump-bone", that I wasn't able to sit for weeks, without pain in the rectum, and it all that isn't an unnumberable Torture, and enough to make any crazy and fell so down-heated, that he rather prefers death then to live a suffering life, such as I have had since I put food on the soil of Eire, then I do not know what the real meaning of Humanity is and "Christian-love" and charity"

After his arrival, it will be seen, he delivered 16,000 dollars to an agent at an address in Dublin and this money was apparently passed to Stephen Carol **HELD**.

Before his departure he had been in touch with GOERTZ who was to follow him a fortnight later. He says in his confession however that the man interned in Ireland as GOERTZ is not the man he knew as GOERTZ in Germany.

September 27th

Houseman rang up to ask whether we were prepared to draft a telegram for JIC Cairo based on the minutes of the JIC meeting on Tuesday where the future of SIME and CICB was discussed. I agreed that we would do this and submit it to the JIC Secretariat.

Telegrams keep pouring in from Security Co-Ordination about the Corby case. Corby says that the Russians are constantly talking about world war 3, and that they regard the San Francisco Conference with complete scepticism, that the declaration made by the Ukrainian Govt. that they were independant and the fact that they took a contrary view on some minor point to the Soviet Govt. was all a put up job. It is of course difficult to say how far this somewhat warlike attitude of Soviet officials is due to fear that they themselves will be attacked.

Adogan has wired to External Affairs in Canada asking them whether they are prepared for a show-down with the Russians and if so whether they would agree to take simultaneous action with us. A similar approach has been made to the U.S. Govt.

A report from the field by an Abwehr character who was acquainted with the Zigzag case is interesting. He says two things of importance (1) that the sabotage carried out by Zigzag was the only really successful operation of the kind that Abt. 2 carried out

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in this country and even at all. (2) that from 1943 onwards the German Govt. decided not to embark upon any further acts of sabotage in this country as they held the view that industry was so dispersed in England that no effective results would be achieved. Moreover they felt that it would be easy to effect repairs in a very short time.

September 28th

I had a talk with Alec Kellar, Harry and Charles about the drift telegram which JIC are sending to Mid East. We added a para. indicating that the question of finance and other details would be worked out in London. All therefore that the Defence Committee have to decide is a question of principle. The question of finance will of course be a difficult one. Charles apparently has no objection to officers being paid by the W.O. provided the pay is not delivered to them through our channels. If all the pay and allowances for the staff of SIME were to be on the Secret Service vote we should undoubtedly have a lot of trouble. It seems therefore almost inevitable that we must allow the Services to pay at any rate a certain number of staff although in principle I should feel it was much better if they did not. The trouble is that he who pays the piper calls the tune and unless the officers are our officers body and soul they are always liable to interference. However I can see that we may have to put up with this.

Akers came to see me at my request. I wanted to put him more fully into the picture. I told him the whole story of the May case

I think he appreciated

being told everything and that he will in consequence collaborate more wholeheartedly. I had the feeling that after his interview with May he had begun to be somewhat sceptical. Akers told me that Cockcroft would be returning early next week and that in view of the telegram received advising the inspection of all documents coming in the High Commissioner's bag to the DSIR he would like to consult with him before a final decision was made and a plausible excuse were found for planting on May documents received from Montreal.

I had a word with Giles Isham who is just going out as DSO Palestine. He is a pleasant person and has had a certain amount of experience in the Middle East. He does not however impress one as being a man with very great drive.

M.E. brought Hester to see me. Hester is taking over from him in 10 days time, but will only be staying till the end of the year. There is no doubt that both Hester and M.E. see eye to eye with us in our views about the future of RSS. I suggested that as soon as ME left RSS I should make arrangements for him to have a frank talk with Findlater Stewart. He was unable to do so when F.S. visited Barnet as G.P. and Maltby never drew breath.

B-W came to see me. He had just returned from Paris. He was a little worried about Peter Hope being asked to take on jobs which were perhaps a little outside his sphere. He said that Hope himself was worried. I told B-W that as far as I knew everything going to him was bottle-necked through Cussen who was extremely careful about watching this. I suggested therefore to B-W that he should talk to Cussen.

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September 29th

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King-Salter rang up about the telegram to JIC Cairo. He proposed to circulate it for comments but not to say that it was drafted by us as this might cause comment. He would make a note on the JIC file of my amendments to the minutes, but would not give them any circulation.

Wren came to talk to me about Lt. J. McNAUGHTON. Wren had known Mrs. McNAUGHTON when she was employed at Security Co-Ordination. She had been evacuated from Singapore before the invasion and her husband had been taken prisoner, but had just returned to this country. He told Wren that he had something which he wished to disclose to the authorities. Briefly it was that for 14 months he had broadcast from Tokyo on a beam to America. He had been drawn into this by threats but had only according to his own account given the names of prisoners in captivity and taken part in certain sketches with other Britishers. An Australian named Major Cousin had later joined the party and according to McNaughton had used the broadcasts as a means of putting over information. I told Wren that if he would give me McNaughton's address we would send someone down to interview him. It looked to me like a mild case of collaboration.

October 1st

I had a meeting with Akers, Cockcroft, Hollis, Marriott and Rothschild, when we discussed the May case. In spite of the instructions which Cockcroft had given that all documents returning from Canada were to be subject to inspection by DSIR, it was thought that it could be arranged that something should be passed to May which he might transmit to the Russian agent on Oct. 7th. During this discussion it emerged that in the documents which were on their way to this country in the High Commissioner's bag there were 3 copies of a diagram relating to development in America which May was certainly not entitled to keep. They should have been handed in at Montreal. First of all it was difficult to understand why he should want

3 copies and secondly there was the rather sinister fact that these particular documents were not in the list submitted by May to Cockcroft before his departure

We then considered the general project of high-level deception. Both Akers and Cockcroft thought that this proposition was not feasible particularly if the Soviet had access to people of the type of May who would very quickly see that the documents were being planted.

In the list of facts about the British War Effort Lord Keynes is reported to have shown:
1. total British casualties were two and three quarters as great as those of the USA forces, ~~xxxxxxx~~ with losses in killed and missing $3\frac{1}{2}$ times as great; 2. Members of the British forces contributed twice as much in man-years as did the U.S. forces, and this does not take into account the services of

the Home Guard and Civil Defence; 3. 55% of British total labour force was mobilised into the forces or into war production by June 1944 compared with 40% of the U.S.; 4. The U.K. suffered from 2 to 3 times heavier deterioration of capital plant and equipment in non-war industries than did the US; 5. The U.K. suffered the loss of external investments 35 times as heavy as those of the U.S.; 6. Civilian consumption in the U.S. increased 16% during the war years, while U.K. consumption simultaneously decreased 16%; 7. The British public paid 53.3% of their cost of the war in taxation compared with 47.7% of the American people; 8. Total British war expenditure was 50% greater than that of the US. 9. The national debt of the U.K. grew to a total 60% greater than that of the US; and 10. British Commonwealth merchant shipping was reduced from about 40,000,000 dead-weight tons to 19,500,000 while U.S. shipping simultaneously increased over 4 times, to 50,000,000. Lord Keynes also demonstrated to Americans facts about the British loss in housing due to the war, and proved by specific statistics that British national wealth as a whole had suffered a 20% decline during the war.

Tommy Harris has shown me the telegrams and intelligence reports found in the archives of Gruppe West which relate to the invasion period. They contain whole chunks of Garbo and are being carefully examined by John Gwyer.

Cayzer came to talk to me about the question of personnel for the Far East. He is doing what he can about the recruitment of female staff. Meanwhile he has in mind one Tilton formerly of the Shanghai police whom I am going to see. It is possible that we might

send Walker although I do not know whether he would be willing to go. What we really want is someone to take Courtney's place. We shall probably be forced to abandon the DSO position in Ceylon owing I think to some extent to the machinations of Russell. The Governor has apparently expressed strong views that he thinks a security officer would be an embarrassment, particularly in the event of Ceylon getting dominion status.

Cussen, Hollis, Marriott and I discussed the arrangements for the party on Oct. 7th. We agreed that unless very exceptional circumstances arose no action should be taken. We should merely observe proceedings. We discussed all the contingencies that might arise. At the moment no decision has been reached on a high level as to whether the three Governments will face up to the consequences of arrests here and in Canada. Robertson and Mackenzie King are on their way over and will talk the matter over with Bevin and Truman does not wish to commit himself till he has seen Byrnes who will be returning from the conference here at the end of the week.

October 2nd

Harry Allen told me that the W.O. were jibbing at our draft telegram for the Defence Committee Middle East on the future of SIME. They have got some complex about the administration of military personnel coming under MI5. This of course has no substance and we are going to try and write them off.

I had a talk with Alan Roger who is leaving in the course of the next two days for Hong Kong. He should do well and seems very keen.

Hollis showed me a draft telegram which he wishes the F.O. to send to Halifax and MacDonald dispelling certain doubts which seem to exist in the minds at any rate of the Canadians that a show-down with the Russians is likely to cause serious damage to political relations. I am sure that this is a mistaken notion and that failure to strike and to strike hard can only cause a loss of prestige in Russian eyes and lead to further excesses and misunderstandings.

Rothschild came to talk about his future. He is going to Paris and possibly also to Germany to clear up a few matters, to sell his cars, after which he will complete the B.I.C. history and fix up the museum. He will then be available to go into scientific matters generally. He would like however to get his position in this respect reorganised.

I had a talk with Tilton who is a prospective candidate in the far East. He started in the Portsmouth Police and joined the Shanghai police a good many years before the war. He served with them until just before the Jap invasion when he left for India. He has since been working as an Air Force officer on Air Force Security matters. He is not yet demobilised but should be out in a few weeks time. He would be quite pleased to take a job for us but would like to feel that there was some security of tenure. He is tough but quite likeable. He has obviously had very valuable experience. I should say that he was more a man of action, as an ADSO in a place like Rangoon, than a person suitable for static work in C.I.C.B.

Marriott showed me an intercept saying that Engelbert Broder, an atomic physicist in Cambridge who is known to be a Party member, is in touch with MAY whom he is anxious to see.

I spoke to Howe and told him that as there seemed practically no prospect of any action on Oct. 7th it was really not worth my while coming down to see him. He told me that he had said nothing to Canning and would not do so in the meantime. I assured him that as soon as things boiled up I would come down and give him the whole story and he seemed quite satisfied with this arrangement.

October 3rd

Vesey showed me certain German documents which had been sent over by NID for our inspection. They relate to an Ainz Marine network set up before the war which will obviously be worth careful study.

Cussen talked to me about the case of Skardon and Spooner. Hill as put forward a variety of reasons indicating that the proposal would not be acceptable to the W.O.

I attended the meeting called by Sir William Palmer of BOT to discuss the extension of the scheme for bringing German scientists and technicians to this country which will involve the bringing to this country of a further batch of Germans. The idea is to put them into industry which will not necessarily be armament industry. It was stated for example that the Germans had a new process for making tissue paper and the services

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of several technicians would be of value to British industry. Newsam and I both gave our customary orations on this subject which has come up so often before that we know it almost by heart. I told the meeting exactly what had happened before the war both as regards machine tools and people of the type of LACHMANN. We were anxious therefore to prevent a repetition and to avoid being

placed in a position where we could do nothing but look on at a form of legalised espionage, against which we were powerless to act. I said that I was not worried about the next two or three years and if therefore we could get the benefit of the brains of these people and then get rid of them I should be perfectly satisfied. Newsam however made it clear to the meeting that if Germans were brought here, married British subjects and had British born children, and did not in any way misbehave themselves, it would be virtually impossible for the Home Secretary to turn them out. Some people at the meeting talked rather aerially about there being no war for the next 25 years. I said I thought this was a very bold assumption and that in so far as Germany was concerned, I should not be surprised to see her virtually in control of her own country within 2-3 years or a large proportion of it still within the Russian orbit. There would be nothing to prevent Germans from going back to their homes, whether they were in the British, French, American or Russian zones. The meeting was left in the air and we were asked once more to submit a memo on the security aspects.

The D.G. has collected various books which he found at the Gestapo headquarters in Berlin. One refers to the British Secret Service and is based on interrogations of Stevens and Best.

I am honoured by being mentioned as a co-worker in MI5 and Curry is referred to as dealing with NSDAP matters. Cookie is also of course in the limelight. I only saw Stevens once, just before the war. Generally speaking German knowledge about our intelligence services at the date of publication, some time in 1940, or 1941 is extremely sketchy. Opinion seems to be divided as to whether M5 is under Scotland Yard or the W.O.

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October 4th.

Alley came to talk to me about the allocation of funds for Polish security. It is I think hardly in our interests to support the existing organisation which looks after the secur.

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ity of Polish forces here and to some extent those abroad. While it is true that nothing we have seen from this organisation is likely to have an anti-Lublin bias, it nevertheless has a certain value if checked against other records. If there is no Polish security here and no responsible body to which we can go we shall obviously be at a considerable disadvantage. The Treasury have frozen Polish funds and are not prepared to release them without FO approval. It seems now that we shall probably have to go to Urme-Sargent.

Hunter and Burt came to tell me that they have got a room at the pub which overlooks the rendezvous. The matter has been arranged on a convenient pretext.

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I talked to Clayton and Ryde, Cayzer and Noble about S. Africa. There is a new Commissioner of Police named Palmer who appears to be a satisfactory person. Baston has retired and Coetzee has died. The S.O I. through whom we sent our cypher communications is packing up and it seems desirable that if the police have now been purged and the Commissioner is a reliable person that we should be in direct cypher communication with him in the future. As regards the results of the interrogation of Germans concerned with South African affairs, these should go through the High Commissioner to Smuts. It seemed eminently desirable to us all that Michael Ryde should pay a visit to S. Africa, taking this

information with him. He could hand it over to Forsyth or to Smuts himself and then discuss with them what our future relations should be. Hyde is quite prepared to go, provided the DG will give his sanction.

came to see me on the introduction of C. He is apparently in charge of the security of Most Secret sources and is ascertaining on C's behalf how the material is handled in the various offices. I told him more or less how it was handled here and introduced him to Noble, Kellar etc. In order that he could get further details. He came in to see me before leaving and expressed himself as highly satisfied that adequate security precautions were maintained.

October 5th

The case of the renegade WOLKOFF in the Soviet Embassy in Istanbul has broken down. In accordance with instructions he was telephoned to at the Soviet consulate. The telephone was answered by the Russian Consul General on the first occasion and on the second by a man speaking English claiming to be WOLKOFF but clearly was not. Finally contact was made with the Russian telephone operator who said that WOLKOFF had left for Moscow. Subsequent enquiries showed that he and his wife left by plane for Russia on Sept. 26th. WOLKOFF had offered to give a very considerable amount of information but much of it appeared to be in Moscow. WOLKOFF estimated that there were 9 agents in London one of whom was said to be the "head of a section of the British counter-espionage service". WOLKOFF said he could also produce a list of the known regular NKGB agents of the military and civil intelligence and of the sub-agents they employed. In the list are

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noted about 250 known or less well known agents of the above-mentioned services with details. Also available were copies of correspondence between London and General Hill of SOE in Moscow. WOLKOFF maintained that the Soviet authorities had been able to read all cypher messages between our F.O. and Embassy in Moscow and in addition to Hill's messages

The Russians had according to WOLKOFF two agents inside the F.O. and 7 inside the British Intelligence Service.

Interrogation of Pretorius is interesting as he knew quite a lot about our D.A.s. He joined the Abwehr in Hamburg as early as 1935. He mentioned a young German student called ALLNOCH who sometime between 1938 and the outbreak of war supplied reports on industries in England while attending the London Polytechnic. He wrote to a cover address in Hamburg. Since the war ALLNOCH has been in the German Army. In talking of UNLAND and his attempts to get money Pretorius said he was the only one who thought that payments could easily be arranged via a third country. In actual fact according to Pretorius this was hard, and Hamburg had no such facilities or connections in the USA.

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Speaking of TATE he said that the Germans did consider giving him a higher award than the EK1 and 2 but whereas Hamburg maintained that he deserved it if only that he had performed his task so long, Berlin held that his reports were not of sufficient value to

warrant it. The genuineness of the traffic was often doubted and it was suspected that the English Abwehr had taken it over but the answers to personal questions made it quite clear that it was still with whom the Germans were dealing. Pretorius says that the outbreak of war in Sept. 1939 found 1st Hamburg very badly supplied with agents abroad. They had no W/T or S/W so that censorship alone put a stop to their reports. S/W was not used until late in 1940. In July 1940 a conference was called in Kiel at which Canaris and other leading Abwehr personalities were present including Pieckbrock, Wichmann, Rantzau @ Ritter, and Sensbueg. Canaris gave the order at this conference that all possible efforts were to be made to recruit and train agents to be dropped by parachute on England and that such missions would be known as Unternehmung. So far as Pretorius remembers some 6-8 agents were despatched including TATE who proved a great success as a W/T operator as communication with him was maintained right up to 1945. Paul Richter who was sent here early in 1942 was a German Czech who wished to gain full German nationality by undertaking a mission. He was first to come by boat from Holland and land in the Wash. The scheme was subsequently rejected by Berlin and he was dropped by parachute with of course the results which we know.

October 6th

We had a further conference, Marriott, Burt, Hunter and I, on the staging of the operation for tomorrow. One man was to see MAY in at the Tottenham Court Road end, Hunter and Burt established in the pub with one watcher, and a car with one watcher would be stationed down Montagu St. near a call-box with which

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which we arranged communication. Tommy Harris would drive through the area in a car a few minutes before 7 and a few minutes before 8 in order to cover the possibility that the meeting had been arranged according to Summer Time.

At Burt's request I went down to see Howe. I explained to him the whole of the proposed operation. Before my arrival he had rather been suggesting to Burt that S. ought to be called in. Having heard my account however he quite spontaneously said that he did not think that the police should play any part at this stage.

Dick returned late this evening.

October 7th

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At 4.15 MAY dialled TIM and synchronised his watch. We thought this was rather suspicious. In fact however nothing at all happened and as far as we could possibly ascertain there was no attempt on the part of the Russians to cover the meeting. We cabled the result to Canada.

October 8th

I attended a meeting at the D O. in Sir John Stephenson's room. Neville Butler, Bromley, Hollis, Clutterbuck and Norman Robertson of Canadian External Affairs were present. We explained what had happened on Sunday and said that in order to make further plans we really wanted to have a high-level decision as to what action should be taken. McKenzie King had had a short talk with Attlee but no conclusion had been reached. Norman Robertson thought that the whole matter was somewhat

bound up with the policy of ourselves, Canada and America in regard to questions of sharing atomic research with the Russians. It would make it a political difficulty to do this both in the USA and Canada if there were no publicity given to the fact that the Russians had been operating such an extensive spy net-work. If it were decided not to give the information to the Russians I think that by and large our viewpoint was accepted that it could only be regarded as a sign of weakness if we failed to act. Norman Robertson wondered whether the information about the atomic bomb could be given to the Russians on some sort of understanding that there should be greater freedom for British subjects to move about Russia and in the Russian zone. In other words that light and air should be let into the country. I said that while I thought the Russians might agree to these conditions they would never carry them out in practice. It was almost fundamental to the continued existence of the USSR in its present form that light and air should not get into the country. If the people realised that they had been hoaxed about conditions in western Europe in the last 28 years they might see fit to overthrow their present rulers, who were doubtless very conscious of this fact. What we were really up against was the one-party state, which could never afford to tell its own people the truth and thereby constituted one of the greatest menaces to world security. It was agreed that the FO should put up a note to the Foreign Secretary embodying Norman Robertson's views and attempt to get a decision from McKenzie King and also from Truman. We stressed the urgency of the matter as otherwise we felt the case would simply go cold.

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[redacted] seemed to think that things were working on the right lines but pointed out the urgency of getting more personnel for CICB. Owing to the sudden cessation of hostilities in the Far East it had been necessary to send out officers to various areas which had been occupied by the Japs. This meant that headquarters were very short handed. It seems that the Army are rather looking to us to supply bodies and to pay for them. This would be all right if we had the commitment and the money. At present we have neither. It may moreover be desirable to have the officers paid by the Services in order to keep down the S.S. vote.

Dick, Teresa, Victor, Michtell and I discussed the Jack case. We all agreed that it should go on if possible and a new approach to the matter of pay is to be made.

October 9th

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I had a further talk with Cayzer about personnel for the Far East. I think he has persuaded Tilton to take up the job. I subsequently talked about the whole question with Charles and Horrocks. Horrocks now says that he has no female staff at all available, having previously said he had a long list. Charles naturally wants to know who is going to pay. I think I shall have to go and see

Brig. Way and try to get something settled. Meanwhile we are to have a meeting on the whole question on Friday with the DG.

Malcolm Cumming came to talk to me about the censorship of telegrams sent by cable companies and wondered how far this was covered. I said that we had previously covered it

He then asked me about the house of B.6. He thought it undesirable that they should be in a government building. It would be preferable if they were alongside a firm of solicitors. I agreed that it would be unfortunate if it could be established that our watchers were connected with the Govt.

Sclater came to tell me about a conference with the Wireless Telegraphy Board which was discussing the possibility of giving private firms facilities for communication or wireless within this country. We have been asked to put up a paper on the security aspects of the subject.

Jugoslavs are still running a transmitter which has been taken over by the Embassy.

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October 11th

We have arranged for a list of undesirable diplomats to be circulated to Passport Control. Embassies abroad will be instructed not to grant diplomatic visas without prior reference to PCO.

I had a talk with Vesey and Cussen about renegades from the Far East. We decided to put forward a suggestion that slips should be issued to all returning British subjects telling them that if they wished to give any information relating to British renegades they should communicate with Room 055.

Eyres Monsell who is in charge of IB in Ita came to see me. He spoke in glowing terms of Ffoulkes who was the lynchpin of his organisation. I asked him about the documents of SIMand OVRA. He said he was conscious of the importance of these documents and would be only too ready to assist us in any way he possibly could in having them examined. Unfortunately he had no personnel that he could spare, but he understood that there were certain people examining documents for other lepts. such as PID who might be of some use.

Alley came to talk to me about the Poles and the payment of their Security section. The D.G. has seen Warner who has agreed to put forward a recommendation to the Treasury that a grant should be made until the end of the year. We may thereafter keep on two or three of the Poles on an agency basis.

October 12th

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Miss Glass would be prepared to go to Italy provided this does not interfere with a job which she has been offered by Stopford.

The DG held a meeting about the Far East and the supply of staff. It was decided to take the matter up with General Penney. The DG. felt that the WO ought to pay at any rate during the military period.

Albert came in to say goodbye. He has more or less completed his task in BID/UK although there are still Far Eastern renegades coming through and a certain number from Germany.

I saw Swann for a moment. He had a talk with a number of personalities in Ast Hamburg. There was no doubt that they were running a racket. The operators had come to the conclusion that some of the agents were controlled on purely technical grounds. They reported this fact but were told to keep quiet, otherwise they would get the whole party sent to the Russian front.

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Hollis came to talk about the Russian section. I said that I thought that Soviet citizens irrespective of whether they were employed in the Embassy or not should be dealt with by one section. He is going to have a talk with Joe Spencer.

Melland came to talk about his future. He is going down for about 6 weeks to fix up a liaison with the French as the Contro Commission think that the French zone is likely to be enlarged in the near future at the expense of the Americans. He will then be more or less free if there was a job going for him. I told him that we would let him know as soon as we could.

Caroe said that that his job in the renegade section would shortly be coming to an end. He would be quite pleased to do anything for the office for the following year or 18 months but did not want a permanent job.

Craufurd spoke to me about the case of KUHNEMANN. Efforts are being made to get this man back to this country and someone in the HO seems to be an interested party. I told Craufurd to find out about this man from the Control Commissio and to put me up a note on the case from our files. I would then talk to Newsam.

I saw John Gwyer. I told him that Rantzau would have to be interrogated in the first instance in Germany after which we might get him over here for a week. As regards the documents from the School of Tank Technology he thought that the Swiss informant was probably mythical and that the tank plan from Armstrongs was probably of a type which they had advertised abroad. There

are apparently a number of documents which concern the Americans. John thinks that Cimperman perhaps could go down and look at these. I told him to speak to TAR, and if he saw no objection to go ahead.

Kellar is very worried about Ispal and Istria the handling of which has now been given to Hastings who knows nothing about the background. I said I would go with him and discuss the matter with C.

Dick and I went to see Findlater this afternoon at his request as he seemed to think that we were not altogether satisfied with yesterday's meeting. I told Findlater that we had been somewhat handicapped by the unreality of the situation. Were the management and personnel thoroughly efficient from top to bottom there might be some meaning in Vivian's words. This however in our view was not the case. Things were far from satisfactory and we did not see any very marked indication that they were likely to improve. On the other hand we fully realised that that side of the question did not come within his terms of reference and that he was merely there to allocate responsibilities and functions as between one office and the other. We said that what worried us most was the prospect of a huge Section V and IX being built up on an extended charter to cover British interests as distinct from the security of British territory and the enormous wastage of personnel and carding that would be bound to ensue. This quite apart from the fact that if the same subject was dealt with in two places on the basis of a territorial division we should, in spite of the excellent personal relations that existed, eventually get back to a state of

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affairs which might well be worse records our experiences under the Cowgill regime. We finally got round to the suggestion by Dick that the extended charger to cover British interests abroad should more logically come within the terms of reference of Section I of SIS. We gathered that somewhat similar views had in fact been expressed by [redacted] in his conversations with Findlater. Unfortunately our conversation had to be interrupted owing to another visitor and the matter was left at that. Dick however seemed relieved at having got a good deal off his chest and I think that Findlater was impressed by the arguments.

I dined with B-W. I asked him what he was doing and whether he would agree to return to the fold. I had in mind that he might perhaps do something towards getting Soviet counter-espionage on its feet. He said that while this would interest him very much he was rather anxious for the remainder of his service to go abroad. He did not want to go to the Far East and he thought it would probably be bad for his health. He would however be quite prepared to go to SIME if there was a suitable job for him. His view of SIS functions is that they should drop all the small stuff and concentrate on carefully-prepared operations of the kind practised on ourselves by the Russians in the King case. Other material was largely uncheckable and therefore worthless.

October 13th

Harry and I went to see Penney who is here from SEAC on business. We discussed the position of CICB and the provision of staff. Penney said that he had after some hesitation sanctioned the establishment and that the

Army would pay. He thought however that we ought to get our own people in since after the military period was over they would go over to quasi-civilian status. Things were moving more rapidly in that direction than we might imagine.

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Scott came to talk to me about a reduction in his pay on his demobilisation. I said I would have a talk with Charles Butler, but there were many difficulties with which he had to contend owing to some people receiving pay from civilian sources and others from military.

Kellar and I went to see C. about the difficulties with Hastings who is now the authority on ISOATS. Some difficulty arose over the Admiralty whose representative in the Mid East had to be initiated. C. clearly appreciated the position and will speak to Hastings.

October 15th

There is a question down in the House for Thursday asking that the name, nationality and sentence of all convicted spies should be given. The only one that presents any difficulty is the case of MENEZES. On

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looking the matter up in this diary I find that the reasons for withholding the information at the time are no longer valid.

I had a long discussion with Curry about the difficulties that we have had with SIS and Findlater. He seems to think my solution is possible, namely that the carding and collation should be done by us and that Section V and IX should sit in close proximity to ourselves and work on the basis of our files for the purpose of stimulating their own agencies abroad. For this purpose they would remain responsible to C.

The DG asked me down to speak to the new DMI, de Guingand. He had the office explained to him in brief but I am going over to have a talk with him at his request.

I saw Sir John Stephenson about Ryde going to S. Africa to hand over the van RENSBURG documents and to fix up our liaison with the S. African Police. Baston has retired, Coetzee is dead and the new commissioner, Palmer, is said to be a good fellow. Stephenson agreed in principle but asked us to draft him a wire for the High Commissioner in order that we might get his comments.

Briscoe is worried about the circulation by DIB of some of our manuals on secret ink etc. They have apparently roneo'd one of these and circulated it all over India. I told him to prepare me a letter for Dixon who might get Finney to make some quiet enquiries. The matter is also being taken up quietly by IPI.

Cyril Mills came in to say goodbye.

Hollis brought me in a telegram from Canada which seems to imply that at least one of the agents involved in the case over there has had something in the nature of a warning.

Kellar has seen Paget about initiating naval representatives in Mid East into ISOATS. He took the opportunity of telling Paget about the telegram about the future of SIME that had been addressed by the JIC to the Defence Committee. Paget said that he had always understood that SIME was under MI5. When told that this was not the case, he said he would certainly support any suggestion that it should in future be controlled by us.

October 16th

We received from Findlater a copy of his basic recommendations which he wishes to discuss with C. and the DG before putting in his final report. These are as follows:

1. MI5 exists for the purpose of the defence of the realm and for no other.
2. The Minister responsible for it as a service should be the Minister of Defence or if there is no Minister of Defence, the P.M. as Chairman of the CID. Only major questions would go to him and go through the channels of the Chiefs of Staff with the permanent heads of such civil offices as are concerned.
3. The requirements of defence make it essential to maintain a registry in MI5 of the present range and character subject to periodical weeding of obsolete matter and a constant policy of excluding the trivial. (This excludes any question of returning the index on its subversive side to Scotland Yard).
4. MI5 should not be amalgamated with SIS either wholly or in part.
5. MI5 is responsible

for the collation and appreciation for the purposes of Govt. of a intelligence bearing upon espionage or subversive movements aimed at the Empire. Similar attempts aimed elsewhere which have a bearing on our foreign policy or defence plans are the concern of SIS. It should be an obligation upon each dept. to pass on without delay to the other whatever intelligence comes its way bearing upon the other's responsibility. Even at the stage when intelligence amounts to no more than suspicion, the information should be passed on at a level that will be determined by the circumstances to the respective dept.s Each side should give access to any accredited officers from the other to records relevant to the information passed. 6. Each dept. should keep the other informed by periodical summaries or oral contacts of the general trend in its own part of the field but there should be no duplication of general reports e.g. on the communist movement. In view of the greater importance of its possible impact on the Empire than its effect elsewhere, the primary responsibility for such a study should be on MI5 but in effect it should be a composite production, each side being responsible for the facts and the inferences drawn from them in its own part of the field. 7. M.I.6 should continue to be responsible for obtaining Counter-Intelligence in the Empire by the means used in the past. Acquisition of intelligence including C.I. by secret means elsewhere must remain a matter for SIS. 8. Nevertheless it should be open to MI5 subject to the agreement of the F.O., to maintain overt contact in special cases e.g. allied Govts. like Belgium, with the Security Services of foreign countries. 9. MI5 to be reresented on Sigint to ensure that the

essential needs of the dept. receive due consideration.

I feel that there is a slight discrepancy between paras. 5 and 6. 5 seems to indicate that all the collation and appreciation should be done by ourselves and 6 that it should be a joint compilation, each dept. being responsible for its own field.

● had a talk with Horrocks about the prospect of carrying all the carding for Sections V and IX and B. and F. Divisions and having one set of records. He seemed to think that this was perfectly possible.

I saw Burt and told him that we seemed to have reached an impasse about the promotion of his officers but that I was still trying to think of a way out.

I had a talk with Clayton who is getting out a charter for DSO Burma. I said that the strength of DSO Burma as an adviser to the Government lay in the fact that he would have the resources of CICB at his back. I told Clayton to get Banford's views on the charter as he had been acting as liaison between ourselves and the Burma Office, and would be able to express a view as to how our proposals would be received. I gather that the Burma Office have little views of their own but would accept those of the Governor probably without demur.

I saw Turnell-Barrett who is going to Trinidad and MacDonald who is going as ADSO Jamaica. I gave them as much information as I could about the FBI and other American Intelligence organisations with which they might come into contact.

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Charles has got out of the establishment for 5.6 giving them 12 watchers at better rates of pay and with certain pension rights. Harry Hunter seemed pleased. I have suggested that we should send these conditions out to the Control Commission in order that we might get an option on any likely FSP who might be getting demobilised.

Charles asked me if I could fit in Nigel Watson who is returning to the fold. I find this rather difficult, and have suggested that Alley might perhaps have something for him to do.

I had a talk with He is by and large in agreement with our views about the carding and collation of records. He told me that there may be certain opposition to our carrying over liaison abroad, not in principle, but conditional on our representative coming loosely under the local representative of SIS. I doubt whether this will be satisfactory.

October 17th

A German named Horst KOPKOW who worked for Section 3 of the Gestapo, had an extremely varied career investigating sabotage and running D.A.s. He was actually employed on the enquiry after the bomb outrage in July 1944. His report shows that the running of D.A.s on the eastern front was a very considerable affair and that Russian penetration in Germany and the Low Countries was widespread, and on a high level. KOPKOW had a lot to do with the "otekappelle which penetrated a large number of departments including the OKW. KOPKOW said there was hardly any government office without some

employee ready to cooperate and give information. About 100 arrests were made almost exclusively in Berlin. The depth of Soviet Intelligence Service infiltration could be seen in the case of an administrative inspector of the Air Ministry who gave away to an intermediary the most secret documents of which only a few copies existed concerning the strength of the Luftwaffe and the rising production output figures. Even in the OKW and the OKM there were officers to be found who were ready to cooperate out of idealistic motives. KOPKOW also had a lot to say about the case of RODE-SCHWARZ. RODE was apparently genuine but his communications were intercepted and the Germans took over the transmitter. This case was known to us as Phoney I, and we were thoroughly aware that it was phoney.

A JIC report dated 13th October deals with the maintenance of Russian troops in Central Europe. Certain recent telegrams seem to indicate that Russian troops are to be moved from one country to another not for reasons of security or defence but in order to ease the problems of supplying these troops. It is known that the Russian military supply system is very rudimentary and that ever since they occupied central Europe their armies have been living on the occupied countries. As these countries are gradually being reduced to famine conditions the Soviet Govt. may ultimately be forced to withdraw their troops, unless they wish to see their discipline break down to a dangerous extent. If the Soviet Govt. are really faced with the prospect of this dilemma, it might explain their present truculent attitude on political matters. They would feel that time was working against them and that they

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must therefore try to extract here and now as many political benefits as possible from their military occupation of central Europe, while they are still at the peak of their strength and before they get involved in the troubles of the coming winter.

October 17th

I saw Jo Archer and Kellar. The Air Force are sending out some I.B. Security staff to the Mid East and want them to have some sort of training here. Archer is keen that they should know as much about this office as possible and realise the resources on which they can draw. Kellar is a little apprehensive, as SIME have had a certain amount of trouble with the separatist tendencies of the Air Force. These however apply mainly to the Provost Marshal's staff, whereas Archer's men are going out from the security division of the Air Ministry. Kellar thinks that they ought to spend a bit of time with SIME or at least see We do not want to get the impression that we are building up a kind of opposition force.

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B-W came in to talk to me about HOWs.

In any case a member of the CP communicating to some CP headquarter abroad is a matter for F. Division. Equally inward correspondence would be an "matter". I explained that we were responsible to the Home Secretary for HOWs and that in peace time there had to be very strong reasons for imposing them. We were ^{not} allowed to put on fishing HOWs for intelligence purposes. He said that he would have all the names and addresses carefully vetted and let us know the full reasons in each case. He would then discuss the matter with me again.

B-W is apparently open to any offers and I have suggested to him that he might possibly like to go as DSO Syria. He would I think like to do this provided it did not imply any drop in rank. This may of course be difficult

October 18th - HSHS

I saw the Dg with Roger about the Corby case. It seemed to us that things were not getting on, and that we were hung up for a high-level

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decision. The D.G. did not wish to see the PM himself but suggested that we should talk the matter over with C. with a view to his going to the PM. C. later agreed to see him Bridges and the PM. He will take Roger along. He talked to me about our representation on Sigint. He doubted whether we should get much out of it. I said that I did not really know what matters were discussed there but that our real requirements were to know what services were being monitored, what were broken and whether they contained anything of interest to us. He said that this could be met by our appointing a liaison officer with GC & CS. This would certainly be desirable but whether we should also be represented on Sigint I am not quite sure. What we want to ensure is that we should get material from central sources as a matter of right and not by courtesy.

Martin Forrest came to tell me there had been a bit of bother about the deportation of O20 characters to S. America including Helmuth. We had notified the F.O. but they had forgotten to inform the Ambassador who was extremely annoyed to find these people were already on the high seas. Section V also complained that they had not been informed. In fact they had been told in our usual weekly circular which they had received and initialled. It was in fact suggested that these characters should be picked off the boat and dumped. I said that unless they were going to be sent back here I did not think the H.O. would be concerned. We should however be concerned if they were to be dumped in Trinidad, and as far as I could see there would be no powers to hold them. F.O. will I think have to get out of their own mess.

Waring came to talk to me about visits of aliens to factories. The present procedure is that names have to be submitted to us through the Ministry of Supply for vetting. NID were apparently concerned about visits from Russians. I said that I thought that it would probably be difficult to resist at any rate for very long the right of factories carrying out secret contracts to receive visitors without getting Govt. permission. I did think however that arrangements could be made through D.Branch officers by which we could be informed direct by the factory when a visitor was expected. It would be of particular interest to us to know first of all what official requests had been made by Govts. for information in cases where this information had been refused. The D.Branches could then warn factory managers and let us know if anybody was making enquiries or displaying knowledge to which they were not officially entitled. It would also be of value to us to know what Russian visitors were particularly interested in, whether they had information about the existence of certain types of armament which were still on the secret list. It might even be possible on occasions for D.Branch officers to accompany them round the factories. I have always been anxious that D Branch work should go further than ordinary routine matters, and be of more assistance than they were in pre-war years to B.Branch.

Dick, Hollis, Curry and I studied Findlaters 9 points. It became increasingly apparent to us how difficult it was to disentangle the functions of ourselves and SIS without causing endless duplication. Curry is going to make an attempt at a paper which we will table before the DG Findlater and C at their

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meeting next Tuesday.

I had an hour's talk with the DMI which was very friendly and satisfactory. I gave him as wide a picture as I could of what we had been doing during the war on all fronts. He was quite interested.

October 19th

I saw Tennyson of SIS with Briscoe. The former is going out to the Far East in an attempt to obtain any information that may be available relating to secret ink etc. or other devices used by the Japs. I dissuaded him from going via Washington as I thought he was more likely to get out to Japan through CIGB and that if he could make contact on his own level with other enthusiasts there would be more chance of his getting what he wanted. I am giving him a letter to Dixon.

I lunched with Kim who expressed regret that at the first meeting with FIS. our charter had been confined to the British Empire and that a discussion of any wider charter was therefore ruled out. I asked him precisely what he meant by this. He said total amalgamation. He evidently did not envisage the possibility of our taking over Sections V and IX. I said that in my view the worst feature was that no single body was responsible for C- and subversive movements and that the more one examined the problem the more difficult did it become to devise any scheme which would avoid duplication. Under the present arrangements it seemed to me that SIS did their own planning and that we did ours, and that as a result of this we both had to file and card. If we

could only get a common set of files and cards a great deal would have been achieved, provided we were housed in the same building. He agreed with this and thought that a common set of files was a feasible proposition and should be handed over to an expert like Horrocks to work out the necessary machinery. He said that he would try and see if anything could be done in this direction.

I talked to Hunter about his new establishment. He seemed quite satisfied with the terms. I told him that I thought he might well have to increase the number of his watchers and that I would see what we could do about getting suitable personnel from the Army.

Hughes came in to tell me about four Yugoslav who came over here with the Yugoslav delegation to the Foreign Ministers Conference, and remained here in order to run transmitters which are operating in the Yugoslav Legation. I asked Hughes to find out whether this was authorized and whether any attempt was being made to monitor and break the communications.

I got M.E. to come in and discuss with me the desirability of our having representation on Sigint. C. in conversation on the previous day had suggested that representation on that level was not necessary and that our requirements would be better met by having a liaison officer with G.C. & C.S. I felt that we should undoubtedly have a say in the management and allocation of Y. sources. Otherwise our interests might not be covered. M.E. entirely agreed that this was necessary.

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Col. Gore of the W.O. came over to see me at the request of D.M.I. D.M.I. had had a visit from Gen. Seibert, USFET. Seibert wanted someone to go out and discuss Russian problems in the American zone. DMI thought that possibly someone from our dept. should accompany the M.I. officer. I said that I thought that Seibert would get more help in this matter from the British zone than from elsewhere but that if DMI specially wanted someone to go we could perhaps arrange it. It depended on exactly what Seibert's problem was. We are not very keen to go too deeply into Russian affairs with G.2. On the other hand we should like to obtain as much information as possible about what the Russians are doing in the American zone if this is not already reaching us through the British zone.

October 22nd

I saw the D. and showed him our draft reply to Findlater's 9 points. He is sending them over today.

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Burt is just back from Brussels having brought over Baillie-Stewart. He mentioned the case of some Arabs who have been languishing in a Belgian jail for some time and were beginning to feel the cold. They are think mainly Syrians who were operating in conjunction with the G.I.S. Kellar has been trying for some time to get the C.O. to make a decision to send them to the Seychelles, possibly with the Muti, if the French can be persuaded to let him go.

At the 12 o'clock meeting today John Gwyer mentioned that he had two cases of some interest which he had not yet cleared up. One related to an agent known as WELLINGTON who is said to have been operating on behalf of Einz Wi.Bremen from 1941-44. This information was of a very indifferent kind. The other is ALLNOCH whom he thinks to be identical with LLANLOCH.

Hughes said that the Yugoslav transmitter had been authorised by the F.O. I have asked Hughes to find out if they are being monitored.

Howard of RSS rang up to say that he thought it was desirable to revive the RSIC. Various problems were coming up which could be suitably aired before that committee. I said that we had been thinking on rather similar lines but that I would be glad to have a note from him giving the various matters which had given rise to his suggestion.

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I have asked Hughes to find out from the BBC what broadcasts were made from the 31st May to 6th June 1944 since it appears from a P/W report by one REILE that the date of the invasion was given away by a broadcast. The Germans had captured agents some months previously which indicated that there would be three phases before the general attack. The signal for the final attack was given on the 5th June at 21 hours. A warning issued to the military commander in the 1st to the 7th Army and to the 15th Army. The 7th Army did nothing and the others apparent did very little. A special court of enquiry was held by the Germans to look into the matters. It was lucky that the warning was treated so lightheartedly. We had of course been given an assurance by SOE and SIS that at a special meeting called before Overlord by Findlater Stewart, that no such indications would be given to the field and that all messages sent out by the BBC would be vouched for by the appropriate depts. We had taken the line that we could not be responsible for messages the contents of which we did not understand.

A C.I.B. report ending 2nd October states that reports continue to be received showing that disrespect for the British authorities is increasing in Germany. This growth of over-confidence is accounted for partly by a lack of understanding of our methods. Tolerance for example is confused with weakness, and partly by hunger and other privations which particularly in Berlin are stimulating criticism of the British administration. In Hanover a critic of the former Gauleiter was threatened with violence without interference from bystanders.

and Jew-baiting is reported from Osnabruck. Also in Osnabruck the 25% of the population are said to approve of leaflets exposing Germans who collaborate with the occupying troops.

The interrogation of Lt.Col.REILE of Leitstelle 3 West contains some interesting items. He says that valuable results were often obtained by Funk Abwehr. During the winter of 1943-44 the Funk Uber Wachungs-dienst succeeded in breaking codes used by one of the most important transmitters of the Polish intelligence service in France. For months thereafter W/T reports from Polish agents to England were interception and understood. The same applied to orders they received from England. The Germans also learned that important military plans were known to the allies and a considerable number of names and cover names of members of the Polish Intelligence Service were discovered. The above is interesting in view of the assurance that we had from SIS in the autumn of 1943 that Polish cyphers were perfectly secure.

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Wood came to tell me that the Chief of Police at Antwerp, Celis, was very anxious to have a liaison with ourselves. He was getting quite a lot of information about Trotskyist activities in Antwerp and had arrested a number of people of that party who were causing trouble in the docks. Before the war S.B. had had a representative in Antwerp. Wood wondered whether they could send somebody out. I said that at the moment while future charters were rather in the melting pot I thought it would not be possible. In the meantime however it

seemed to me that Brook-Booth might establish a link. He said that he had called on B-D but that he had been away. I am going to write a line to B-D about this.

I had a meeting with Harker, Bromley, Cussen and Kinchley Cooke about MENEZES. There is a question down in the House asking for publication of the names and nationalities of all people convicted of espionage during the war. MENEZES' name was excluded as we did not wish to give any publicity to his reprieve and wished the Germans to think that it was possible for their agents to disappear without any public announcement. Both these reasons are no longer valid.

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I dined with David Boyle who told me that he had re-opened his business in another place but intended to go very slowly for the present.

October 23rd

Luke was asking me about his release. He wondered whether he could be sent on indefinite leave. I said that as far as I knew that would be quite impossible. He would be quite prepared if he has to stay to go to the Far East for 6 months.

Curry came to tell me that Drew had asked hi

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to look through his report on MI5 which is apparently to be incorporated in Tindlater's report. Curry evidently did not think much of it. He was asked only to correct it in so far as the facts were concerned. He made a number of marginal notes which he hopes to discuss with Drew. Generally speaking he thinks that the report does not give anything like an adequate account of the work of this dept. during the war. I told him that I thought he should see Drew and say that after an immense amount of study he had himself compiled a, 8,000 word report which was not yet quite complete and that this gave as accurate a picture as it was possible to obtain. If the DG saw no objection he would be quite prepared to let him have a copy for adaptation to his own purposes.

C. rang up to tell me that he had learned through a private source that Dr. OLIPHANT one of the big shots in atomic research had gone off the deep end about not giving away the experiment to the Russians or to the Control Council and that he had spilt the whole beans to an M.P. called Blackburn who is of a somewhat Left Wing type. Blackburn proposed to use the information in the House of Commons debate. The worst feature was that in addition to giving the information about the experiment Oliphant had given Blackburn details of the agreement between ourselves and the Americans on the subject of atomic research. If this got out it would make a most frightful mischief. C. had accordingly seen the PM. The PM said that curiously enough Blackburn had already spoken to him and told him that he had received a great deal of information from Oliphant. He did not however mention the Anglo-American agreement. Oliphant is taking

the line that he does not care what the authorities do to him as he feels under strong moral obligation to disclose the facts

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John Marriott and I went over for a conference with Sir John Stephenson at which Neville Butler, Bromley and Norman Robertson were present. We had to discuss a draft telegram to Canada embodying the decision by the PM and McKenzie King that all those in Govt. service who were implicated in the CORBY case should be interrogated and if they were willing, searched, provided that no publicity resulted. Similar action would be taken here in regard to MAY. Action against the Soviet diplomats would be deferred until after the interrogations. We made it clear that it would be quite impossible to interrogate 14 or 15 people without the matter leaking out and that if simultaneous action were desired it would at least be necessary to detain the parties until the job had been completed. Detention would inevitably lead to publicity. It seemed to us moreover that if we were going to face up to the question of publicity it would be as well to take in Sam Carr and Rose the M.P. who to a very large extent were controlling the agents on behalf of the Soviet Govt. Anybody who was not taken in on the first sweep would destroy his documents.. If the risk of publicity

could not be faced we saw no point in dealing simply with the view Govt. servants in the High Commissioner's office and in External Affairs. It was in our view better to wait for another 2-3 weeks until a decision had been reached about handing over the atomic bomb to the Russians. A memo has been prepared by the FO on these lines and the question will be submitted to Attlee and McKenzie King.

I saw the DG after his meeting with C. and Findlater to discuss the latter's 9 points. He said that there was a free and frank discussion for more than 2 hours. Findlater had sometimes agreed with him and sometimes with C. and that the whole atmosphere was extremely friendly. The 9 points were going to be re-drafted and we should ultimately have a copy. I asked the DG what view C. took of our representation on Sigint. C. had said that we could always attend the meetings of the board if we had any complaint to make. I rather got the impression that the DG had agreed to this. I said I did not think this was satisfactory since I did not see how we

could have a complaint against the Board unless we knew what it was doing. C. also offered to give us a liaison officer with Travis and argued that through that channel we should always know what was going on. I doubt it. I also asked the DG about our representation abroad. He told me that C. had raised a number of points but that he had said that he was of an open mind and I think prepared to give the matter a trial.

October 24th

I saw Brig. Way and Max Percival about the establishment of CICB. They are going to put it forward in accordance with the SEAC telegram as far as the male staff are concerned. They doubt however whether they now have authority to appoint ATS. I said that AT grading was not very suitable for the type of girl we should wish to send out, that having to live in barracks was a severe handicap. Way talked to me about the Russian wives of British officers who were coming back from Russia. Some of them he thought were particularly undesirable. I said that if he could let me know their names I should be grateful. He then spoke to me about his own wife, a Russian who he married in Tashkent and is still in Soviet territory. He hopes to get her out. He said that possibly when she did arrive he might be grateful if we could keep some sort of eye on her in order to ensure that she was not got hold of and persecuted by the Russians. He thought that if she were black-mailed she might not be willing to tell him.

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Hilgarth came to talk to me about Whittaker. I told him about the constitutional difficulty. He said that he had spoken to C. and that the latter had expressed grave doubts about the possibility of MI5 having an officer in N.E.I. I told Hilgarth that this is precisely what I had expected. Hilgarth will suggest to Penney that Whittaker should be appointed to SEAC.

John Marriott showed me a new wire which has come in from the other side indicating that the Corby case is breaking. Warnings have obviously been given to a number of people. There is also a further telegram about the agent known as ELLI who is alleged to hold some high position in British Intelligence. References are made to C.E. but as Corby's theories are only based on scraps of information picked up here and there there is not very much to work on. It is possible that in mentioning the figure 5 he is referring to the five people who formerly signed JIC reports. It equally does not follow that because information is high-grade it comes from a highly-placed officer. It may mean merely that an extra copy of JIC reports is coming off the rosette and being passed by a clerk. In this connection the KING case is not a bad illustration. Hooper always referred to Vansittart as the source of the information and we found afterwards that his name was only used to cover up the high-grade reports received from cypher communications which KING was handing out to the Russians.

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October 22th
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Alec Kellar brought a man called Steward to see me. He has just been demobilised. He did a certain amount of intelligence work here and attended a course before going out to N. Africa where he served in the FSP as an officer. He was then sent to Syria where he did well. He is very fond of intelligence work and very anxious if possible to continue in M.I.5. Before the war he was engaged in the wool export trade and travelled a lot on the continent. He makes a good impression.

Cayzer and Owen came to see me about Tilton. They are trying to sort out his case as he seems to be the victim of slanderous reports from the Far East. The probability is that being charged with I.B. duties which nobody in the Air Force understood he incurred the enmity of a number of people through his persistence.

At the staff meeting we discussed the personnel required by CICB. A letter had come in from Dixon saying that there were certain SOE female staff who would be available if we could take them on and pay for them. It was finally agreed that we should do this.

I raised the point about secretaries who are put on to war establishment losing their connection with this office. There did not seem to be any very complete answer. It seemed to me that they could perfectly well be told that if and when the permanent staff were considered here their names would be taken into account in addition to those employed in London.

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I had a word with Clifford Norton and asked him to speak to the appropriate Swiss official about Lemon. He was to say that he had heard that the Ambassador was leaving and all a rumour about Lemon. He would emphasise that it would be a great pity for Anglo-Swiss relations if both of them were removed as they had a very good understanding of the British point of view.

I had a word with Connie BENCKENDORF at the Travellers. I had heard through Guy Burgess that he was frequently to be found at the house of the Baroness BUDBERG, whose true colour has always been a matter of some speculation in this office. BENCKENDORF really wanted to talk to me about a Frenchwoman, whom he wished to get over here. I told him that he could mention my name. He also told me that he was editing a new Penguin publication known as the Russian Review of which he left me a copy.

October 26th

Stopford came to see me about Miss Glass. He is prepared to wait for her for 2 months, during which time she could go to Italy and finally make up her mind whether she wishes to remain with us or go into the city. I gather that she prefers the work in our office if it is likely to give her any prospects.

Gisela rang up about a Russian named OLKHOVSKY with whom Balloon is in touch. He is a member of the Soviet Mission who are purchasing bicycles from the Raleigh Cycle Co. He has however expressed a good deal of interest in and a certain amount of knowledge of a new tank, the Centurion, and has asked

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Balloon to get him the particulars. Balloon has been told to stall on this and to try to discover any other things in which OLKHOV-SKY is interested.

October 27th

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I had a talk with John Gwyer and also with Harry Allen about the writing up of C.I. in the War Office. There has already been a joint pamphlet on security and another on military security. Meanwhile someone is supposed to be dealing with civil security. It seems desirable that we should see the documents already written and probably write the one on civil security ourselves. John pointed out that it was very important that something should go on record about having a proper recording system on a uniform basis. Experience had shown that all the various corps had their own systems. Another point I thought ought to be emphasised was the necessity of providing officers in the field with secretarial assistance. It had been our experience that the usefulness of officers had been reduced by about 75% when they had to interrogate and then write out their reports in long hand.

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Harry is taking the matter up with the W.O.

October 29th

I saw yet another Hughes today, who is due for discharge from O20. He wants to go back and live in the Pyrenees as soon as things settle down in France. In the near time he would be prepared to take a job for 6 months or a year. He was formerly employed in the French section of SOE, went overseas during the Battle of Normandy, and joined O20 in January this year. He seems a sensible kind of fellow and I gather that his work for O20 has been good. I told him that as far as we were concerned there were only 3 possible jobs open to him, either in the Far East, the German Control Commission or the Austrian C.C. He said he would be prepared to sign on for 6 months or a year with the Austrian Commission. I undertook to make enquiries. He has a good knowledge of German and French.

I took the opportunity of asking Hughes about SOE's pre-Day-day plans in France and I read him out the extracts from the interrogation report on REILE in which the Green, Red and Black plans were mentioned. He knew of these plans and he knew that the various phases were notified to the field by BBC transmissions. SOE had at that time been integrated with the F.F.I. and placed under Gen. Koenig but the French were not supposed to know the actual time and date of the operation. He said that the whole operation had been worked out in 3 phases by the Planning Section. By this he meant the planning section of the integrated organisation.

He said too that as far as he knew the whole business had the blessing of SHAEF. He was somewhat horrified to learn that it had all been known to the Germans who had warned their units in the field at 9 pm on the 5th June. I have now got copies of the actual messages sent from the BBC. The originals were apparently removed by some Brigadier of SOE. The copies which I have are not initialled as the originals presumably were.

I had a talk with Newsam about the case of Rudolf BAUDISCH, who wants to get his mother and sister over here from Czechoslovakia. Newsam said that it presented certain difficulties from the Home Office angle as it might create an awkward precedent. People like Eleanor RATHBONE wanted to bring all European refugees to this country and the H.O. were doing their utmost to resist her onslaught. If however I would write to him he would put the matter up as a special case.

I also talked to him about KRYMER, one of the Polish interrogators at the LRC whom I wanted to get discharged from the Polish Army. I explained to Newsam that he was only staying on with us for a few months and that he would then be launched on the labour market. Newsam said he thought it would be possible to treat this also as a special case.

What is believed to be another Polish transmitter has come up somewhere in Northampton. Communication is apparently with the British zone in Germany.

I talked to Stone about the case of FABISCH

in which Herbert of Censorship is interested. He will find out from the Control Commission the precise grounds on which they turned the application down.

TAR asked me about his future. I told him it was difficult to express a view at the moment. He would rather like to do Soviet espionage. I suggested that possibly as an alternative he might care to take Anthony's section, which would be engaged in running agents into Embassies, plus wireless plus M/S. For the purposes of the wireless section he would need to have a highly qualified technician. TAR said that he did not really mind much what he did within limits but that he did not wish on any account to go abroad.

A telegram from the British M.A. Moscow states that in the course of investigating the security of offices occupied by the Service attaches and formerly by the Military Mission a system of microphones had been discovered in the buildings. Moving coil microphones, presumably very sensitive, are fitted behind ventilators grids. There are two in what if formerly the Military Mission map room where conferences were held. Elaborate wiring under the floors indicates that the wiring system was probably installed before the occupation of the building. Investigations are proceeding but it has not yet been possible to discover the place the cables leave the building. A specimen microphone is being sent home by bag. Our Charge d'Affaires in Moscow is not in favour of any action being taken beyond disconnection of the instruments.

In the report on the interrogation of Colonel REILE, it is stated that Leitstelle III West had so much material available about allied intelligence services that they were nearly always well-informed about the development of resistance movements in France, Holland and Belgium. They could follow almost exactly the work done by the Armee Secrete, the France-Tireurs, and partisans etc. It was observed how strong the resistance movements grew in 1943 and 1944 and how they gradually became more dangerous to the Germans, particularly after their unification under the F.F.I. and after they had obtained a considerable quantity of weapons and sabotage equipment by air. In 1943 and 1944 certain documents fell into the hands of the SIPO. They gave the important tasks which the active resistance movements were to carry out on D-day and days immediately after it. The SIPO had discovered the existence of Plan Rouge, Plan Vert and Plan Noire. It also ascertained that resistance groups were to be given code words and that sentences were to be transmitted at certain times by the BBC with the warning to the resistance groups to be ready to carry out their invasion tasks and to start on them in case of invasion. FAK 3 West was immediately given orders to carry out active penetration and in a number of cases was successful. About 25 BBC announcements on the 1st June and 5th June were recognised for what they were and the beginning of the invasion could approximately be worked out. On the evening of the 5th June at approx. 21 hours Leit. 3 West notified O.B. West, M.B. Frankreich, Leitstellen 1 and 2 West and FAK 3 that the invasion was due to begin that same night or at the latest within the next 36 hours. REILE heard that an enquiry was subsequently held

y the Wehrmacht Führungstab and that the findings of the court of enquiry were that insufficient importance had been attached to the report from Leit. 3 West. When REILE informed O.B. West he was not entirely believed. Nevertheless O.B. West passed on the information to the 7th and 15th Armies. REILE heard that the 7th Army and M.B. Frankreich took no action while the 15th Army order ordered its units to be ready for immediate action. REILE was asked what he knew of Rudolf LEMOINE whose real name is KOENIG. He said that this man was of German origin but before the war he worked for a considerable period for the 2eme Bureau against Germany. He is over 70 years old. He was arrested in France in the winter of 1943-1944 and was subjected to detailed interrogation about his anti-German activities. He talked freely. After his interrogation he was taken to Germany by the SIPO and as far as REILE knows the Abwehr had no more dealings with him. I think I am right in saying that this man played quite a part in the famous Mr. A. case. There may therefore as we thought at the time have been some political motive behind the scandal created.

Swann has interrogated a Col. METTIG on the question of German D.F.ing. He said that the German D.F. stations were very effective against allied agents at first but that the position rapidly deteriorated, due to increased signals security on the part of the agents. Shortly before the invasion 12 radio links were working to England from France. These were controlled sets. The Germans planned to reveal in the course of transmissions that 6 of these were controlled

with the object of confusing the British Secret Service. METTIG also stated that Tito's radio traffic could be decyphered, in part, but that Mihailovic was entirely penetrated. Tito constantly warned Mihailovic that the Germans had full understanding of his cypher system through traitors. If true this is rather a remarkable statement.

SOE are publishing an account of their activities which has been compiled by Lionel Hale. I looked carefully to see what had been said about Holland. The para. opens with the following words: "Resistance in Holland had been sporadic and loosely knit from 1941-44. The work of special forces did not surmount the difficulties until 1944 when renewed attempts on the usual pattern were made." Since the whole of SOE was wiped up from Sept. 1941 to Oct. 1943 it would seem to have been more a case of dropping stitches than loose knitting.

KOPKOW confirms the information given by REILE about early knowledge of the time of the invasion, obtained through BBC announcements. He differs only in the timing of the message received on the 5th June, which he says was 1900 hours. The Germans had no knowledge of the target. KOPKOW mentions the case of KOENIG, an SOE agent about whom Field-Robinson had discussions with me at the time. We could never believe it possible that this man could succeed in carrying out his task in Germany and get back to this country via the Peninsula within 10 days. KOPKOW says that in a hotel in Hanover objects were found belonging to a Luftwaffe NCO who had been there several days. This was sometime in the autumn of 1943. After examination the conclusion was reached that the owner of these objects was KOENIG @

BROECKEN who had long been a deserter, and whose uniform had been found in a wood on the French-Spanish border. Many months after the report was received that a German soldier had been arrested for having been dropped from an English long-distance bomber in South Baden. This ultimately proved to be LOENIG who was on his third mission into Germany. On the two previous occasions he had returned to England via France and Spain. An attempt was made to use his transmitter but this never succeeded. He was sent before a Court Martial but KOPKOW does not know his fate. SOE understand that he was shot.

KOPKOW gives a long account of the Russian organisation on the continent. It began by the rounding up of the Wenzel group in Belgium in 1942. This led to the arrest of the Petit Chef of the Belgian organisation known as KENT. KENT was from Leningrad and had been trained for the Soviet Intelligence Service, since childhood. He held the rank of Lt. His closest collaborator was the Soviet student JEFFRIMOW who was living in Brussels as a Finnish subject with Finnish papers. KENT ran an import and export business in Brussels called SIMEXCO which did business on a large scale with the TO organisation and Wehrmacht establishments. KENT also had relations with the parent company SIMEX in Paris which was under the control of the Grand Chef. KENT had papers in the name of Vincent SIERRA which alleged him to be a Uruguayan subject. The purpose of SIMEXCO was to avoid difficult transfer of currency from Russia to Belgium and to have the money necessary to finance the Intelligence people on the spot. It also facilitated the travel and relations with the O.T. and the Wehrmacht. KENT on

being ordered to make touch with Germany, visited Schultze-Boysen in Berlin at the German Air Ministry and gave him a new code and documents. KENT was played back to the Russians with the result that the Grand Chef in Paris was arrested. He turned out to be the Soviet Russian TREPPER @ Jean GILBERT. TREPPER came from Galicia and held the rank of Capt. in the Red Army. TREPPER was allowed by the Germans to escape in the summer of 1943. Full use was made of KENT however who got orders to set up transmitters in Marseilles and Paris. By this means "Solja" a Russian agent who had lived many years in Paris was disclosed. He was a Latvian Col. who had played a leading part in the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. The Grand Chef received extensive information from a Froi. Basil MAXIMOVITCH and his sister. The former was at the time at the Sorbonne in Paris and the latter was a lady doctor also in Paris. A certain Henry ROBERTSON (real name) was responsible for the Grand Chef's connection in France with the Soviet Intelligence in Switzerland. He travelled continually from France to Switzerland direct or via Germany. ROBERTSON was arrested.

October 30th

At the D.G.s meeting it was announced that SCOs were to be finally withdrawn in the course of the next few weeks. Immigration are by no means ready to take over and I do not think that we are likely to get much service out of them for some time.

Geoffrey Wethered came in to see me. He said he would have to make up his mind within the next 3 months whether he was going back to the Bar. He would like to remain on with us if there was a job going. I told him I hoped there might be but by the end of the year we ought to be in a position to say definitely one way or another.

I talked to Malcolm Cumming about Briscoe. He said that the present arrangement was that Briscoe would continue to act in peace time in a supervisory capacity over the Lab. This would probably mean that he might be in here two days a month. I told Malcolm I was wondering whether if Victor was going to be scientific adviser he ought not to take charge of these matters. Malcolm thought that Briscoe was such a specialist in his own line, that he had established such a satisfactory liaison with SIS and SO⁴, it might be a good thing if he continued to hold a watching brief in so far as S/W and other special devices were concerned. This may perhaps be a good plan but I am inclined to think that Victor should really take over the responsibility and make contact with Briscoe as and when this seems necessary.

B-W came to see me and showed me a letter written by Dennis Page to Tim Milne in which he gave his views about CICEB. He explained that everyone had been sent out into the field and that CICEB itself was reduced practically to Dixon and Courtney. Since he wrote his letter however things have improved a bit through the addition of 2 or 3 officers from D. Division of SEAC. He seemed to think that CICEB lacked a certain direction. IBLD were more or less marking time since as Dennis put it they are standing on the tennis court with nobody on the other side of the net to

to whom they can serve a ball. He meant that the JIS and other subversive organisations were in such a state of disarray that it was difficult to know what to aim at until things began to take shape.

I showed B-W Courtney's letter both about Dixon and about Ionides. I said I felt that it was a great pity that the show out there was not being run as a joint concern, that all our resources were not pooled. The only reason, which to me was not a reason, for IBLD standing outside was that they were keeping special records of their own on Ultra material. I thought that Ultra material ought to be incorporated in the CICB records just as it was in our records, with any safeguards that might be necessary.

I had a word with Blatchley, who has just returned from Trinidad. He was the person responsible for detecting ZUHLSDORF, a German S.D. man who was trying to make a get away to S. America. After all the examinations of some 700 passengers had been completed Blatchley recognised ZUHLSDORF from a photograph and after a fair struggle managed to break him down. He was travelling on false Spanish or S. American papers.

Noble came in to talk about COLUMBINE, who wants to marry a Swedish girl who nursed him in Stockholm before his arrival here. Noble suggested that it might be better for him to wait until he got settled in Germany but as he insisted, I said that there could be

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no objection from our point of view, provided the H.O. were prepared to let her come.

Marriott showed me the memo put up by Bevin to the PM and MacKenzie King. It is not a particularly good one but emphasises the necessity of early action if anything is to be got out of the CORBY case. We have sent a telegram to Roger suggesting that if Canada does act, no useful purpose would be served at this moment by our interrogating MAY. We have asked him to get the reaction of the Canadians.

Kellar tells me that Gort is apparently seriously ill and has been ordered home... It looks as if he would not be going back to Palestine, and that his successor will be appointed. It is a great blow as we were co-operating very closely with Gort on many highly confidential matters.

October 31st

Burt tells me that there is a case of sabotage down at Portsmouth and wanted to know whether he should deal with it. I said that this would be the normal practice in peace time and I should be glad if he would send an officer down, particularly as this had been requested by NID.

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circumstances in which the information had been given. Meanwhile it appears that we only made one small payment to Sarah who went back to Stockholm in April 1945. On 14th June 1945 however SIS posted him 500 kr. in Stockholm. I think we must press the Swedes to state the name of the individual concerned. We may then offer to clear up the position and tell them that we had only been concerned about German agents entering this country.

I said goodbye to both Blum of the War Room and Martin Forrest. The latter is taking up a job at Eton as a master.

I saw Back about the case of Grace KOLIN. He is going to wire out to Berne and try and get the position clarified. I will then speak to the H.O.

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November 1st

Marriott tells me that Street of the H.O. is being moved to the Ministry of Town and Country Planning. Street is a C.P. member and is an embarrassment to us as he sits in the same room as Hill and Bromley.

Burt came to say that 2 officers had gone down to Portsmouth as apparently more than one act of sabotage had been committed on a destroyer which was proceeding to the Far East. This is presumably an act committed by ratings who are anxious to delay the ship's departure.

TAR has returned to the fold. I had a talk to him about the future organisation. He is going to put down some of his ideas on paper.

Bromley rang to say that Bevin was taking a very strong line about Capt. BLACKBURN's disclosures in the House of Commons on the subject of the atomic bomb. BLACKBURN had stated amongst other things that we had an agreement with the U.S. about the develop-

ment of atomic research. He stated that the full details of the atomic bomb were known to our scientists. We knew of course that all this information had been given to Blackburn by OLIPHANT. Bevin I gather has reduced BLACKBURN to something of a jelly and is anxious that proceedings should be taken if possible against both OLIPHANT and BLACKBURN under the Official Secrets Act. He wants us to explore the position.

Newsam rang up to say that H.O. had decided to expel KUCHENMEISTER but to allow LACHMANN to remain in this country on the grounds that he had helped us during the war and that he could not therefore be expelled if German scientists and technicians who had been working against us were to be brought here to settle down with their families. He wanted to obtain our agreement to this course of action. I said that I should have to refer the matter to the DG and to Joe Archer but that I would let him know as soon as possible. We should of course deprecate the action but we fully realised the difficulty.

dined at 020 last night. They have just got rid of all their prisoners and will be closing down themselves within the next month. I saw a Capt. T.P. Bagge who I gather is an efficient officer and would be quite prepared to go to the Far East on a 6 months contract after which he would probably wish to return to civil life.

I had a talk with Cayzer and told him of the latest developments about CIOB. He is telegraphing to Dixon about Bagge.

Harry Allen came to talk to me about certain cables going on between the JIC here and in Washington on the subject of deception. ~~xian~~. Washington pointed out that officers returning to civil life will probably talk about their experiences and that there is no means of stopping them. We are pointing out once more the desirability of getting the Americans to cope with this situation. The matter was left with Bridges some time ago but I gather that nothing has been done. The difficulty is of course that the Americans have no Officials Secrets Act and would have immense difficulty in getting anything of the kind passed through Congress.

We also discussed the telegram received from the Defence Committee Cairo agreeing to the proposal that we should be responsible for the administration and policy of SIME. This will be discussed by the JIC next Tuesday. Harry appears to be diffident about our accepting this as a firm commitment. His only reason as far as I can see was that it might get the office into difficulties if things did not run well. This seemed to me to be just flunking the issue. We were all agreed that M.I.5 was the only body in London which could look after SIME properly and that if we had no official responsibility it would be difficult for us to intervene on their behalf. Harry saw this point but thought and I think rightly that we should insist on the full co-operation of the Services in providing us with useful bodies and not in moving them about as soon as they began to know their job.

came to see me about the Swedish case of SARAH. Subject to anything

Stopford says I have recommended that the Press Attache in Stockholm should return to the charge with ROSEN and ask him the man's name. We would then explain that we had a great responsibility here during the war in keeping an eye on the fast routes between here and Stockholm and indeed not without reason, but that we hoped that that period was over and that SARAH's services would therefore be no longer required.

We also discussed the proposed visit of two officers of Danish Military Intelligence and 4 police officers. They are arriving in about 10 days time.

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I saw Machell and told him that I could not really justify his retention in B. Division. We had a number of LRC officers whom we could not get rid of until their demobilisation and they could really carry the interrogation of British subjects as well as aliens. He quite saw the point and said that he would make arrangements accordingly.

Harker discussed security in connection with atomic research with myself, Harry and Victor. Victor felt that it was very important that we should get a grip on this matter. There was a great deal going on and a considerable amount of publicity but at the moment we had no very clear idea of what the field of knowledge was in this country. I said that I had already written

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to Akers and that he had telephoned to me apologising that he had not sent a reply. He had been extremely busy in connection with Chadwick's visit from America. As soon as he had got this out of the way he would be very pleased to discuss the whole thing with Victor.

I had a talk with Cussen about the position of OLIPHANT and BLACKBURN vis a vis the Official Secrets Act. He said that on the evidence available OLIPHANT was clearly liable and that according to the Sandys report BLACKBURN would also be liable if it could be shown that he had in any way solicited information from OLIPHANT. Technically at least he should have stopped OLIPHANT from talking as soon as he realised that information of a highly secret nature was being communicated to himself who was not an authorised person to receive it. If he had gone further than this and asked questions or indeed had asked OLIPHANT to come and see him to discuss atomic research in any but its broadest aspects he would clearly be liable. He would of course be privileged in anything that he had said in the House of Commons. The report of the select committee on the Sandys case makes it very clear that MPs should understand that their position as members in no way entitled them to solicit information of a top secret character from any person who is directly or indirectly in the service of the Crown. OLIPHANT has clearly been in the service of the Crown and has in fact signed the Official Secrets Act. Even if he had not signed the act he would be bound by its terms. We are at present awaiting a letter from the F.O. or from Downing St. stating whether or not we are to investigate the case and put the matter

forward to the D.P.P. There is at the moment no evidence whatever but there would be grounds for an interrogation of OLIPHANT which might well produce the required results.

November 2nd

I told Dick that we should want him to go to the Far East and got the D.G.'s approval.

Archer tells me that after consultation with the Air Ministry they view with grave concern the possibility of LACHMANN returning to the aircraft industry. They would like to know what restrictions can be placed on his employment.

Wibroe came in to say goodbye. He is leaving at last for Copenhagen tomorrow.

I had a talk with Anthony Mitchell and Guy Burgess about the future of Orange. It has been decided that Mitchell shall run him in future in conjunction with Burgess, since a good deal of his information relates to Fascist activities abroad, and Mitchell is the kind of person who is likely to get on with Burgess. *3 months Graham Mitchell*

Herbert of Censorship came in to talk to me about the case of FABISCH. I explained to him that FABISCH had been turned down by the Control Commission (a) because he was a German and (b) because his wife was the daughter of a German General. The Commission take a very strong line on both these points. As regards the letter that we had written, it was grossly improper for the Establishment Officer of the Commission to quote it.

and particularly to quote it wrongly, which he had clearly done. The only fact in the letter which appeared to be inaccurate was the reference to FABISCH having been posted as a deserter. I told Herbert that I had checked this up in the W.O. files and discovered that there was no trace of it and that FABISCH's conduct had been described as good. I told Herbert that the letter as it stood would not in any way bar FABISCH from any other suitable employment for which vetting might be required. I would also record on the file that certain of the suggestions made in the letter did not really rebound to FABISCH's discredit, in view of the explanations that Herbert had given.

S. Africa do not want Michael Ryde to go there; owing to the rather tricky political situation they would prefer that any documents relating to van RENZBERG should be sent out through our Commissioner. Later on they would welcome somebody to discuss our future liaison.

November 3rd

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Bromley rang up about the possible prospects of proceeding against OLIPHANT and BLACKBURN. I told him what the legal position was and that I did not see any point in our doing anything until Downing St. made up their minds that a prosecution was desirable, if the necessary evidence were forthcoming.

November 5th

I had a talk with Stopford about the case of SARAH. He agreed with the course of action I had suggested to

came to see me about the Danes, 4 policemen and 2 security officers who are arriving tomorrow. As usual there has been a muddle. The visit has been on the tapis for a long time but no one has ever taken the trouble to write to the DG about it. B-W is anxious that the policemen should be well looked after even though they will be concerned almost entirely with matters affecting the Yard. He thought it would be a pity if they were not entertained as well as the security officers. He had made certain enquiries but could not ascertain that S.Y. knew anything about them. I had a talk with Burt later and asked him to have a word with the Yard.

I had a talk with Machell and told him that I had made enquiries as to whether there was other work for him but without success. He readily agreed that his presence here was redundant and it was agreed that he should leave at the end of the month.

I gave a talk to Flt/Lt. Denny of the Air Ministry on general security matters and the work of the office. He is employed under Merer. He asked whether we could give him any documents which he could use in lectures given to Air Force Security Officers, explaining to them something of the Security Service.

Marriott showed me some recent telegrams on the subject of ELLI. CORBY has been re-interrogated and refers to an incident when the Soviet M.A. in London referred to information that he had received from ELLI relating to a British agent in Russia. As the only organisations that can possibly have been running a British agent in Russia are SIS, SOE or the British Military Mission, it seems unlikely that ELLI could have any connection with ourselves. Nobody in fact knows anything about any agent in Russia. I should doubt very much whether there was one. The above does not necessarily throw any doubts on the bona fides of CORBY who may have got the story wrong.

Ronnie Haylor came in to see me. He told me that Intelligence I.A. and I.B. were now to be unified in one Intelligence Bureau. A number of extraneous organisations had been absorbed and would probably be gradually liquidated. The effect of this had been to make the organisation somewhat top-heavy. The M.G.I. Lethbridge is at the head of it with Brig. Ford on the IA side, who is clearly redundant, and also Bill Williams who for the moment will deputise for the MGI in his absence.

Ronnie seems to think that everything is going fairly well in CIB. He also feels that the zone is broadly speaking being well run. MilGov. have apparently done quite a good job, very much contrary to his expectations. A propos of this, there is an interesting Chinese B.J. A representative of the Chinese Military Mission who has recently returned from Germany compares our administration very favourably as against that of the American, Russian and

French zone. He says "In the Soviet-occupied zone laws and regulations are being constantly altered. There are no guarantees for security of life and it is inadvisable to offer criticism." According to what the Germans told him, the Soviet Govt. is determined to create a de-populated zone between the Rivers Oder and Elbe, and then only will they withdraw their forces. Poland and Czechoslovakia, with a view to currying Soviet favour are employing the most harsh and repressive measures for dealing with Germans. From other sources he forms the impression that the Americans have been inept in handling the situation. They were not aware of the necessity first to establish local government, to take responsibility for the restoration of communications and other imperative measures. The situation was apparently disorderly and there was no one to take responsibility while the Americans spend their time in arresting people. Though American soldiers were friendly and the food situation was relatively good, the Germans did not regard American methods with favour. In the British zone control was strict. Nevertheless within a few days of the occupation the British had setup local government in each area, promulgated laws and regulations and found individuals to bear responsibility for each and every matter. Moreover they do their utmost to restore communications and public order and everyone knew what orders he had to obey. Further it was exceedingly rare for a British soldier to enter a private dwelling house to extort money or property. There was security in every respect and in consequence Germans on the whole were satisfied with British control. The French on the other hand were adopting a policy of retaliation. Their administration in Germany differed in no

way from their administration of their colonial territories. French troops lived on a better scale. Germans only got a monthly ration of 200 gr. of meat, 160 gr. of fats and 4 kgs. of bread. Apart from a small number of officers of a comparatively good type, French officers and men commonly enter German homes to extort money and goods.

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November 6th

I attended the J.I.C. when the telegram from the Defence Committee Mid East was discussed regarding the future of SIME. Einhiirst expressed certain misgivings and seemed to imply that the Air Ministry had rather been rushed. The chairman however pointed out that the matter had gone forward from the JIC in the form of a proposal to Mid East.

for their approval. This approval had now been given. Eimhirst was therefore proposing that the policy should be reversed. It was moreover pointed out to him that the A.O.C. Middle East was presumably satisfied as he would have had an opportunity of voicing his opinions on the Defence Committee having made it clear that there was no suggestion that the internal security of the Air Force should be in any way interfered with, and DMI said that he saw no difficulty in the proposal which he felt was sound and logical. It now only remains for us to work out the details of administration and finance.

I saw Olafield of SIME. I asked him to have a talk with Roberts about the possibility of making use of B-W. As regards his own position he will have to stay on with SIME until June after which he would like to be considered for permanent employment with ourselves. I said that at the moment we could make no promise but we ought to be able to let him know some time early next year.

Newsam rang up about the LACHMANN case. He wanted to know if Handle, Page had any military contract. I explained to him subsequently that although I was not certain whether they had an Air Ministry contract at the moment they were certainly on the approved list of bomber contractors and would therefore be in receipt of specifications of our requirements in the future. Newsam seemed to think that it would be possible for the H.O. to release LACHMANN under certain positive restrictions prohibiting his employment with firms engaged in the production of military aircraft.

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November 7th

Mark Johnston looked in to say goodbye.

November 8th

Burt came in to say that he is going to Madrid to check up on the Amerly evidence which purports to show that Amerly had been a Spanish subject for some years.

I went with the DG to see Maxwell about future policy in regard to the admission here of former members of the GIB. Maxwell seemed to think that this should really be a question for the Interdepartmental Standing Committee on Security.

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Cunningham has been appointed to succeed Lord Gort in Palestine.

Montagu brought me his report on the work of the W. Board. I am retaining the original documents and one copy here. The other copy is being sent to C.

November 9th

Marriott showed me a telegram from Roger saying that if the Canadians went off the deep end on the CORBY case he thought we should do something about MAY on the grounds that if the latter had not already gone completely to ground he certainly would on hearing of the arrests in Canada. Moreover the Canadians might not think that we were playing our part. Roger is to meet the PM, the President and Mackenzie King in Washington, if required. They will be having a discussion on the whole case, after they have settled the little matter of the atomic bomb, and its handing over to the Russians or to the Security Council.

I gave a talk to two officers of the Danish 2eme Bureau and 4 Danish Security policemen, most of whom had worked for the Resistance. After describing to them the main features of our work and the inter-relation of security and investigation, I gave them a very brief account of our operations imme-

diately before, during and since the war.

An officer of Einz Marine called Alfred Geor Nicolaus von HERZ who had served in Berlin, Paris and Portugal has been interrogated at length in the field. He mentions among other things that British seamen who visited Portugal were well-trained and gave away practically nothing. Observation of GIP, however had been fairly profitable. This had been done as we knew from Algeria and La Linea and had been carried out by the use of a strong telescope during the day and a telescope with infra-red for use at night. There had also been a great deal of long-range photography. The report were sent daily to Paris on ships which had passed through the Straits and ships which were in GIP Harbour.

November 12th

Harry Allen talked to me about the proposal of the JIC to warn all British Military Missions abroad, particularly in the Russian zone, about the discovery of mikes in the British Military Mission in Moscow. We agreed that the proper course was to issue a warning but to say that experts would be coming out to investigate. The whole business is rather unsatisfactory since it is not at all clear who is really responsible for Military Missions, particularly where there is no Embassy. Two of battery men had in fact been to Moscow but nobody had asked them to look at the Military Mission. There are really only two people who can give advice on these matters, one being ourselves, who are the prime users and the other the GPO who are the technical experts. C. meanwhile is apparently arranging with the FO that one of G-P's 110 men

in the Embassy should make periodical inspections. So far Treasury sanction has not been obtained. G-P's men would not of course know anything about mikes, unless they were properly trained by the BPO.

Col. Bradford, who is now head of the Military Intelligence School which was moved from Matlock to Farnham, came to ask whether we could give him a lecture on the GIS. Dec. He wanted Hart's lecture on the GIS. I suggested that possibly this subject might be a little out of date seeing that the GIS had been largely liquidated. He said that as a certain number of the officers would be going to the British zone he thought it would be a good thing for them to know what the Germans set-up was and to be familiar with the ordinary GIS jargon. I then suggested to him that there might be other subjects connected with our work on which he might like us to lecture from time to time. He welcomed this with enthusiasm. His address is S.M.I., Pierrepont House, Farnham, telephone Frensham 211. I am asking TAR to see what can be done about the Dec. 14th lecture. He might do it himself, or possibly get Hart or Roland Bird to give it.

Sclater tells me that RBS are sending a special unit with DFing apparatus and sniffers to Palestine. Nobody seems to have heard anything about this. I said I would speak to C.

November 13th

I saw Ruffer. He has been at home on sick leave but is going back to the British zone shortly. He would like to be considered for the Security Service as a permanency.

Kellar tells me he has seen Cunningham who visited the DG. Kellar has given him, and also the ADC, a long talk on the subject of the work of the DSO. He found Cunningham and the ADC quite intelligent and quick on the uptake. He thinks however that Cunningham might on occasion be a bit peppery. He has not quite got the same genial personality as Gort.

I went over to see C. about the question of mikes. He agreed that the present position was rather unsatisfactory but told me about his proposals for a wireless operator of SBU in each Embassy being made responsible for periodical inspections. I told him that these officers would have to do a course with the GPO, since mikes were a highly specialised job. I also spoke to C. about our responsibilities with regard to any prima facie case of espionage in the FO or one of our Embassies abroad. I said I thought that such cases should be investigated by ourselves. I told him off the record that I knew of a case where the FO had taken out a telephone check on one of their own employees, whom they suspected of leakage. He agreed that this was thoroughly irregular and undesirable. They had been able to do it because any Secretary of State was apparently empowered to sign a warrant. I told C. that if a matter like this came to the notice of the HO they would probably raise Cain. It was clearly undesirable that this sort of thing should not be centralised in one Secretary of State.

The DG, TAR, myself, JC, Marriott, Luke and Ian Wilson were decorated by King Peter of Yugoslavia, though precisely what for

nobody is very clear. Presumably the basis of the whole thing is Tricycle. Break was present at the ceremony dressed in a naval uniform with much gold braid. C. was decorated at the same time.

The King explained that he could not actually give us the decorations as they had not been made yet. They were on order in Switzerland but we should receive them in due course of the presentation of a document which was handed to each of us. The King was rather nervous to begin with but melted later and was full of talk on various trivialities.

I asked his Air A.D.C. after the ceremony what the situation was in the light of the elections which had put Tito in power by an over-whelming majority. He said that almost certainly a Republic would be declared in the course of the next few weeks but that in his opinion the King would be asked to return probably in about 5 years time. He said the whole election was a ramp but that nothing in the nature of a democratic election had taken place in Yugo-slavia for hundreds of years. On this occasion there were two boxes. The voter put his paper in a rubber ball concealed in one hand and placed his hands one in each of the two boxes on either side of him. He dropped the ball into one, but it probably made a noise and indicated clearly to Tito's representative standing by as to the party for which he had voted. There were few who would not succumb to this form of intimidation. The royalists party had refused to vote and all their votes had been counted for the Govt.

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November 14th

I attended the meeting of the JIC. We pointed out to them that there was some doubt as to who was responsible for the security of Military Missions abroad. The Ambassador was responsible for military, naval and air attaches but in some countries there was not an Ambassador but only a Military Mission. Nobody seemed to know the answer. Meanwhile a telegram we suggest is going off and we have been asked to find out what personnel safety has available.

Col. Dalley, who may be I.G.P. Singapore came to see me. I gathered that he would be very ready to work for us, although he is I understand a person who is apt to make enemies and might not therefore be particularly suitable. I outlined to him our proposals about CIB with which he seemed to be in fairly hearty agreement.

I was summoned to Bridges and a Selection Committee consisting of Cadogan, Finlatter and Maxwell. They asked me what I had done during the last 25 years and then my views about German activities, here, before, and since, the war. They also talked about future staff. I said I thought we ought to have more and better people. Money was not the only object. It was necessary to give a wider field of promotion. I then mentioned Service Intelligence and the desirability

of some sort of permanent civilian staff to give continuity to their work. If such staffs were established there could be promotion round the 3 Services and C.I. Everybody was very sympathetic. I said that I thought the Russian problem would be the outstanding one of the future and would involve us in a great deal of work. Further that in this connection an adequate watching staff was of the greatest importance since we should have to cover not only Russians and C.P. members but all the satellite states. Maxwell then asked what it was possible to do when we had discovered a Russian spy. It would not put a stop to such activities. This seemed to be rather a counsel of despair and I was relieved to find that all the other members of the committee fell upon him.

In the anteroom I saw Pilditch late of DIB and Inglis, late ACSI. God preserve us from either of them as future DG.

Dick, Curry, Charles and I had a talk on Curry's paper on the future organisation. The paper emphasises the fact that the responsibilities must be properly placed on the heads of 3 divisions, A. Administration, and Organisation, B. Investigation and C. and D. Security. There should be three Directors and 3 Deputy Directors. The Deputy however should be heads of sections and should officiate in the division only during the absence of the director. In the same way the DDG should be a senior director and should only operate in his capacity as DDG in the DG's absence.

November 15th

I saw Marriott, Serpell and Buzzard this morning. They told me about the case of one JONESCU, a Rumanian pilot who had brought over a delegation from Bucharest to the Youth Congress. From Serpell's material it seemed that a good many of the people who have come over are C.P. members. JONESCU had been given a mission to carry out espionage at de Havillands. He reported this fact to Col. de Chastellaine of SOE whom he knew personally and had expressed his intention of not going back. He had also apparently called on the Aliens Dept. but as he was somewhat incoherent they had asked him to put it in writing. It seemed that JONESCU was quite genuine as he said that he was quite prepared to go to South America if he could not stay here. We decided that Buzzard should see him and take a statement. We could then consider the matter further. I thought it would be a good thing to have him picked up at the meeting and see where he went afterwards.

TAR came in to talk to me about passing to OSS information about the undesirable aliens wishing to proceed to the USA. I said I thought this information really ought to go through the FBI who were the only people who could do anything about it. OSS apparently regard this as their function as they say they have performed it in other places abroad on behalf of the Embassy. I told TAR to ascertain from the Embassy what their chances were and to point out to them that we thought the FBI was possibly a more suitable channel.

Curry talked to me about his paper I said

that personally I was in agreement. I did however see certain difficulties when we considered the relations of Kellar's section with SIME. The section had worked extremely well because Kellar was handling not only security, organisation and administration but also intelligence. If SIME was now going to be a divided responsibility within the office it might lead to difficulties. Much however would depend on the co-ordination at the top and it might be that we should have to make some sacrifice in order to maintain the principles laid down in Curry's memo.

Cimperman came to tell me that a man called WEBB on the Daily Express had asked him to supply him with spy stories, and he had said that he was here solely in the capacity of liaison officer with MI5. We told him to tell Webb that he could not disclose anything. Cussen hopes that this will choke Webb off. I told Cimperman I thought it would be a pity if any emphasis was laid on the liaison between ourselves and the FBI as this might be awkward for us both. He agreed and said that he would do everything he could to damp Webb down. He rang later to say that he had been successful and that Webb had promised to wash out the whole subject.

November 16th

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the Turkish
President has been considering the revelation of certain facts about Turkish policy during the war and especially the attitude of Russia in 1942 when, afraid that Turkey might side with Germany, Stalin made lavish promises of territorial advantages to Turkey to induce her to keep her neutrality.

At that time Stalin was in favour of granting to Turkey large parts of Southern Bulgaria including the port of Burgas, all the Greek Islands close to the Turkish coast including not only the Dodecanese but also Mitilini, Kios and Samos and a slice of northern Syria including Aleppo. These promises were made first in Moscow and were confirmed in Ankara by the Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov. The British Govt. is said to have been aware of these proposals which were declined by Turkey.

The interrogation of Rundstedt has produced some interesting information. The Polish campaign was intended to start on 25th Aug. 1939 but in the evening orders were given to hold everything. Rundstedt thought that a peace feeler must have been made by Mussolini.

During the break-through in France in May 1940 Rundstedt had at his disposal 5 Armies and 86 Divisions altogether. As the divisions went forward across Belgium and France they turned left in order to meet a possible attack from the south. Rundstedt mentioned that the British must have been surprised at the sudden stop that was made at Dunkirk. "That" said Rundstedt "was done on the Fuhrer's orders. He suddenly called a halt and we were all suspended. We were not allowed to go forward more than within 10kms. of Dunkirk. Whether he was already too much occupied with the second part of the campaign against France, that is to say the turn towards the south, or what caused him to do that, I don't know. At any rate it was, if I may say so, a lucky stroke for you, for if we had gone ahead I do not think you would have been able to get so many away".

Talking of the invasion of England, Rundstedt said "We lay around until the middle or end of July and preparations were made for an invasion of England. It was nonsense, because the ships were not available. They first had to be brought from Germany and the Netherlands. They were barges which had to be reconstructed so that a tank could be driven out of the bows. Then the troops had to learn how to embark and disembark. We took the whole thing as more of a game because it was obvious that no invasion was possible since our Navy was not in a position to cover the crossing of the channel, and the carrying of reinforcements, nor was it possible for the G.A.F. to play the part which should fall to the Navy. I never believed in an invasion. There was no need to. These vessels had to be towed and could only be done at high tide. Supposing anything were to have happened en route which would have meant that I lost one or two hours, the tide would have been ebbing and there I would have been off the coast. I was always sceptical about the matter. We had only very few paratroops at the time. There was one airborne division in Rotterdam. I have got the feeling that the Fuhrer never really wanted it. He never had sufficient courage. Afterwards he said 'On land I am a hero but I am frightened of war'. Some figure of speech like that. He definitely hoped you would somehow make overtures to him. Afterwards it was too late. Everything however on your side had become much stronger. Our Air Force could undertake the job of the artillery in supporting landing operations but they could never have replaced the Navy which was lacking."

On the Russian campaign Rundstedt said that

the first he heard of the plan to attack Russia was in the winter of 1940-41. He was insistent that such a campaign must begin in May, after the swampy period. This was not possible owing to the Balkan campaign which caused a 4 weeks delay. Rundstedt himself was not enthusiastic about the campaign. He had always favoured an understanding with Russia such as had existed under Von Seeckt. The Germans had tremendous difficulties with transport even in the summer. Rundstedt remembered how a panzer division covered only 7 kms in 12 hours. "It is unbelievable" he said, "anyone who has not seen it does not believe it. If it begins raining then that is the end".

On the Normandy battle Rundstedt said that after the landing he had to reckon with a second landing specially along the Belgian coast. Until he was convinced that this was not the case he could not withdraw a great deal from that area, and once that was established the moving of the divisions was considerably hampered by the destruction of the Seine bridges. He was afraid of a thrust in the direction of the lower Rhine and the Ruhr and also of the proximity of our coast to the invasion coast and to the V.I sites. The latter however were not a very serious consideration in holding the German 15th Army in the Pas de Calais. Rundstedt evidently thought that the landing on the south of France was a mistake. He thought that by putting those forces into the north we might have rolled up the front so ner. When asked by his interrogator about German withdrawals and why they always took place too late, Rundstedt said "Oh, well, that was the Fuhrer's eternal principle of staying put. Where I am I

remain, that was his principle to which he unfortunately adhered in important matters as well as unimportant ones. The effect of these principles showed up in a catastrophic manner when the Ardennes offensive was broken off. We kept on staying put all the time instead of forming a sensible front line. I had to ask before I moved a single man." Hitler was present at the first part of the Ardennes offensive at headquarters, and later was permanently on the telephone.

Rundstedt was opposed to the operations in N. Africa. He said it would have been better if the Germans had left it alone altogether. It cost them an incredible number of outstanding leaders and material.

John tells me that it has been agreed by Canada that if we interrogate MAY we can have full discretion to make whatever use we like of Corby's evidence.

I went to see Archie Boyle about the ELLI case and discussed with him at length SOE's set-up in Russia. He again expressed to me confidentially his grave suspicions about George Hill, and also about one George Graham whose real name is Serge LEONTIEF a White Russian. The two are very close tied and one always backs up the other. Archie says he cannot understand how a man like Hill can possibly be acceptable to the Russians unless they are getting some sort quid pro quo, the more so since they banished his mistress to Siberia and then brought her back after a certain delay. Hill himself lives in an extensive flat, which is often visited by the Ambassador. The expenses of the SOE Moscow Mission have been roughly £7-8,000 a year, and absolutely nothing has

come out of it. Other members of the mission including DARTON who according to Archie is 100% reliable, have had their suspicions and in any case think that the whole mission is something of a racket. Archie has expressed his views very forcibly within the organisation for a long time but without any success, except perhaps that the whole thing is now being closed down.

Archie advised strongly against it and his view was finally accepted. I asked him how it was that Hill got appointed to the Control Commission. He said that there was a demand for his services both from the W.O. and the F.O. Meanwhile he appears to have freedom of movement. On the 24th Oct. he called on SOE and informed Archie that he was going on a private visit to Russia. He had had no difficulty whatever about getting his visa. He asked whether there was anything he could do for SOE on the side and whether they would be prepared in any way to meet his expenses.

There has been a fairly recent suggestion from the Ambassador that Graham should remain on in Moscow as a member of his staff.

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I have arranged with Archie to dine with him and Barton on Wednesday in order to get something of the atmosphere of the Moscow Mission.

I am getting the personal files for all the representatives of the SOE mission. Neither Hill nor Graham of course really fit the bill since the only apparently concrete piece of evidence by CORBY is that he decyphered two telegrams indicating that ELLI was in London and worked through the Soviet M.A.

I threw a fly over Alley about George Hill. He said he had known him for many years and that he regarded him as a charlatan. He had in fact employed him on behalf of Imperial Tobacco in the Balkans but that he had been too expensive even for them. He had also used him in the old days to make contact with various MPs like Commander Kenworthy who seemed to be a spokesman for the Soviet Govt. in the House of Commons. There were periodical meetings in the form of luncheon parties which were arranged by Hill. The suggestion that ELLI=ALLEY is I think too fantastic to merit any serious thought.

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I had a long talk with Dick about future organisation. He had thrown a fly over Curry about his running the Secretariat, but Curry evidently did not think the job would be more than that of a glorified PA. Dick wondered whether he would not be a good choice for C.Division, which is now a very large one with 4 sections and of course doing extremely important and delicate work. It is essential that somebody should be in charge to give advice who really assess the value of records in a balanced way. The appointment would fit in with the general policy of moving people around and inculcating officers with B.Divn. experience into other divisions. Another idea in this connection is that TAR should become Deputy D.Division.

I also talked to Dick a good deal about SIME and CICB. It seemed to me that even in peace time we should have to have a certain number of Army or Air Force officers on the staffs of these organisations, which to some extent would be collectors of Intelligence. SIME were in fact the principal collectors of intelligence in Mid East at this moment. If the services thought that they were going to lose information as a result of new management they would clearly complain. What I think it comes to is this. As long as SIME is covering the security of the military area it will have to continue on its present lines. If the whole area quietsens down, and I cannot see it doing so for some considerable time, we might consider

having all its members on our staff. I spoke to Alec Kelliar about the new proposal by Curry that the 3 main responsibilities should be A.Divn.Administration and Organisation,B.Division Investigation and Intelligence,C.& D.Division security. I asked him how this would fit in with his present functions. He did not seem to see any real difficulty. He thought that if we still had a section dealing with the Mid East, advice on strictly security matters could continue as it does now,through D.Division, and that information regarding Russian activities could be passed to a Russian section provided Mid East were kept well in the picture.

Joe Archer came to talk to me about LACHMANN. MAP have had a request from Handley-Page to re-employ him provided he is kept in a special laboratory apart from the main organisation. We pointed out all the former snags.

I have just read a record of the activities of the Russian Liaison Group here and its relations with the Soviet Military and other representatives in the U.K. from 1941-45. It is an appalling record of all give and no take. There is no doubt that we rendered immense services to the Soviet Govt. in every possible respect and put up with an incessant flow of indignities, injustices, protests and criticisms, and received absolutely nothing. A typical example is in the case of Valentines, which the Russians wanted. It was not for 3-years after the first shipment that they complained. As the tanks had been termed obsolete by

us some two years before the complaint, and as moreover we were only continuing manufacture and supply at the Soviet authorities express request, the criticism was worthless. Gen. Firebrace says "The Russian character delights in a bargain and they have certain standard reactions to a gift horse. Their first reaction is that it must be a wrong 'un. Their next reaction, having established that the horse is a good one, is that there must be some deep-paid scheme to exact appropriate compensation, and their third reaction on finding that the horse is both a good one and that nothing is expected in return, is to classify the giver as a prize mug. The Russian Liaison Group, the British Military Mission in Moscow and even higher-placed British organisations earned a strong reputation as belonging to the third category".

An interesting aspect of our relations centres round the supply of intelligence on enemy organisations. The service which was provided by M.I. was of the highest order in all departments of Intelligence. There was in London a weekly meeting with the Soviet Order of Battle representative who was given the fullest information on the enemy. Similar meetings took place at the Admiralty and the Air Ministry. Although there were supposed to be regular meetings of a similar kind in Moscow they rarely took place and when they did no information was imparted. In one case they asked for a sample of a tank which at that time only the prototype existed. A great deal of trouble took place over Russians who were captured in the field fighting for the German forces. In Feb. 1944 we informed the Russians that there were large numbers working in the Todt organisation.

and also for Vlasov's Army. When we did so the head of the Soviet Military Mission showed great indignation and refused to accept the possibility that any Soviet citizens could be in German Service. Immediately after D-day Russians in German uniform were captured in quantity and transferred to camps in the U.K. but it was not until Sept. 1944 that the Soviet Govt. suddenly changed its whole attitude and launched what was tantamount to an accusation against us of retaining liberated Soviet citizens in German P/W camps. The reason was a probable but somewhat inappropriate counterblast for the maltreatment of British P/Ws over-run by the Russians which were of course in an entirely different category. In any case there was nothing in the Russian accusations about treatment of their own nationals found in German uniforms. Immense trouble was taken to look after these people and to repatriate them. Many of them did not wish to go back and some committed suicide. Firebrace concludes that after 4 years of residence in this country the Soviet Military Mission and Trade Delegation and of our Mission in Moscow, relations have not only not improved but have deteriorated. The only link, the only common interest was the war against Germany, and as it became more and more evident that Germany was to be defeated so in fact had the Soviet authorities become more and more difficult if not impossible to deal with. Undoubtedly there are a number of them who are pleasant to meet and appear to be genuine in their likes and dislikes of people but they are merely part of a ruthless bureaucratic machine and their personal feelings or views cannot in any way influence their official contacts and work.

