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19th November 1945

to

25th September 1946.

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November 19th

The Press today reports a rising in Persian Azerbaijan with all the appearance of full Russian backing. This has been anticipated for some time and is of course the clearest possible case of aggression.

I had a long talk with Dick about the future organisation of B.Division.

Howe rang me up to say that according to an informant of theirs, [redacted] a Czech called JANSEN who was acting as a courier was taking out a quantity of notes contained in one of 8 bags. Travelling with him was HAVLICEK, former Czech Ambassador in Tokio, who knew about these notes and strongly disapproved. Howe wanted to know if there was anything we could do. The courier was to have gone on Saturday but was delayed owing to bad weather. It seemed likely however that he would leave by the early plane today. Noble spoke to Bromley and told him that in our view nothing could be done unless the FO were prepared to have a show-down. This would mean having the bags sent back and opened in the FO in front of a representative of the Czech Minister. We told Bromley that we could not vouch for the information 100% as it came from the Yard. We had every reason however to think that it was accurate.

November 20th

Poston is taking over the lesser banking enquiries from Withrington who is leaving at the end of this month.

[redacted] who is Asst.PCO in Holland came

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to see me. He had hoped to be promoted on the departure of his boss but he understand from that he is as yet too young for the job. He would I think return to us if we had a post for him.

SIS do not appear to have any further work for him to do. He wondered if he could obtain employment with us. He is quite a pleasant chap but I have no idea about his capabilities. He is a barrister by profession but doubts whetherhe will have much prospect if he goes back now.

Clayton talked to me about TILTON who if he does not get he appointment with us in the Far East wishes to take up his case with the Air Ministry in order to clear his name I told Clayton to give his report to Dick who could discuss the matter with Dixon. If necessary he could see Tilton before he went out.

Harker tells me that BOLSOM has been caugh bribing a policeman with £100. BOLSOM was apparently extremely worried about the various enquiries which were going on and wanted to get information. The evidence of bribery can constitute a separate charge or be used as evidence in part of a general charge in connection with the case of fraudulent evasion or service.

Marriott has shown me a memo from Washington dated 14th November and subsequent telegram from Security Co-Ordination. The CORBY case has been discussed by Attlee, McKenzie King and Truman. In principle they are in agreement that action should take place

here, in Canada and in USA. There is however likely to be a delay until early next month pending the completion of enquiries by the FBI into the information supplied by Elizabeth Terril BENTLEY. This woman has been working for some years with World Tourist Inc. New York, a travel agency operated by Jacob GOLOS until his death in 1943. During the war GOLOS organised a U.S.Service and Shipping Corporation which send food parcels to Russia. Both these firms were used as a cover for an espionage organisation which after the death of GOLOS came directly under Soviet Control. It previously worked under the Communist Party and had always retained strong party connections. BENTLEY acted as a courier between various agents and sub-agents. The network follows the usual pattern of Soviet Intelligence and extensive penetration of American Govt.Services has been brought to light. There is reason to believe that the espionage ring was controlled by the NKVD. About 30 agents have been identified but the ramifications of the case have not yet been fully explored. Reference has been made to Cedric BELFRAGE. This man is said to have handed over a long report on training of agents by Scotland Yard. Mention has also been made of Peter RHODES, described as a newspaper man whose mother was a British Intelligence agent in the last war. RHODES had been covering the war in the UK and in Africa but the NKVD had lost touch with him. They were attempting to renew contact. RHODES is believed to be Peter Christopher RHODES, born December 30 1911 in Manilla. Father of German origin, mother nee Abrahams born in Jamaica. RHODES attended Oxford University 1934-36 and them was employed by United Press in London, Paris, Moscow and Stockholm. In 1941 RHODES was connected with

U.S.Federal Communications Commission in London. Later he went to N.Africa. Towards the end of 1944 he was with OWI in London.

November 21st

The D.G. held a meeting on civilianisation of the office. A few exceptions were made where the officer was operating in a military zone or was closely associatedwith military affairs in this country. It was agreed to get the remainder into civilian clothes as soon as possible but to ask the W.O. to grant us facilities in exceptional cases to wear uniform when proceeding ona mission to the military area.

Ned Reid came in this evening with a curious story. A woman named Anita de POMBO @ Ana Caller de CAPURRO, a Uruguyan, arrived here with a certain Joan CAMPBELL, said to be a connection of Sir Ronald Campbell, formerly our Ambassador in Paris. They have apparently got with them three pictures, a Reubens, A Goya and a Reynolds, which were got into the country by "moyen souterrains" as they said. They were expecting a Velasquez to arrive by similar means. They were on their way to Uruguay. On arrival here however de POMBO went straight to Armin SCHMIDT with whom she is apparently now living. is anxious to go with him to Panama but Joan Campbell wants to prevent this and wants her to go with her to Uruguay.

Meanwhile M/S learned from an entirely diffe-rent quarter that Armin SCHMIDT has made contact with MATHIESSEN, the art dealer in Bond St. and on the security of some drawings has received a loan of £300. According to Mathiessen the drawings are not worth £300 and the loan was made on a hard-luck story pu

put up by SCHMIDT who gave him hair-raising accounts about his experiences when working in the British Secret Service. Mathiessen is now expecting a call from SCHMIDT and POMB which may well develop into a proposal to see the 3 pictures. It is not unlikely that these pictures were loot purchased by SCHMIDT in Paris from the Germans and that de POMBO was commissioned to bring them over This however is pure surmise at the moment.

I dined with Archie Boyle and Darton and discussed the SOE Mission in Moscow. (See note in front of diary).

November 22nd

Curry talked to me about the redraft of his office organisation plan, with which I am broadly in agreement.

I had a long talk with Vivian about the possibility of Ede running security for the FO and SIS. I told him that I spoke to C. only with regard to the FO appointment but that on learning of the fact that SIS wanted someone to look after their own security it had occurred to me that Ede might well carry both appointments.

November 23rd

I discussed with John Noble his rather successful visit to GC & CS where he had seen Hastings and Catty. GC & CS were very forthcoming and introduced him to all their various departments. He was then asked to state exactly what our requirements were. This is being done. We are also to be given a weekly summary which will show us what material is being dealt with.

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I had a discussion with Vesey and Payne tod They told me that the HO are inclined to admit the British-born wives of Germans and Austrians automatically, and then ask us to sort them out after they have arrived. This seems to me an unsatisfactory arrangement. Most of these women are coming here purely because they think that conditions in Germany and Austria are bad. Personally I think that if any of these women have actively worked for the Germans during the war and their husbands are still ali they should not be admitted. In cases wher the husband and wife have been anti-Nazi or where the husband has been killed and the wife wishes to re-establish her British nationality, permission to return tothis country could be given. I have asked them to prepare a note on the various cases after which we will take the matter up with the H.O.

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Eire is apparently contemplating the develop ment of atomic energy on a fairly high level Prof.E.T.Walton of Trinity and Prof.O'Reilly of Cork University are working on it. Incide tally old SCHRODINGER, the atomic physicist

may well be taking a hand. They will all probably blow themselves up before long.

G-P rang me up about the Polish wireless. He had gathered from C. that there were certain things I was not satisfied with and about which I wanted information. I told him that I was by no means clear who was responsible for Polish illicit wireless communications from this country. It seemed to me that as the Security Service we must know about all illicit transmissions as soon as they are detected, otherwise we should be making enquiries in other directions to no purpose. I understood that there were certain wireless sets active in this country but I had only learned this unofficially. In a similar manner I had heard that the vans had gone out. G-P said that he had thought we were kept informed of these matters and that the vans could not go out without our being informed. I said that as far as I could gather his people at Barnet did not seem to think that Polish wireless was really our concern. Personally I thought that if there was any question of going in on a station we should really have the last word, and presumably it was for us to take up the running with whatever Govt. Dept. was concerned. G-P seemed to agree rather vaguely but said that he had always understood that we were kept informed about these matters. He would however send up Maltby to see me.

I then asked him about the units which were designated for Palestine. He said that these were mobile units who were under training for that purpose. He had been cut short in N.Africa and did not wish the same thing to

happen again. These units would not however leave without prior consultation with ourselves, and the W.O. The idea was that they would assist in picking up any wireless sets behind our lines. I told G-P that if such units were going to operate it was highly important that our DSO should be informed, otherwise the units might do a good deal of damage. He said that he thoroughly understood this and that there would be no questio of their moving a foot without prior consultation.

November 26th

I have drafted a note for the JIC meeting on Wednesday on the question of Signals Security. The W/T Security Committee is coming to an end and is suggesting that its duties should be handed over to the BJCB/WT Committee. In the note we have made it clear what our interests are in Signals Security and asked that we should be represented on any new committee to which the task of looking after signals security is given.

Burt and Cussen have returned from Madrid, where they have been looking into the question of AMERY's alleged Spanish nationality. It transpired that Ronnie Campbell of the FO had written a personal note to Victor Malet, the Ambassador, introducing Julian AMERY, John's brother, to the various depts of the Government. This was of course quite right and proper but the Spanish Govt. seem to have taken it as an indication that the British Govt. wanted to let AMERY out. There is no doubt that the documents relating to AMERY's nationality were signed quite recently and not in 1939.

The Spaniards refused inspection of their register but Burt managed to get hold of it and get it photographed. It differs in one or two important particulars and the dossier showsquite clearly what has happened. It is possible that the Spanish Govt. may now wright a letter stating that none of the documents so far produced entitles AMERY to Spanish nationality. There is going to be a consultation with AMERY's Counsel and it seems likely that he may now withdraw the previous exhibits.

After consultation with various bodies in SIS Dick has drawn up a rough framework for CICB which we are going to try and get agreed before he goes out. I have asked Sinclair to call a meeting on Thursday next.

I have had two long letters from Alan Roger in Hong-Kong. On the whole he seems to be doing fairly well in spite of the many difficulties and confusion. There are various points which he raises which will have to be settled by Dick when he goes out

I saw Horace Seymour at the club last night. He has just returned from Chungking. He is quite intrigued about what the Russians are doing both in Azarbaijan and Manchuria. Their policy in the latter country does not seem yet to be quite clear. He said that he would rather welcome the job of Soviet Ambassador. It is so easy. If any question arises for discussion,all you have to say is that you will refer it to Moscow and let your colleague know in due course. If asked for your personal views, you say you haven't got any.

November 27th

Harker is having another try to get promotion for Burt, Spooner and Skardon.

I had a talk with Harry about a recent proposal which has come before the JIC for the Dominions to appoint Service Attaches to foreign missions abroad. DNI welcomed the proposal and would be glad to receive any information they could obtain. He understood that they could not pass on any technical information to foreign powers without our approval. I pointed out to Harry that this raised a rather important security issue. If there is to be a general exchange between JIC London and JICs in Ottawa, Canberra etc. it would be likely that copies, resumes or extracts of London's reports would be passed on to Dominions Attaches as general background. If this information was sent by telegram, were Dominion cyphers secure. Equally were their offices abroad secure? A new surface of leakage was clearly being opened up and I thought that the matter should be brought to the attention of the JIC. Harry is going to put in a memo.

I saw the DMI and told him about the ELLI case. He sent for the current files of telegrams between the British Military Mission in Moscow and London which only covered a period of 3 months. All back files are sent to the Record Office at Droitwich. He is sending for those covering the years 1942-43 so that we can go through them. There was nothing in the current files to show that the Mission were running an agent. DMI also sent for a list of officers who had served on the Mission during the relevant period. He found a Capt. CHAPMAN, who he is going to see. He will merely ask him whether at any time the

Mission had run agents and if so whether he recollects any request from London for the identity of such an agent. This seems to be as far as we can go at the moment.

November 28th

I discussed with Vesey the cases of British-born women married to Germans and Austrians who are applying to come to this country. The HO seem to take a rather light-hearted view and we are asking them to define their policy. In our view British born women married to Germans or Austrians should have their cases cleared abroad before being granted admission. Those who have assisted the enemy or whose husbands have done so and are still alive, should notbeallowed to come merely because they think conditions here are more favourable than on the continent.

DMI rang up to say that he would be having a talk with CHAPMAN and would let me know the result.

I spoke to Archie Boyle and told him that I had seen DMI to whom I had spoken about HILL. DMI was considerably worried and was anxious to know who had backed HILL in WO. Archie said that HILL's file which would be with the Military Secretary, would give the answer. Archie saw no objection to my discussing the whole matter of HILL with the FO.

I saw John Cimperman. He told me that the FBI are pulling out of S.America after the end of this year. He thought it likely that they would also give up their European stations, although it was still possible that they would continue to have a representative in London. I asked him who would be taking over in S.America. He said that as from next year

the War Dept. would be responsible and he thought that the personnel employed would probably be S.S.U., namely that part of OSS which had in fact come under the War Dept. He undertook to keep me informed of any other developments.

Maltby came to see me on instructions from G-P about Polish W/T. He said that he had made enquiries and had ascertained that we were kept fully informed when illicit wireless sets were detected and when the mobile un. were sent out I told him quite definitely that this was not the case, and I asked Sclater to come in to give him the facts. Sclater explained that he had not been told officially about either and indeed that there seemed to be a kind of impression that the wh whole business was an F.O. matter, and no concern of ours. Maltby was full of apologies and expressed his intention o raising cain with his own people for not carrying out the regulations. It was of course an understood thing that we should be informed about all ill -icit transmissions and certainly whenever they reached a stage where it was considered profitable to send out the mobile units. Such searches should be under our direction. In this particular case he told me that th units were operating in Rutland and that woas quite clear that the signals were tho. of military personnel playing about with their sets. What grounds he had for saying this I do not know. The sets apparemly only come up for very short periods.

He then told me about the set in Italy which was apparently broadcasting blind to Poland. There had been a complaint about this set to the F.O. by the Russians. It was said that propaganda was going out from this country and was being communicated from stations

abroad with a view to stirring up trouble in Poland. There had apparently been a meeting at the F.O. at which Maltby had been present, when the whole matter had been discussed. Maltby had, on what evidence I do not know, told them that the propaganda material was going out to the continent through the Polish bag. I explained to Maltby that if his information was correct it was a matter of some concern to us since we were responsible for the activities of Poles in this country. He said that he was under the impression that a matter of this sort would reach us through the F.O. If however anything of the kind came to his notice in future he would tip us off.

I then raised the point of responsibility. I said that if any diplomatic action was to be taken against the Poles I thought we were the dept. responsible for making representations to the F.O. Maltby seemed to agree about this but said that in the case of military units who are misbehaving themselves on lines somewhat similar to radio amateurs, it might perhaps be simpler if RSS passed the facts on to M.I.8 in the WO who were responsible for the Polish armies. I saw no objection to this provided we were kept informed, and provided the activities of Polish army personnel did not go beyond hamchat. If however they were running a clandestine service it would undoubtedly be better for us to take it up.

Capt.Kahn came to see me on instructions of de Wavrin @ Passy. He is apparently in charge of DGER records and is anxious to have our filing system and also to discuss the holorith. This all arose from a discussion I had with Passy when he was here last. I have arranged with Horrocks for Kahn to visit the registry.

Burt came to tell me that Slade, on being confronted with the facts which had been obtained from Madrid on the question of Amery's nationality, had decided that his client should plead guilty. Slade and John Foster were apparently extremely annoyed at having been mislead by Julian Amery. In addition to the evidence obtained by Burt, the Spanish Govt. have written a lette saying that Amery had no claim whatsoever to Spanish nationality. Amery accordingly pleaded guilty and was condemned to death.

November 29th

Dick and I went to a conference at Broadway attended by Sinclair, Vivian, to discuss the future of CICB. We agreed a frame work involving the housing of SIS and ourselves in the same building, a common index, an interchange of files, a common policy based on the cdlated records and possibly an equalit of allowances and leave. This is certainly an advance and may I hope prove to be a pattern for somewhat similar collaboration here and in Mid East.

rang up to say that arrangements had now been made to get Arnim SCHMIDT and Anita de POMBO away to S.America on Dec.15t

November 30th

Peter Hope came tosee me. I told him to wr out a full account of his dealings with Arnim SCHMIDT and de POMBO. I also advised him to extricate himself as soon as possibl from any dealings on behalf of these partie

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Bagge came to see me. He has got a GSO2 job on the British Military Mission in in Bulgaria. I especially warned him about mikes.

Dick, Curry and I had a further discussion on office organisation. We agreed that it was probably better to eliminate assistant directors as an unnecessary wheel in the coach. If it were subsequently found that they were required, the matter could be reconsidered.

Perceval rang me to ask whether I would send a copy of a report on the J.I.S. to Gen. Penney. This I have arranged.

I had a talk with Dick and Hollis on the formation of a Russian section. Roger is now convinced of the necessity of this Subject to DGs approval, a nucleus will be John Marriott and Serpell. I have in mind also Hill of B.1C and Skardon but their participation is problematical for a variety of reasons.

Serpell talked to me about his future. He had been given to understand by Harker that he would do well to take a job offered to him by the Conservative Central Office at £1,000 a year He did not particularly want this job and would prefer to remain in the dept. If however the dept. did not want him he would of course accept the new offer. I said that the Dept. would want him even though they could not make a definite offer at the moment. He seemed re-assured by this and will I think turn down the offer of the Central Office.

December 1st.

Ledward of LRC came in to say goodbye.

December 3rd

I had a talk with Noakes. Things seem to be going fairly well in the British zone and everybody agrees that Mil.Gov. have in the circumstances done a fairly good job. I asked Noakes whether Brian Meiland had been able to see Robbi Mendelssohn. He said he had not heard. Meiland had been down to the French zone but had come back and was returning shortly. Russian behaviour is say the least peculiar. The whole of their zone is being stripped of machinery. The impression is that they intend to create a belt of Germany which will be devoid of any war potential. This in addition to Poland will act as a protective barrier between Russia and the Germans. The policy is being carried out in the most ruthless manner.

S/Ldr.Cox came to see me. He is the Security Officer for Transport Command. I talked to him generally about our work and problems. I also mentioned to him that Fish, who was formerly here, was now doing security work at BOA C and might prove a useful contact. Cox mentioned that recently one of the AFA planes had come down in the Russian zone, in Germany. The crew had been closely interrogated and had even been asked whether they were readers of the Daily Worker and whether they were satisfied with their pay conditions.

Burt told me that he thought it would be a good thing if I had a word with Howe and put him au fait with the Russian case.

T-R tells me that Hitler's will has been discovered and that frominternal evidence it is most undoubtedly genuine. Skardon has

submitted the signature to very careful examination and thinks it authentic. The document deals with both political and personal matters. Hitler appoints Doenitz his successor and dismisses both Goering and Himmler. It seems that he was dissatisfied both with the army and with the direction of the Luftwaffe, hence he chose a naval man. Goebbels was to become Reichschancellor but there is a P.S. by Goebbels himself in which he says that while he fully realises somebody has gotto carry on and pick up the pieces he thinks that this can be done by others. He thinks that he would be doing a greater service to his country by following in the Fuhrer's footsteps and as an example to posterity in that he is prepared to die for his country. Hitler states that he actually married Eva Braun. He leaves his personal effects to members of his family and sufficient funds to maintain them in their particular station in life.

We have also received a report on the interrogation of 3 of Hitler's doctors, one of Dr.Erwin GIESING, one of von HASSELBACH and one of Dr.Karl BRANDT. They have all attended Hitler a good many years, Giesing having examined him after the bomb-outrage. All the reports which are in very considerable detail,indicate that Hitler's health and physical condition were by and large extremely good. Only after the bomb outrage did he show a slight tremor inthe left hand and it is clear that he went through a severe mental crisis in the last days before he made up his mind that the end had come. Once he had done that he was again normal. All 3 doctors agree that Hitler's orientation was excellent his memory for things

both near and remote good, his judgment good and although somewhat restless his powers of concentration always met the needs of the moment. His reaction to his environment was normal, his flow of words was coherent and speech relevant. No phobias or obsessions were noted by the 3 physicians. Hitler was emotionally labile. Von HASSELBACH observes that Hitler couldhate deeply in some fields while forgiving almost anyth to those he loved. GIESING notes that Hitler believed he was chosen by fate to be the leader of the German people and that h he felt his ideas must be carried out, even if Germany and her people were destroyed in the process. GIESING believes this may have indicated meglamania. Von HASSELBACH attributes hysterical significance to Hitler's epigastric pains, one of the few troubles that he had. Von HASSELBACH observes that Hitler's mental endurance was astonishing and that he loved to be merry and gay. He generally appeared to be calm and deliberate but on occasion he reacted with a vehement attack of anger which subsided and disappeared quite rapidly. He complained of lack of sleep but was not inclined to sleep long hours.

A telegram has been received from McDon. and also one from Bill Stephenson, stating that McKenzie King only wants to have those interrogated who were employed in Govt. offices, in the hopes that this will avoid publicity. The Soviet Ambassador has asked to see him tomorrow/after which he proposes to make a statement about the whole affair and ask for the recall of the Military Attache. RCMP reactions are unfavourable. We have drafted a telegram expressing our disapproval of the line adopted and making it clear that

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we cannot possibly do anything more without publicity.

December 4th

A telegram has now come in from Canada stating that McKenzie King's idea has been cancelled. He now intends to wait until the Americans are ready. The whole question is really a political one. Canada evidently do not wish to have a show down unless the Americans are in it too. The Ambassador called, but the visit was purely a formal one before he went back to Moscow.

Adam talked to me about the situation at the ports. We are arranging to have a conference with SCOs in order to find out exactly what the lay-out is at sea and air ports. The object is to arrive at some constructive plan by which suspects can be successfully examined and signalled on without their knowing that they are the objects of suspidon. The present set-up makes it very difficult to operate anything in the nature of a Black List, effectively.

James Robertson came to talk to me about an informant of his named

illegal Immigration to Palestine from Poland and other European countries. There is an element of provocation about this and the DG I think feels that we should not embark on a project which may ultimately lead to bloodshed. The only trouble is that

, and illegal immigration is perhaps the most important aspect of the Palestine problem at the moment. We are going to consider the matter when Kellar returns.

December 5th

I talked to Burt about the possibility of getting Skardon. He told me that both Skardon and Spooner were anxious to join the Control Commission when they have finished their present job. He thought however that Skardon's services to us might be very valuable and if we could give him satisfactory terms he might be pleased to consider an offer. Burt himself would like to stay wi[th] us until and unless he is appointed to S.B.

Victor, Harry and I had a conversation about security of atomic research and other matters. Victor nowthinks that representation on the JSIC is probably unnecessary and that a better way of effecting the problem would be for him to have his own personal high-up scientific contacts. This would however need the blessing of some high authority. He is going to prepare a memo on this matter and also add what he thinks should be done with reard to atomicresearch. He suggested the possibility of making contact with certain suitable people who would give us some idea about the political leanings of scientists such as May. This could only be discovered by an informant who was working in the lab and knew the students intimately.

We have now received photographs and a full report on the 26 mikes discovered on the premises of the Military Mission in Moscow. They appear to have been in every room except the bathrooms and lavatories. There were 3 in the cypher room. They were discovered by attaching a buzzer to the main lead. This caused all 26 mikes to buzz till they were finally unearthed. When the floor-boards were removed to discover the wiring, the covers of two cigarette boxes were found, one dated

1938 and the other 1940. The Czechs were originally in the building in 1938. In 1939 they were replaced by the Jugoslavs and we took over in 1941. There was an interval between the time the Jugoslavs were in occupation and the time we took over. The probability seems to be that the mikes were put in when the Czechs went out and they were re-examined after the departure of the Jugoslavs.

December 6th

John Cimperman came and told me that the FBI stations abroad were to continue. He showed me the two telegrams which Hoover had sent out, the first one instructed his representatives to wind up their affairs as there would be no further appropriations after the 31st December, and they were so to inform the Ambassador. The second telegram indicated that by a Presidential decree all the offices were to continue. This means that the FBI will maintain stations in London, Paris, Lisbon, Madrid and Rome.

The D.G. saw Hollis and myself about the formation within F Division of a section to deal with Russian espionage. John Marriott and Serpell will form the nucleus of this section. This has of course been the position ever since the Corby case started. I suggested to the D.G. that we might obtain the services of Hill of O/B.1.C. This depends rather on the state of Hill's private business. He might be open to an offer if his firm, which is a one-man show, did not show signs of getting on its feet.

I asked Burt about the possibility of getting the services of Skardon on a permanent basis. He thought that Skardon might be open to an offer if we could get over the

difficulty of his police pension. At the moment both he and Spooner were anxious to join the Control Commission when they had finished their job on renegades.

I had a meeting with Vickery, Bamford, Grogan and Vivian on thesuggested abolition of censorship in the Far East. We all thought that if external censorship could be maintained in Burma and Malaya for the time being, there might be considerable advantage. I said that this was really a matter for SEAC and indirectly for CICB. It was agreed to send a wire to Dixon drawing his attention to the various telegrams received and suggesting that he might wish to reconsider the position. India are apparently in favour of maintaining censorship if this is politically possible.

Lunched with William Charles Crocker: on the whole the atmosphere was friendly. He gave me a long account of his visit to Cairo when he recovered diamonds, emeralds and rubies at the spot where a BOAC plane had crashed. He had been sent out by Lloyds to investigate the loss of diamonds being cut by Antwerp dealers in Palestine and flown to this country.

December 7th

12 o'c meeting. Had a meeting with Harry Allen, Tar, Jo Archer and Lee on the question of German scientists. It was agreed that a paper should be put up and submitted to Creedy's committee on Inter-Departmental Security, the object being to see that we were fully informed about the arrival of these people and a measure of control exercised over them by the responsible departments.

December 8th

_____ came to see me. He has just returned from a visit to Athens and Vienna. He gives a terrible picture of Vienna but from the C-E point of view he says that there is really a golden opportunity as it is possible to buy up almost anybody with a packet of cigarettes or a hunk of bread.

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Archer came to see me about Lackmann. MAP are anxious to allow him to work for Handley Page because they feel that there is no evidence that he has ever acted as a spy. Archer has written a very good letter to Meira of A.M. Security, pointing out that this is not the real issue. What we want to prevent is the incorporation of aliens into key positions in our armament industry where they have access to everything and where the Security authorities can exercise no control. He suggested to Meira that the A.M. should represent this view to MAP on a high level.

December 10th

Ronnie Reed came to see me. He is a little worried about his future as the W.O., seeing that he cannot be demobilised for another year, have suggested that he go to SEAC. He would prefer to remain with the Control Commission and I gather that Ronnie Haylor is anxious to keep him. Ultimately he would like to remain in M.I.5. I told him that if our charter allowed, we should be very pleased to retain his services.

Theresa Clay tells me that the bank have

agreed to allow JACK to remain on in our service for another year, and to retain his status and pension rights.

I have just read a highly interesting paper sent over to us by NID. It is a translation of a document produced by the Naval War Staff of the 3rd German Division which was in command in the South of France at the time of the landings on 15th August 1944. The enquiry is directed towards the value of RSHA information supplied about enemy landing intentions, with reference to their suitability for use in appreciations of the situation. The sources available to the Germans were (1) reports of enemy naval forces and enemy merchant shipping seen ~~in~~ passing Gibraltar; (2) air reconnaissance in the Mediterranean; (3) appreciations by Foreign Armies West mainly derived from radio intelligence; (4) appreciations by Foreign Air Force West, mainly derived from radio intelligence (5) RSHA reports. No information of any importance was obtained apparently by Naval radio intelligence owing to the security of our naval signals. From a careful examination of the information obtained through sources 1-4 during the period May-August, the Germans came to a fairly firm conclusion by the last week in July or first week in August as to the approximate locality and time of the invasion. In evaluating the reports of the RSHA after the event their analysis shows that out of 190 reports only 15 were correct while 32 were approximately or partially correct. The inference to be drawn from this is that they might well have dispensed with the RSHA reports which only tended to confuse their minds but that in any case such reports should not be accepted unless checkable by visual recce.

I discussed this matter with John Booth who before the invasion of Normandy was working

at the Photographic Unit at Meddenham. He said that there were many cases where they carried out photographic reconnaissance on the basis of CX reports with very valuable results. Photographs would probably not have been taken had it not been for the reports. He did not know of course where the information came from; he referred to these reports as "ground reports" but he would not of course have known whether they were from agents or from 'Y' sources. Incidentally, he told me about the practice ground for the invasion at Brankaster in Norfolk. Photographs were taken of this area which showed abnormal activity. Brankaster had been chosen because the sub-soil and other conditions were almost identical with the Normandy beaches. He thinks that if the Germans had done a recce over Brankaster and had known anything about the geological conditions they could not fail to come to the conclusion that the landings were to take place between Issigny and the area of Caen. As a method of deception he would have recommended the making of tracks on other parts of the coast. The Germans did not get on to this of course as hardly a single plane succeeded in getting across the Channel for some weeks or even months prior to the Invasion.

The Research Section of the War Room have produced a final report on Economic Espionage. In conclusion they state (1) Economic intelligence obtained through economic channels. This is a normal activity which any large firm uses in peace time. It operated independently of the GIS and must be regarded as an inherent feature of economic life, the results of which would naturally be made available to the State as soon as war broke out. (2) Economic intelligence obtained through non-economic channels, e.g.

Abwehr or S.D. As has been seen, the Abwehr and S.D. had few, if any, genuine clandestine sources on Allied enonomic activities. They relied chiefly on American technical journals for information on American production and had no source of information on British production. (3) Non-economic intelligence through economic channels. This was developed late in the war, and there is no evidence that it yielded any concrete results. SCHELLENBERG's collaboration with I.G. FARBEN is, however, a good example of the sort of use which a future GIS might make of the legitimate economic information service of a great combine.

December 11th

NOCK came to see me. He is leaving. His successor is Landrieux, not a very attractive personality with a shifty look.

Bertram Ede talked to me about our station in East Africa. I thought on the whole it would be better to leave this until Dick's return.

Gerald Glover is returning to his business.

Jopson called about staff for operating telephone checks in the Slav languages. He knows what our requirements are and will keep his eye open. He suggested that I might get rid of a list of the personnel in censorship who were in the uncommon languages section. He would then be able to say which of them he thought might be suitable.

Miss Wadeson wants to take up a civilian job: I put to her all the pros and cons but she seemed quite adamant about making a change. I said that we should always be pleased to see her back if there was a vacancy.

December 12th

I lunched with Howe today and gave him the latest dope on the CORBY case and told him that it was now in the realm of high politics and there was no chance of anything being done until the Americans were ready. I asked him about Burt and he said that Canning was almost certain to go of his own accord but that if he did not, gentle pressure might be exerted in the spring.

December 13th

J.C. came in. He asked me whether he could have two copies of his report. I said that this was of course highly irregular and we had in fact made a great fuss about all documents relating to the XX Committee and W Board and that if by any chance he were run over by a bus and the copies of his report were found in his safe by his executors and sent to the F.O. or the W.O. for disposal—after being read by anyone interested—the D.G. would obviously be in serious trouble. I thought therefore that he would have to ask the D.G's permission. I am convinced that whatever we say or do, J.C. will have a copy of his report and will not destroy his original ms.

I lunched with B-W and _____ of S.I.S. _____ is taking over the job of P.A. to 'C' in place of Cordeaux who will be leaving him in the new year.

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Ede came to talk to me about communication with the F.B.I. from Jamaica in view of the withdrawal of F.B.I. officers from the Caribbean. I suggested that we should consult Cimperman and place the onus on the F.B.I. If they did not wish to communicate through B.S.C. we should have to think up some other arrangement.

I saw Colonel Walter who is the new D.M.I. in Canada. He wanted to know how much M.I.5. work his organisa-

tion should do. I said that in my view the only body who could really carry out the work would be the R.C.M.P. although D.M.I. would have to be kept informed. It seemed to me that so much depended in Canada on local knowledge and experienced in interrogating etc. and that unless he contemplated having a large staff situated all over the country he could not really compete. He seemed to agree with this view. I told him, however, that in my view the R.C.M.P. Intelligence Branch wanted all the support they could get. They had an excellent head in the person of Rivett-Carnac but they needed encouragement and the necessary staff to carry out their duties. They had been seriously denuded both before and during the war. More important still was that they should get the backing of the Service Departments and External Affairs. As they were very much in the public eye they were invariably beaten up if anything went wrong. Consequently they were somewhat reluctant to take action where matters of external or internal politics were concerned. I thought that this position would be rectified if a JIC were established in Canada on the London model namely, the inclusion of External Affairs and the R.C.M.P. The latter would then feel that they had the necessary backing and they could air their problems and difficulties in sympathetic circles. Colonel Walter seemed to be entirely in agreement with these views, and he is a pleasant personality. He spoke in the highest possible terms of the work of Torry and Brunnarius, during the operations in Normandy. They had done a first-class job and earned the praise of all with whom they had come into contact.

December 14th

Colonel Seward, Assistant Commissioner of the Southern Rhoedian Police called. I discussed with him the suggestion that it might be a good thing for us to have a DSO somewhere on the African continent and that Nairobi appears to be the most appropriate spot. He is inclined to agree that it would be useful. He said that reports were so often misleading and that a real picture could only

be gained by constant visits. Communication with Nairobi was fairly easy. I asked him about the penetration of Ossewa Brandwag. He said that for the moment it did not really present much of a problem. There were certain communities which were known but they were not taken very seriously. I explained to him all the difficulties which we have had with the Union. These he fully understood; he said, however, that Parma, the new Commissioner and also Goldby, the head of the CID were both 100% people with whom we could safely have a liaison. The Deputy Commissioner, Marak, was an Africaan, but so far as he knew, fairly all right. He mentioned that he might at times be able to get things out of South Africans which we should have difficulty in getting. This is a point which is worth bearing in mind.

Dickson came to tell me about a case of his which had gone wrong. He had taken on an agent who had subsequently had misgivings and gone round to S.B. This is a thing which is bound to happen from time to time although this is the first case which we have had.

Cumming and Furnival-Jones came to talk about the post office microphone experts who are visiting Moscow and the Balkans also Germany, Austria and Hungary. They thought that they needed some sort of backing from the J.I.C. in getting authority to examine not only Military Mission and Embassy premises but also private dwellings of members of the staff. The suggestion has been put forward to the J.I.C. I spoke to S.O.E. and to S.I.S. and asked them whether they would like to avail themselves of the services of these men. S.O.E. have no missions, except in Germany and Austria where they are part of the Military Missions. Vivian, however, is sending wires to all his representatives instructing them to get into touch with the G.P.O. experts.

Lee, Harry Allen, F-J and I discussed the question of German scientists which is to come up before

before the Imperial Defence Committee on Security next week. We shall make it clear that we want to be notified of arrivals and their destinations; that we wish to know the name of the officer in each case who is going to be in charge and that we shall want to be kept informed about the associations and visits of all German scientists and technicians.

Ferguson came to see me. He wanted to know if there was any chance of his coming back to M.I.5. I said that we could do no more at present than to put him on the list. Meanwhile he is applying for a job with Mil.Gov. in the British Zone.

Alley came to talk to me about the destruction of L.R.C. uncarded files. Horrocks has made the suggestion that they should be burnt as a category without examination. Both Alley and I agreed that this would be undesirable. Some of them might be burnt but only after a review by a responsible officer.

15th December

I told Burt that his promotion to Lt.-Col. and the promotions of Spooner and Skardon to Major had been approved by the Military Secretary. He is very pleased about this.

Reviewing the position of Russia, the Chinese Military Attache in Moscow draws attention to the extent to which she has taken advantage of her situation to obtain by diplomatic means areas of strategic importance adjoining her frontiers. In the east she has the Kurile Islands which afford direct egress into the Pacific. Port Arthur, Dairen and rights over the South Manchurian railway: these facilitate the absorption of Manchuria and further the policy of deep penetration into China. Outer Mongolia is being supported in her demands for independence. She is also trying to get a firm hold on Inner Mongolia. There is now unrest among the so-called Khasak tribes and it is thought that this may lead to an attempt for voluntary inclusion in the U.S.S.R.

For years past Russia has been paying special attention to the Pamir plateau, the tactical value of which is extremely great. If they gain control of the area north of the Indus river and defiles there they would be able southward to embarrass India and westward Afghanistan. In Persia, Tabriz is an area of the greatest tactical importance to Russia. From there she can directly disturb Persia and Iraq or by penetrating deeply into Turkey from the West. What is more she can sever land communications between Europe and Asia. The present tactics are to foster among the local population revolutionary disorders coupled with a demand for inclusion in the Soviet Republic of Armenia. The Russo-Turkish frontier is very mountainous. The Kars defile affords the only pass. The three districts Kars, Ardanan and Artvin are accordingly of the very greatest importance. Holding these Russia could bring pressure to bear in various directions. An examination of the situation shows that there is not a single one of the Soviet's neighbouring states which does not outwardly express friendship for her while inwardly harbouring resentment. There is covert plotting everywhere. In the whole stretch across the continents of Europe and Asia from the Sea of Japan to the Baltic and northern Norway there is no spot where a direct conflict of power may not arise between the Soviets on the one hand and Britain and the US on the other. To seek co-operation between Communism and Capitalism will, the M.A. fears, be like climbing a tree to catch a fish!

Reviewing the situation in Persia from the standpoint of Soviet strategy, should she in future suffer any threat from the Middle East, her best course would be to eliminate British and American influence in the Persian Gulf. But there is a succession of mountain systems south of Teheran which run east and west athwart the country and render difficult rapid access to the sea coast. If, however, the Soviets control Persian Azerbaijan north of a line Mahabad to Resht and then promote popular movements of independence in Northern Iraq and Eastern Turkey. She will then be able to

control the British oil region in the Iraq (Mosul). Soviet forces could then move southward to Bagdad and thence directly on to Basra while to the west they could traverse Syria and move directly on the Mediterranean.

Hans Ulrich van CHAPPUIS, incidentally a brother-in-law of Berkeley Gage at the F.O., has been interrogated. He was at one time on the staff of Rosenberg and was arrested by the Russians and submitted to a very lengthy interrogation after which he was handed over to the British. He visited this country fr[illegible] often to stay with his sister and to report gene[illegible]-ally on political conditions. This he did fair[illegible] objectively. On one occasion he was told to get into touch with Mosley about whom he gave the following information. Mosley had requested financial assistance as he was lacking funds to organise the B.U. on a larger scale. He had made the suggestion that it would be possible to buy up a majority in shares of British Gaumont Picture Corporation, London, which firm was, according to Mosley, in grave financial difficulties. W.E.D. ALLAN and Gordon CANNING were said to have brought documentary proof of this to Berlin. It was of course suggested that by this means the British film industry and thereby the British film-going public could be influenced. CHAPPUIS states that he did actually see the documents dealing with this project. It was, according to him a fantastic plan involving vast sums. Nothing came of it. It was turned down both by Rosenberg's offi[illegible] and Von Shirach. Mosley is said to have then applied to Mussolini thereafter for financial as[illegible]tance which of course we knew he got.

December 17th

Desmond Orr came to see me on the 10th. He told me that he had heard on good authority that a policeman in the U.K. had been appointed as the new D.G. He asked me not to question him. He wondered when the Security Service was going to be allowed as a body to say who they wanted to run the

office. He then asked if I thought there was anything he could do, as he would be quite prepared to go and see the P.M. I said that he might possibly be mistaken as many people were interviewed. He indicated that he was quite sure of his ground. I said that if that was the decision I did not think there was anything to be done. I went down and saw Charles immediately and repeated to him what Desmond Orr had told me. He asked me to wait in his room while he saw the DG. He then returned and told me that Shillito, C.C.Kent, had been appointed and that the D.G. had instructed him to let me know. No one else however was to be told. At the D.G.'s request I went to see him. I confined myself to saying that if that was the decision I had nothing further to say. The DG made some remark about the Committee possibly having thought that it might be better that I should have my hands free to deal with the Intelligence side of things. He said that Shillito was a very good man and he thought I should like him. Apart from a certain feeling of disappointment, the appointment seems to me to be a bad one for the following reasons: (1) it is a mistake to appoint a policeman since the work of this office is entirely different from police work. (2) It puts the stamp of the Gestapo on the office. (3) It creates a false impression in the minds of police forces generally and of the Services that MI5 is a kind of police dept. (4) It generally down-grades the office. (5) the choice I understand lay between myself and Shilli to. It would seem either that somebody was required who had an intimate knowledge of the work and was persona grata in Intelligence circles or that a man of considerable weight and standing was necessary in order to carry relations on the highest level.

The appointment of Shillito would not appear to meet either need, however good a chap he may be. (6) Lastly it is I think extremely discouraging for the younger members of the office and for others coming in, to feel that the head of the office is likely to be appointed from outside.

The D.G. showed me today a letter he had had from Bridges who had just returned from Washington and stating that Shillito had been appointed and that he was to inform me. I asked him whether he was going to tell the office. He said no, he thought it would be better if it leaked out gradually. I asked if he had any objection to my telling a few senior members working under me. To this he rather reluctantly assented. Personally I cannot see the point of not informing the office, who have got to know sooner or later and may well feel somewhat insulted. DG I gather had said that he would not stay later than the 10th March but at Shillito's request he is now staying on until April. This is unfortunate since for 3 months he will be filling Shillito up with all the wrong ideas. I have informed only TAR, Roger, Curry and Kellar.

December 27th

I saw Nove today, who is back from the British Zone on leave. He was formerly at the LRC and is now working in the Russian section, Control Commission. He will not be demobilised until towards the end of next year. He is very anxious to join the office. He is a pleasant fellow and I gather has done very good work. He is clearly intelligent. The only thing against him is his appearance.

TAR and Sclater came to tell me about a number of leakages or losses of codes and cyphers, the property of the Admiralty. In particularly one at Malta, where a safe had obviously been broken into. Sclater is going into these cases with Wood of N.I.D. The first thing to find out is the damage caused. Will these losses enable the enemy to break our past cyphers and has everybody been warned about the use of these codes or cyphers in the future? Lastly what are the security precautions with regard to documents of this kind? Are they kept in safes? Have the safes got combination locks? If not, how many people have had access to the key during the last 6 years.

Joe Stephenson looked in today. He is just back from the British Zone and is joining the Control Commission in Germany as a GSO1 after a certain amount of leave.

Corin and Alley came in to tell me that Col.Eindhoven wanted to send 4 or 5 of his officers for attachment here for a longish period. We all agreed that it would be impossible to have them actually in the office and that the most that we could do would be to give them a course of lectures.

December 28th

I saw Curry this morning. He asked me about his future. I told him frankly that if I became DDG I thought that Dick ought to become DB. He seemed deeply hurt by this. I told him that I thought there were many things which Dick could do which neither I nor he could do, that he had carried a big job during the war and had established confidence with all outside depts. I mention

to Curry that Charles Butler had told me th if I had become DG he would have been quite prepared to see Dick appointed DDG and would not have been in the least offended. Curry seemed to think that it was quite impossibl for him to work under Dick. I then asked him if C.Division would appeal to him. He said no. The only possible job that I could see is director of organisation and the registry if Horrocks goes. Meanwhil he is putting in for a job as librarian at the FO which has been advertised in the Times.

Field-Robinson came to see me and said that he was packing up at SOE He said that if we had anything for him to do, not necessar ily in an exalted capacity, he would be quite prepared to take it on.

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had been separated for 4½ years. Hhe was interned by the Germans in Paris. I told him that I would put his name down and let him know if anything suitable turned up.

I saw [redacted] who told me that it is impossible for him to get a job as long as he is still in the Polish Army. He is leaving us at the end of the year and will then have only £12.10.0 a month from the Poles. He is persona non grata with them who regard him as a British spy. He has two children and a motherto look after. I told him I would see what I could to to help him.

I saw JC. He told me that the DG had allowe him to have a copy of his report on DAs and

he took away with him copy No.3. He also has his original MS. While I feel that this is most irregular and have told the DG so, I realise that there is nothing to pre vent JC from reproducing his MS and that being a determined person he will somehow have a copy whatever we do or say. I have therefore confined myself to getting him to institute all possible safeguards. The copy and the MS will be kept in his safe at Christchurch andwill be in sealed envelopes with instructions that if anything should happen to him they should be returned unopened to me personally c/o Room 055.

JC told me that he had heard from Caccia that Sillitoe had been appointed. He had told Caccia very frankly that he thought this was a disaster and that I ought to have had the job. He had spoken to Findlater before the Selection Board met and had strongly advanced my claims. He had thought that Findlater was more or less persuaded that I was the right person. Findlater did however say that he wondered whether I was quite the right person to put a point ofview across to the Cabinet in a crisis. JC said that he thought that 10 minutes conversation with me would ppobably be a great deal more profitable than the remarks of someone thumping the table who did not really know anything about the job. There was one other rather significant remark. Findlater said that he wished Petrie was 10 years younger when he could have stayed on another 2 years to get the organisation on to its peace-time footing and then hand over. It is possible therefore that this is what the Selection Board had in mind by appointing Sillito who is 58 and would normallyretire at the age of 60.

I told JC that it would make some difference to me if I knew whether this was or was not so, since if there was any other job that I could do I should not mind a change. My only doubt was whether I was fitted for any other sort of work. JC. said that there was nothing he would not do which was within his power to help me in any way he possibly could. He thought however that it would be better for him to wait until the appoint was more or less public. He would then go and have a talk with Findlater.

Anthony tells me that the Control Commission have done nothing about Padgham although they had a letter which I sent out to Dick for the DGs signature when he was in Germany, advancing Padgham's claim for some form of employment in military governme The letter apparently was never signed. Equally nothing has been done about Robbi Mendelssohn although Melland has now been given further instructions. Anthony has brou back on behalf of the King some very valuabl miniatures and other antiques worth about £100,000 but it has been made quite clear that these are only on loan from the Duke of Brunswick. There are many other thing including gold plate and a complete set of silver plate for 240 people, whi are all about George I period. Most interesting of all is an MS of the Four Gospels, illuminated, dated about 1160, which belonged to Henry the Lion, the founder of the House of Brunswick. This document is quite unique and almost the earliest known of its kind.

Bingham came to tell me that there was still difficulty about BAUDISCH's sister. I am taking the matter up with the H.O.

December 29th

Anthony rang up about Orange who it is now suggested should be posted to Washingtc Anthony is anxious to know whether there has been any reply from Clifford Norton. Of course there has not. Anthony will be seeing Bromley and will ask him to send a wire.

December 31st

I saw Prestige about BAUDISCH's sister. He dictated a letter granting a visa which was sent to Jeffes.

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I asked C. what he thought about the new DG. He said he was extremely sorry that I h had not got the job and he agreed that the appointment constituted a down-grading of MI5 and was undesirable in that it gave it a police stamp. He said that he himself had been asked to go on the Selection Board but had refused as he knew so many of the candidates personally and thought it undesirable that in a matter of this kind he should have a voice. I imagine that he had been consulted by Cadogan but I doubt whether he knew who the candidates were. He said that very few people realised how mu much depended upon long experience and how difficult it was to put across the right point of view if you had not the necessary background and knew the answer to the supplementary question. In his own organisation he said that the only people he really relied on were those who had been with him for 20 years. Although I did not say so I felt that he would have often done much better if he relied upon himself and stuck to his own point of view instead of allowing himself to be influenced by many of those who surrounded him during the war. He emphasised the necessity of good relations with other intelligence depts. and

he felt that this was perhaps more important than anything else. It was in fact due to his personal association with L'Aisne, the head of the French 2eme Bureau that before the war Dunderdale and Godefroi had gone to Warsaw and had actually seen the cypher machine on which Degs were based. This had given him just the start he needed.

January 1st 1946.

Miss Chenhalls talked to me about Otto WITT who is now in the British zone under detention. I told her to send the full report and to suggest that the Control Commission might either re-interrogate Kraemer or talk to somebody in the Gestapo who had been in Copenhagen or Stockholm. I still thought that WITT had at one time hadsome connection with the Gestapo although they may not have sent him here officially.

Bingham brought me a report to the effect that a German member of the Gestapo named WOLFF had been seen in Paris after the liberation. He was then in American uniform and going under the name of Captain Douglas BADGER. He was now believed to be in the American forces in this country. I have passed on the report to OSS.

Herbert came to see me. He knew of course about the new DG. He said that although a pleasant individual and one who would probably be prepared to listen, he was of a somewhat shy and retiring disposition and not likely to put up much of a fight. He felt that the appointment was a definite mistake and that it constituted a downgrading of the office as a whole in addition to giving it the police stamp, which was

undesirable. Other candidates about whom I had not heard before were Hordern, put up by the H.O., Davidson, late DMI, and two airmen called Dunn and Goddard. Newsam had backed one of the airmen. I do not know to what extent Maxwell pressed the case of Sillitoe beyond the fact that he urged him to accept the appointment if it were offered to him. The worst feature is that before the committee met they had circulated to them the DGs memo on the office where he laid it down that the future DG should be either a Service man or a policeman with colonial experience In so far as backing my case therefore, if he ever intended to do so, he must have started on the wrong foot.

I asked Harker about the possibility of a decoration for Burt. He told me that all the particulars had gone forward but he did not know what the police had done.

Thornton, formerly of LRC, came to see me on his return from Scandinavia where he had been to try and re-establish his wool export business. He told me that this country had lost about 6 million pounds in contracts Had he been there 6 weeks ago this country might well have got the business. He has however succeeded in re-establishing his position for next year. Meanwhile the S.Americans are holding the field. Sweden had everything in the way of food and other goods that a man could want. They were trying to forget about the part they had played in the war. Norway was extremely well-disposed towards us. In fact Thornton had, without making any overtures, been summoned to see the King and the Crown Prince and the interview was most cordial.

January 2nd

I attended the JIC when a variety of subje were discussed. DMI was inthe chair and I thought handled the meeting very sensibl The paper came up suggesting that the defence of all our bases throughout the world should be carefully worked out. The DMI felt that this was largely a waste of time. The first thing to do was to make up our minds about our potential enemies and about the possibilities of modern technical weapons. As far as he could see the only possible enemy was Russia. It wo therefore be better for the moment to limi the problem to defence of bases which the Russians might possibly attack. For this purpose it would be necessary in the first instance for an up to date memo on everything that was known about Russian future intentions and about the internal state of the country, which would reflect on its war potential, to be prepared.

We also took the paper about the publication of information relating to SOE. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff had reversed the decision of the JIC and had ordered that a revised version of the SOE memo should b given to the press. They thought that if some official publication went out it woul damp down unauthorised publications. I confined myself to saying that it would be almost impossible to us to prosecute under the Official Secrets Act if an official release was made, and I suggeste that when making the handout something might perhaps be said to the press to the effect that the Official release did not authorise them to publish all sorts of stories that they might have already got written up intheir lockers.

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I had a word with de Guingand about the [redacted] case. He told me that Chapman had not been able to get any futehr. I asked whether he thought we should now do a general vetting job on JIC,JIS and anyone he who had been concerned with the Military Mission in Moscow. He said that in his view this was essential and he undertook to give us facilities.

Vesey brought me the case of DEAR who turned up here in the guise of a British subject. He is really a Roumanian. He was sent back to us from Moscow. His story is extremely dubious. He may well have been both a German and a Russian agent. He has now succeeded in getting enlisted and is being considered for employment with SOE. In fact he ought I think to be locked up or deported. The H.O. who were approached some time ago have given us no reply. I have told Vesey to supply me with up to date particulars and I propose to write to H.O.

[redacted] came to talk to me about the VERMEHRENS. He said that all sorts of Catholic dignatories had been writing in to the H.O. but that the latter had so far

held their ground and that the VERMEHRENS were to go. His point was that SIS could no longer be responsible either for their upkeep or their security. I said that as far as we were concerned we did not feel that at the moment they constituted a menace to security but that they were the type to get involved in all sorts of political intrigues and would be agitating for this and that course to be taken with regard to Germany's future. This need not necessarily affect us, at any rate for some considerable time.

January 3rd

A report by Lt.Col. METTIG of OKW/AG and WNV/Chi, captured at Rheims on 15th May 1945 gives interesting details about the interception of wireless traffic. The greatest success was apparently achieved by the intercepting of wireless communications of the leader of the Czech Resistance Movement in London. This is the only case where P/W is sure that it was possible for Referat Vauck to break into an agent network by purely crypto-analytic methods. The Czechs were as far as cyphers were concerned apparently very poorly advised. They transmitted many long messages which were sometimes divided into 10 or more parts. Each message was signed MAREK and each time in the same part of the text. These breaches of security, along with the interception of identically written messages made an inroad possible. The book used for encyphering was found and the cypher key was taken from a poem. In Sept.1942 the Czechs were to go over to a new cypher but were inefficient enough to name the book for encyphering from the 1st Oct.1942 in the old cypher. The contents of messages

were nearly always concerned with the political situation and activities of the Czech Resistence Movement. This type of information was so important that for a long time the wireless traffic was allowed to continue unhindered. Similar successes were achieved in the case of the Poles. The Germans were able to listen in to the internal wireless traffic of agents operatin in Poland through the Warsaw rising of 1944. From this the dispositions of the Polish liberation troops as well as friction between them and the Russians could be established. It was possible moreover to get all wireless traffic which the Polish Govt. in London carried on with their organisations in Poland. The methods by which these transmissions were compromised were known to P/W. A further success against the cypher systems of the Polish Govt.in exile was achieved over the link London-Ankara. P/W does not know if this system was solved by Vauck or by the Polish Section of OKW/Chi. Results in this field were almost successful when just before the allied invasion of France a ban on all W/T transmissions from England was instituted which included even diplomatic channels. The wireless traffic of Polish agents to England however continued to operate.

I attended the staff meeting and informed those present that according to a letter that I had had from Dick, 6 or 8 officers and 11 secretaries would be required for the Far East. Some of the secretaries were of course already there and some of those formerly in SOE might be kept on. I also spoke about Miss Glass and explained her position. Charles seemed to think that work might be found for her if she decided to stay on in the office.

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Michael Ryde came to tell me that ZIGZAG was publishing his life story in the Etoile. It contains almost every detail of his career with us. After talking to Cussen we came to the conclusion that we should attempt to obtain the necessary evidence in France with the assistance of the French authorities. We should then consider whether it was desirable or not to prosecute. There are many arguments both for and against. The prosecution would have a salutary effect possibly on whoever else is intending to publish a book, such as Treasure who is intending to publish a book on her experiences. On the other hand the public might get the impression that all MI5 agents were crooks. Unless the proceedings were given a certain amount of publicity they would have no deterrent effect and such publicity might get rather out of hand.

Hester came to tell me about the proposed initiation of Army "Y" into OATS. A telegram had been sent out to the Mid East without any prior consultation with ourselves in spite of Hester's warning to Maltby. The result had been that Paget had put his foot down and that we had won the first round. Maltby as usual had taken the view that it was an order and nothing to do with us.

I had a talk with Tommy Harris and Richard Butler about Armas GARCIA, who is being questioned by the Income Tax Authorities about the transfer of funds which was carried out on behalf of Garbo. The matter originated through Eggs who learned from MUNOZ, the Spanish MA, that Armas, a fruit merchant, wished to get funds from this country to Spain. It had originally been

suggested that Munoz for a consideration should take the money in a diplomatic bag. We saw in this an opportunity for getting funds to Garbo and put up Cyril Mills under a cover name as an intermediary. The money was paid by Armas to Dick Butler's firm who held the stakes until the Abwehr passed the money over in Madrid to Armas's father. Armas has shown this transaction, which was carried out under cover of a sale of cochineal, in his books. These have been examined by the income tax authorities and so the trouble. Armas of course has no idea that the transaction was really an Abwehr one. He merely wished to evade the currency regulations, which we indirectly and for our own purposes assisted him in doing. It has been arranged that Charles and DickButler should see Finch of the Inland Revenue, who is accustomed to peculiar transactions of this kind, andwill probably know what todo.

January 4th

I saw Miss Shaw. She is anxious to get the services of B.5. in the event of any sabotage activities by the Germans in Wilhelmshaven. There are certain ships there which will shortly have to be handed over to the Russians. It is thought possible that the Germans may attempt to sabotage them, since there is already a report that they put sand in the wheels of the Prince Eugen before she was taken over by the Americans. Both Lewis and Haylor are very anxious that we should assist if possible. After speaking to Burt, it seemed that Spooner and Skardon would probably be able to handle any case if it arose.

I saw the D.M.I. about the ELLI case. He s sent for Jimmy Way to whom we outlined the problem. Jimmy Way will see Roger Hollis and arrange to get the names of all people who handled JIC ad JIS as well as Military Mission documents, at the material time. These names will then be passed over our records.

I asked the DMI about his visit to Ireland and told him that he had been described to us as the "head of the positive side of our firm". He did not tell me what he had been doing but we spoke about McKenna the Chief of Staff, whom we both agreed was a good fellow.

I saw Hunter and told him that I had got 4 names from Control Commission of possible candidates for B.6. These men will report at 055 on demobilisation.

I had a long talk with Ffoulkes who is home on leave. He is evidently working under very great difficulties and has no really experienced staff. His office is used as a sort of training ground for raw recruits in Intelligence. He would like to be considered for a job in this office but is not likely to be demobilised before the summer. He has no commitments.

January 5th

Ede came to see me about Tufnell-Barrett going over to Caracas to make contact with Garbo. I spoke to Tommy Harris who suggested that Garbo should either communicate direct with him or be given an address for DSO Trinidad in case he found himself in any difficulties.

Bill Luke's proteges are causing a certain amount of trouble. He wants to get Freak employed by UNO. I am seeing what can be done.

January 7th

Hester spoke to me on the telephone about the small intercept unit at Portsmouth and also about accommodation at Barnet. asked him to talk the matter over with Sclater and then told him to speak to me again. I said that we wished to keep some sort of finger on the pulse of the ether otherwise we should have no idea as to what was the extent of leakage. This applied more particularly to civilian wireless and experimental work done by Ministry of Supply, MAP and others.

A long list has been received of all the employees of Alst Paris. This list includes the name of HANLET, a Belgian who passed through the LRC, was regarded as suspect and sent on to the Belgians with a warning. His story was regarded as thoroughly unsatisfactory but noevidence could be obtained on which a 12(5)a order could be based. While there is no reason to think that he became active there is no doubt that hewas a German agent. When we have all the information we shall consider what action is possible and necessary. HANLET is at present working in a factory.

Nigel Watson has been offered a two years contract by the FO as Charge d'Affaires in Luxembourg.

He did of course do a very gallant job during th

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war, and was parachuted into Yugoslavia as Liaison Officer with Tito's forces and he subsequently did well for IPI on cases of Indian renegades. On return here he was put into F.Division and evidently felt the work was not sufficiently important.

Hill spoke to me about Courtney being made a Lt.Col. He is putting the case forward on the grounds that Courtney is Dixon's deputy and in his absence has to control t the DSOs who are all Lt.Cols.

January 8th

Keith of PWE sent over Major Hope about a PID employee named PRINGSHEIM, who is apparently making complaints to unauthorise people outside the office about certain PID compilations on the morale of the population in Germany during the war. PRINGSHEIM alleges that any documents indicating the resistance of the German population are being excluded. It is I am told quite untrue. The question is what can be done about PRINGSHEIM.

I saw an Air Ministry film yesterday on the activities of SOE. The film itself was extremely good and it is difficult to take exception to any details.

I pointed out that a film which had the Govt.stamp on it was always valuable to foreign intelligence services. Moreover it would encourage unauthorised persons to give publicity to their various stories. It was decided that if the Cabine were in favour of releasing the SOE story

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to the Press the film should be included.

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I discussed with Vesey and the question of vetting of American visa applications. The whole thing is getting into a serious muddle due to the intervention of OSS who have constituted themselves the vetting authorities, with the apparent agreement of the Embassy. The proper people of course to do this wo are the FBI who will have to handle the various characters if and when they arriv in the USA. My inclination is to discuss the whole problem with Cimperman.

John Mair came in. He is just back from Vienna. He says conditions there for the population are really terrible, particula in the Russian zone. There is still a go deal of looting and rape. The other day a woman got on a tram in her underclothes She apologised by saying that the Russian had removed her fur coat and her coat and skirt and she had to get home. A certain number of the Russians are going southea John saw a train piled up with every so sort of equipment and trailers with antiq furniture and Russians sitting round a table drinking wine as the train rumbled through the city. This is rather typical of what has been happening. John seems to like his work and feels that he has quite a chance of getting into the FO through the back door.

Geoffrey Wethered rang up from Berlin to know whether there was any chance of his being taken on here. Otherwise he contemplates returning to the Bar.

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the German radio.

January 10th

Vesey came to tell me that he had seen Krymer who is apparently prepared to retur to France. He has two houses there and hi roots are really in that country. Vesey will see what he can do to get him over.

KOHOUT and MARITA have been given their Kriegsverdienstkreuze and appear to be extremely gratified. MARITA is going to hide hers in the stuffing of her armchair.

The DG has decided to let Cussen go to Paris to investigate the leakage of information by ZIGZAG to the Etoile.

January 11th

Rhodes rang from the Hague. He was rat -er worried about our turning down Gen.Eindhoven's request to send some of his officers here for a course. I explain that at the moment it was almost impossible to receive them but that we would do what wecould for them at the earliest possible moment. This would be in the form of a course rather than a period of attachment.

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At the 12 o'clock meeting today Hughes drew attention to the fact that there were now 3 transmitters running. One was the transmitter which was known an had been under observation for some time. There were however two others operating from the Embassy. RSS had not been able to pick them up from any of their stations They had been heard only by a van in close proximity. This is one more illustration of the weakness of RSS in so far as pickin up illicit transmissions from this country are concerned. Hanslope I am told has gon over entirely to SIS business and RSS is shortly to be handed over to Army "Y", und Walter Scott. It is a curious thing that all this could happen without any official notification to ourselves and more than ever emphasises the necessity of our havin a representative on the Sigint Board.

I heard a good Winston story the other day. At the end of a long and somewhat tedious conference at Athens when the Greek crisis was on, Winston summed up by saying "Well, gentlemen, it seems that we shall have to put our trust in General Plaster Ass (Plastiras) and hope that his feet are not made of clay".

A number of documents have now been captured which are the property of 3F of the Abwehrstelle Netherlands. They are dated March 1943 and relate to the penetration of SOE. A list is given of 60 captured persons who have been sent for trial, giving their descriptions and a number of details of their espionage activities. The financiers were the brother MENTEN from Warmond and the Hague respectively. They had regularly placed large sums at the disposal of the organisation, roughly 5,400 florins a quarter, and a total of some 43,000. It is stated that the Dutch section of SOE was in the charge of Major Blunt in 1942 and Major Bingham in 1943. The formation of some 20 sabotage groups each from 80-100 strong, was planned. Likewise modern weapons and sabotage material were to be supplied by air. By the end of 1942, 46 droppings had taken place, 38 parachuted agents had been captured, and all the material dropped had been secured for German use. By the end of 1943 the total of 90 droppings had been made 53 parachuted agents including a woman, and 900,000 kilos of weapons and sabotage material were captured. When the operation was at its height, 13 wireless stations were working and the Germans were pretending to run 40 agents and their sabotage groups. The weapons captured included 800 sub-

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machine guns, 60 light machine guns, 2,000 pistols and revolvers, 8,000 hand grenades 50,000 rounds of ammunition and 52 package of explosives. In about March 1943 the controlling station in London asked the na of the leaders of the organisation and their deputies in Belgium with their addre ses and spheres of work. This request of course gave the Germans a wonderful opportunity. Prior to the round-up about 300 of the members of the organisation wer reported by name.

The final round-up in Belgium seems to have taken place about Nov.1943 when the leaders of other resistance groups who, wit the Corps Franc were trying to amalgamate wanted to make a discussion with a repre--sentative of the British Govt. and the English Group in Belgium a condition of their acceptance. There had been signs that the leaders of these new groups were in W/T contact with London and that London had expressed suspicion. A meeting which took place in a house rented by Ast Belgiu was therefore arranged. The following wer present: Col.Siron as representative of th Corps Franc, Col.Bastin as representative the Radio Belgie, Col.Adam as representati of the Army of Liberation, Col.van Nooten as representative of the "holding-down" group of the Corps Franc, and principle liaison officer with the Front de l'Inde pendance. Here the first round-up took place. Force had to be used and Adam was fatally and Siron and Bastin slightly injured. Thereupon the breaking-down of the whole organisation was begun. House searches brought to light a large quantit of material, particularly regarding espiona work, and many leaders. At the end of

November 143 arrests had been made and another 100 were contemplated.

Another document relating to DA work in Holland states that from Feb.1942 to 30.6.43 172 operations had been controlled and included 86 parachute droppings consisting of 515 containers with sabotage material and weapons, 52 containers with ammunition, about 5,000 Kilos of munitions and 77,000 Kilos of material and weapons. 48 agent W/T sets, 9 ultra short wave sets, 58 agents, 7 delivery aircraft shot down or crashed and 4 further probables. By April 1943 43 out of a total 49 agents captured had been persuaded to work for the Germans and 430 agents' helpers had been arrested.

_____ came to tell me that he was going to tour the Mid East, Italy Cairo Athens and returning via Switzerland. His purpose was to see what could be done about XXX which the FO wished continued. I am notifying Douglas Roberts.

A Major Brede in reporting on I Luft, reports on Ostro. He says he provided very extensive and detailed reports about England with special reference to British aircraft production and allied subjects. He was said to have agents in London who had access to documents about British aircraft production. One of his most important channels for passing information from England to Lisbon is said to have been Dutch pilots of BOAC. Information was also sent by letters in secret ink. Ostro obtained reports from the USA about American Air Force and Naval building programmes. He was considered the most important source of information of Ampt

Ausland. His reports about English aircraft production in the period March 1941 to Jan. 1943 were believed to be correct, with reservations. His reports generally were considered reliable because the information in them nearly always tallied with that obtained from T/W and from evaluations of the press.(Our analysis of these reports showed that the majority were inaccurate and we came positively to the conclusion that they were fabricated). Ostro was run by I.H.Ost, Berlin, even when he went to Portugal, his case being in charge of Col. Scholtz. Under Scholtz's supervision Capt. Kniebis and Dr.Beck actually did the work. The latter was the owner of a chemical factory in Berlin which made synthetic resins and varnishes. I Luft employed an agent called Ivor Lissner in Hsinking. He was referred to in traffic as Ivar and is believed to be an author and journalist. He was in the Far East before March 1941 and frequently visited Tokyo. He ran a network of agents who provided reports on the order of battle of Russian troops in Siberia. He also sent in political reports on Japan which were received by teleprint. He is believed to have been arrested by the Japanese shortly before or soon after Jan.1943. Another agent was Kraemer, Asst. Press Attache in Stockholm who used the cover name of Siegfried, and also Josephine His information on British air power was sai to be derived from a member of the Swedish legation in London who passed it to a member of the Swedish FO in Stockholm. Kraemer said that he obtained the information from this FO member in return fora fairly considerable sum of money paid monthly. In Switzerland the Asst.Air Attac Major Prinz Auersperg had a contact with the publisher of Interavia, and with a

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former French diplomat. Interavia was also used by the head of IT/LW. "Pasha" reports from Ankara were derived almost entirely from the press. Reichert of the DNB was connected with the organisation which was believed to have been a Greek-Jewi -Armenian concern in the near and middle East of which very little was ever known and which sold its reports for a fiarly high monthly sum to intermediaries of Reichert. Headquarters in Berlin assume that the greater part of the information derived from this organisation was false. Nevertheless the reports were accepted because it was believed that they were partly correct and because there were no other reliable sources of information in the near and middle East.

Speaking of the Sofia Meldekopf Brede said that this was in the hands of Richard Kander @ Klatt. The organisation Max was aimed at Russia. Kander worked in Sofia with a Russian emigre who had formerly lived in Czechoslovakia and who claimed to have been a Cossack officer. This man had a passport in the name of Ilja Lang. The Max organisation in Russia was said to consist of a net of W/T agents among Russian headquarters who were members of families which had been anti-Soviet. (See p.61 for continuation)

January 14th

Joe Archer asked me about the future of the Control Commission in Germany, whether it was to continue to be an integrated show or was to have regular Service sections. The Air Ministry feel to some extent that they are left out in the cold. Moreover they do not

appear to have a very satisfactory liaison. I think these views are expressed by Plant who probably has been somewhat side-tracked owing to his general lack of knowledge about C.I. matters. I told Joe that there were no prejudices against the Air Force with regard to their taking an active part in C.I. both in Mid East, Far East and on the Control Commissions. The trouble was that their candidates were rather bad starters as they had never had an I.B. staff in the Air Force. I suggested to Joe that he should take the matter further with Dick on his return as I was not really clear about the future status of CIB.

We have now been asked to write up the question of CI records in the field. Gwyer is going to do this.

I had a meeting with the DG, Rothschild and Allen about Victor's future. It was agreed that letters should be written to Sir John Anderson and Edward Bridges with the suggestion that they should be visited by the D.G. and Victor. This should give him the necessary credentials and backing for any enquiries he wants to carry out. He has already gathered that there is some further development with regard to uranium which is known to Lord Cherwell, but which he will not at the moment divulge.

I saw Marriott who is at present employed in CICI. He is the son of the Dean of Westminster. He seems intelligent and has a very detailed grasp of politics and personalities in the Mid East. He would like to join the office and is quite ready to serve in Mid East if required.

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I spoke to John Noble about the report which I received from Singapore. It is based on the interrogation of Shinosaki who was at one time concerned with espionage activities in Malaya. Shinosaki says that in Oct.1943 he attended a dinner on the flagship Kashii when a staff officer of the First Deppatch Southern Fleet made the following disclosures. Shortly before Japan entered the war, a German submarine sank a British transport ship in the Indian Ocean. The Germans boarded the ship and in the captain s cabin found (a) a report from Sir Robert Brook-Popham,C.in C Malaya to London giving the dispositions of all British planes in Singapore and Malaya and ma making an urgent request for RAF reinforcements.(b) the British naval codes. These documents were handed over to the Japs who thus acquired exact knowledge of British air power in Malaya and planned their invasion accordingly. The possession of the British Naval codes and the consequent ability to rea British naval wireless messages was an important factor in the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. The captain said without these documents it would have been very difficult to have captured Singapore so quickly. This may be the answer to a JNA from Berlin to Tokyo in December 1940 in which it was stated that the Jap N.A. in Berlin had received from the German Navy the minutes of a meeting of the British Cabinet held on Aug.15th1940 dealing with operations against Japan. The points in the document were (1) although Singapore was in danger Britain could not send her Fleet to the Far East but must defend it by Army and Air Force reinforcements.(2) Japan would probably invade French Indo-China or Siam as a first step and the N.E.I. and Singapore would follow. Britain was not in a position

to resort to war in the event of an attack on French Indo-China or Siam. (3) Hongkong would be abandoned but would continue to resist as long as possible. (4) If the operations against the Italians in the Med. should proceed rapidly and successfully it would be possible to send a fleet to the F.E. (5) Operations must be conducted jointly with N.E.I. (6) Since it was probable that the Japs would occupy Suva in the Fiji Is. as a base, one brigade must be sent there from N.Z.

I saw Roger Fleetwood-Hesketh at the club today. He is writing a memo on deception during the battle of Normandy based on the translations of the intelligence reports of the OKH and OKW and on Jodl's papers and Jodl's interrogation by Cuthbert Fleetwood Hesketh. While his enquiries are by no means complete they are already providing evidence to show that the Germans conducted the battle of Normandy on the basis of the report of Garbo and Brutus. It is significant that there is no mention at all of the use of Y.material. Incidentally it is confirmed fro other xeources, which indicate that monitoring was in a state of complete confusion at the time. Jodl realised that something had gone wrong and that the staff had made a miscalculation about the possibility of attack in the Pas de Calais. He said however that the Germans regarded the presence of so many units which they believed to be Patton's Army in the S.E. of England as an almost certain indication that the bridgehead was only a blind. Asked when he first came to the conclusion that an attack in the Pas de Calais had been abandoned he said that it was when units of Patton's Army began to appear in the bridgehead. At that stage he urged strongly that the 15th Corps

should be brought down from the north to the bridgehead. A long struggle ensued lasting more than a fortnight with Hitler over this point. As usual Hitler won and no effective move was made until 4-5 weeks after the attack on Normandy had started.

January 15th

I had a talk with Kirby Green who is leaving in about 2 weeks time for the Caribbean. I gave him as good a picture as I could of the various intelligence bodies in the USA and in particular of the FBI. While he should certainly see Peter Dwyer and Stephenson if he is still there, he should avoid if possible going to the FBI under their auspices, as t is would normally do him no good.

Dick has telegraphed suggesting that the transfer of SIME should be postponed for 6 months owing to the difficulties of getting military personnel to fill the gaps. DG was inclined to agree with this. We pointed out however that this was a situation which we had always envisaged. We never thought of providing SIME with more than 5 or 6 officers one of whom would be the head. For the rest we should have to rely on military personnel. It seemed therefore that there was no object in postponing the discussions. After some difficulty we got the DG to agree to our drafting a telegram on these lines.

I talked to TAR about the possibility of his going to D Division and taking the wireless outfit with him. He seemed quite ready to do a job with D. but was a little doubtful about taking the wireless team, which he felt was more suitable in D. Division.

I pointed out to him that the mechanics was really a security matter whereas the Y.produ of RSS were a B.division matter. It seemed me therefore that he could quite logically t B.3E with him.

Curry is nearing the completion of his work. The sections of the office have given him a million words which he has reduced roughly to 120,000. I impressed upon him that it was important that he should have this document ready for the new DG which was the only one on the office which he ought to read. The DGs own memo should be burned, Hankey's report is quite useless and Findlater Stewart in so far as the work of the office is concerned, gives a somewhat inadequate picture.

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January 16th

Allen brought down [redacted] who has just been demobilised from the Mid East. He was Secretary to the [redacted] Kellar tells me that he is a bit of a snake. He was at one time a stooge of R.J.s but has since turned against him. He is however intelligent. I asked him about the transfer of SIME to ourselves. He seemed to think that it was quite logical and sensible and he was quite sure that as long as Paget was there all would be well. Douglas Roberts was apparently persona gratissima with the GOC. Douglas is apparently trying to avoid being a member of the JIC on the grounds that the JICare not initiated into OATS and that this frequently puts him in an awkward position. I said that in this I thought Douglas was definitely wrong. He certainly should be a member of the JIC and if he saw them going wrong from lack of knowledge he should get the position rectifie

through the G.O.C. who could quite easily say that there were certain matters on which he was not authorised to speak. GOC I gather rather regards SIME as his special personal Gestapo This causes slight irritation among the two other C in Cs. Kellar tells me however that they have not been put into the full picture. The AOC is Charles Medhurst. There is no doubt that the Air Ministry consider that they have a 33% sha in SIME and that they are only waiting for certain areas in the Mid East to go over to the Air Force Command to claim the organis-tion or parts of it as their own. This seems to me to be the wrong conception. SIME should be a totally integrated body. If the Air Force can produce better intelligence officers there is no reason why it should not provide up to 90%. The fact is that whenever they have been asked in the past to supply an officer they have always regretted that they were not in a position to do so. This is mainly due to the fact that they have never had an I.B staff and tha their personnel are therefore unqualified.

January 17th

Peter Hope came to talk to me about KRAUS, who is wanted by the French authorities. I said that ultimately it is a matter for the Control Commission. If however he wrote us a letter I would pass it on to Ronnie Haylor He told me incidentally that Raymond Lee has now deserted Mrs.Lee and is going round eithe with KRAUS's wife or another daughter of Mrs. Reginald Fellowes. All 3 daughters of the latter are now in trouble with the French authorities for collaboration.

At the staff meeting today I said that I felt

it was important that the staffing of one division should not be considered except in its relation to the whole office. I had a list of a considerable number of candidates, some of whom had been employed by us throughout the war, who were anxious to return, and could take a job in any division. It would be a pity if the office got filled up with new people and the others missed their chance. I gave the meeting an estimate of probable requirements in the F.E.

I talked to Cussen about the case of ZIGZAG. There is apparently an MS of a book now in possession of Victor Gollancz which has been referred to Bellinger M.P. and Aneurin Bevan. Cussen will take steps to find out the position and if possible to stop publication.

Haylor spoke to me about COLUMBINE. He would I think make another effort to get C. into the police if the PID job in the Mid East is no longer open.

John Irvine is coming home on leave and is anxious to see me. Ronnie would like some female staff from the War Room if there are any available. Haylor mentioned also that he had spoken to Malcolm Cumming about the C.I.Lab. Haylor thinks that the work could be done by reference home and that there is no longer any justification for a Lab. in Germany. Malcolm I gather feels that if a search is conducted it is necessary to have someone on the spot who knows what he is looking for.

I spoke about Robbi Mendelssohn and his mother. Ronnie will give Brian Melland another dig and if I let him have particulars about the mother he will see what can be done.

I had a talk with TAR, Sclater and Hughes about the future of RSS. We agreed that it would be a good thing to have a discussion with Walter Scott and make clear to him exactly what our requirements are. It is a remarkable thing that so many changes in regard to RSS have been going on and that C. has never said a word about it to the DG. who is after all a co-partner in the organisation. This only shows how necessary it is for us to have a representative on the Sigint Board.

Cecil and I dined with McKenna and a man called Kerr who is in the Contracts Branch of the Ministry of Defence. The evening was extremely pleasant and frank. Both are over here at the moment in connection with the purchase of ships for the Eire Navy which will consist of a couple of old corvettes and a few motor-boats. They are also looking for an ex-Lt. Commander who has had a ship during the war who will become the Admiral of the Irish fleet. It is essential however that he should be at least of Irish extraction if not an Eire resident.

McKenna is also working on getting permission for the representatives of the Eire Army to attend staff courses over here and in general to get the whole Eire Armed Forces equipment and training on the same basis as our own. He envisages that in the long run a settlement will be reached and he thinks that if he could lay the foundations now Eire will be able to dovetail into our operational machine. He is desperately anxious that the liaison with ourselves shall continue indefinitely on the present friendly and co-operative basis. Personally I think that he is entirely genuine. We said that if there was anything we could do to help him by putting in a word we would certainly do so.

January 18th

Burt came in to talk to me about the announcement in the press today of the secret appointment of Sir Percy Pilliboe to work under the Chiefs of Staff. He presumed that this meant that he was going to be our new head. I told h him that this was so. He said that he was disappointed that it was not to be me.

Harker asked me to put up a note to the DG about the distribution of JIC's report. I said that I thought it only ought to go to 4 or 5 people at the outside and that they should return their copies when read. Otherwise we might be in serious trouble with C. whose sources might be compromised.

Kellar has been offered permanent employment here. He will I think stay although he might make more money elsewhere.

Alley, Rhodes and Corin came to talk to me about Eindhoven. The real trouble is that Eindhoven has promised his P.M. to build up a C.I. organisation. If therefore he does not go on with the trainig of his men he will be in trouble and forced to apply to OSS. He would much prefer to send his men here. We sketched out a programme which I think should keep them occupied for 2-3 weeks.

The DG asked me to consider the future of Russian espionage. He is apparently reluctant to link up F and B Division.s I said that I thought it was difficult to separate Russian espionage from the CPGB but that I would gi e the matter further thought and let him have a note.

January 19th

The Control Commission have at last found a job for Padgham. I only hope that we shall not have the same fiasco as with Columbine. I have written to Ronnie saying that they really ought to give C. a job with the police without his being forced to go through the ranks.

Cecil and I dined again last night with McKenna and Kerr. McKenna was particularly forthcoming and we talked a lot about the value of our personal relations - how for example the question of the wireless set in the Legation had been settled after McKenna's conversation with Cecil in Dublin. McKenna had gone the following morning to Dev and had succeeded in persuading him of the urgency and importance of the whole matter. McKenna said that although Dev deviated from Right to Left in coming up to the point, once he had made up his mind he stuck to it. This of course had both advantages and disadvantages. McKenna firmly believed that Dev had kept his word when he said he would not let Ireland become a base for operations against England. He had in fact been constantly nagging at the Ministry of Defence on this very point in order to be quite sure that everything was being done to safeguard the position. McKenna then said that there were of course many people both in Govt. circles and outside them who if they knew that we were discussing matters so frankly and freely in his room at the Cumberland Hotel, would mark him down as a traitor to the Irish cause. It was an unfortunate thing that Dev did not come down more firmly on people of this sort. McKenna believed that it was now Dev's official policy to co-operate with this country and to get Eire's defences forces on a common basis

with ours. He was quite certain that if the partition issue could be solved Dev would be prepared to enter into a defensive alliance giving us in the event of war free access to the Irish ports and airfields. The difficulty here of course is that we should never know if Eire would see eye to eye with us about going to war, particularly if she was not even within the British Commonwealth of Nations. McKenna fully realises the defence of Eire was bound up with that of this country and that ha we not had the north during the war we should have been sunk. He argues however that it would have been much better if there had been no partition issue when not only would we have had the north but all the ports in the south as well. This would I firmly believe be all right if McKenna had been at the head of the State but who is to know wh t Dev's successor might do. McKenna was very insistent about the maintenance of an unofficial liaison between ourselves and the Ministry of Defence. He said that at all costs it must continue on the present intimate and personal basis. He himself might not be in position very much longer as he was due to retire, but he did not see why this should prejudice our good relations. He said that if at any time Cecil and I were in Ireland and would like to have an off the record meeting alone with Dev he would be very pleased to arrange it.

January 21st

I talked to Alley and Corin about Eindhoven's officers' visit to which the DG has now agreed

Dick arrived back yesterday after a successful tour. He is full of information about near and far east but very despondant about the new DG which he feels is a real disaster.

January 22nd

The F.O. have asked us for notes on various Polish organisations here and in Italy. This is on account of the arrest of a number of people in Poland whose trial may result in accusations being made against this country and possibly against S I.S. or S.O.E. There may be suggestions that we have been fostering activities against the Polish Govt. We have said that if and when such accusations are made we may be able to give further particulars. This is exactly what I expected would happen and only shows how necessary it is to be in a position to give the facts regarding either pro- or anti-Lublin Poles.

Cimperman came to talk to me at my request about the vetting of immigrants to the USA. He said that he had been approached by the Embassy some time ago to arrange the necessary clearance here. He had turned this down as he was only concerned with visas granted in spite of an adverse record. This sometimes happened when people like Eleanor Roosevelt weighed in. He would be grateful therefore if we could let him have a copy of any adverse report. He would then check the matter up with the Visa Dept. and if necessary notify the FBI.

Burt came to talk to me about the fate of his officers. I said that I was not sure whether on their ceasing to hold commissions they were not eligible for 56 days leave with full pay. This would act as a kind of bonus if they returned immediately to the Yard and would undoubtedly be very acceptable. Burt felt that all his officers, whether in uniform or not ought to get similar treatment. I have spoken to Charles about this. He is going into the

matter and realises the importance of doing Burt's people well.

Teresa tells me that one of the people in the Jack case wants to murder his old mother aged 83 who is taking exception to Fascist meetings in her house. He realises that she could get him and his brother in law into serious trouble. The Dept. took the view that they did not believe in murder since it would undoubtedly react unfavourably on the organisation as a whole. This seems to me to be the right attitude and I doubt whether anything further need be done. I told Teresa however to have a word with Burt.

I saw Russell who is just back from Ceylon. I told him that SIFE was now on its legs, that the DSO points at Singapore, Burma and Hong Kong had been set up, and that I felt it was a pity that therewas not some link with Ceylon. He seemed a little astonished that SIFE had really come into being and blamed the position in Ceylon on the Governor. Personally I think that he rather encouraged the Governor to haul down the flag, although there is no doubt that the latter was an extremely timid person, terrified of having anything to do with Intelligence. I explained to Russell that it might well be necessary for us to know something of what is going on in Ceylon just as much as we may have to have some link with Malta even when the countr obtained its independance. It will not of course be possible to have a full-blown DSO but there are many other covers in which we can have representation. Though Russell is intelligent I do not think that he has much imagination.

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came to see me. He wanted to keep Klop until the end of the first week in Feb. Klop has apparently been doing extremely useful work. I asked if he had seen the recent report on the PIAT and PESCATORI interrogations which give in considerable detail the low-down on the British, American, French, Polish, Dutch, Russian Czech, German, Italian and Swiss Secret Services, during the war. One would have thought that being on leave this would be the one report that Section V would have wished to discuss with him. Nobody had even mentioned it. I told him that we were particularly interested in the activities of the Russian S.S. which were related to the Rote-Kapelle organisation and also to the CORBY case in Canada. I arranged with him to have a talk to Gwyer, who is writing up the whole of the RoteKapelle. This of course should really be a job for SIS but I have never been able to discover that anyone is taking an interest in following up all the various leads which started from the KOPKOW case.

January 23rd

I had a talk with Hollis and Burt about possible action against MAY. Byrnes and Bevin talked over the matter with the Canadians here and the final decision now rests with McKenzie King. The proposal is to set up a Royal Commission in Canada which after examining CORBY, will detain and interrogate all others, including CP. members of Parliament. We discussed whether it would be better to interrogate MAY before the public announcement of the Royal Commission or afterwards. I said that I thought it would be preferable to do so after the public announcement as the circumstances of our approach would then appear more natural. Burt would assume that

MAY was a loyal citizen anxious to assist us in any way in the enquiry.

Briscoe and Cumming brought Besley of the Lab.in the British zone to see me The decision is that Ronnie Haylor thinks that there is no longer any necessity to have a Lab in Germany. He reasons that as the underground movement never got going and so far has shown no signs of doing so, it is a waste of money to keep the Lab.in being. Besley thinks on the other hand that there might be a considerable amount of work for the Lab in examining false passports etc. and personal effects, but that in fact these articles never come his way. Haylor thinks that such matters could be adquately dealt with by sending them home. I got Dick in to give his views. He said that he thought we should have to accept Haylor's view that from the point of view of the BAOR there was really no justification for the continuation of the Lab. On the other hand from an MI5 point of view we were anxious to get right up to date on any S/W or other devices used by the Germans. There were clearly a number of technicians in this line of business who had never been interrogated. This should be done by Besley or some other suitable person going out from this country as a representative of MI5. Such an officer would carry more weight and be more likely to get the required information.

We discussed the future of RSS (Sclater,Walter Scott,TAR,Dick,Hughes and myself). Scott said that RSS from the engineering and Y. point of view would be coming under the Sigint Board. He would only be concerned to some extent with its activities abroad. He suggested therefore as a result of a talk that he had had with Travis that we should

get into direct touch with Travis. I explained to Scott exactly what our requirements were. He was a little inclined at first to think that representation on the Sigint Board would not do us much good, but he rather revised his view later in the discussion, although he thought that clearly we should be able to get all we wanted if we had direct liaison with Travis. I said that it was just the difference of getting a thing by kindness and getting it as a right. We had suffered so much in the past from relying on kindness that I felt in a way that it was preferable to get the constitutional position properly established. If we were not members of the Sigint Board we could have no authoritative say in the allocation of Sigint resources. We had very definite requirements and there must be some machinery in future therefore through which we could state our claims. "C" rang me up later in the evening. He had evidently heard from Travis that Walter Scott was coming to see me. He said that he rather doubted whether I was talking to the right person. I said that I had realised this from the discussion and that I was intending to get into direct touch with Travis. C. entirely agreed with this course. I took the opportunity of explaining to him once more what our requirements were. He seemed to agree that they were legitimate requirements and should be met. The Findlater Stewart report suggests that we should be represented on the Sigint Board. C. while not demurring personally, said that he would have to refer the matter to the Board. He still felt that if we had the opportunity of presenting our case it should be sufficient for our requirements. I doubt therefore whether he will put our case very strongly to the Board. He said that he had previously put up Cavendish-Bentinck to

represent the F.O. but that the Board as a whole had turned this down. I think however that we differ from the FO in that we are not solely concerned with Y products but with the general set-up

It is difficult of course to say what we should get out of the membership of the Sigint Board without knowing more about Sigint's work and the kind of problems which are brought before it.

Wibroe has returned from Denmark and is being demobilised. He is rather worried about the situation there. He says that the higher collaborators seem to be getting away with it and returning to their big business activities unmolested whereas a certain number of the junior collaborators are being prosecuted. The young resistance workers are antagonistic to the present Govt. and favour collaboration with Britain. The present Govt. however is somewhat subservient to Russia. It is still expected that the Russians will go out of Bornholm when the British leave Denmark, but this is by no means certain.

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January 24th

Horrocks, Adam, Byrde, Vesey, Strong and I discussed the vetting of American immigration. I told them about my conversation with Cimperman. Horrocks said that as long as we made a proviso that if the numbers increased greatly the Americans would have to discriminate, he could tackle the problem. He was at the moment bang up to date on his carding. He did not of course mention the fact that a great deal of carding that he had undertaken on behalf of the War Room had never been done. It was therefore arranged that contact should

be made with Wyn Scott who would deal with all immigration visa questions with C.Divisi As regards any other matters he would deal with Vesey. I have circulated a note to this effect to all concerned.

I saw Col.Bourne. He was formerly head of the Shanghai Police, but found himself in Canada on leave at the outbreak of war. Having his leave pay only he decided to join up and got posted to Security Co-Ordination where he did a job for Connop Guthrie's section in Washington. Eventually he got sen to India by SOE where he helped them to work up some sort of organisation in China to operate against the Japs. In his own words "I don't know whether I did much good but I think I probably saved them from spending a lot of money". He said that generally speaking D.I.B. were so much concerned with the Congress Party and internal politics that they gave little thought to the activit of the Chinese. He spoke to DIB about the Chinese gambling houses. DIB took the view that all Chinese gambled and that there was nothing to be done. Bourne pointed out however that this was exactly how bandit armies were started. They began by having guards to look after gambling houses and then some potential warlord got control of all these guards and started to run various rackets. Ultimately hebecame extrem rich and a great power in the land. Bourne had seen this happen in Shanghai over and over again. In his view the only thing to d was to nip it in the bud. To do so DIB needed Chinese informants. The fact is that Civil Servants in India are so disheartened by the general trend of things that they are not bothering very much, although if DIB are to survive they could seal themselves much better to any Indian Govt. if they had

knowledge of attempts at penetration by the Chinesethan if their knowledge was merely confined to Indian organisations. I thought that Bourne might be extremely valuable to us as a Chinese adviser at SIFE. He wants to work for another 2-3 years and although he would be prepared to go to Singapore he would prefer to be in the dollar area as he has his boys at school in Canada and will be keeping them there until they have completed their education.

Harker told me that he had discovered that the recent release in the press about Khillito had been put out by the Ministry of Information, on whose instructions he did not know.

January 25th

I had a long talk with Curry about reorganisation and the suggestion that I might possibly be DDG. I said that normally I felt that such an appointment was unnecessary, but in view of the present circumstances it might be thought that I could be of more use if I had some jurisdiction over other Divisions. I asked Curry if he would define the charter of DDG since my view was that it was important that if the appointment existed it should not be a backwater. If it were offered to me I should refuse it unless I had very positive terms of reference.

Dick,Hollis and I had a talk about reorganisation and personnel. We began by trying to reach some estimate of the number of vacancies which existed. When we have finally established this point we shall consider the names that we have on our index.

Sloane is going back to Prague and he thinks

that the communists will not obtain more than 20% of the votes in the coming election and that as a result many CP members at present in Govt.Depts. will lose their jobs. The warmth of feeling for Russia has cooled very considerably and there is a tendancy again to look towards the west. The present head of the Second Dept. is a Col.Hanus. He was in the Resistance during the war. He is a nice man but rather weak in character. In London Sloane said that Col Foot or Col.Krcek would look after our needs. These people were under the Ministry of the Interior and were attached to the Embassy. They were,according to Sloane, chiefly concerned with representation questions and their work would be something in the nature of Passport Control. Sloane did not say so but undoubtedly they will also continue some of their activities in connection with the Czech intrigues in this country. Czechs are ho ing to develp fairly substantially a representation of Czechs from all parts of the world, in order to make good part of the lossess resulting from expatriation of the Sudeten population. Sloane hopes that U.35 will come out to Prague but on the whole thinks that his visit might be more profitable after the elections.

The amalgamation of SIS and SOE took effect from the 15th. SOE now come under the command of C.

The renegade section have now tried and convicted 22 Service men. Meanwhile large numbers of other cases have been submitted to the JAG and a considerable number are under investigation.

Strang,in reporting on a visit to Military

Government detachments in the British zone says "It was a sound impulse that moved the boys of the 7th Armoured Division when their team was hard-pressed by the Russians in a football game in Berlin to shout in encouragement 'Come on, Civilisation'" Strang was evidently very impressed by the hard conscientious work being done by the Military Government. The Potsdam policy is as yet far from fulfilment. The French have demanded the separation of the Rhineland and Westphalia from Germany and resisted the establishment of central German depts. The Russians while paying lip service to it are claiming all the advantages it confers upon them, representations, the right to a say in the affairs of the western zone as well as their own, etc., but still decline to raise the barrier that stands between their zone and the rest of Germany, and go their own way in their own zone more freely than others do. The Americans though their representatives in Germany parade their devotion to the Potsdam principles in and out of season, some of them have little thought but to discharge themselves as soon as possible of their responsibilities in Germany. We ourselves are maintaining Potsdam policy but are imbued with the form of zonal particularisation which is apparently peculiar to ourselves.

(The next para. follows on from page 60).

Brede claims that he had no knowledge of the W/T organisation in Russia and adds that Kander himself appeared only to have a very scanty knowledge of this part of the organisation. He and Lang were chiefly concerned in establishing and maintaining contact with the Russian W/T agents. A traffic started in

the summer of 1941 and was particularly satisfactory from the autumn of 1941 to Jan. 1943. Brede is convinced that the link passed through Turkey. He does not know whether the Russian Embassy in Istanbul played any part in it. The Max reports provided very detailed and also very accurate information about the order of battle of the Russian armies and their communications. Fremdeheere Ost considered the reports very good and required them to be passed daily from Vienna by W/T. Even when the reports dealt with Russian intentions and were sometimes doubted, they were nearly always confirmed by subsequent events. Lange was also in contact with some Russian emigres in Belgrade about whom Brede knows no details. Lange also knew Gen. Turkul, a Russian emigre living in Rome. Neither the emigres in Belgrade nor Turkul had anything to do with the Max organisation. Kander knew the Spanish Ambassador in Turkey, named Pratt. He took on a young Spaniard who acted as one of Kander's agents in the capacity of a Press Attache. Kander was in W/T communication with the Spanish and the link had the cover name Moritz. Brede believes that it was established early in 1942. Up to Jan. 1943 it produced nothing of value. The Spanish had been trained by Kander at Sofia. Kander was a non-Aryan, the son of an emigre officer of the former Austro-Hungarian Army. His mother lived in Vienna but moved to Budapest later. She had previously twice been arrested by the Gestapo in Vienna in spite of every effort by the Abwehr to protect her. Kander had contacts in Sofia with the Bulgarian police and in Budapest with the Hungarian Intelligence Service. He was also in possession of a Hungarian passport.

The interrogation of LtCol.Muller, formerly Leiter I.G. of the Abwehr, has led to the discovery of the German use of two very high grade methods of secret writing involving radio-active material. He described very fully indeed a secret photographic method of communication evolved by the Germans just before their collapse. He regarded it as one which afforded very high security. We had no previous knowledge of the enemy's use of this process. Muller has also given us information about apparatus for long-distance photography.

Under interrogation Rundstedt said, a propos of the Normandy landing, that the Navy had always said that it was unlikely that we could land on the beaches on which we actually we actually did land. The Navy always maintained that such a landing could only be made at high tide and that even then we could not get across the reefs and rocks. In actual fact of course we landed at low tide and used the rocks as cover against fire from the land. When asked "Had you any definite grounds for believing that invasion would also be made in the north", Rundstedt replied "Yes, in the first place from tactical strategical considerations. I say I will land here, wait until they get all their forces here and then land at the other place. And as you know the launching ramps of those V weapons were in the Belgian area."

Kopkow in commenting on the use of DAs says that the first operation of turned W/T agents with Russia started in 1942 after having an agent's message decyphered which mentioned the name Schultze-Boyzen. This decyphering was the first sign and the start of the investigation which led to the rounding up of

the biggest Russian espionage organisation in Germany, Belgium and France. The Soviet Intelligence Service had left transmitting sets with an number of Berlin agents through the channels of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin on the outbreak of war in the summer of 1941. 7 transmitting stations were discovered in Berlin itself. SchultzeBoyzen was paid for his treachery but his main motive was a strong leaning towards Bolshevism. There was hardly any Govt. office without some employee ready to co-operate and give information. About 100 arrests were made almost exclusively in Berlin. The depth of Soviet infiltration could be seen in the case of an administrative inspector at the Air Ministry who gave away to an intermediary the most secret documents of which only a few copies existed, concerning the strength of the Luftwaffe, and the rising production output figures. Even in the OKW and OKM were officers to be found who were ready to co-operate out of idealistic motives.

The Soviet Intelligence Service was for a long time under the impression that the whole organisation was intact. They were induced to drop a number of parachute agents in Brandenburg who were caught and turned round. This took place some time in 1943. The Germans were also able to discover a number of Soviet Intelligence agents who had been left behind in Germany since 1941. Kopkow relates the story of a German colonel who had been trained by the Soviet Intelligence Service and put through the lines and gave himself up to his own countrymen. He was subsequently played back as a double. This man had quite a lot to do with Gen. Ivanov of the NKWD. Ivanov and other high officers of the NKWD openly expressed their strong dislike of England and in various conversa-

tions had repeatedly pointed out that with the collapse of Germany the war in Europe was by no means finished. The next phase would be that the Soviet Union would take the leading position in Spain which Germany had prevented in 1936-37. Ivanov went on to say that the pincers would close as a result of this development in the Mediterranean. Speaking of the penetration of the "nglo-American Intelligence Services through BBC messages Kopkow states that these messages were fora long time a complete mystery to the GIS. The first big penetration into this system was accomplished by the H.Q. of the C.in C. Sipo at Paris who had captured a number of English agents in northern France belonging to the so-called French section movement. Through them the Sipo was able to get a rough idea from these messages which ones belonged to the French section and those belonging to a section still unknown. As regards the date of invasion these agents said that there were two or three phases which would be indicated by BBC messages. In the first phase sabotage and in particular the destruction of communications was to take place. In the second phase there were to be acts of violence against individuals especially against the Sipo. When the third phase was signalled invasion could be expected in 24-48 hours, and that was the signal for all the Resistance Movements to go into action. The above described phases were picked up by radio at the beginning of June 1944. Kopkow remembers definitely that on the 5th June towards 1900 hours the news came in from Paris that according to the BBC messages the Anglo-American invasion was to be expected in the next few days. In actual fact the attack started shortly after midnight on the 6th. Kopkow would like to emphasise that the

eventual date of the attack was obtained from these BBC transmissions but as regards the main target of the attack which would have been more important, absolutely nothing was obtained. Kopkow gives the finalword about the SOE agent KOENING whose story seemed to us so fantastic. He says "In an hotel in Hamburg objects were found belonging to a Luftwaffe man who had been there several days about the autumn of 1943. Amongst these objects were Wehrmacht paybooks, soldered into a corned beef tin. The conclusion was reached that this airman was the German Obergefreiter Kurt KONIG @ BROECKER who had been a deserter whose uniform was found in a wood on the Spanish-French border. At that time there was a suspicion that KONIG had gone to England via Spain. Not so many months later he had reported that a German soldier had been arrested after having been dropped from an English long-distance bomber in southern Germany. The identification of this soldier, who possessed false papers proved him to be the wanted Kurt Konig, who had been sent repeatedly on sabotage and espionage missions. The most important thing in the case was the fact that this was Konig's third mission into Germany and on the two previous occasions he had returned to England via France and Spain. As Konig was in possession of a transmitter it was hoped that he could be turned round but this never succeeded. He was sent before a court martial but Kopkow does not know of any judgment having been passed on him.

January 29th

Dick, Curry, ✗ John Noble and I gave a dinner to Sloane who is returning to Czechoslovakia. He told us that Bartik had resigned from

the Ministry of the Interior and had gone over to the military counter-intelligence though in what capacity he did not know. He imagined that Bartik had found his communist surroundings rather uncongenial.

I asked Sloane whether in his view the Russians would have come in in 1938 in suppor of Czechoslovakia, as I had often heard it said that they had their aeroplanes on Czech aerodromes. I had in mind a statement to this effect that had been made to me by Winant early in the war. Sloane said that he was quite certain that they would not have come in. The Czechs knew that the Russian rearmament programme would not be complete until 1941 and in any case any assistance was conditional upon the French assistance which had been categorically refused. The talk about Russian assistance and Russian plans of which there were two or three for show purposes, was entirely bluff. Sloane seemed to think that Czechoslovakia was now looking more towards the west than the east. What had made a great impression was the return of the Czech Air Force which had been integrated with the RAF. They came back with Spitfires and Mosquitos and Lancasters in considerable numbers, whereas with the Czech Legion which had been fighting on the Russian front they had only a few out of date tanks and Stormoviks. Sloane thinks that the withdrawal of the really well-disciplined troops and their substitution by riff-raff from outlying parts of the USSR may well be due to the fact that the Russians need their well-disciplined troops at home and do not wish them to be corrupted by bourgeois life. He thinks that it will take the Russians a very long time to get on their feet and that meanwhile they will play a heavy game of fluff.

S.S.U. have now written to us that the national intelligence authority in the USA consists of Admiraly Leahy as the personal representative of Truman, who will act with Secretary of State, Byrnes, Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, and Secretary of Navy James Forrestal. Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers former deputy director of Naval Intelligence, has been appointed by the President of the Central Intelligence Agency. Details of the structure and key personnel have not yet been received. The exact role of X2 branch is unknown. Howe a cable has been received stating that they are to continue their present work and that their organisation would be a key one in the newly established C.I.A.

January 30th

The D.G. saw Jimmie Dickson and myself. He congratulated Dickson on his report and the work that he has done during the war. He thought that it should continue. He felt it was important to have a few extremely good agents. He did not see however that each

Haines came to say goodbye to me. I congrati lated him on his work and explained to him on the basis of Roger Fleetwood-Hesketh's enquiries what an immensely important part i had played in the operations on the Second Front. Haines was of course Garbo's wirele operator. Incidentally he learned both wirele and Spanish during the course of his employ- ment with us.

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Burt came to tell me that he and his officers were required back at the end of February. Their work by then should be completed. It seems clearly definite that Burt will take over Canning's job at the end of Feb.or thereabouts.

Bromley rang up to know whether Alley's report on Polish organisations could go to Cavendish-Bentinck. He has been told that we will let him have an expurgated edition.

C. rang up to say that he would like me to talk to [redacted] absence about RSS and our future requirements.

Patterson came to see me about his future. I gave him as good a picture as I could about the opportunities that might exist in this office. He is I think a little worried aboutthe pay.

January 31st

Hall came to see me from CSDIC bringing a letter from Stephens. Two Swiss C.I. officers named MAURER have been interrogating a Ge[redacted]n called HUEGEL. They were well entertained and seemed pleased with their visit. They offered in return to supply information about Russians. Stephens wanted to know what he was to say. After consultation with Kim and with Ronnie Haylor who was a little annoyed that the request had not come through him, it was arranged that Stephens should thank the Swiss for their offer and say that he was interested to see copies of the interrogation reports on Note Drei, a Soviet organisation which was rounded up in Switzerland during the war. A little later a further visit could be arranged for these C.I. officers to interrogate some other GIS character, when

it would be hoped that they would perhaps bring the reports with them. This arrangement has the approval of Philby, who said th was in touch with BALSINGER the MAURER's chief. The latter had apparently made the same offers in Switzerland but nothing very much had been forthcoming, and their approaches were not encouraged by BALSINGER. Philby thinks therefor it would be better to keep the lines clear. He appreciates the fact that CCDIC have probably got better bargaining counters than

Ronnie whom I have seen, is going once more to stoke up Brian Melland about Robbi Mendelssohn. He himself will be leaving in about 3 weeks time. Bill Williams will take over for about 6 weeks and may thereafter be succeeded by Jimmy Way. In the British zone things are advancing fairly rapidly and more and more of the Germans are being made to run their own show under British supervisio There is however a certain tendency to try and impose decentralisation and democracy of our own kind upon them. Whether the Germans would be able to take this or not is another matter. The police for examp are being organised rather on the lines of our C.C.s

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Bill Younger came to see me about , —
PEABODY who has married a Frenchman. Both have been told to leave the country by the

H.O. I told him that if he gave me the necessary particulars I would see if there was anything to be done.

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February 1st

I saw John Marriott's brother-in-law Salmon. He seems a nice straight fellow but has no other particular qualifications. I said that we would certainly consider him.

T/S and I went to see [redacted] at C's request. I left with him a memo showing exactly what our requirements were in respect of the work formerly carried out by RSS. I emphasised to him very strongly that we have been thoroughly dissatisfied with the management of RSS who had kept us permanently in the dark about the allocation of their resources. I explained how this ha happened through the multifarious duties of G-P which enabled him to juggle with the set between one organisation and another. We had in fact never known at any given moment what sets were employed upon general search and nobody apparently considered it their business to tell us or even recognise our right to know. I pointed out that if we had taken over when RSS in 41 was offered to us (we had been unable to do so purely on account of personalities), we should now be making our contribution in Y.stations to the general pool of Sigint. In that eventuality we should certainly have been given a position on the Sigint Board. I personally would be quite prepared to waive this if it was held that the Sigint Board was not the place where the allocation of resources was discussed. I did think however that we should be informed about these matters as a right not a favour. Itwas impossible for us to make a case for the Sigint Board if

in fact we never knew what was happening. De Grey I think saw these points and promise to discuss the whole matter with Travis and see how they might best be met.

February 2nd

Harker came to tell me that Maxwell had agreed to the annual review of HOWs.

Maxwell is rather inclined to question any HOW on the lines of whether it strictly constitutes "defence". What he does not see of course is that there is no dividing line. For example at the moment it is of paramount importance that we should collect every bit of information by whatever means concerning Palestine and illegal immigration. It is only in this way that there is any chance of preventing bloodshed.

February 4th

We approved a programme for the Dutch C.I. officers who will be coming here about the 15th Feb.

Briscoe came once more to complain that he did not get all available information about S/W and other technical devices. He had got hold of the case of SETH. This case of course was dealt with mainly from the point of view of SETH's integrity and he should of course have seen it. I told him that in very isolated cases like these the only information on these matters was contained in CSDIC reports from the field. These I said were very carefully marked to him. I have arranged however that he shall attend the Tuesday meeting and make a short speech to

all concerned about his requirements.

I saw the DG this evening about my going to America. He does not think my case is a very strong one and he wants me to be here in March when Shillito will be coming in fairly frequently. He would be quite prepared to arrange for me to go in June when Shillito is in the saddle. I had to explain to him why I felt it was necessary that I should maintain the liaison but he seemed to think that Hollis had been over fairly recently and Victor was now going, it would be difficult to justify my case. In the end he said that if I would pay half my passage he thought I could go now. He would like me to think it over.

February 5th

I had a meeting of all those who are going to take part in the course for the Dutch officers and explained generally how much information we should impart to them. [redacted] so far as HOWs are concerned we should not go further than to say that during the war censorship had operated successfully but that in peace time these matters could only be dealt with in very special cases under the authority of the Home Secretary. We should lay the emphasis always on CE and security and explain subversive movements on the lines that it was there that we had to look for potential spies.

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I told the DG today that provided he felt that I could be spared I should prefer to go to America in the course of the next few weeks rather than wait until June, even though I had to pay half the fare. He has agreed to my going on this basis. Personally I feel somewhat insulted by the whole incident. It just shows how much value is attached by the D.G. to one's efforts to try and build up a liaison with the Americans. I feel rather like a schoolboy w has been accused of wangling a day's holiday on the excuse that he is going to his aunt's funeral.

I dined with Bertram Ede. He was full of all his own arguments about Q.C. and it seemed to me that Dick had rather led him t believe that there was a job for him to do on what he called the A.O. and Q.side. I told him most emphatically that I thought that the ideal way of running O.C. was the manner in which Kellar controlled the Mid East. All we wanted were similar sections to control other parts of the world. O.C. should do the pure administration. I said further that I would have another talk with Dick.

A wire has come through from Canada to say that Mackenzie King has approved the plan for a Royal Commission on the CORBY case.

February 6th

Charles has agreed to pay the expenses and salary of Miss Shipley who is going out to work with Miss Glass in sorting out the Italian C.I. records in Rome. S.I.S. having failed to do anything about these records in the first instance, appealed to us for assistance. We said we would try and give them two girls but could only spare Miss Glass at the moment. Now that we are able to send Miss Shipley as well their production side, contrary to Kim's advice, say that they cannot carry the expense. I told Kim that I was rather browned off about the whole job. He evidently went back to the production as a result of which they have finally agreed to pay half Miss Shipley's salary.

Hollis came in to show me a transcript of a broadcast by Drew Pearson, the American columnist, blowing the CORBY case. This is one more instance of how anything that reaches a high level in the USA invariably leaks. Drew Pearson, who is bitterly anti-British, has now blown the gaff no less than 3 times. His first leak was I think Ambassador Phillips's report to Roosevelt on the situation in India. Incidentally a singularly ill-informed and stupid document.

I attended the Cabinet Offices in case I should be wanted to answer any questions at the Chiefs of Staffs meeting on SIFE. I was not called but I understand that t

they are asking for some estimate of the expense involved.

Haylor rang me up to ask about Marie von Mendelssohn. I said that if he could get her through the British zone it might be quicker than her going to Switzerland in March. He is going to have a try.

A wire has come from Courtenay about U SAW. The Governor is apparently putting him up as a rival claimant in Burma, without, Courtenay thought, much knowledge of his past. We have however made enquiries with I.P I. and find that the Governor's action has the full approval of the Burma Office and that though the Governor may not know the source of the information, he is very well acquainted with the substance of the BJs, which we obtained early in the war, showing that U SAW was a Jap agent. C. apparently was not anxious for the Governor to be told about the source, though I personally cannot see that it matters very much now since (a) there are no more Jap BJs and (b) the Americans have blown far and wide the fact that the telegrams were decyphered.

I spoke to Cussen about the case of ZIGZAG. He has ascertained from Paris that the M.S. was sold to Gollancz who sold the foreign rights to Reuters. Among various introductory matter preceding the first article in "L'Etoile", appeared the following words "L'Etoile exclusively presents the first great spy story of the 1939-45 world war, authorised by the Secret Service of the United Kingdom". Cussen thinks that it might be well worth while bringing a case against ZIGZAG and having it summarily dealt with in camera by a magistrate. There could be some form of agreed publicity after

the case, which would only involve a fine, and the magistrate could make a little speech which might well act as a warning to others.

Caroe came in to see me. He is leaving the renegade section as its work has come to an end. He is thinking of getting some job connected with enemy property.

Roger, Burt, Cussen, Sinclair and I had a meeting about handling MAY. There was some doubt as to whether MAY had committed an offence under the O S.A. of the U.K., or whether he would only be liable under the Canadian act. Cussen however quoted a para from the Act which seems to show that if in his capacity as as a representative of DSIR MAY was at the time the act was committed a servant of the British Govt., he would be liable under our Act. Burt is arranging to get a warrant by swearing an information and probably the interrogation will have to be conducted at DSIR as MAY might plead that he was not entitled to disclose information relating to atomic research. It might need Akers to give him the necessary assurance.

February 7th

I told Cimperman I was going to America. He is going to fix up my passage with Wyn Scott.

Niall McDermott has just been demobilised. He proposes to sit for his bar exams. He mentioned a man called Andrew ?NOEST who is assistant to Rhodes and is thoroughly persona grata with Col. Sindhoven. If we wanted someone in Holland he would like an opportunity of joining the Security Service.

We had a long staff meeting I told Charles that SIS had agreed to pay half Miss Shipley's salary and half Miss Glass's. We then considered personnel for the Mid East. We agreed that Oldfield and Amery should be offered contracts, Oldfield on a permanent basis and Amery as long as DSO Egypt continued to function. In the Far East we felt that Alan Roger ought to be given a contract and that Col.Bourne should be taken on as head of SIFE or DSO Singapore for two years.

Lee has got the final draft of the committee dealing with the security in connection with German scientists We are laying down certain regulations both for the ministries and for the individuals themselves.

Burt came to talk to me about PRINGSHEIM. He was a little apprehensive lest Philip Noel Bakermight be committing a breach of confidence. I told him that I had explained this point very carefully to Tess but that Stewart Hampshire had rung up Major Hope who had communicated with me to the effect that we had the all clear. I thought however that to make doubly sure he should see Hampshire before seeing PRINGSHEIM and point out that Noel Baker might have a come back from Lucy Middleton for disclosing the source of information which she had given in confidence.

I attended a meeting in Harker's room with Cussen and Vesey (a) on the subject of the prosecution of ZIGZAG and (b) on a spy book written by one FIRMIN, Crime Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph. As regards ZIGZAG it was agreed, subject to anything that the DPP might have to say, that we should recommend a prosecution. We would not press the

proceedings beyond the magistrate's court and would hope for a substantial fine. The magistrate could then point out that althoug ZIGZAG had behaved with great gallantry this was undoubtedly a case of a breach of faith which could not be tolerated, that if the prosecution had pressed the case ZIGZAG would probably have gone to penal servitude. We felt that this might act as a healthy deterrent and might be useful in showing our allies that we take a serious view of matters of this kind. // As regards Firmin's book, itwas agreed that the M.S. should be submitted to SIS for their comments and that subject to anything they had to say we would press for the deletion of certain offending paras or chapters.

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February 8th

Akers came over to discuss the MAY case, Hollis Hussen and Burt being also present. The position was explained to Akers and he readily agreed to summon MAY to his office provided he could have a couple of days notice. He also undertook to have some competent person at hand who if a search was conducted would be able to say whether MAY was properly or improperly in possession of certain documents.

I lunched with _____ who has taken over Arnold-Forster's job in SIS. He seems to be rather at sea at the moment, and finds his job singularly complex.

The DG called me down to introduce me to Sillitoe. The DG explained that I was going to America and a short discussion ensued about the merits of the F.B.I. Sillitoe did not say very much but seems a pleasant person.

Klop looked in. He is justback from Switzerland and is full of ideas of a short and long-term kind.

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Hales of SIS who is now working with Brian Melland in the French zone, brought me a letter from the latter in which he said that he had already made contact with Schlesser who was very ready to help us in any way he could. He had not yet seen Rob i Mendelssohr but was going to do so at the earliest opportunity.

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February 9th

Sclater tells me that Wilson is coming over to discuss with Briscoe ways and means of ensuring cryptographic material sent abroad is not opened in transit or if it is opened the fact is easily detectable.

came to talk to me about the VEHMERENS. The husband is now a master at the Blue Coat School. seemed anxious to know how he would put his past over to his pupils. I said that we might be able to discover this if he really felt it was worth while. It did not seem to me that he had very much that was worth disclosing and that in any case it would not be in his interest to say that he had been in the G.I.S. Blake-Budden is worried about his discussing his relations with SI[illegible].

Stewart Hampshire and Burt came to discuss the case of PRINGSEHIM. It was agreed that Stewart would see that Noel Baker spoke first of all to Mrs.Middleton telling her that he proposed to have the case investigated.

Stewart told me incidentally that everybody w[illegible] was thoroughly fed up with the Russians. Not the least I gather P.J.himself. Everybody realises that they are playing a dirty obstructionist game. Some think that Bevin has been a little too uncompromising, although they realise that he has been speaking under very great provocation. The danger is that the Russians may avoid UNO and always insist on unilateral negotiations. Their general line seems to be to stall on everything

until the Americans get the jitters and say we must all go to Moscow. This generally ends in disaster as nobody likes to come home without having achieved something.

Desmond Orr came to talk to me about McBryan who has gone back to Sarawak. Desmond seems to think that the whole thing is a scandal, particularly the telegram in which the C.O. said that he had beenpassed by Security. What we said was that the whole matter was not our concern. We did however give the facts about McBryan which indicate largely that he is a crook, operating with Rajah Brook

February 11th

Kellar's section is very overworked but it is difficult to see how we can get much relief at the moment.

I saw Cimperman about UDHAM SINGH, the Indian who wants to go to California, on the flimsy excuse that he is going to help his uncle on a farm. In fact he is probably going to join the Ghaur Party. Cimperman said that he would not get a visa in the ordinary way unless he changed his ground and gave a bona fide business reason.

Cussen talked to me about Patterson. He is afraid that at the moment he cannot spare him. I wanted Patterson to start up the Far Eastern section.

WynScott rang to say that the Army would send me to America on one of their planes and would be very pleased to look after me while I was in the USA. I said that I was very grateful for the passage and for anything

they could do to assist me in getting accommodation but that I thought that while in the USA I ought to pay my own hotel bills etc.

I had a meeting with Charles, Horrocks, Dick, Ede Clayton and Kellar to discuss administrative matters in connection with SIFE and SIME. It was decided that as regards accommodation, cars, telephones, medical assistance etc. we should try and get the C.O. or the W.O. to pay. The heads of SIFE and SIME were to have a measure of administrtive control over their areas. This would not however preclude DSOs from communicating direct with us on certain matters or in any way weaken their position vis a vis local Governors.

February 12th

Briscoe has put me up a note on his organisation and Maltby's attempts to muscle in. I am going to discuss this with C. and suggest to him that he should see Briscoe personally.

Roger Fleetwood-Hesketh came over to discuss the paras. on deception contained in Eisenhower's despatch. These paras. give the whole business away. Our grounds for objection are (a) that this constitutes a reversal of the decision by the Chiefs of Staff that strategic as opposed to tactical deception should remain on Top Secret level, (b) that we think on general grounds this principle should be maintained since if it becomes known that a major deception had been executed successfully in the battle of Normandy everybody would be on their guard in

the future. (c) that recent disclosures make it perfectly clear that the Germans ran the battle of Normandy on the information supplied by GARBO and BRUTUS and that their reports were passed to Krummacher, Hitler's personal Intelligence Officer, by Jodl. Many of the reports were actually initalled by Hitler himself. If therefore the world is to be told that the Germans were deceived thr-through emphasis being laid on an attack from the Pas de Calais this disclosure will certainly point the finger at GARBO and BRUTUS A principle here is involved in giving away an agent. No govt. that gets this reputation will be able to get agents in the future. Apart from this GARBO's own safety is at stake and his usefulness is by no means ended. We have devised a form of words which draws the whole operation factually and more or less describes how the Germans made a misclaculation by thinking that we should attack by the shortest route to the Ruhr. We have in fact given them the explanation that Jodl believes himself. Whether this will be acceptable to Eisenhower I don't know.

The DG considered the reorganisation plans whi had been worked out by Dick, Hollis, Horrocks and myself and has apparently objected strongly to the re-amalgamation of E and F by B. So far he has only seen Horrocks and Charles on the subject. They had a sticky passage and the question is at the moment in abeyance.

February 15th

Curry has rewritten his chapter 4 and wants me to vet it, particularly in regard to the part that I played in the early days of the war in co-ordinating the work of the various divisions.

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Burt came to tell me that the prosecution of ZIGZAG is being set in motion.

Alley has got a case of a Pole employed by RAE Farnborough. I understand that there are quite a number there always getting in touch with the pro-Russian group of Poles in this country. This may or may not be significant, but in any case there are over 80 British CP members in Farnborough through whom there is doubtless a complete leakage of information to the Russians.

February 13th

The F.O. have written to us in connection with the activities of Poles, suggesting that we, SIS and the W.O. should get together with a view to suppressing any undesirable activities conducted from British territory or from Italy, against the Polish Govt. The F.O. fear that there may shortly be unpleasant revelations owing to the arrest of a number of people in Poland and their forthcoming trial. We have been particularly asked to disconnect ourselves from Polish Intelligence. This is not quite so easy as it sounds. We have a large number of Poles here and unless we have some contact with their CE dept. it is not easy to know what everybody is up to. Just how well all this is being done however I cannot say as I have no responsibility for Alley and his minions.

We had a further meeting, Charles, Dick, Bertram and myself. Bertram wanted to get his charter more clearly defined. In fact he wanted to go back to his basic charter which he took over from Jelf. He is of course perfectly entitled to say that this charter stands. The trouble is that Dick and I have always regarded it as null and void, since it makes O.C. responsible for far too much and causes them to impinge on work which can much better be dealt with by D.Division. I said that agreed that technically Ede was entitled to stand by his charter but that I fundamentally disagreed with the whole of it. I felt moreover that it was a pity to stir everybody up until we had got the proper decision from the new DG. Meanwhile we would do all we could to bring Bertram into discussions concerning O.C.

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February 14th

Findlater-Stewart came to see the DG who called me down. I showed him my minute about RSS. He said that we ought to see his report and in particular what he had said about RSS. He suggested the Dg should ask Bridges for a copy It did not seem to me that he had said anything very positive about our representation on the Sigint Board. I told Findlater about the revelations in connection with GARBO and BRUTUS and also about the reports from P/Ws on the leakage in connection with Overlord which was caused through SOE BBc broadcasts.

Tess rang up about the secretary of Manuilski who has implored PJ to let her remain in this country. I recommended her to speak to Maxwell and to make sure that further representations were made that on no account should the girl be sent back to Russia. If the Govt. were not prepared to go so far it would be much better to warn the girl beforehand, since if she absconds she is bound to be in for serious trouble.

Garvey of the FO rang me about a question put down by Beratin the Communist alleging that a Special Security Committee in Egypt consisting of 3 British and 3 Egyptian representatives was dealing with the communists and was supplied with British funds. I said that we would make enquiries and let him know.

February 15th

I spoke to Burt about the future of sabotage cases. It seemed to me desirable that the experience of his officers should not be lost and that if possible the problem should be

centralised in Scotland Yard. We would only be interested if there was any suggestion of enemy action.

Horrocks, Dick, Harker, Hollis and I attended a meeting of the DGs to discuss future staff. We went through the list and decided as far as possible on the number of names to whom offers could be made.

February 16th

[redacted] He would I gather be quite pleased to stay on if he could afford to.

Burt came in to tell me about MAY whom he interviewed yesterday, the CORBY case having broken in Canada. When MAY was told by Acker that someone wanted to see him he turned as white as a sheet, and was very near collapse. He failed to answer any questions except in a plain negative. He made one rather curious remark when asked whether he would be prepared to assist the authorities: "Not if its counter espionage". Asked what he meant he was unable to explain. His usual answer was "The answer is no", after several minutes silence. There is no doubt from his demeanour that he is guilty. Burt and Spooner searched his premises but there is no reason to think that any of the documents are of a specially incriminating nature.

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February 18th

Haddon spoke to me about Eisenhower's despatch. He said that we ought to submit our observations to Col.Moore of M.O.i. Later in the day I called on Moore and left with him a paper giving our views (a) on the question of revealing strategic deception as a whole contrary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ruling and (b) on the danger to both Garbo and Brutus in the light of recent revelations which made it clear that the battle of Normandy was fought almost entirely on their information. I said that could see no reason why Eisenhower, rather than disclosing deception on a major scale, should not confine himself to stating what Jodl in fact believed, namely that the Germans made a miscalculation as to the purpose for which our reserves in the SE England were going to be used. I said that if the Chiefs of Staff intended to give way on the former agreed policy, Wingate's draft was the best that could be made of a bad job. It would still however involve a considerable risk to the agents. Moore then asked me too provide him with some alternative draft, which I did.

Tommy Lascelles rang up about the CORBY case which he had seen in the Press. I told him more or less what the facts were.

Vesey talked to me about the liquidation of B.1D. Their work has declined very considerably and they will gradually be drifting away in the course of the next two months. Meanwhile he thinks that may be able to give some assistance to Patterson. I am anxious that Patterson should complete hiswork on renegades as soon as possible in order that he can take over from John Noble and act as a receiving

point for information from the Far East until Courtney's return.

February 19th

Information is beginning to come in about the CORBY case where the Royal Commission has had CORBY under examination. The results are so far entirely satisfactory and CORBY himself has created a very good impression. McKenzie King sent for the Soviet Charge d'Affaires before he made his announcement, showed him a copy of it and told him that the Foreign Power mentioned was Russia. The Charge d'Affaires expressed both surprise and distress and said characteristically that he would be reporting the matter to his Govt.

At the DGs meeting Roger stated that the Cabinet Committee which is investigating Fascism is, on the lead of the A.G., rather taking the line that the existing law is adequate and that a prosecution could probably be mounted against Arnold LEESE. My own feeling is that if LEESE is going to be indicted for conspiracy there will be an outcry from the Right about the Communists, whose organisation and aims have long ago been pronounced as constituting an illegal conspiracy by one of H.M.Judges. This is not to say that I should not be extremely glad to see LEESE prosecuted.

Our terms of service for B.6. watchers which were sent to Ronnie Taylor have evidently been broadcast throughout the British zone. A man turned up the other day with a copy of these terms in his pocket. Incidentally he was 6'6" tall, which hardly conforms to Harry's standards.

I gave a lecture to the Dutch Intelligence Officers on the same lines as the one I gave to the Danes a little while ago. They seem to be very keen and are very receptive.

February 20th

Vesey came to talk to me about the case of a man who has given the name of BUTLER and who has been at Beltane for some time. Although frequently interrogated, he has only just stated to an I.O. that he is a Russian agent It looks as if he had been working for the Rotekappelle in Germany and had later been sent into the British zone.

Luke tells me that [redacted] through the agency of [redacted] who she has now married, has succeeded in getting permission to remain here for 13 months. She has not however yet been able to obtain the release of her funds. If we can assist her in this matter we should be able to give some help to the other agents in the Tricycle group. It is not clear whether H.O. sanction to allow her to reside here was given as a resul of our representations or owing to some entirely independent approach.

I saw Burt who had just been talking to MAY. He has succeeded in getting a confession. He took his usual line and intimated that since the last interview MAY would have noticed from the Press that a good deal was going on in Canada and in fact that what Burt had told him was true. Since the opening of the enquiry Burt said that MAY would appreciate that he had obtained a good deal of further information on which he would like to put some further questions. The point I think that shook MAY more than anything was Burt's reference to the proposed meeting in London.

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Finally MAY signed a statement, not under caution, in which he admitted that he had been approached by a Soviet agent whose identity he would not disclose. This agent asked him for information about atomic research. He had supplied him with a report and also with two pieces of uranium. He had done this because he thought it was in the general interest that the Russians should be kept in the picture, and should share in the experimental work. He knew about the appointment in London but he had not kept it as as he felt that since so much information had been made public on atomic research there was no further need to communicate any more. The question of prosecution now arises. While Burt feels that if there were no prosecution he could get a lot more out of MAY, it seems likely that the Canadians will expect us to take legal action. The A.G. thinks that a prosecution could be mounted even though the statement was not taken under caution.

I attended the JIC when the establishment for SIFE was agreed to . It will go forward to the Chiefs of Staff for endorsement.

We also discussed a paper on the down-grading of deception put forward by Wingate of LCS. Both Wingate and Dudley Clarke were present. I handed a paper in which I put forward the same arguments that I had already put to Col.Moore. C.spoke strongly in favour of making a stand and recommending to the Chiefs of Staff that they should stand firm on their ruling. In his view it was far better to fight this battle even if we lost it either to the Chiefs of Staff or in America. Wingate's argument was that we were fighting a losing battle owing to publicity by such people as Capt.Butcher and that we should therefore be

wise to dig ourselves in a bit farther back. The meeting felt however that it would be right and proper to make a stand first and fall back to our second line if necessary. It was recommended that C, myself, and Wingate should attend the Chiefs of Staff meeting on Monday.

Alley, Corin, Vivian and I lunched with the Dutch.

Wingate rang up to make it clear that he was entirely with me about standing firm if this were possible.

Win Scott came to talk to me about the future of his organisation. It has now been decided that 8 OSS officers will take cover in the U.S.Embassy and that only one or two of the representatives of the offensive side of OSS will remain here for liaison purposes at Broadway. Broadway are more and more tending towards shrugging off OSS and it looks to me as if the principle liaison in future will be through ourselves.

Win Scott then talked about the KLATT case. Through the influence of Bob Blum in Washington we are now asked to send someone out to interview KLATT. Evidently the American D.A. case has broken down. I am trying to get hold of Gilbert Ryle.

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February 21st

I spoke to Howe on the telephone and told him about MAY's confession and the excellent piec of work that Burt had done.

Scott came to see me about the possibility of a job with UNO. I told him to talk to Luke who knew the form.

The Russians have come out with a very naive statement about the CORBY case. They say that their M.A. in Ottawa received a certain amount of information about atomic research and other matters from acquaintances in Canada but that this information was of a very low order and of no value to the Soviet who were much further advanced in these matters. Apart from this all the information they received had been given full publicity by the Americans. At the same time they realised that activities of this kind by their M.A. were not permissable and that they had therefore decided to recall him. The Russians are of course sticking out their necks badly sincewhen the Commission's report comes out it will be shown that all activitie by their M.A. were directed in detail from Moscow.

I had a talk with Dick and Alley about the Poles. It was agreed that Alley would get ou a note showing exactly where Poles were located and in what numbers and who was responsible for looking after them and their W/T sets.

Bertram came to tell me that he was going to put in a note to the DG suggesting that he should go to S.Africa instead of Kellar and raising the whole issue of his charter. I said that I thought it was perhaps a pity to throw a spanner in the works pending the arrival of the new DG but that of course he was within his rights in doing so if he felt strongly about the matter. He did subsequently see the DG who sent for Dick and was inclined to agree with Ede that he should go instead of Kellar. Dick has put up a forceful minute in reply to the DG, raising the whole issue of OC.

February 22nd

I had a talk with Dick at the flat about future staff requirements. I am going to see TAR and ascertain whether he would prefer to take a group of B.Division or act as deputy toD.

I havedrafted a note to Curry showing what I believe to be the causes of the confusion in this office in the early months of the war. There were many contributory causes but the predominant factor was undoubtedly a lack of trained staff without which no proper organisation on decentralised basis was possible.

I had lunch with Orr. He was full of forebodings about attacks on the Security Service by Oliver Baldwin and in particular attacks on Harker. He wondered how Oliver Baldwin had ever heard of Harker. He seemed to imply that Sillitoe's appointment was still in the balance and that it would be hotly opposed in the House. There may be some smoke here but I doubt if it amounts to very much.

Orr let out one gem. He said "You don't like Lennox very much I think". I said that personally I liked Lennox but thought quite frankly that there was no job for him in the office. He then said "Of course if he had taken over, it had been his intention to give you a K. and to use you as his adviser".
I made no comment.

I had a word with Newsam about general H.O. policy with regard to the admission of aliens and expulsion of aliens. He said that the basic criterion was stimulation of the export trade. As regards Poles the H.O. were on the whole resisting entry and also refusing permits to work. In general they were bringing pressure to bear on Poles as far as possible to get them to return to their own country. Meanwhile the Treasury were pressing for Poles resident here to be absorbed into industry. He did not know what the outcome of this would be. As regards our own personal cases, he would always be prepared to consider them in so far as this was possible but he hoped that we would keep them down as far as we could.

February 25th

I saw Roger and Cuthbert Fleetwood-Hesketh when they produced for me documents showing the part played by GARBO and BRUTUS in the deception plan. I was intending to use these if there was any difficulty at the C.O.S. meeting where publication of Eisenhower's despatch was to be discussed. Actually however the meeting was postponed. The documents are of the highest interest. They constitute the daily reports on which the battle was fought by the General Staff and contain whole chunks of GARBO and BRUTUS and in one instance the comments of Gen. Krumacher, who was the I.C.

representative at OKW and the receiving point for Abwehr information. In the telegram dated 9th June which contained information from GARBO, Krumacher has underlined an important passage about the threat to the Pas de Calais and written a note drawing Jodl's attention to the matter. Jodl has initialled the telegram and has also made a special mark indicating that it was passed to Hitler. A report of 19th June states "Attention is drawn to a report from a particularly trustworthy source according to which GUSAG will be supported in action by strong operations by the heavy bomber force which points to its employment against strong fortifications and so fits in with our existing preparation, middle channel coast."

Cuthbert had prepared a note of his interview with Jodl who had been shown many of the documents and asked to explain the various signatures etc. He says that he had a conversation with Jodl on Dec.11th 1945 when Jodl explained his view that the very excellence of the German High Command's insight into the geographical distribution of the allied forces in the U.K. prior to and during the invasion had caused a false appreciation to be made. "We knew" he said "that you had one Army Group inthe south of England and one in the southeast. We know now that the S.E.Army Group was not in fact launched against the channel coast but its continued presence in the Southeast of England constituted a threat which it was not possible for us to ignore. We therefore did not feel justified in authorising any large-scale release of 15th army formations for use in Normandy until a considerable time after the invasion had started. Had our picture of your dispositions in the U.K. been less complete and had we not been aware of the presence of the 1st U.S.Army Group

in S.E.England we might have despatchedmore of the 15th Army to Normandy earlier,which might have had very serious results for yourselves." Jodl himself considered that the Pas de Calais FUSAG threat was off by the middle of July when formations of the 3rd U.S.Army began to appear in Normandy. He admitted reluctantly,since his loyalty to Hitler'smemory is absolute, that the retention of a considerable part of the 15th Army in the Pas de Calais until long after was due to the Fuhrer's own persistent belief in the continuing possibility of a landing in that area. The interview convinced Cuthbert of Jodl's complete acceptance of the existanc of FUSAG in S.E.England.

Vickery came in to tell me that if any questi arose with Commissioner Wood about his organisation in Vancouver, I could say that it had now been liquidated.

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There is another fairly detailed report from the field on PESCATORI. He makes a very positive statement that in 1940 there wa no organisation working inside England. The Abwehr's main efforts were concentrated against outposts in Holland and Belgium. In talking of the Bureau Jahnke, he says that it was dissolved about the middle of 1940, allegedly because Jahnke furnished too many reports of an undesirable nature. As a resul Jahnke came into conflict with the other sources of information. He thereupon retired

to his country estate near Frankfurt on Oder. At one time Jahnke had an agent working under him in Holland called Vinzenz KRAFT who is alleged to have supplied a certain amount of information about England. KRAFT was in the sixties and was eventually discovered to be double-crossing the Germans and was imprisoned.

The Germans had little knowledge of our I.S. before the capture of Best and Stevens. M.I.5 was interpreted as a purely army espionage service which would have corresponded to the I.c branch of the German Army.

There is an interesting field report on the interrogation of Heinrich Dietrich Wilhelm AHLRICHS @ ALBERS who handled a large number of agents sent to this country, to Canada and to the U.S.A. He worked for I.Marine Hamburg. He spotted that COBWEB was a D.A. of ours but when he reported the fact to Menzel and Pheiffer he was told not to be such a pessimist. He speaks well of OSTRO. He says that Ostro's cover at Freetown was effected through an employee of the Lisbon agency of an American Export Line who was later transferred to Freetown for his firm.

A German who returned from internment in 1944 or 1945 reported that Vera was interned in the I.O.M. This was the first official intimation that was received as to her fate. AHLRICHS is particularly interesting with regard to the Irish cases and the control of the situation by Dr. VEESENMEYR of the German F.O. There was an agreement between V. and CANARIS that no agents were to be sent to Ireland without V's knowledge. This was apparently broken in the case of O'REILLY and a stiff letter was sent to CANARIS. The matter emerged through Francis STUART complaining to V. that he had not been allowed to go to Ireland whereas

preparations were to be made to send O'REILLY. AHLRICHS discovered that the agent MOSCARA or MOSCADO was being played back by the FBI from New York.

An agent named Jose BENTES @ BERNARD is mention-ed. He had been a ships chandler in Antwerp. He reported from Lisbon. It was saidthat he was in touch with a former Portuguese Ambassador in London and it is said that some 4 days before D.day AHLRICHS received from the agent a report giving the exact place and time of the proposed allied landing in Normandy and the absequent line of attack inland. As his source he quoted the British M.A. who had apparently been talking out of turn and in his cups at the home of Texeira, the former Portuguese Ambassador in London. BENTES' information about the battle of Normandy was accurate but some suspicion attach-ed to him as there appeared to be some resemblance to the writings of Liddle Hart.

The agent MEILER in America was regarded as an F.B.I. double-cross.

The D.G. talked to me about Curry. I said that I had been thinking about the problem for years and found it almost insoluable as he did not wish to serve under anybody except me. It was possible that he could do the job of looking after espionage in countries other than Russia but this would mean his working under Dick. I had the highest regard for his work and should be very sorry to see him go. The D.G. finds the problem extremely difficult but hopes that a solution might be found. I rather gather that he thought of telling Curry that there was nothing derogatory in working under Dick.

I went to see C. primarily to get his views about America. I asked him point-blank whether he had any interest in Passport Control. He said that he did not propose to make use of it. I then said that I thought in a way that if we did have representation in America, thatshould be phe place for us to be. He said that he was quite open-minde but that in some ways he thought it was better to keep representation in the hands of one dept. in order that the F.B.I. should not play off M.I.5 against S.I.S. This of course is Viv's old argument. C. was not ve clear what Peter Dwyer was doing but suggested that I should have a word with Philby. Dwyer of course is carrying the liaison with the FBI but if C. has relations with the new Intelligence organisation he will appoin someone else for that work in order to keepth two liaisons quite distinct. He is rather worried about the new intelligence set-up as he thinks it will be political and change with the Govt. He told me that as regards deception he had decided that it should be in the Cabinet Offices and that the machiner should be worked out between ourselves, something onthe lines ofthe old XX Committee.

I spoke to him about Briscoe and told him that the introduction of | was causing a certain amount of friction. He said that he would look into this and that he would be pleased to see Briscoe and hear his difficulties. I told C. that Maltby was really rather a 5th wheel in the coach and it would be preferable if Briscoe dealt with Cohen.

C. had read the Findlater report. While he agreed that it laid down certain principles he did not think it had really solved very much. He objected to some of the paras.

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recommending the introduction of the Treasury.

February 26th

I talked to TAR about his future. He is quite ready to go to D.Division or to take over the aids to investigation section or the section dealing with espionage by other countries than Russia. He would prefer to remain in B.Division, but feels that there is a big job in D. to be done and would be quite happy to do it.

At the DG meeting today I raised the question of the employment of Poles in our research establishments. I said that I felt this was highly undesirable and that it was part of the general question of the employment of C.P. members I agreed with Alley however that where Poles had been employed on highly secret work, steps should be taken to get their families over to this country as soon as possible, whether they remain in research establishments or not.

I talked to Hill. He is ready to come to us if he is offered £700-£750 free. He says he is not in the least ambitious and that he likes the work.

We gave Canning a farewell lunch today.

I had a long talk with Sillitoe. I explained to him quite a lot about our work and its various difficulties. I impressed upon him that we stood or fell with the outside world on problems like vetting and passport control. One slip in these most difficult jobs meant letting down the whole dept. in the estimation of outsiders who really knew nothing of the more important work. I told him that I thought the dept. had been in

difficulties in the early days of the war. said that he was looking forward to working with me and that he would rely very largely on my past knowledge and any advice I could give him. He was quite prepared to take strong action on any convincing case. He would be seeing the P.M. at least once a fortnight on the latter's special instructio He then got on to personalities. He asked me confidentially whether I knew what was going to happen to Harker.

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At any time he wished I would be very pleased to give him my full and frank opinion of anybody, and also about the work. He was extremely friendly and I think I shall be able to get on with him.

I arranged with Win Scott and Burt that in special cases we would pass the names of immigrants or visitors to the USA over police records. I shall do this privately through Burt.

Dick and I had a long session with Caccia who dined with us at the Travellers. We gave him the works with as much as we could aboutthe dept. its difficulties etc. He was most receptive and creates a very good impression. He is coming over for another talk with Dick who will introduce him to various people in the office.

February 27th

I was again in attendance at the C.O.S. meeting and was not called. Afterwards reception was discussed by the JIC when it was disclosed that the COS were prepared to stand on their ruling and to substitute something on the lines of "German miscalculations". These paras.will follow Joel's line of thought. Meanwhile a telegram is be sent to Maitland Wilson telling him that I am coming out and suggesting that I should explain the whole position to him and to Eisenhower.

I lunched with Kim, when we discussed representation in America. I told him of my conversations with C., said that I was of an open mind but that it had occurred to me that if we were represented in America, we might usefully be in Passport Control. I then asked him how he would view the possibility of our carrying the liaison with the FBI and SIS carrying the new Intelligence organisation. Kim said that in a way he would be rather reluctant to give up direct contact with the FBI on whom he relied to some extentfor intelligence from A.America, as well as north. I pointed out to him that under the new arrangement it seemed unlikely that the FBI would continue their commitments in S.America. I explained to Kim that both the F.B.I.s and our point of view was that we must as far as possible have direct exchange and that whereas we as a defensive organisation were not suspect, SIS particularly in view of Bill's past antics, were suspect, even though Bill might have acquired a letter from Hoover thanking him for his past services and stating that without Security Co-ordination the war could

not have been won. Kim I think saw the force of this argument but would probably be reluctant to give up the FBI angle.

I saw Bill Crean and Glazebrook. Crean has been made Security Officer to External Affairs in Canada and both of them are over here to go into security generally, particularly the machinery which we employ such as the Bridges panel and Creedy's committee. I gave them a brief outline of how it is worked and suggested that they should see Drew and Creedy.

The D.G. held a meeting to discuss B.Division and its amalgamation with E. He has approved of the charts. He raised the question of F.Division and was still hankering after putting Russian espionage into B. and leaving the rest of F. where it is. We all said that we thought that this was a bad idea and he decided for the time being therefore to leave Russian espionage where it is.

The D.G has asked that the ground should be explored in regard to making offers to certain officers to join the permanent staff

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Fleetwood-Hesketh tells me that the German General Meyer DETRING who was the Ops. man at OKW was spirited away to Washington some months ago. Cuthbert had wished to talk to him but he was not available. He now rather suspects that the Americans may have been writing up their despatches on Detring's information. Whether or not they have disclosed to Detring anything about deception is not known, but is quite possibl

I leave for America tonight.

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April 25th

I left with Victor by the boat train for Dieppe on 27th Feb. For almost the first time they were running Pullman cars from Newhaven. The ship however was hideous, packed with people. We managed however to get bunks in the general men's cabin, with people snoring all round. We were somewhat irritated by seeing so many generals on board who were of course well looked after. On arrival at Dieppe we were I am glad to say met by Peter Hope. He took us to Paris by car and deposited us at the Embassy. We then went round to enquire about ought flight. We were told that the aerodrome was closed owing to the heaviest sn snowfall that they had had since sometime in the 80's. In fact it only amounted to about a couple of feet. We were asked to ring up the following morning. This process of ringing up went on about every 3 hours until March 7th when we finally got away.

Life at the Embassy was amusing though a little bit trying as it was impossible to plan anything ahead. Both the M.A., Sandy Aitkin, and the Air Attache, A.V.M. George were extremely nice, and George obviously did a lot towards finally getting us away. There were one or two interesting lunch parties which strained my French to its utmost. At one, the old Comte de Chambrun was present. He was I think Councillor at the French Embassy in St. Petersburg at the time when Rasputin was murdered. He recounted how he had sat next to Prince Dimitri when the rumour went round the table. From Dimitri's attitude he made up his mind that he had been closely involved. Among others present at our lunch party were Francois Poncet, the

ex-French Ambassador in Berlin, and various literary lights. There was plenty of food and wine and we were certainly very lucky in being billetted at the Embassy. Diana and Duff were extremely kind. Eric Phipp's widow was staying for a few days and was clearly, as I was, somewhat overawed, and would on occasions have preferred to have her dinner in her bedroom. She was rather a tragic figure, having lost her husband and her son during the last year. She must have found the Embassy a very different place to what it was in her time. The general impression I got was that Duff was extremely good in handling the French although I gather that quite a number of people are sniping at him at home.

I talked to Peter Hope and also to Bobby McKenzie about the future of our office. Hope I think gets on extremely well with all his French opposite numbers and both Duff and Bobby find him useful. I told Bobby that the question of our having representation abroad was more or less an open one but that at the moment it was difficult to say whether with advantage we could have anyone in Paris I hoped however that before any final decisio was made or any arrangement by which S.E. re-established themselves, careful consideration should be given to the whole matter. Duff apparently has found Hope extremely useful but he would not be able to justify his presence there purely for his own purposes.

A.V.M.George was living in Dubonnet's house. He was a collaborator and has been in rather serious trouble although I believe he has bought his way out. His house was rather what you might expect it to be. Very elaborately decorated and looking out over the

Loire. At the top he had a sort of glass house with a cocktail bar, which I believe was frequented by Ribbentrop, Goering & Co. It was certainly a perfect setting for them both. The lavatory is made of looking glass of the type which enables you to see everybo outside without anybody seeing you.

We left from Orly at about midnight on the 7th March on a C.54 Douglas 4-engine plane w which carried about 20 passengers. With us was an American general who had just been to the American zone in Germany and Victor and I and he were regarded as V.I.P.s and given free whiskies wherever we landed and plenty of food in a special room. For this we were very grateful as the seating accommodation was not particularly comfortable.

We arrived in the Azores at about 8.30 on the 8th March and after stopping for an hour started for Stephensville in Newfoundland. The flight was smooth and was completed in about 11 hours. We stopped there another hour and then left for Washington. When over Boston we got a call to go back to Presquesile on the Canadian Boruer as owing to bad weather the fields at New York and Washington had closed down. Pr Presquesile was surrounded by snow but conditions there are such that you can land in almost any weather. We all bundled out expecting to stay the night but after a wait of about 1½ hours we were told that New York and Washington were again open and that we were going on. We passed through a belt of storm on the way but landed safely in Washington about 5 am on the 9th. As it was Saturday we decided to go up to New York by train, and succeeded in getting into the Pierre. New York is very full and it

is almost impossible to get a room anywhere unless you have some kind of pull or have booked through a British Mission. Victor knew the manager so all was well.

Through Sol Rosenblatt I got into touch with Gay and met her and Carl Paulson. He seemed a nice quiet type of American. It was not possible to make very much of him on first acquaintance. I saw Pat Stone and drew some money and left for Washington by the night train on the 11th.

Next day I was met by Vince Hurley of the FBI who got me a room at the Washington.

I rang up Cornwall Jones whom I subsequently saw and explained to him the implications of of Ike's despatch as it stood at present. I went with him to a meeting of the Joint Security Council where I met Capt.Thurber on the Navy side and Col.W.Harris on the Army side. We discussed the whole problem and I found the Americans taking a much stronger line than we were. In fact if our Chiefs of Staff had stayed firm and asked for the total exclusion of the offending paras. of the despatch they would have got the full co-operation of the American members of the Joint Security Committee. They might however have met with difficulties in putting their views across since I gather that Bedell-Smith was being quite troublesome. When I got there however the pass had more or less been sold since Wingate's note which I felt went further than was necessary had already been submitted to higher authority and more or less approved. It was arranged that I should go and see Field-Marshal Wilson and that if necessary he should take me to see Ike.

In the afternoon I went down to the Bureau where I had a long talk with Carson, who is

now more or less Laud's deputy.

On the 13th I saw Lish Witson and Harvey, both of whom are working on communist matters We confined ourselves to generalities and back history as I was not au fait in any very great detail about the Canadian case. It seemed however that there had been no startling developments as a result of the reports received from Canada, neither had the Speed case developed to any point where action could be taken.

I saw
At 12 noon/F-M.Wilson and explained to him in some detail the success of the Normandy Deception plan. I pointed out that there was now conclusive proof that the Battle of Normandy had been run almost entirely on the information supplied by Brutus and Garbo and that as the Germans were still in the dark and thought that they had made a miscalculation, we should do our utmost to leave them and the rest of the world in ignorance of the true facts. It could not possibly do us or anyone else any good to broadcast the fact that the whole operation had been so successful. Secondly, there was the question of our agents, one of whom was already in exile and whose life would be in danger if his identity became known. If the facts came out it would be clear to the Germans that it was Garbo and Brutus who had misled them.

In the afternoon I saw Murphy of OSS(X2) and also his chief Gen.MacGruder. The latter was leaving shortly and would be succeeded by Col.Quin. MacGruder was anxious to know my views about their future organisation. I said that I thought that it would perhaps be more logical if intelligence were divided into defensive and offensive, in which case it might be right

and proper that Hoover should carry OSS(X2) in addition to his present commitments. At the moment OSS do not seem to be doing very much, and of course many of their former operators have left. X2's main commitment is the vetting of visas abroad, which they do on behalf of the State Dept.

I dined with Joe and Elsie.

Next day (the 14th) at his special request I went to see Col.Sweeney in Pentagon Building. Col.Sweeney is concerned with deception on behalf of G.2. He knew broadly speaking the story of the Normandy deception and he was seeking some guidance on the possibilities of employing deception against the Russians. I told him that thiswas a very different problem. In war time we had all sorts of restrictions and we were operating in England in the reasonable certainty that there were no other than controlled agents in the country. We could therefore go to almost any lengths in what we put over. If we were operating against the Russians in peace time it would be a different thing altogether. Firstly because restrictions on movement would be taken off and secondly because the Russians penetrate most Govt. Depts and factories and unless we were extremely careful would soon know that we were deceiving them. I thought therefore that although one had to provide chicken food for agents, major deception against the Russians would in present conditions be extremely difficult.

I lunched with Lish Witson and Harvey and discussed mainly aincient history.

In the afternoon I saw Vice-Admiral Souers

and was accompanied by Jimmie Murphy. Souers seemed a decent fellow, although he had not very much experience of intelligence work, having been only a DDNI in the Caribbean during the war. He is at present more or less marking time and seeing what comes in from the various agencies. It is not likely that he will ever be more than a collating body and one which will lay down general policy.

I had a short talk with Ladd and gave him a general idea about our post-mortem. He told me that it seemed possible that the Boss might run foreign intelligence as well as home. If he did Ladd was all out to do it. Ladd said that he had been asked by a committee which was looking into the future of intelligence what he thought of OMI and what they did. He said that he was quite aware of what they did, that he had his own opinion about their work but that he thought that if the Committee wanted to know about ONI they should send for an ONI officer to tell them.

In the evening I dined with MacGruder and about a dozen OSS officers, at some private club in Washington. I was apparently the guest of honour.

† On the 15th March I saw Mr. Hoover at about 10.15. He talked so long that I missed the 11 o'clock train to New York. Hoover was putting over his usual set piece about Russia and communists. I told him my views about our future liaison and asked him whether if we put an officer in Passport Control to look after security cases there and to cover Washington and Ottawa he would have any objection. He

had none and said that he would always be pleased to see one of our officers in the Bureau. Hoover gave orders that I was to be looked after in California.

In the evening I dined with Sol.

On the 16th I lunched with Gay and saw her against on Sunday 17th. I left that evening for Ottawa.

On the 18th I was met by Carnac and Gagnon and had lunch with Carnac. In the afternoon I went to the House of Commons where I heard Mckenzie King speak on the espionage case. Fred Rose, the Communist M.P. who was out on bail, was in his seat.

I dined with Peter Dwyer and his wife. We were afterwards joined by Carnac and his wife.

On the 19th I saw the Commissioner at 10.30. He was as usual extremely cordial. We discussed the espionage case and things in general. Later I lunched with him at the RCMP headquarters, just outside Ottawa. Gagnon, Slim Harvison, Bethel of the FBI, E.K.Williams, Fauteux, Carnac and Jack Mead were present. Williams and Fauteux are the two examining counsel on the Royal Commission.

In the afternoon I saw Col.Anderson the new DMI and Col.Acland who is now leaving. We talked quite a lot about security and the DMI's future responsibilities. He explained to me that the JIC differed from our JIC in that External Affairs and the RCMP were only holding a watching brief and that External Affairs were in a similar position on the Chiefs of Staff Commi-

ttee. This meant that very little got settled as between the Services, External Affairs and the RCMP on a low level. DMI was worried about his responsibilities. He was evidently not satisfied with the enquiries that he got from the RCMP into people who were going to be employed on confidential jobs in the Services. He was therefore doing this with his own FSP and as far as I could see doing it pretty thoroughly. I tried to persuade him that the best line was to get closer together with the RCMP and to build them up as much as possible.

I had a long talk after dinner with Williams and Fauteux who were staying at the Laurier. We were later joined by Senator Haig.

On the 20th I had a talk with Leopold, with Gagnon and with Mead. I then lunched with Col. Anderson. He told me that he was shortly going to England. I urged him to look us up.

In the afternoon I spent an hour with Corby. He is a youngish man, I should say not more than about 25. He is extremely alert and intelligent. He should I think make a good witness. He will not be drawn into making any statement about matters of which he has no first-hand knowledge. He is somewhat temperamental, though when I saw him he was much elated by the fact that MAY had not been given bail and by McKenzie King's statement in the House of Commons commending his (CORBY's) action. I asked him how it was that Russia had been going on in its present state for 28 years and how it was that the Russian people fought so well. He said that if I had been brought up on Marxian dialectics from the age of 6, if I had heard nothing but Soviet press and radio telling me that conditions abroad were far worse than any con-

ditions in Russia, in fact that the rest of the world was living in squalor and revolution, if I had known what it was to walk down a street with my best friend and feel I could not talk freely, and if I had had no opportunity of comparing my standards with those of anybody else, I should have been thinking as he did before he came to Canada. The impact of Canadian conditions was so terific that he had been completely converted and had realised that from his youth up he had been deceived. He said that although he was under guard day and night by 3 officers of the RCMP he had never felt freer. I had no idea what it meant to him to be able to go out and buy a bag of oranges and a pound of hamburger. As a matter of fact it meant quite a lot to me on this occasion.

I then asked CORBY whether the Russians had deliberately let the Germans into their country in 1941. He said emphatically no. He was at the time at intelligence headquarters. The Russians were in fact running away and throwing away their arms to an alarming extent It was only at Rostov on Don that anything like a halt was made. On this occasion Stalin put the NKVD behind the troops and gave them orders to fire on anyone running away. Subsequently there had been a tremendous wave of nationalist propaganda recounting deeds of Soviet heroism. In this way the tide had just been turned at Stalingrad.

I saw Norman Robertson and Hume Wrong of External Affairs. Robertson was deploring the whole Corby incident but was clearly alarmed and felt the prosecution of security devolving upon him. We had quite a long discussion Russian policy generally. Robertson I think is still reluctant to believe the worst of our allies. I tried subsequently to

see Malcolm MacDonald but he was away. I saw his deputy, Stephen Haines. I explained to him that I was anxious to see MacDonald in order to put him in the picture about SIFE. I hoped therefore to see him in London.

In the evening I dined with Carnac, McLelland who is in charge of Corby, and Peter Dwyer. Carnac insisted on going out to see whether Corby was all right and found his guard sleeping in the next room. There is no doubt that the RCMP are extremely conscientious. This may be due to the very rigid discipline under which they are all brought up. Later on we called on E.K.Williams and asked him to use his influence to get the Court cleared when Corby gave his evidence in Montreal against Fred Rose. Special arraggements had already been made to prevent any photographs being taken.

On the 21st I had short talks with Mead, Gagnon, Carnac, Leopold and the Commissioner before flying to New York.

Next day I saw Pat Stone. He told me about a Pole called Ignace ZLOTOWSKY who was a physicist and was travelling on the Queen Mary apparently in transit to Warsaw and may be to Moscow. He was friendly with the present Government and generally Left Wing. I got a line on this man through Hans Halbau, a friend of Victors who had been working on the atomic project. He knew ZLOTOWSKY, having worked with him under Joliot. He said that Z. was not likely to be of much use to the Soviet Govt. in their work. He was not creative and could only work under guidance. He was a disappointed and disgruntled man whom everyonedisliked. This information was telegraphed to London.

On the 23rd I left with Gay for California and spent the following day in Chicago looking at some wonderful pictures and going to an ice show. We arrived in San Francisco on the 27th. While on my holiday there I saw Stein who is the local FBI representative. He was very helpful to me in getting reservations.

On the 11th April I left by air from San Francisco for New York, arriving midday on the 12th. I stayed at the Waldorf and went down to Washington on the 15th. Here I had a long and very satisfactory eveing with Micky Ladd and also a final talk with Hoover. It seems that the reorganisation of intelligence has been moving a bit during my absence Committees are being formed and Hoover has been drawn in on the Advisory Committee to the N.I.A. to assist in deciding how home and foreign intelligence is to be divided up. Hoover would have had me believe that the ball was completely at his feet and that if he wanted it he could have the whole thing. He had however some doubts about taking on the Far East. Alternatively he might do his present job plus OSS X2. Again he might retire into his shell, confine himself to American territory and the establishment of liaison officers on a purely overt counter-intelligence work.

I lunched with Jock Balfour who is a charming host. Jock is very depressed about the Russians but under no illusions. He knows them well as he was of course in Moscow for some time.

I saw Hoover for the last time on the 18th. When I got back to New York I had a talk with Bill Stevenson and told him the kind of

story that Hoover was putting over. He said he was quite certain there was no question of Hoover taking the whole of intelligence, home and abroad. He thought he possible he might get X2. Appropriations have apparently been voted for a foreign Secret Service until the end of 1947. As regards our representation Bill seemed to think that Peter Dwyer might carry both.

I left from La Guardia at 9.30 on the 20th April, arrived at Shannon 10.15 New York time, 4.15 Irish time, motored with Dan across Eire to Rush where I was met by Daphne's children and crossed to Lambay in a motor boat. I was on the island by about 10.30 pm.

April 25th

My first day back in the office.

Col.Anderson, the new Canadian D.M.I. came in and discussed his work with the D.G., Harry Allen, Harker and myself. He had with him Lt Col.Raymont from Canadian H.Q. We went over much of the ground that I had gone over with Col.Anderson in Ottawa. He seemed rather apprehensive about his responsibilities which he did not think he was likely to be in a position to carry out, e.g. if a spy was discovered in the Canadian War Dept. or in any other military establishment he would undoubtedly be held responsible, although the only body that had a charter to keep Canada clean of enemy agents was at the moment the RCMP. We said that in a similar case here we should have a certain responsibility if the man had been vetted by us for confidential employment and cleared. If he had not been vetted the responsibility would definitely lie with the W.O. The point which Col.Anderson has to decide is whether it is desirable to set up an organisation on somewhat similar lines to M.I.5 in Canada or whether he should concentrate on getting the RCMP built up in such a way as to enable them to look after not only civil but service security. This is of course a domestic problem. The DG I thought rather unfortunately seemed to come down on the side of setting up an M.I.5. From what I have seen of Canada I am quite sure that if t this were to be done properly an enormous organisation would be required owing to the immense distances and that the expense of it would notreally be justified. It seemed to me that it would be much more profitable to build up the RCMP and draw them much more

into the JIC orbit. To do this it is necessary that the Intelligence Branch of the RCMP should have a much more important status and not be mixed up in the ordinary criminal police heirarchy. It needs an assistant director with direct access to the commissioner. At the moment Nivett-Carnac as to go through two other individuals who know nothing about his work, before he can get to the Commissioner.

Dick has been doing a lot since I have been away in the matter of shaping B Division and getting recruits both for the organisation at home and for our overseas stations. The D.G. has got the final charter from the P.M., which excludes the recommendations about Treasury interference in finance and personnel to which we took exception, but also I am sorry to say excludes any reference to consideration being given to our representation abroad. The new D.G. and the department are to come directly under the P.M. in his capacity as Minister of Defence and the DG is to see the P M. once a fortnight. This part of the recommendations is satisfactory. The D.G. does not think that the omission of the reference to representation abroad necessarily means that the matter should not be one for discussion. I gave him my views about America and said that subject to the final settlement there in regard to charters I thought that we should carry representation with the FBI and SIS with the national intelligence authority. I pointed out that Peter Dwyer, although an excellent fellow and doing extremely well, so actually doing our work in Canada and that there seemed to be a very positive need for somebody from our dept. to assist Passport Control in the granting of visas. I mentioned to him the

case of Earl BROWDER who had applied for a visa to the U.K. while I was in New York. If we had a representative in America I thought that he ought to be in Passport Control New York with freedom to go to Washington as and when necessary.

I had a talk with Courtney about the Far East. He seems to think that things were beginning to settle down and on the whole he thought that we might do well to leave [redacted] in position at any rate for the time being.

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James Robertson came to talk to me about a meeting on illegal immigration. It seems that there is very little that can be done unless the authorities are prepared to take a much stronger line. This may come about since the ANGLO-American Committee is evidently coming down rather heavily on our side, and advocating if not the abolition certainly a drastic curtailment of the powers of the Agency. It is also recommending partition. The only thing that can be done in the meantime is to get better information about the organisers and finance of the illegal traffic and the confiscation of ships which take part in it.

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April 26th

Harker I am told has been given a reprieve until September. when he is definitely to go

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General "Bubbles" Barker, the new G.O.C. Palestine, came to see us. We told him as much as we could about our part in Palestinian affairs and about the general set-up of SIME and DSO Palestine Barker struck me as being rather of the "blood and guts" type. bursting for action. It looks as if he were

likely to get it and he may therefore be the right man for the job. I explained to hi that the basic reason for inaction up to now had been the Govt.instructions that everything should be done to avoid the provocation of an incident,particularly since the establishment of the Anglo-AmericanCommission. Alec Kellar is at present in S.Africa and will be returning via Mid East where he will see Barker.

Roger took me over to see Malcolm McDonald to whom I explained our set up in the F.E. He said he would do anything he possibly could to give our organisation all assistance. He would always be accessible to the head of SIFE and would make a point of seeing Dixon on his arrival.

April 27th

I attended a meeting at the W.O. on illegal immigration in Palestine. The D.M.O. was in the chair,and DMI and F.O. were also there. SIS and the C.O. failed to turn up. We went over all the ground and finally decided that the most effective action would be the confiscation of the ships. Everything is to be done to enforce this if possible. There is in fact a test case going on at the moment.

I had a talk afterwards with Gen.Templar the new DMI whom I had already met. He was very friendly. I told him about my visit to America and particularly my conversation with Jumbo Wilson. I asked him whether he had read our report on the double-cross system,a copy of which had been left with de Guingand. He said that he had cleared almost everything out of his safe but on taking a look he found that this report was still there. He said he would be much interested to read it.

I saw Charles. He told me that it had been decided that Horrocks should stay on. Cussen on the other hand was returning to the Bar. The D.G. is handing over finally on Tuesday.

The D.G. has asked me to write a short note on my American visit for the PM's report.

I had a talk with Bertram Ede. He is still fighting for an overseas division but Dick has placed him quite definitely in B.3C in the new organisation. The final word now rests with the D.G.

Courtney tells me that the F.E. want a change in the designation SIFE and to call the organisation Senior Security Liaison Office. We all think here that this is a mistake. SIFE is an analagous organisation to SIME and really means something to the JIC and the Chiefs of Staff here. If we reduced the offi to anything i the nature of a liaison office the status of SIFE here will go down accordingly. As long as there are military forces in the FE. we can see no objection to the title of SIFE, and many objections to its being changed. We have telegraphed Dixon accordingly.

We received a message on Sat. Afternoon from OSS to say that Earl BROWDER was landing at Hurn within a few hours. Our records do not show that we had received any application for a transit visa. I was interested, since BROWDER's application came in while I was in New York. Pat Stone consulted me about it. I told him that clearly the application should be referred to us and that we should consult the FBI, a matter which could be more expeditiously dealt with if we had representation with the FBI in Washington

or New York. I recommended that the applica tion should be sent home without any special instructions that it should be referred to us. I would be interested to see how the machine worked when I got home. Evidently it did not work at all.

April 29th

I saw M.E. with TAR. M.E. is a little doubtful about the desirability of having Howard Morton Fraser as our representative with G.C. & C.S.

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M.E. thinks much more of Martin who was working under him at R.S.S and will find out what Martin is now doing. M.E. is doubtful about the job of our representative in the LSIC as he thinks that it will be rather a difficult one to carry out. If our representative was part of the workin machine he must owe a certain loyalty to the head of his dept. but according to the chart he would have direct access to Travis. He will also have responsibilities to R.5., Phil b[redacted]'s section, and he will in fact be paid by u[redacted] Both Dic[redacted] and TAR feel howev[redacted]r that we ought in all the circumstances to accept th plan proposed by SIS in order to show goodwill. If it does not work we shall have to say so. M.E. on the whole agrees with this view. M.E. himself would of course have wider responsibilities in control of B.4. but would closely supervise our representative in LSIC.

I lunched with TAR, Wyn Scott and Bossard, to whom I gave an account of my visit to Washington. They were unable to tell me any more than I knew already about the future of Intelligence in the USA. One thing however is disquieting them. G.2. in the person of Gen.Seibert have set up in Frankfurt what they call "target investigation" This is I think particularly directed against the Russians. The trouble is that in many ways they are trying to duplicate other people's work and that they keep all the information they get to themselves. They ask OSS for data and then refuse to tell them what the results of their enquiries are. This of course is an echo of Gen.Seibert's visit here some months ago when he asked for all the information we could give him about Russian espionage If I remember aright we referred him to the Control Commission. It also ties up with a recent request by the M.A. here to the W O. for information about Russian espionage. In addition to Seibert, Lt.Commander Belin representing ONI here is seeking for somewhat similar information. Belin I am told is one of 43 ONI representatives in this country at the moment. I said that quite frankly we were only too delighted to help anybody who had a clearly defined charter but that we could not give similar information to 3 or 4 departments. Firstly this involved us in a great deal of work and secondly it was apt to lead to serious confusion. It seemed to me that we could not deal satisfactorily with American Intelligence until they had got their own house in order, and their own charters clearly defined. It was hoped that the discussions now going on in Washington would eventually clarify the position.

I saw Byrd, S/Ldr. Marshall of Air Intelligence, and TAR, about a possible case of action against a man* who has offered to produce plans of an aircraft at present on the drawing-board to the French or if they are not interested to the Russians. The man in question called on the [redacted] at [redacted] on Saturday. He said that his brother-in-law was hard-up and was prepared to sell the plans for a suitable consideration. He was told that the matter would be considered and he offered to call back on Tuesday. Meanwhile [redacted] informed his superior officer who told him to say nothing about the matter to the British. [redacted] however who I believe ultimately wishes to become a British subject spoke of the incident to Marshall and offered to co-operate in any way he could provided his partidipcation in the affair did not come to the notice of his superiors. We have a description of the man in question and have arranged for [redacted] to be kept under observation. As soon as the man turns up [redacted] will telephone to Marshall and we shall try and house him if he leaves the building. In that way we will perhaps get on to his brother-in-law and effect an arrest of them both when the plans are handed over. This should give [redacted] the necessary cover.

* John Charles RICHARDS.

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Burt came in to see me. He is very pleased about his new appointment and finds that he has a great deal to do, particularly with protection duties and naturalisation cases, of which he has to produce 250 a month. He has told the H.O. that he cannot possibly do more and that in his view it is essential to have the cases properly investigated. I told him about the possible case of French espionage and I also discussed with him anti-

sabotage enquiries. We shall return to the latter subject later on. I feel that some centralisation will be necessary if this can possibly be affected, particularly in the case of Admiralty enquiries. The Admiralty do not like the interference of the local police but would be quite ready to accept assistance from Burt.

Burt seems quite confident about the outcom. of the MAY case although he may have rath a rough passage. The whole question turns on the acceptance of MAY's statement which opposing counsel will try and make outwas obtained without caution, and therefore invalid. The A.G. is quite confident that the statement will be accepted as evidence. I gather off the record that MAY is quite prepared to plead guilty to a misdemeanour under the act if the statement is accepted.

April 30th

Horrocksis making arrangements for a definite offer to bemmade to Gash who will probably go to Roger's division.

M.E. has accepted our offer and will be joining us in a week or so.

The DG has put a non-committal minute on the recommendation that O.C.. should now become B.3C. He seems to have missed all the points we put up to him and the matter will have to be left to be settled by his successor. He told me yesterday that when Harker goes in September I should be succeeding him as D.D.G. He thought this would give me the scope I wanted and enable me to continue with the intelligence work. It seemed to me that he was really trying to justify his action is not recommending me fo

the post of DG. Personally I am by no means certain about the job unless it is much more clearly defined than the present DDG's charter. It might easily become a backwater as it has been for so many years. I shall however be discussing this with Sillitoe.

Bertram talked to me about the DG's ruling which he equally thought was unsatisfactory since it really decided nothing. He agreed that it would be better to leave the matter in abeyance another week or so and then talk it over with the new DG. Meanwhile it appears that during my absence he has been to Gib. and formed certain views about the kind of work being done (a) for ourselves and

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Alley came to ask me whether I would be prepared to go to Holland for 2 days next week. Apparently Moyland was very keen that I should go with Alley and Corin and help to smooth over difficulties between Col. Eindhoven and van Angeren. I said that much as I would like to go I did not feel

could be away just as the new DG was taking over. I saw no objection to his going with Corin if this were agreed.

Vesey tells me that there is a lot of interesting information about the Etappendienst. This shows quite clearly that before the war there was an individual named JAKOBS, a British subject living in Wimbledon, who was receiving £60 a month for providing information from various ports about our naval craft. The case is under investigation. It seems likely that JAKOBS returned to Germany before the outbreak of war. There is also information relating to the transmission of funds for secret service purposes. The idea was to build up a fund here by making remittances through the Norddeutscher Lloyd. It is doubtful however whether any such fund was in fact built up since whenever the payment of an agent was in question we always had to work out some scheme for the Abwehr who seemed incapable of making arrangements themselves.

May 1st

The new D.G. had his first meeting. He wants to continue the weekly meetings and wants to get I think more of a contribution from everybody on the current work that they are doing. I did not say that I had not been accustomed to do this in the past because the late D.G. did not really want to listen to it, and that I had not raised anything at all controversial as I was always afraid that I should get a snap decision which would not be to my liking.

I attended a meeting of the JIC on deception. The idea isto set up the old machinery of the W.Board and XX Committee and to reconsti-

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tute the office of the Controller in the Cabinet Offices. Dudley Clarke is suggeste as controller. The Committee first suggested TAR as the Secretary but I said I doubt whether he would be available for a job of that kind unless he could carry it with his other duties. We should however in any case make him our representative on the Committee. DNI suggested Charles Cholmondeley as secretary. I said I thought he would be an excellent choice but that I had last heard of him pursuing locusts in the Middle East. I would endeavour to find out what he was doing.

Courtney brought in Hunt to see me. He seems to know his area pretty well. I gather that he is not keen about going back to Burma and I doubt whether there is any other place where he would be of real value to us.

I understand from Adam that the question of travel without visas between this country and America is once more under consideration.

Hall Cain came to see me. He was formerly in B.A.A.G. in China and Hong Kong where he handed over his papers to Ingram and Alan Roger. He had come to do a job with the economic side of the Control Commission in Germany. This has now fallen through and he is at a loose end. I did not quite frankly take very much to him and cannot see him as a member of the permanent staff.

Bromley rang up about a journalist called KIMCHE who had got hold of the Palestine Commission' report two days before it was

published. Apparently Howe of the F.O. Security Dept. is anxious to know who KIMCHE's contacts are. We have a file about him showing that he has already been a source of leakage.

M.E. has got hold of Martin who would be quite willing to come to us, if he is acceptable to LSIC.

May 2nd

I had a talk with John Cimperman. From rumours that have reached him he thinks that the Boss might carry a wider assignment. This is probably an echo of the Boss himself. The wish may be father to the thought.

I took the D.G. round part of B. Division and the various officers concerned talked to him about their work.

I lunched with Kim and at one stage his father joined us. His father is just back from Arabia and of course full of the Palestine Commission's report which he feels must be totally unacceptable to all Arabs. Various Arab legations were calling a meeting to decide what line they were going to take.

I told Kim about my American visit. I said that Peter Dwyer was doing excellent work and that he was thoroughly persona grata with everybody. At the same time the work that he was doing was really our work. Kim was evidently rather worried about a rumour that had reached him that I was positively opposed to SIS having any relations with the F.B.I. I said that I had not the slightest objection to SIS working to the F.B.I. but that I thought it possible that they might get better results by working

through us, since I knew quite positively that whatever letters were written by Hoover to Bill Stevenson etc. there was a fundamental distrust of SIS in the FBI. I did not actually mention to him what Barty Bouverie told me 3 days ago that when he was in Washington quite recently he had dined with Micky Ladd who had expressed those very sentiments. What I would suggest for consideration would be the placing of an officer in Passport Control who would carry out a liaison with Washington and Ottawa and assist the P.C.O. in dealing with security cases. Kim did not seem to see any objection to this. I told him I thought it would be difficult to reach a decision until the Americans knew exactly what they were going to do qua reorganisation and liaison.

Peter Hope talked to me about his future, and the future of the job in Paris. I told him that I saw many advantages in having an office in Paris but I doubt whether we should have the necessary finances to run it. It seems clear to me that there would be many jobs which Hope is carrying out now both for the Embassy and for ourselves which in the future would not be handled. If there is any question of sending out an S.B. officer again I think we ought to consider whether in the general interest would not be served better by an M.I.5 officer.

Anthony is worried about Padgham. After long waiting he thought that he had got Padgham placed in an administrative job in Germany. We are now told that the local German authority does not want him. Anthony is quite sure that the objections are entirely invalid and is prepared to go out if

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necessary and see our people and the Germans on the spot.

May 6th

Briscoe came to ask me about the carding of Germans who had been concerned with secret writing and other technical devices. He had made a short list of these people which he had passed to the registry for carding. The registry had refused to card. I suggested that Briscoe should discuss this matter and if necessary refer it to me. Personally I have no doubt in my mind that all such names should be carded.

I lunched with VORONETZ. He is looking extremely fit and well and said that for some years he had been working as a wood-cutter in Hampshire. He has about 4 Italians working under him and under contract thins out people's woods and disposes of the products. He lives in a caravan with his wife and works from about 6 am to 5 pm. He likes the local people and seems to be thoroughly happy. He is clearly too out of date on all Russian affairs to be of much use to us now. He reminded me incidentally that Wilmott the present Minister of Supply was formerly an official working under him in the Bank for Russian Trade. Willmott who was very friendly with Casparson, Party member and chairman of the Bank, was eventually thrown out owing to a general purge of individuals connected with the Labour Party and Communist Party which took place some time in the early 30's. Wilmott was concerned about this and did everything in his power toget reinstated w without success.

The D.G. spoke to me and Horrocks about the

destruction of LRC uncarded files of which there are some 20,000. Horrocks had got a snap decision out of the D.G. to have these files destroyed without showing him the minutes which had been recorded in January of this year on the subject. A decision had then been reached to postpone this matter for a year. Horrocks had put the case for destruction forward on the grounds of the PM's directive about the purging of our records. I pointed out that the PM's ruling really had nothing to do with the matter and related solely to any references that may have crept into our files about the private lives of MPs and other public individuals. The DG said that this was the impression he had gained when talking to the PM. Horrocks apologised for not referring the matter to me before the decision was made. It was agreed that it should remain in abeyance at any rate until the move and that meanwhile I should ascertain from Alley what view the allied governments would take. I felt that we were under an obligation to them to supply them with any information about people who had passed through our hands during the war, and thereby assist them to clean up their countries. If for example they were investigating a case it would be relevant to their enquiry to know what the man had said when he went through the LRC. We should therefore at least tell them that we were proposing to destroy these files otherwise we might be accused of bad faith. A compromise would be to hand the files to each allied government. I undertook to make enquiries.

I had a talk with Dick and James Robertson about the future of the Middle East section. They are extremely hard-pressed and there is an increasing demand for memos prepared

by experts in each particular field. This -thwaite is good at this kind of work but only covers his own particular field. It seems to be a necessity for someone else to cover the rest of the ground. We all agreed that it was of vital importance for memos to the JIC and outside depts. to be clear concise and well-written.

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Dick and I had a talk with Col. Thicknesse, who is at present employed on the Control Commission in Berlin. He has had a fairly wide experience in the Middle East and elsewhere and made a very favourable impression on us both. Harold Caccia met him in Berlin and had spoken to Dick about him. He is a friend of Geoffrey Wethered: We regarded him as a possible future head of SIME or SIFE.

I had a short word with Dick and Bill Williams, I asked the latter what he thought of Ralph Ingersoll's book. He said that he was being constantly rung up by the Press and asked to give a reply. He is a little worried as Ingersoll apparently was right in on the whole decep tion plan.

May 7th

I discussed with James Robertson the effec of the declaration of the Govt. on the evacuation of Egypt. The question arises as to whether we shall be able to keep SIME or our PSO in Cairo. I should imagin that SIME would have to move back with the Commanders-in- Chief, presumably to North Africa, but it is possible that we might still be able to keep Jenkins as a Liaison Officer with the Egyptians. Keller will doubtless be going into all this when he reaches Cairo on May 14th.

Vesey and Cussen discussed with me Firmin book on espionage. Firmin is a corresponde of the Daily Telegraph. Much of what he writes is sensational and inaccurate, but it is noteworthy that in every case where have touched the policehe has acquired good information. An example of this is the case of Muselier, and cases of counter sabotage etc. He has also speculated a great deal about cryptography and the use of machines forthat purpose. We are askin him to cut all this out. As regards Muselier we do not propose to take a firm stand although we shall say that it seems regrettable to rake up this mud. In refer ence to counter-sabotage, Victor is going t see Firmin and Cussen and get his somewhat sensational facts rationalised, on the

understanding that he makes no reference of any sort to an interview with Victor.

The D.G. held his second weekly meeting which was very different to the ones that we had under the old D.G. It was possible to discuss things very freely. The main subject was the PMs directive. It was agreed that it should be sent out to members of the office with a covering explanatory note from the D.G. Horrocks complained about the amount of vetting that had to be done for the Control Commission. It even included lorry drivers. We agreed that steps should be taken to cut this down. Adam said that he was relying largely on Passport Control to tip us off in the event of any undesirable alien coming to this country. I pointed out that the chances of our getting information of this kind were doubtful but I do not see any chance of getting anything sensible done as long as Adam is here. In fact a large number of these applications will not be linked up. Though PCOs may have a certain amount of local information we know from experience that they are not briefed by SIS with any information which emanates from delicate sources. If therefore there is no look up here we shall never know who is good or who is bad.

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and would like to be in touch with us as well. I said there was no objection to this provided he was not covering the same ground as other American agencies. He asked first if we could provide him with information about American deserters. I said that this was

a matter for the Provost Marshal and for the police and would not come our way. He then wanted to know if we could give him information about sabotage I explained to him what we had done during the war and wh the present arrangement was. If there was a case in which it was suspected that eith the agents of a foreign power or any subversive organisation was behind the incide the police were under an obligation to inform us. It follows therefore that if we heard nothing of fires or other acts of sabotage they were due purely to accident or to disgruntled individuals. We should always be ready to transmit any information to him which came our way. He said that he was also interested to know any move for example of the C.P. to penetrate the armed forces. I said that I saw no difficulty in passing information of this kind. He did not seem to want to cross our lines with the FBI in any way.

Derbyshire brought me a note on the activities of the NKVD in Poland. It seems that they are pretty well running internal security in that country.

Hewill continue in liaison with Bihan and Mampuys and will deal with all enquiri both from here and from Colinson of PCO.

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May 8th

Dick and I had a talk with Curry about his proposal that he should run straight intelligence. We both have misgivings about this since it will cut across the general organisation of B.Division.

Various steps were recommended beginning with an attempt to get hold of newspapers and technical journals and to get them properly studied. Frank Roberts who is now Councillor at Moscow, was present. He said that he had great difficulty in getting these papers. He submitted a list to his news agent but was told that the papers were not available. Whether this was definite obstruction or whether due to short-age of paper is not clear. I thought that possibly we might be able to ascertain what papers come to this country, and whether firms dealing with Russia get technical journals in which their products were advertised. We then discussed the question of translation. It was suggested that perhaps the JIB should provide a pool of translators. It was also necessary to have intelligent readers. I said that I thought there might be a job here for Russian renegades who knew the whole machine and could interpret Soviet decrees better than anybody else. C.disclosed that Sigint sources were likely to provide considerable information for the future, particularly on the Russian order of battle. We were asked to prepare a paper in conjunction with SIS on communist activities at home and abroad as it was felt by all that they had a very marked bearing on Russian intentions.

We had a meeting of the Appointments Board and selected two candidates both of whom look promising.

Corin came to see me about a refusal of the registry to look up 6 names of diplomats coming to this country. He is referring the matter to me. Frankly I do not understand the basis of this refusal and the whole question will have to be taken up in a big way.

May 9th

Harker consulted me on a letter that he had had from Victor suggesting that he should sever any official connection with the Security Service and cease to be on the payroll. He would of course remain at our disposal as adviser on scientific matters, and would make a claim if this involved him in any expense as and when the occasion arises.

Briscoe consulted me about the truth drug which is a refined form of marihuana. He wanted a practical demonstration. It had been suggested that it might be tried out on Jap prisoners but for some reason or other this is no longer possible. He wondered whether CSDIC in the British zone could do anything. I said I thought this would be difficult particularly if it could not be done without the individual becoming aware of the fact that he had been drugged.

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Dick and I continued our talk with Curry who suggested that there should be two

D.D.Bs, one concerned with C.E. and the other with what he called straight intelligence. He envisaged that all memos would go out through himself and that he would be generally directing and supervising on that side of the work. Dick explained to him what our reorganisation scheme was, and what our difficulties were with regard to personalities. We both agreed to consider his scheme but we felt that it would set up a kind of dual control which would cause difficulties and confusion. It is not easy to see how C.E. and straight intelligence can really be treated as separate subjects. Dick and I feel that he will either have to take B.2. or retire. Curry's main concern is that some means should be found for obviating the necessity for his taking a step down in the hierarchy. He still holds the rank of a deputy director The only other job that I can think of is the Secretariat.

May 10th

Roger and I went to the JIC to discuss Russian sources. A number of other suggestions have been made and the JIB are to set up a committee to discuss the availability to press material. A decision was was also reached about periodic reviews and appreciations on Russian activity.

There has been a blaze in the Washington Post about McCormack and also an article in the same paper dated 29th April by Joseph and Stewart Alsop entitled "The FBI becomes a Secret Service". It goes into the intelligence set-up in considerable detail, draws attention to the work done by OSS and mentions the possibility of Hoover taking over the whole of secret

service work at home and abroad. It is pointed out that the FBI have alienated the British who have done so much for the Americans during the war and that if Hoover were appointed American intelligence would suffer accordingly. It draws attention to the fact that the FBI led the move to force the British Col.Ellis,who headed the British Secret Service in America early in the war, to leave the country. Ellis it is mentioned reported direct to the fabulous Maj-Gen.Menzies,head of all British Secret Services whose name is quite unknown to the British public although he can frequently be found holding forth genially in the famous White's Club in London. Finally the objection is raised to Hoover's appointment on the grounds that an extremely powerful Gestapo with executive powers would be created.

Drew came to see me about 3 major leakages which had occurred recently. Two of them were in connection with iron and steel reports and the 3rd related to atomic research. Reference was made in one to a cabinet discussion and the information was accurate. The inference is that somebody having access to cabinet papers,possibly in the Ministry of Supply, is leaking to the press. The PM is very concerned and has given instructions to the Lord Chancellor to investigate. He through Norman Brook and Drew is appealing to us as there is in fact no other body capable of undertaking the enquiry. I said to Drew that this seemed to be a pretty wide interprepation of the PMs new directive on our functions We of course were only too ready to undertake the enquiry and it could be justified on the grounds that if a

leakage was going on in Cabinet circles about a matter which did not directly concern the defence of the realm, the channel was open for leakages which did come within these terms. It was therefore incumbent upon us to discover what that channel was and to block it up. This however was stretching the directive to some extent. I thought therefore that we ought to have a letter asking us to conduct this enquiry. He said that he too had considered this matter with Norman Brook who felt that this was an investigation which we should undertake and that the charter should be stretched accordingly. He would let me have a letter. Cussen who was also present then pointed out that our machinery to deal with these matters had to some extent run down. Formerly we had Pam Fraser on the one hand and B.5 on the other. If we were going to be asked to carry out enquiries of this sort the question of staff would have to be considered. I also pointed out that this matter raised the question of records. The instructions were that our records were to be kept clean of anything that did notcome directly within the terms "defence of the realm", and the PM had made it clear that he did not want us to have the names of anybody on our cards who was not considered to be a danger to security. Drew was now telling me that possibly Brendan Bracken and Sir Andrew Duncan and undoubtedly Freddie Kuh were all mixed up in this business. If we were to investigate cases of this kind we should probably have to have their names on our cards. Under the present ruling we might well have destroyed all our files on Freddie KUH. We should thereby have been deprived of valuable starting points in the present enquiry. Drew entirely

agreed. Cussen is going to make out a short report and will be seeing the Lord Chancellor on Wednesday. He emphasises however that it would not be possible to go further than to indicate on general lines how far enquiry was likely to be profitable and in what directions it should be made. I reported all these facts to the DG who seemed pleased that I had asked for an official letter from the Cabinet Offices should be sent to us requesting that the enquiry should be made. He fully understood all its implications with regard to staff and records.

May 11th

Sclater came to see me this morning. He is a little upset at having received his notice. Actually I did not know that the notice was going out. I should have preferred that M.E. should have reviewed the whole position before these notices were issued.

M.E. comes in on Monday and I have arranged that he should go down to Barnet to discuss matters with Sclater. What I am most concerned about is Sclater's small unit which takes a cross-section of the ether. I am sure that this work ought to go on and I doubt very much whether Sigint will do it properly even if they are prepared to take it on at all.

I talked to Charles about various problems, firstly OC, secondly John Adam and thirdly D and C divisions. These were major issues about which I had very strong views. I could talk to the DG but I did not want to give him the impression that I was trying

to rush him into a number of decisions before he had had time to look round. Charles said there would be no harm in talking to him, but we could hardly expect him to decide on any but the most urgent controversial matters.

May 13th

M.E. joined us this morning. I particularly drew his attention to Sclater's little organisation which has been taking a cross-section of the ether. I said that in my view this work should certainly go on. I was doubtful whether if this commitment went to Sigint the work wouldever be done. It had I thought amply proved its usefulness and if it did not continue we should never have any idea as to the extent of leakage through Service and civilian signals..

I talked to Curry about the possibility of his taking on the Secretariat. I thought that there was a job to be done if all the JIC papers came into the Secretariat instead of going to D.Branch. The Secretariat should also be concerned with matters of policy. There would too I thought be an opportunity for putting up suggestions about memos and lines of action that the office could profitably take. Curry said he would like to consider this.

Corin has just returned from Holland. He says that Col.Sindhoven is running two private jails and that when his prisoners escape he never reports the fact to the police. He is clearly running into difficulties and it seems a little doubtful whether he will stay the course. We seem to be on firmer ground in dealing with the Ministry of Justice.

I had a talk with Dick and TAR abour our liaison abroad. We came to the conclusion that it was useless to do anything about Paris at the moment. As regards America I put all the points I am inclined to think that it would be profitable to have a man in PCO New York. I shall discuss this with the DG before I have a talk with C. Dick Ellis whom I saw at the club thinks that I am going to encounter considerable opposition mainly due to Vivian who takes the view that if we have a representative there we shall cut out Dwyer. The real facts are that the FBI will never trust SIS owing to past history and the fact that they are an offensive organisation. Further that we can and do already conduct direct liaison with the FBI through John Cimperman who passes us information which he does not pass to SIS.

Harry and Dick discussed with me the figures for our mobilisation in any future war. We felt that without prejudice to any further build-up we should require 20 officers at the LRC (we have had 26 in this war), and 10 officers at 020, w officer for each region and 50% increase for all SO points including SIME and SIFE. Harry is arranging about the SCO staffs.

I talked to Courtenay Young about | that the Chinese are anxious to obtain information about our Intelligence Service and other matters. It seemed to me that we ought to do something about this. He is taking steps to set some machinery in motion.

There is I understand a development in the French leakage case. has returned

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From Paris and has told us that in the mea time the individual has called again, offering 14 blue prints from Hawkers factory where his brother in law works. We have now the name both of the man and his brother -in-law.

The JIC have circulated a very hot memo by Warren of the FO on Russian intentions Warren points out that these intention have been made plain by the utterances of Soviet officials and in their press. He thinks therefore that we should take them at their face value. He points out that we failed to do this in the case of Mein Kampf, with disastrous results. He suggests that as it may be inexpedient to attack the Russian Govt. we should conduct propaganda and diplomatic action against C.P.s throughout the world which are one of their principle instruments for foreign policy.

May 14th

I saw Le Mar this morning. He is unfortuna -ly leaving us. He is an extremely likeable character and would be very glad to do the liaison work here if he could work quietly on his own without interference I told him that we all very much regretted his departure and hoped that he might come back to us one day. I also said that it was our earnest desire to establish a clos liaison on a confidential basis. Possibly when things settled down this might be brought about.

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At the DGs meeting today we discussed the P.M's directive and the circular which is to go out with it. Horrocks has adopted some of my suggestions and I think that with a full explanation by heads of Divisions on the question of carding, it can go out in its present form. This was generally agreed. I mentioned the recent demand on [redacted] to conduct enquiries into the Cabinet leakages and said that this meant that we should have to be very careful about what records we destroyed. The DG thought that we were amply covered by the PMs directive. We then discussed travel control. I mentioned that ADAM had said at a previous meeting that hewas relying on PCOs to keep us informed about undesirables. I said that they were frankly not in a position to do this. Firstly they only had a certain amount of local knowledge, secondly the suspects in one country, thinking that they would not get facilities locally, would probably go somewhere else where they would be no records and thirdly there were many records which owing to their secret nature SIS would nt circulate to Passport Control under any conditions. This meant that a check on our records and possibly those of SIS was the only real safeguard. There was no apparent solution to this problem at the moment but it was suggested that we should discuss this matter with SIS. I said that unless we got proper leads from Passport Control which was our first line of defence, our work would be very seriously impaired. We then discussed the H.O. Traffic Index on which there is a time lag of something like 6 weeks. It was agreed that Harker should see Maxwell and try and get some improvement.

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May 15th

I took the D.G. round the rest of B.Division this morning and he has made the acquaintanc of M.E.

We had a long session of the Appointments Boa The future of B.Division is to be discussed tomorrow. I pointed out that this depended to a considerable degree on what the D.G. proposed to do about the JIC. I thought tha he at any rate nominally ought to be our representative on the JI- and that generally speaking he should attend the meetings accompanied by a representative of the Divis concerned with the particular item on the agenda. If he decided to do this all papers from the Chiefs of Staf and JIC shou really come direct to him, or more properly the Secretariat which would be responsible for seeing that all sections of the office were consulted and if a memo were required that it was properly co-ordinated. This led me to talk of the possibility of Curry running the Secretariat. If he did there were a number of other matters affecting policy which should go to him. At the moment for example D.4 formulated their own policy with very little regard to the requirements of the rest of the office. Adam blandly announces that he has placed the onus on Passport Control for warning us about suspects coming to this country. Hence it is not necessary to look up visa applications. This is all very fine but the Passpo

Control cannot possibly carry this responsibility in the circumstances. Firstly they may have no local knowledge of an individual who, finding difficulty in getting his visa from his own country, goes to an adjacent one. Secondly there is much information, particularly that in a highly secret category, which SI. will not send out to PCOs. Thirdly it is difficult to put information from highly secret sources on a Black List since it is our experience that such lists sooner or later come into the possession of a foreign power. Harker said that he had discussed with H.O. the possibility of having landing cards sent to our office before they were sent to the Aliens Brance. It appears that there are some 6,000 aliens arriving here every week. The problem would therefore be a considerable one. The H.O. index is in a real mess and a good 5 weeks in arrears.

May 16th

I saw Scott and told him that I was very much afraid that there would be nothing here for him of a permanent nature, but that his services might well be required in a temporary capacity to deal with Anders's Army when it was demobilised. I said that I would do my utmost to find him some suitable employment. He is I think not unnautrally concerned about his future. He has a wife and child and was anxious to bring a sister over from Poland. I had in mind possibly some job in dealing with the foreign Press in J.I.B.

I saw Tommy Lascelles at his request. De COURCY had been to see Lord Clarendon. He said that the Duke of Windsor, for whom some job in connection with the British Embassy in Washington had been considered but turned

down, was proposing to make some statement to the Press in America retailing all his grievances against the King and the British Govt. This seemed most undesirable and de COURCY was doing everything he could to persuade him to refrain from any such action. Meanwhile he wondered whether some palliative could not be administered by allowing the Duke to go back to the Belvedere. I told Tommy that I would not put it above de COURCY to have fixed all this up with the Duke in order to blackmail the Govt. into allowing the Duke to return to the U.K. I told him what we knew about de COURCY and that this was just the kind of matter in which he would probably like to dabble. He might well think that it would enhance his importance in Royalcircles. Tommy's line is to refuse to see de COURCY and to take the risk of the Duke giving a statement to the Press which he does not think would cut much ice.

May 17th

Cimperman came in. He told me that he was visiting certain of their overseas stations, including Geneva, and then returning to Washington for a conference in June. He did not think that this implied his withdrawal.

M.E. has shown me a report on RSS by Hesten which indicates that the whole organisation is gradually being disintegrated and that there is nothing very adequate to take its place. A sergeant has been placed in control. He appears to have few qualifications other than association with Blair Cunningham who used to run the organisation. The latter is at present away on 3 months leave. Two captains have been placed under the sergeant.

M.E. thinks that the discrimination work is going to suffer for some considerable time and can only recover if some very drastic changes are made in the personnel in charge.

An interesting report has come in on the interrogation of PROTZE a SF man in Holland. Padgham's downfall is now explained. It transpires that the individuals who offered their services to the German Embassy and were reported on by Padgham to Stevens, were subsequently kept under observation on the orders of Hinten and Hendricks by a man called KOUTERICK. KOUTERICK was a German agent, hence it appeared curious to the Germans that people who reported at the Embassy were within 24 hours under observation by the British. The German Ambassador refused at first to believe that Padgham was involved because his name was in the Almanach de Gotha. He said nobody of such standing would do such a thing and that it was more likely to be the Nazi porter at the door. Krueger's downfall (he was the SIS agent who had worked for 21 years) was also due to KOUTERICK who was told to cover one of his periodical visits from Gotenberg to the Hague. The Germans arrested him and he committed suicide in jail. The report also confirms that Hooper was for some time in the pay of the Germans. PROTZE corroborates almost everything that had been previously said by Feldman, Giskes and Perry Gordon.

May 18th

I had a long meeting with Burt, TAR, Hunter, Wilkinson of S.B., Cussen and Sargent of B.3 on thecase of the man who went to the French Embassy with plans from Hawkers. Hawkers now say that this man might have had access

not only to the Furies but to a jet-propelled fighter which is on the secret list. We felt therefore that we could not afford to leave him at large. It was decided that Wilkinson should take a statement from him at the factory and that his premises should then be searched. The DG was not here at the time but I told him after lunch what had been done.

Wiley and Wadeson talked to me about a document which we had received from the field indicating that the Germans had information to the effect that we were going to occupy Norway and that this seemed to have a bearing on the trial of Raeder at Nuremberg. Raeder was saying that the Germans occupied Norway because they had information that we were going to do so. We are arranging for the documents to be sent out. It was obtained originally from one of our P/Ws.

May 20th

Herbert came to see me this morning. I showed him the PROTZE report. He was interested. He took the view that while it confirmed what we had previously said about HOOPER it did not add very much. While he thought it would be possible to mount a prosecution he felt that the old reasons for not doing so, namely the exposure of SIS, still held good.

Henderson came in to say goodbye. He is going back to his hotel and restaurant business and said if at any time he could be of assistance to us he would be very glad to help.

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We had another long meeting today on the Hawker case. It transpired as a result of the interrogations on Saturday that there were two people involved and it seems that the real nigger in the woodpile is the brother-in-law Andre Richards, a Frenchman who admitted that he had gone to the Embassy but only once. He had taken two plans which had never left his possession and had taken them away again. He was not very clear what the plans were but his brother-in-law who works in Hawker says that he never brought out of Hawkers any plans except those relating to the Furies. He brought them out because he was going to another branch of the factory and had no idea that his brother in-law had taken them. There are quite a number of discrepancies in the stories of these two, but the general opinion is that the Englishman is innocent, although it is difficult to understand how, if he took certain plans out for some specific purpose, it did not occur to him that they were missing. There were no plans in the house and it was assumed that they had been taken back by the factory. We decided not to approach the French but to get the Air Force officer who is going to Paris this week to make contact with and inform him of what action has been taken. Otherwise he might feel that we had let him down. Although a technical offence has been admitted by Andre Richards, there is clearly no case for prosecution. We are however going to try and get at the full facts by further interrogation.

D.G. held a meeting on O.C. at which Marker, Butler, Horrocks, Sec. Pick and myself were present. He listened to all the arguments and I think will decide on the abolition of

Walter Bell came in to say goodbye. He has got a job as P.A. to Clark Kerr in Washington.

Roger and Cuthbert Fleetwood-Hesketh came round to talk to me about the recent interrogation of Keitel. Keitel was shown Garbo's message of June 9th 1944 and is of opinion that the decision of the OKW to divert the 2 panzer divisions and 4 infantry divisions destined to reinforce Rundstedt to the Pas de Calais, the Lagebericht of the Loth which formed part of Jodl's diary draws attention to a report from Madrid and also toaBritish propaganda directive as the evidence on which these tactical moves were carried out. Unfortunately the actual reports have been destroyed but the one from Madrid and the propaganda directive almost certainly refers to Garbo's message in which he pointed out that his contact in the MOI had been told that no mention was to be made of the Pas de Calais. Various other things have come to light. It seems that SOE or some underground headquarters at about this time were giving instructions to the underground movement in Brussels. The organisations with which they were communicating had recently come under the control of the Germans. The initial tendency therefore was to regard communications as intended to mislead. Later however the Germans thought that as the Belgian organisation had been sorecently taken under control this fact would not have so soon come to the notice of the British and that therefore the communication about starting trouble in the Brussels area should be taken at its face value. It was lucky that they did take this view since it reinforced the Pas de Calais idea. It does show however

how dangerous communications to the underground movement can be to deception. Jodl's diary was apparently written up by a Prof. Schramm who as luck would have it was at Nuremberg as a witness. Schramm suddenly asked Cuthbert whether the whole of the "Patton's Army" idea was not a blind. Cuthbert replied that we had of course had forces in the S.E. of England and that if we had seen the 15th Army moved down to the bridgehead we should have in all probability struck across the Channel. Schramm, obviously very pleased, said "Ah that is just what we thought".

I told Roger about the leakage through SOE about D.day. This I have previously mentioned. He is going to try and find out who was responsible for communicating with the underground movement in the Brussels area.

May 21st

Dick, TAR, Cecil and I had a meeting about the control of passengers arriving at Rineanna. It was decided that we should approach Dan in due course and see what he was prepared to do in giving us information about particular aliens arriving or in telling us what aliens arrived on a particular date. We then discussed the possibility of putting someone into Rineanna under BOAC. Such an individual would have to get to know the various pilots and crews and ascertain whether any of them were acting as unofficial couriers. A further suggestion was made by Cecil that we should have somebody here who really knew about all air routes. I thought that possibly we might have a contact in BOAC who would supply us with this information. I thought

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that possibly Victor could fix this. Hinchinganna is rapidly becoming a very important traffic centre with lines to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Portugal etc.

Cussen brought Capt. Wilson to see me regarding a theft of inter-service cyphers at Ghent. Somebody had broken into a room which contained only these cyphers and removed them all. It seemed therefore that the person who did the job knew very definitely what he was after. We suggested to Wilson that he should get Philby to communicate with

I explained to Wilson that in a general way we were ~~xxx~~ interested in knowing about cases of this kind in case we were conducting other enquiries about leakages of information. I arranged with him that where we had an important and unexplained case we should first refer to him in case he could provide any explanation from his knowledge of cypher thefts or breaks. At the moment he said that he thought our cyphers were entirely secure. I reminded him of the incident during the war when Dick went to Gib. to investigate the leakage about the submarine Rutland. He had, of course, thought I did not rub it in, contended that it could not have been due to any cypher break. He confessed that in the light of subsequent revelations he had been mistaken and that the Germans were in fact reading quite a number of our naval cyphers.

TAR and Cameron came to see me about the cases of Federico, Kuhlenthal and Lenz who were all concerned with Garbo. These people are now in the hands of USFET having been flown from Spain to the American zone.

The Americans being short of interrogators were proposing to talk to them at a round-table conference We do not wish them to r late the whole history of the Garbo case to USFET and are therefore anxious to get them to our own CSDIC. A strongly worded letter to this effect is being sent to S.S.U. representative on USFET.

May 22nd

I attended the JIC meeting today. Gladwyn Jebb gave a n interesting talk on the Paris Conference. He said that the keynote was th toughness of Byrnes who was adopting a polic of not giving way an inch to the Russians. We of course back the Americans up. Whether they will see the red light and qualify thei demands in consequence will become clear at subsequent meeting. If they do not, it may end in the whole proceedings being submitted to UNO and even to the Russians walking out. This would mean two opposing camps in Europe The three main problems discussed were (1) Italian reparations, whether agreement could po sibly be reached, particularly if it were decided to give the Russians the Italian battleship Littorio to which they apparently attach very considerable importance. Our naval experts say that this would not matter a great deal. (2) the question of Trieste is far more difficult;from a strictl naval point of view it is felt that as the Jugoslavs already have two bases it would not matter very much. The issue is more a political one in that it constitutes further encroachment by a power within the Russian orbit. A possible solution is to make Trieste a kind of Danzig with a corridor to Italy,but the Jugoslavs may try and put a kind of enclave round it and then build a Gdnyia alongside it and freeze it out. Two

other naval bases that the Jugoslavs already have are Pola and Fiume. (5) Italian colonies. Jebb was anxious to know whether the planners wish to hold on toCyrenaica, making a port of Tobruk. He thought that by making some concessions in other matters it might be possible to achieve this objective. We were after all on the ground and could say that we were not going to move. We could then make atreaty with the Senussi and start putting in our installations. There would of course be a certain outcry about painting the map red. This might be offset by some overall mandate from UNO. As regards Eritrea and Libya,any suggestion that these places should go back to Italy seemed unthinkable. There was equally an objection to giving them independance either now or in 10 years time since the French were insistent that it would only lead to similar demands being made to them in the case of Algeria and Tunisia. The only other possibility seemed to be a quadripartite mandate which would have to include theRussians. The inclusion of the latter was objected to by some as enhacing their prestige in these areas giving them opportunities for intrigue which they would not otherwise have. Jebb pointed out that even if they were not participating in the mandate they could not be prevented from establishing diplomatic representatives or consuls who would be in just as good a position to carry out intrigues. The Turkish question was hardly touched upon although it is expected to come up before long.

We then discussed Turkish cyphers.

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The immediate problem was to get the maximum security before the Turkish issue came up. At that stage there would be telegrams passing between London and Ankara, and probably between Ankara and Moscow, which would indicate the measure of support which this country might be prepared to give. It might be a serious matter if this information fell into the hands of the Russians through a weak cypher system. A committee is to report on what can be done to reduce the risks. While it would be possible to get the Turks to send all their communications by cable instead of W/T and possibly to use the bag only, it would probably not prevent the Turks in Ankara from passing on information to their representative in Moscow. Equally if all the negotiations between ourselves and the Turks were conducted in Ankara, it was probable that the Turkish Govt. would wish to keep their Ambassador here informed. The problem is not therefore an easy one. Elmhirst raised the question of a representative in Beirut. I said that arrangements were being made to put in an assistant M.A. who would be working to SIME. Elmhirst thought this was satisfactory.

I saw Victor. He is going to find out whether there is a useful contact in BOAC who will be au fait with air routes all over the world. He is also going to see Fish and ascertain whether he has any suitable contact in Rineanna. He told me that he had heard from Duff that de COURCY had been in Paris and he believed was making contact with Right Wing circles there. He was giving out that he had some kind of mandate from C.

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May 23rd

I had a talk with the D.G. who gave his permission for Cussen to go to Paris to interview Blaise.

I then discussed with him the future of D. Division. I did not know what he was intending to do with regard to the JIC but personally I felt that he should be our representative, attending as and when he was able and taking with him any specialists he liked. If he thought this was right, and apparently he did, it seemed to me to follow that all JIC papers and papers from the Chiefs of Staff should come into a properly constituted Secretariat which would be concerned with all matters affecting policy and with the integration of any replies or memoranda which went to the JIC.

I then discussed the D. sections. It seemed to me that although it was necessary to have 3 officers to control factory work, they might well utilise the services of ALOs

for a great deal of the work that was done in the provinces. It seemed to me uneconomic to have two sets of people touring the country for different r ason . This led us to discuss the ALOs. I said that onthe whole I thought that they had performed a useful function during the war and that generally C.C.s were anxious that we should not return to the pre-war isolationist policy. On the other hand it seemed to me that the job must be made alive and that ALOs should be really well informed and when visiting C.C.s do more than pass the time of day. On the B.Division side we had taken quite a lot of trouble to get C.C.s a d their S.B.' informed about our work and for this purpose we had sent round people to lecture. We had however been in some difficulty owing to restrictions placed upon us concerning secret sources which were in fact basic to all our work. I quite realised that police forces in the provinces might be different from Scotland Yard but our experience there had not been altogether satisfactory. I regretted to say that wherever we had touched the Metropolitan Police the facts were either in the possession of the Daily Express who probably intended to release them as and when possible, and I had been reinforced in this view by a book recently submitted to us by one Firmin,a correspondent of the DailyTelegraph. This book purported to deal with C.E.in thi. country. A great deal of it was nonsense,but wherever we had touched the police the facts were accurate. I said that psychologically I thought there was something in continuing the ALO system but that he would probably be able to put me right on this point. I believed that C.C.s liked to feel that they had someone in their area whom they could instruct to get an answer from MI5

about certain problems which concerned them, and that they liked in a sense to regard this officer as a sort of member of their staff. Otherwise a C.C.might think that M.I.5 was a rather secretive body somewhere in London which he could not really penetrate. The DG said that I had entirely hit the nail on the head, that he thought this was a most important aspect of the whole problem. He was proposing to get together a few selected C.C.s both Borough and Country, and obtain their views. He ended by saying that he was at the moment conscious that a number of matters affecting the organisation needed adjustment and that it was desirable that something should be done at as early a date as possible, and before we moved to a new building. He was also fully seized with the importance of getting S I S and ourselves into the same building. He had already mentioned this to Sir E.Bridges and Berkely Sq.House was under consideration. With regard to our reorganisation, however he still felt himself very much in the dark and he would welcome any suggestions that I might have to make. I undertook to prepare for him, in conjunctionwith Dick, some kind of chart affecting all Divisions. As far as amalgamation of B and F were concerned the matter was simple. All that was necessary was to call it Division B.1.

Vesey has discovered that KOUTZNICK was for a short period in B.24 but that we got rid of him in 1941. I do not think there is the least likelihood that he would have been working for the Germans then. Had he wished to do so he would probably have remained where he was. He subsequently worked for SIS but where he is now I do not know. We shall have to find out.

Ede came to see me about his proposed visit to the Caribbean. It has now been decided that OC is to go into liquidation. He is of course very disappointed and does not know what he is going to do. He clearly does not relish anappointment as ADA to look after the purely adminstrative side of OC neither wouldhe come into B.Division. I think he will probably resign. He does not propose to talk to Kirby Green about the abolition of OC because he thinks it might affect his morale. When he has finished his work in Jamaica he will spend a fortnight's holiday in USA. I said I thought I had better just mention this fact to Cimperman.

I talked to Harry about the Turkish cyphers. It seemed to me that the only possible course was to issue very definite instructions to our Ambassador in Ankara to the effect that if the Turkish issue blew up we proposed to conduct our negotiations with the Turks through him and not through the Turkish Ambassador in London and that as and when the occasion arose the Turkish Ambassador here and the Turkish Govt. should be so informed. The Turkish Govt. would also be told of the reasons and urged not to telegraph back to London resumes of the conversations in Ankara or to send indiscreet communications to their Ambassador in Moscow. We may also see whether it was possible to ensure that any communications between Ankara and London were sent by cable and not by wireless. I did not think it was possible to do more.

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May 24th

We have been asked by Garvey of the FO to give a security course to Howard Bridge who is going as F.O.Security Officer to Moscow. D.G.has agreed. It is the first sign of the FO seeking our assistance in security matters.

Bossard of S.S.U. has told TAR that Admiral Leahy would very much like to see the DG,myself and TAR. I have asked the DG about this and explained to him the kind of things that may be discussed. I thou that we should be careful about saying anything that might be quoted to Hoover and which he might think damaging to his interests. Leahy is here purely on an Intelligence mission.

May 25th

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May 27th

We had a meeting about F.Division at which it was agreed in principle that B and F should be amalgamated. It was felt however that such an amalgamation could take place more profitably when F.Division could be housed in the same building as B. I said that if the move was not going to take too long we could wait for it but that we did not want to wait longer than was absolutely necessary. Hollis felt that from his own point of view this wasextremely important. It was left for consideration whether F.3 should go into B.2 and whether B.1 should not also go into B.2. F.2 would then become B.1.

Malcolm Johnston came before the Appointment: Board as a possible candidate for the head of SIFE. He makes a good impression and his qualifications seem good. He has been confined during his 20 years service with DIB to work in Bengal on terrorist organisations and to work at DIB headquarters. He therefore has more of an intelligence outlook than a police outlook. He seems keen to do the job. We felt however that if it could be arranged he should be on loan from the Indian police for a year. This would ensure that he did not lose any compensation that might be coming to Indian police officers when the Indian Govt. took over. It would also give him an opportunity of getting to know us and

we should also have a chance of seeing how he got on in the F.E.

I had a longish talk with him afterwards about the SILVER case for the running of which he had been mainly responsible. Unfortunately all records have been burnt and he is really the only person who could write the case up from memory. I told him I thought it extremely important that he should do so since his experience of DA work was very different from our own and might in fact have more bearing on future tactics. The conditions in India were of course entirely different from those in this country and in many ways much more complex.

I spoke to the DG about a contingent of the Jewish Brigade which is coming over to take part in the Victory Parade. I told him I thought we ought to inform the WO of the exact position and point out to them tactfully that they had departed from the ruling in granting permission to these people to come. The ruling is that only British subjects can come here on leave and that Palestinians or other nationalities have to take their leave on the continent and cannot come here except on extreme compassionate grounds. There was just a possibility that the contingent might include a terrorist although this I thought seemed unlikely. We felt that for political reasons it would be difficult to cancel the Jewish Contingent.

I had a talk with MARTIN who we want for our representative in LSIC. He seems thoroughly qualified to take the job and is quite keen to take it on.

May 28th

Miss Wadeson came to talk to me about the Etappendienst. Unfortunately I had not yet read her memo. It appears quite definite that JAKOBS who obtained British naturalisation, was working for the Germans prior to the outbreak of war, but there is no reason to think that he has done anything since the war. His own spymaster AHLRICHS says that he never showed any signs of life after his return here or at any rate after Novvor Dec.1939. The Etappendienst was really set up on the assumption that we should not be taking part in the war. Hence Germans had been recruited rather than neutrals or British subjects.

At the DGs meeting today the question of vetting short-term service officers was raised Hollis thinks that if we vet people for regular commissions we should also vet those who are receiving short-term commissions up to 5 or 7 years. This seemed logical but the amount of work may be considerable. Before coming to a decision we are going to ascertain roughly what the figures are likely to be. We have also to vet some 9,000 Polish officers. I said I thought this could only be done by forming a small committee of Poles who are thought to be reliable since our records would not be likely to be of much help. These Poles are coming back from Italy. I raised the question of the abolition of the American visa. I took a very serious view of this because it seemed to me that it was the foundation stone of the whole of Passport Control's fabric. As they stood at present the proposals did not give us reciprocity. We should have to get visas, although free of charge, whereas the

Americans are not to be asked to get visas at all. I thought also that it would be difficult for us to resist other allies, particularly the Russians, if they asked for similar facilities. I suggested to the DG that we should write a strong letter to Maxwell and that I should also see Caccia. Adam was inclined to discredit this idea. I did not think it was any use writing to Carew-Robinson or Prestige on a matter of this importance and since the FO and in particular our Ambassador in Washington had raised the matter in the first instance, we should try and get them to change their views. It did not seem to me that the project had anything to recommend it. The DG agreed to the course I had suggested.

The DG raised the question of informants. He thought that he, Harwand Butler ought to know more about what we were paying for. I explained to him how informants were taken on by this office and that in so far as I was concerned this was never done without my sanction. If large sums were involved I invariably consulted Charles Butler. I could not however speak for M.S. While I agreed that it would certainly be a good thing to review the information received from time to time and assess whether the agent was worth keeping on, this was not altogether a simple matter. Sometimes we had to keep people on as an insurance and although the balancesheet at the moment might be poor we might get a dividend later on.

After the meeting the Dg talked to me privately about M.S. He had learned that Robertson was conducting an enquiry. I told him that I had had no responsibility for MS until a few weeks ago and that because I did not feel very happy about the position I had

asked Robertson to conduct this enquiry. I then explained to him about police informants and how it had been bow experience at S.Y. that much of the information they received went down the drain because they had not got sufficient information to lead the informant properly.

Dick to whom I talked after the meeting was a little in despair. He felt that the DG was thinking of the organisation too much on police lines. This I think is only natural and time will be needed for him to get into the picture and understand the somewhat different approach.

I saw Peter Hope and told him that I was afraid there was nothing that we could offer him. I thought he would be well advised to take the job which the FO were offering him in Paris. He gets the rank of First Secretary and the possibility of being taken on permanently and going over from the administrative to the political side.

TheDG, TAR and I were taken by Win Scott to see Admiral Leahy. He is an oldish man, nearer 70 than 60. I told him what I felt from our point of view to be the various alternatives in setting up an intelligence organisation. I explained that we had found our liaison with SSU and the FBI extremely profitable and that we very much hoped that it would continue in the future. He said that he would take note of this and impress these facts on the committee set up by the President. He was sure that we should keep as close together as possible and he was extremely grateful for all that British Intelligence had done for the Americans during the war. He said that the present

programme was to maintain G.2. and ONI as producers of information through their Service Attaches, and to build up a new Secret Intelligence Service using some of the remnants of SSU. The FBI would continue as at present to operate as an offensive organisation in S.America. It was however anticipated that when the new intelligence organisation was going it would take over in S.America from Hoover. Hoover would then be responsible for American territory but would continue to have his liaison officers abroad. The Director under the N.I.A. would be a collator of all information derived from Service Attaches, from the new Secret Intelligence organisation, from the State department where necessary from the FBI with whom the present director was already in the closest touch. Souers is I gather to go back to his peace-time work and will be succeeded by someone else.

May 29th

Vesey came to consult me about the case of JAKOBS. We have now reached the point where we should decide what action ought to be taken. I said that I would first like to see the file. It seemed to me to be just for consideration whether we might not profitably leave JAKOBS alone in the hope that at some future date he might become a focal point. The odds are however strongly against this since if the Abwehr were ever reconstituted it might well be thought inadvisable to take on any former agents in view of the thoroughness of our post-war enquiries. JAKOBS is a naturalised S.African and is at present in this country running a tobacco business.

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Dick and I and Harry discussed the question of representation in Iraq. The F.O. are proposing the withdrawal of SIME's officers. We think however that we might come to some arrangement with the Iraquis. Everybody had suffered considerably from our withdrawal from Persia and it might strengthen our hands considerably in Egypt if we could point to some arrangement with the Iraquis. The Egyptians may well want Jenkins and his ASOs withdrawn unless we can get some agreement embodied in the new treaty.

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May 30th

I saw Harold Caccia. I talked to him about the abolition of the American visa. He was quite sympathetic and said that he would do all he could to back-pedal the matter if I would let him have a copy of our letter to the F.O.

I also talked to him about the building of the Soviet Fleet being the basis of most of their political action during the past 8 months. He agreed with my thesis which admittedly seemed a fairly obvious one. He said that in fact it was being treated to some extent at any rate in a memo which was at present in course of prepapation.

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He then mentioned a case of leakage in the "Observer" about the disbandment of Anders's Army. This had appeared 48 hours before the official announcement. I told him that we were already investigating 3 cases of Cabinet leakage. He promised to let me have particulars of this latest one. He mentioned that when he had spoken about this at the JIC Harry Allen did not seem to know anything about it. I said that this was not the kind of thing that would normally come his way and that in fact there were many things discussed at the JIC which were more my concern than his. I explained that he was generally very good about taking me along whenever there were items on the agenda of interest to my division. The difficulty was that discussions often became general. Caccia said that they wanted more and more to make the Wednesday meeting a general discussion when any of those present could raise points

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off the agenda. He thought it would be extremely helpful if I could find time to attend the meetings regularly. I said that if I could arrange it internally I should be only too glad to do so.

I attended a meeting on D.Division which did not seem to get us much further.

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I raised the question of ALOs doing D.Branch work but Harry was evidently against it although he thought that occasionally they might be used as indeed they were now. It seemed to me that he had rather saddled himself with Brock and Bennett, at any rate for a year or so until they reached the age limit. This is indeed a gloomy prospect. We did not get on to the question of the Secretariat.

May 31st

I talked to Thistlethwaite about my views on the Soviet Fleet. He is collecting a certain number of additional points.

Tommy came in to see me about an incident which had occurred at the Spanish consulate when he recently applied for a visa for him-

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self and his wife to take a holiday in Spain. The consul Moral said in conversation that he could certainly grant a visa on his own responsibility, that he had done so frequentl in the past and only in one case had he got into trouble. He then said "You remember, that man who went to Venezuela and has been trying to sell El Greco and Velasquez portraits". He was of course referring to Garbo. Tommy says that if they trace these portraits they are bound to connect him with Garbo since the portraits are all well known to be in his possession. Presumably some enquiry has been made about the loss of Garbo's passport, here and again in Venezuela. We decided that it was better not to say anything and that if Tommy were challenged in Spain he would simply say that he had been given an introduction to a Spaniard in London to whom he had given photographs of certain of his pictures with a view to their possible sale in S.America. He had not however since heard of this individual.

James Robertson talked to me about a proposal by the DG to get C.C.s up here in order to discuss the Palestine situation, and to seek their co-operation in the tracing of any terrorists who may arrive in this country. He thinks it desirable that they should have the necessary background. He also thinks that they might assist at the ports. We both later saw the DG to whom I pointed out that it might be wise to have a talk with Burt first, since we did not wish to cross S.B.slines, who already had officers in the principal ports. I gather from the DG that

local C.C.s do not very much welcome the presence of SB officers in their ports and they thought they ought to do the work themselves. This does of course mean a considerable spreading of knowledge. If we are really going to get a definite advantage from it I should be all in favour of it. I am doubtful however as to the extent to which the police can be of use to us in a case of this kind. However I do not wish to discourage the idea of getting the C.C.s here. It will certainly be valuable to hear what their views are about a liaison with this dept. and how it can be improved.

I am going up with the DG on June 17th to meet other C.C.s in Edinburgh.

June 3rd

I spoke to the DG and showed him a draft letter to Maxwell about the American visa, which he agreed to sign.

Dick talked to me about Kirby-Green. We agreed that Ede should make his position quite clear. He should tell him that while he would be required to remain in the Caribbean probably for another year or so, he might possible be wanted at some other station abroad later, or alternatively have to go back to a section job. If he was prepared to face this we should be delighted to keep him on

On the other hand if he stayed with us for some time he might if he wanted to become a C.C. since his qualifications would obviously be extremely good.

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I saw Maxwell today and discussed with him the American visa. He was quite sympathetic and said that he would take an opportunity of speaking to the Home Secretary. The trouble was that he thought that Bevin had a big idea about freedom of travel between allied nations.

I then talked to him about the case of Mel CANG, the Polish journalist who represents the Times, Observer and Manchester Guardian in Poland. Later I also talked to Hutson who is now in Markbreiter's job. Maxwell said he thought it was a little absurd that we should be making CANG into an Englishman in order that he could ostensibly more easily perform a job for which he was peculiarly fitted by reason of his Polish origin. I pointed out to him the inconsistencies in the case. One thing to me seemed fairly certain, namely that CANG wanted British naturalisation for a different reason from the one stated. He was seeking the protection of the British Govt. against the Polish Govt. but according to Cavendish

Bentinck and British journalists in Warsaw he gets more facilities than anybody else out of the Polish Govt. and appears to be thoroughly persona grata. I then talked about the naturalisation of certain Germans whom Stephens wants to employ in CSDIC. Maxwell thought that the cases would receive sympathetic consideration.

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Burt came today to see the DG who wants the CCs to be better informed about Palestine affairs, particularly those who have ports in their areas. I had suggested to the DG that he should first discuss the matter with Burt as S.B. had officers in the ports. I told Burt that the DG was to some extent of the opinion that C.C.s should manage their own ports. Burt is hotly opposed to this and I am bound to say I agree generally with his view that matters of this kind should be centralised in a police force which has much more experience of political affairs. It transpired at our interview with the DG that all ports will be covered by S.B. except Glasgow, Liverpool and Bristol. We shall therefore confine ourselves to the C.C.s of those areas. I gather from Burt that Tarry of Southampton rather resents the presence of S.B. in his area. Burt says that Tarry is an extremely ambitious man.

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The J.I.C. paper dated 22nd May on Russian troop movements in S.E.Europe and Persia makes what I think is the first reference to Soviet naval policy and the basis of diplomatic action in the Mediterranean. It is referred to as a feature of the Paris Peace Conference. It states "The position originally taken up over Libya and Venezia Giulia, especially Trieste, and the bargaining over the disposal of the Italian Fleet, fall into place as part of a long-term scheme for establishing Russia as a maritime power in the Mediterranean with footholds if possible at Trieste, in the eastern Adriatic, in the Dodecanese, on the Straits and even in North Africa".

In this connection it is interesting to note that evidence from neighbouring countries suggests the possibility that Russia is becoming interested in the Albanian coast line and that in particular have been noticed in Vallona Bay. Suspicion is strengthened now that Albania, a country with no naval tradition whatsoever, has been asking the Powers for a share of the Italian Fleet "to protect her coastline". It is noteworthy that 4" coastal batteries at Saranda near the Greek frontier fired on two British warships passing the port on the 15th May. Vallona Bay and the Albanian coast would be an important link in such a strategic chain as that outlined above.

June 4th

Perfect came in to see me. He is back from Malta on a visit. He said that he felt rather isolated and devoid of information as to what the office were doing. He thought that it would be an advantage if he could

be kept more informed about general trends. I said that I felt that his needs would be provided for when B.3 became a going concern. It would then be the duty of the head of the B.3 section concerned to visit him and to see that he was well briefed in all that concerned him. I gave him as much general information as I could.

David Scherr came to talk to me about the DAMATO brothers. It seemed that Sir Hector McNeill and Lord Sempill were seeing Creech Jones at the Colonial Office with regard to the Damato's return to Gib. I told Scherr to try and find out through a suitable contact in the C.O. whether any such approach had been made. The DAMATO brothers are bringing an action of libel against one of our consuls in Spain. We know that the evidence they are putting forward has been forged and if proceedings go on they will probably be charged with forgery. It is therefore desirable the case should continue.

I went to see Burt and showed him certain information obtained by [redacted] indicating the possibility that certain members of the Revisionist Zionist Youth organisation were in possession of dynamite and a German pistol with 50 rounds of ammunition. The information was extremely vague and disjointed. We discussed with Chief Inspector Jones of S.B. whether any action was possible. We came to the conclusion that nothing could usefully be done. S.B. could not swatch the parties concerned as they have not sufficient staff. I arranged with Burt that if he felt that it was absolutely vital for C.I.Jones to know the source of this information I would consider it if he would let me know. I explained

that I was not anxious to spread this source beyond himself as if it once got round we should certainly be in serious trouble. Burt agreed and said that he did not think that it was necessary to acquaint C.I.Jones.

Burt told me that he had a satisfactory conversation with the DG who had asked him whether he did not think that local police could on occasions assist the S.B.officer at ports. Burt replied that he thought that it would be inadvisable and probably cause friction. Burt had also made it clear that there was quite a lot of confidential information which he did not think the police ought to have. He cited the case of sabotage we had during the war in Suffolk where he personally had advised against anybody being informed except the C.C.himself.

Dick,Bertram,Clayton,Courtenay,James Robertson and I had a discussion on the liquidation of C.C. A redraft of Horrocks's instructions is to be made. We are concentrating on ensuring that information from all parts of the office should go through B.3. sections concerned. We thought that officers in other divisions could sign their own letters after they had been approved and initialled on the carbon by the B.3.section. They should however write on a B.3 number which would ensure that the letter came back to B.3. Only letters to L.A.and W.E. should go direct. As regards telegrams, the action copy should go to the B.3section concerned but there will be a wider distribution to other interested sections which would take place simultaneously.

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Cussen saw [redacted] in Paris. He came to the conclusion that although his intentions were generally good he was not a very stable person. His story had obviously got twisted a bit by Marshall in transmission. It now seems clear that [redacted] only intended to say that RICHARDS called once at the Embassy although he did ring up on another occasion. There is no reason to suppose that any other documents passed or indeed that the French took any interest in the particular ones that were submitted to them. [redacted] story now substantially coincides with that of RICHARDS. We have therefore decided to tell RICHARDS to clear out and to inform [redacted] that we have done so in case he is questioned by the French Air Ministry. We have taken into account the possibility that RICHARDS may report the incident to the French Govt. on his return.

June 5th

I saw Marshall and told him that SIS had no special job for him at the moment as he was rather above the age that they were recruitin If however he took the Passport Control job in Paris and a vacancy occurred there would be no difficulty in his getting a transfer. Marshall has decided therefore to take the Paris job.

Dickson brought me particulars of documents which had been handed to him [redacted]

atomic research. These documents had been sent to the Spanish Consul in London by a man called C.W.MARSHALL. The Spanish have evidently considered them and the consul had been instructed by the Embassy to return them in a registered envelope stating that they

did not come within the sphere of the consulate's duties, I arranged with Allan that a check should be put on MARSHALL and that the documents should be photographed in the post, in case they might be required as evidence. It looks as if MARSHALL was not a serious customer and had merely tried either to embroil the Spanish consulate or to get money for worthless information. He may even be a lunatic.

I had a long talk with Dick and Alley about Poles. Alley has a liaison with Klocek of Polish security on purely security matters.

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We then discussed the return of Anders's Army. We thought that as soon as we got the figures we should probably call an interdepartmental conference and try to get a clear picture of the machinery required, to deal with the rehabilitation of Anders's forces. In the first instance they are to be divided into 4 divisions, one for each British command. Some 9,000 officers who are going to be vetted will receive British commissions. Ultimately however we understand that the whole of the Polish Army will be demobilised and settled into civil employment.

Miss McNab came to tell me that MARSCHNER the spy in Ireland has expressed a wish to return to Germany and that the Irish Govt. are prepared to let him go without reservations as to treatment when he reaches Germany I said that we should be in agreement.

The DG, TAR, M.E. and I saw Travis. We put before him our requirements from LSIC. He seemed generally in agreement and asked us to specify one or two things in a more detailed way and let him have it in writing. We may then have a further meeting. He is quite agreeable to Martin being our representative, instead of Howard. He was also agreeable to arrangements being made by which any of our specialists could go down and make contact with the appropriate sections in LSIC.

We also discussed Kirby-Green's case. We are writing to him putting his chances in the Security Service quite plainly. Charles is in favour of his leaving the police and taking his contributions. It seems that he would not really lose anything since if he has a 20 years period with us he is likely to get as big or bigger pension than he would if he stayed on in the police until he reached the rank of Superintendent.

I spoke to the DG about Dickson's work. He said he had been wondering what value there was in the type of woman whom we had supplied him with as a domestic servant and who had previously worked for us. He thought that she was somewhat neurotic and that her judgment would not be worth much

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Isham talked to me about Mrs.Ingram Fraser, of whom he had formed a good impression. He thought she might be extremely useful in supplying information about the Bergson Group. Both he and James Robertson are quite certain that the person who was meant to make contact with her was SMERTENKO. The latter has been away and this may account for no approach having been made. We decided to leave matters for the present and if nothing happens Mrs.Ingram Frazer migh ask New York for an introduction.

June 6th

Cimperman brought Rousseau,formerly FBI in Paris, to see me. He will be coming here while Cimperman is on leave. I asked Cimperman to tell Ladd that we should be interested in any further information he might get

about the Bergson Group. I also mentioned the fact that the American visa question had been raised again. I very much hoped that the FBI would dig their toes in. Lastly I told Cimperman to tell Ladd that I hoped before very long to let him have the Garbo story for his own private information. It was not at the moment quite complete. Cimperman told me that he had had a request from the Bureau for some report that was written on Communism in India. I gather that the State Dept. were interested. I imagine this must be the report which the late D.G. wrote when he was head of DIB in which case it is at least 10 years old. I told Cimperman he had better discuss this with Hollis. I rather doubted the value of such a report which under present-day conditions might be somewhat misleading. Cimperman spoke about requests which were reaching him from G.2 for certain information. It had apparently been agreed that a separate channel from G.2 to ourselves might not be altogether desirable. He wanted to know whether this arrangement was satisfactory. I said that I could see no real objection provided we did not get the lines crossed. It was a little difficult to say owing to the present ill-defined sphe(spheres of American Intelligence. I thought he might also usefully discuss this matter with Hollis.

Hill talked to me about various undesirable aliens that he had come across in connection with his Black Market enquiries. He said that the policy of the H.O. was only to get rid of those against whom there had been a conviction, or where an alien had been interned for Black Market offences. Where the alien was concerned in dubious financial

transactions and had not been convicted they were extremely reluctant to take action unless information was of a very recent date. All our information has already been passed to the H.O. and to the police. It seemed therefore that there was very little that we could do beyond suggesting to the police that they might try and stiffen the H.O. attitude. I do not see that we can intervene with the H.O. in purely criminal cases. I said that I would have a word with Burt.

Vesey tells me that a Swiss citizen in this country called Werner STREBEL was given an assignment by the Abwehr and after the outbreak of war made one trip to Switzerland. He had secret inks and was told to report mainly on aircraft matters. His masters took a very poor view of him and dropped him altogether early in 1940. I said that we would consider his case in conjunction with that of JAKOBS.

During the course of their enquiries in Bucharest i to the security of telephones, GPO have discovered that for the last 5 years all military telephones have been activated by some small condenser which formed part of the equipment and enabled the telephone tobe used either in the normal manner or as a buzzer circuit. Half a dozen new telephones were selected from Ordnance in order finally to test this out. They all reacted, and it is now clear that anyone who tapped in on any of those circuits could have got the whole of any conversation within 15 ft. of the receiver at the rest position. A number of F.O. installations are using this equipment on the continent.

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June 11th

At the DGsmeeting today the DG said that he was holding a meeting of CCs from England at 2.30 tomorrow for the purpose of finding out their requirements with regard to liaison. The DG thought that James Robertson might give them a short talk on the various organisations operating in Palestine. Hollis said that he was finding considerable difficulty in co-ordinating the report on Communist activities throughout the world which was required by the JIC. He did not know who according to the present charter was really responsible. SIS had written a certain amount but Hollis thought that much of it was rather off centre and that many of the old fallacies about the Soviet Govt. and the Comintern were creeping back. Jane Archer had rather let herself go on her old theories and had not included in her note any reference to the very important conference of C.P.s which had taken place in Prague. This conference was really a reconstitution of the Comintern Conference except that those present were confined to representatives of countries within the Soviet sphere of influence. Jane said that she had not seen this report. I said that in my view we were, in accordance with the charter, really responsible for the overall preparation of the report. Hollis said that SIS seemed to take a different view. The net result was likely to be a bad report.

I talked to Dick about D.Division and the Secretariat. I asked him to try and get out a chart of the reorganisation of the whole office. Only in this way I think shall we be able to get anything done. I think Curry's 5 original basic principles are

sound but it must be made clear that A,C and D Divisions will have of necessity to take their cues from B.Division.

June 12th

I took Harry the report on army telephones which we received from the Post Office. He is going to put the matter to the JIC.

I talked to Dick about Curry's position and the Secret Unit and we decided to raise the matter at the next staff meeting.

[redacted], we learn of a peculiar financial transactions to trasfer money from Paris to Cairo. The connections indicated that this had something to do with the Mufti. Thistle immediately got into touch withthe F.O. who had had a report through a Ministry of War Transport representative in Marseilles about a passage booked for a Mme SHAWI, and since SHAWI was connected with the financial transactions, the two things clearly linked up. It looks very much as if the Mufti were on board a [redacted] British vessel bound for Alexandria. Mme. SHAWI was particularly anxious not to go on a ship that called at Malta. We are cabling Mid East and the Navy have been mobilised to intercept the ship outside territorial waters.

We had a meeting of Chief Constables from various parts of England. They were asked to give their views about future liaison with ourselves. Comments were somewhat varied but there was almost a unanimous feeling that ALOs should continue and should where possible attend district detective

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conferences. There seemed to be a general appreciation of what had been done by the Security Service for C.C.s during the war. The only real criticism seemed to be that in writing we might at times give more details. I said that this was a perfectly legitimate criticism and that we would endeavour to meet C.C.s requirements as far as possible. I did say however that there were certain types of information which did not come from our own sources and these sources we were under a strict ban not to disclose and if we did at times appear rather cagey this might well be the explanation. One C.C., Williamson, referred to rumours that we had agents in different parts of the country. It was made quite clear that we had no such agents except where C.C.s were informed. This had always been our practice and so far as I knew it had never been departed from. The DG suggested that if C.C.s thought it desirable further conferences could be held. Hordern was very strongly opposed to any form of integration between ourselves and the police. He thought it would be dangerous for both parties. This remark came after a suggestion by Col. Young that we might have a small body of police officers here who would be responsible at this end for conducting liaison in cases which concerned the police. He thought they would know better what the police required. I am glad to say that this was vetoed. It was agreed that where possible we would send down experts as we did during the war to lecture to police conferences on particular subjects.

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June 13th

I saw Bridge, the future F.O. Security Officer in Moscow. He was 5 years at Vine Street, joined the Air Force during the war when he was employed as a rear gunner and has recently gone back to S.B. He is not a very impressive character. I had previously spoken to Burt about him who did not feel that he was really the man for the job. However as he has now resigned from the police and been definitely taken on by the F.O. we shall probably have to make the best of him.

Dick, Cumming and I had a talk about security within the office. We all felt that as soon as we got into the new building it would be necessary to tighten up our own security in a number of respects. I drew attention particularly to the matter of keys. Cumming's solution is that we should have 3 or 4 resident officers in the building one of whom would be responsible for all security out of office hours. All other Govt. departments have a resident officer and I am quite sure that we should have no defense whatever if it were known that the whole of our security depended on the integrity of the night watchman.

I saw Cooper with Dick. I took quite a favourable view of him although he has not done what we call case work in any of his varied jobs. I think he should be seen by the Appointments Board provided Margaret Sample, who worked with him in Italy, has a good opinion of him.

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Dick, F-J, Hill, Harry and myself discussed a request from the School of Military Intelligence for information as to thetype of course that we required for port security and militar permit officers etc. The answer is of course that nobody in the S.M.I. knows anything about these subjects and in fact that we a: are the only people to give such a course. We also discussed what type of course or instruction to Army personnel we ought to give in I.B.Civil Security duties. While we felt that there were certain principles which could be enunciated it would be difficul to give much instruction until we knew what was exactly the situation which we had to meet. In the case of the Second Front ops. it was an easy matter but against a hypothetical enemy it was not so easy. This led us to consider the point as to when intensive instruction should begin. Prior to this war Munich was certainly the moment. It should we felt be somebody's business to give the word "go".

June 14th

I talked to TAR and Dick about the securi of BJs and SMs and We all agreed that we should maintain our present standards and not adopt the modifications suggested by Horrocks, that the scrambled versions of B.J.s and the full versions of SMs should go into open files. We are quite definite however that all 3 categories should ultimately be seen by all those concerned. We do not wish to begin this until the temporary staff have left. I mentioned the fact that I was anxious that all sections should think very carefully

before putting away any of these papers whether they had done everything that it was possible to do. It seemed to me that any rate many of the new people and indeed some of the old did not take all the opportunities that presented themselves. I had in mind a paper which indicated that an Austrian girl was well informed both about the Jewish movement and about Austrian com unists. It seemed to me that some approach through U.35 was indicated in a case of this kind. I am afraid that if we do not watch these things very carefully and read quite a number of documents ourselves, we shall find many oppotunies passing be passing us by.

I saw Peter Irwin of the Ceylon Police, who is anxious to come to us when the colony goes over to dominion status. I liked the look of him and I thought he might ultimately be useful to SIFE. I have told him to communicate with us as soon as he is free, which will not be before May of next year.

The Mufti episode has I am afraid turned out to be something of a flop. Mme SAWA has been identified as Mme SHAWA but certain doubtful people got on board at Toulon and a very thorough search of the ship has been made. There is little doubt I think that Mme SHAWA is connected in some way with the Mufti's escape and although her suspicions have been aroused she may be worth watching.

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We considered a number of cases at the Appointments Board but had no interviews. I mentioned the question of the Secretariat and D.Division. No progress appears to hve been made with D.Division. Harry is insistent on having D.1 as the munitions securit, brannh and then a liaison section with the W.O. I said that I thought the JIC & Chiefs of Staff papers all ought to go to the Secretariat, that D.1,2 and 3 should maintain liaison with the Service Depts. on matte affecting security of factories and occasionally on other matters of security. They shoul also make use of ALOs for a considerable amount of their factory work.

Ned Reid has sent me a printed documents from RENNIE ASSOCIATES of Box 1708 Washington D.C. wichstates that this organis tion wnts details of industrial and economic analyses and proposes if it can raise the funds to reconstitute the remanants of OSS as a kind of industrial espionage organisation working presumably for big business. "ouldbe subscribers are asked not onlyto say what places and what countries interest them in S.America but whether they desire a similar service for Europe or the British Commonwealth, Russia or Asia.

June 15th

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June 17th

We had a meeting about Fripp who has complained to the G.G. about his treatment on return here. He was in fact seenby Dick and also by Charles and told that his services would not be required after September. There was never any question of his staying on with us indefinitely and we want to get our organisation in the Far East on to its permanent peace-time footing, as soon as possible. Fripp I think rather wants to hand on in the capacity of D.S.O. and meanwhile to build up his business again. This would clearly be undesirable apart from the fact that he is not very popular in the colony.

I had a meeting with Dick, TAR, Curry, Vesey and Miss Wadeson on the Etappendienst and about the cases of JAKOBS and STREBEL. With regard to the Etappendienst we have decided that we should get the report as complete as possible in conjunction with S.I.S. and that we should continue enquiries to ensure that any Etappendienst agents here have been finally rooted out. We should then give the report a fairly wide circulation. It would seem clear that we should not be called upon to put in force any very elaborate machinery to deal with Etappendienst activities until the Germans get somemeasure of freedom in their own country, begin to travel and establish business with this country and with colonial and dominion territory.

As regards the two cases, we decided that we should liquidate them both and that the best method for doing this should be discussed with Cussen. I subsequently had a discussion

with Cussen Miss Wadeson and Vesey. We came to the conclusion that the first step should be for Cussen to see both these individuals and get them in the right frame of mind. They should then be called upon to do their prep, when they would be further interrogated. We would then consider ways and means of getting rid of them after their clearance from the DPP. We did not think a prosecution in either case would be profitable or desirable.

James Robertson brought me an Istria document indicating that the Agency had got hold of a document showing exactly what our plans are with regard to the liquidation of the Hagana if this is finally decided. Meanwhile a series of outrages and kidnappings are going on in Palestine with the threat to execute those kidnapped if two Jews now under sense of death for murder are not reprieved.

June 18th

I went to Edinburgh with the DG and attended a meeting called by Morun, the C.C. of Edinburgh at which various other C.C.s were present. C.C. Glasgow did not come but sent his superintendent and another officer. The meeting were asked to express their views as to whether they were satisfied with the existing liaison and whether they thought there was any way in which it could be improved. I sensed a slight undercurrent particularly in Supt. Glasgow, that it was the police who really had to do M.I.5's work and that they were generally speaking kept rather in the dark. I tried to dispel this idea as much as possible by giving them a frank picture of the situation immediately prior to the outbreak of war and up till the end of 1941. I explained how

through no fault of our own we were understaffed, had no money or accommodation, with the result that we had no trained officers for expansion. This was all unavoidable and I was anxious therefore that they should frame their recommendations for the future not on the impressions that they had got of us immediately prior to the war or immediately after the outbreak but rather on the subsequent years and the present situation. They were quite unanimous about wanting an A.L.O. and on the question of his residing in the area. They also seemed to think this officer should more profitably be a police officer who was persona grata with all the various forces in Scotland. I explained to them that it was in no sense our intention to do their work for them or indeed to do more than give them a clear indication of our requirements and the delicacy of our sources. In this connection I said that I quite understood their wish for the fullest possible particulars and as much background as we could give them. At times we might have failed in this respect but it was not necessarily due to a reluctance on our part to give them the information they required. We had a variety of sources of information some of which were not our own. We were under the strictest ban not to impart such information to any outside body and indeed to only a few selected officers in our own dept. On other occasions our enquiry might well be a fishing one and that we knew no more about the individual or subject than was contained in our letter. Another slight complaint was that C.C.s never heard what happened as a result of information which they submitted. I explained to them that very often it took a long time to develop the information and that sometimes it led to nothing. There was perhaps a reluctance to

reply until we had explored every avenue and that this might lead to the matter being overlooked. I thought that in such cases where they felt that they were entitled to some answer, they should get hold of the ALO and ask him to produce it.

The next question for decision was the location of the ALO. They all seemed to want to have him in the area and an offer was made by C.C. Edinburgh to house him and look after his records, which of course would be kept in his own safe and apart from police records. The question of records arose because C.C.s seemed to think that when they wrote to London they had to send a copy to the ALO. I explained to the DG that this meant having an office and a secretary and that we had considered this idea and abandoned it on the grounds of economy. If however the ALO had a room in the police office it might not perhaps be necessary for him to have a secretary.

General appreciation was expressed regarding the lectures that have been given and a hope that these will continue. It was also suggested that selected CC.s might perhaps come down once every 6 months for a conference. As regards the appointment of a police officer, I pointed out that in my view what the police wanted more than anything was somebody who knew the machinery of MI5 and could get them the answers they require particularly when a letter was not as complete as they would like it to be. They seemed to think that while the more important C.C.s would know how to handle the enquiries, if given sufficient information, some of the less important boroughs might be rather at sea and there would therefore be an advantage in

having a police officer as an ALO who could direct the course of such enquiry in MI5's interests. Lastly I discussed privately with C.C. Edinburgh the question of records. I pointed out to him that in some cases there was a certain reluctance to put more than a limited amount of information on paper because we realised that the letters we wrote must go into the police registry and therefore be available to most if not all members of the police force. There was a certain danger here with which I personally had had to contend at Scotland Yard. I explained how we had at one time been forced to keep our records in S.B. and that when we found that two police officers were handing the information out to the S.P. Sir John Anderson had given orders for us to keep a registry of our own. I was not accusing any particular police force but with an organisation so large there was bound to be a risk. Our letters therefore were not always as informative as they might be but I thought the gap here could be filled in their personal contact with the ALO who could supply additional details verbally.

Generally speaking I think there was plenty of goodwill and anxiety to co-operate to the full although it is necessary to get clear in the minds of the police that MI5 work is not police work, and that the police can never be more than an agency for certain types of enquiry. This is a difficult point to put over without giving offence and without damping the enthusiasm of the police in conducting any enquiries which we may want them to make.

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June 19th

We have received a shock this morning. [redacted] who is concerned with [redacted], has been missing since 1 o'clock yesterday. It rather looks as if he had been kidnapped. It is not certain whether it is a chance kidnapping or whether they knew that he was employed on specially secret work. James Robertson is a little worried in case Alec Kellar should get picked up in the same way as Chadwick. We want Alec back and are asking him to give us an approximate date.

Hollis tells me that the FO have asked us to let them know about the connections of a member of the Roumanian Legation here with Soviet representatives. This means that somebody will have to put a telephone check on the Roumanian Legation. We decided that we should give Henniker-Heaton the opportunity of handling the matter. If he cannot do so we shall have to take it on. We are trying to get Mrs. Caird, the wife of a British officer in CICI who is Russian by origin. She has been in this country since early 1920's and is now about 46. The Russians did make a pass at her in Persia and much to her amusement presented her with expensive fur. We have taken every possible opinion about her and are inclined to think that she is 100% reliable. Joe Spencer, Thistle and James Robertson all vouch for her. She knows Roumanian, Russian and a number of other Slav languages.

I saw Harker and told him about the visit to Edinburgh.

I had lunch with Norman Archer. He said that Freddie Boland had spoken to him about the I.R.A. who now appear to be considerably in funds. Boland is inclined to think that this money may be coming originally from Russian sources via Michael QUILL and Gerald O'REILLY of some American Transport Union which is affiliated to the C.I.O. He is going to tell Boland that he has reported this matter to us and that we shall be taking it up with Dan. We might consider later writing to the F.B.I.

He also spoke to me about the question of supplying Dan with a black list of aliens and also possibly of British subjects. This whole question is of course very difficult and delicate. We shall have to consider it and then get Dan over for a discussion.

Sclater came to thank me for intervening on his behalf in the matter of his gratuity. He is I gather being given the extra £50.

June 20th

I saw Curry this morning and discussed with him the Secretariat. I said that I did not know how it was goingto work out. Would he therefore care as an alternative to take the job of B.1 which would mean dealing with the Control Commission in Germany in so far as both German and Russian matters were concerned and any questions like the Stappendienst. I think he felt that this was slightly insulting but he did not say so. After thinking it over he came back and told me that he would prefer to do the Secretariat job.

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Andreas Mayor came in and brought the John DEVOY decodes which he had done while taking a holiday at Achille Island. The cypher messages had been left by a relative of John DEVOY to the Eire Govt. on the strict understanding that they would not be publicised. The Doc was delighted to get them decoded. They are not in the papers of ADMIRAL Sir Reginald Hall which have now been handed over to us by the Admiralty for safe keeping.

James Robertson came in to tell me that Chadwick had managed to escape. This is the only bright piece of news that has come out of Palestine for some time. Alec Kellar is due back on the 24th.

C. talked to me about Passy who is still under detention. He had apparently spent about 10 million francs on buying up some paper for purposes of anti-communist propaganda and promised the paper another 5 million.

Gen. Ismay has now arranged for Wingate to carry on as controller of deception in the Cabinet Offices until the end of this year. After that a regular officer is to be seconded from the services. He will hold in the first place a G 2 job as secretary and after 18 months would be promoted to take on the G.1 job running the organisation. After that he would presumably return to duty. Ismay has no objection to our getting Chas. Cholmondly as a permanent G.2 provided MI5/6 pay for him.

June 21st

I had a long talk with Irvin and explained to him the set-up of the office. He is taking various lectures under TARs direction.

Peter Hope came in to say goodbye. He says that nobody has told him what he is going to do or whether he will be responsible for security. As far as he knows there is no security officer in the Embassy and he does not think the arrangements are particularly water-tight. He has a possibility of going over to the political side at a later date with the rank of Counsellor.

We saw a number of candidates at the Appointments Board today but did not feel very positive about any of them. I raised the question of Bancroft. It was agreed that we should approach the GPO to second him on his GPO salary. Horrocks thought however that it might lead to difficulties if we supplemented his normal pay.

I gave Horrocks a copy of a note on the Secretariat and said I hoped this matter could be seriously discussed.

June 22nd

I saw the DG and told him about CHADWICK.

I also gave him my impressions of the C.C.s conference in Edinburgh. I said that although I did not think it applied to all, I sensed an underlying feeling that MI5's work was police work which in the main had to be carried out by the police forces in this country who were inclined slightly to resent receiving

directions in this matter from people they would regard as amateurs. I said this was of course very far from the case, that MI5 work difered entirely from the work of the police, who were merely operating at the periphery on certain aspects of the department's work. The dept.had many other sources of information which were of necessity highly centralised. I emphasised how little in fact even during war time SCOs could provide by being told in detail about the German organisation and its methods The best example was the dot. We had debated a good deal as to whether we should inform them and had ultimately decided n not to do so because we realised that there was neither the time nor the opportunity to conduct a detailed search of people on arrival and that their chances of finding a dot which might be concealed anywhere were so remote as to be negligible.

I gathered from the DG that my visit had made a good impression on the CCs and that they all very much appreciated the talk I had given them The DG then told me that he had considere the question of the ALO having an office in police headquarters at Edinburgh or Glasgow, and that he was somewh t doubtful about the desirability of this,sinc he realised that the presence of that fficer would become known and that a disgruntled policeman might quite easily blow to the press. This might lead to complications. He had therefore approached the local representative in the Scottish Office at St.Andrews House,Edinburgh. who had volunteered to give our officer similar facilities. This seemed a far bet er arrange-ment. I emphasised again to the DG the point I had made to C.C.Edinburgh about records. I said that I was sorry I had not raised it at the general meeting since it was a point of considerable importance. There was and always

would be a reluctance on our part to put more on paper than was absolutely necessary on account of the fact that our letters would go into police files which were available to the whole force. I had experience this difficulty at Scotland Yard which had in one instance at any rate led to disastrous results. The LG said he thoroughly appreciated this point which he considered of great importance. I said that I hoped that I had not given offence in raising this but it was a matter I had often discussed with Burt who was well aware of its potential dangers. The difficulty was inherent in the whole police system. We had no further discussion about the desirability of appointing a police officer as ALO Scotland since there would in any case be much ground to clear before such an appointment would be possible.

James Robertson and Thistle came to see me about a request from the DMI that we should send a representative to a sub-committee of the Anglo-American Commission which is going into the feasibility of carrying out the main Commission's report on Palestine. The particular discussion is concerned with the screening of D.P.s from Europe, who would go back as part of the 100,000. We agreed that we should first of all ask what the standards of vetting were to be. If for example we discovered a member of the Irgun, would that be considered grounds for a refusal. My point was that it was no use vetting people if no action was going to be taken. We should also point out that as the action was ostensibly proposed on humanitarian grounds, it would suit our book and facilitate vetting if a high percentage of aged and infirm accompanied each party. Thirdly we should state that neither our records nor Mid East records were likely to

be particularly productive although it was possible that we might pick up a suspect. It was arranged that Stewart should attend the meeting with Mars.

I had a talk with Harrison and explained to him the general structure and purpose of the office He seemed intelligent.

June 24th

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I had a talk with [redacted] whom we are going to consider for a job in this office. Dick had I think thought that [redacted] who was to be demobilised in February next, might be a possible candidate for Gib. I doubt however whether this will suit [redacted] His wife died recently and he is left with a small girl aged 8, who is in the charge of his mother-in-law. He thinks that he ought to see as much of her as possible and that a matter of a couple of weeks every six months would not really be enough. This I am afraid will be a bar to his employment in Gib.

I had a talk with Dick and Kellar about the future of SIME. Their impression is that SIME at the moment is weak as an organisation and that there are many things which need doing which will not be competently carried out by the existing staff. Dick's view is that Alec should take over when Douglas Roberts goes, and that he should probably take out with him two other officers who have been working in B.3a. We would then staff up the London end again. We envisage Kellar being there for perhaps a year. I said I thought possibly John Mair might take over the London end if we got him. Douglas Roberts has been behaving rather badly, probably because his pride has been somewhat wounded by not being offered the permanent job in MI5.

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June 25th

Hollis talked to me about language personnel as he had been unable to get the services of Mrs. Caird. I suggested that we might try and get somebody who was formerly employed in Pilkington's section of Censorship. I according-

ly rang up David Boyle who said that he knew of people and in fact was employing them on an ad hoc basis. He said that if I would write to him he would give me the names of people he thought suitable.

Adam, Dick, Alley, P-J and I had a talk about arrangements to vet the personnel of Anders's Army. It seemed to me that many questions would arise which would probably have to come before Creedy's Committee. At the moment we were very much in the dark. I subsequently rang up Drew who thought that a little later there would be questions for Creedy's Committee. He suggested however that meanwhile I should get into touch with Brig. W. Davey, Polish Liaison Section, Abbey 1272, who knew all the details of the arrival and destination of units of Anders's Army. Other questions he thought at the moment were largely on the plate of the A.O.

I saw _____, who has just arrived back in this country, and who we propose to take on on a temporary basis since he is a regular Army officer. He gave me an account of his escape. He was walking down one of the main streets in Jerusalem when he passed a taxi drawn up at the side. There were two men standing outside and talking with a man and woman inside. As he approached the men drew their guns and bundled him into the taxi. The woman then took out a chloroform pad and stuck it over his face. When he recovered consciousness he was in a bakery, tied to a plank in a lying position. He was told he was among 26 other high-ranking officers who had been taken and would be executed if the two Irgun men under sentence of death were shot or hanged. His guards were masks and later on an officer came to interview him. For this purpose his eyes were blindfolded. The officer told him

more or less what the guards had told him and then chatted quite amiably. He was given food and allowed to sit on a low couch provided either his arms or his feet were tied. Later he was allowed to exercise and for this purpose got rid of his bonds. He then flopped down on the bed and pretended to go to sleep. One guard remained inside the room and another was close at hand outside. While lying on his bed he noticed a piece of sacking over the roof, and also a ledge in the wall, which would enable him to reach a beam. Noticing that his guard was apparently asleep (he could not see his eyes owing to the mask but he saw his head nodding), he got up on his bed, put his foot on the ledge and reached the beam. He looked round once more to see whether the guard was still asleep, tore away the sacking and went out through the hole. This of course made a certain amount of noise and the guard waked. He slid down the roof and dropped into a courtyard with iron gates. Luckily the gates opened when he used a certain amount of pressure. He ran down the road, pursued at a certain distance by the guards. He could get no assistance but as luck would have it he was able to jump on a passing bus. He asked where the bus was going. At first nobody replied. Finally he got an answer out of a woman who spoke English who said that the bus was going to Jaffa Gate. From there he went straight to the District Police office. There was no doubt that he was kidnapped fortuitously. His captors said that they had hoped to get the G.O.C. He was never seriously interrogated or even searched. This was lucky as he had several somewhat incriminating documents on him from the DSOs office.

I had a talk with Hellar about N.Africa. He seemed to think that the whole machinery of Govt. was extremely one-horse. The police are

reluctant to do much S.B. work as should the Afrikaans Govt. get into power they would lose their job. The Minister of Justice, Lawrence, formerly minister of the Interior, was very friendly and even suggested that MI5 should set up an organisation in S.Africa or alternatively use some sort of private intelligence organisation which was to be established by Rand magnates. Keller very properly said that this would not do and that we must confine our liaison to purely official channels. Lenton was brought into the picture and apparently a re-conciliation has been effected between him and the police. His records are to be available to us as required. Communication is to be through the High Commissioner's bag. The High Commissioner, Evelyn Baring, was very friendly and ready tohelp in any way he could. The negro problem in S.Africa is likely to become somewhat serious since intelligent negroes are receiving advanced education and going into the medical and legal profession All Govt. employment however is barred to them.

No use has so far been made of the information that we gave from the field about van Rensburg. The line was taken that the evidence is not strong enough to obtain a conviction. The real reason robably is that Smuts wishes to hold up the report until there is an election.

June 26th

I saw Roger Moore for a moment. I told him that Norman Archer was saying on the advice of Boland that the IRA were in funds. Roger Moore thought this was extremely doubtful.

I attended a meeting of the JIC. DMI talked about his recent visit to Washington and Ottawa. He said that in Ottawa the central

point of the maps hanging on the walls was the North Pole and that both the Canadians and the Americans had a real bee in their bonnets about the possibility of Russian attack from the north. This had been actively discussed in the American-Canadian Defence Committee. The Americans are pressing to instal metereological stations and radar apparatus in the north of Canada. They say they have the manpower and the equipment and that they wish to install it this summer. The Canadians are stalling as they would prefer to do this job themselves. They think that if the Americans do it the Russians may think that it is an act preparatory to aggression. On the other hand they have not at the moment got the necessary staff or equipment to carry out the work themselves. The American-Canadian Defence Committee does not, according to DMI, imply that the Canadians in any way wish to secede from the British Commonwealth. It is purely a natural defensive measure in which both Canada and America are intimately concerned. As regards the exchange of information between Canada and the USA there may be certain information particularly that relating to S.America which the USA would not wish passed on to ourselves. DMI made it quite clear to the Americans and Canadians that this position was understood and accepted and that he would make no attempt to obtain American information from the Canadians. On the other hand he hoped that in the course of their deliberations they would keep it actively in mind that certain matters would be of interest to the British Gov. and should be passed to them. Meanwhile a lively exchange of information is to continue between ourselves and the Americans but will exclude any reference to

S.American affairs. Efforts will be made to break down the reservation about S.America at any rate on questions affecting the order of battle of S.American states. It is felt that the American objections to our being given information about S.America are more economic and commercial than anything else.

DMI has set up a Commonwealth Intelligence Bureau in Washington which will include the Australians and Canadians. He is having two working representatives of Canadian Intelligence in his directorate and is sending an officer to work under the Canadian DMI in Ottawa. DNI will continue to have relations with ONI on a separate basis since relations between them and G.2 are known to be good. ONI are being given the benefit of a good deal of technical information here and with certain reservations we are receiving American technical information. Attempts will be made to improve the quality and volume of information whichwe get from the Americans. I mentioned that according to our information ONI had some 43 officers in this country. DNI said that he did not know there were so many but he was aware of the fact that a considerable number were constantly callingon various Admiralty est b-lishments. C. said that he had refused to d deal with Capt.Belim of ONI until the Americans got their various intelligence spheres more cl clearly defined. DMI said that as far as he knew,the Central Intelligence Authority was still more or less marking time.

I saw C. this afternoon and discussed with him the problem of the American visa. He said that he would give our views his full support,if I would let him have copies of the correspondence He took a very grave view of the proposals whic he thought might vitally affect the future of

Passport Control throughout the world.

We went on to talk about our representation in the USA. I told him that I had sicussed this matter with various authorities in the USA and also at length with Dick Ellis and Kim. C. said that he was quite ready to let us have a representative but he would like to see him in the same office with Peter Dwyer in Washington. I said that quite frankly I did not think this would do. My information, and I quoted him Barty Bouverie's talk with Micky Ladd, was that the FBI would never really trust SIS. They regarded them as an offensive organisation and were consequently shy about giving them the same assistance as they gave us.

I told him that from our point of view it would be infinitely preferable to put our man in Passport Control, New York. I thought he could perform a really useful function there for both our offices and be of assistance to Pat Stone. He would moreover be placed between Washington and Ottawa both of which places he would want to visit fairly frequently. C. said that he would give this matter further consideration and let me know.

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June 27th

Curry told me that he had seen the DG who had said that he was considering the question of the Secretariat but did not wish to make up his mind finally until he knew a bit more about the office.

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I said goodbye to Sclater today and thanked hi for all he had done. He said he was very sorry to go and that he had been verry happy while here. He was I think pleased about my being able to get him a small extra gratuity.

June 28th

Vesey came to tell me that he had read a book by Arthur SCHUTZ who caused us so much trouble in the early days of the war and who we had regarded as suspect and even put into 020 for a short period. We came to the conclusion tha he was a more or less harmless lunatic. The M.S. which is in the hands of McMillan, is violently critical of ourselves and Censorship Most of the book is nonsense. I said that I thought DPR should intimate this to McMillan who would probably turn the proposition down.

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Dick brought Winterbourne to see me. He is going as one of our military officers to SIFE. We had a general talk about the building up of sources of information.

Buzzard came to say goodbye. He is going to Moscow as Language Officer and a firm contract has been given him for 5 years with an almost certain prospect of being kept on and absorbed

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I talked to the DG yesterday about his visit to the PM. He said that the latter was still asking whether we had cleared our records of any irrelevant material. The DG assured him that this was a normal practice but pointed out certain information we had accumulated which was perhaps a little outside our strict charter but was valuable in providing leads and that it would be inadvisable to destroy it. I asked the DG what the PM had in the back of his mind. He said he was quite sure he was still afr[illegible] that the Opposition might accuse him of running a Gestapo. This is of course quite ridiculous in so far as MI5 is concerned, since I am certain that Winston was merely referring to the socialisation of industry and controls which caused the appointment of staff of a Gestapo kind to see that the regulations were carried out. The DG apparently discussed the question of our getting accommodation and told the PM of his interview with Bridges and de Normann who had said that we could not use Berkeley Square House. The DG said that he had spoken to C. who he thought was quite willin to come in with us but he did not wish our move to be delayed on that account. This I think is a pity unless we move to a building which could ultimately be occupied by C. as well.

Douglas Roberts had telegraphed in a rathe[illegible] neurotic way about CHADWICKE, implying that he might have been double-crossing us and that his escape was bogus. Personally I do not think there is any foundation for this. The proof is that Oats still goes on.

John Gwyer brought in two Belgian officers who had come over from Bihan to discuss the Vote-kappelle case. They have two cases running now in Belgium which may link up with the organisation and they hope before long to let us have full particulars.

Meanwhile TREPPER has been identified in the files of the Palestine Police. As he is more or less blown in Europe we think it possible he may gravitate back to the Mid East. He had always been to Belgium under different names and the Belgians have now got the full link-up. They are anxious to get an effective finger-printing system going which will defeat the Russian alias.

June 29th

The raids in Palestine begun at 4 am and we already have news that certain number of the leading personalities have been arrested. Sneh, the leader of the Haguna, has however not yet been caught. There had been considerable vaccillation by Hall, the Colonial Minister, who had not wished to arrest either Shertok or Bengurion. On pressure from the High Commissioner however he officially decided to tell Palestine to go ahead. Bengurion is as far as we know in Paris and is in the circumstances likely to stay there.

F.J. and Clayton discussed with me the question of sending the recommendations of the Bridges Panel about retiring officials signing the Official Secrets Act to Dominions and Colonies. We decided to write to the D.O. suggesting that they send the documents out not only to the High Commissioner which they have done already but also direct to the Dominions. As regards the Colonies, where there is reluctance to send documents to the Governor we have obtained permission to send it to the DSO who will bring it to the attention of the Governor.

July 1st

I had a talk with Battersby who is going out to SIFE. He seemed sensible and intelligent.

The DG got me down to discuss with Horrocks theproposed destruction of LBC uncarded files. Horrocks says that the H.O. will be unwilling to accept any files unless we can show that the alien is in this country. I said that I was quite sure that we ought to retain Polish, Czech, Hungarian, Roumanian and Bulgarian files after they have been reviewed. I would however like to look at a certain number of the files before expressing a final opinion. Horrocks has promised to send up a bundle. Meanwhile I have Vesey examining the problem again. DG seemed reluctant to make a decision and suggested that Horrocks and I should work the matter out between us.

July 2nd

Thistle showed me various messages indicating that the Agency are considerably worried about the raids. It looks as if we had obtained some quite important documents relating to the Palmach and also some of our own top secret documents about military dispositions in the Middle East. A considerable number of arms have also been captured. The adjournment of the House was moved to discuss the whole question last night. Dick Crossman, one of the British members of the Anglo-American Commission, made a speech strongly in favour of the Agency. On the whole the Govt. held its ground well.

At his weekly meeting the DG gave an account of his last interview with the PM. The PM's mind still runs on the records. Horrocks explained for the first time how the matter of the record had arisen. When visiting the registry Findlater Stewart had looked down a list of files and selected 2 or 3 the names on which were familiar to him. One was Eileen Bennett the tennis player and the other was Gen.Martell the tank expert. I cannot remember the 3rd. It was apparently these files that had worried him and which had led him to make the recommendation about keeping our records clean. In actual fact there was a perfect justification for our having both files at any rate during wartime. Eileen Bennett was the wife of an SOE officer and had been reported to us as talking indiscreetly about her husband's job. She had to be severely cautioned. Martell had been in communication with Gen.Fuller and had also been talking indiscreetly. The matter had been taken up on the VCIG's level and the latter had instructed us to bring any further instances of indiscretions by Martell to notice. I mentioned to the Dg the case of Crossman who had now come very much to the fore in connection with the Agency out of whom he had successfully extracted a copy of our military orders for the liquidation of the Haganah which the Agency alleged that they had got from the captured officer. This document was subsequently published in the New Statesman. Crossman as a member of the Commission was clearly a man in whom we had to take some interest, however mild, otherwise we could not get a clear picture of how the wires were being pulled. The DG thought that this was very much a case in point and had some idea of bringing it to the notice of the PM. I toldhim that I would let him see the papers.

I had a word with Vesey and asked him to go again into the question of the LRC files and try and work out some practical solution. I was loath to destroy them as, as documents, they were extremely good. They gave xxxxxxxx a photograph, the description and life history of the men.

I asked Clayton to tell me about BUSTAMENTE and PIXLEY, who were at present on trial in Jamaica. BUSTAMENTE is leader of the Labour Party, head of the Industrial Trade Union organisation and head of the Stevedores Union. His rival is MANLEY, a very intelligent K.C. who is head of the People's National Party and closely connected with the Negro Communist Movement in the USA. He controls the communist unions which form what is known as the National Union. The employees of mental institutions who were affiliated to MANLEY's union, had struck for higher pay. BUSTAMENTE had taken this as a personal challenge and had caused a disturbance by beating up pickets. One man had been killed. BUSTAMENTE was charged with unlawful assembly and with manslaughter. He had objected to being tried in Kingston which was a stronghold of MANLEY's party and a compromise had ultimately been reached by which he was to be tried at some other place. If the verdict went against him there might be very serious trouble and the loyalty of the police was in question. He has however been acquitted on both charges. We made reference to this matter in our report to the PM this month.

I saw Stanbury who was working under Joe Stephenson in Hamburg. He is a candidate for Mid East. He is very keen on Intelligence work and anxious to come to us permanently. He looks a promising candidate.

I talked to Stewart about the screening of 100,000 Jewish immigrants. I suggested that we might, rather than photograph those who were refused on account of their political background, photograph the whole lot and send copies of the photographs to Palestine. This would act as an effective check and produce quite useful documentation. We are embodying our views about the whole problem in a letter to Norman Brook who is in charge of the Anglo-American Committee which is investigating the Anglo-American Commission's report.

July 3rd

At the JIC today a Dr. BOLSOVER gave a talk on Russia. BOLSOVER is a student of Anglo-Russian history, was employed by the MOI during the war and has for some time been in Moscow as a member of the Embassy making a study of general trends from Press and other sources. He had read the JIC drafts of their latest report on Russia. He agreed with their conclusions but thought that they had no not laid sufficient stress on the importance of the long-term party view. From such public utterances as had been made he thought that the party line was almost back to where it was from 1924-1935. There were at that time 4 causes of conflict which would play into the hands of Communism. (1) rivalry between the USA and Britain. Britain was thought of as a dwindling power and the USA as a rising power. (2) rivalry between the victors and the vanquished in the 1914 war. (This has now been eliminated). (3) Antagonism by the capitalist powers for the USSR. (4) Desire for emancipation by colonial peoples. He was quite interesting on the subject of Stalin's position and on those of the leading personalities. He thought that the principle

characters were Molotov, Zhdanov, Malankov and Beriya. He did not think there was any chance of Stalin fading out. He would die in harness, as he would have a poor chance of surviving if he went into retirement. He did not think that there could be any division on the question of cooperation with the west since this matter was laid down by the Party. There could only be differences as to tactics. He felt therefore that it was important not to draw deductions from opportunist motives but to keep one's eye on the Party line.

Harold Caccia made me outline my theory about the Fleet being the basic factor in recent Soviet moves. Bolsover substantially agreed. He thought that the matter was certainly important and that a close eye should be kept on it. DNI said that he had alwaysrealised this although personally I do not believe he has given it a thought.

Colonial Office Security in the light of developments in Palestine was raised by the DMI and Caccia said that he would suggest to themthat MI5 might possibly give some useful advice. DMI raised the question of India. He thought the JIC should be considering what the position of intelligence would be whenIndia became either a dominion or seceded entirely from the British Empire.

We considered a number of cases at the Appointments Board. I raisedthe question again of the Secretariat and D.Division and gave my views, also aboutа Police Section. Horrocks said that he was considering both and hoped to produce a document. They all agreed that it would not be possible to make much progress with D.Div. until a number of people were eliminated.

There is a man called VISSER over here who is apparently charged by Smuts to collect data concerning Van REENSBERG and his associates, presumably with a view to prosecution. He seems to know that we intercepted certain signals relating to SITTIG and BAASCHE.

July 4th

Talked to Hollis about intelligence relating to atomic energy. It seemed to me that for our own defensive purposes we ought to run some network of informants into scientific circles in order that we could identify potential MAY's. On the preventive side we ought to stimulate all factories producing any sort of equipment which would be used for the production of atomic energy, to notify us when and by whom orders were placed. Hollis agreed but felt that on the preventive side we should do nothing until we had eliminated Brock, who could only think in terms of barbed wire and fences.

John Bingham came to say goodbye. He is joining the Control Commission where he has a 7-year contract.

July 5th

Harker called a meeting of Hinchley Cobbe, Cussen, Vesey and myself on the book which A. SCHUTZ wishes to publish. It was decided to ask that certain matters relating to this dept should be excised on the basis of the tentative agreement drawn up with the Press and publishers after the cessation of Censorship. It was also agreed that we should inform the publishers that the book was largely inaccurate and that the deductions drawn were hopelessly wide of the mark. A

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photostat copy of the book has been made for future reference.

At a meeting with Cussen, Courtney Young and Miss Russell King on the proposed handling of VISSER and BARRETT, the two South Africans who are collecting evidence against Van RENSBERG and his associations, it was still not clear whether they wanted B.J. information. It was agreed however that Cussen and Courtney would see them and draw them on this point. I am inclined to think that they are interested in the BJs since Sir John Stephenson rang me up later to say that he had had communication from S.Africa House indicating that there was certain information which we were apparently reluctant to give. I told Stephenson that we were trying to draw them on this point and we would come as clean as we could.

Dick,Kellar and I had a talk about Douglas Roberts coming visit. We agreed to explore whether there was any opening for him on the Control Commission. Dick thought he might take over the Russian side of the Control Commision affairs as a Brigadier and more or less on a level with Shoosmith.

We felt that he was fairly well qualified, as he knows Russians and is a fluent Russian speaker. Dick will take up this matter with Cohen and later I will speak to C. Kellar is anxious that Douglas should stay on after September but if pressed we would not mind his remaining for another year. We should have to make it clear however that we could not give him a permanent contract on the grounds that we had nothing to offer him at head office.

Alec and I called on Sir George Gater at his request to discuss the White Paper for Palestine. Gater was pressing hard for the disclosure of [redacted] and [redacted] unless documentary evidence was found in Palestine which would satisfy the House that the Hagana had been engaged in sabotage with the connivance of the Agency and that the Agency at least had a certain hold over the Irgun. It seemed to us that the P.M. had committed himself to the production of documents found in Palestine, but that he had been less definite about the production of documents which had led him to decide on the arrest of various members of the Agency. Gater thought the matter went further than internal politics. He felt that it was of paramount importance to convince the world and particularly the USA that our action had been fully justified. I said that while I could appreciate this point,

I had never been able to understand why a Government with a large majority could not say to the House that they were satisfied from information received that such and such was the case and that the House would readily understand that the disclosure of information leading to the detection of the source might well endanger the informants' lives. If it were finally decided to publish, I thought that we ought to consider [redacted] or messages which would give us an excuse for the publication of certain groups. This would give the impression that we had monitored them and had only been able to decypher on the basis

I thought that this avenue was worth exploring a and had given instructions to Thistle to look into this aspect of the problem when he visited Palestine in the course of the next few days. We agreed to get out two notes, one on the basis of information that could be published and the other on the basis of and . After this meeting I went over and saw "C". I explained to him what was in the wind and told him the arguments that I had put forward. He said tht his great difficulty apart from his reluctance to blow the source was

I then suggested to C. that if we were really pressed it might be worth while for U.S. to put the evidence before the President and ask him to make a statement to the effect that he had seen the evidence and was satisfied that the British Govt. were thoroughly justified in taking action over it. This would go far to allay American criticism. Even though the President might not be willing to do this for political reasons it would at least to some extent put him on the spot. C. agreed that this was well worth considering

July 6th

The DG has just returned from Brussels where

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This caused the DG to raise the whole issue of our representation abroad. He thought that he ought to take it up with C., the P.M. etc. I told him that I had for a long time been convinced of the logic of the PCO being our first line of defence and naturally carrying with it liaison with our opposite numbers abroad. This matter had been ruled out and were now saddled with the unsatisfactory and ambiguous compromises as outlined in Findlater Stewart's report. If he proposed to take the matter up, and personally I thought the cause was a sound one, he should bear in mind that he was stirring up a real hornet's nest. I had seen this going on for nearly 30 years at varying intervals. Each time a vast amount of mud had been stirred up but without any result, except general suspicion on all sides. This had for the moment subsided and a limited amount of progress made in Singapore, and in an admission by SIS that we should probably have a man in America. It would need careful consideration whether the best move might not be to let things take their course and fight our case on its merits rather than try and back-pedal Findlater Stewart's report as a whole. If he chose the latter course he would have to realise that C. would bring in the F.O. and the Chiefs of Staff and that everybody would be inclined to say that this matter has been thoroughly thrashed out by the Govt. within the last 6 months and a decision reached. Why therefore was it being raised again. I said that I should like to have time to consider this, when I would speak to him again.

July 8th

Stewart tells me that the question of the confiscation of ships carrying illegal immigrants to Palestine has been decided in our favour. Some five ships altogether have so far been held. This is really the only deterrent to illegal immigration. The ships are at present sailing under the British flag.

I discussed with Dick the question of our representation in Passport Control, which the D.G. is anxious to raise again. We agreed that the first thing to do was to get Findlater Stewart to call. Dick gave me a recent example.

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We have prepared a brief for the Colonial Office and Prime Minister, which brings together all the information that we have from Top Secret sources and other sources, which tends to show a) that the Jewish Agency is in control of the HAGANAH and the PALMACH, b) that the HAGANAH and the PALMACH have been responsible for illegal activities and acts of violence, and c) the association of the HAGANAH and PALMACH on the one hand and the IRGUN and STERN Group on the other. It is our intention that Thistlethwaite shall take this out to Palestine and marry it with such documental evidence as may have been obtained during the course of the raids. He is to be back by Tuesday of next week, when we intend to prepare a statement for our Minister.

July 9th

I accompanied the D.G. to a meeting called by the P.M., to discuss what evidence can be given to the House in support of the Government's action in Palestine. Those present, in addition to the P.M., Hall, The Colonial Secretary, accompanied by Martin, General Ismay and C. The P.M. appeared somewhat irritated at having been mislead by the Colonial Offi when he made his previous statement to the House.

Basing himself on a telegram from the High Commissioner, he had somewhat unfortunately committed himself to the production of documents. He said that he had asked whether he could use the information in the telegram, and had been given an affirmative reply. This was, of course, true, but it had not been anticipated that he would make the offer to produce documentary evidence. I think he was more annoyed with the Colonial Office than with anyone else. He then asked what the evidence was. C. said that it was our department that had really been working on the material. He therefore passed the buck to me. I said that I thought that the three points, which I have already enumerated, were amply proved. If it were not, the other evidence consisted of statements made by the Jewish Agency liaison officer to our D.S.O. in Palestine, which were of a decidedly compromising kind, and statements made by informants. The statements by the Jewish representative might perhaps be denied, and equally the informants' evidence might be criticised, quite apart from jeopardising the informants' lives if it was given in any great detail. The P.M. came fairly rapidly to the conclusion that C. pointed out that if we did this we might be in the dark, as far as future operations were concerned.

It was finally decided, therefore, that the Colonial Office, assisted by ourselves, should prepare a statement on the existing evidence, including Top Secret sources, to be ready by 6 p.m. on Thursday, when it would be discussed by the P.M., the Lord Chancellor, the Lord President, the Colonial Secretary, General Ismay, C., and the D.G. If, in the meantime, it were possible to cover up the sources this could be done. The P.M.

felt that he would have to make his statement to the House no later than Wednesday of next week.

July 10th

I attended the J.I.C., when the A.C.S.I. gave a talk on his visit to America. Broadly speaking, his experiences had been the same as the D.M.I's. Everybody was thinking about a possible attack by the Russians via the Antarctic. He pointed out to the Canadians that, for the moment at any rate, the Russians were singularly ill-equipped for such an operation, since they had not got the right type of aircraft or sufficient quantities. He discussed the future of our Intelligence relations with the United States, when the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee came to an end. Although there was a willingness on all sides to continue full co-operation, there was clearly about criticism from Congress that large numbers of British officers were seen in uniform walking in and out of the Pentagon Building. It would not be possible to camouflage these officers as attaches, since that would put them in a category where they could not be given priviliges which were not given to other powers. The J.I.C. are considering how the exchange of information can go on in future. Harold Caccia then said that he had recently had a visit from a Canadian called CREAN, who was of course Bill CREAN, who had been with us throughout the war. CREAN, who is at present doing security with external forces in Canada is probably the future Chairman of the Canadian J.I.C. I asked whether this meant that the Canadians were going to form their J.I.C. on our model and what the position of the R.C.M.P. would be. He said that, broadly, this was the proposal; although he did not know about the R.C.M.P. He was, however, lunching with CREAN and asked me to come along. Bill CREAN told me that the Commissioner is now a co-opted member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Canada, and that his Department is to be represented on the local J.I.C. in the same way that we are represented in London. This is certainly a step forward. I was at some

pains to explain to him that in the past the R.C.M.P. had been somewhat timid in their operations, as they never felt that they had the backing of External Forces or of the Services. I hoped that under this new set up they would get the backing they required. I also told him that it was of the greatest importance to constitute the Intelligence Branch of the R.C.M.P. as a separate organisation working direct to the Commissioner, and not as part of the ordinary Police hierarchy. In my view, far and away the best person to control that branch of the R.C.M.P. was RIVETT-CARNAC. I heard rumours when I was in Canada that there was some question of posting him to one of the provinces. I sincerely hoped that this could be avoided. He said that he would do anything he possibly could to arrange matters on the lines I had suggested. Harold Caccia talked to me about the possibility of constituting a Security Section in the Foreign Office. He thought that the head of it should be a Foreign Office man, who should be assisted by a representative of M.I.5. and one from M.I.6. I gathered, however, that M.I.5. and M.I.6. were expected to pay the officer. I told him that this might present some difficulty. I also said that I thought it would be preferable to have as head of the organisation an officer with considerable experience of Security Intelligence matters, and that if necessary we could provide one. He was, I think, inclined to the view that a regular Foreign Office official would carry more weight. Personally, I am doubtful, as it is much more important to have somebody who knows what he is doing.

Kellar and I had a discussion with Martin and Mathieson of the Colonial Office on the draft of the Prime Minister's statement on Palestine.

I attended a meeting called by D. C. & D. to discuss security matters connected with atomic energy. I said that I thought it ought to go a good deal further than the vetting of personnel and the physical security of establishments. We should circulate a list of foreign physicists to all Passport Control officers, so that if any of these people turned up they would be thoroughl

questioned as to the purpose of their visit and the firms or organisations they intend to see. Secondly, we ought to ascertain the names of any factories where equipment was likely to be bought for the setting up of an atomic energy plant. These factories should be visited and asked to keep us informed about any requests for such equipment that did not seem to them to have a normal explanation. Lastly, and most important, we should place informants in all laborotories where work on atomic energy was going on, such informants should make it their business to know as much as possible about the general mode of living and political views of young scientists. It was only in this country that we should be able to deal with potential MAYs. There is to be a meeting to-morrow with the Ministry of Supply, when a certain number of these points may be cleared up.

I had a talk with Hirsch, the D.D.M.I. I told him that I did not feel that it was sufficiently appreciated by the Chiefs of Staff how much the G.O.C. Palestine was going to be in the dark if [redacted] were blown. In such an eventuality they would only have informants to fall back on. I said that I had not seen the minutes of the Chiefs of Staff meeting nor the briefs that had been given to them, but it seemed to me that they were taking the whole thing rather lightly. He took the point and subsequently spoke to the D.M.O., who said that he would go and see the C.I.G.S. at his home that evening. I then told C. what I had done.

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11th July.

Hirsch told me that H.M.O. had seen the C.I.G.S., and that the latter would be speaking to the Prime Minister.

We had another meeting with the Colonial Office to put the final touches to the draft.

I had a meeting at Chesterfield Street with Hastings and Doniach, C. being present. Hastings, by Doniach, took the view that it was necessary to publish since the HAGANAH and the PALMACH, in broadcasts by Kol Israel and in broadsheets, had accepted full responsibility for many of the outrages committed in Palestine. He also said that if Shertok were asked he would admit that members of the Executive of the Agency took part in the meetings of the HAGANAH. Lastly, he criticise the draft by saying that did not really tie up the IRGUN and the STERN groups with the HAGANAH and the Agency. I said that we were doing our best to get information fr. Palestine, which we hoped might prevent publication. Meanwhile, however, the Prime Minister had ordered that a draft statement should be prepared on the existing evidence. We would at this evening's meeti press for as much time as possible. We had already received a telegram from Palestine indicating that a certain amount of overt evidence had been obtained.

I attended a meeting with the D.G. and Kellar, called by the P.M., to discuss the draft. Morrison, Hall, Jowett and Ismay were present. The question of blowing secret sources was discussed, and a telegram which we had received from Palestine was read out. This telegram expressed the anxiety of the G.O.C. lest he should find himself entirely deprived of Intelligence sources in what was obviously a crit situation. The Prime Minister seemed reluctant to discuss the aspect of the problem which affect the security of our troops.

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All this was of little avail, the Lord Chancellor was instructed to go through the evidence with ourselves and to draft a statement. We were to be given a week to obtain evidence from Palestine, which if sufficiently convincing might prove a substitute for

The Lord President was sympathetic with our point of view, but felt that it was of world importance that the statement made should be as convincing as possible.

The Spanish Police have arrested a woman named Ilsa BARTEL, who had been employed at the Spanish Legation in Berlin during the war. She has admitted having passed on secret Spanish reports to the Gestapo as from the year 1941. She is to be indicted on a charge of espionage.

The case of Caspar HASLINGER has been brought to my notice. We got rid of this man in 1938, on the grounds that he was engaged in espionage. He was a member of a yacht club on the east coast and was clearly collecting information. When we wrote to the Newcastle Police, they said that they had been unable to ascertain any information which would indicate that he was interested in any organisation of a subversive nature. Later, after the man had gone and we that that he was coming back, we asked the Police to let us know. They said that they had made contact with two individuals who were personally known to HASLINGER, but that these two persons had no idea of the real nature of the enquiry. A later report from our original informant stated that two people had visited one of these individuals and shown him HASLINGER's dossier - So much for the value of the Police in enquiries of this sort.

July 12th.

I attended a meeting at the Home Office on Travel Control to Ireland, with Mars. Carew Robinson was in the chair. The meeting was said to be purely exploratory, the object being to see whether it was possible to relax the present controls, in whole or in part, before the end of 1947. It was pointed out that the Expiring Laws Continuance Bill would cover us after the end of 1947 if necessary, but only subject to considerable fire in Parliament. If possible the Home Office would like to make some relaxation before the end of this year. The Ministry of Labour said that they had an interest in the entry of aliens, but were not worried about Eire citizens flooding the labour market. They were ready to submit to whatever the Home Office considered an adequate control. The Registrar General viewed the relaxation of the present system with considerable concern, since it knocked the bottom out of the whole of the rationing system. He was dependent upon the Immigration Officers to provide him with the necessary statistics. If the Irish door was open these statistics would be valueless. It would, moreover, be open to people coming from Eire to start an extensive food racket. People could quite easily get on to the electoral register at several places under different names. The Treasury were alarmed to find that there was no control of currency in the case of people leaving this country for Eire. This has apparently been abandoned for some months. The difficulty, apparently, is to distinguish between people who are going to Eire within the sterling area, and those who are going to other destinations abroad outside the sterling area. As regards the Security Service views, I said we had always regarded Ireland as the back door into this country. We had put up with this situation before the war, but we were anxious that the present system should continue, both as regards visas and proper identity documents, to distinguish

the alien from the British subject. The problem was now a far more important one, in view of Foynes having become a most important centre for air travel between the Americas and Europe, lines haveing recently been opened from Foynes to Oslo, Stockholm and Copenhagen, in addition to the route to Lisbon. It would now be an easy matter for an alien, who could not get a visa for the U.K., to fly from Foynes and enter the U.K. through Holyhead. Moreover, if he were so minded, he need never register. All he would have to do would be to return to Eire when his two months were up and come in again. Carew Robinson suggested that we might obtain the co-operation of the Eire authorities, and so extend the ringed fence to cover the whole of Ireland. I said that I did not think that this was very practical. There were two factors, a) the inability of the Eire authorities, however willing, to control immigration, owing to a shortage of staff and other reasons, and b) the political factor which might at any moment make further co-operation impossible. The suggestion would involve our giving our Security Lists to the Eire authorities, and in certain cases this might be highly undesirable. The only helpful proposal for getting out of this difficulty was made by Hill of the Home Office, who suggested that British subjects should be allowed to travel on the green National Registration Identity Card, which bears a photograph. The Registrar General has undertaken to consider this proposal, which would considerably relieve the burden of the Passport Office. I gathered that the main purpose of the meeting was to ease the strain on the Passport Office, which cannot now issue a passport under a months notice. This is due to the flood of applications which always take place during the holiday season. If they were to obtain an increase in staff, they would by the middle of September have nothing to do.

Kellar and I went over to see the Lord Chancellor, to assist him on matters of detail in the preparation of his draft. Hastings came with us.

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July 15th.

We have received the Lord Chancellor's draft. We have been asked to fill in certain gaps and return it to him this evening, as he wishes to give it to the P.M.

Gilbert Ryle is going out to interview KLATT.

Brian Melland looked in. He is now demobilised. He thinks that if I want to see Robi MENDELSSOHN (?) the best think to do is to borrow a car and go down to Georgenhof, without saying anything to the French.

TAR and M.E. have been having a certain amount of difficulty with Wilson about the B.J.C.B. Wilson says that Signals Security and cipher policy are one and indivisible. His Committee deals with both, and he does not wish us to sit in on cipher discussions. It looks as if he only intends to co-opt us as and when he thinks necessary. I rang him up on the telephone and pointed out to him that it had been laid downby the J.I.C. that we should be a member of his Committee. He said that the letter he had written to the J.I.C. had been incorrectly drafted, but he fully accepted us as members, provided we only stayed for the discussion which concerned us. I said that we had no intention of interfering

He said that he would be very glad to keep us informed of matters of that kind, and that he had appointed Davey (?) as liaison officer for that purpose. I pointed out to him that recently

It seemed to me that a matter of this kind could make nonsense both of his work and ours He said that he would be very grateful for any information that we could give him bearing on this subject. I think the ground is now fairly clear. Wilson is rather a difficult customer.

Kellar, Chadwick, Thistle and I took the Lord Chancellor's proof back to him, with certain amendments. We had a long discussion. He was extremely friendly and very ready to draft another proof on information received from overt sources, if it were sufficiently strong to prove his points. We told him that we would let him have the information in the course of the next two days.

July 16th

At the D.G's meeting to-day it was decided that we should pass limited lists of British subjects to Wynston Scott, provided he used them discreetly in the matter of visa control. Adam quoted a Home Office meeting before the war, where the policy of passing information in this way had been more or less agreed to.

July 17th

Morton-Evans tells me thatthe meeting with B.J.C.B. went off quite smoothly, and that we were accepted as full members for the discussions on signals security.

July 18th.

Briscoe came to tell me that he has now been appointed a member of a consultative committee under Cockcraft. This is to deal with the chemical aspects of Atomic Energy. He will shortly be proceeding to Canada. I outlined to him what I felt to be the proper course of action for ourselves for dealing with the security of Atomic Energy, and in particular I told him that it was essential that we should first learn where experimental work was going on, what new developments were in the wind, and then try and get useful contacts in the various labs., who would know something of the daily life and political views of those employed. I seemed to me that it was only in this way that we should get to hear about anyone of the type of MAY. He quite agreed and said that he would keep his eyes open in this direction.

Sir Findlater Stewart came to see the D.G. at the latter's request. Dick and I were present. The D.G. was anxious to get Findlater's views on that portion of his report which related to the possibility of our having representation overseas. Findlater said that he had purposely left the door open and that it was up to us to take the matter up with 'C', and if necessary with our Ministerial Head. He was entirely sympathetic with our views and agreed that it would be desirable, wherever possible, for our representative to be situated in Passport Control. It was decided that we would begin by writing a letter to 'C', pointing out that this matter had come to the notice of the D.G. in the course of his recent visit to Brussels, and that it was only on returning here that he had been acquainted with the back history of the whole matter. We would make a definite request to 'C' for the appointment of our representative in Passport Control, New York, as a test case.

July 19th.

The following matters were dealt with at the J.I.C. this morning:-
We were requested to ask SIME for any confirmation or amplification of a report from the Governor at Aden to the effect that a Russian Mission was going to the Yemen. Hirsch mentioned that there was a report that uranium had been discovered in Madagascar, and that the French had sent an Atomic expert, and that the Russian Mission was going to Madagascar. I was asked whether there was any objection to our Canadian espionage report, which is to be embodied as an Appendix of the J.I.C. report on Russian intentions, being sent to Foreign Office representatives abroad. Caccia thought that it might help them to realise the dangers of penetration. I said that most of the information had been published in the Press and that I could see little objection - I should, however, like to consult before giving a final opinion. Elmhirst told the meeting that he had discovered that Soviet News was still being distributed to 225 units in the Air Force, this

was a hangover from the war. It was decided that it should be stopped, on the grounds that no propaganda publication of a foreign government should receive official distribution within the Forces in peace time. Kenneth Strong said that he was going into the question of monitoring foreign broadcasts and would be glad to know peoples' requirements. I asked whether he could let us have a list of broadcasts, if it was possible to take, we could then tell him which ones would be of value to us. Harold Caccia disclosed that he had seen, entirely off the record, an extremely gloomy letter from the Viceroy about prospects in India. The Viceroy anticipated that the Constituent Assembly, which I understand comes into being in August, might conceivably break down entirely in the first week, owing to disagreements between Moslems and Hindus. If this happened what was the Government's policy? He said that although the British administration had gradually been weakened, it would he thought be possible for them to reassume the reins of Government, but if this were so it would have to be on a long-term basis for, say, twenty years. The alternative seemed to be chaos.

Kellar, Thistle, Chadwick and myself discussed with the Lord Chancellor a very rough draft of the paper on Palestine, excluding At the beginning the Chancellor took a favourable view of the document, but later became extremely worried about the weakness of the communication with Kol Israel and the bringing in of the "Resistance Movement". It was agreed that we would try and find some further supporting evidence of the relations between the Agency and Kol Israel.

July 20th

We attended on the Chancellor again at 11 o'clock, and outlined to him the new scheme for the paper, which was set out on the basis of the three main incidents - those of October, 1945, February, 1946, and June, 1946. We began by a statement on the events as reported and the damage done, and this was followed by a showing the

complicity of the Agency and the co-ordination of activity by the Agency to include the IRGUN and STERN groups. We then quoted the Kol Israel broadcast, with a note to show how Kol Israel was connected with the Agency, and lastly we quoted the claims of HAGANA, IRGUN and STERN from their own papers. Finally, we showed how each of these incidents, with the complicity of the Agency, had been intended as a warning to the British Government of further incidents to come of a widespread kind, and how the last straw had been the kidnapping of British officers. Faced with this evidence the British Government have no alternative but to act. The Chancellor expressed his approval of this new scheme and we undertook to have the final draft completed by 10 o'clock on Saturday night. He dictated a covering letter to the Prime Minister in which I got him to include a phrase to the effect that he considered this draft more satisfactory than the original one, and he undertook to hand the copies to each of the Cabinet Ministers concerned on Sunday morning, when he would be seeing them. They they would then have time to study the document before the meeting on Monday evening at 5.30.

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July 22nd.

The D.G. held a meeting on Curry's book. It was decided that Harry Allen, Dick White and myself would each draft a skeleton for a six-page memorandum, which it was felt would be more suitable for D's of I., Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of State. The general view was that they would not have time to read anything longer. I said that I thought that it was of the greatest importance that they should understnad exactly what the scope of this office was and what it had done during the war, since the ignorance of them all at the moment was abysmal. We were all lumped together as "those Intelligence people", with the result that the wrong people were generally consulted and papers which were intended for us went bucketing all around the place. Curry's memorandum will be kept for instructional purposes for officers joining or going out to our Stations abroad.

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John Mair came to see me. He has regretfully decided to go into the Control Commission. He felt that he was taking a gamble, but he just could not afford to live here and bring up his family on the terms that we could offer.

The D.G. talked to me about the dispute between Hollis and Adam over vetting. I told him quite frankly that he would never have any peace so long as Adam remained. He was too old and too narrow in his outlook and took an almost sadistic delight in catching people out on the letter of some document. The only person who could really express an opinion as to whether a Communist should or should not be employed is Hollis, who had been responsible for making a file on the individual and knew precisely how to evaluate the documents. If work was done in the Vacuum of things were bound to go wrong. It was in fact on cases of that kind that the office was judged by the outside world, and on all cases of espionage about which they knew nothing. The D.G. I think took the point.

News has just come through that the King David Hotel in Jerusalem has been blown up. There have been a considerable number of casualties, but we do not know yet what the extent of the damage is.

I saw Fawdry and discussed with him his various problems in Gibraltar. He is staying on until February of next year.

July 23rd.

Harold Caccia spoke to me this morning about the possibility of the Foreign Secretary going to Egypt, at some future date unspecified, to sign the Egyptian

Treaty. He was apprehensive about a possible attempt on the Foreign Secretary's life and wanted to know our reactions. I said that there would obviously be considerable danger of an attempt on his life, either by Parties opposed to the Treaty or by the Irgun or Stern, and that while the Egyptian authorities would be anxious to prevent any such incident, recent events have shown that they might not be able to do a great deal. The fact was that if a fanatic intended to carry out an assassination and was prepared to disregard his own safety, there would be very little that he could do. After consulting Orme Sargent, Caccia asked if we would get the opinion of Douglas Roberts, presumably in conjunction with Jenkins, as to whether it was really advisable for the Foreign Secretary to go at all. He was particularly anxious that the matter shouldbe confined to the most limited circles possible, as it was of the utmost importance that nothing should get around about a possible visit or that we were apprehensive about the Foreign Secretary's safety. Any telegrams sent should, therefore, be of the "for your eyes only" variety. I have told Kellar to have a word with Harold Caccia if a reply comes while I am away.

I have ascertained that the draft paper on Palestine has gone through to the P.M., who refused to take out the words about ISTRIA - referring to their being interpreted. This is a pity,but I don't think it matters a great deal. A further wire has come through from Palestine about the damage. Our records have apparently been destroyed, the OATS unit is intact, none of our D.S.O's have been injured. Some of our Army secretarial staff have been killed and other wounded. Apparently entry was made by members of the Irgun or Stern group in the guise of Arabs carrying milk cans full of explosives.

VESEY, I am sorry to say, is leaving us on Saturday.

I went to a lecture given by General Sinclair, at the Imperial Service College, on the subject of S.I.S.

His talk was purely historical, showing how S.I.S. had been built up on the outbreak of war and of the difficulties that they had encountered. He quoted various reports which his Department had submitted in advance of the more important moves that the Germans had subsequently made. Those quoted at the beginning were, I thought, Padgham's reports which of course came through the P.C.O. to Haigh. By D. Day he said that S.I.S. had 27,000 agents in France and the Low Countries. This I felt was a somewhat extravagant claim; the impression given was that these agents had been put into the Countries, whereas of course they were merely members of local Resistance Movements - although they were of course to some extent organised through S.I.S. agencies. At the end of his lecture he asked his listeners whether he had given them what they wanted. They said that they would like to have known a bit more about organisation and how the information was fed to the various departments concerned. They were not enlightened. At one point I was drawn into the discussion owing to a question about leakage of information through neutral Embassies. I told the meeting that these Embassies had of course been a source of interest to us, but we had in a large measure succeeded in neutralising the information which they supplied. They did, however, present us with very serious difficulties, since every delegation or mission which came to this country from a neutral country always operated under the auspices of its Embassy or Legation - it followed that these people provided useful material for Service Attaches to put in their reports, for example, Stockholm and Madrid. Once the information reached either of these capitals it almost inevitably ended up in German or Japanese hands. It followed from this that the more pro-British the individual was the more he was likely to learn and unwittingly pass on to the enemy. The whole proceedings did not strike me as being too alarming, but I think we shall have to prepare the lecture in two parts, one historical and the other organisational.

July 24th - 26th

I flew to Nuremburg with Harker. We were met at the other end and taken straight to the Court, where we had a seat in the Strangers Gallery. A German named SEIDEL was winding up the defence of NEURATH, FRITSCHE - of the B.N.B. and Propaganda Ministry - and HESS. The whole proceedings were highly mechanised; in each seat was a pair of earphones with a dial which enabled you to switch in to English, German, French or Russian. The set speeches were submitted to the Bench and the interpreters in advance. If approved by the Bench, from the point of view of irrelevant matter, they were read by Counsel and read a few seconds later by the interpreters, who sat behind a glass screen speaking into microphones. There was, therefore, a permanent babel of foreign languages which could be heard going on all the time Counsel was speaking. GOERING was considerably reduced in size and was wearing a light grey-blue uniform without badges of rank or decorations and brown top boots. He seemed to be one of the few who had much spunk left in him. He would talk and smile at his colleagues in the Dock and would show flashes of anger when he thought that unjust accusations were being made against him. When accused of treachery by Shawcross, he whipped off his glasses and gave him a ferocious look. HESS only appeared for one morning while his defence was being heard; he appeared to be entirely indifferent to the proceedings. RIBBENTROP looks pale, thin and haggard and occasionally shakes his head. KEITEL was fairly passive, while JODL, his Chief of Staff, was taking copious notes as if he were fighting a rearguard action in the Field. I doubt whether he has a clue as to what it is all about; he probably thinks that a gross injustice is being done to himself, a soldier, who has done nothing more than carry out his orders - how could he possibly do otherwise - even though it was clearly shown that under his instructions the Army had collaborated satisfactorily with the Einsatzkommando, which had been concerned with the liquidation of the Jews and others in Eastern Europe. FRANCK, who was a reichstadthalter in Poland, seemed

defiant and at the end of one session turned his back on the Bench. ROSENBERG and STREICHER were mainly indicted for their philosphy and racial theories and showed few reactions. FUNK and SCHACHT were both accused of having guilty knowledge of the mass murders, in that the gold from the teeth of the murdered victims were all melted down and placed at the disposal of the Reichsbank. SCHACHT sat looking like an old owl and it was difficult to escape the view that he had sat on the fence and jumped down wither side as and when he thought it was likely to be in his own interests. In the second row sat DOENITZ, who was quite placid; the accusation against him being that he had given the order about sinking ships without warning. The facts are, of course, that in this respect it is probably difficult to humanise war, since by giving warning submarines were likely to give their own position away, with disastrous results. RAEDER, who sat next to him, was present at the meeting in 1937 when Hitler disclosed his agressive plans. Baldur von SCHIRACH was accused of educating the youth for war-like purposes and in anti-Semitic ideas. SAUCKEL, a particularly unpleasant looking individual, was mainly responsible for getting forced labour from the invaded countries and with their treatment in the various camps in which they resided. FRICKE, the Minister of the Interior, clearly had intimate knowledge of the various crimes against humanity. SEISS INQUART was responsible for the Anschluss and also for atrocities committed during his Governorship of Holland. NEURATH pleaded that he had resumed office in Czecho-Slovakia as he had no alternative, and that it had been his intention wherever possible to damp down his instructions. SPEER, probably one of the ablest in the Dock, was mainly responsible for production and of course made use of all the labour that SAUCKEL could give him. FRITSCHE, of the D.N.B., was No. 2 to Goebbels and mainly responsible for broadcasting. It was difficult to avoid the point made by his Counsel that had Goebbels not committed suicide he would hot have been in the Dock. The main charge, that is Count 1 - Conspiracy to wage agressive War - a conspiracy which

the Prosecution held began in 1921 with the formation of the Nazi Party. Those in the Dock, therefore, are to some extent a body representing the whole Government and the N.S.D.A.P. Although I did not hear all the evidence, I find it difficult to accept the view that the conspiracy started in 1921. There is, of course, "Mein Kampf", but the Germans contend that the primary objective was to get rid of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. It is a truism to say that talking was no good and that you could only hope for any success if you went into conference with the guns behind you. They say, however, that everything they did up to Munich was condoned by ourselves at Chamberlains's famous meeting with Hitler. Our only answer to that would be that had we known then what we know now we should not have signed on the dotted line, to which I would reply that our Government believed that they had no alternative and would have done so in any case. The first evidence of conspiracy seems to date from the document of May, 1937, when Hitler summoned his Chiefs of Staff and Ministers and told them to prepare for operations against Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, which he envisaged might well involve Germany in war with France and England. The Counsel for the Defence argued that this and subsequent meetings are not evidence of a conspiracy - one man, they say, cannot conspire with himself, and anyway he is dead. The Ministers merely attended the meeting to receive their orders. Count 4, which is concerned with crimes against humanity, seems to me to be on much stronger ground. There is no doubt that every man in the Dock must have known of the appalling atrocities and mass murders to the extent of 12,000,000 people, although all of them were not directly concerned. The Prosecution say that with this knowledge they should have disassociated themselves with the Government. They, of course, pleaded that to do so would have been tantamount to High Treason, and that they would have suffered the supreme penalty. Some, of course, such as KALTENBRUNNER, have a far more intimate knowledge of what was going on. The feature of the trial is perhaps that most of the accused have at one time or another tried to pass the buck either to those who are dead or to each other, and in so doing have to a considerable extent, condemned either themselves or

others in the Dock. The two Russian Judges sit placidly in the dark(?) and one cannot escape the feeling that most of the things of which the 21 are accused of having done over a period of 14 years, the Russians have done over a period of 28 years. This adds considerably to the somewhat phoney atmosphere of the whole proceedings and leads me to the point which in a way worries me most, namely, that the Court is one of victors who have framed their own Charter, their own procedure and their own rules of evidence in order to deal with the vanquished. It is not a Court of world opinion sitting in judgement upon the Germans - doubtless the answer is that if it had been the proceedings would never have got on their feet at all. One cannot help feeling, however, that a dangerous precedent is being created. Those in Nuremburg - lawyers and officials - dismiss this point rather lightly, they say "Oh, we have got over that long ago". I think to some extent because they are so steeped in atrocities and also because they think that any aggressive power will deal with its enemies unfairly in any case. They also put forward the argument of the Common Law being built up on case history, but this I do not feel is a very good analogy. During one of the sessions I visited the prison, which is very like Wormwood Scrubs. All the prisoners have been in solitary confienment since last November. They are watched night and day by a "snowdrop". As soon as they get back to their cells their belts, ties and anything with which they might conceivably commit suicide are taken away from them. They have to clean their own cells. There are a number of Germans performing menial tasks who have undertaken to remain prisoners until the end of the trial. There is a clinic with a doctor and a dentist, both Germans, supervised by Americans. The doctor was an oldish man and stood at attention while we inspected his clinic; he struck me as being generally distressed and I wondered what was passing through his mind - he must have a pretty frightful job. The prisoners receive 2,000 calories a day; it was explained to us by the American conducting officers that this treatment, which differed from the other Germans, was merely for the purpose of getting the best out of them. The prisoners have an hour to two hours exercise in the morning and the afternoon and they are not allowed to pick up anything off the ground, in

case it might be an object with which they could commit suicide. In an adjacent prison there are a number of Nazis who are giving evidence for the Prosecution or for the Defence. They have a greater measure of freedom, in that they are allowed to walk about in the prison and converse with each other. The 21, on the other hand, can only speak to their Counsel thro ugh a grille or to each other in the Dock during the intervals. I was also shown the exhibits which consist of the most revolting photographs of Nazis smiling while they torture or execute their victims. Soap made from human bodies, human hai[r] packed in bales for use in stuffing furniture, d[o] human skins used for every possible purpose - all [t]hese came from the factory which exploited human bodies, and there is a mass of documentary evidence showing exactly what the factory turned out and what its capacity was, etc., etc. From these somewhat grim proceedings you go to the Grand Hotel which is about the only one standing; the crowd there is completely cosmopolitan and includes even neutrals. There is a large dance hall with a huge jazz band and a German cabaret thinly disguised as Czechs. I walked out in the evening into the old town with its 13th Century Church and the whole thing is just a shell, the rubble being piled up on either side of the street. Durer's house has not gone completely and is being repaired. An old night watchman outside one of the Churches to whom I spoke said that he knew that this would happen sooner or later and that one thing that the Germans cared about was being able to earn suffic[ient] money to keep themselves and their wives and children. The only monument which appears to be intact is the Nuremburg Stadium with its Greco-Germanic columns and arena. I believe that indue course it is to be blown up. Other visitors were Rebecca West and Louis Golding, also a very tiresome woman called Mrs. Bowles, who told me that she was a barrister, or had been one - I do not think that she could have been a very successful one. I dined with Lord Justice Lawrence at his villa outside Nuremburg - nobody could have been nicer. I had a talk with him and also with his wife and with Francis Biddle, the American Attorney General and principal American representative on the Bench. He was a great friend of Hoover's, about whom

we had a talk. John Phipps was there and also a German called Braun, a lawyer who was apparently a refugee in this country and is helping the Prosecution. Passes are very much the order of the day in Nuremburg; it is extremely difficult to get into the Court and once you are in you have to show your pass about every other minute. You cannot even get into your hotel without showing a pass. I heard off the record from John Phipps that although Lawrence had handled the Russians extremely well and had got over all difficulties up to the present, there were many matters which had taken a long time to settle. He gave me two rather amusing incidents. The Russians had objected to the witnesses for the Defence being allowed to give evidence on oath; they said if they gave evidence on oath everybody will believe them! They then became extremely worried about the witnesses for the Prosecution and the witnesses for the Defence giving their evidence from the same stand; they evidently thought that this would place them on a kind of equal basis from the point of view of credulity. This was finally settled by shifting the witness stand to a position exactly mid-way between the Prosecuting and Defending Counsel. Katyn had caused a certain amount of trouble. The Russians had insisted on including it in their indictment, but they were hotly opposed to the matter being raised by any of the witnesses for the Defence. Lawrence pointed out that it was they who had raised the question and that he therefore had no option but to allow the Defence to have their say, in fact as things turned out the Russians came rather badly out of the whole incident. Lastly, there was trouble over the secret protocol to the Russo-German alliance in 1939. The Defence put forward witnesses who stated quite categorically and convincingly that such a protocol had existed and that it related to the partitio of Poland between Germany and Russia. The Russians have not apparently disputed the existence of the protocol but refused to produce a copy of it - which must of course be in the archives in Moscow. The German copy could not be found.

July 29th.

It has been arranged with Courtney Young that he will visit Australian Security on his return to Singapore. The object is to find out something about the organisation and the reliability of those in charge. We can

then consider whether the moment has arrived when we should ask them to supply a Liaison Officer to S.I.F.E.

July 30th

Corin came in to tell me that he had more or less wound up his affairs here, but that he would be at the disposal of the office at any time. He said that in the course of his business he occasionally came on matters which he thought would be of interest to us.

Burt came in to see me. I discussed with him an interesting report that he had submitted relating to a rather dubious Jewish Banking concern in London. I told him that we had recently had a report that a man, thought to be connected with illegal immigration, in Italy, had been ringing up Landy, one of the principals of this Bank in London. Burt told me that it was possible that proceedings might be taken against the Bank under the Currency Regulations, and that in view of this there would be further communications concerning which he would keep me informed.

Kellar tells me that there has been something of a whispering campaign going on by S.I.S., suggesting that M.I.5. had rather let the side down over the publication of ISTRIA in the White Paper. Travis, who had spoken to Kellar, suggested that if S.I.S. had had their representative in Palestine it might make a lot of difference. Eddie Hastings had apparently been talking either in the Foreign Office or in the Colonial Office to the effect that it was really worse to have blown ISTRIA than OATS. This is, of course, entirely contradictory to what he told the Lord Chancellor and ourselves at the many meetings which we attended. I have told Kellar to get out a note showing the whole sequence of events which led ultimately to the publication of the White Paper. I shall then speak to 'C' and tell him that if members of his staff have any doubts, we should welcome a post-mortem on the whole incident.

~~I told Charles Hutchinson that I had had a long discussion with the D.G. about staff matters and about the Registry.~~

July 31st.

I have just read Gilbert Ryle's extremely interesting analysis of the KLATT case with particular reference to MAX and MORITZ. Ryle had been out to the American Zone where he had interviewed KLATT but had not been able to see LANG. Gilbert's thesis is that for a long time the White Russian General TURKUL has been operating in the interests of the N.K.V.D. and that his principal assistant in this matter has been LANG. He thinks that at some time during the later stages of the war, KLATT may have become aware that he was dealing not with the White Russians but with the N.K.V.D. Hence the desire of the Russians to kidnap him owing to his guilty knowledge, which he might have thought fit to impart to the Allies. The primary objective of TURKUL's organisation was to penetrate all White Russian organisations in Europe and to control them in Soviet Russian interests. His attempt to get a controlling position in VLASOV's Army and his sending of White Russians to fight with the German troops, were two incidents which he thought might help him in his task. The primary object of his penetration of the German Service and of the MAX messages was to blow himself up in the eyes of the Germans. The information supplied to him for this purpose was true information of great value to the German High Command and probably led to a very considerable loss to Soviet troops in particular to a convoy. Gilbert thinks that this is just the kind of thing the N.K.V.D. would hav done quite cynically and probably without informing the Army since human life in Soviet Russia was never of much account when big objectives were at stake. There is a good deal of evidence to show that the MORITZ messages were purely fabricated and passed to Mussolini on a fairly high level. The object of this was to obtain funds and presumably also to penetrate the Italian Service. There is evidence of this, when he says it was known that two of the MORITZ reports reached the Abwehr in almost identical terms, both from the Italians and from KLATT. An enquiry was held but the matter was ultimately dropped. Further proof is TURKUL's anxiety to get out

of Italy when Mussolini callppsed. A feature of the whole case has been the reluctance of LANG to allow any investigation by the Germans into his organisation. This position was accepted by the Germans owing to the high order of information they were receiving from Soviet Russia. It is probable that the MAX reports were sent "blind". This would account for their never having been picked up by RSS. It is quite clear that there was no element of deception in the MAX reports.

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I told Charles Butler that I had had a long discussion with the D.G. about staff matters and about the [redacted]istry. I have also discussed with him our relations with the Treasury and all the difficulties and dangers that exist in trying to get this Department in any way on a Civil Service or Police basis. A department such as this was constantly expanding and contracting in accordance with the nature of the work. If, therefore, you established grades, particularly intermediary grades, you were certain sooner or later to get into difficulties. I said there were similar difficulties in connection with finance. 'C' obtained a lump sum, and it was nobody's business whether he spent it on himself, his officers, motor cars, or his agents! If the Government were not satisfied with the information he supplied, their remedy lay in getting rid of him - they could not interfere in his internal business. We were unfortunately not in this happy position but I was cetain that the more we could approximate to it the better.

[redacted] of S.I.S. came over at my request to discuss the possibility of sending FOWKES, with a roving commission, to Europe to follow up illegal Jewish immigration and traffic in arms. I told that we had had very disquieting reports both from Seager, who had been out to investigate the arms dump at Bordeaux, and also entirely off the record from General Morgan, who had told the D.M.I. that UNRRA and Jewish welfare organisations were positively engaged in these activities - the whole thing was going on under his eyes but he was powerless to do anything. I felt certain, therefore that unless an officer were detailed to make a whole time job of this question, with freedom to travel round, we should never get anywhere.

He said that he would put the matter up. Later I spoke to 'C', who appeared to be quite sympathetic.

August 1st.

Lethbridge came to see me about illegal immigration and also about "Tin-Eye". I told him about our plans to send an officer out to investigate illegal immigration and traffic in arms. He said that I had taken the words out of his mouth and that he was extremely glad to hear that this was being done. He undertook to give our officer all the support he needed in the British Zone. As regards "Tin-Eye", he was anxious to keep him on and to give him a contract for 7 years. He said, however, that he was doubtful whether he could keep him at his present rank - he was going to do his best but he wondered, in the event of failure, whether there would be any possibility of our subsidising his pay. I said that I doubted whether this would be possible but I would mention it to our Administrative Branch. I also told him that I felt it was in "Tin-Eye's" interest to accept the offer, since we should find it extremely difficult to fit him into our organisation here in a position which would give him the scope that he needed. It seemed to me that he is admirable in his present job and that nobody could have served us better. I told him too that we should not be able to guarantee him employment here when his seven years were up, as we might not have suitable work for him to do; he would therefore have to take into account that he had completely severed his relations with this office.

A suggestion has been made that we should send a counter-sabotage officer out to Palestine to train personnel in counter-sabotage work and to look into the security of the U.P.S. Victor has suggested KIRBY GREEN and as a second choice Colonel RHEAM. KIRBY GREEN would, of course, be ideal, but I do not think we can take him away from the Caribbean.

August 2nd.

Courtney Young and Margot Huggins are leaving for Singapore on Tuesday morning.

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At the J.I.C. to-day

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Sir John Shaw also spoke to the J.I.C. upon the situation in Palestine. He was obviously considerably moved by his recent experience. The principal point in his statement was his conviction that the Palestine Arabs would prove entirely intransigent. He thought that we were lucky to have got over the funerals of the Arab victims in the King David Hotel without any serious incident. He thought that it was quite on the cards that, although the Arabs knew that in a street fight with the Jews they could not hope to win, they might at any moment commit some outrage which would cause things to flare up. It might even lead to a Holy War. There is no doubt that Shaw is the man who really runs Palestine, since he knows the situationinside out and is not

afraid of speaking his mind.

Sir John Shaw came round to see Kellar and we had a further general talk. I think he is very appreciativ of all the work that Kellar and his officers have done.

I had a talk with the brothers HESKETH, who seemed to agree with my views about Nuremburg.

August 6th

Dick has come back from leave to attend the meetir about reorganisation to-day. I went through Horrocks' reorganisation chart with Dick and Holl when we suggested a number of amendments.

The D.G. said that he wanted to deal to-day with B. Division. We put forward our amendments, which were generally accepted, and the inevitable position of CURRY came up. It was decided that he would not be suitable for the job of the Secretariat, and indeed that at this stage the Secretariat was scarcely advisable.; it was thought better to start perhaps with a P.A. Personally I think that a Secretariat, properly staffed, could perform a useful function - it would, however, be dependent upon all J.I.C. and Chiefs of Staff papers being dealt with there rather than in D. Division. I then raised the question of ranks. I thought that it would be a goo thing to abolish the ranks of Deputy and Assistant, since such ranks tended to make the organisation inflexible; it would, I thought, be preferable to talk about Senior Officers and Section Officer This was agreed. The D.G. asked me to see Curry and make him a definite offer of B.2. I undertook to do this.

August 7th.

I talked to Fowler about the job I wanted him to do in connection with illegal immigration. He expresse his willingness to take it on.

I attended an extremely dreary meeting at the Cabinet Offices on the future of Intelligence in India. It was pointed out that there were a variety of contingencies, the period of the Interim Government and the possibility of Dominion status, Eire status, the possibility of complete independence and a kind of half and half chaotic period when Congress might control certain States and the British Government other States. At any moment we might be faced with an Indian D.I.B. and an Indian War Minister through whom any communications on Intelligence matters might pass. It seemed that in such an eventuality the only sure link would be through the Viceroy. What struck me, although I did not think it appropriate to say so at that meeting, was that we should anticipate the very worst, namely, a completely chaotic situation over a period of months if not years when all communications would have broken down and the Government here would have very little idea about what was going on.

I did, however, say that if India had a Dominion or Eire status we might have a Liaison Officer for the purposes of an exchange of information with the Indian authorities. We might do this even if the Indians had complete independence.

Maxwell Knight has asked whether he can come into S.J. as he was now a part of B.4. I told him to discuss the matter with T.A.R.

Hirsch rang me up about Jewish illegal immigration. I told him of our plans to send out Foulkes. He seemed quite satisfied with this arrangement.

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I saw Curry and told him of the D.G.'s decision about the Secretariat, and the offer to him to take over B.2.

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August 8th

The D.G. held another meeting on re-organisation, when we considered C. Division. Very considerable amendments were made. We all felt that it would be wrong to set up a Military, Naval and Air liaison section, since this created a wrong impression. It would be entirely wrong to suggest that this section should be a bottle neck to the 3 Services. It has always been our policy to let sections deal direct with whatever section in the various Service Ministries they were concerned. The most that a liaison section could offer to do would be to act as a kind of directory to new officers in the Service Ministries - this, however was not a job in itself. It seemed, therefore, that these functions should be carried by the officers in C.2. who are concerned principally with munitions security. Meanwhile Furnival Jones will continue to do his present work in relation to all three Services. I suggested that it might work properly, at any rate in so far as the J.I.C. and Chiefs of Staff papers were concerned if they were brought down to the D.G. It was decided, however, that for the time being matters should remain as they are. I said that in view of that decision I doubted whether there was any point in the D.G. having a P.A.

Colonel Jackson and Colonel Kingham Douglas called to make their number with the D.G.

At the B.meeting to-day I tried to impress upon everybody that Briscoe must be consulted when anything that bears

on scientific matters comes to them. Very often people are so carried away in pursuing an individual that they forget the scientific aspect of his work, in which case it is only by accident that Briscoe hears about it at all. He does hold certain highly technical files which are not sent to the Registry as they would not know how or where to card them. Sections, therefore, must be relied upon to pass the information on to him. Names are carded in the Registry, wherever possible. I said that I would probably bring this up at every meeting for some time to come. I told the meeting about my talk with regarding the present lay-out of the French Intelligence Organisations and asked Irvine to and get the picture absolutely clear when in casual conversation with The question of re-opening liaison with D.A.F.L., which had been put up by Archer at the D. meeting, It was decided that contact should be reestablished through Archer. Bennett said that he receives reports from factories shipyards and Admiralty establishments every month, and ad hoc, giving the names, etc., of all foreign visitors. It was agreed that these lists should be sent to T.A.R. and that he should circulate them and then return them to D.2. There is to be a meeting with Potter on this subject which is to be attended by T.A.R. T.A.R. referred to an extract of a letter from Airy about a request from the Surrey Police regarding the notification of changes of address for people who were on Suspect List and aliens on the List to be interned in invasion. I said that I thought this was largely an F. Division matter and T.A.R. said he would put it up to Mitchell. I thought that t people concerned had declined considerably in importance and doubted if the notifications of address would now be necessary, except in the case of an individual which was being investigated. All aliens would be traceable on account of their registration. I suggested that the Suspect List should be circulated to the sections concerned in order that they may have a look at it. Morton Evans then raised the question of Monomarks. It was decided that in future T.A.R. should deal with this matter and that he would find out each section's needs and then go and see Mr. Robson. I mentioned the abolition of visas, which came up before the Cabinet last week and was

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potponed until the Autumn - which gives us a breathing space.

August 9th

I attended the J.I.C. with the D.G. Frankie Roberts, the Councillor from Moscow, gave a short talk. He said that in White Russia practically nothing was being done from the point of view of reconstruction; a certain amount was being done in the Ukraine, but as a production centre he thought it was on the decline. The centre of gravity for industry had moved to the Urals. This is clearly a defence measure in the light of Russian experiences during the war. Althought travel is supposed to be free, every possible obstruction is put in the way of members of the Embassy staff wherever they go. There appears to be a certain amount of feeling in the Kharkov area that the Germans were not nearly so bad as they were painted, and that some of the population at any rate preferred their regime to the Russian. As regards the Army, there seems little doubt that ZHUKOV is in Odessa in disgrace, probably on account of his not having been able to maintain sufficient discipline within his Forces. Russia Generals are becoming a discredited class and the tendency is to regard they as war profiteers; it was even suggested that the Soviet Government have allowed them t bring back a great deal of loot in order that the local population may be induced to make invidious comparisons. It is noteworthy that none of the new Generals is a member of the Polit Bureau (?). BULGANIN seems to be the principal official under Stalin who controls the Forces; he is not a real General but a strong Party man. The system of introducing Commissars into the Army has been re-introduced. The question of giving assistance in Security measures to be carried out in Dominions and Colonies was raised. I said that if the Ministry of Supply policed an area in Australia we could give them advice on their internal security measures and that the responsibility outside would have to rest with the local security authorities. The Americans have asked us for the BEACH Intelligence; they want this information in case they may be called upon to recapture the U.K. from some hypothetical enemy.

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M.E. talked to me about a meeting of the SIGINT Board next week to which he and the D.G. are going. The Board want our support for resources in equipment and personnel to cover our demands. This results from an enquiry which has been made by A/M Ebill into the whole workings of L.S.I.C. Ebill seems to have done a good job, ably assisted by our old friend Drew.

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I met 'C' and General Sinclair at the Club. I raised with them the question of India - I said that I thought a concrete plan ought to be formulated now between ourselves, S.I.S. and D.I.B. for running an Intelligence organisation in India with clandestine wireless communications, in anticipation of the worst that might happen. It seemed to me quite on the cards that almost at any moment we may ~~xxx~~ be faced with a completely chaotic condition when all communications had

broken down, including the Viceroy's. The Government would then be completely in the air. It seemed to me that they were considerably perturbed and decided there and then that this was the right course to adopt. I told them that I should be meeting Vivian and Bamford next week, when I should put similar views to them. I had not put them to Colonel Holman's (?) meeting as I did not think that it would be appropriate. // I also told 'C' that from certain remarks which had reached me from other offices and also from a conversation between Kellar and Travis that there was a certain amount of feeling that M.I.5. had let the party down over the White Paper, I thought that if this feeling really existed it would be a good thing to have a post-mortem as I was quite sure that I could convince him and his officers that circumstances had been forced upon us by the P.M.'s offer in the House to lay papers, and that we had fought the best rearguard action that we could. I said, moreover, that we had endeavoured to keep his officers informed of every move; this had not always been easy since Eddie Hastings was extremely elusive, he was either at Chesterfield Gardens, Eastcote or Broadway - and 'C' added "at the races", with which I concurred. We had had a most frightfully strenuous time and I should regret to feel that he or any of his people thought that we had not done all that we possibly could to save 'C' said that he himself had heard certain rumblings that in fact a suggestion had been made to him by Travis that he should have his officer in Palestine. He had, however, turned this down. He thoroughly appreciated our difficulties and the causes of all the trouble and he did not intend to alter the procedure which was at present in force which seemed to him satisfactory. He would, however, have a talk to Travis and Eddie Hastings about what I had said. He entirely agreed with me that to pay an officer £800 a year to sit in Jerusalem, in order that he might protest once a month about the use of or to the G.O.C., would be a waste of money.

August 10th

SCOTT came to see me. He said that the most that M.I.L. could offer him was a Captain's job. I said that I would, if he thought it advisable, speak to Colonel Ramsay but that I would think the matter over. He sai

that he was extremely happy in his present job, since Irvine had taken over. He obviously had a high opinion of Irvine, who in his view was a person with a definite ideaas to what he wanted to do and how it should be organised.

August 12th.

I lunched to-day with a man called Reg. Denison, who is an Australian and former member of Australian Security in New Zealand. He is a friend of Ogilvie who came over here during the war. Ogilvie was at the H.Q. of Australian Security, but in private life runs a chain of broadcasting stations. Denison is also connected with broadcasting, his firm being the Maquarie Broadcasting Company of Sydney. He is going to America and returning here at the end of September. I asked him how Australian Security was now organised. I said that as far as I knew a man called BROWN was running it. He said that would be Rowley BROWN, who was an Inspector in the Commonwealth Investigation Branch. He regards him as a mere pedestrian Policeman - not really fitted to carry on a job of this kind. In his view, a far better man would have been Bob WAKE, who runds the office of the Commonwealth Investigation Branch in Queensland; He says that, generally speaking, security in Australia has gone very much downhill and that its importance is not sufficiently realised. He thinks that the only man who could put it right, if he had the time and inclination, would be EVATT. He suggested that if we could get hold of EVATT it would be a good thing. He said that, generally speaking, Australia, although enjoying a considerable measure of independence, was fundamentally loyal, and that this feeling had been considerably increased by the various interferences by the Americans, who were carrying out a fairly extensive propaganda and muscking in wherever they could. They have a large Embassy staff and entertain lavishly. He thinks that we ought to do more on these lines than we are doing at present. The Governor General has not definitely put his foot in it, but has, as we all know, very little personality; the Australians find him rather a dead weight - certainly his wit is heavy like that of most of the family. The Duchess, on the other hand, is very much liked and has

generally been a great success. Denison thinks that by far and away the most appropriate successor would be Mountbatten; he has made a great impression on the Australians, both by his appearance, his bravery, and by his charm of manner and unquestionable ability of saying the right thing at the right moment. Dick CASEY may stand at the next election as a Liberal, but Denison thinks that the Party, as a whole, has little chance of success as long as Menzies is at the head of it. Menzies appears to be generally disliked.

Drew came to see me. He has been working with Air Marshal Ebill on the enquiry into L.S.I.C. He seemed to be a little bit doubtful how far the organisation was getting value for money; he thought, too, that they were perhaps putting too many eggs into the wrong basket. I said that I could not really express an opinion, as I only saw a proportion of the work done. We did, however, think that more attention might be given to general security; I sugges ed that Drew should have a talk with Morton Evans. I then talked to Drew about the means by which we should receive Government papers - it often happened that the lower ranks of Ministries wanted to discuss such papers with us, and it caused difficulties when we had not seen them. Apart from that, there was an instance of a Cabinet paper on the abolition of the visa which came up for discussion without our getting any previous warning. Drew said that he entirely saw the point and that he thought that he himself could look after our needs on the civil side, and that on the military side he would speak to Cornwall Jones, Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff.

Curry came to see me, to tell me that he had decided to take on B.2. and had so informed the D.G. He seemed depressed, but I think that once he settled down to the idea he will probably make it work.

I saw Scott and told him that we should be prepared to keep him on for a year, but that I could give him no guarantee of permanent employment. If, in the meanwhile, a job turned up which he felt was to his advantage, we would not stand in his way. I said that I would see what could be done about his pay. I so informed Charles and Horrocks.

Our old friend Hans Christian PIECK has turned up again at the Hague. It seems that he has made contact with some member of the Embassy, although with what object we do not know. We are going to try to cultivate these relations.

M.E. tells me that Wilson of the Cipher Security Board was much impressed by our enquiries at Gibraltar into the physical security of ciphers - so much so that he has suggested that our D.S.O.s abroad should carry a mandate from the Cipher Security Board to carry out similar periodical enquiries in other areas. This I think is a great step forward. Later on we might tackle the question of ciphers in H.M. Embassies.

According to one, Werner BRAUNE, who was head of the Reichstudentenfuhrung from January, 1943, until January, 1945, that organisation and the Austauschdienst for the exchange of students, was used by Amt. 6 of the R.S.H.A. for espionage purposes. The students were specially selected during a five day course by an Amt. 6 representative before they went abroad.

I have seen an extremely interesting report by the Joint Technical Warfare Committee, dated July 26th, which deals with the effect of the discovery of the atomic bomb on any future war. It is considered that atomic energy development and development in biological warfare are likely to be the two most important factors. The vulnerability of this country is strongly stressed by comparison with that in the United States or in the U.S.S.R. The old methods of defence with every modern improvement will have to go on and the High Performance Interceptor Fighter will be of immense importance, backed up, of course, by RADAR and radio counter-measures. Manned aircraft are likely to continue for ten years and may then be replaced by supersonic (?) pilotless aircraft and/or rockets. The policy of dispersal, both of industry and bases, is considered highly desirable. The use of deception as a deterrent to agression is advocated. The question of placing important bottle-necks underground if also to be considered and, in addition, extensive deep dugouts for the civil population. This

is apparently the only protection against the atomic bomb. It is felt that 30 to 120 such bombs could cause the collapse of this country without invasion, but that several hundreds would be required to deal with the U.S.S.R. Within five to ten years the U.S. could probably accumulate sufficient atomic bombs to devastate a large proportion of the U.S.S.R., if the latter started a war of aggression. The U.S.S.R. itself could probably produce enough bombs in six to ten yeaps to devastate the United Kingdom.

August 13th.

I have told Patterson to get into touch with Piggott, formerly a S.C.O., who is now P.A. to Lord Knollys. He will try and find out whether there is any central body to which we can apply to obtain information about air traffic.

Horrocks talked to me about a suggestion by the D.G. that he should accompany the latter to the Middle East and Far East. He said that he had told theD.G. that whilst there might be a certain number of administration matters on which he could be of assistance, he could not cover the B. interests and suggested that if he contemplated such a visit he should take Dick White with him. I said that I entirely agreed , but that I hoped that the D.G. would not go to the Middle East until Kellar was in position at the end of the year or early in the Spring. What is really necessary is that the D.G. should acquire a very considerable knowledge about these areas , from the Intelligence point of view, before he goes out there. Otherwise he is likely to be faced with many awkward questions to which he will not know the answer.

I discussed with Dick our representation in East Africa. We both agreed that it would be necessary to maintain a situation there for several reasons, amongst others,that the route to the East might well be across the African Continent if the Suez Canal were blocked. It was also possible, although not likely, that Middle East H.Q. might move to Kenya. We both thought it important that our officer should be accredited to the Governor's Conference, as this would give him a more important stance.

Philby came to see me about two ex-S.O.E. Danes, now incorporated into the British Army and proceeding shortly to Palestine. While on leave in Denmark they had been approached by some Jews who wanted them to give instruction in sabotage methods.

They are apparently of a pretty tough variety, although one of them likes Bach and the other Nietsche.

August 14th.

I attended the J.I.C. to-day when O'Brien, D.M.I. India, gave a short off-the-record talk. The point stressed more than any other was that the question as to whether or not there would be a clash in India depended more on the policy of the British Government than anything else. If it were not possible to obtain some form of agreement by which the Moslems were a party to the forming of the Constitution and represented in the Constituent Assembly, NEHRU might try and take matters into his own hands and govern without them. It seemed that this was a situation to which H.M. Government could not possibly agree, in which case there was bound to be trouble, even if they did agree there would be trouble from the Moslems. It seemed, however, that there would be a certain breathing space owing to the renewed attempts by the Viceroy to bring NEHRU and JINNAH together. O'Brien did not seem to think that the Left Wing of the Congress movement was likely to get the upper hand, in fact the Communists were already going to ground as they expected that they would be suppressed. As regards the reliability of the Army, O'Brien said it depended entirely upon the officers. It was, he thought, doubtful whether, if they thought that they were going to be ultimately handed over to Indian rule, they would feel prepared to fight under the British Raj.

Had a meeting with Vivian, Cohen, Maltby, Dick and Paddy Bamford at Broadway on the subject of the future of Intelligence from India. After a good deal of talk it was agreed that we had to prepare for the worst; that Maltby should proceed straight away to try and recruit some suitable wireless operators, who

could if necessary train others; that S.I.S. should send someone out for consultation with the D.I.B. about the lay-out of any future organisation and the measure of assistance that they could expect from D.I.B. officers and agents if the worst came to the worst; that Bamford should obtain from the D.I.B. a panel of suitable officers from all the Provinces; that S.I.S. should appoint an officer who would control the organisation from the outside in the event of crisis; and that we should select one or two officers who, if circumstances permitted, would act in the capacity of D.S.O.s in liaison with D.I.B. under Indian rule. It was, I think, generally agreed that, except under the most favourable circumstances, S.I.S. would almost certainly have to operate in India, even though there might be Dominion status. It was pointed out that under an Indian D.I.B. only a very small percentage of the information now supplied by D.I.B. would be available, partly because there would be no willingness to impart it and partly because D.I.B. would be employed on different tasks.

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Hunt, who is going back to Burma, came to see me. Generally speaking, the organisation seems to be settlir down and all the authorities, both here and locally, appear to welcome the presence of a D.S.O. organisation.

The D.G. saw the P.M. this morning about a request by Hector McNeil for certain information relating to SEMPILL, and also his namesake, Sir Hector McNEAL. The P.M. ruled that the information should not be supplied. The P.M. appeared to be particularly interested in Russian activities here. TheD.G. raised the question of the abolition of the visa and explained our point of view. The P.M. rapped the table and said that he had shelved the whole matter, at any rate for the time being, and that he was fully cognizant of its dangers. The D.G. then went on to discuss our position vis a vis Passport Control and the desirability of our having officers posted abroad for overt liaison purposes in certain countries where this might be profitable. The P.M. agreed with this view and said that if we met with difficulties he would discuss it with 'C' and the D.G. I told the D.G. that I thought we had to be a little careful in matters of this kind not to incur the displeasure of Permanent Under Secretaries of State or other Ministers. In this case, for example, we were wiritng a letter to 'C' to which we might get an unfavourable reply. The next step should be to take the matter up with Sir Orme Sargent and only if we failed on this level should we go to the P.M. for a final decision. If 'C' gave us a favourable reply in the first instance he would undoubtedly brief Orme Sargent, who would brief Bevin and they would both resent it if we went over their heads direct to the P.M. The D.G. saw this point and thought that the line of action proposed was the right one. The only other point that the P.M. raised was Palestine and measures to prevent terrorists from entering the U.K. He seemed particularly concerned about this.

September 11th.

I dined in Dublin with McKENNA, ARCHER, DAN and DOC. The meeting was extremely cordial and we discussed many matters of a general kind. After dinner I had a private talk with McKENNA, when I asked him how the attendance of Eire Service personnel at Staff courses was going. He said that in general things were going extremely well, apart from one or two minor hitches. Staff courses for Naval representatives had been arranged

but the question of the officer to command the Irish Navy had not been finally settled. It had almost been decided that they should have a Lt.Cmdr. called SYNNOT, but at the last minute the Admiralty decided to send SYNNOT elsewhere. They had, however, another candidate in view whom McKenna thought would probably be satisfactory. The only other slight hitch was with the Air Ministry. Although the Air Attache in Dublin was extremely helpful and co-operative, McKenna sensed some slight obstruction in the Air Ministry to the Air Force in Eire beinggiven the same facilities for Staff courses as was being given by the Army and the Navy; he had, therefore made no direct request for such facilities as he did not wish to get a refusal. He was not anxious at the moment to press the matter in any way; he thought the best policy was to wait, as he was confident that things would come right in the end. I said that if he really got worried he should let me know, through Dan, and I would see whether there was anything to be done. The Navy are buying three more Corvettes as they seem to be very pleased with their earlier purchases. The question of setting up a Small arms factory in Eire had recently been under discussion with, I imagine, the Ministry of Supply or the War Office. McKenna had been given to understand that it would be as well to hold this matter in abeyance at the moment, since the question of the British Army going over to .30, the American calibre, was now under consideration. McKenna entirely agreed, as his one desire is to have the Eire Forces on such a footing that in times of emergency they could be quite easily integrated with the British Forces. He wants all their equipment and training to be entirely on British lines - in this matter there is, I gather, a certain amount of political opposition, which McKenna is trying to circumvent. Those individuals who were hostile to the U.K. are anxious that Eire should take her cue from the Americans; McKenna is therefore pleased that we are going over to .30 as this will deprive the opposition of quite a forcible argument.

September 12th.

The next day I had a talk with Dan. He raised the question of the interned spies. He told me that Mrs. UNLAND had been pressing hard for them to be

released on parole and that the Government are finding themselves in rather a weak position, owing to the unsatisfactory quarters in which the prisoners were housed, and had felt bound to acquiese - the result was that GOERTZ & Co. were all out on parole during the day. Dan felt this was unsatisfactory, particularly as regards GOERTZ and UNLAND - GOERTZ, he said, had been considering going to South America; meanwhile he was trying to make contact with various I.R.A. personalities with whom he imagined he was in touch while he was in prison

said that so far as I knew the Dominions Office had communicated to Sir John Maffey the terms on which the Control Commission were prepared to receive the prisoner back in Germany; I did not know what these terms were. Dan tried twice, unsuccessfully, to get into touch with Freddie Boland, the Minister for Internal Affairs, but said that he would probe the matter further. We then discussed the question of travel control. I explained to Dan that so long as the Registrar General's office continued to perform its present functions there would be bound to be some check on people arriving in this country from Eire - it would otherwise be impossible for the Registrar General to keep his statistics accurate. Ultimately, however, I indicated that there would be a strong move to get all travel restrictions abolished; I hoped, however, that we should be able to resist this to the extent of insisting that some sort of identity document should be carried by all travellers. Dan was very despondent about the inability of the garda and the Immigration authorities to exercise any adequate supervision over the entry of aliens. He said that, generally speaking, their attitude was to let the whole thing to hang; apart from that they were not well equipped to handle delicate cases of the kind in which we might both be interested; unfortunately he had neither the funds nor the staff to put a man at each of the principle points of entry. He referred to the practice that had existed before the war by which he notified the Home Office, Aliens Dept., whenever an alien landed with the intentic of proceeding to the U.K. - this arrangement had been reciprocal, but in practice it had not worked out

particularly well, since on many occasions aliens arrived saying that they intended to reside in the country, and subsequently crossed the Irish Sea. There was, therefore, no prospect of putting up any adequate ringed fence round Great Britain and Ireland which would result in our being advised concerning the arrival of aliens. I said that there was always an inherent difficulty in circulating lists of suspects: while we might be quite prepared to let him know about individual cases and leave it to his discretion to handle the matter, we were chary about putting names on lists when the information about the individual concerned had come from delicate sources. He said that he was in exactly the same position.

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March 13th.

I went to Belfast where I saw Roger Moore and Pym, of the U.I.G. They were both extremely friendly and ready to help in any way they could, although at the moment there did not seem to be very much of common interest. I gather that the I.R.A. were showing slight signs of activity, although nothing serious was anticipated at the moment. Both Roger Moore and Pym talked to me about BODDINGTON's visit. I enquired whether they had been previously informed and asked whether everything had gone all right. They said that the local Inspector up in 'Derry had been impressed by the way BODDINGTON had handled the ratings(?): on the other hand, it was made quite clear to me that BODDINGTON's presence in Northern Ireland was not entirely welcome and that his past there had not been ~~entirely~~ forgotten. So far as I could gather, he had been employed under Wickham during the bad times and the suggestion was that he had "planted" certain information on an I.R.A. suspect. This had been discovered and Wickham had sacked him. Pym also spoke to me about BODDINGTON's visit to Yalta with the P.M. during the war; he had apparently had the whole staff up on the ship several times and given them a somewhat tedious lecture on security, which had not

altogether gone with a swing, particularly amongst senior officers and people like General Ismay. Apart from this, he had done fairly well. Pym felt that he was the kind of person who ought not to be let out alone. Pym asked me how long I thought it would be before the North and South were united; he evidently thinks that the border ought to go as a beginning. It was curious to me that he should even envisage such a possibility - I said that while everybody would, of course, welcome a solution to the present rather ridiculous situation, I thought it was difficult to get over the defence question, since once unification had taken place we should be entirely at the mercy of the Irish in any future conflict, unless we were prepared to re-occupy all the ports by force and so drive them off their own .

I returned from Eire by air on the 14th.

September 16th.

I found the new chart, showing the new organisation in its reconstituted form, which had recently been issued. My position as D.D.G. has been clearly defined. Horrocks has been made Director of Establishments and Administration, and Charles Director of Finance. Personally, I do not feel too happy about this, since it overweighs the administrative side of the office, Although he mentioned the matter to me before I went away as being in his mind, the D.G. has not said anything to me since I returned on the subject. I told him then that I thought it was undesirable, both on personal and organisational grounds. F. Division is amalgamated with B.Division.

September 17th

Charles returned to-day from his holiday in Sweden. He accepts the position of being Director of Finance but quite frankly does not like it at all and told the D.G. so in front of Horrocks.

I talked to Roger about the squatters. Apparently neither ourselver nor S.B. had any clue as to their

action before the event. This is curious, but may be accounted for by the fact that we had no observation on the London District H.Q. Roger does not take the whole business very seriously, nor does he think it was directly instigated by Moscow. He takes it as a normal attempt by the C.P. to cash in on any genuine grievance. The effect of it has been that within the last three or four days the local authorities have wakened up to their responsibilities and have housed something like 50,000 people who were on their waiting lists.

Gilbert Ryle came to see me. He is going to interview TURKUL and LANGE, the two Russians in the KLATT case who have been brought over here by the Americans for interrogation. We have, of course, been told for months that LANGE was so ill he could not possibly be seen by anyone; this was merely a somewhat transparent ruse by General Seibert, who was in charge of G-2 in the area and thought he knew more about the case than we did. Seibert has now gone to Washington, so we now have a chance of really getting to the bottom of the matter.

September 18th.

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I spoke to James Robertson about sabotage in Palestine. It seemed to me that as KIRBY-GREEN was coming back for a short period on leave, we might get him to go out to Palestine and try and put counter-sabotage on a proper footing. A request has come from Palestine for the services of WRIGHT, ex-D.I.B. officer, whose services we have been trying to get from the Indian Government. So far we have had no reply from India.

Harry is rather worried about Jo ARCHER not having been made a Senior Officer. He has raised the point but has been told that our establishment does not allow any further appointment of the kind. Personally, I thought that the whole purpose of getting rid of Deputy Director was to make us more flexible, but evidently an establishment for Senior Officers has now been obtained from the Treasury which puts us back more or less where we started.

Brigadier Shoosmith, from the Control Commission, came to see me and brought with him a report on Russian activities in the British Zone, which he said were considerable, although much of the information that they were seeking was of a somewhat trivial kind. He thought, however, that under a screen of low-grade agents there might well be others of higher calibre who were being bedded down on a long-term basis. He was very anxious to have any information that we could give him which would show the form Russian espionage was taking and all details about the Russian organisation in any part of the world. He was particularly anxious to have a copy of the report of the Royal Commission on the CORBY case. He would also like criticism of his own report. I said that we would do anything we could for him in this line. I asked him about MASON, who is now working for us in East Africa and had wanted to join the Control Commission. He said that he would be glad to have MASON at any time, if we considered him a good officer - his experience of M.I.5. officers had been so good that he would take anyone on our recommendation.

September 19th.

I attended a meeting of the Railway Police, at which there was present a representative of the Ministry of War Transport. It was generally agreed that, with the exception of a few pieces of secret equipment and the location of war time controls, there was nothing that could reasonably be kept from any foreign delegations. I pointed out that spies were very inclined, when they were hard up for money, to buil their masters up with any information which could easily be obtained, even though it came from the newspapers or technical journals. This, however, did not mean that they would not engage in other more important matters - it was therefore possible that delegations might contain certain individuals of this type, and that anyting that could be done by the conducting officer to test their bona fides would be of the greatest value. I mentioned in particular people who appeared to have muscled in to the delegation and were not

properly accredited, or people sho had joined the delegation in this country from one of the Embassies or from some private business concern. We on our part agreed to vet the names of any delegations submitted by the Railway Companies to their own Police.

Colonel Archdale, a Marine, who is the new S.O.I. for the Eastern Mediterranean, came to see me. He had been doing a tour of the office. I explained to him something about our work and about S.I.M..E and introduced him to Perfect, who was home on leave.

At the B. meeting to-day M.E. said he and Martin had been to a meeting regarding the

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M.I.5. requirements are already on this Watch List, but M.E. said that any further requirements should be sent in to him (he emphasised the necessity for keeping the list down as much as possible) and he would sent them to Philby, who was the central point for receiving them. I said that in a case where anyone has a good line, it is worth while consulting Allan regarding any mail or censorship problem, as he will probably be able to say whether there is any way of getting round it.

R[illegible] said that at the Military Attaches Conference D.D.M.I(I) gave a talk on Intelligence requirements and laid particular stress on directing attention to Russian activities, i.e. expansion of arms, strategy, vehicle markings, battle order, etc. He also included the countries supported by Russia, especially the Balkans.

Strong told us that Adam had had a query from the H.O. regarding a request from foreign airlines to have their offices at airports in this country. It was agreed that as the matter was linked up with reciprocity no objection could be sustained. I

agreed with this view. Archer asked who liaised with airports. I said it was the job of the A.L.O. and that I would bring the matter up at the A.L.O's meeting next week.

Miss Chenhalls said that TURKUL had arrived and that he was in the process of being interrogated. Eyle feels that even if TURKUL is not broken the interrogation will have been worth while. IRA (LANGE) the more important character, is at present on hunger strike in the American Zone, but it is hoped that he will be brought over here in due course. I gave the meeting a brief account of the KLATT case. I told the meeting about the conference with the Railway Police.

M.E. said that the security of [redacted] has been re-emphasised in a new pamphlet published by L.S.I.C. which will come into force shortly. The general principle of it is that anyone who knows about this material or has to deal with it should be re-doctrinated as to what it is; They will then have to sign a form to that effect. M.E. said that there is already a list of officers who deal with this material and there will have to be a list of secretaries and registrars who handle it. He said he would go round to sections concerned and add to the existing list.

The D.G; is rather worried about MASON's position in East Africa. He intends to appoint PERFECT as our D.S.O. and it is thought possible that MASON might stay on as his assistant. If not, MASON should come back as soon as possible and take up his job in the Control Commission. I said that I thought that whatever the Colonial Office had to say we should appoint a D.S.O. and an Assistant D.S.O. to East Africa, who would cover the West Coast as well. It seemdd to me that the area might become important if there were any trouble in the future, since our main route of supply to the east would be by air across the African continent. The Suez canal might well be out of action. If we had a D.S.O., it was essential that he should have the full backing of the Governors' and of the Governors' Conference. The D.G. has written to Gater in this sense.

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September 20th. 1938

I talked to James Robertson and to Stewart about the case of three ships in Plymouth, which it is thought are being purchased by some Greeks for the purpose of illegal immigration into Palestine. It seemed to me on reading the file that there were a good many lines of investigation about which new officers were, not unnaturally, ignorant. We had, for example, the opportunity of getting incoming and outgoing telegrams, two HOWs that could be put on, and there was an Insurance field which might well be covered through Lloyds. I later saw T.A.R. and told him to try and work up the necessary machinery to cover these fields, in particular through Lloyds. In the old days we had a very good line and they were in a position to obtain details about the movements of any ship. We also had a check on Insurance Companies

We ought to have all that machinery at our disposal.

I had a meeting with Harker, Charles and Harry about the future title of the office. We were all agreed that it would be difficult for us to call ourselves Ministry of Defence, Security, as there was in fact no Ministry of Defence but only a Defence Minister in the person of the P.M. Apart from this, the title was rather a clumsy one. A further difficulty is that by virtue of our title of M.I.5., even though it doesn't carry any organic connection with the War Office, we have continued for many years to obtain War Office services, i.e. office equipment, cars, etc. This service now amounts to something like £100,000 a year. The arrangement was also convenient, seeing that provision was made for expansion in war time. Apart from this, it seemed almost impossible to throw off the name "M.I.5" entirely. The meeting was inconclusive, but the general feeling was that the lesser evil was to continue as we are. There is one rather obvious snag, namely, that in so far as departments like the Office of Works are concerned we are M.I.5. - our coke is delivered to the War Office, M.I.5., and files have already been

opened about moving M.I.5. to another building. This is, of course, unfortunate, since M.I.5. is so bound up in the public mind with catching spies. Meanwhile, it has been made quite clear by the D.M.I. to all his minions that we are not part of his Directorate, althou we are closely associated with it. M.I. must, therefore, express its own views on Security matters, even though they may differ from those of the Security Service.

Lt.Col. SPRUNT called on me this morning on the recommendation of Sir Findlater Stewart, who describes him as a friend of his for whom he can vouch as to straightness and keenness. SPRUNT is at present employed in the London office of the Control Commission on recruiting personnel for the British zone. He finds this work rather boring and would much prefer to do something more interesting and more in the line of his past experience. Although his Commanding Officer may not be anxious to release him, he sees no real justification for his retention since somebody could easily be found to do his present job. He could of course, return to his Regiment, but this he regards as something of a dead end since just at the moment when he would be coming up for a Command post he would be classified as too old - his present age is 44. At the present time he could not be released from the Army altogethe and on the whole would prefer to remain in t Service and be attached for any job which we might have to offer him. Ultimately he would like, if possible, when his service comes to an end, to be taken on to the permanent staff of M.I.5. He is married and has a daughter of eight, and, provided he can take them with him, he would be prepared to go abroad. He has a strong preference for the Middle Eas which he knows, and would, I think, like to go to Iraq if there was a job. Although he has visited that country, as his curriculum vitae shows, he would not be regarded there by the local authorities as an Intelligence Officer. He knows Douglas Roberts and also, I think, Jenkins. I told SPRUNT that the people who were most intimately concerned with the Middle Eastern area were away on leave at the moment but would be back at the end of next week, when I would consult with them and let him know as soon as possible if there

was any opening. He is a quiet kind of fellow and quite pleasant to talk to, although perhaps not a striking personality. It is, I think, very much in his favour that Findlater Stewart recommends him as being entirely straight and keen.

I asked Burt about protection for various Ministers against terrorism. He said that apart from protection for Cabinet Ministers, he had an Inspector and four officers at the Lancaster House Conference. We both agreed that the protection of Ministers was a matter for the Ministries themselves. The War Office have tightened up their internal security and we propose to advise the Home Office and the Colonial Office to do the same.

Patterson has established a connection with B.O.A.C. through a friend of his called Henry. He tells me that Winterbotham has a Communist Party secretary named Mis Maclurg. Winterbotham, however, does not seem particularly perturbed about this.

September 23rd.

General Festing came to see the D.G. He was extremely pleasant and talked quite a lot about his area. He is to be succeeded in November by General Erskine, who is at present on the Control Commission in Berlin.

Festing said that there was a Defence Committee, on which we were represented, but that he thought this somewhat august body was not very practical from the point of view of settling Intelligence matters. He thought that the Intelligence Committee, which was a Service Committee which included Roger, was a much better organisation, since discussion of confidential matters could be much freer. He gave the slightest

hint that Staples was not altogether an easy character. He thought, however, that he was a good Staff officer. He said that if Roger met with any difficulties with the Governor, he thought that he personally could probably help him.- he saw the Governor frequently and had his confidence. He will be glad to see Roger at any time. He took a poor view of the forces of law and order. Before the war the Police force had consisted mainly of Sikhs, many of them had turned out to be renegades , and the Europeans who were controlling them had become apathetic and, to some extent, corrupt. Most of them had married Chinese wives. The result was that the military were performing a large number of Police duties; this, however, would not last very long and the prospects of getting an efficient Police force were not bright. He evidently thought that the present lot ought to be cleared out lock stock and barrel. Sansom, the Chief of Police, was a decent fellow but a bit old and obviously working against heavy odds. In other ways, however, the Island was extremely prosperous, since it was even more a haven of those who wanted to preserve their funds and do genuine(?)business. It was one of the few places in China where people felt safe- many were therefore pouring into the country. He did not know what the future of Hong Kong would be, but the present intention appeared to be to hold on to it. The only effective measure that the Chinese could take would be to boycott British goods, but he doubted whether they would do this for some time. It had been proposed to replace the present troops with native troops of some kind or another. Festing had strongly opposed this and, in fact, this was the principal reason why he had come home; he thinks that he has won his point and that a White Brigade will be maintained, although probably on a reduced strength.

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I had a talk with WRIGHT, ex-D.I.B. officer, who is going out as No. 2 to Magan, D.S.O. in Palestine. WIRGHT, who comes to us with strong recommendations from Bamford and others, seemed to me to be an extremely good type. He knows Magan well and the two should work together well. He is going to be in the office for about twelve days and will then take up his appointment.

September 24th.

I talked to the A.L.O's to-day about cultivating Immigration Officers. I said that I thought they should get to know the lower graded and encourage them to talk about people who pass through their hands. We want them all to feel that they are, in a sense, part of our office. It was only by discussing their cases with them that we should get more detailed knowledge about undesirable people coming and going; they should have a great deal of information under their hats which they would not dream of putting in any of their reports to the Home Office. I found that nobody was covering the London area - this had arisen because there was no bottle-neck for the liaison with Special Branch. It seemed to me desirable that somebody should cover the Gravesend and also London airports. A.L.O's are covering the airports in other districts. I warned them that foreign Companies would be establishing offices on our various airports and

that it might be a good thing to learn as much about the personnel as we could. We had the pre-war experience of Luft-Hansa, whose representative, SCHMIDT REX, was now proven to have been a German agent.

At the D.G's meeting Adam produced a memorandum, addressed by Bevin to his Cabinet colleagues, on the question of the abolition of the visa. He recommended as a first step the abolition of the visa in France, and went on to refer to the International Conference under U.N.E.S.C.O. which is to deal with the subject on a much wider scale. He deprecated the attitude that his colleagues adopted at a meeting held early in August, at which it had been decided to leave the whole question in abeyance, mainly on security grounds. He put forward all the usual arguments about the importance of promoting good relations by trade and tourist traffic. He thought these "advantages" fully outweighed any security risks, which could be covered by the normal procedure of Immigration, Police registration, etc. We have replied, making it clear that the various spokes he suggests are more apparent than real, and that the real remedy for the present situation is to provide adequate staff for the Passport Control of the Aliens Department in the Home Office. By abolishing visas he will not get over the man-power question because the burden will be transferred to the Immigration staff and to the Police; an increase in the Aliens Department will also be necessary in view of the enormous number of applications for extensions that will result from the free admission of all aliens to this country. There will also be the problem of getting people out when their visas expire. This will throw an additional burden on the Police. Bevin also suggested that the security difficulties could be overcome by a close liaison with the French authorities concerned. It was pointed out to him that although the Police might see eye to eye with regard to criminals, an exchange of information between themselves and security authorities would depend entirely on the political situation. It was made clear that our main preoccupation was

Russia, and that the Russians used the Communist Parties of all foreign powers for their purpose. Lastly, it was once more explained that any advantage in good relations that might accrue at the outset from free travel would be more than off-set if the individuals were turned back at the port, after having paid the expenses of their journey.

Colonel BLAIR-CUNNINGHAM, who has taken over what were formerly R.S.S. functions at L.S.I.C., has been paying a visit to our office and has made the acquaintance of most people in B. Division. I gave him as clear a picture as I could about our main interests.

September 25th

The first meeting of the reconstituted XX Committee has taken place. The three Services, S.I.S Wingate, of the Controller's Office, and Drew on the civil side are members and T.A.R. was in the chair. They have considered the various channels which are open to them, but at the moment these are confined largely to the British Zone and to Ankara. At present there is no definite policy, or at any rate it is not been made known to the XX Committee.

I talked to M.E. about the Registry, of which he has seen a good deal. He thinks that by and large it is a good Registry, but he is concerned about the policy filing, which seems to be in a bad mess. He says that the first thing to decide is what a policy file is - on this he could not get any guidance from anyone in the Registry or even from Horrocks. The whole matter is largely a question of analysis. M.E. has, I think, managed to get his own files straight, but it is clearly necessary to get the whole office on to the same footing. M.E. feels, too, that something more might be done in the direction of getting look-ups made on a more individual basis. While look-ups are not bad, they are still in some degree mechanical.

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We are making arrangements for the D.G's visit to the Middle East. He leaves on the "ORONTES" on October 5th. We are arranging for his Egyptian visa here, but suggesting that if he wants to go to Iraq and Syria he should get his visas in Cairo. We had some difficulty in deciding whether he should go as "Sir Percy Sillitoe" or "Mr. Sillitoe". This question has not arisen before as all our visitors have been in uniform. We decided in the end that it was better that there should be no mystery and that he should go as "Sir Percy Sillitoe, Government Official". In the application for the visa, however, he will be described as coming from the War Office. Although this is a bore, it is probably better, in view of the publication in the Press some time ago about his appointment.

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