




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September 26th.
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1946.

We have now got IRA @ LANGE, and TURKUL under interrogation by Gilbert Ryle and Klop. Although TURKUL has said that IRA is a N.K.V.D. agent, the latter strongly denies this. Both of them, however, have lied and have had to retract. There are signs that the ice is beginning to crack. Nothing has been said, so far, to discredit Gilbert's thesis and much has come out which confirms

Hill and Wakefield came to see me about the case of a man called GOODE, who on our recommendation was arrested in Italy as a renegade and detained, contrary to our advice, for a period of five months. GOODE is now threatening action for wrongful detention against the Secretary of State for War, unless he can obtain the name of the individual responsible. The Treasury Council are pressing us for the name. We are saying that the local military authorities are responsible since we have no powers, and that in our covering letter we made it clear that detention should only take place if this appeared desirable on account of the military situation in the area. I recommended that we should stick to our line and that Wakefield should discuss the matter with Cussen, who initiated the case, and if necessary go with Cussen and see the Treasury Solicitors.

At the B. Meeting to-day I raised the question again of foreign airlines establishing offices at our aerodromes and the need for closer liaison with the Immigration authorities. I told the meeting that at the A.L.O's conference last week I had stressed the importance of their getting to know the Immigration people of all ranks, in

1.

order to find out what people were passing through their hands, etc.

I told the meeting that the D.M.I. had issued an order to the effect that M.I.5. is not a part of his directorate, but that there is a close liaison between us.

Himsworth gave a talk on the B.5. Press contact

I said that the person who does the cuttings should find out from all sections what their requirements in this direction were.

Mitchell said that the LEESE escape route affair was much clearer, now that LEESE has been writing letters to various people in which he refers to the "Argentine affair", "British Passports for males to go to Eire" etc. the

M.E. referred to/list of people from this office who handle material. He said we shall shortly have to fall in with ISIC requirements in this respect, and suggested that when the new organisation comes into being Senior Officers should supply lists from their sections of all secretaries and registrars who have to handle the material, a list of officers having been already supplied. He also mentioned a list of language qualifications which he was trying to compile. He said he would make a complete list, & would discuss it with DE/A as to how these people can be made available.

Ned Reid came to see me about RENNIE ASSOCIATES. His American friend, who had asked for information about South America had been told that the organisation did not receive sufficient support to make enquiries possible. They did not say, however, whether they were opening up activities in Europe or the British Commonwealth. Ned does not think that his contact can go back to them again on this subject. If, however, he sees an opportunity of getting a Swede or Dutchman to do so, he will take it.

September 27th.

Jack Barrow came to see me. He is now connected with a Company which has an important liaison with Franco ROSSI, a large engineering company near Milan. He will be concerned with the sale of their products within the Empire and has representation in Hong Kong, the Caribbean, Singapore and other places. He thought that we might possibly find his Empire contacts of use to us. I am going to discuss this matter further with him.

Sir John Shaw and Mr. Gurney, his successor as Chief Secretary in Palestine, came to see me and subsequently saw the D.G. Gurney has been initiated into OATS - I explained to him the position of our D.S.O. and of S.I.M.E. As Gurney had been previously in both West and East Africa I talked to him about the proposal that we should have a D.S.O. in Nairobi. He thought that probably this was right, but he was emphatic about this officer covering West Africa as well. He pointed out that it would be easier to send someone to West Africa from here than to send someone from Nairobi. He did not think that there were any but purely local problems in West Africa and he mentioned that anybody coming from East Africa to discuss the affairs of West Africa would get a bad start owing to a long-standing breach which was, of course, subdued but nevertheless existed. The D.G. told me afterwards that Sir John Shaw, while having a very high opinion of Kellar's knowledge and ability, felt that as a successor to Douglas Roberts, Giles of the Palestine Police would be a better choice. I told the D.G. that Sir John Shaw had a very limited knowledge about the whole organisation and work, and that I doubted very much whether he had any idea what the head of S.I.M.E. was called upon to do, or what type of person it was desirable to have there. Personally I was

convinced that the appointment of Giles, who was a Levantine and extremely touchy, would be a disaster. It is unfortunate that this should have happened, since Shaw has confirmed Douglas Roberts's view which I am certain was given purely out of pique. Moreover, Douglas Roberts contradicted himself completely when he said that Kellar would not be suitable as he is not a soldier and then recommended Giles who is a policeman.

Curry came to talk to me about the carding of a report on the Hungarian Intelligence Service. The Registry were asking for a ruling, and were evidently hoping that this could be a matter for S.I.S. I said that while I was certain that there ought to be discretion, i.e. that it was not necessary to card cipher clerks, etc., it was essential for us to card our opposite numbers and their agents. We had been made responsible for the defence of the realm, in so far as security matters were concerned, and we, therefore, had to card in accordance with our responsibilities. If anything went wrong as a result of not carding, the section concerned would be responsible and not S.I.S. or the Registry.

Ruffer, late of O20, came to see me. He is at present employed by the British Council in Paris. He knows Bobby Mackenzie, having been with him at school and in the Gunners but has not made his acquaintance in Paris. I told him that I thought he ought to do so. He also told me that he had been meeting Baudreuil in a social way. I told him that I did not much like Baudreuil, and that he had better watch his step in any relations with Bobby Mackenzie, as Baudreuil, knowing that Ruffer was an ex-Member of M.I.5., would be almost certain to suspect that he was up to no good.

September 30th

Dick White returned to-day from leave. I discussed with him the question of his going to the Middle East. We came to the conclusion that as he could not get out there until the end of the month, it would hardly be worth his while going unless the D.G. feels that he has to make a decision on the spot about Douglas Roberts's successor.

Cussen and Wakefield came to see me about GOODE. Cussen is quite clear about the legal position. He says that only the local Commander on the spot or the Minister of War can be indicted. He will see the Treasury Solicitors. He himself would be perfectly ready to give evidence as an ex-Army officer.

We also discussed the case of Admiral Thomson's leakage to Freddie KUH about the cuts in his articles in the Sunday Despatch; these related to Ireland. An article appeared in the Chicago Sun, stating that these cuts had been made on account of the co-operation that had been received from the Eire Government during the war. Clearly Admiral Thomson told KUH. We agreed that owing to the lapse of time and lack of any publicity given to this matter in this country, it would be better to let sleeping dogs lie. If, however, Admiral Thomson became troublesome in the future it would be as well to have the information on record.

Bertram EDE has returned from the Caribbean with KIRBY-GREEN. I discussed with him his future. He does not want to run B.3.c., nor is he particularly keen to become A.L.O. Scotland, although he would not mind this job if there were nothing else for him to do. He seems to think it would only be a part-time job and that for the rest of the week he could shoot or fish.

I said that this was not quite my idea of the job. What Bertram would really like to do would be to act as an adviser on Colonial matters to myself, and be sent abroad on missions similar to the one that he has just carried out. I said that in my view this was really a reversion to the old Overseas Control idea - I did not see how he could perform that function without cutting across the tracks of B.3., or without knowing all about the Intelligence of the area which he was visiting. He seemed to think that the job was different and that such a knowledge would not be really necessary. I gathered that if it were decided that his services were not required in this capacity, he would like to apply for the Foreign Office job, although he did not wish to leave the department. He asked that his name should be put in provisionally. He then told me about his ideas for running the Caribbean. He thought that the Head Office should be in Washington and that the D.S.O.s in the Colonies should be removed. I said that I liked the idea of running the show from Washington, but that I had always understood that this was unacceptable to Governors and to the Colonial Office. Bertram said that he had ascertained that this was not so. I also said that I thought we should have to retain some pied-a-terre in the Colonies. The idea appeals to me, as it provides an additional argument to 'C' for the establishment of an office on American soil. It would, I think, be for consideration whether the office should be in Washington or New York. Stephenson always had a preference for New York, as he felt that if you visited Washington it was easier to get access to the people you wanted to see. If you were resident there they were inclined to put you off.

October 1st.

I took over from Harker and, in the D.G.'s absence, took his weekly meeting. Harry said that the J.I.C. had accepted his recommendation that Creedy should investigate the question

of reciprocity and the exchange of information with the Russians. While the War Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry are working it on a reciprocal basis, the Ministry of Supply are handing things out right and left. Hollis raised the question of two historians who were members of the Communist Party and working in the Cabinet Offices. Although they might not be engaged on confidential subjects, it was not unlikely that they mixed with other people who were. These people would not know that they were talking to members of the Communist Party. I suggested to Hollis that he should have a talk with Colonel Walker, who spoke to me about them at the club the other day - one of them was taken on against our advice and the other was taken on before the result of the vetting was received.

Alec Kellar returned from leave to-day.

Vickery and Bamford came to see me about their H.O.s. At present they are only supplying to D.I.B. such information as the Interim Government requires. This, of course, does not include anything bearing on the activities of the Congress Party. On the other hand, members of Congress, such as MENON, are in touch with R.P. DUTT and also with Molotov in Paris, which is clearly a matter of interest to the Foreign Office. The H.O.W. which produced this information can no longer be sponsored by the India Office. It is suggested, therefore, that we should take over the responsibility. A somewhat similar situation exists with regard to Burma. I said that I did not think there would be any real difficulty in our doing this under our Charter. I would, however, speak to Maxwell. The present Government in India did not like the Communists, mainly because by supporting Russia they indirectly assisted Great Britain during the war. NEHRU, however, is

prepared to take a fairly tolerant view of this. MENON's connection with NEHRU indicates that he, MENON, wants NEHRU to take an entirely pro-Russian line in all international dealings. MENON and DUTT saw NEHRU a short time ago in India and are believed to have, in some degree at any rates, won him over to this point of view.

The D.G. told me that he had seen the P.M., who had said that if any matter of importance cropped up during his absence I could have access to the P.M. at any time. He read the memorandum on TURKUL and WEIZMAN, and also a note by Hollis on the Peoples Party and Arnold LEESE. The P.M. was interested in all these three things. He appreciated the position about BULLDOG and wished that any important items should be brought to him personally. He did not wish them to be given any other circulation. He said that he had never heard of the Peoples Party or of LEESE and would be very glad to have some further information. The D.G. said I or Hollis would go over and see him. The P.M. said that unfortunately our memorandum about the visa had arrived after the Cabinet meeting which had decided on its gradual abolition at some not too far distant date. He appreciated, however, the arguments that we had put forward, which the D.G. reinforced, and said that he would speak to the Foreign Minister. The D.G. asked him about the creation of a Ministry of Defence and how this would affect our position. He said that it was his firm intention that we should remain under him in his capacity as Prime Minister. I talked to the D.G. about the Caribbean plan and our representation in the U.S. He wanted me to pursue the matter as far as possible with 'C' during his absence. I have warned him not to talk to the P.M. on the subject until we reach a complete impasse. I thought that 'C' might be more amenable to our having an office in

Washington if one of its purposes was to run the Caribbean, for which we were responsible.

2nd October 1946

Harold Caccia rang to say that the F.O. had turned down Bertram for the security job. I think he gave the impression that he was going to run something on slightly Gestapo lines. I am sure he had no intention of doing this, nor do I think he would have operated in that way. It is a pity, but the F.O. have apparently made up their minds that he is unsuitable.

I discussed with Dick, Kirby Green and Clayton the proposal that K.G. should run the Caribbean from Washington. Dick seemed a little bit worried about this. He thought it would be a bad thing to give the impression that we were running Colonies from America and if there were an officer there for that purpose it might invite criticism if Congress got on to it. I said I did not think that this need happen. K.G. would go to Washington as our liaison officer. The Caribbean area would be run by two D.S.O.s, one in the north and one in the south, in Trinidad and Jamaica respectively, and K.G. would only go down and inspect them occasionally. Meanwhile he would carry liaison with the F.B.I. and R.C.M.P.

Machell looked in to see me. He has a job with Kemsley's press. He is writing leaders for the provincial papers. He hopes ultimately to go to America.

The D.G. held a meeting to discuss the Washington situation. It was officially agreed that we should proceed and that I should try and clear the ground with "C". If "C" is adamant I could either go and see Bridges or await the D.G.'s return.

October 3rd, 1946

At the J.I.C. today we discussed the Communist paper. DMI remarked that nothing was said about North Africa. I intimated that this was really a matter for SIS. DMI said that he was worried about Greece. After our troops left what sort of intelligence organisation we were going to have? What would happen to SIME and DSO point? I suggested that if it were acceptable it might be possible to leave somebody behind under suitable cover as we had done in Syria. Elmhirst said that the evidence about alleged rockets falling in Sweden was entirely inconclusive. So far not a bit of anything had been found on the ground.

I told Bertram about the F.O. decision.

I had a word with the D.G. about our representation in the Middle East. I said that I thought we had to go forward with the firm conviction that we had the best man we could possibly put into the job as the head of SIME in Alec Kellar, and that we should say so to the Commander in Chief and hope that the proposal would be acceptable to him. We could very easily canvas opinions, but we should always find some which were pro and some which were adverse and many of the people consulted would not really have any proper idea of what the job was or what kind of a person was required to fill it. He had already had the opinion of Roberts who began by saying that Kellar would not do because he was not a soldier and then went on to suggest Giles who was a Levantine policeman. Sir John Shaw had expressed great admiration of Kellar's work, but when asked whether

he or Giles was the better choice had said Giles. In fact, Sir John Shaw had no clue as to what the head of SIME had to do or what kind of a person was required to fulfil the appointment. The DG has now seen the late C-in-C, General Paget who had expressed firmly the opinion that Giles would be totally unsuitable. Meanwhile the D.G. had had a hint from Rymer Jones, the Inspector General of police in Palestine, that Giles was expecting great news from him. My view of this talk was quite valueless. We knew the situation, what was required, the person and what they were capable of, and the decision should be ours subject to the agreement of the C-in-C and no one else. D.G. agreed and said that he would proceed on those lines. He then told me that he had seen Gater and that it was agreed that the D.G. should visit Nairobi. He would probably be taking Perfect with him.

Captain Caiger came to see me about the Lambay-Rush pigeon service. He is our pigeon expert. He is, in fact, the nearest thing to a pigeon that I have ever seen. He talks, thinks and dreams about them. He has had pigeons since he was a boy and his father had pigeons before him. I asked him about the homing instinct. He said that the matter is quite unsolved. There is however, one curious fact, namely that in a sun spot year all pigeons go hay-wire. Sun spots are, of course, minute radio active particles though how they affect the pigeons' homing instinct nobody knows. This gives some colour to the suggestion that pigeons might be able to home on an electric beam, in other words that you might have radio-controlled pigeons. There is apparently a slight suspicion that a man in Scotland who is particularly

successful is actually doing this. Caiger does not believe it.

4th October 1946

John Phipps came in to see me. He has returned from Nuremberg. I discussed with him the judgement. He said that he thought that it might have been better than it was and that in certain points the local pundits may well think that it was over-criticism. It had however to be borne in mind that it was an agreed judgement and that agreement was not always easy. On the whole more trouble was experienced from the Americans through a muddle-headed idea of first principles and law than from the Russians. As regards the sentences he thought that their execution was inevitable in view of the fact that many people had already been dealt with and were being dealt with every week for having carried out the orders to which many of the accused in the dock put their signature.

I had lunch with Tangye who gave me his press report. He made it clear that it did not pretend to be anything more than Fleet Street gossip and he seemed quite prepared for me to say at any time that it might be a commitment which we did not wish to continue since it was doubtful how far it came within our charter. On the other hand, we might feel, and Norman Brook might feel, that it had certain uses and that Tangye's contacts could be useful in other ways from time to time. I do not think that Tangye would really mind if we ceased to employ him. I said that I should be seeing Norman Brook and

considering the whole position. If I felt honestly that we could not justify the expenditure I would let him know.

5th October 1946

D.G. left today for the Middle East with Horrocks.

Cussen told me that he had entirely satisfied the Treasury solicitors in the case of GOODE and that if they had to name anybody responsible they would name the officer in Italy who gave the orders for arrest. As regards Admiral Thomson and the article in the Chicago Sun stating why the paragraphs on Eire in his Sunday Dispatch articles had been expunged, we decided that owing to the lapse of time it was better to let sleeping dogs lie. The Chicago Sun had not been copied over here.

7th October 1946

I went to see the P.M. at his request in order to give him further information about the British Peoples Party and Arnold LEESE. We discussed generally the Fascist movement and I think I gave him all the answers he required. I said that of course the one common factor in all the various Fascist groups was anti-Semitism and it seemed a pity that the reputable Jews could not do something to call their disreputable kith and kin to order. The P.M. agreed, but said that the trouble was that they always held together. He was afraid that the Fascist elements had a good deal to work on, particularly in the East End where boys in factories were sometimes ruthlessly exploited. He asked me to come and see him again whenever

I wanted and to keep him generally in touch.

I lunched with Perks. I explained to him our anxieties about the visa and about the whole work of sifting incoming travellers falling on his I.O.s. He seemed to take the whole matter rather lightly, in fact he told me in some ways he viewed it with favour. He wanted his officers to use their powers of observation and intuition and to be thoroughly well trained in spotting undesirables. He always instructed them to look at the traveller rather than at his passport. He was not, however, too sanguine about all his personnel, many of whom are recruited at £6 a week. He fell in very readily with my suggestion that A.L.O.s should be in closer touch with I.O.s and suggested that in future they should attend I.O. conferences when Perks himself went down to the port. He undertook to let me know when he would be making such visits.

Ann Glass has returned from Italy where she has been sifting documents in the Ministry of Popular Culture. She is going to work in B.2.

I saw Harold Scott today about Kirby Green. He readily agreed to his transfer on the condition that he would hand to us all his pension increments and receive in exchange pension rights with this Department from the date when he joined the police. I talked to him about the visa abolition. He entirely agrees with all our views, particularly about the Aliens Branch and the inadequacy of the Immigration Service. He has made a strong stand about retention of identity documents for travel to Ireland.

8th October 1946

Cimperman called to see me with a letter which he had received from the Bureau asking that we should be informed that contrary to a statement in the American Press, Mr. Hoover had communicated nothing to Drew Pearson about the Corby case in Canada. There was a leak through the Press before the case broke and some colour was given to the suggestion that this had occurred through Hoover by the fact that Hoover knows Drew Pearson through Cuneo and that he might have been interested in forcing the hand of the American government to make arrests in the U.S.

Colonel Neilans, former C.C. Dundee, came to see me. He is now carrying out special investigations for the Ministry of Food. He is really the successor to Charles Teggart. He wanted to know whether we could help him with a banking account. He had a black market case on hand in Blackpool and Liverpool where large quantities of Tate & Lyle sugar had been going to icecream merchants. Two of his own officers, one an ex-inspector of the Manchester police, in Blackpool were involved in tipping off the gang when raids were being made. He wanted to look at these mens' accounts. I said that with the greatest regret we could not help him. There had been a general enquiry after the war with a view to deciding what our peace time charter should be. Although the services that we had rendered with regard to black market offences during the war were thoroughly appreciated, it was desirable that we should be connected with nothing of the kind in the future. We had therefore a definite order from the P.M. to which we were bound to adhere. He

fully understood the decision. I said, moreover, we no longer had any powers under the Defence Regulations which would give bankers the necessary cover.

Wright came in to see me for a moment. He is joining Magan, our D.S.O. in Palestine.

Dick, Curry, Anthony ^{BLUNT} and I discussed the case of Padgham. Anthony had just seen him in Germany and he was in a very low state. His de-Nazification was not complete and he had not, therefore, been able to take up his post as Oberregierungsrat. He did not think he could stick the winter in Germany. We have all felt that there is not much future for him in this country and we should do all we could to alleviate his lot by getting him petrol and food. If he could have a small car he may be able to live with his brother just outside Kiel instead of in some dingy boarding house. Padgham seems unable to face up to realities. I suggested that Dick and Anthony should put all the facts to Vansittart and get his backing for our point of view. Since Van's advice carried great weight with Padgham.

9th October 1946

I saw Norman Brook and gave him Tangye's report. He said that while he liked these reports and that on occasion he took quite useful action, he could not say that they were vital to him in his work. If, therefore at any time we thought that the expense was too great he would not press us to retain Tangye's services. He was very pleasant and said that if ever I thought he could be of assistance I was to go and see him.

A man called TURNER, late of the Sudan Police, called to see me on the recommendation of Harold Scott. He had been invalidated out of the Services. While he is now quite fit he did not think that it would be fair to himself or to us to offer himself for employment in the Middle East or in any hot climate. He would, however, be quite prepared to work either whole time in this office or part time. I told him that if anything turned up I would let him know. He knows Arabic quite well.

Had a long talk with D.B.P. mainly on the subject of FIAT who had recently produced an interesting report on I.G. Farben. The report shows a very extensive ramifications of I.G. Farben in Europe, America and even to some extent in this country. There was a possible case against two individuals here who had diverted a shipment of some vital raw material at the beginning of the war, but he felt that these people were too small fry to warrant prosecution. He agreed however, with us that FIAT should continue its work for two reasons. Firstly it was desirable that somebody should know the extent to which these vital industries were controlled by a foreign power, and secondly, because firms such as I.G. Farben might well be used as a cover for espionage. The matter is to be discussed by the J.I.C.

Harry Allen attended a meeting at which Monty spoke to the Military Attaches on 24th September. His main points were: (1) National character. Without strong national character a nation will go to war.

(2) No parsimony regarding scientific research.

(3) Dispersal of new war industries.

(4) Preparedness. A small regular army backed by a large territorial army the whole to be a balanced force ready at short notice.

(5) Conscription.

The problem he has been studying in America is how to train officers and men quickly. On Intelligence he admitted that before the war commanders did not really understand or appreciate it for what it was worth. He felt that this was now quite changed and the Higher Command saw the matter in its proper perspective. Monty is now a strong supporter of 'I'. In fact, operations and intelligence are to inter-change their personnel as much as possible. Monty said that in U.S.A. he was asked whether Armies, Navies and Air Forces were not dead already owing to the atomic bomb. His answer was "You muck about in your labs and places and have no responsibility. I have a responsibility to advise my Government on what to do if, for example, things blow up in Palestine. Am I to advise the dropping of an atomic bomb, or several, on Palestine or do I advise the despatch of an armed force?"

10th October 1946

I saw Maxwell today and talked to him about the abolition of the visa. I explained to him how vital the visa was to our work and said while I realised it would go in due course, it did mean that we should be more and more dependent on the Immigration authorities. He welcomed the proposals which I had made to Perks that we should

get into closer contact with Immigration Officers, but he did not hold out much hope of improvement. In fact, I rather doubt whether he thought improvement was necessary in the work of Immigration Officers. I said that what had really brought the visa into disrepute was the lack of staff in the Aliens Branch of the Home Office for dealing with applications. I cited to him the case of the applicant in the U.S. who applied in February and was still waiting for an answer in June. He said that they were doing what they could to obtain better accommodation and facilities for the Aliens Branch, particularly as regards Traffic Index. Apparently their filing system is very out of date. I was left with the impression that nothing would be done to improve the Immigration Service until there was a complete breakdown. I met Miss Nunn going out and repeated to her my anxieties. She was extremely sympathetic. She said that there was always some inconclusive going on in B. Division of the Home Office and that they were like a bottomless pit as regards staff. Nothing seems to ease the situation and they were permanently in a muddle.

Saw D.M.I. on the question of Greece and left with him a note showing how our interests would be affected if S.I.M.E. withdrew. He agreed that we should remain and said that he would be quite pleased to give us one post as Assistant Military Attache. As regards the other post, possibly in Salonica, I suggested that Wickham's police organisation might provide suitable cover. I told him that there might be some opposition from "C" at our remaining at all. We considered

We considered whether it would be better that he should tackle "C" or that I should. I thought, however, it would be best to clear the matter with the Middle East first. I outlined to the D.M.I. the lecture I was going to give to the Imperial Defence College which goes pretty far. I thought that this was necessary when speaking to officers who might, in the future, be responsible for giving us ^{the} assistance we required. I intended to explain to them that we had the control of the enemy's Intelligence Service throughout the whole war and our machine had been turned over to successful deception for D. Day. He entirely agreed that this was right.

11th October 1946

I discussed Ede's position with him and with Charles. It seemed to me that whether Ede accepted the job of A.L.O. Scotland or not it would be impossible to appoint him until the D.G. returned. The Scottish police had expressed a desire for a police officer of their own choice and the D.G. had promised to give the matter his careful consideration. If, therefore, Ede was to go to Scotland it would be for the D.G. to go up there himself and explain the position. If I made the appointment they might well think that I was trying to put a fast one across they in the D.G.'s absence. It seemed to me therefore, that Ede's appointment should remain in abeyance and that he should go on leave if he wanted to until December.

Nigel de Grey came to see me. He had been making a tour of the office. I

explained to him the general principles on which we worked.

I had a word with "C". I discussed with him my lecture to the Imperial Defence College. He agreed with the line I was proposing to take. We then talked about America. I was insistent that if we had an officer there he should not share his office with Peter Dwyer. "C" saw my point I think, but was obviously reluctant to make a final decision. He wanted me to discuss with Kim Philby what the division of functions would be between our officer and Peter Dwyer.

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14th October 1946

I gave a lecture to the Imperial Defence College on the work of the office lasting about an hour. Thereafter I was questioned for another hour. This was something of an ordeal, but I think it went fairly well.

General Slim, the Commandant and former commander of the 14th Army in Burma, was in the Chair. There were about 40 students including 4 budding Chiefs of Staff, 2 Australians, 2 New Zealanders, 2 Canadians and 2 Americans. I began by telling them our objectives in three fields namely Intelligence Services of potential enemies, subversive movements and security and showing how the three were closely inter-related. I then gave them the principles that we adopted in our work in connection with each field. In the second part I gave an account of our work from the period immediately preceeding the outbreak of war to the conclusion of hostilities, and in part 3 I told them what our organisation looked like on the ground, where it was found and how it fitted in to the machinery of government. I took the lid off completely on the question of getting control of the enemy's organisation in British territory and the turning over of our D.A. organisation for the purposes of deception. I explained how this had been done, and what its effect had been, and how the facts had ultimately been checked against enemy intelligence reports and the statements of Keitel, Jodl and Rundstedt. At question time I was asked more about Fascists and Communists than about anything else. None of the questions was difficult to answer. I got the impression that prior to my talk most of the officers present had very little knowledge of the kind of work we did or the way we did it. I left them with two points: firstly the extent to which we depended upon the Services, the Government Departments and indeed the community as a whole, for security sense. If their security sense was bad much of our work might be a waste

of time. Secondly I said that I hoped that I had impressed them with the immense importance of the counter-espionage and deception weapon which we had build up by means of double-agents, since were it not for the number that we had obtained and the success of these operations, many might regard them as too fantastic to be believed. We had found it difficult to convince people in the early stages and had, consequently had considerable difficulty in getting their very necessary co-operation.

I got the D.N.I. to lunch at the Travelle and afterwards brought him along to the office for a talk. He saw Harry, Dick, Alec and Roger and I think felt that his visit had been profitable. He is an extremely pleasant individual and I feel a great improvement on his predecessor

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15th October 1946

I saw Krymer today. He is absolutely on his beam ends. He gets £16.10.0. a month from the Polish army on which he has to keep himself, his mother and his two children. He wanted my support for his application to join the Control Commission. As he would not be receiving any more money until November 1st and had already pawned most of his belongings

I gave him a cheque for £10 which I told him to regard as a purely personal thing between myself and him. I made it quite clear that the office could be under no obligation to him.

Burt came to talk to me about his visit to Ireland. He went down to Dublin where he was received in a most friendly manner by General Murphy and by the Garda, particularly Cantley and Carroll. They promised to co-operate faithfully with him.

We considered several applications at the Appointments Board today. The most promising seemed to be [redacted] who would be a suitable worker for Roger Hollis. He is of the academic kind and clearly has no great ambition. Another man, [redacted] is worth further consideration. He went to the University for a year and felt that he would like to know more about human beings. He took various jobs such as a lorry driver and grocer's assistant for a year and then went back to the University. He subsequently did extremely well in the Army, getting the M.C. and mentioned in dispatches. He is the kind of person who would want to be kept very busy and would have to work under somebody he thoroughly respected otherwise he might become troublesome.

I discussed with Kellar certain BULLDOG material. We did not think it was of sufficient importance to give to the P.M. We have now agreed not to send BULLDOG material to the ^{High} Commissioner unless it has been to the P.M. or unless it is material which is of purely local significance.

16th October 1946

I spoke to Kim about the officer which the Palestine police want to send on a roving commission in Europe in connection with illegal immigration. I said that frankly we thought this a bad idea and would be glad to know whether he and his chief agreed and would be prepared to back us up in our reply to Palestine. He spoke to "C" who said that he entirely agreed with our point of view and provided we were not rude would endorse anything we said.

T.A.R. brought in an army friend of his who is a possible for A.L.O. Scotland if Ede falls down. He has a distinguished army record as a G.S.O.1. and seemed a very alert and pleasant person.

I had lunch with . He was rather disturbed about what he described as a natural reserve by those officers with whom he was in touch here. He quite understood the position, namely that we would be anxious about passing information in the present circumstances lest it should get into the wrong hands on the other side of the Channel. He said that he thought that things generally in the intelligence world were settling down and that reliable people such as Bonnefus were getting control. He would be in a better position to give us assurances in about a month's time when we should see the effect of the new constitution and the new Government on the intelligence world. Meanwhile, he said that he was watching our interests very carefully and passing things on in a form in which they could not do us harm if by any chance they

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got into the wrong hands in Paris. He would be quite prepared to give us a guarantee not to pass certain information on if we were at all worried about the source. He said that he was conducting no offensive operations here at all. He was merely concerned, apart from acting as liaison officer, with a study of the press and an explanation of the significance of the various articles or extracts which he sent over. In this connection he mentioned de COURCY's leaflet. I took the opportunity of telling him that de Courcey sometimes hit the nail on the head, but was by no means always accurate and that he had a way of obtaining information by posing as an official or unofficial representative of British intelligence. I wanted him to understand that de COURCY had absolutely nothing to do with any Government Department or any intelligence department, and in fact that M.I.5. or M.I.6. would fly a mile from him. I happen to know that he, by innuendo, had been suggesting in Paris that he had something to do with M.I.6. This was totally untrue. I promised I would do anything I could to help and assured him that he personally had the complete confidence of all officers in our Department.

Drew asked me about the Canadian Royal Commission Report and the extent to which it had publicity. He was speaking on behalf of the Lord President who wanted us to consider whether anything further could be done towards getting lessons home in high quarters. I told him that the report had been dealt with by The Times, Weekly Review, The Sunday Dispatch and a special weekly called Tidings by

Douglas Reed. 1,400 copies were on order from Canada, 400 of which had been earmarked by the F.O. to send to their representatives abroad.

17th October 1946

I went over the accounts with Charles and Miss Constant. They seemed to me to be admirably done.

Krymer came to see me. I put him on to someone in the War Office in the hope that he might get employment as an interpreter at one of the resettlement camps. I heard later that this had failed and I therefore put him in touch with Dick Butler who had said he would do what he could.

I had a discussion today with Harry, Dick, T.A.R., Archer and Miss Clay. It was decided that a point should be established in B. Division for the collation of all papers dealing with sabotage. Poston of B.4.A. would be the officer. The arrangement would not affect the present responsibilities of Archer for preliminary investigation of sabotage cases, and Boddington would remain in C.2 for the purpose. It was agreed that the Service Departments should be informed of the division of responsibilities and that they should be instructed when in doubt to apply, in the first instance, to the head of C.2.

18th October 1946

I had a discussion with Kirby Green, Cumming and Farnival Jones about passages for our overseas officers. To get K.G. back to the Caribbean we have to move

the local G.O.C. to send a telegram to the Priorities Board. We feel that suitable priority ought to be granted on the D.G.'s request. Furnival Jones says that the principle adopted is that if we expect the army to pay the G.O.C. must be the person responsible for saying what people coming to his area should have priority and that if we interfere the War Office may say that they won't undertake to pay for our transport. We are going to see what can be done.

Mr. Van Millingen, who is the brother-in-law of Jock Balfour, came to see me about a job. He seemed an intelligent fellow. Before the war he was in the Bombay & Burma Corporation and during the war he worked for both S.I.S. and S.O.E. in the Far East. He evidently took a poor view of S.I.S. He is not anxious to return to the Far East, but would be ready to go to other parts of the Empire or to work here. He is going out to Indo-China for his company on a two months visit and will get into touch with me on his return in case there may be anything for him. He is aged about 44.

Colonel Sprunt came to see me again. He was anxious to know whether we could take him on probation. I said we never did anything of the kind unless we had a definite object in view. I think his real object in suggestion this was a fear that he might be whisked away from his present employment in the Control Commission London. He then asked me whether I would recommend him to S.I.S. This I have undertaken to do as I thought possibly his knowledge of Turkish might appeal to Kim Philby.

We saw Brigadier Major at the Appointments Board today. While we liked him we felt that his age, 53, and his seniority would make it difficult for him to take employment abroad under officers who would clearly be very much his junior. We told him too that we were barred from taking on the permanent staff anyone of his age. We thought there might be a possibility of employing him in C. Division if this work would be congenial to him. On this point we advised him to consult Harry Allen who knows him personally. He struck me as being a very pleasant and alert person. He has had quite an interesting career during the war doing a variety of jobs, one of which was to organise the stay-behind army here if there had been an invasion. He clearly had the greatest admiration for the people who served under him in that connection.

I attended a meeting of senior Immigration Officers at the Home Office to which Perks had invited me. A variety of subjects came up for discussion and it was made abundantly clear that I.O.s did not think much of the quality of their staff. This is not surprising as most of them are being recruited at £6 a week. With the exception of two or three, the I.O.s themselves did not strike one as being particularly bright. Most of the running was made by Jewel of Dover. I took the opportunity of explaining to the meeting how important the work of I.O.s was to our organisation. We relied on controls which, unfortunately were being constantly relaxed, to help us in our enquiries and to narrow the field of investigation. Anything we could do, therefore, to assist I.O.s

in watching our interests could only have tremendous advantage for our organisation. I therefore welcomed the opportunity of attending the meeting and also Perks' kind offer to allow our A.L.O.s to attend local meetings to I.O.s. I said that I felt that it was only by knowing officers personally at ports and discussing various cases with them that we could get good co-operation. This seemed to be quite well received. I then raised the question of the Suspect Index. It is clear that it lies open on the desk in front of the alien when he is being interrogated and with accommodation as it is today at the ports no other system is really feasible. We have to take it, therefore, that if we put a man on the list and he comes through the port he is almost certain to become aware that he is suspect.

21st October 1946

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Briscoe came to tell me that papers connected with the German censorship

centre at Salzburg were being shared on a quadripartite basis. This presumably means that the Russians would be aware of many of the inks and re-agents employed by the Germans. It seemed desirable that we should at least know what the information was and how much the Russians had learnt.

22nd October 1946

At the J.I.C. today we discussed propaganda in the Middle East and against Communism and the paper prepared on this subject by Kirkpatrick. Some doubt was thrown on the ability of Kirkpatrick's existing organisation to handle the matter and a caveat was entered that it might be necessary to reform P.W.E. on a modified scale. Strong seemed to think that a planning section was necessary and an executive section and the planners should be in close touch with the various intelligence departments. I asked what the machinery would be for transmitting any contribution that we might have. Hayter said that he would go into this and let us know. Bevin has apparently issued a directive which makes it clear that he is only prepared for the moment to carry out propaganda in the Middle East. A paper is, however, to be prepared by the J.I.C. for the Chiefs of Staff showing what the effect of Communism in any part of the world may have upon our strategy. In this connection we have been asked to prepare a paper showing what the Communists could do or might do in the event of a war with Russia. I have asked B.1 to put up a draft. A proposal to send a limited number of renegades from the Soviet sphere in Germany to

this country was turned down. It was apparently thought that if some inducement and a home here were held out we might get more information. I said that I thought this was a very two-edged weapon and invited the Russians to plant people on us. It would be much better if such people were dealt with in the Zone. As regards lectures to the Imperial Staff College as distinct from the Imperial Defence College we are not to be called upon. Hayter will explain our position in the general set up, and D.M.I. will deal with counter-intelligence. I promised to let them both have a short brief.

Spencer came to talk to me generally about Ireland. I explained to him the position and said that I would take the first opportunity to introduce him both to Dan and to Sir John Stephenson.

23rd October 1946

Ian Carrel came to see me today and was subsequently put before the Selection Board, including Malcolm Johnston. We made his terms of service quite clear to him, including the possibility that if there were a drastic cut he would have no right to employment elsewhere. He seemed very keen to come to us and made a thoroughly favourable impression. His whole record is excellent. We told him to think things over and let us know.

B.A. Hill came to tell me about the WICKS case. There is a rather complicated legal point and the Court of Appeal have reserved their judgement. There is no doubt about WICKS' guilt, but if the case is upheld it may cause an awkward precedent for reviewing old statutes or regulations.

If the sentence is upheld there will almost certainly be an appeal to the House of Lords. If the proceedings are quashed it will mean that those of four other renegades will probably be dealt with in a similar manner.

24th October 1946

Win Scott brought General Peabody to see me. He was formerly, I think, Military Attache here. He is now to return as head of C.I.G. in London. He is a pleasant individual.

I told Adam that by agreement with Hastings they had decided to stop any enquiries about the Jewish connections of people who were to be initiated into . There had been a case where S.B., having been asked to make indirect enquiries, had called the man up on the telephone and told him to come round to the police station. It was inevitable that this sort of thing would happen if we gave the police any excuse for making enquiries. The only thing to do was to ask if there was any record and to make it clear that no enquiries were to be made. Hastings had agreed.

At the B. Meeting today Archer raised the question of a Chinese mission at the Gloucester Aircraft Co. The Chinese had a contract for the building and designing of jet engines. The Chinese were being instructed on an adolescent engine, but were being taught by the same designers and engineers who were engaged on work for a new top secret engine. There seemed to be nothing for it but that the Chinese would become aware of the existence and performance of the new engine - in fact they were

already talking in terms of 700 m.p.h. A curious feature of the whole position was that the Russians, who had a contract with Rolls, and where the Chinese had previously been, were asking no questions and were not in the least bit curious. This was considered rather alarming in view of the fact that every Chinaman has his price.

Vickery came to see me about certain documents affecting Krishna MENON. These were communications between MENON and NEHRU. Vickery did not feel that in the present set up he could pass this information direct to the F.O. He would, therefore, arrange for S.I.S. to do so if that met with our approval. We should, however, keep copies.

Charles, Dick, Ede, Kirby Green, Spencer and I discussed the question of Trinidad and the withdrawal of Tufnell-Barrett. It was agreed that Kirby Green should carry a letter from us couched in suitable terms informing him that we could not give him, Tufnell-Barrett, permanent employment. K.G. would take this down to Trinidad and let us know the re-actions. Meanwhile, we would try and think of a suitable successor to Tufnell-Barrett.

The D.M.I. rang up to say that from a paper he had seen it was just possible that we might withdraw from Greece at the end of this year. I told him that Dick would be looking into the whole question of our representation in Greece as soon as he arrived in Cairo.

25th October 1946

Krymer rang up to say that there was no chance of his getting employment as an interpreter with the Polish Resettlement Corps. I put him in touch with Dick Butler who had kindly offered to try and find him work.

Dick and I had a talk with Kim Philby about Washington. I had not previously realised that S.I.S. were already situated in the Embassy. I had imagined that "C" wanted us to go into a joint office somewhere in town. This seemed to me to create an entirely satisfactory situation since if we could get a room in the Embassy we should be working in the Embassy and not under M.I.6. We agreed tentatively that (1) we would have our own representative with the right to make contact with F.B.I. and C.I.G. as and when we desired. (2) We would have our own ciphers. (3) We would work in close collaboration with S.I.S. and if possible have our records linked by a common index. (4) we should be responsible for cases directly affecting the defence of the Realm and that S.I.S. would handle cases predominantly of foreign interest. We should have to rely on our two representatives sorting these matters out on the spot. I said that we would draft a letter on these lines to "C" and that I hoped we should have his backing in asking the F.O. for the necessary cover and accommodation.

I went to look at the new building. It is not very impressive, but may improve with redecoration. Its worse feature is its inaccessibility.

The Americans have refused to receive TURKUL and IRA back in their Zone. I have, therefore, written to Shoosmith asking whether he could take them in C.S.D.I.C. Gilbert Ryle has put in his final report and Clop has made a minority report which does not vary much in substance, but slightly in emphasis. Clop feels that TURKUL was only a sub-agent^{eminent} and that IRA was the central figure. TURKUL's main idea was to sit on the fence and provide himself with a get-away whatever the outcome of the war might be. He re-assured the Russians by wittingly passing information to IRA about White Russian organisations. He must have been pretty sure where it was going.

Burt told me that he had seen Le Man and shown him Scotland Yard and the Law Courts. He wanted to know whether he should introduce Le Man to his friend BOULANGER. I said that, on the whole, we were not anxious to encourage Le Man to build up any sort of organisation here. I was fairly confident that he was not doing so at the moment, but if he had a contact like BOULANGER the temptation might be too great.

I had a meeting with Charles, Dick, Alec and others in preparation for the subsequent one at the War Office on our military ceiling. It was agreed that I should try and get a ceiling of six officers and permission for other officers to wear uniform wherever this might be necessary. It was further decided that we should try and regularise the position with regard to our accommodation in our various stations abroad. In some places we provide living accommodation and in others we do not. As the War Office

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are paying we thought that they ought to consult with Brigadier Page and try and get the whole thing on an agreed and uniform basis.

I attended a meeting at the War Office with General Browning, the Military Secretary, in the Chair. Sinclair, Templer and Kenneth Strong were also present. It was agreed that we should be given permission to wear uniform subject to D.P.S. confirmation, provided our officers had previously been commissioned; that we should reduce our ceiling to 6 by the end of the year; that any officer attached to us should, at the end of two years, make up his mind whether he was going to remain with us permanently or continue his career in the army. Browning was extremely friendly and helpful.

26th October.

I gave Dick a brief before he left to enable him to discuss various matters with the D.G. on his arrival in Cairo. These included Giles's proposal to send an officer to Europe to deal with Jewish illegal immigration, our representation in Greece after the withdrawal of the troops, and SIME's proposal for the attachment of Police Officers. I also gave a letter to Dick to take to the D.G. telling him what has happened since he left.

28th October.

Briscoe came to talk to me about collecting all available data about Russian knowledge of secret inks. There is a certain amount already in our files but we want to ensure that anything in

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this line comes our way. I said I thought that we ought to make an approach in the proper quarter, both to the British Zone in Germany and Austria.

I lunched with Anthony to discuss the case of PADGHAM. We have decided, in view of his depressed state, to bring him back for two or three months, but not until his de-Nazification proceedings are at an end.

Robi MENDELSSOHN arrived yesterday from Switzerland. He has had some remarkable experiences during the war, and it is little short of a miracle that he is still alive. Being unfit to serve, he was employed by the Reichsbank for various matters affecting foreign credits. In 1943 he realised that things might become difficult for his mother, so he started to try and find out ways and means of getting her out to Sweden. He was not able to save his aunt, who was to be taken away to Auschwitz, so gave her an overdose of veronal. He approached a friend about his mother and was told that his only possible way of getting to Sweden would be on an Abwehr ticket. He found a sympathetic character in Oberst HANSEN, who was subsequently made head of the Militarischesamt of R.S.H.A. He declined to do any espionage work, but said that he would be willing to explore the ground for the opening up of peace negotiations. As it was necessary that some sort of report on his visit should be passed to the R.S.H.A., which, of course, could not include peace negotiations, he made one up, even before his departure, in collaboration with the Abwehr. He visited Stockholm three times in 1943 and once in 1944, and on each occasion saw [redacted] and the American Military Attache. He managed finally to

get his mother out on payment to the S.S. of some 100,000 krone, which he managed to raise in Sweden. They tried to get 200,000, but when he said that this was impossible they allowed his mother to go. He was warned never to leave her alone as the S.S. had a way of kidnapping people after they had got their money. In 1944 he received an approach from LUNGBEHN, who was apparently associated with Himmler. The approach was, ostensibly, at any rate, on Himmler's behalf. The suggestion was that he should go to Stockholm and try and get the Allies to agree to the following project:-

Himmler would get rid of Hitler. The Allies would be allowed to come in on the West, and German forces would be turned over to repel the Russians. Robi said that at that stage he did not see how such a proposal could be entertained for one moment by the Allies, particularly if Himmler were to remain in power. If he went on such a mission, he would want something concrete to take with him. He went back to his farm in Wurtemberg and awaited a final answer. After two weeks he heard that LUNGBEHN had been arrested by Himmler and sent to Orianenberg, where he was kept in fairly honourable detention, but was finally liquidated after being in prison for nine months. Robi has some idea that LUNGBEHN went to Switzerland to negotiate with Dallas the American President's representative, and that the telegram-either one of ours or an American telegram from Switzerland to Moscow - was intercepted, coupling Himmler and LUNGBEHN as the instigators of the peace proposals. This telegram got into the hands of WOLF, the S.S. man who negotiated the peace terms with Italy. WOLF tackled Himmler, who saw that his only way out was to throw LUNGBEHN overboard. How Robi escaped is little short of a miracle. On his last journey back from

Stockholm, where he says everybody seemed to know about everything, he felt almost certain that he would be arrested by the S.S. on arrival at Tempelhof, even though he had an O.K.W. pass. In anticipation of this he consumed almost a whole bottle of schnapps on the aeroplane an hour before he arrived! Before his departure he had been found waiting in the cold and had been asked in to the S.S. Mess on the Aerodrome at Tempelhof. He felt this was a rather extraordinary situation, where he, a Jew was sitting with twelve S.S. men, not discussing war, but merely their wives and families, etc. At the end of the war he was over-run by the French in Wurtemberg. Two Moroccans entered and ushered himself and his cousin out at the point of a bayonet. They were made to stand with their faces to the wall and their hands tied, while the two Moroccans loaded their rifles. Having stood there for ten minutes, a French corporal arrived and said the whole thing was a mistake - they were looking for two S.S. men who were firing at the troops. Robi said he did not know quite whether to laugh, as it seemed so extraordinary to him that after all the risks that he had taken in fighting them, he should finally be shot as an S.S. man himself! Another amusing incident was the entry of two huge bearded Moroccans into the room of his cousin, who had just had twins. They were, of course, fully armed. They looked round the room, caught sight of the twins and a huge grin appeared on their faces; one of them then pulled out a 500 franc note, placed it on the table, said "pour les bébes" and went out. Robi, of course, knew a large number of those who were liquidated for their participation in the 'putsch'. He puts the total of those executed at something like 15,500. His wife was imprisoned four or five weeks by the Gestapo. He thinks mainly

because they wanted to get some excuse for turning him out of his farm. He constantly went down to see the Gestapo officials, but was never seriously questioned himself - once he was asked what he had been doing during the war. He replied that he had been concerned with foreign credits for the Reichsbank, which seemed to satisfy his interrogators. His wife was eventually released without any explanation. He has certain constructive proposals to make. He thinks it is hopeless to expect agreement from the Russians to run the whole of Germany as an economic unit. The only thing to do is to accept the 'iron curtain' and try and put the West on to a sound economic footing - to do this it is necessary to consult with experts in all the various fields, i.e. banking, industry, agriculture, etc. Robi could integrate suitable people and they could, if necessary, be got over here. He thinks that if this is not done, and advantage is not taken of the swing to the Right in the recent elections, Germany will gradually sink into Communism and starvation. He talked to Ned Reid about this, who agreed with his views and put him into touch with Playfair, the financial expert in the office of the Control Commission in London. He told Playfair about his proposals and mentioned the kind of people he had in mind; one was a man called ABS, who was in the Reichsbank. Playfair took the view that it would be impossible to use a man who had served throughout the war in an institution which had been supporting the Nazi regime. Robi said that if this attitude was maintained, it would be really impossible to do anything. It was clearly no good digging out some old financier who had been out of the swim for the last fifteen years. He suggested that I should see Playfair and try and get some sense into him.

29th October.

At the J.I.C. to-day we discussed the paper put up by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Security on the subject of dealing with the Russians on a quid pro quo basis. It had been agreed that Attaches should work on a strictly reciprocal basis. This agreement was, however, being torpedoed by the Ministry of Supply, who were letting Russian representatives into factories. They had, in fact, a contract with Rolls for the supply of Nene jet engines. The Committee took the view that, while it might be difficult to operate on a strictly reciprocal basis since the Russians wanted to buy things from us, and we did not want to buy anything from them, it was important to see that the security safeguards were adequate. In the case of Rolls, which is so far from being the position, since Russian technicians were sitting in the factory and hob-nobbing with all our technicians who were working on highly secret contracts. It was decided that this whole matter should be referred to the Chiefs of Staff, and we were asked to put in a paper showing exactly what the position was at the factory and, if possible, whether there were any Communists employed on the particular work in hand. The general view seemed to be that it was questionable whether the supply of ten obsolescent jet engines, which were merely for the purposes of instruction in the manufacture of jet engines and would be pulled to pieces was really sound. For a short term financial gain, which would not necessarily lead to any further orders, we were giving instruction to our potential enemies.

Curry came to tell me that he had been ordered by his doctor to take three months leave. I told him that he ought to wind up his current

work and get away as soon as he could.

Shoosmith telephoned about his message regarding BORRMANN. He had had a report that BORRMANN was in Switzerland, and he thought that the case should be handled in London. I said that I would take the matter up with M.I.6. as soon as I got his telegram. This I have done and they will handle the enquiry.

Colonel Walker telephoned to say that he had spoken to Brigadier Latham about Trevor-Roper's proposal to write a book on the 'Putsch'. He said that, provided the Foreign Office gave their approval, he thought that Latham would be able to collect the documents that Trevor-Roper required.

30th October

Hollis talked to me about the carding of Communists. According to the late D.G.'s ruling, we have for the last two years only been carding important Communists. Membership of the Party has now fallen from 60,000 to 42,000. and we can take it that those who join now are not doing so in a spirit of enthusiasm for the Russian advances, but on account of fanatical enthusiasm for all that the Party stands for and in spite of the present Russian atmosphere. Hollis feels that we are misleading the departments for whom we vet if we do not at least card all industrial workers who are members of the C.P. He feels, too, as I do, that if we are to fulfil our responsibilities to the J.I.C. and Chiefs of Staff, who have asked to prepare a memorandum on the potentialities of the C.P. in time of crisis, we must at least know where Party members are situated. It would be no excuse, if after twenty-five years of study, to say that although the names were in

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our records, we had never carded them on account of pressure of work.

Howe gave a lunch to Harker at the Dorchester, at which Charles and I were present.

PAGE came over to discuss the question of establishment and general service provided by the War Office to our out-stations, in order to keep down the secret service vote. He was extremely helpful and promised to do all he could. He will deal specifically with the case of S.I.F.E. and also discuss with the authorities concerned in the War Office the question of putting our other stations on a similar basis.

I sent to see 'C' about the employment of [redacted], who is of Russian origin. We want to take her on for Russian work. We had made every enquiry that we could and were satisfied, as far as it was possible to be so, that she was all right. I did not, however, wish it to get round that we were employing a Russian woman and were consequently insecure. If, therefore, 'C' did not like the position, on account of any opportunities which might give this woman access to his information, I would much prefer not to take her on. He said that he, in fact, had White Russians and Poliss himself and that it was a risk he thought we both had to take.

October 31st.

Harold Caccia rang to say that Orme Sargent had give his over-all approval to Trevor-Roper's book, provided it was submitted in the same way as "The Last Days of Hitler", and that Trevor-Roper's work did not in any way clash with that being done by Wheeler-Bennett, who is working principally on the Nuremburg trials.

Sir John Kennedy, formerly D.M.O., came to see me. He is going out as Governor of Southern Rhodesia. He was extremely friendly and expressed his willingness to do anything he could to help us.

At the B. meeting to day I referred to a complaint which had been lodged recently by one of our D.S.O's, who said he received information directly bearing on his own area but was not informed of what was going on at home and in other areas. I asked that all officers should bear this in mind as it was essential that the D.S.O's should have a good background of the general security picture, as if the Governor or C.-n-C. saw something of interest in the Press about Fascists or Communists, etc., and asked the D.S.O. about it, his stock would be very much reduced if he were unable to answer. Kellar said that arrangements were being made for the issue of an Overseas Bulletin and that probably B.3. would be responsible for the distribution, but it was up to each section to supply contributions. I said this was a good idea and asked all officers to send in their contributions while a case was current. I said I thought the Bulletin would be of particular interest to D.S.O.s Malta, Gibraltar and the Caribbean area. Kellar said he hoped this would be brought into operation in the New Year.

I raised the subject of the acquisition of technical information by the Russians which had come up at the J.I.C. yesterday. The J.I.C. took a poor view of the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security report and several inconsistencies had been found. They were particularly worried concerning the security side of the matter, particularly the situation at Rolls and Gloucester Aircraft Co. They are very keen to put the whole position before the Chiefs of Staff. They were inclined to take the view that the Russians had bought the ten engines to pull to pieces and from the long-term commercial view the proposition was not much good. Farnival Jones said he had heard at the Cabinet Offices an unofficial reflection on this matter, to the effect that the Chiefs of Staff would not have approved the sale of these engines to the Russians had they contemplated the remotest possibility of their going to the factory to see the things for themselves. Archer said that he thought this had occurred through ignorance in high places (i.e. the Ministry of Supply) and that if the machines were sold it was obvious that the purchasers would want to see their goods. After further discussion, I said that a note of this situation was to be incorporated in the paper which Hollis is preparing for the J.I.C.

Curry spoke about one, WIESNER of the Czech Intelligence, who had rung up from Oslo and sent his warm greetings to everybody particularly Sinclair and John Noble. He had joined the new Czech Intelligence, but there was reason to believe that he would not have got this job without Russian sanction. He appeared to be doing counter-intelligence on the offensive as well as the defensive side. I said that all officers should be careful in their dealings with him.

T.A.R. asked who should be responsible for matters connected with the Channel Islands. He thought B.3.c. should be responsible. I said that it should be born in mind that these people had no particular loyalty to anyone except themselves, and a great number had collaborated in order, probably, to save their own lives. I asked Spencer to undertake what few suspects there are in the C.I.

M.E. said there is now an arrangement whereby all external cables, whether they touch this country or not, are centralised in the Traff Analysis Group at Eastcote. If a person is put on the Watch List it is now given a serial number in order that the originating officer can be more easily traced. M.E. said he was most anxious that all requests for this black-listing should go through B.4 and not through Col. Allen as hitherto.

Archer raised the question of the carding of civilians employed on long term secret research work here who were now applying for naturalisation. He thought they should be kept on record in the Registry. I agreed on the grounds that if a man had been naturalised it did not necessarily mean that he was entirely free from suspicion. I asked Archer to take this up with the Registry.

A Captain GARDNER came here on the recommendation of Howe. He seemed a nice young fellow, but, apart from his keenness, has no particular qualifications. I told him that we would bear his name in mind but that we had nothing to offer him at the moment.

TAR has proposed that he, M.E. and Farnival Jones should canvass sections for their views about the Registry and the extent to which it is serving their purpose. I said that I

thought this an excellent idea, but I did not wish to proceed until either I had had a word with Potter, or until Horrocks's return. I do not wish to give the impression that I am trying to interfere with Horrocks's department during his absence. I shall certainly take the matter up on his return.

Patterson talked to me about Censorship. The question arises as to what our relations should be with the Censorship Testing Dept. in any future war. Should it be under our control or should we throw off an expert to run it? Experience in up to-date secret ink methods will, of course, be with Hedger and with no-one else. I am proposing to have a preliminary meeting with Herbert and Todd on the subject.

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The Control Commission find themselves unable to take over TURKUL and IRA. We have, therefore, to take the matter up again with the Americans.

I was asked by the J.I.C. about Bill STEPHENSON. Apparently the Americans wish to give him a decoration.

At the Appointments Board to-day we decided to take on [redacted] for a probationary year. He has done very well with the Control Commission and is obviously a very keen officer. I think he will make good material.

I spoke to Cookie to-day about the two spies, whose cases he has had now for nearly three months. He said that he was so busy that he had been unable to make any progress - goodness knows what he does! He was full on complaints about Orr's

records, which I gather he has mainly destroyed. I suggested tactfully that he should send the two cases over to me and that I would get Hill to deal with them. He seemed quite agreeable to this suggestion.

November 4th.

Ede told me to-day that he was rather veering round to the idea of taking the job of A.L.O. Scotland.

At the A.L.Os Conference I explained to them the work of the J.I.C. and also talked to them on the subject of immigration and visa policy.

Rodney DENNIS and G/C CARY-FOSTER, the new Foreign Office Security Officer, came over to see me. Rodney is his deputy. The visit was purely a formal one. I gave CARY-FOSTER a brief survey of the work of the office and of the organisation. He was seen by various other officers as well. I told him that we were, of course, interested in other peoples' security, although we did not wish to interfere in any way in their domestic affairs. If, however, they had a case of leakage in this country which could not be normally explained, it was our business to take up the case.

I saw the D.M.I. I told him that I had had a rather vague hint from the Middle East - I was referring to Horrocks's letter to Charles - that KELLAR for some reason or other was not acceptable as the head of S.I.M.E. I asked D.M.I. whether he had heard anything to this effect. He summoned Kenneth Page and both of them confirmed that they had not heard even so much as a whisper. D.M.I. said that he

knew KELLAR and liked him, and thought that he was extremely competent. If he were asked he would certainly support his appointment. He offered to telegraph to the Chiefs of Staff in the Middle East, but I said I thought at the moment it would be better if he did not.

I then went round to Broadway, where I put a similar question to 'C'. He said that likewise he had heard no whisper and that he in fact, would be extremely pleased to know that Keller was in the Middle East. He understood his sources and would look after their safety.

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I told 'C' that we had a somewhat similar case, where MacNeal had asked for information about BING, the Labour Whip. We were not prepared to give this information and were suggesting that MacNeal should apply to the Prime Minister. If he presses us to hand over the information, I shall be forced to see the P.M.

November 5th.

At the J.I.C. to-day we discussed the paper on a possible attack by Russia on this country. The matter had been gone into in considerable detail by the J.I.S., the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee and the Technical and Scientific Warfare experts. They had assumed that the Russians would sweep through Europe and then mount their attack on this country. The D.M.I. expressed the view that it was more likely that their attack would be of the Pearl Harbour variety, and that we ought to be prepared for it to be launched from their present bases. He also thought we should consider the possibility of a landing by a large number of parachutists. Nobody, I think, imagines that we are going to be at war with Russia within the next five years, but it is good to see that the matter is being given every consideration.

The Air Ministry have agreed to allow our officers to wear Air Force uniform when serving abroad, provided we make special application for them in each case, stating the circumstances which make this necessary.

Bill STEPHENSON rang me up to say "Hello". He is going back to America. While he has a home in Jamaica he still retains his office in New York.

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At the A.L.O's Conference I raised with C.2. the question of what work the A.L.O's could do for C.2. in the provinces. C.2. were clearly very jealous of their own preserves, but I gather that they do already make a certain use of A.L.O.s. They thought, too, that if bottle-neck factories where no

particularly secret work is going had to be covered, the A.L.O's might well take this on. A.L.O.s. look after utilities in the provinces and in the London area. The view held by C.2. is that this work can better be done from London, where the necessary contact can be maintained with the Ministries concerned. I am not entirely convinced about this.

Cavendish-Bentinck gave a talk to the J.I.C. about Poland, with particular regard to the Order of Battle of the Russians. He estimates their forces at 144,000. D.M.I. thinks that they have over 400,000. I am inclined to think that Cavendish-Bentinck is nearer the mark. He and his staff have evidently been travelling about a great deal and all the indications were that the Russians were pulling out to a considerable extent. The Poles dislike them heartily and they are, therefore, perhaps reluctant to aggravate this antagonism. Further, they are afraid that their troops may go bourgeois. D.M.I.'s information comes mainly from Right Wing Polish sources which would, of course exaggerate the Russian menace.

November 6th

Watt discussed with me the appointment of his successor in Scotland. I showed him the file of one, Sergeant CRAWFORD, concerning whom a letter had been written to Shinwell by Councillor Crawford, J.P., of Uphall, West Lothian. This letter showed that the Councillor was aware that the position of Regional Security Officer, Scotland, would soon become vacant and that the D.G. of M.I.5., in whose hands the appointment lay, was Sir Percy Sillitoe. He strongly recommended his brother, of the

Glasgow Police and thought that a recommendation from Shinwell "might well be the means of putting one of our own kind into a good Government Department". George Mathers, Labour M.P. for Linlithgow, has also written about CRAWFORD to Bellenger, requesting that Sgt. CRAWFORD's qualifications for the post of M.I.5. Regional Security Liaison Officer in Scotland should be given every consideration. In our case we have replied that the name has been noted and will be considered with those of other candidates. Watt had some misgivings about the acceptability of Ede in Scotland if the Scottish Chief Constables had expressed their desire for a Scottish policeman. He said that he would be quite prepared to carry on for the time being.

Group/Captain Jones and Mr. Hooper, of the L.S.I.C., came to see me. I explained to them in broad terms the work of the office and what we had done during the war. They seemed to be extremely pleased with the reception they had had and were quite overwhelming in their compliments. They are, I think, genuinely out to co-operate to the full. Jones has sent in a most glowing letter of thanks.

I told Kellar about the telegram I had received from the D.G., provisionally appointing Magan as head of SIME until a final decision could be made about Douglas Roberts' successor. Meanwhile, he wanted Foulkes and Thistle to go out to Palestine. I could give Kellar no reasons for this decision because I had none. It was obviously a great shock to him. He thinks that almost undoubtedly it was due to poison which had been dropped about by Douglas Roberts. I told him that I had seen the D.M.I. and 'C' and satisfied myself that there was no objection here - in fact not even a whisper had been heard about

his being unsuitable. Kellar, I think, feels that this is more or less the end of his career in the Security Service, particularly since a number of people both inside and outside the office were under the impression that he was going to take up the appointment. He himself had made it clear to all enquirers that there was no decision in the matter. People will, of course, think that there must be something wrong with him and his stock is likely to go down. I urge him not to prejudge the issue until we really knew what the reasons for the decision were.

November 7th

Sir Arthur Dixon came, really to pass the tin of day with the D.G. and to mention a friend of his who was in touch with a Nazi school-teacher, a matter which I explained as politely as I could was not likely to be of any importance. He talked about the Canadian spy case and was very interested to see a copy of the Royal Commission's report. I lent him a copy. He is now head of the National Fire Service.

At the B. meeting to-day I raised the J.I.C. points regarding the method of attack the Russians might use on this country (see page), and Cavendish-Bentinck talk on the Russian Order of Battle in Poland.

Curry said that B.2.a. has been divided into B.2.a. and B.2.b.; the former consisting of Irvine, Scott, Miss Cape and Miss Glass and dealing with all satellite countries, and the latter consisting of Miss Chenhall, Mrs. Quin, Miss McCallum and Miss Gunn and dealing with Allied countries.

Curry also mentioned the case of an ex-member of the Czech Intelligence in London who came

over here last week, namely Lt. Otto REIMANN. He said he had come over here to be demobbed, but after a five hours talk with him Mr. Curry said he was convinced that he was working for the "other side" and that he had come over to find out all he could about the set-up of M.I.5. Derbyshire said that REIMANN was trying to get a job in the British zone in Germany. I said that Shoosmith should be warned about him. Hollis saw

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T.A.R. said this was covered by C. Division, but Jo Archer said that this sort of work called for highly specialised people. I said that the S.I.S. scientific section would be useful to us. Furnival Jones said that Harold Caccia is going to South America shortly and was there anything on which he should be briefed. I said there was nothing. Irvine gave a talk on the Polish situation explaining in particular what our conflicting interests were with S.I.S.

We, on the other hand, have to protect the Foreign Office against accusations that London is being used as a centre for intrigue against Warsaw. Our interest in E.W. Poles is considerable, as they would probably be used by the Russians for espionage purposes. Irvine spoke about the attempts of the Canadian Govt.

to get Poles from Italy who might be suitable for emigration to Canada. They had met with considerable difficulties because a large number of them had been engaged in fighting with the Germans and were thought to be unsuitable on that account. When they asked the Poles whether they had any other candidates, they finally produced several hundred of a much better calibre. The names of these people had not been put forward in the first instance because the Poles did not like the idea of their best citizens becoming absorbed into the Canadian population. They wanted to keep such Poles in a separate community, with their own schools and newspapers, etc., so that they could be called upon in time of need. In fact, the Poles are really preparing for a future war against Russia by the Western Powers, when they hope to get back the whole of Eastern Poland. Kellar asked Irvine if the Jews in the Polish resettlement camps in this country were segregated. Irvine said they are segregated at the moment but will be redistributed later on. A contingent of Polish Jews will be arriving in Southern Command soon. Kellar said that in view of the fact that there are indications that terrorists are already in this country, it might be as well if Commands were asked to keep any suspicious Jews under observation. Irvine said that the only possible solution was to try and agitate for permission to send them back to Palestine. James Robertson suggested that any suspicious Jews should be kept in Italy, but Irvine said this was not possible at the moment as all the Polish Forces were being withdrawn from Italy as the War Office do not want them to be left there any longer. Kellar said he thought this should be taken up separately.

Mitchell said that of 230 Communist candidates put up in the Municipal Elections only one got in. He said that the C.P. campaign for recruiting and boosting sales of the "Daily Worker" had not been successful and that both were down in numbers. I said this was interesting and thought that the Russian attitude probably had something to do with it, as people who were enthusiastic before may be feeling a little doubtful now.....

Spencer said that, contrary to an agreement reached between the F.O., the C.O. and ourselves, the visa has been abolished for American citizens travelling to Jamaica. We were not consulted regarding this reversal of Foreign Office policy, and the Colonial Office, although they put in a plea, felt they must endorse the F.O. decision. Spencer said he had sent a minute round to sections concerned regarding this matter. I said I did not feel we could do much about this now that it was a fait accompli unless we asked the F.O. what they intend to do about it. The whole burden will now fall on Immigration in Jamaica, which is pretty weak at the best of times. Kellar said he thought the F.O. would take the line that tourist traffic to bring in dollars is of primary importance. I said a report should be asked for from Kirby-Green, unless we had already had his views on the subject.....

James Robertson referred to a telephone call received by F.M. Montgomery's M.A. yesterday afternoon. The caller said that if bloodshed continued in Palestine, retribution would be carried out on the War Office and other Government Depts. I said I had spoken to the D.M.I. and he is going to send someone round to speak to me on the subject... Archer drew attention to an article by Chapman Pincher about the production figures of atomic bombs in America. He said the figures given are dangerously near the truth

and we may be asked to assist in an enquiry as to how the leakage took place. I said it would be like looking for a needle in a haystack so far as the Min. of Supply was concerned. Hill said that Drew has taken this matter up with the Min. of Supply in order to get confirmation from the Americans as to the authenticity of the story.

Marriott said that the Soviet Embassy have had ten new telephone lines installed, in addition to the five lines that were there already, at 18 Kensington Palace Gardens, where the Soviet Press Section is to be housed.

I spoke about the trouble we are having with the Americans in the Far East, i.e. S.S.U. operating on our territory.

KRYMER came to see me again. What seems really necessary is to get him, firstly demobilised and then naturalised. This is the only way in which he can obtain permanent employment of any value.

AIRY talked to me about his position, with particular reference to his retirement from the Forces. He said that he had no wish to go back to duty, since there was obviously no future for him in the Army. He could not say that he was performing a very strenuous job at the moment. On the other hand, he was perfectly happy to remain in charge of his area, so far as I can see, indefinitely.

November 8th.

Colonel Cole, who is M.A. to the C.I.G.S., came to listen to a record. It was thought he might be able to identify the voice of the person who had telephoned him, stating that IRGUN intended to get the C.I.G.S. The voice was apparently a different one.

D.N.I. told me that Admiral Oliver had attended a meeting of the Bacterial Warfare Committee and was disturbed to find that there was no representative of the Security Service present. He thought that the Professors might well commit indiscretions about the publication of information, and that they needed guidance generally on security matters. He had made this suggestion to the meeting, but it had not been very well received. In fact, the view had been expressed in one quarter that the Committee did not wish to have a Gestapo in their midst. I said that we would certainly consider the matter, but that I wondered a little whether anybody who was not a scientist could do very much good.

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November 9th.

Serpell came to see me about the case of JAHNKE. He succeeded in tracing two reports mentioned previously as being in JAHNKE's possession. These seem to have been compiled by . This seems have led to the suggestion that may have been ELLI. Personally, I am unable to believe that there is anything wrong with but of course one never knows

November 11th.

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day I raised the question of vetting. I was relieved to hear that we do vet personnel, down to the lowest levels, in offices where Top Secret information is handled. I also discussed the question of carding Communists. It seemed to me that on the present ruling we would hardly fulfil our responsibilities since only important Communists were carded

This question had two aspects, firstly the vetting problem, and secondly our responsibilities to the J.I.C. and Chiefs of Staff, who had asked us to assess the risks from the Communist Party in the event of war with Russia. It seemed to me that in future we should have to card all industrial workers, also we might include agricultural workers and housewives.

SPRUNT came to see me. I promised to find out whether there was any opening for him in the J.I.B. I told him that, so far as we and S.I.S. were concerned, there was no immediate prospect of a job.

November 12th.

'C' came to see me. I showed him the letter that we had had from the Americans about their operations in the Far East, and my suggested reply. He entirely agreed with the line I was proposing to take. I said that I proposed to sound the ground in the Far East with Commanders-in-Chief and Governors, and then raise the matter with the J.I.C. I thought it better that we should get the Americans to co-operate with us in the field rather than turn them down flat.

I discussed with Kellar and Charles Butler the possibility of finding someone for Iraq. We have two Indian policemen and Charles is anxious to take on more people on the basis of Malcom Johnston; he would prefer them to complete their service with the Indian Police and take their pensions. We are asking Malcom Johnston to explore the ground. In the present circumstances they might very well be prepared to burn their boats.

I have had a letter from Dick, in which he makes it clear that his visit to the M.E. has been anything but pleasant. He found himself faced more or less with a fait accompli. The D.G. and Horrocks were persuaded that what was required as Head of S.I.M.E. was a big administrator, and that Kellar was not the man for the job. Douglas Roberts had been putting in a certain amount of poison and had talked a lot about "levels". My telegram had been ill-received - the comment was "What has this demand got to do with 'C' or the D.M.I.?" Dick explained, as was in fact the case, that clearly my intention was to strengthen the D.G.'s hand by clearing the position in this country, in case he was meeting with local objections to Kellar's appointment, as had been indicated to me from the rather vague letter which had been sent by Horrocks to Charles. Horrocks was apparently worried at his letter being quoted, although exactly why I do not know. Dick made it quite clear that in his view what was required was not so much an administrator as a man who really knew about the Intelligence needs, but seeing that the D.G. was adamant he played for time and suggested that Magan be brought up from Palestine, and that the final decision should be deferred until the D.G. returns. He got the general impression that the D.G. thought that information was being withheld from him and that attempts were being made to rush him into appointing Kellar against his better judgement. Dick explained to him that Kellar's appointment had been discussed a long time back, and that everybody at Head Office was of the opinion that he was far and away the best candidate. As regards withholding information, this apparently had been planted in the D.G.'s mind through his seeing a Situation Report in Palestine which he thought was interesting. He wondered why he had not seen it at Head Office. Dick said that reports of this kind

came in constantly, and that if the D.G. was keen to see them all he would spend all day and all night reading them. The D.G. had apparently - aided and abetted by Horrocks - drawn up an instruction to Magan that any reports which he considered of importance were to be sent to the D.G. personally. Magan spoke to Dick about this, as he said that it went entirely contrary to his original instructions: was he not in future to write to officers who were directly concerned? Dick took the point up with the D.G. and Horrocks and asked what it meant. He said that it was, in fact, the very negation of organisation - with the Horrocks touché - and that it would create an impossible situation. The D.G. made some lame excuse and then collapsed - the order is to be revised. The D.G. had various suggestions for the Head of SIME; General Penney's brother was mentioned and also two policemen - one named Nielson, who had been with the D.G. in Glasgow and subsequently went to the Control Commission. Dick happened to know about Neilson, as he was sacked from the Control Commission for incompetence. From what we know of Control Commission standards he must have been very incompetent indeed! Dick returns by sea and should be here on the 18th. Horrocks arrives on the 16th by air from Nairobi. The D.G. goes on to Pretoria.

November 13th.

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Gray, Inspector General of Palestine Police, and Catlin, his assistant, called and were seen by Kellar, Robertson and myself. They had two points to raise: firstly, the question of the Palestine police officer who is coming to Europe. Gray explained that the real purpose of this officer's visit was to recruit agents from Europe and filter them back into Palestine by legal or illegal means. This was necessary as it was impossible to recruit agents in Palestine. I explained to Gray that I fully understood the position, which had been made clear beforehand; at the same time, there were very considerable difficulties if, for example, his representative intended to operate in France he would undoubtedly come up against the French police and this might seriously jeopardise 'C's relations. I thought, therefore, that he would have to obtain 'C's approval and co-operation. I suggested that he should call at S.I.S. and undertook to fix up an appointment for him, which I did. As regards Richardson, who had been suggested for this appointment, we did not think that he was altogether suitable but we recommended to Gray that he should see Richardson himself and make up his own mind; meanwhile, Colonel Quill had other possible candidates.

The other matter discussed was the proposed C.S.D.I.C. for Palestine. I explained to Gray that this question had been under discussion by the J.I.C. and that it had been submitted to J.I.C., Cairo, for final approval. We would do our best to get the necessary equipment. There were two obvious points with regard to the security of the operation: (i) we were interested in the security of the equipment itself and would naturally be interested in ensuring that it did not come to the notice of unauthorised persons that the equipment had been installed in a particular building. I thought

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too, that it would be necessary to have someone at the head of the organisation who was reading(?) the "map" interrogations and also the "cross-roughing" reports. That officer should brief the interrogators in some detail since they would show a natural keenness to cross-examine prisoners on the "cross-roughing" information and might well give the whole thing away unless they were closely controlled.

Sir Charles Wickham called at my request. He is leaving for Palestine to-morrow. I asked him whether he would be prepared to give us cover in Salonica under his Police organisation when the troops withdrew. He said that, provided the Foreign Office saw no objection, he would be delighted to do so - if necessary the man could be in Police uniform. I asked Kellar to talk to him about Palestine generally. I gathered that he was much impressed by what Kellar had to say and by Kellar's general knowledge of the whole set-up. Wickham said that his impression was that things had really gone too far, and that whatever was settled in Palestine, terrorist activities were likely to go on. He was inclined to think that the only way of cleaning the situation up might be a military operation, combing the country out from top to bottom. I said that I was rather inclined to think so too, but that whenever these things were suggested political pressure was brought to bear; it was invariably said that such an operation would prejudice future conferences.

Hilgarth came to see me about Ignacio MOLINA. He said that his Assistant Naval Attache in Madrid, Gomez Beare, had used MOLINA as an agent and had got very good service out of him. He thought, therefore, that it was unfair that MOLINA should now be penalised and kept out of the Gibraltar area. I

suggested that Beare should come and see Spencer and give a full account of what his relations with MOLINA had been during the war. I did not tell Hilgarth what our information was about MOLINA. There are very good grounds for thinking that he passed on the information to Berlin about the bogus "Monty". Monty arrived on the 26th May, 1944, and a telegram was sent from Madrid to Berlin on the 28th May, reporting his arrival. This deception had been carefully planted on MOLINA, who was put in a room in the Governor's house, from which he saw the bogus "Monty" walking up and down with the Governor. My own view about MOLINA is that he played happily (?) with both sides. It may be, however, that he cannot do so much harm now. There were, of course, many other reports stating categorically that he was passing information to the Germans.

November 14th.

I had a meeting with Briscoe, Cumming, Grogan and Hedger about the definition of functions between Hedger's laboratory and Censorship testing in time of war. It was clear that any knowledge about secret inks in any future war would be centered in Hedger's laboratory. We all felt, however, that it would be undesirable for Hedger in time of war to have anything to with censorship testing beyond passing to them all the information he could and receiving from them any data which might have a bearing on the subject. It was essential, however, that we should maintain control over testing methods employed if we were to give the necessary protection

that might be in use by our double agents. It was decided that we should discuss the matter with Herbert on his return from America

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I had lunch with [redacted] He told me that Dutch Intelligence was in a fluid state, but the future of Eindhoven was precarious. He was going over to Holland himself and would know more about things on his return.

[redacted] paid a long visit to the Registry, which is certainly a very fine piece of organization. While it undoubtedly does very good work and handles an enormous number of documents, it is not to my mind wholly suitable to meet Intelligence needs. There are 21 people in the L.U. department who do L.U.s for the whole office; none of them is a specialist in any particular line. They go to the Index, either with a slip of paper supplied by Head Office or with the last paper that has come in, but they never see the file unless circumstances are very exceptional. This means that the L.U. girl is in no sense a specialist, and in no sense going to the index as an Intelligence officer bent on solving an Intelligence problem. The vetting L.U.s are easier, in the sense that the particulars are fairly complete and are set out on a pro forma. The Intelligence

[redacted] Us, on the other hand, are much more difficult, as the particulars are often of necessity vague. I discussed with Potter the question of carding the Communists. I thought that there was something slightly dishonest since there were many Communists on our records who were not carded. Things had changed, since the D.G.'s ruling, in two respects, firstly, enthusiasts who joined the Party during the war had fallen away - anyone joining now would be doing so with a fanatical faith in the Soviet regime. Secondly, the J.I.C. and Chiefs of Staff had asked us about the potentialities

of the 5th Column in the event of a war with Russia and the action we were proposing to take. It seemed to me, therefore, that we must at least care as much as we can about industrial workers, in addition, of course, to the intellectual groups. We might, on the other hand perhaps disregard agricultural workers and housewives. Potter pointed out that he might want extra staff for this, and that it should be accompanied by a weed out of the index of the individuals who were no longer active members. I also suggested to Potter that we might with advantage canvass sections in the office to find out exactly what the difficulties were with regard to the Registry, and that having done this it would be profitable to have a meeting. With regard to policy files, on the other hand, we needed two things; firstly, a thin(?) file which would show exactly what the policy was at any given moment, and secondly, a supplementary volume which, if we wished to change policy, would show us exactly why a particular policy had been adopted at a particular time.

November 15th

Bobby Mackenzie came to talk to me about the possibility of having an officer working in Passport Control, Paris, who would deal with Jewish matters. He suggested Foulkes. I said that I should want to consider the matter very carefully, but that unfortunately Foulkes had just been ordered out to the Middle East.

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Spencer tells me that not only visas but passports have been abolished for American tourists visiting Jamaica, the Leewards and Windwards. The Colonial Office have let us down on this in spite of our protests.

Burt tells me that as far as he can ascertain the publicity about the Jewish woman was due to a leakage either from the Liverpool Police or the Immigration.

Pat Stone came in to see me. I told him I had now seen a letter from 'C' agreeing to our having an office in Washington. In so far as it is possible we shall do our liaison work with C.I.G. through General Peabody in London, rather than in Washington.

I dined with Marriott, Milmo and Stamp.

November 16th.

November 18th.

Horrocks came to see me. He told me that the D.G. had been impressed by the size of organisation of S.I.M.E., and thought that an officer of considerable administrative experience was required. I think it is emphatic that Kellar's name had never been discussed with the people in the area. I confined my remarks to saying that I still thought Kellar was entirely suitable for the job, but I was somewhat worried about Magan being taken away from Palestine - quite the most important position at this moment - and the denuding of B.3.a. in London by the departure of Thistle and Foulkes. I thought too, that if we were always going out into the highways and hedges to look for new people when appointments of this kind became vacant, we should never get any good officer to stay in the department. Horrocks made no comments.

Dick arrived back to-day. I told him what Horrocks had said. He said that in so far as not mentioning Kellar's name, it had clearly been bandied about all over the place and opinions were canvassed, even with Jenkins. Jenkins, apparently, caused a certain amount of trouble by not wishing to work under the Head of S.I.M.E. It was, however, made clear to him that he would have to, and I gather that he has now accepted the position. Dick confirmed to me everything that he had written in his letter, and expressed himself as being profoundly disturbed about moving Magan who had just settled down in Palestine, which was obviously a most important place at the moment. In addition we had, of course, to some extent dislocated

B.3.a. at this end by being forced to send out Foulkes and Thistle. Dick had seen Dempsey with the D.G., and Dempsey had said that he would prefer to have a civilian rather than a soldier or a bogus soldier. The door had, therefore, been opened for the immediate appointment of Kellar, if this had been thought desirable. Dick does not think that the Head of S.I.M.E. is a big administrative appointment. The heaviest responsibility is in Palestine and is local. What is really required is a man who knows the Intelligence in the area and can stimulate other peoples' activities and get them the assistance and backing that they require. It seems to us that Kellar would admirably fulfill these requirements.

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day we discussed the vetting of Canadian Immigrants by RCMP representatives and Security Liaison with the Railway Police and Ministry of Transport. (see Mins. of D.G.'s meetings - 1946 - held D.G. Sec.).

Kellar talked to me about his own position, and he has thought about it a good deal. While he does not dispute any decision that is made, he feels that if it is considered that he is not qualified, after his considerable length of service and intimate knowledge of the area, to become Head of SIME, there cannot really be much future for him in this office, and that his only course will be to look round for something else. I told him not to worry about this for the time being.

came to talk to me about getting Mrs. RUSER back to Spain. This is going to be quite a difficult operation. I advised him to consult with Tommy Harris, who knew the ropes pretty well.

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I had a meeting with Viv Philby and at Broadway, about the representatives of the R.C.M.P., who wanted out assistance in vetting immigrants from this country and from the Continent. They have sent over a with whom we are already in touch. It was agreed that he would also be placed in touch with Passpor Control

, while we would vet anybody who it was known had been resident in the U.K at any time.

I had Pat Stone to dinner.

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At his request I went over to see Bellenger, Secretary of State for War. He told me that he had had a note from the P.M. containing a suggestion that BING had abused his position during the war in giving away military information to Communists, and whether, in fact, BING was a member of the Party. I said that I was a little surprised that the P.M. had not, in fact, referred this matter to us direct, in view of a somewhat similar case that we had on a previous occasion, where he more or less directed that he wanted to deal with matters of this kind personally. In view, however, of the fact that Bellenger had had a letter from the P.M., which he read out to me, I felt that I was quite authorised to go ahead. Bellenger was very sympathetic and quite understood my embarrassment. I told him that I would consult our files and come and see him again. I thought it wise to tell him that I should be speaking to the P.M. personally, because it seemed to me that the case involved certain principles on which we should like to be quite clear. Did, for example the P.M. expect us to volunteer information of this kind. If so, was it to be done to the Minister responsible or to the Prime Minister himself? I explained that our aim and object

was to remain entirely non-Party in all these matters and to avoid any suggestion that the Department was a Gestapo. Mr. Bellenger thought this was a very right and proper and said that he would, in fact, mention the point to the P.M. himself when he saw him about

November 19th.

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Burt came to see me about Poles. The Commissioner wanted to know whether we should tip off the word in the case of any undesirable Polish jews being given leave from any of the camps in which they were situated. I said that I would go into this and let him know what we could do.

I saw Bellenger again. I told him that I had personally examined the papers about BING, but there was no indication whatever that he had abused his position as an officer to communicate information to the Communist Party, but but that it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that he was actually a member of the C.P. Bellenger did not ask me for the source of my information, but he did say that it was of course a serious accusation. I told him that the documents in our possession did not in my view leave any room for doubt. I think the information was perhaps a slight shock to Bellenger, although he knew, of course, that BING was strongly left in his tendencies.

We had an Appointments Board, but did not decide to take on any of the candidates.

Hollis brought me Mitchell's paper on the potentialities of the Communist Party here in the event of war with Russia. It is extremely well written and well balanced. It shows that the membership has declined from about 60,000 in the peak period of 1943 to about 37,800 - with probably a hard core of 10,000. These people are placed in all walks

of life and are particularly strong in some of the industrial Unions. Potentially, they could do a very considerable amount of harm if they were not interned. We laid stress upon adequate knowledge of where these people are to be located, and the immense importance of getting them out of their positions from the word "go". Any delay would be disastrous.

I went to see the P.M. at 9.30. I found him in the Cabinet Room huddled up in his chair and, I thought, in a somewhat exhausted condition. He had, of course, just been through the incident of the revolt in the Labour Party against our Foreign Policy. I told him about the summons that I had had from Mr. Bellenger, and that, in view of the letter from the P.M., I had thought fit to go ahead and give him the information that he required. I did, however, think that a matter of principle was involved. I handed to him a questionnaire asking him generally what action he requires to take in the case of M.P.s belonging to subversive movements, and in the case of M.P.s who had close contacts with subversive movements. Without answering each question in detail, he said that he thought that he alone should be informed in every case where we had positive information that a Member of Parliament was a member of a subversive organisation, whether that member was also a member of the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, or any other Party represented in the House of Commons. I thought he was not very specific; I gathered that he felt that he had a responsibility to the House and country to see that such members did not get into positions where they might constitute a danger to the state. They might either be members as members of the Government, or ~~the~~ if they were in the Opposition as members of Royal Commissions or Parliamentary Delegations.

I then talked about Palestine and the attitude of Ben GURION, who was anxious to make the

attendance of the Agency at the coming conference conditional upon the discussions being limited to:

- (a) a return to the pre-White Paper situation and the British mandate with limited immigration, or
- (b) partition, with a viable territory for the Jews.

If these were not granted, Ben Gurion was in favour of breaking off relations with the British Government and transferring the Agency to the United States.

Weizmann was counselling moderation and the going into the Conference on an unconditional basis. He intended to go full out for partition at the Zionist Conference at Basle, and was not unhopeful of carrying the position and taking Ben Gurion with him. I then told the Prime Minister about KOLLEK and explained to him how we had had previous relations with this man in Palestine, and that we were in touch with Agency representatives both in Palestine and in Cairo. I told him that the measure of this co-operation was limited; it had never led to the actual pin-pointing of terrorists - it had generally taken the form of notifying us that something was likely to happen somewhere within the next 24 or 48 hours, or that the terrorist was believed to be in Jerusalem. In fact, the Agency told the authorities just as much as they thought was good for them and had always endeavoured to keep the strings in their own hands and to imply that they were the people who were governing Palestine and not the British Government. The P.M. remarked that they were singularly tortuous people to deal with. Lastly, I told him about the paper that we had put up to the Chiefs of Staff on the potentialities of the Communist movement in this country in the event of war with Russia. I got very little reaction from the P.M. about all this.

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He kept on repeating their names and saying: "Really, I should never have thought it". This is quite interesting, since has, in fact, been a member of the Party since 1920.

I found the P.M. an extremely difficult man to talk to. He was, of course, tired, but he hardly ever responded. You say your piece and when you come to the end there is a long pause - you then begin the next item on the agenda. I think it is to some extent due to a curious shyness, which he radiates, and, indeed, imparts to his visitors. He does not often look you in the face. I had the same impression on the other occasions when I spoke to him, and, from what I can gather from others who have seen him, it is his usual form. After I had finished my piece there was a further pause; I therefore got up, saying that I did not think there was any other information to communicate to him, unless there was anything special that he wanted to know. He then bundled out of his chair in a somewhat confused state.

November 20th.

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Briscoe came to see me about MUELHEISEN, who was the principal chemist dealing with secret ink for the Germans during the war. MUELHEISEN is now in the British zone in hospital, but is anxious to return to his wife in Munich, who is being persecuted by the German authorities on account of her husband's former activities. It was felt desirable that we should get MUELHEISEN over to this country. I said that I was doubtful about the wisdom of this, since he would obviously be in possession of our secrets, which at any time he could impart to an enemy. If he discovered a new form of secret ink, therefore, we could not make any use of it. Further, we could never prevent him from going back to Germany to visit his relatives or from imparting his knowledge to the Russians in this

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country, if he were so inclined. I felt, therefore, that, subject to anything S.I.S. has to say, it might be better to try and find him some suitable employment in Germany. Our aim and object should be to get him interested in some other subject and hope that he would forget about secret ink.

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At the J.I.C. to-day a number of subjects were discussed off the record. I explained to the meeting the action that we proposed to take with regard to the encroachment of American C.I.G. on our preserves in Hong Kong and Burma. The Committee agreed that the line that we were taking, namely, of co-operation in the field, was the right one, provided the Colonial Office, Burma Office, and the local civil and military authorities were also in agreement.

The D.M.I. raised the question of Greece. I said that we could, if it was considered desirable, continue the activities of BSIC - an offshoot of SIME at Athens - under A.M.A. cover, and in Salonice under cover of Wickham's Police Mission.

There was a discussion about Staff Courses. It was disclosed that an Egyptian had been invited to attend, and that his presence had the support of D.M.I. and C.I.G.S. D.M.I. went so far as to say that if the Russians

would give us reasonable treatment, he would be prepared to see Russian staff officer attending these courses. I think he felt that this was a fairly safe bet, as reciprocal treatment by the Russians was, to say the least, problematical. D.N.I. took strong exception to the presence of foreigners, except American. The Egyptians were notoriously leaky, and if we were present the course really would be open to the world. He saw no point in teaching our potential enemies how to fight a Naval battle. A.C.S.I. said that the Air Force ran two courses, one for British subjects and one for foreigners, but that they might run

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into Treasury difficulties in future. The meeting thought that courses for the Army and Navy should be run on similar lines, if this could be arranged.

D.N.I. mentioned that the mines which had led to the disaster in one of our destroyers in the Adriatic had been purposely sown, and that material indicated that if we made any attempt to enter any Albanian port we should be fired upon. There seems to be little doubt that rather sinister operations are going on at certain ports on the Albanian coast and that the Russians are behind it.

I saw WESTGARTH at Room 055; his son was with him. I told him that somehow or other my name had been mentioned in connection with his projects, and that if he had obtained the money on the strength of any statement that the British Government were behind him, it might be rather a serious matter. He said that he did not know how my name had got mentioned, but that there had never been any suggestion that I had anything to do with his financial schemes. I explained to him that he must not get it into his head that I could use my influence in any way to further his interests. I thought the best thing he could do in the present circumstances was to make as full a statement as he possibly could to the Police, giving all the facts. By what he told me it seemed that Mrs. Salisbury had parted with her money without any conditions at all, and that it was in the nature of a personal gift. If this were so, there could be no complaint. We parted on perfectly good terms.

Colonel DALLEY, formerly of the Malay Police, came to see me. He has been offered the job of Director of the Malayan Security Service. He has not yet accepted it, partly because there was some suggestion that he had run away at the time of the Japanese occupation, and partly because he feels that the Malayan Security Service in its present form is to some extent

redundant. As regards the first reason, he says that he did not wish to be a prisoner throughout the war with the Japanese, and that he subsequently engaged in guerilla activities behind the Japanese lines, was captured twice and escaped. He originally conceived the idea of the M.S.S. on the lines of S.I.F.E., but in view of the establishment of S.I.F.E., he thought the position was unsatisfactory. Either there should be an Inspector General to cover all Malayan police forces and to stimulate S.B. activities, or the M.S.S. should be reduced to about six in number and should collate information received from police Special Branches. He disapproved of an independent organisation without any executive powers and without any authority to extract the necessary intelligence from the police.

He struck

I thought what he had to say about the M.S.S. made good sense. I passed his information on to Malcom Johnston. I feel a little that Malayan Security is usurping the functions of S.I.F.E.

November 21st.

Miss Bagot talked to me to-day about foreign Communism generally. There is a certain amount of evidence to show that Paris is becoming a kind of Comintern centre, somewhat on the lines of the Western European Bureau of the Comintern, which in the 20's was situated in Berlin. She feels fairly confident that there must be some clandestine method of communication which we have so far been unable to discover. I suggested to her that she might check the handwritings of certain likely Communists against the outgoing Paris mail from the London area.

Minutes of B.Meeting in B. Division
Weekly Meeting Minute Book.

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Dick and I lunched with Vickery and Bamford, when we discussed the various eventualities which might arise if an Indian was appointed as Head of D.I.B. Smith, the present D.I.B., advised that we should take over I.P.I. and appoint a liaison officer with D.I.B. in India - they in turn should appoint an Indian as liaison officer here in London. This has already been tentatively been discussed in India with Patel, and the suggestion is that we should send out someone from here to clinch the matter with the Indian authorities.

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November 22nd.

TAR came to see me about [redacted] He was doubtful whether we ought to approve his naturalisation. I said that he had given loyal service to the Department during the war years and that I felt, in the absence of any positive information against him, we were justified in making the recommendation.

I talked to Harry Allen and Archer about A.L.O.s looking after vulnerable points. Jo is getting out a memorandum on the whole subject, which I shall discuss with the A.L.O.s at their next meeting.

November 23rd.

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November 25th.

D.G. Meeting - See minutes of meeting
in file held by D.G. Sec.

Colonel Pitman came to see me. He is an Army officer and served in India for most of the war has been head of the Intelligence and Security Dept. in Uganda. This Department, though staffed largely by police, was entirely independent and worked direct to the Governor and ran its own agents independent of the police. Colonel Pitman talked about the the various intrigues in Uganda which had culminated in the general strike. He had

apparently warned the authorities at an early stage, but the administration had done very little about it. He evidently took a poor view of the administrative officers - many of whom had gone to seed and indulge in various mal practices and immoralities. He seemed less worried about the Indian problem than the native problem. The Moslems were backed by the Aga Khan and were acquiring a considerable amount of property, but they were mostly of a poor class. The Hindus were equally poor in quality. So far there has been no serious reaction due to the situation in India.

Colonel Pitman took a poor view of Holt and also of Pearce, in which opinions he was undoubtedly right. Nash, on the other hand, had found favour and had done a good job. He was very sorry to hear of Nash's illness. Colonel Pitman's job has been taken over by his Deputy, a man named Sharpe, and he himself is going back to the Colony in March to do a job in the Game Department. He made a very favourable impression and I am sure would always be a useful contact of our D.S.O.

I gave a short lecture to Naval officers of the Dominions and certain S.O.s who were going a course here at the Admiralty. I talked to them more or less on the lines of the lecture which I gave to the Imperial Defence College. A complaint was made by the S.O.I., Rangoon, about HUNT. I had explained that our S.O.s had a local responsibility to Governors and Commanders-in-Chief in their areas. S.O. Rangoon said that he had never been able to get anything out of HUNT, who had always given the impression that he only reported to the Prime Minister. I said that this was entirely wrong and that I would see what I could do to put it right.

Captain Hale, R.N., of Singapore raised the question of the S.O.I. in Shanghai, who is in fairly close touch with our D.S.O. in Hong Kong and carries out enquiries of our behalf. He

said that this S.O.I. might at any moment be asked to withdraw by the Chinese. If this were to happen the area would be entirely uncovered from the Security point of view. I said this was really an S.I.S. commitment and that we had no authority to place anyone in Shanghai. A suggestion was then made that perhaps an A.N.A. might be appointed. Hale also drew attention to the fact that everywhere in the East the Navy were coming more and more to rely upon Chinese as servants, orderlies, etc. He wondered whether the authorities were alive to the dangers. I said that the same situation existed in Foreign Office Embassies abroad and that, while we as a department had no responsibility, we were constantly drawing attention to the risks that were being run. I thought his best line would be to raise the matter with the J.I.C. in Singapore and ~~report back to the~~ J.I.C. in London.

November 26th.

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~~Peter Hope came in to see me. He is having~~
quite a lot to do in Paris, since in addition to being an administrative officer, the handling the security of the Embassy had been put on his plate. He says that in view of the threats of the Irgun, the Embassy is bristling with armed guards and detectives. In practice, however, this does not amount to very much. He made an inspection one night and found the majority of them absent. He is tying up internal security as much as he possibly can, but finds it an uphill task. The Ambassador is generally rather bored with the whole business. I recommended to Peter to have a talk with B.3., since as far as our information went the risks in Paris were very considerable.

November 27th.

The Dominion Naval representatives attended the J.I.C. They were concerned mainly with methods of communication with J.I.C., London. The Canadian High Commissioner is to have Military, Naval and Air advisers attached to his staff. It was thought desirable that if possible there should be communication between the Secretaries of the J.I.C. in London and the J.I.C. Canada direct. In Australia the position is more complex. There is a Captain Buchanan in London who passes J.I.C. papers to the Defence Minister; from there they go to the Defence Committee, which should pass them on to the Controller of Intelligence, Brigadier Chilton, who has under him the Australian J.I.C., J.I.B. In practice, however, these documents generally get stuck in the Defence Committee. There is, however, direct communication between the three Service Intelligence Depts. here and their opposite numbers in Australia. It was decided, therefore, that Ds of I. should tip off their opposite numbers when a J.I.C. paper went to the Defence Committee. In New Zealand the Chiefs of Staff have a Secretary, but there is no J.I.C. They had not apparently been receiving the J.I.C. papers from here at all. New Zealand has one representative in Melbourne, who makes contact with all three Service Intelligence Departments. It is proposed, however, that they should have an integrated staff in the Australian J.I.C. and that they should have a representative on the Australian J.I.C. for all domestic matters.

We had an Appointments Board, but did not decide on the acceptance of any candidate.

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November 28th.

The D.G. arrived back to-day.

MAR 2010

I discussed with Courtenay Young the Malayan Security Service, which seemed to me to be getting rather across our tracks. He agreed that the position was not particularly satisfactory, but thought that it would work and that there was no possibility of adopting Dalley's suggestion of an Inspector General looking after local Special Branches.

For Minutes of B. Meeting held to-day see Minutes of B. Division Weekly Meetings.

November 29th.

I attended the J.I.C. again, when the area to be covered by Intelligence in Singapore was discussed. It was felt that the outer area should include India, China, Japan (and most of the Pacific up to Honolulu), Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia. All Intelligence coming from this area would be relevant to the Commanders-in-Chief in Singapore, although they would only have direct responsibility as far north as Hong Kong and as far west as Ceylon. It was thought that the C.I.S. in Singapore, which a joint unit of the three Services, should be abolished and that we should revert to the J.I.C. system with a J.I.S. consisting of Service representatives, a Foreign Office representative, a Colonial Office representative, and someone from SIFE. This body would prepare papers for the J.I.C. and also deal with political matters, information on which was required by the Commanders-in-Chief.

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Theresa Clay came to talk to me about Colonel MEINERTZHAGEN, who had received a mysterious visit from a man who said that he was a representative of the Irgun. He did not disclose his identity or his address, but wanted a message passed on to the Home Office to the effect that the Irgun did not intend to carry out terrorist activities in this country, largely, I think, because they realised it might prejudice their chances of getting money from their financial backers. MEINERTZHAGEN had been to the Home Office, but he was not prepared to give his informant away or to help us in establishing his identity and movements. I explained that it would be ~~an~~ extremely helpful to us to have these, since to some extent I was inclined to doubt the bona fides of the message, which might well be that the Irgun wanted the authorities to relax their vigilance. If we knew where the suspect was living, we might find out names of those with whom he was associated. Col. MEINERTZHAGEN

had apparently been approached in view of his active sympathy with the Zionist Revisionists. Theresa said she had seen a woman outside their house and wondered whether she was a Police agent. I said that, so far as I knew, the Police had not been informed but I would find out.

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I dined with Gray and Kellar. I like Gray very much personally and I think he has tremendous guts.

November 30th.

I had a talk with the D.G. to-day and told him about some of the things that have been going on during his absence: the possibility of our representation in India; the proposed arrival here of an Irgun terrorist, and our meeting yesterday at the Foreign Office.

Gray and I went to see Sir Frank Newsam.

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Newsam then suggested that we might have a talk with Maxwell. Maxwell took a much more favourable view. He thought the risks were negligible and was quite prepared to make a recommendation to the Home Secretary to that effect on Monday.

December 2nd.

The D.G. took his meeting to-day and said that his tour had been very satisfactory, and

that he had succeeded in getting the full co-operation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and the Union, all of whom were very keen to work with us. He made no mention of S.I.M.E. I raised the question of the A.L.O.s covering non-secret factories. The D.G. seemed to think the idea was a good one. Adam brought to notice a number of cases for additional vetting, mainly for the Air Ministry, but also for the Navy. It seemed to us that certain of the requests were unreasonable: the Air Ministry, for example, wanted all their air crews vetted - presumably because they had access to secret equipment. I said that we had always regarded equipment as issued to the troops more or less as public property; there was little to be done with regard to its security.

Theresa came to tell me that MEINERTZHAGEN had been followed in a car in a more than obvious fashion. He had tested it out by pulling into the side, which the following car had done as well. He thought this was just a clumsy manoeuvre by the Police and was very much annoyed in consequence.

We had a meeting with Charles, Dick, Horrocks and B.3.b. on accommodation for S.I.F.E. There was no doubt that Singapore feel that we are not looking after their interests, and they are in despair about the latest news that Killlearn is taking over the house that we had earmarked for ourselves. This, of course, is entirely due to dilatoriness on the part of the War Office, who had authority to buy from the Treasury. Horrocks said that the D.G. was in favour of our getting grants from the Treasury to do our own buying. I said that while this would be satisfactory, it would be a great mistake if this money was charged to the secret vote: there would inevitably be a cut in the secret vote sooner or later and we should end by finding that ourselves and S.I.S. were spending all the money on houses and motor-

cars, and that nothing was left for Intelligence. If, on the other hand, the Treasury were prepared to authorise the War Office, or the Ministry of Works, to honour our signature and to pay the money from the open vote of either Ministry, it would be an excellent plan. It was decided to draw up a paper, showing our commitments, and get the D.G. to see Bridges.

The D.G. spoke to me about Gray. He thought it was a curious thing that the Commissioner had asked Wickham to go out so soon after Gray's appointment. He himself had heard complaints about Gray from the Police that he did not understand Police administration. I said that I had a great admiration for Gray, but I did not, of course, know what the complaints were, although I had the impression that Gray was doing his utmost to build up the Police and to get them many things which they obviously needed. It seemed to me that the situation in Palestine had got beyond a matter of Police administration. The fact was that most of the Police were extremely tired and that, with the exception of people like Conquest, whom Gray regarded as being worth more to him almost than the whole of the C.I.D. put together, ~~they~~ were extremely few and far between. By and large, most of them had "had it" and it was not surprising in the circumstances. It seemed to me that it was now open warfare in Palestine and that little short of a military operation, or a settlement by which the Jews would be in a position to clean up their own kind, would really provide a solution.

I talked to the A.L.O.s and to Jp. Archer. Jo is writing his memorandum about non-secret vulnerable points, but has not yet worked them out in areas. There are some 450 points under consideration. He thinks that the division between the A.L.O.s and C.2. should be secret factories and non-secret factories, and that for the sake of co-ordinating their activities, on factory lines should be controlled by C.2. This seems reasonable enough.

December 3rd.

Miss Nunn tells me that no information about Colonel MEINERTZHAGEN has been passed to the Police by anyone in the Home Office. Either, therefore, the Police have got on to him on their own, or he has been followed by the Irgun. Miss Nunn thought that perhaps we ought to discuss the matter with Burt, urging him to lay-off if in fact he is carrying out observation.

Watt came to see me about A.L.O. Scotland. He said that he had seen Merrilees, Superintendent in Edinburgh, who had heard talk about Cormack, who is in fact his Deputy. He personally does not think Cormack at all suitable. Watt thinks that if we do not make a decision before long, the general talk in Scotland will go on. He does not think that Ede is suitable successor to himself. I told him to have a talk with the D.G. about the whole position.

TAR and I attended the "W" Board. 'C' was in the chair: the three Ds of I., Drew, Wingate and Hayter were present. TAR made an extremely good statement on the work of I.C.I.C. (Inter-Service Combined Information Centre). He explained, for the benefit of the new Ds of I., exactly how the system worked during the war and how it might work in the future. At the moment there seemed to be no very definite policy. It seemed desirable to establish something in the nature of I.C.I.C. points in various theatres, and to centralise the passing over of all information in the hands of L.C.S. L.C.S. should also have a knowledge of what D.A. channels exist. This was generally agreed.

The question of bringing in the Americans was discussed, and it was thought that for the moment, until they settle down, it would be

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better not to make any approach. Later, however, something might be said to General Peabody. Mainly, it was agreed that the Controller should get into touch with the appropriate scientific bodies and see whether it was possible to mislead the Russians on scientific development. Hayter, on behalf of the Foreign Office, said that he could quite easily use certain selected members of Missions abroad for putting across 'indiscretions'.

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December 4th.

At the J.I.C. we discussed the draft to the Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the future Intelligence set-up in Singapore. It was agreed to give them two alternatives: either the C.I.S. or the J.I.C./J.I.S. systems, with a strong preference for the latter. We have agreed to give the local J.I.S. an officer from S.I.F.E.

D.N.I. said that his S.O.I. in Shanghai was being made an A.N.A.

At the Appointments Board to-day we decided that an offer should be made to Jack Morton of D.I.B. to take the post of D.S.O. Iraq. Malcolm Johnston had ascertained that MORTON was prepared to accept.

I sent and saw Burt. I told him the Colonel MEINERTZHAGEN saga. He ascertained that no observation at all had been carried out on Col. M. or his house. This would seem to indicate either persecution mania on the part of Col. M., or that he is being watched by the Irgun

95.

Burt agreed with me that there was no point in the Police intervening.

December 5th.

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For Minutes of B. Meeting held to-day
see Minutes of Weekly Meetings of B. Div.

The D.G. talked to me about getting a block grant from the Services for the Service personnel in S.I.M.E., and then the officers on the Reserve. He and Horrocks had an idea that these officers would be returned to their Service on the outbreak of war as trained counter-Intelligence officers. I said that this was just the moment when we should be requiring their services, in fact we should be contemplating a 200% expansion. The D.G. then suggested our taking on extra Service personnel. I said that I thought this would be unsatisfactory, because they would have no fixed job. They could not indefinitely be looking over someone else's shoulder, and if they were any good would undoubtedly say so.

James Robertson talked to me about the note which the D.M.I. requires for the C.I.G.S. on the facts of the "blowing" of in the White Paper. We have not been able to deal with since, and have now gone over to Hastings, characteristically, says that all this has got nothing to do with us and says that he will be seeing the D.M.I. himself. I said I had no objection to this, provided he did not suggest in his note - as he has done on previous occasions - that M.I.5. let the party down. I gather, however, that he is taking the line that it is by no means certain that the present state of affairs is due to the blowing of He thinks it is more on the lines of general precautions(?). I told the D.M.I. that he would be getting his note from S.I.S. He said that Hastings had spoken to him and he sensed that there was some kind of petty jealousy.

The D.M.I. thought the whole thing was rather stupid.

December 6th.

Dick prepared a very outspoken note on the present decline in morale, both here and in the Middle East, owing to a lack of a decision about the Head of S.I.M.E. and about various other matters affecting S.I.M.E.'s organisation. He took each item point by point. When it came to the Head of SIME, the D. G. said that he had been gravely concerned by the lack of administration in Roberts's office, and that in his view what was required was an experienced administrator. He thought emphatically that Magan was the man. Curiously enough, Horrocks has been saying the same thing! I said that it was nothing new to me to hear that the administration of SIME was bad. Kellar, after his last visit, had, in fact, expressed himself in very definite terms on the subject. In any case, he could not be held responsible for this state of affairs. I thought emphatically that he was by far and away the strongest candidate for the post: everything that he had done here and the Middle East showed that he was qualified both on the Intelligence side and as an administrator. Moreover, before coming to us he had held quite a responsible position as Secretary of the Employers Federation, where doubtless administrative ability was required. He knew the whole area and all about the Intelligence products obtained and required from that area. He knew his staff and had their full confidence. He had been signally successful in carrying the highest ranks in the Middle East - particularly Lord Gort, - who consulted him on almost everything. It seemed to me, therefore, that to go outside in order to make this appointment was both unnecessary and extremely discouraging to many good officers employed in this Department. We should never be able to keep good officers if whenever jobs of this kind turned up we looked around elsewhere. The D.G. asked Horrocks what other candidates there were, and Horrocks

had to confess that so far he had not been able to trace the mythical Penny, the alleged brother of the late D.D.M.I.: all that had been ascertained was that D.D.M.I. Penny had not got a brother! The D.G. then said that he was considerably impressed by the arguments that I had put forward, particularly that one which I also put forward that anybody taking over the Head of SIME should have had considerable experience in our office in London, and that it was our general policy to have a complete interchange of officers at home and abroad. We did not wish to build up a Colonial Service and a Home Service. He reserved judgement about Kellar, but the impression was that he is veering round to giving Kellar the job. Horrocks, characteristically, remained silent. I said that if he decided to appoint Kellar, at the very worst he would not let him down, and I should be very surprised if he did not make a signal success of the whole job. We decided to send Stewart out as No.2 in SIME, vice Hamblyn who has resigned, and to put Shotter at the Egyptian desk. It is to be made clear to Jenkins that his information is to be filtered through the Head of SIME, who will brief the G.O.C. B.T.E. at Ismailia. Only on very rare occasion may it be necessary for Jenkins to see the G.O.C. himself. Hornby is to be taken on as an extra hand.

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I asked Hill whether he wanted to retain the Services of Tangye. He seemed to think that Tangye might be quite useful to him and therefore agreed that Tangye should be kept on on the present basis until the 31st March.

The D.G. spoke to me to-day about 'C''s weekly report to the Prime Minister. He wondered whether we ought not to have a similar report. I told him that we had had a monthly report, but that we had dropped it as it became rather repetitive. It seemed to me better that we should have something really important to take to the P.M., and that we ought to be careful about reporting to him matters which affected other departments, as he might get them out of perspective: we should then find ourselves in trouble, either with the Minister or the Permanent Under Secretary. I thought that senior officers should be capable of bringing any important matters to the notice of Directors and they would bring them to my notice if there was anything that they thought the P.M. ought to know. I would talk to them on this subject. The D.G. seemed quite satisfied.

Miss Chenhalls came to see me about a letter which one, Gunnar JENSSEN had written to Lucas-Tooth, who had passed it to the Prime Minister. It related to the Cuban spies who landed here in 1940 with sabotage material. JENSSEN is an international spy who ~~is~~ has worked for the French and the Russians. He is stateless and we have never been able to get rid of him. He arrived here in '41 as a seaman and was interned, except for a brief period when he was released to S.O.E. He has a grievance and is now criticising the statement made by the Prime Minister about the projected German landings in 1940. He got his information about the four spies, whom he belittles, from being interned with them at the Beltane Schools. He alleges that a dog kept by PACHECO cost the British Government £1,000. The dog was, in fact, kept at PACHECO's expense and cost him £300.

A Moscow despatch dated 26th August reviews the position of the Red Navy and its post-war development. When the position was reviewed in July, 1945, the British concluded: (1) that

the Soviet Union, again a first-class power with world-wide interests, would make great efforts to increase her naval strength, (ii) that for some years to come, however, the Soviet Union was likely to be fully occupied in restoring her naval position in the Baltic and the Black Sea; (iii) that it was doubtful whether the Soviet Navy, even when expanded, would ever become more than a loyal helper of the Red Army, but (iv) that it would be unwise to overlook the possible implications of the re-emergence of Russia as a great Naval Power without a big sea-going and ocean-going fleet and suitably disposed bases. During the past year Soviet political interest in Naval forces has manifested itself in many directions. There has been opposition to American naval bases throughout the Atlantic and in such important strategical positions as Iceland, Greenland and the Azores. The question of the Dardanelles has also been raised. In Northern Europe she is posing as the disinterested friend of Norway, Denmark and Iceland, against the excessive demands from the Western Capitalist powers. She is not abandoning her own ideas upon Spitzbergen and ~~Bay~~ Island, nor should her evacuation of Bornholm be interpreted as a sign that she is abandoning her intention of dominating the Baltic.

In the Mediterranean, in addition to the "straits incident", she is trying to make herself felt through E.A.M. in Greece and by attempting to profit from the dissolution of the Italian Colonial Empire. Her methods as regards Greece, the Dodecanese and Tripolitania have been clumsy, and she appears to have abandoned her designs in both the latter cases. Only in the Adriatic would Russia appear to be extending her interests, through her control of Jugo-Slavia and Albania. She is now, however, supporting Bulgarian claims for an outlet upon the Aegean.

In the Far East, Soviet naval policy has not

yet show^d its hand so clearly, but apart from securing an outlet into the Pacific through the ~~annexation of the Kuriles & South Sakhalin~~, she would seem to be turning gradually to the long-term aim of controlling the Yellow Sea. For the moment this also is only showing itself in the consolidation of Port Arthur and all Soviet rights (?) at Dairen and in Soviet support or sympathy for the Communists in Korea, Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula. In the Middle East the Soviet Government is clearly trying to extend its influence throughout Persia and has inherited Czarist aims for oil and an outlet on the Gulf.

9th December,

I asked the D.G. out to lunch. He told me on request that he had been thinking a good deal about the Head of S.I.M.E. I said that there was one aspect of the problem that I had not put to him before, because I felt that I might possibly have been misunderstood, and that I did not wish him to think that either I or Kellar was trying to force him to a decision against his will. The point was that if Kellar was not wanted, he would be bound to feel that after four years hard work in the Middle Eastern section and in building up SIME, he was not considered fit to take it over; there could not really be very much future for him in this office. This might lead him to look elsewhere. Moreover, it would have a bad effect on morale generally if when such appointments came along we went outside the office to fill them. I felt it was only fair to let him know this. I said that I was quite confident myself that Kellar could do the job admirably and that he had very considerable administrative ability. While I realised that good administration was essential, I thought that it should spring from a knowledge of the Intelligence needs of the area; it was on the basis of that that the organisation would have to be planned and the administration would follow in its wake. To do anything else would be putting the cart before the horse.

This had been, in my opinion, the trouble in the early days of the war. The office had done a terrific job of work, but this had been carried out not so much on account of the organisation, but in spite of it. The fact was that we had had some first class people working for us, that we have a nucleus, I think, left and have taken on some very promising others. During the war, as a result of the organisation having been planned to some extent in vacuo, without due consideration being given to the Intelligence needs, I had had to contend with a good many difficulties. By slow degrees, however, we had evolved a workable system and back-pedalled a good many of the original suggestions. The D.G. then said that he had been turning over in his mind whether Kellar should not have an administrator who would work with him. I said that he could take it as a certainty that if Kellar wanted an administrator he would not be slow in letting us know. I thought that he ought to allow Kellar to go out there and formulate his own views. I was certain that if the D.G. chose to go out two months after Kellar's arrival, he would find a very marked change in the whole organisation. He must remember that Kellar could in no way be held responsible for the present position in S.I.M.E. Nobody was more conscious of Douglas Roberts's deficiencies than he was. He had, in fact, said so very forcibly on his return from the Middle East some months ago. We had all known for a long time that Douglas Roberts was no good and we never, in point of fact, thought very highly of his predecessor. We had had to set up an interrogation centre and plan a general control of entry in Egypt in 1942. Before that nothing of the kind existed. The fact was that Maunsell had been extremely lucky to get away with it: had the Germans been cleverer in exploiting the deficiencies of S.I.M.E., Maunsell might have been in trouble. The D.G. said that he would speak

to Kellar and has, I think, made up his mind to appoint him as Head of S.I.M.E. We then discussed the question of finance, particularly with regard to the purchase of accommodation, cars, etc. I told him that I was all in favour of the Treasury making a grant to the War Office, or the Office of Work, which could be drawn on on the office signature. I was, however, strongly opposed to such a sum being put on a Secret Service vote. We and S.I.S. had to be regarded as a unit in the production of Intelligence: if, therefore, the Secret Service vote was cut down in Parliament, we should both suffer and we might find ourselves in the position of having a lot of property, cars, etc., but no Intelligence. This would be disastrous, as our organisations would be judged by the Intelligence they produced.

11th December.

The case of the two escaped German prisoners is getting rather exciting.

a voice has been heard reading the newspaper in guttural tones. Hill maintains that under the Defence Regulations we cannot enter private property in order to arrest an escaped prisoner. It would however, be possible to get a warrant for the arrest of Mrs. EDMONDS for harbouring him, and this would carry with it powers of search. Clearly, however, we ought to be pretty sure of our ground before we go in.

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I talked to Mrs. Keene about the difficulties of getting female staff. I had mentioned this matter at the Directors meeting, and suggested that some circular might go round the office so that members could canvass their friends. It was, however, necessary to know how many people would be required with secretarial qualifications, and how many without, and what pay, etc., they would get.

I felt that there could be no harm in telling prospective candidates that they would be coming into Military Intelligence. At present we are only telling them that they are going to join a Government Department, which must sound extremely dreary.

Trevor Roper came to see me about his book on the "Putsch". He wants certain documents from us. As his project has been authorised by the Foreign Office, and by the Government Historical Section, I see no harm in letting him have what he wants. I asked him to write me a letter, stating his requirements.

Hayter rang me up to say that Kirkpatrick's representative in the Middle East is G/C. (?) Marsack, who belongs to an organisation called B.I.S.M.E. I am arranging for SIME to get into touch with Marsack.

The D.G. went to the J.I.C. to-day, alone for the first time. I did my best to brief him, but a good deal of course comes up which is not on the Agenda. A paper by Wingate on the defence of India was discussed. The general feeling seems to have been that our sources of Intelligence from India are extremely limited. This was precisely the situation one felt was bound to arise.

Neither D.I.B. nor the Services can now communicate much Intelligence to this country and the Viceroy is deprived of many of his sources. There is a consequent dearth of Intelligence and the J.I.C. find themselves unable to brief Chiefs of Staff. We are now asked to state our Intelligence sources from India. We, of course, have no Intelligence Sources:

No-

body seems to have thought of suggesting that I.P.I. might be consulted. I am explaining all this to the D.G.

12th December 1958 MAR 2010

I talked to Roger about the case of our agent, who has been asked by on the C.P., to give lectures on street fighting. It seemed to me that there might be an element of provocation in this. Roger pointed out that the request had come from and that had made it clear that he could not take part in any such street operations himself, since being an alien he would be deported, and that if turned the offer down it would only mean that somebody else would be given the job and we should know nothing about it. He has therefore been instructed to go ahead and submit his lecture to us for approval. He has been told to do nothing further until he is again approached. Personally, I think that this is quite all right. I shall, however, be informing the D.G.

Bertram EDE returned to day from Spain. I told him about the position with regard to Scotland. He regretted the decision as he had made up his mind to take the job. I said that we should be trying to find some other kind of employment. Later, the D.G., Horrocks, Dick and I had a meeting and decided to offer him D.S.O. Caribbean.

For minutes of B. Meeting held to-day, see green folder.

Horrocks came in while I was talking to Dick. He asked me exactly what the purport of the enquiry was with regard to the Registry. I said that it had been intimated to me that certain section in the office did not really understand Registry procedure, and that some of them had complaints - whether justifiable or not I do not know - and that it would be a good thing, therefore, that we should find out

exactly what was worrying sections. Having done so, we would then have a Round Table Conference with Potter. I had spoken about this to Horrocks on his return, and also I had discussed it with Potter, who seemed to think it was a good idea. I said that there was no reason for anybody to think that we were conducting an inquisition into the Registry. Horrocks said that he mentioned the matter because several people had spoken to him about it and intimated that they were not prepared to talk. What exactly he meant by this I do not know: personally, I regard it as somewhat sinister and insubordinate.

We then talked about finance. Horrocks said that he had been to a large meeting at the War Office, but had packed it up as he thought it was not getting anywhere. He felt the only thing to do was to get a grant from the Treasury in order to finance our administration abroad. I said that I was all in favour of this, provided the money did not come from the Secret Service vote. He said he thought I had an exaggerated idea of the whole thing. I said that I was quite clear on the point, since I was certain that sooner or later the vote would be cut, and that we should then find ourselves in the position of having large administrative commitments and no money for Intelligence purposes.

I then talked to him about female staff. He thought it a good idea that we should tell prospective candidates that they were coming to Military Intelligence, and that we should try to make the job look as attractive as we could. He will let me have the necessary particulars. I said that not only could these be circulated within the office, but that I might give copies to the D.M.I. and D.N.I., in case any of their officers had daughters whom they wanted to place.

14th December.

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16th December.

Burt came to see me. He is leaving in a few days time for South Africa. Kellas is giving him a copy of our note on Zionist Revisionists in the Union. I asked him about the leakage at the Yard. He admitted that it was bad, but expressed the view that it would always go on to a greater or lesser extent. He evidently did not think that it was a good idea having a Public Relations Officer like Fearnley, who was an ex-Pressman. He said that the Commissioner was fully aware of the state of affairs. He himself never communicated any information to Fearnley - occasionally he gave guarded answers to enquiries which Fearnley received from the Press. He said that some time ago he had caught out two of the

civilian clerks in the General Registry collecting information which they were handing out to the Press. The General Registry is, of course, a mine of information and carries enough political dirt to sink most politicians, not to speak of other citizens.

The D.G. has told Bertram EDE that he cannot offer him the job in Scotland, and EDE has turned down the Caribbean job. He has now been offered B.2., which he has accepted pending Curry's return. It is then proposed that he should go to C. Division.

We have a telegram in about WINTERBORN, who has been offered a job as Head of the J.I.S. We would like to keep him, but it is difficult to make a forward commitment that we take him on to the permanent staff four years hence when he is due for his Army pension.

17th December.

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I had a meeting with Harry Allen and the Railway Police. It was decided that we would revert to the pre-war system, by which the Railway authorities referred to us for vetting in the cases of visitors whom they may have reason to suspect, and notify us after the event of the names of all visitors.

We had a meeting about WINTERBORN. Horrocks is in favour of suggesting that he should be given the alternative of resigning now from the Army and joining the Security Service, or continuing his career in the Army. Dick suggested this secondment to us, without pay and allowances, which would give him one of the permanent vacancies on the M.I.5. ceiling in SIFE. Horrocks did not, however, like this.

20th December 1958 MAR 2010

D.N.I. came to see the D.G. about leakage of information on our tie-up with the Americans on armaments. Hill and I explained to him the history of KUH, and I showed him a copy of "The Week" of December 11th.

KLOP came to see me. He said that he had a feeling that possibly we might think him on the verge of an embarrassment, and that for reasons of loyalty we felt that we ought to go on retaining his services.

I said that I was conscious that there was a vast field here in England which he could exploit on our behalf, but that owing to reorganisation and general pressure of work here we had not, unfortunately, got down to thinking things out. I myself thought that we should do this as soon as he has finished his interrogations on the Continent.

It
even happened that people who were moving about from one place to another got better opportunities for picking up information: if they are rooted to one spot, things are apt to get slow and people become less communicative. I think he was pleased to hear that we still wanted to retain his services.

23rd December.

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day I raised the question of putting forward a memorandum about C.P. members employed in research establishments, which problem is linked with

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proposals to bring over here a number of second-grade scientists and technicians from the British Zone of Germany. Harry Allen said that he had a memobandum in the course of preparation.

30th December.

Perfect came in to see me. He had been down as far as Cape Town. He is back here for a short period before taking up his job in East Africa. He has received good chits from the Governor and the G.O.C. in Malta.

1947.

1st January.

At the J.I.C. to-day it was agreed that the Committee should defer putting forward their memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff, on various aspects of Russian visits to our factories, until they had our memorandum covering the whole problem of Russian penetration. On the question of Iraq, it was agreed that the Committee should recommend that the directive of the Defence Committee Middle East to the A.O.C. should be amended to confirm with the SIME charter. The present directive shows our D.S.O. as integrated with the A.O.C's staff: he should, of course, have freedom of action to go to any of the Commanders-in-Chief and to the Ambassador.

Horrocks told me that the D.G. had had a successful visit to the Treasury, who had agreed to the principle that a little sum of money should be placed on the open vote to the War Office, or some other suitable department, on which we could draw for various administrative commitments abroad.

We had a meeting about India, at which Vickery, Bamford, Vivian, Dick and myself were present. It was agreed that we should have a D¹S.O. in India, in a separate building but under cover of the High Commissioner's office.

I.P.I. would come under our control and would continue to run its agents abroad.

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We shall go forward with the above views when the meeting at a higher level is held. Somebody will have to visit India to fix up our liaison. I informed the D.G. of the gist of our discussions.

Carey Foster and Rodney Dennys came to talk about the leakage of information about Germany. I got Hill down and we told them that without any doubt the source of this leakage was Mr. Hynd, who had passed the information to Freddie KUH. The matter was already in hand and the Lord Chancellor was seeing Hynd.

Curry suggested that possibly he might be useful as a liaison officer in Australia. I said that in view of the unsatisfactory state of Australian Security, I rather doubted whether it was possible to make much headway until the Australian authorities had put their house in order. I would, however, consider the matter.

2nd January

David Stewart came to say goodbye to me. He is off to Egypt at last.

WINTERBORN has decided to stay with SIFE, on the chance of being ultimately absorbed by the Security Service. Dick and Courtenay tell me that HUNT has incurred the displeasure of a number of people in Rangoon, but that Malcom Johnston, in conversation with Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, has temporarily smoothed matters over. There is no doubt that we shall have to change HUNT as soon as possible.

I talked to Mitchell about a request from the J.I.C. for information about Lothian name SCOTT, who is apparently holding some consular post in France and has written in a long report about conditions in the French Zone which has interested the Minister of Defence. Adam took it upon himself to put up the reply, which was in an unsatisfactory form. SCOTT is a thoroughly unreliable person, who in the past has had association with German and Fascists. He is generally considered to be unbalanced and unreliable.

For minutes of B. Meeting see green folder.

3rd January.

I told the D.G. that we had just had a telephone conversation by a man called

FLOCKHART from MOSLEY's house, a number in Bayswater, which made it clear that FLOCKHART and others are using RAVEN THOMPSON's car and are intending to pick up four prominent Jews and flog them on Friday night. We were giving information to Thompson of S.B., and the D.G. suggested that I should speak to Howe, which I accordingly did. Later we got information that FLOCKHART intended to take over RAVEN THOMPSON's car at an address in Chelsea Park Gardens.

Dick, Kellar, Clayton and I had a meeting about East Africa. It seemed that we ought to have a clearer idea as to how our D.S.O. at Nairobi was going to function. Ideally the D.S.O. should control all the local S.Bs, but this would be a heavy commitment. He should, however, be the recipient of all their information. On the basis of this information, he could then make up his mind what movements were purely indigenous and what had a wider significance. He could then concentrate on these latter movements and stimulate the Police to further action. We were all somewhat doubtful whether two officers could really control such an enormous area, but it may be better to see how things work out before suggesting that further assistance is necessary. Kellar is going to try and draft some kind of instructions for the D.S.O.

4th January.

I had a talk with Harry Lee. The Police have made a bungle of the Fascist case. They picked up RAVEN THOMPSON's car at Elstree on the Friday night and followed it through all the lanes and highways. They were, of course, detected and challenged. A complaint was made at Woodford Police Station and later at Scotland Yard. Tommy Thompson seems rather complacent and was writing off with the idea that prevention is better than cure. It is true, of course, that nothing happened, but on the next occasion the Fascists will doubtless be more careful. The net result, from our point of view, is that our telephone checks have been blown without any compensating advantage.

6th January.

KIDP came in to give us the result of his interrogation of FIDRMUC @ OSTRO in the American zone in Germany. His story is rather a sensational one. OSTRO claims three agents

of importance, one in Paris, who went after the German occupation, another in the Yemen who had been operating since 1936, and one in London who had been operating from 1938 until the end of the war. The London agent is said to be RASCHITZKY of the Czech Legation, who is the brother-in-law of Irene EISINGER. OSTRO was quite emphatic that Irene had nothing to do with German activities and no knowledge of them. RASCHITZKY had various contacts with the Society of British Aircraft Instructors, and with the Czech integrated Air Force through its Chief, JANUSHCEK. He claims that the information obtained was of the highest value to the Germans, that it was sent out to secret cover addresses abroad on the back of British propaganda posters and other material on which there was writing in secret ink. In 1944 he said that it was necessary to establish wireless communication in order that the targets that we intended to bomb should be communicated at the earliest possible moment to the Germans. In order to do this it was necessary to employ Spanish Republican wireless operator, but the Abwehr did not consider it desirable that RASCHITZKY should be placed in direct contact with this man. They therefore devised a system by which RASCHITZKY - known as TOR or THOR - selected half a dozen Catholic Churches. If Essen was to be bombed, he would ask the Priest to say Mass for "George Frederick Essenden": if Hamm was to be bombed, he would ask the Priest to say Mass for "George Frederick Hammond". It is customary in these cases for notices of these events to be posted on the Church notice board. The wireless operator was therefore instructed to take note of the names of any people for whom Mass was said who had the initials "George Frederick". He would then send over by wireless the first syllable of the name. This story, of course, immediately rang a bell, since GARBO's alleged wireless operator was always referred to as a Republican Spaniard. If, in fact, there was any other republican Spaniard, it may be that OSTRO has characteristically been building himself up as a master spy. It is possible that

he may have had the idea, but that in fact nothing happened. It certainly could not have happened through GARBO's notional Spanish Republican as the set at all times was under our control. OSTRO alleges that LOBKOWITZ, the Czech Minister, was a close collaborator of RASCHITZKY and we intend to investigate this whole story in great detail, since in a number of respects it is circumstantial and contains a large amount of checkable detail.

Phillips rang me up about the extract from "The Week" which I had send to the D.N.I. He asked whether we covered them on these matters. I said that normally we should, provided we knew exactly what interested them. B.I., the Communist section, would not normally know that D.N.I. was interested in a leakage of the standardisation of our armaments with American patterns: I, however, knew about it and happened to be reading "The Week". I said that of course there was nothing to prevent Phillips getting his own copy, but that such things might just as well appear in any other publication. I would, however, continue to read the "Week" as for Hollis's section.

C.C. Edinburgh looked in to see me to-day. I did not discuss with him the appointment of A.L.O. Scotland as he was seeing the D.G. Watt tells me that Ewing, the D.G's late Superintendent in Glasgow, is thoroughly disgruntled as he feels that the D.G's decision, conveyed to him by Watt, that the appointment would now be made from outside, is a complete let-down. Watt is doubtful whether, if asked, the Glasgow police will put in any names at all. Edinburgh do not seem to have any candidates either. Meanwhile, of course, the D.G. is seeing Cunningham, who has told him that he thinks he ought to go ahead with his idea of getting a Scottish policeman. Cunningham

of course, knows no more about what is required than any of the Chief Constables. I am afraid that as a result of all this our stock in Scotland is at zero.

I asked Hill about CRAUFURD. He thought CRAUFURD, quite innocently, was making use of information that he had obtained during his service here, in order to fight the claims of those who wanted their property released by the Custodians of Enemy Property. In this connection, apparently, Craufurd has been representing Wolf Bros. Hill suggested that I should have a word with Poston.

7th January.

I had a meeting with Harry Allen, Horrocks, Roger, Stanley Strong and Adam about the vetting of civil servants. We decided, firstly, that the Bridges Panel should be asked to revert to the system of vetting of civil servants, temporary or permanent, who were to be employed on secret work. Secondly, that we ought to vet temporary civil servants at the outset and thereafter rely on their being brought to notice if they were to be employed on secret work, and thirdly, that the D.G. should bring to the notice of Bridges the question of P.As and secretaries brought in by Ministers and Parliamentary Under Secretaries. Normally, these people were not vetted: it could, however, be taken as a certainty that they saw all the Minister's papers. Fourthly, that the Bridges Panel should ask Departments for an assurance that their outstations knew about vetting procedure for secret work.

At the J.I.C. to-day 8th January.

At the J.I.C. to-day it was agreed that the appointment of a further Soviet A.N.A. should be refused, and that our Naval Attache in Moscow should point out to his opposite

number that this was done on grounds of reciprocity. I suggested that an opportunity might be taken when members of the Soviet Naval Mission return to Moscow to refuse a replacement until the Soviet Naval Mission was reduced to normal proportions. The paper on Egypt & Near and M.E. was not entirely up to date and it was decided that the more recent developments should be included in the next paper.

I had a further meeting with the A.L.Os about Utilities and vulnerable points. A certain amount of progress has been made, but we have not quite reached the stage where they can be given their orders. They will work broadly under the direction of G.2.

Alan ROGER is back from Hong Kong. Everything there seems to be going extremely well: there is still a certain amount of difficulty from Colonel Stables, the G.1, who will insist on running a secret service on his own.

Hunter brought HUTCHINSON to see me. Hutchie is a most remarkable little man: he has been with us for seventeen years and is by far and away the best 'watcher' we have ever had. Unfortunately he has developed some trouble due to blood pressure and cannot any longer stand about. It is quite clear that in spite of its arduous nature he has really enjoyed his work. As a special concession we are going to put him on half pay and perhaps occasionally make use of him. He is, I think, very pleased about this. I told him that he was to keep the matter entirely to himself.

9th January.

I had a talk with Perfect about his job. I told him that it seemed desirable that before his departure we could be quite clear what it was we wanted him to do and how he was to do it. It seemed to me that there were broadly two types of information we required, firstly,

that which was inter-Colonial, and secondly that which had a wider interest. I told him that we were intending to call a meeting on this subject.

For minutes of the B. Meeting held to-day see green folder.

Colonel Shaw came to see me and Harry Allen about the circulars to ex-members of the I. Corps, in which they were asked to state whether they were intending to travel abroad. We felt that some re-wording of the circular was necessary, and it was agreed that Shaw would make a draft and then call a meeting of ourselves, M.I.6. and M.I.1.

10th January.

Herbert, des Graz, Colonel Todd, Brinsley Richards, M.E., Hedger and myself discussed to-day the secret ink side of Censorship in a future war. Our recommendations were accepted by Herbert; namely, that in a future war, as in the last war, Censorship would have to have their own laboratory, and that there should be a complete interchange between this and the joint S.I.S./M.I.5. laboratory. Meanwhile, Censorship should appoint a suitable chemist who could do at least a part-time job in Hedger's laboratory and keep himself thoroughly au fait with up to date methods. In time of war this man would be thrown off to organise the Censorship laboratory. Herbert said that the present arrangement with regard to Censorship personnel, including himself, was that they entered into a yearly contract to make themselves available for the work in time of war. This contract was, of course, renewable but depended upon age and general service. Herbert himself, for example, could not say, except from year to year, whether he would be in a position - on grounds of health or business - to make himself

available for a further year. I emphasised that if possible it would be desirable to get a chemist of such an age and such circumstances as would make it at least likely that his contract could be renewed for a period of several years, since continuity in secret ink work was highly desirable.

13th January.

I talked to Hill about CRAUFURD. Horrocks thought that CRAUFURD was making use of knowledge acquired in this office in an improper manner. Hill said that he had seen CRAUFURD once or twice, and that he had told him quite frankly that he was assisting Wolff Bros. in a matter affecting the release of some of their funds and that he had been paid £500 in £1 notes. Hill also had it in mind that CRAUFURD formerly had the intention of going to I.C.I. to run their intelligence for them, and that in this connection he had become fairly au fait with matters affecting their relations with I.G. Farben and Duponts. I said that I did not see anything necessarily very sinister in this: I thought a distinction should be made between making use of information regarding the machinery of Government and making use of information about individuals, acquired from a knowledge of our files. I could not regard the former as improper, but the latter, though difficult to define, would be definitely wrong. Hill said that he had no evidence to show that CRAUFURD had had anything to do with the files of the Wolff Brothers, nor had he questioned him about any individuals who had records in this office. He thought Poston might know more. I spoke to Poston on this subject. He said that he had not seen CRAUFURD for a month or so, and that the last time he had come here it had been at Poston's special request as he wanted information which CRAUFURD was in a position to give him. CRAUFURD had been quite

open about what he was doing and had never asked him for any information from our files. My own view is that CRAUFURD is not the kind of person who would deliberately do anything dishonourable, although he might, owing to his training here and his enthusiasm about the work he did for this office, unconsciously make use of certain facts which he had acquired while working here.

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day we discussed the questions of Established Staff, Security Service Reports, and the disposal of Mrs. JOYCE (wife of William JOYCE) - For full minutes see minutes held by D.G. Sec.

I saw Bridges at the D.G.'s request about the proposal that we should establish a liaison office in Delhi. I showed Bridges the minutes of our deliberations between S.I.S. and I.P.I., which he approved. It was proposed therein that we should send someone out to India, who would be introduced by Smith, the present incumbent D.I.B., to Patel, and also to Smith's successor. We would then obtain the agreement of the Indian Government to our proposal. We would take over I.P.I. and we would ask the Indian Government to appoint a liaison officer in London, who would come under the aegis of the Indian High Commissioner, or Ambassador. Our officer would come under the British High Commissioner, but should have a separate office which would give him the necessary immunity.

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I told Bridges that we had budgeted with the Treasury for about £10,000 a year for I.P.I.; we had not, however, told Bamford about the cost of our office in Delhi: we thought this might come

to something like £5,000 a year. Bridges said that the money would have to be found.

14th January.

Fawdry came to see me. I had a long talk with him about affairs in Gibraltar. He said that his personal relations all round were extremely good, and that he was getting all the co-operation from Naval and Military authorities he required. He said that in the Forces, discipline was not all that it might be; this particularly applied to the Navy who were extremely rowdy when coming ashore - most of these men I think are on their way home for demobilisation and feel that this is the last opportunity of beating up the town while they are still in uniform. The effect on the local population is bad. There was a case not long ago of the Acting-Governor's wife being assaulted by three drunken sailors in her car, which resulted in the A.D.C. getting several teeth knocked out. As regards MOLINA, there is still a strong movement to allow him back into the Rock area. MOLINA admits his association with the Germans, which he says was due to orders from above, but that he told them virtually nothing and gave us a lot of valuable information. Be this as it may, there is very little doubt that he passed on to the Germans the information about the bogus Monty in Gibraltar.

I saw Air Vice Marshal Baker about allowing Shotter to wear uniform in the Middle East, and also to take promotion. He demurred at first, because he said he had just turned down somebody from DCOS, who appeared to want to wear uniform in order to get priority for travel. I explained to him that our reasons were really functional and that we were as anxious as anybody to civilianise the whole organisation, but that we felt that we had to go slow as long as the area continued to be

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primarily a military one. We had, however, made a start when we took over SIME in appointing a civilian as its Head. Baker was very sympathetic and agreed to do what we wanted.

I took the yearly retention of warrants over to Maxwell. He remarked that he thought our activities were fairly evenly distributed over Communists, Fascists and Jews. He kept the list to show the Home Secretary.

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15th January.

Charles Peake came to the J.I.C. to-day, when he gave a short account of affairs in Jugo-Slavia. The country was, he said, entirely in the hands of young Communists, many of whom were totally illiterate. They were imbued with an almost pathetic belief in their creed. Tito and become a figurehead like Stalin; his picture was in every home and factory. He was outwardly friendly and on occasions inclined to be helpful. His decisions were not always carried out by his subordinates, who generally adjusted them to suit their own views. Peake thought that Tito rather liked to pose in the eyes of Moscow as one who knew better how to handle the Western Powers. He was uncertain whether Tito would sign the Trieste agreement and felt that there might be some conflict of views between Russian International Communism and Jugo-Slav Communism. By and large, however, there is no doubt that Tito takes his orders from Moscow. Jugo-Slavia is extremely hot on the subject of Carinthia, which they intend to have at any cost. They are more inclined to

wait for Trieste, which they think will inevitably fall into their basket in the long run. A certain amount of reconstruction work is going on, in spite of the poor quality of the administration. Trade is poor with Europe, owing to the exchange, and with Russia as the latter has little to offer.

Trevor-Roper, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, came in to tell me that he had a letter from Ronald Seth, late of S.O.E., about his book on Hitler. Seth wanted to come and see him. Trevor-Roper had an account from Seth of his various exploits, which at the time had seemed somewhat fantastic to us. T.R. felt, however, that they fitted very well into the picture and showed up Himmler as he believed him to be. He also told me of a Russian named BELOV, who was writing up for some authority or other, the German/Russian relations. He thought that Belov should see Hilger's report. I said that, provided, that Belov was working for an authorised Government Department, this could probably be arranged.

17th January.

Hill and I went to see the Lord Chancellor; Norman Brook and Drew were present. The Lord Chancellor was considering the report of the Control Commission leakage which he had received from Hynd, and also one which he had received from Orme Sargent. He did not think that either report was conclusive, but that the evidence pointed to Hynd and his Public Relations Officer. This raised the whole question of the work of Public Relations Officers of Press Departments. It seemed to the Lord Chancellor entirely wrong that a man like Houghton, of the Control Commission, should be on the distribution list for the Foreign Office telegrams. He wondered what the system was at the Foreign Office. I said that the

Foreign Office had a long established Press Department, and Norman Brook added that they appointed ? officers with wide responsibilities as the Head of the Department. The Lord Chancellor proposed, however, to see Orme Sargent on the matter. I then drew his attention to the leakage on the standardisation of arms with the U.S.A., which, according to "The Week", had occurred through the Public Relations Officer, Major Le Prevost. The Lord Chancellor agreed that it did seem necessary to review the whole machinery of Public Relations, particularly since, it was pointed out, many of these people are White Street officers. Did these officers receive a great deal of confidential information, and was it left purely to their discretion to disclose what they thought fit to the Press, or were they briefed? The whole thing needed looking into, and he would report the matter to the P.M. He wondered even whether Francis Williams at Downing Street should receive as much information as he did. When I had seen Orme Sargent, the Lord Chancellor proposed to see Mr. Hynd and acquaint him with the result of his findings.

We saw three candidates at the Appointments Board to-day, but none of them seemed suitable, except an old man who had acted as interpreter for the D.N.I. in Berlin and at many other conferences. He was brought up, to the age of 23, in Russia and was bilingual. We decided to consider his case carefully.

18th January.

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Scott is getting out a report on Right Wing Polish activities here. In case any questions are asked in connection with the allegations made against Cavendish-Bentinck in Warsaw.

Cavendish-Bentinck has been cited in the proceedings against Count GRUHOLSKI, who has just been condemned to death for espionage in Warsaw. It is not, I think, denied that Cavendish-Bentinck had met BRUHOLSKI socially.

20th January.

Mrs. Keene came to see me about the Registry enquiry in B. Division. She was worried about the possibility of secretaries using the committee as a forum for Registry complaints, since she already had machinery for dealing with such complaints direct with the Registry sections concerned. I said that this was not really the purpose of the enquiry at all; the fact that this very point was explained to those who came before the Committee before they began. All we wanted was to ascertain their difficulties and hear any possible bright suggestions. When we have done this, we propose to discuss the whole question with the Registry. I got M.E. and F.J. to come down and explain to Mrs. Keene exactly what they were doing.

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Secondly, it was the policy of the office not to intervene in matters which were primarily the concern of the Navy. It was our business to inform the Navy about any subversive organisations on shore which were attempting to undermine naval discipline, and to warn the Navy about the possibility of strikes in the dockyard, etc. We might even

give the Navy advice on occasions as to how they might handle a case of internal discipline. We could not, however under any circumstances run cases; least of all could we use a naval rating as an agent. The Navy had always tried to draw us into cases of this kind since Invergordon, but we had strenuously resisted such attempts in the past. We were issuing a clear directive on the subject.

The D.G. and I took Hayter to lunch and afterwards he had talks with Dick, Hollis and Kellar. Kellar told me afterwards that Hayter had remained adamant on the question of our representation in foreign countries which were within the orbit of S.I.M.E..

I had a talk with Horrocks about a draft note which I was proposing to put up to the D.G. on the constitution of the Appointments Board. In addition to its present duties, I was proposing that the Appointments Board should deal with transfers and promotions of male and female staff, and resignations, and that there should be regular reporting on the male and female staff every six months. As regards the latter, there would be additional reports by the male officers on their secretaries. On the basis of these reports it would be possible to make decisions about promotions. Horrocks said he took grave exception to the proposals which in his view infringed seriously on his function. He seemed to think that it was insulting that the other Directors should have any say in staff matters. I said that I thought it was taking an exaggerated view; all that we were doing, in fact, was to give the Heads of the Divisions some forum where they could state the cases of the personnel working under them, whether male or female. It seemed to me that this was the right and proper way of doing things. I subsequently talked to the D.G., to whom I had not previously submitted these proposals. He

seemed to agree with my view. I explained to him that there was nothing personal about the matter, but that as things were at present vacancies occurred and neither he nor I, nor any of the other Directors appear to have any say in the matter at all.

21st January.

I had a meeting on East Africa with Dick, Perfect, Spencer and Clayton in order to work out some kind of charter for the D.S.O. We felt that to some extent this charter would have to be tentative until the ground had been fully explored. We needed to know how far the various District Intelligence Services were prepared to work together, and what support would be given by the Governors. We then wanted to know the relative efficiency of the various Forces. It is important that the periodical conferences between Rhodesia, South Africa and the D.S.O. should not in any way lead to Rhodesia being used as the normal channel between ourselves and South Africa. The D.S.O. should write direct to Palmer on any matters affecting his area, sending a copy to us, and we, of course, would continue to deal direct with Palmer here: perhaps sending a copy of our correspondence to the D.S.O. Broadly, it would be the purpose of the D.S.O. to ascertain what subversive movements were common to more than one Colony in his area and what subversive movements had a wider significance and indicated attempts at penetration from the outside..

We had a meeting with the D.G., TAR, a Dick and Charles Butler on the subject of agents. TAR had been charged with looking into the whole matter and assessing what payments were being made and whether they were commensurate with the results. TAR had prepared an extremely informative paper, giving illustrations of the kind of information that was being obtained. It was made clear that it was difficult to

estimate the value of these agents at any one moment: it was necessary to have certain coverage which on occasions would not pay a dividend for a year or eighteen months. There are also the cases of agents who had to be put in at the bottom and gradually work their way up. A good deal of pruning has already been done and the position is considered to be generally satisfactory, although, of course, it wants constant watching.

Hirsch, the D.D.M.I., brought round General Macmillan. I had a short talk with him, when I explained the structure of the office here and in the Middle East. I then passed him on to Alex Kellar, with whom he had a long talk. He was evidently extremely pleased with his visit and particularly with Alex. He said to me afterwards that he was very impressed by him, particularly the way in which he had given him all the salient features and anticipated everything that he really wanted to know. Macmillan is a very different type from Barker and has an extremely pleasant personality.

Kim gave a large farewell party, which consisted mostly of representatives of our office, S.I.S., and the Americans. He is off to Turkey next week.

22nd January.

At the J.I.C. to-day Mr. Roberts, the Counsellor at our Embassy in Moscow, gave a short talk on Russia. He said that when he returned there in the Autumn, a certain atmosphere of gloom was discernable. This was due firstly to the partial failure of the wheat crop, and secondly to lack of progress in reconstruction both of houses and factories. The result of this had been that to some extent Russia was turning her eyes more inwards than outwards.

C.I.G.S.'s visit had on the whole been a success. He had come to the conclusion that it was unlikely that Russia would be ready to engage in a major war for at least ten years, and that she would not be prepared to face an Anglo-American combination. This did not mean, however, that she might not engage in minor wars, or that subversive activities would not continue and, indeed, be as profitable - or even more profitable - than a successful campaign. Mr. Roberts was convinced that the Russian rulers felt that time was on their side, and that ultimately nothing could stand up against the doctrine of Communism. They had, however, a lurking fear that they might be presented with a war of intervention before they were in a position to deal with it effectively. It appears that Stalin made a definite offer to the C.I.G.S. of a military alliance.

This was not unfavourably received, although it was pointed out that an alliance with regard to Germany did already exist. It is proposed, I gather, at some future date, to go back to the Russians on this point and ask them exactly what they mean by a military alliance. It is thought that there may be some element of bluff in this, and that if it fails the Russians will be in a position to emphasise their recent contention that Mr. Bevin is not sincere in his wish for a fifty year pact with Soviet Russia. All the talk about Stalin's health is thought to be nonsense. He appears to be in excellent form and thoroughly well in the saddle.

The question of his successor, when the time comes, is still in doubt. When pictures are displayed, Stalin is at the top and Molotov underneath; underneath Molotov comes Zhdanov, Molenkov and Beria, with the remaining members of the Politbureau spread out on either side. Molotov is, of course, most in the news and Zhdanov, Molenkov and Beria are played up more or less in rotation. This is thought to be part of Stalin's game of not allowing any of them to become too popular, plying one off against the other.

From a propaganda point of view, the question of the Straits is still very much to the fore. Pudobkin produced a film on this subject in January, which was turned down because it did not conform to the Party line. It depicted Admiral Nahimov, a prominent figure in the Crimean War, but did not show the Russian troops in a sufficiently favourable light, and did not indicate in a sufficiently sinister way the role of the British. In the final version, British Naval officers were shown in secret session with the Turks, and, at Stalin's special request, the Brigade of Guards is routed by the Russian troops. The moral of the film is that the Turks should not intrigue with the British, but should rely on Russia.

A stony silence has been maintained in Moscow about events in Persia.

There is considerable hostility to the Jews but Party leaders have emphasised the dangers of racial discrimination, which is fundamentally opposed to Communist doctrine. There are very few Jews left in normal administrative jobs; they are confined mostly to artistic circles and to the films.

"The British Ally", the paper publishing British news in Russia, has a circulation of about 50,000, but is said to reach a far greater number of people, as it is handed on from one to another. It is uncensored, but cannot contain anything at all controversial. It confines itself largely to public statements by British Ministers, to scientific and industrial achievements, and to sport - which is

extremely popular. I asked what evidence there was to show that it reached the public. Roberts said there was no doubt that it did; it was to be found in all reading rooms all over Russia, and people were to be seen reading it in public places and in the trains. The normal price of it was two roubles, but when something sensational was published the price went up on the Black Market to anything from 60 to 100 roubles. Its continued existence is perhaps somewhat precarious, but the Soviet realisation that if they abolish it we may crack down on "Soviet War News" in this country. The Russians were disturbed when they found that "Soviet War News" was no longer being supplied to the Air Force, but had no real answer when they were told that British airmen could buy it if they wanted to, and that the only change was that it was no longer supplied by the British Government free gratis and for nothing.

Roberts said that there was just the slightest indication that Party activities were not as popular as they were. There had been a great drive on the Komsomol organisation, which was described as having fallen short in many respects. A significant incident was when only two out of thirty of the best students at some institution volunteered for work in the Komsomol.

Roberts discussed the forced labour camps with many Russians. When he puts the figure at 10,000,000, nobody demurs. If he puts it at 20,000,000, they shake their heads. If he says 15,000,000, they are inclined to say: "Well, perhaps". He thinks, therefore, that probably something around 12,000,000 would not be an exaggerated estimate.

Harry Allen, Hill and F.J. discussed with me the agenda for a meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Security, who had been asked to make recommendations with regard to a number of leakages which seemed to have occurred mainly in the Service Ministries.

It seemed to us that they were due partly to a lack of security within Ministries, and partly to bad briefing of Public Relations Officers. It seemed questionable whether the matter of Public Relations Officers should be handled by that Committee, since the Lord Chancellor was already looking into it.

23rd January.

I had a short talk with Magan, who has come back to discuss his proposals about civilianising our organisation in the Middle East. I told him that while I was generally in agreement that this was a desirable objective, I thought that probably we ought to go a bit slow, since it was not without some difficulty that we had got S.I.M.E's charter through the J.I.C. The Ds. of I. had felt a little that something in the Intelligence world was being taken away from them. If we came out too quickly as a full blown civilian body under Ministry of Defence cover, we might frighten them and lose their co-operation. Magan's point was that in Palestine we were so mixed up in the military hierarchy as to be more or less indistinguishable. The result was that we were rather pushed around by the lesser Staff Officers, who called upon us to carry out all sorts of jobs which were not strictly speaking our function. This is, I think, a real point. We have, however, made a start by sending Alec out as a civilian, and I think the rest will follow before long.

24th January.

We discussed Magan's problem with the D.G., when it was agreed to proceed as at present with an eye to civilianising as soon as the situation would allow. We discussed the case of STANBURY. The D.G. was quite adamant that as he had resigned his resignation should be accepted and no attempt should be made to retain his services.

General Hollis called on the D.G., who took him and me to lunch. We discussed generally the work of the Department and in particular the question of getting Defence Committee papers. He thought that our needs would be met if he made arrangements with Gleadell for us to see the agenda: we could then say what papers we thought had a bearing on our work. He would speak to Gleadell when he got back to his office. He seemed to have a very hazy notion about our place in the hierarchy and our general functions: he did not even know we were under the P.M. When he came back to the office he had a short word with Roger Hollis.

I spent an evening with Alec Kellar, who is leaving to-morrow to take up his appointment in the Middle East.

27th January.

Curry came to see me and told me that he had been recommended by his doctor to wait another two or three months, and that the D.G. had suggested that it might hardly be worth his while to come back for a further six or eight months in order to finish out his time. Curry seemed to agree, but thought that he would like to think it over.

28th January.

I held the first weekly meeting with D.B., D.C., and their Senior Officers. This is, I think, a useful piece of machinery, as not only can we settle a number of points at issue between the Divisions, but there can be a general exchange of views and a closer liaison between the Intelligence and the Security side of the office.

29th January.

At the J.I.C. to-day D.M.I. mentioned "Exercise Spearhead", in particular relation to certain

Indians who might be attending. The C.I.G.S. said that he would only accept two Indian officers of the rank of Major-General or upwards. The Indians had pleaded that this would exclude certain officers they had intended to send of a lower rank. The C.I.G.S. had, however, remained adamant. It is, of course, possible that the Indian Government will now promote two of their Brigadiers in order that they can attend the course. If they do this, certain top secret documents regarding the exercise will be withheld from them.

Personally, I have no idea what this exercise is - I believe it is centred on Camberley. There was a further discussion, off the record, about Staff Courses. There is no doubt that all three Services are now in line about the necessity for having separate courses for our own officers and officers from foreign countries. This is already done by the Air Ministry, although for financial reasons there has been a move to cut this course out. The three Ds. of I. are now going to approach the Chiefs of Staff on the matter. Meanwhile, the I.D.C. course 1947-48 has got to stand with its Indian students, two of whom, I think, are from civilian departments. 'C' is going to get round the difficulty in his lecture on SIGINT by talking to the Instructors, who will only pass the information on to selected British and possibly American students. I said that we should prefer to adopt this method as we suggested that if we could have the names of the Indian students, it might be as well for us to get I.P.I. to vet them. This was agreed. I asked Harry Allen to ask Gleadell to let him have the names.

D.N.I. stated that, with the knowledge of their Governments, he had been holding unofficial talks with the Swedes and Danes, who were anxious for some common policy with regard to defence against Russia. The Norwegians refused to be a party to these talks, partly, it was felt, owing to their age-long dislike of the Swedes, and partly because they do not altogether trust the Swedes vis a vis Russia.

There was a certain amount of discussion as to how far it was really wise to encourage the Scandinavian countries to form a bloc. Sweden would be the dominating partner and would perhaps be likely at the critical moment to succumb to Russian pressure, dragging with her the other members of the bloc.

I saw the D.P.P. I explained to him the position about his son in Malta and a general directive which we were issuing to D.S.Os, showing the line of demarcation between ourselves and the Navy. The job that it was proposed to assign him to was really a matter for the Navy, and in any case it was a stupid thing for the D.S.O. to have picked on him, since clearly it was open to the criticism that the D.P.P. himself was concerning himself with discipline in the Navy. The line between ourselves and the Navy is that we undertook to inform them about any outside subversive influence being brought to bear on Naval ratings when they are ashore. We can also advise them tactfully about their own problems; we could not, however, interfere in any way in matters of discipline with the crews of H.M. Ships.

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30th January.

I spoke to the D.G. about a [redacted] who is a Communist and said to be working in the private office at the Home Office. The D.G. went over and saw Maxwell, who was much perturbed and undertook to look into the matter immediately. The danger from our point of view was that [redacted] might be seeing all our H.O.Ws.

I saw Hill and asked him whether he would take on certain aspects of the Air Ministry leakage case. A number of Intelligence Summaries had been found to be missing: they are all of a top secret level. The matter has been gone into in some detail by Boddington, but no solution has been found. Hill said he thought he would be able to carry this work in addition to what he is already doing; if he found himself overburdened he would let me know.

The Home Office are proposing to abolish Regulation 18, which gives power to prohibit exit from this country. We are quite prepared to see this Regulation go from the Security point of view. If the Government feel, from the political angle, that they cannot allow people like MOSLEY to travel abroad, that must be a question for them to decide - it does not particularly worry us.

Hollis came to tell me about one, [redacted] of T.R.E., who came up to London yesterday and met STEMASHOV, the Assistant Soviet Military Attache on the Air side, and also a Naval man interested in wireless called BUNDOVRIAK.

[redacted] had previously made a rendezvous with STEMASHOV at the Strand Palace. The two met in the lounge, had a talk, and then went on to the Cumberland, where they were joined by BUNDOVRIAK and had a further conversation. We are proposing to get into touch with Richards, Head of T.R.E.

We have sent a full-dress letter to the F.B.I. asking them to interrogate RASCHITZKY.

31st January.

I talked to the D.G. about the Appointments Board and explained to him in some detail my point of view. He said that he had passed my note to Horrocks and asked him to state exactly what the present procedure was.

The D.G. saw Bridges to-day. He discussed with him the question of P.As to Ministers. While Bridges saw the danger of Ministers and Permanent Under Secretaries bringing in P.As who were ostensibly concerned only with their Parliamentary duties, he did not feel that at the moment we could do anything about having them vetted.

In the case of Miss KLASCHKA, a Czech employed by the Minister for War, he thought that we should have to accept Speed's answer that she was only employed on the Minister's Parliamentary business, although he agreed that this would really give her access to almost anything which went into the Minister's room.

The D.G. also discussed with Bridges our draft letter to the P.M. about our charter and the division of duties between ourselves and S.I.S. He said that as soon as we got a reply from the Foreign Office about SIME, he would assist us in putting the case to the P.M. Prima facie he thought our case was a good one.

At the Appointments Board to-day we saw de WESSELOW and Peter HAMMOND. de WESSELOW seemed to us to be a strong candidate: he had a pleasant personality and an extremely distinguished academic record. Peter HAMMOND had no academic record, but extremely good chits from the Admiralty for the security work that he had done in Germany. We thought we might fit both into the organisation.

HUNT has been sending almost daily reports from Burma, in which he emphasises the seriousness

of the situation is Aung SAN's demands are not satisfied in London. There have already been one or two unpleasant incidents, including the invasion of the Secretariat by a mob, which had to be dispersed with various fire appliances.

1st February.

There has been some unwelcome publicity for the D.G. in the "Daily Mail". He is shown as the custodian of all secrets in connection with atomic energy. Since mention is made of the appointment to M.I.5. of policemen in this connection, I think that the leakage was probably started in Glasgow.

D.M.I. rang me up about this. He said that he had instructed the Public Relations Officer to deny any knowledge of it.

Dick Watt came to talk to me about the appointment of MANN as A.L.O., Scotland. He said that he thought MANN would be loyal to us, but that it might be a good thing for me to have a heart to heart talk with as soon as he came into the office. I should have to explain to him that there were categories of information in this office which were not available to everyone who worked here, and that he could only communicate to the Police what sections here wanted him to communicate, since he must know that once a thing is on record on the Police files, it was open to the whole Force.

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In the evening I met Scott, a grandson of C.P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian, and Guy Burgess, who is now P.A. to MacNeil - not, I venture to think, a very suitable appointment. Scott is in the News Department of the Foreign Office. They both appeared to have seen F.O.

telegrams indicating that Molotov had given his support to the Egyptian case going to U.N.O., in the belief that he would thereby hasten the complete withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. It was only later that MOLOTOV discovered that the real bone of contention was the Sudan, and that the Soviet would look rather foolish if they used their influence on U.N.O. to support the Egyptian plea that the Sudan should come under Egyptian suzerainty, rather than be given complete freedom to decide its own destiny. Molotov had thereupon withdrawn his support, leaving the Egyptians in the cart: the latter were now running round trying to find a way out.

3rd February.

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day, the question of some officer going to Germany to look into public safety was considered. It transpired later, however, that the Home Office wanted the D.G. to go as, owing to heavy expenditure, a proposal had been made to cut down the number of Police officers who had been given contracts by the Control Commission on the advice of the Home Office. The Home Office view was that the cuts should take place in other quarters, since they were worried about having to pay compensation and also about the difficulties of fitting these policemen these policemen back into their various Forces.

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I met the A.L.Os to-day. I told them about 'Operation SANDSTONE', in case it came their way. This is a joint survey by ourselves and the Americans of our beaches, in case this country is overrun and the Americans have to recapture it.

I discussed a reorganisation of the zones with the A.L.Os. It seemed to me that Airey's zone, from Land's End to the Wash, was a large area to cover. Equally, Callaghan's, which included Wales and the Midlands was widespread. Would it not perhaps be better to draw a line down the centre of England and to run these two zones from London? Neither of them seemed to think that this was really necessary, since they were fairly well placed with regard to the more important parts of their areas. Against the complaint that they did not visit all C.Cs often enough, they felt a certain difficulty in calling on C.Cs when they really had nothing to say. It might be, however, that the new duties in relation to vulnerable points would make their approach easier.

I saw Air Vice Marshal Elmhirst, and Pendred, the new A.C.A.S.I., in relation to a proposal that a Scientific Advisory Panel should be set up for consultation by the Services as and when necessary. It had been suggested that BLACKETT should be on this Panel. Elmhirst disclosed to me that he was a brother of the Elmhirst who runs Dartington Hall. His brother was one of the most patriotic people in the country, but nevertheless had been prosecuted (persecuted?) by M.I.5. at the beginning of the war. His brother knew Blackett, and when Elmhirst took over A.C.A.S.I. had offered to effect an introduction, as he was convinced about Blackett's patriotism and immensibility. Moreover, Sir Henry Tizard had expressed a similar view about Blackett. I said that as regards Dartington Hall, it would never be possible to prevent people from writing in about it: every sort of allegation had been made, and

the Police, in the kind of atmosphere that prevailed in 1940, doubtless felt that they were bound to investigate. I thought, however, that the ghost of Dartington Hall had finally been laid. As regards Tizard's view, I was somewhat sceptical about the advice given by one scientist on another. We had been badly let down in the case of Alan Nunn MAY: When we consulted Cockcroft and Akers, they both said that of all the people whom they had sent to Canada on atomic research, they would as regards integrity have placed MAY at the top of the list. I then gave him the information that we had about Blackett. I said that it was capable of two interpretations: that on discovery that information given to the Communist Party had gone, through SPRINGHALL, to the Soviet Military Attache, he was doubly shocked, or that he was merely frightened as to the consequences should he continue to give important information to the Party, as he undoubtedly had been doing. While I did not wish to express a positive opinion either way, it seemed evident that Blackett was a dangerous character, with an international outlook both as regards science and politics. I had thought it right that Elmhirst should have this information before he committed himself to recommending Blackett as a member of the Advisory Panel. He thanked me for the information. The interview was quite friendly, although I think he was inclined to take a too liberal view of the whole position.

I want on to see Hayter, who took a much graver view. He felt that even though BLACKETT might be in the middle of atomic research, that did not constitute a reason for giving him a wider field. He was clearly opposed to the proposal.

We got on to the question of our charter. I said that the D.G. was very anxious to get the Foreign Office reply to our proposals for the Middle East. He said that this had not yet received its final touches, but that we could

expect it in the course of a day or so. He was afraid that we should feel that the F.O. were not prepared to agree to our proposals, or to go further than they had already gone. I said that I regretted this, as my D.G. felt very strongly about the matter. He then said that he had received a letter from the Minister in Washington, who approved the appointment of our representative there for the purpose of liaison with the F.B.I. In talking about our charter, I said that in my view, the arguments about ourselves and S.I.S. not being able to work together on foreign territory were to a large extent imaginary. In the field both parties saw the usefulness to each other of such an arrangement, and difficulties had not arisen. It was only when the matter was referred back to London that the trouble started. Our functions were different to those of S.I.S. and our approach was also different: we both preferred to handle our own business through our own channels.

Ellis rang up to ask whether Dwyer could inform the F.B.I. about our representation in Washington. I said that for the moment I would prefer that he did not, since the D.G. would now have to write to Mr. Hoover to confirm that the arrangement was acceptable to him.

The D.G., Dick and myself had a discussion about Bertram EDE's future. We could find no immediate solution.

4th February.

TAR and I attended the 'W' Board. In addition to the three Ds. of I., Draw and L.C.S., Bridges was present. It was agreed that the 'W' Board should be responsible for policy both with regard to deception and to certain matters affecting double agents. Formerly L.C.S. had been inclined to look to the planners as the most appropriate department under the

Chiefs of Staff, from which they could receive advice. It is now the business of the 'W' Board to consult the Planners as and when necessary. Certain measures were agreed about exploiting two potential double agents who were playing to the Russians in the British Zone.

I had a word with the D.M.I. about BLACKETT. He agreed that our view that BLACKETT should not be employed on the new Scientific Advisory Panel. I also showed the information to 'C', who concurred.

At my weekly meeting to-day, we discussed the new Sub-Committee of the Committee of Defence which studying subversive movements. Roger was not clear as to just how far he should go. I said that I thought he should be rather tentative at the outset. The Committee is to discuss Communist control of Trade Unions and Communists in the Civil Service.

We had a meeting at the India Office, under Sir Paul Patrick. Present were 'C', Viv, Mayter, Vickery and Bamford. The proposals at our preliminary meeting were discussed. It was agreed that these proposals should be sent out through the Viceroy's bag to Shone, the High Commissioner, and that he should be asked to give his concurrence. The question of charters arose, since at the moment

and later on we might be infringing ours. I said that I should like to know whether when the Viceroy retired we should be asked to withdraw: if this were so, my D.G. would be reluctant to go forward with the present proposals, since he did not see how he could obtain the services of a suitable officer on a temporary basis. I could get

this point Mayter eventually spoke up and said that he would like to discuss this matter at some future date. He obviously felt that it was bound up with the principles that we had raised in our letter to the Foreign Office

about our future charter in the Middle East. The report on the proceedings is to go to Bridges.

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The D.G. has seen Gilmour Jenkins of the Control Commission, and has also consulted Bridges, about his conducting an enquiry into public safety in Germany. Bridges takes the view that it is not the D.G.'s job to conduct enquiries of this kind, so the proposal is off.

Harry, Roger, Jo Archer, FJ. and I had a meeting on our J.I.C. paper re the C.P. and Russian penetration. We have suggested a number of amendments to the J.I.C. draft.

I have read an interesting report on our relations with L.S.I.C. written by Martin. The liaison is clearly as good as it can be: it does, I think, reveal that certain services performed by R.S.S., particularly general search, are weak in the new organisation and that there is a fall in the number of messages intercepted on other known services, due, to a large extent, to inexperienced Army monitors, particularly those in North Germany. It further transpires that we have 75% of L.S.I.C. material and are the second biggest users. This makes it all the more remarkable that we have no place on the SIGINT Board: the disadvantage is that if we have a complaint to make we must always be regarded as outsiders who have got to know too much. This may have a diverse effect upon our liaison.

5th February.

There is to be a redraft of our paper to the J.I.C. on penetration of secret armaments factories and research establishments by the Russians on the one hand, and members of the Communist Party on the other. The Norwegians have refused an air survey of their country. The successful survey of Siam, Java and Sumatra is being done in co-operation with the local authorities, who will have the benefit of it.

It is thought that something on the same lines might be proposed to the Turks.

Kenneth Strong has just come back from the Far East, where he visited both Australia and New Zealand. J.I.B. Melbourne is to be a going concern by July; six New Zealanders are to be taken in, but are not to be given appointments as Directors - this caused a certain amount of ill-feeling. New Zealand may have a J.I.C. - if not, Internal Affairs in New Zealand will control British interests in J.I.C. Melbourne. The Australians are sending a liaison officer to London, Singapore and Washington. Australian J.I.B. are to take on the Antarctic and China. Our information about China will go to Melbourne via Singapore. The Australians have

a few representatives in China, but they are not much good. The J.I.B. representative in Singapore is in the Secretariat of the Defence Council. Later on, Melbourne J.I.B. may take on Ceylon, Burma and India. Efforts will have to be made to get American co-operation in regard to China and Japan. At the moment the Americans are refusing to give information on their aerial survey of China, on the grounds that they have a private and exclusive arrangement with the Chinese in this matter. The present Head of the J.I.C. in Australia is Brigadier Chilton - he and his organisation are considered to be good. Sheddon is the really strong man in Australia and, in fact, controls the Chiefs of Staff: this leads to a certain amount of friction, particularly with External Affairs

The case of BLACKETT was discussed, but after a speech by Elmhirst on his behalf, who said that it had the support of Tedder, it was decided to recommend against his appointment to the Advisory Panel on scientific matters. Hayter undertook to inform Tizard.

Murrie called and was seen by myself, Brigadier Allen, Hollis and Dick White. The organisation and functions of the office were explained to him. In addition to taking on Creedy's job, he will retain his other

positions, in particular that of one of the Secretaries of the Defence Committee: in that capacity he will look out for documents which he thinks are likely to be of interest to ourselves.

Carey Foster came to discuss the sending of Post Office experts to Moscow, who are to test out the building allotted to the British Delegation attending the Conference in Moscow in March. One of the people selected was a man who had done jobs for us here, and it seemed undesirable to us that he should go to Moscow, where his identity might be disclosed and also the nature of his business. We had managed to arrange that someone else should go. Carey Foster, who had just been to Moscow himself, said that Security in the Embassy was deplorable: he is doing what he can to tighten things up.

TUFNELL-BARRETT came to see me about his future. He does not want to go back to the Army. He asked me if I could help him to get some job as an A.D.C. to a Governor. I said that I would do what I could.

6th February.

HIMSWORTH came to see me about his future. He wondered whether I could help him in any way with S.I.S. He has been told that he cannot be taken on to the permanent staff. I said that I would do what I could.

I went to see the D.M.I. about SIME and the Foreign Office attitude. I gave him our draft letter to the P.M. to read - he was extremely sympathetic. He thought the matter of considerable importance and said that he was convinced that the Middle East could only be considered as a unit. He thought that if necessary he could swing the C.I.G.S. on this matter. He realised the importance of having a professional (?) Security Service in the Middle East in case of trouble.

Klop came to see me about his further interrogation of FIDRMUC. He had got a good deal of additional information, which is to be the subject of a further report. He cannot say positively that LOBKOWIZ or JANUSCHEK were conscious agents - we can only learn this from RASCHITSKY. ALEXANDER has made a full confession.

I went with Roger to see Sir Archibald Rowlands at the Ministry of Supply. I told him the story of CARTER of T.R.E. He immediately realised the importance of the case and said that he would arrange for Richards, the Head of T.R.E., to come and see us.

7th February.

Richards of T.R.E. came to discuss the case of CARTER with Hollis and myself. He seemed worried and took the matter very seriously. He agreed that it was important not to disturb the ground, but to endeavour to clear the matter up one way or another. He said that CARTER's conduct in meeting the Russians without reporting the fact was grossly improper, to say the least.

I had a talk with Thistle about Palestine. There is no doubt that while there he did an excellent job. He started right away to reorganise the Registry on a practical basis. His first consideration was what, in fact, D.S.O.'s office was trying to do on the basis of the P.M.'s directive. He then broke this down into subjects and then considered the personal files. This is, of course, the way that a Registry should be built. The Intelligence needs should be the first consideration, and the technical side entirely subordinate. It was a pity that our own Registry was not set up on similar lines. Thistle and Ffoulkes did much to restore the morale and efficiency of the office, the reputation of which locally is not very high, but I think we can rely on

Magan to put this right.

I had dinner with Magan, and a long talk with him about the general principles of Intelligence work. I am certain that he is a first class officer and would run anything well from a section to a fairly large organisation.

10th February.

Win Scott brought Penrose and Rositzky of the C.I.G. to see me: they have been touring round Europe. Rositzky is clearly the brighter of the two, and I should think a fairly slick operator. We merely discussed generalities.

Gleadell, W/Cdr. Lamb, and Captain Thorold came to see me. I described to them more or less the basic functions of the office and they subsequently had talks with Harry Allen, Jo Archer, Hollis and Dick.

11th February.

I went to see Newsam about on Civil Servants.-

I asked him to make special arrangements to see that the warrants were not handled by the staff as and had both been in the Home Office.

The Americans came again and saw the D.G. and members of the staff.

TAR and I went to see 'C' about the "W" Board affairs and position.

12th February.

There was nothing of real importance at the J.I.C. to-day.

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I lunched with Win Scott and the C.I.G. representatives from America. Conversation was general and friendly. S.I.S. were there as well.

I talked to Strong about his vetting, and subsequently spoke to Drew and explained to him the difficulties we were having with Johnson, the Establishment Officer, who refused to make contact with anybody and pass on names of people in J.I.B. who were having access to top secret material. Drew said he would take the matter up.

Furnival Jones has completed his report on the Registry, which is a valuable objective piece of work. I am passing it to Horrocks and Potter for their comments. The important issue of sectionalisation has raised ahornet's nest.

13th February.

I gave Cimperman a letter, showing the general layout of the office. He has been bothered for this by the F.B.I. for some time.

14th February.

I saw TUFNELL-BARRETT again and told him that I would try to see what could be done about getting him a job as a Colonial A.D.C.

I sent to the J.I.C. Sub-Committee, when Hayter gave a brief resume of world affairs, which is given weekly to the Joint Planners. The French Treaty seemed to be going well; the Russians had been asked to state precisely the points which worried them about our existing alliance; it was probable that the Austrian Treaty would be signed in Moscow, but there were doubts about the German Treaty. The Egyptians were having difficulty in the presentation of their case to U.N.O. The outcome of the decision to submit the Palestine case to U.N.I. was very problematical: the Russians would probably go

for quadripartite trusteeship - this would suit the Allies, who wanted Palestine to be made an independent state. The U.N.O. Commission to Greece is likely to decide in favour of the Greeks, with the Russians and Italians in the minority. The Greek case had been well presented, while the cases of the Jugo-Slavs, Albanians and Bulgarians were clearly phoney and irritated the Commission. An urgent telegram has been sent to General Marshall for financial aid for Greece and Turkey. Greece, which is in desperate straits, needs seventy or eighty million pounds. We have contributed forty millions and cannot do more. The Russians are moving V.2. equipment from Peenemunde. A Russian pilot landed recently at Habaniyeh and asked for a route map to the Persian Gulf: when this was refused, he produced a perfectly good map of his own. The Air Ministry report the continuance of an air build-up by the Russians in Bulgaria. The War Office knew of no increase for the land forces. A large quantity of documents have been captured in Iraq, as a result of a round up of 400 Communists: the documents show that Communism in Iraq has been run from Syria and that Syria is receiving its instructions from Paris. Lastly, there is to be a round-up of Nazi organisations in Germany on Sunday morning.

15th February

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Major Battye telephoned to me about the arms traffic. I am arranging for TAR to see him.

17th February

I saw Herlihy, Sir Robert Knox's assistant, on the question of foreign decorations. de BONA has been given an O.B.E.: this upsets the apple cart because "Tricycle" has only got the M.B.E. I am arranging to get "Tricycle" stepped up to the O.B.E.

19th February.

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I dined with Dick and Padgham. The idea is to get the latter into the German Foreign Office or Consular Service, as soon as it is established. The Russians are going to raise this matter in Moscow and have NADOLNY as their candidate. Padgham thinks it best to accept their candidate and to go in as No.2., if this can be arranged. He has the backing of the Americans. I have already approached Hayter on this subject. Padgham's description of the British Zone was pretty depressing. He has visited his brother

in the Russian Zone, where conditions are as bad, if not worse, but at least something is moving. His brother is swimming with the tide, has joined the Communist Party with his tongue in his cheek, and lives on the Black Market. His sister, on the other hand, is trying to cultivate a miserable 50 hectares in order to earn a living, which is almost impossible. All the land has been split up and the peasants who were formerly in the employ of the Putlitz family, when they meet their former landlord say: "Here you see is the free peasant, but he has not got a rake a plough, or anything else - can't you take him back?".

20th February.

I went and saw Bridges about India. His draft letter to the P.M. contained a para. which seemed to cut across our major proposal about the alteration of our charter. He saw the point and asked me to try and work out a formula with Hayter. He said he had the greatest sympathy with our case, which he thought was fundamentally sound. He asked me how things were going, and I said I thought they were going quite well. He then said he felt there was more cohesion.

21st February.

I attended a meeting of J.I.C. Deputies. Liaison with the Americans, Dutch and French Military Missions with the C.I.S. at Singapore was considered. We said that while we would prefer to see these Missions depart, we had no objection to their remaining if the Services thought that they were likely to get a quid pro quo elsewhere, such as Indo-China, N.E.I., etc. At the same time we thought it ought to be understood that they did not engage in any offensive activities in the area. In this connection, the Dutch Mission was in fact running agents. We did not mind if they continued, provided we knew exactly

what they were doing and who their agents were. It was thought that this was a matter which the Head of SIHE should arrange locally. The Services clearly wanted the Missions to remain on account of the reciprocal advantages. We also discussed the proposal that the report on deception in the Far East should be given a limited circulation. It was agreed that it would be better if the knowledge contained in this document was confined to members of the L.C.S., M.I.5. and M.I.6., and disseminated to Staffs only in the form of a lecture to be given at the Imperial Defence College. In this way, budding Staff officers would become indoctrinated, which was necessary as they were the people who might in the future have to implement the policy of the L.C.S.

Furnival Jones told me that there is a proposal to sell Meteor engines to the Russians. Jo Archer will be attending a meeting at the Air Ministry on this subject to-day.

Horrocks came to talk to me about the Scientific Section. He is considering certain adjustments in the rate of pay. He does not think that, as recommended by Briscoe, Hedger should be paid on a basis equivalent to that of a Senior Officer. I am inclined to agree. He is proposing to accept Peter HAMMOND as an Assistant, to start with, to Malcolm Cumming, vice Clayton who is going to East Africa.

22nd February.

The D.G. returned from Scotland and I told him about my interview with Bridges and with Hayter.

Marriott and Miss Bagot told me that six German Communists have been granted visas to attend the Communist Conference here, and

that, according to the P.C.B., this has the sanction of the Prime Minister. I can only imagine that the Prime Minister wishes to have some makeweight against the visit of SCHUMACHER, which caused a protest from the Russians. I do not think that these Germans will do any harm, but it seems rather outrageous that trouble makers of this kind from an enemy country should be permitted to visit us at a time like this.

I talked to TAR about the present procedure of granting export licences for arms. It seems that all surplus arms are turned over to the Ministry of Supply, and that all export licences for these arms are submitted to the Service Departments and to the Foreign Office. It has now been arranged with the War Office that we shall vet the consignors and consignees and supply any other information which may be in our possession. There is, however, apparently, no check upon the sale of arms to licensed dealers in this country. This we are going into. Abroad, there are surplus dumps in Belgium, France, Cairo, Algiers and Rome, which are under the control of the Ministry of Supply. It is understood that they are only released on the authority of the G.O.C. and that considerable quantities are being destroyed. This action needs looking into, particularly in the Middle East. Are the arms in fact being destroyed, and to what parties are they being sold locally? I have suggested to TAR that, in so far as Cairo is concerned, this is a matter for the Head of SIME to look into. When we have fully explored the ground, we should put up a paper to the J.I.C., explaining the exact position.

24th February.

At the D.G.'s meeting we discussed the question of travel control in Eire. The Home Office want to remove controls from the Western ports which they say necessitate the retention of roughly 40 Immigration Officers. They suggest

as an alternative that a Regulation under the Aliens Order should be framed, insisting on registration for anyone coming from Eire within forty-eight hours, with serious penalties and immediate deportation for failure to comply. We do not think that this will be satisfactory in practice, since, for political reasons, if anyone is caught, which is doubtful, it will generally be considered inexpedient to prosecute. We point out that Foynes is now a kind of Lapham Junction for air travel, and that anyone who is refused a visa to Copenhagen, Stockholm, or elsewhere, can be in Foynes in a couple of hours with free entry to this country. We propose, therefore, to insist on controls being maintained.

I have drafted a reply to Sir Orme Sargent on the subject of our charter in the Middle East. We are pointing out that we feel bound to take the matter to high authority, since his decision virtually means the disintegration of SIME, which not only contributes good Security throughout the Empire, for which we have a responsibility, but also forms part of the defence organisation set up with the approval of the Chiefs of Staff. Meanwhile, we are agreeing to his proposals without prejudice to any future alteration, and have asked him to issue the necessary instructions to the Embassy in Cairo about giving cover to Jenkins.

The D.M.I. rang me up to say that he had had a letter from the D.M.I. in Melbourne about leakage of information from the Foreign Relations Committee to the Russians. He has named the individual and has asked Templer whether he can confirm. This creates something of an embarrassment, but I have promised to have a L.U., which I am fairly confident will be negative.

Page rang me up about a report which I sent D.M.I., saying that S.S.U. in Italy had three times warned A.F.H.Q. about the woman PASQUINELLI, who murdered Brigadier de WINJON in Pola. For some reason or other no action was taken. Page wants to send this out to Italy. I said that I would try and get clearance from Win Scott.

25th February.

We decorated the "Three Charlies", MAR 2010.
 a Czech, and a Spaniard. The
 "Three Charlies" got the B.E.M. & and
 the K.M.S. Afterward Tommy Harris,
 TAR and I took to lunch. Everyone,
 I think, was pleased. One of the Charlies
 made a long, but completely incoherent speech!

At my weekly meeting to-day we discussed Displaced Persons. We came to the conclusion that there was no form of vetting which we could carry out which would be of any value, and that the matter must be left to the Control Commission - even they could not do much. We are considering the possibility of the introduction of Jewish Terrorists and I asked Dick to discuss this with B.3.a.

I mentioned a proposal made by the Home Office about travel from Eire. It was agreed that we should stand firm on insisting that documents of identity should be carried.

Jo Archer said that he had attended a meeting at the Air Ministry about the sale of Meteors to the Russians. There seemed to be agreement by the Board of Trade that small sales of two or three were of no value and should be discouraged, and the Air Ministry appear to be thoroughly firm about the undesirability of building up Russian knowledge. I asked Jo to find out whether there was any high duty alloys contract which went with Meteors. He did not think so, but in any case there is no question at

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the moment of the sale of manufacturing rights. If the Russians made a demand for large quantities of Meteors, there might be some difficulty in refusing owing to the financial advantages, and because we should be discriminating against Russia. We are already selling a certain number Meteors to other powers, i.e. the Dutch. Adam reported that, in so far as J.I.B. vetting was concerned, a contact had now been made with the subordinate of the Administration Officer. Horrocks complained that he could not get any answer from SIME. I pointed out that SIME were denuded of their personnel and that one must expect a certain dislocation until Kellar had got well into his stride. I agreed that a telegram should be sent asking for replies. Jenkins has asked for three watchmen for his office at £8 a week - this seems a lot and is to be gone into.

Arthur Thurston and Win Scott came to see me. We had a general conversation. Arthur is going back to Washington.

Geoffrey Wethered came to see me about a proposal that he should be transferred to Security in the Foreign Office. He is evidently keen to take the job. I said that if Carey Foster would get Harold Caccia to speak to me, I would certainly recommend him. There is some difficulty over establishment.

I had a word with Iris Marsden, who is leaving us and apparently wants to be a shop assistant or drive a milk van, but we all thought she would probably like to come back to us in a year or so if we have a vacancy.

26th February.

Carey Foster spoke to me about two F.O. vetting cases. He did not quite know how to interpret our letters. I said that I would look into it and that, if necessary, he could come over and see the file.

I spoke to him about Wethered. He is doing all he can to get him.

Sir Henry Tizard came to the J.I.C. to-day. He tried four times to light his pipe with a spill of his own manufacture, but was completely defeated by this somewhat simple scientific problem! Eventually someone came to the rescue with a lighter, which he blew out! He was discussing the organisation of Scientific Intelligence and particularly stressed the importance of economic Intelligence in this connection.

With regard to the papers on Russia, prepared recently by the J.I.C., he said that in the present state of our economy it would be extremely difficult for her to maintain a war, and that this could not improve for a good many years. He pointed out that, according to Russian figures, Soviet coal production was only 148,000,000 tons a year, and that we with 200,000,000 were sitting with the lights out and the fires turned off!

I had a long conversation with Horrocks about the Appointments Board. He read my minutes and wanted to get an agreed solution before going to the D.G. I gave way on a number of minor points, but agreed to differ on the question of the promotion of female staff. I was not satisfied that the present selection by himself, Miss Dicker and Mrs. Keene should go on. I thought, however that it was necessary to have some place where the Directors of Divisions could state their views when any member of their own staff whom they thought showed promise or needed recognition.

In the past the Directors had felt out of order in putting forward names and, in fact, when they had done so had rarely received an answer. Their candidates had not been promoted and they had never been told the reason why. This had created rather a bad impression both on the Directors and on the female staff working under them, who did not feel that their interests were being represented.

I agreed with him about his proposals in connection with the grading of the scientific staff, but made it very clear that it was important that Briscoe should maintain a controlling interest, as he was the only unifying factor as between ourselves and S.I.S.: if he were dropped.

We had always carried out offensive research in order to keep abreast with the subject and work out the necessary reagents. Horrocks seemed to agree about this.

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D.M.I. telephoned about the Indians attending the I.D.C. I told him that we had given them a vet, which so far as I knew was negative I thought perhaps we might be able to find out something about them from I.P.I.

27th February.

We have had a frightful blow to-day. A Telegram from Singapore states that Malcom JOHNSTON was on the Dakota which left Singapore on the 26th and has been missing for twenty-four hours. According to "The Times", there were six passengers and four crew. Search is being made by Sunderlands.

Kenneth Page came over about his lecture on Security, which he is to give to the Staff College. I gave him a talk on the general principles, and we are supplying him with the documents. He also spoke about the arms traffic. I explained to him what we were doing and the reasons, which he fully understood. He thought it might be a good thing if TAR and Wakefield, who is going to handle arms traffic under Hill, had a talk with Clayton, who is trying to co-ordinate this matter in the War Office.

Briscoe came to talk to me about the grading of the scientific staff.

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I talked to Dick and Courtenay about SIFE. We thought of Megan as successor to Johnson, but came to the conclusion that as he had been moved once from Palestine, it would be impossible to move him again. Bourne is out as he is in hospital with Malaria and is not likely to be fit enough to carry on. It seemed to us that Courtenay should at any rate come out with me on Tuesday and, possibly, stay in Singapore until we can find a successor to Malcom. I got this approved by the D.G. and we have got Courtenay on the plane for Tuesday.

28th February.

There seems to be a faint hope about Malcom Johnston, as it is reported that wireless signals from a dinghy have been picked up and that a fast minesweeper has been sent out. On the other hand, we have no confirmation of this from Singapore or from the Air Ministry.

I had a talk with Dixon about various matters with regard to SIFE. He himself kindly volunteered to go back if he was of any use. I said that it was very kind of him to make the offer, but that it had not really entered my head that we could very well ask him to do such a thing. In the meanwhile, I had succeeded in getting Courtenay on to the 'plane, in case his services were needed and in order that he might assist me.

At the Appointments Board to-day, we tried to sort out affairs in the Far East. It was agreed that I should go earlier to India and try and recruit some D.I.B. officers.

I discussed with Horrocks and Charles the pay of the Scientific Section and we considered the appointment of a D.I.B. officer called RAE, whose services we thought we could accept on the excellent chits that he had got from India. We propose to send him as an assistant to Morton in Iraq.

Dick, Vickery, Bamford and I discussed my brief for Patel. This is, I think, fairly straightforward.

We also arranged that D.I.B. should be informed about my desire to recruit and should be asked to give suggested names, and asked to warn certain officers of the Provinces that

they might be asked to come up to Delhi. Both Vickery and Bamford thought JENKIN might be a suitable successor to Malcom Johnston if necessary: another alternative might be HAMILTON - the latter is efficient, and likeable, but is considered to be a bit rough.

1st March.

I had a talk with F/Lt. LOW, who was recommended by Sir Norman Kendal. He is an Austrian of Jewish origin; a decent fellow, but not suitable for employment here.

3rd March.

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We had a further meeting about India with Vickery, Dick and Horrocks. A letter is to be written to Smith, asking him to collect a few officers for me to see on arrival in Delhi on March 24th.

Win Scott has given us an extract from the write-up by John Waldron on the work of the X-2 Section. Waldron's praise of our organisation is overwhelming:-

"It would be difficult to exaggerate the open-handed generosity of the British security services in their readiness to share the fulness of their intelligence, methods, and experience with their American colleagues at all levels. Certainly, nothing like it had occurred in intelligence history before.

The X-2 arrangements with those services, M.I.-6 V and, later, M.I.5., left X-2 a full independence. The relationship was

"not then that of a joint operation, but it was one that in the uncalculatingly full exchange of facilities made in the working for an extraordinary unity of effort to the immense advantage of the junior American agency. Cordial relations ... based on mutual benefit... will often obtain between such organisations, but will in almost all cases be limited to an exchange, more or less full, of pertinent intelligence items: the sources, methods, policies, personnel are uncovered only as slightly as possible. For even an Ally to be admitted to a full access to most secret files and to a knowledge of their sources; to information on most secret methods and procedures; and to a knowledge of the personnel and the system of organisation and of its operations ... in short, to the innermost arcana of perhaps the world's most experienced and efficient, and therefore most carefully safeguarded security system, was beyond precedent or any expectation. Yet the British did it. That they did do it is one of the incontestable, diamond-hard facts of the Anglo-American alliance. The value to the future of U.S. security in trained and experienced personnel and in the enormous registry of counter-espionage intelligence thus rapidly accumulated by this liaison is almost literally beyond reckoning. It is worth posing this amazing fact once more before we leave it: the British saw fit to give another major power, not the body, but the living principle of a security organisation. The implications of that fact are staggering... and completely inexplicable in terms of any merely calculated exchange of mutual advantages. The advantages were enormously heavily on the American side".

