




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1950.

1st January.

Tommy Harris has remained in Mallorca, so I did not attend his annual party.

It is difficult to say whether 1949 has brought us to a lower ebb than 1948, since the effect of the devaluation gamble cannot really be estimated or known for some time.

We are on the eve of a General Election and nobody can really say what the outcome will be. The statisticians calculate, on the basis of the turn-over on by-elections, that if these figures are maintained throughout the country the Conservatives are bound to get a majority. On the other hand, the older politicians, who act on intuition and hunches, believe one week that they will keep a majority and the next week that Labour will get back. On the whole, the wage-earners have perhaps a little less to complain of than they had last year. Although the T.U.C. have agreed to a wage-freeze, which cannot be very popular, there is full employment and a tolerable existence. As long as these conditions prevail and the working man can buy ten cigarettes a day and a pint of beer which is not over-watered, he is not likely to react very forcibly either one way or the other, but this is pure speculation and you really never know what is in his mind, and that of his wife, until Polling Day. I have great faith in his long-term basic common sense and he will probably do the right thing for the wrong reason after a good deal of suffering.

During the year considerable progress has been made with Western Union, which is now backed by the Atlantic Pact, and there are certainly signs of economic recovery, particularly in Holland and Belgium. In France the Central (?) Government has been holding on, often somewhat precariously, and the Communists have not recovered from their major defeat in the French miner's strike last year. On the Right Wing less seems to be heard about the possibility of de Gaulle coming into power. In Italy the position is perhaps less satisfactory, but there are no signs of a Communist revolt. C.P. (I) has, I think, on the whole lost a certain amount of ground. The Scandinavian countries have made progress. Norway and Denmark have come into the Atlantic Pact and Sweden is as close to the other Scandinavian countries as she dares: she also has fairly close unofficial liaison with this country. In Finland the Communists have certainly had a setback, which is causing Russia some anxiety.

In the Eastern Zone of Germany the Bereitshafte have been built up to a considerable degree, it was thought, preparatory to a suggestion by the Russians that all Allied forces should withdraw, but things have clearly not altogether gone according to plan and so far the Russians have postponed elections which might be to their disadvantage. The position in Berlin is not too bad and for the moment the Russians do not appear inclined to aggravate it: they still want to keep the quadripartite door open. In the West, Adenauer's Government has been set up and plans for its Security Services are well advanced. There will be a steady relaxation of control, which within a year will not amount to very much. The question of a German Army is in abeyance and a proposal has been made that at some future date the Germans might be armed by the Western Powers and make a contribution to Western Union defence. Adenauer makes a great show of saying that he does not want an Army, at any rate for the present; this is, of course, a great

advantage to Germany: it saves them a good many millions and gives them their young men to work on the land and in the factories. The effect of this has already been considerable; the land is cultivated to the last inch and the shops are full of manufactured goods which are being sold both to the East and to the West. What I rather fear is that now that the Germans are on their feet, there will come the moment when they will consider which side their bread is buttered. They must have two main objectives: (i) to get rid of the occupation forces, and (ii) to recover as much of their lost territory as they can. When they find that the French are not prepared to give up the Saar, and that the Ruhr Authority is to continue, they may be open to an offer from the Russians, who might suggest a readjustment of the Oder-Neise line. This would be particularly tempting to the Germans who might by then have certain elements of the old Nazi Party in their Government.

Matters in the Far East have been moving fairly fast and we have now recognised the Communist Government in China. This was presumably inevitable sooner or later, but it is bound to have a very considerable effect on the situation in S.E. Asia, where the Chinese hold dominant positions in so many countries. There have been no demands so far for the return of Hong Kong, although this is bound to come sooner or later. At the moment it has been left out of any of the fulminations of MAO-TSE-TUNG and his minions, probably because the present Government in China finds, for economic reasons, that it is essential to maintain contact with the West. This position may continue for a period of five to ten years, but the moment the Chinese find it profitable to liquidate Hong Kong, there seems little doubt that by non-co-operation, strikes, boycott, etc., they could very soon reduce the Colony to impotence.

In Malaya the position is far from satisfactory. A large number of troops are being maintained there at a considerable cost, and there are still no signs of the position being satisfactorily cleared up. One of the main deficiencies is an inadequate knowledge of the order of battle of those against whom our operations have been directed. Until recently there appeared to be a conviction, at any rate in the mind of Harding the G.O.C., that without this knowledge random operations in the jungle are not likely to lead to any positive results. It is really the Police who are largely at fault, although we are doing our best in S.I.F.E. to stimulate them to the right kind of activity.

The situation in Indi-China is, to say the least, precarious, and things are none too good in Siam. In Burma the position is chaotic, with the Karens fighting for independence, and the Communists fighting for control against a weak Government are now heartened by Chinese Communist forces on their borders.

In Indonesia, where a Treaty has now been signed with the Dutch, the position is far from being under control. Perhaps the only bright spots in the area are New Zealand and, to some extent, Australia, who have brought in a Conservative Government prepared to take a strong line against the Communists. Unfortunately, however, their machinery is somewhat inadequate. New Zealand has no Security Service and Australia, under considerable pain, having only just given birth to one; the infant is a bit rickety!

The United States seem to be prepared under the Atlantic Pact to supply arms and equipment to member countries, subject to security precautions. In this connection, the COSMIC system has come into being as a result of a Security Conference held in Washington, where Roger Hollis took the Chair.

The event of the year has been the explosion of an atomic bomb in Russia, which has thrown everyone's calculations out of date and will necessitate the revision of all former J.I.C. assessments. There is still some doubt as to whether this was an experimental bomb or the first one off the line. It is, however, clear that by 1957 at any rate the Russians should have sufficient Atomic bombs to blot this country out entirely.

2nd January.

Sir John Shaw has arrived and attended his first Directors meeting. We discussed a proposal that Hamblen should attend the meeting in Florida with the F.B.I., where Caribbean affairs were to be discussed. Shaw said that as we were already sending three representatives, he did not feel that such a journey could possibly be justified in the present circumstances. He did not think that our Security Officers had really had time to settle down: when they had, he would like to visit them himself as he had some doubts as to how far there was really a job for them to do.

We discussed also the question of Bell's return for a three month's course in Overseas Division, and who was to replace him during that period. Shaw said he doubted whether it was necessary for him to come home at all in view of his past experience; there was nothing that Overseas could tell him about Kenya that he did not already know. He felt that an occasional visit of a month, to get the latest information in his office, might be useful.

Generally speaking, Shaw thought that our overseas officers required knowledge not of the country to which they were going but of the principles and methods of working in this office.

 I saw the P.M. to-day. I reminded him of the origins of the FUCHS case, the conclusions we had reached by a careful process of elimination, and the final decision, after consultation with D. At.En., that FUCHS should be interrogated. I explained to him that FUCHS had given us an opening by reporting to the Security Officer at Harwell that his father was now residing in the Soviet Zone of Germany, and that FUCHS had been informed that this in itself raised grave security issues which might jeopardise his continued employment at Harwell. This issue was under consideration by the Atomic Energy authorities. The suggestion that FUCHS had been engaged in espionage was kept as a matter entirely between FUCHS and the interrogator.

I gave the P.M. a rough outline of the course of the interrogation, and told him that what FUCHS had said was really consistent either with his guilt or with his innocence. We had, however, reviewed all the evidence in the light of this interrogation in conjunction with Lord Portal, Mr. Perrin, and Sir John Cockcroft. Lord Portal seemed to take the view - although no final decision had yet been reached - that the security risk of maintaining FUCHS at Harwell could not be accepted, and that some post should therefore be found for him at one of the Universities. We should be holding a further meeting with Lord Portal before any action was taken.

The Prime Minister said that he presumed Lord Portal would be informing him of his final decision.

The P.M. asked me whether I had heard anything about the recent trouble with the staff of groundnuts. I said that we had heard through Mr. Wall,

the Establishment Officer of the Ministry of Food, about an alleged plot, of which a scientist named BUNTING was said to be the focal point. We had been promised details but had so far received none.

The P.M. said the matter was certainly a serious one, and there was no doubt that BUNTING was at the bottom of the trouble. I then asked him precisely what the trouble was - had BUNTING been trying to stir up trouble among the natives? He said that there was no question of that, but BUNTING had remarked to somebody that he was trying to "wreck this Imperialist scheme" and that he had become a focal point for the grievances of the European staff. I said that we knew something of BUNTING's history, that he was a Communist, and it seemed natural, therefore, to us that if there were any grievances going he would obviously be the kind of person who would support them.

The P.M. seemed to agree with this view. I had the impression that Strachey had convinced him that there was more in the whole business than merely the voicing of petty grievances. He told me that BUNTING was now in this country on leave for six months, but gave no indication as to whether his contract would be cancelled and made no suggestion that we should keep him under observation.

I told the P.M. about the recent trend in the Communist Party which seemed to indicate a more revolutionary turn of mind: the word "revolution" was being used where it had never been used before. At the same time, in spite of their indignation about the wage freeze and Beakin's removal of nine Communists from the T. & G.W.U., they were still telling their Party members in the T.U.s to behave properly. Foulkes, of the Electrical Trades Unions, had in fact denounced the unofficial strike. Meanwhile, we had heard that the Daily Worker was in extremely low water.

As regards the Fascists, there was nothing very much to report, except the formation of the National Labour Congress, which was intended to recruit in the T.U. movement. It was advocating full employment, a more expeditious method of settling disputes, and a share by workers in the management - in fact everything that the Labour Party was advocating, although I did not say so!

The P.M. was his usual self and did not react very much to anything I said. After a pause, he bundled himself out of his chair in the usual fashion when I left!

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day, at which I took the Chair, Dick said we had been asked by I.R.D. to extend our defector policy to three Russians who are to be brought over from Germany for broadcasting purposes, the object being to encourage others to defect. It was agreed that as these Russians did not really fall into the defector category but rather into the refugee category, we could not take on this commitment. It was decided that the Foreign Office should be told that our paper on the suggested administration of defectors had not yet been taken by the J.I.C. and we could not, therefore, cope with a flow of them which the broadcasts might produce. I said, however, that Chief Constables should be informed of the movements of these people.

Dick said that at the last meeting of the Deputy Directors O. & S. it had been announced that the D.M.I. was pressing for a joint paper by M.I.5 and M.I.6 on the possibility of a revival of the German I.S.

It was agreed that it was inevitable that the G.I.S. would revive when the Germans were ready for it, and that it would be our normal responsibility to detect it as soon as possible. Dick said he would speak to S.I.S. and ask them to cover Int. Div., Germany, in conjunction with whom they could write a basic paper which could then be submitted to us for any necessary additions.

Dick then spoke about the difficulties of liaison with the French. He said that matters have taken a possible turn for the better. in that

He said the question of whether we should set up a direct liaison with the Surete _____ was now under discussion. It was thought that _____ might improve our relations with the Surete, although it would probably worsen them with S.D.E.C.E. I then mentioned the question of sending someone from here to look into Surete records of members of the Rote Kappelle. It was agreed that this should be discussed with S.I.S.

Dick told the meeting about the Home Office, against our advice, having naturalised Carol STRAUSS, a known Czech agent. He said he did not know what had gone wrong here, but could not do anything until we saw the H.O. file.

Malcom Cumming said he was not quite clear what the position was

_____ He wondered whether we should pay a formal part as a link with the Canadians. I said that we have _____ in R.C.M.P. HQ. at Ottawa, and that everything is co-ordinated in Washington. Provided, therefore, that S.L.O. Washington is satisfied that he is being kept fully informed of what is going on, there should be no cause for worry on our part. Malcolm said he had discussed this matter with McClellan of the B.C.M.P. and he thought the matter was now tied up.

I said I thought we should be informed when people from the R.C.M.P. visited this country on courses, but I felt this could be adjusted in Washington.

Malcolm also referred to the increasing extent of S.I.S. direct touch with U.K. Govt. Depts. on, e.g. the subject of defectors. Alec Kellar said he had also observed this tendency.

Furnival Jones told the meeting about the case of a German who is chief designer to Fokker-Wulf. We had informed the Ministry of Supply that although this man was a specialist in transonic and supersonic spheres, we thought it unwise to put him into guided weapons. There is no doubt, however, F.J. said, that this man will be put into guided weapons here and, indeed, that he will probably run it. I suggested that this might have some bearing on American projects, namely, that they would be reluctant to pass their information to us. F.J. said, however, that this would not be the case since the Americans had already offered the man employment on very good terms. It was finally agreed that when we know exactly what job this man is to go to, we should try and get him naturalised so that in future if it were necessary to take proceedings against him the course would be made easier.

Perfect said that the new arrangement for S.B. meetings to take place on a C.P. District basis was now in force, but it would mean that our officers would have to pay more visits owing to the fact that there were 18 C.P. Districts in all.

Perfect also mentioned the case of a woman Communist who had been employed in the C.I.D. office of the of the Police Forces. He said efforts were being made to encourage the Police to make their S.B.s secure, including their typing staff.

I told the meeting of a visit I had had from _____ and _____ on the question of the vetting of immigrants to the U.S.A. _____ said he would let us have the figures in due course of British immigrants. I asked Strong to think this over.

I told the meeting about my talk with the P.M. regarding BUNTING and the groundnuts scheme.

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4th January.

We had a preliminary meeting to discuss the line for Portal's meeting

4th January (contd.).

At the J.I.C. to-day we discussed the question of three Russian defectors whom I.R.D. wished to bring to this country from Germany. I said that this was a new clause which did not come into the normal definition, and that there was a limit to what we could do in the matter of looking after and housing people of this type. I, of course, understood the value of such people; at the same time it had to be borne in mind that their task while here would really be to encourage more defectors and that meanwhile nothing had been done to implement our proposals that proper arrangements should be made for the rehabilitation of Russians. It was stated that these particular individuals were getting browned off in a D.P. camp in Germany. I had suggested that they should do their broadcasting from Germany by means of records, and pointed out that if they were browned off in Germany they were just as likely to get browned off here. Enquiries are to be made before anything is settled, as to whether it is really necessary for them to come.

our conviction that we have the right man in FUCHS. Meanwhile, we are to receive the raw material over here so that G.C.H.Q. can work on it. This information has been explained to Perrin and Portal.

I attended a meeting to-day, called by Lord Portal, at which Rowlands, Perrin, and Cockcroft were present. It was agreed that in the light of all the evidence it was impossible to retain the services of FUCHS at Harwell. The procedure is to be as follows:

1. Cockcroft will speak to Skinner, which he is more or less bound to do in any case since FUCHS is serving under him. He will tell Skinner that as FUCHS' father has accepted a position in the Eastern Zone it is impossible to retain him at Harwell, and that the Security authorities are quite adamant on this point. He will then ask Skinner whether he can find any opening for FUCHS, and he confidently expects that the answer will be in the affirmative. He will be told to keep the reason for FUCHS' departure to himself, as once a job has been secured it will be possible to say quite openly that FUCHS has got a better and more lucrative appointment, and that employees at Harwell are always at liberty to leave and take on other work if they wish to do so. Nothing will be said to the University beyond the fact that FUCHS is looking for other employment.

2. Cockcroft will then speak to FUCHS and will tell him that, owing to the fact that his father is employed in the Eastern Zone, he very much

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4th January.

We had a preliminary meeting to discuss the line for Portal's meeting on the FUCHS case, which has been called for to-morrow.

5th January.

We had an extra Directors meeting in order to clear up our views on what should be said to 'C' in regard to the provisional agreement reached on the integration of S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E. We all feel that the proposals should be accepted, subject to financial considerations in regard to Moascar, to reservations about the new status of our representative in Iraq, and to an expression of opinion that Ceylon should remain under Head Office, although continuing lateral communication with S.I.F.E. We also thought that it should be made clear that the agreement was on trial and that the appointment of S.I.S. representatives to the heads of B. Division in the Middle East and Far East should be regarded as purely a question of merit.

Some fresh information has come in from Washington about the FUCHS case clearing up corrupt passages. On the whole it tends to confirm our conviction that we have the right man in FUCHS. Meanwhile, we are to receive the raw material over here so that G.C.H.Q. can work on it. This information has been explained to Perrin and Portal.

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7.

regrets that it will no longer be possible to retain his services at Harwell. He will then say that the Security Service are adamant on this point, and that he does not know whether there is anything else behind their decision.

3. FUCHS is to be allowed to remain at Harwell and carry out the ordinary hand-over. This may take some weeks, and it is quite possible that he will not leave until the end of March, when Skinner himself goes.

Rowlands and Perrin were prepared to accept this risk, which, frankly I do not think amounts to very much. FUCHS will not know more in six weeks time than he knows now, and it would be little short of madness on his part to attempt to extract any documents. As long as he is alive, the possibility of his transmitting to the Russians all that he knows up to date will remain, whether he does it here or elsewhere.

4. The point was discussed as to whether it was possible or desirable for anybody to give FUCHS one more chance to come clean, by suggesting to him that he had up to now been reluctant to do so in view of his sister being implicated. This might be followed by a guarantee that anything he told us would not be passed to the Americans.

There were doubts as to whether this would produce any useful result, and it was made clear that of course the Americans knew already and that nothing we could do could stop them from pursuing their enquiries and, if they had the evidence, from prosecuting the sister.

5. One further argument was put forward as a possible indication that FUCHS may not have been active since 1944. The information that he passed to the Russians at that time, and any information of a similar kind, should have been of considerable assistance to them if they were working on the Isotope theory.

Perrin said, in a rather guarded way, that information received from various sources tended to show that the Russians had made little or no progress in this field.

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6. We now have to consider what further security checks should continue to operate, at any rate until FUCHS leaves Harwell.

6th January.

The D.G. has returned. I saw him for a minute and he seemed pleased with the results of his visit and was astonished to hear that we had not seen copies of his despatches to the P.M., which were passed through the ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ C.R.O.

9th January.

At the Directors meeting to-day we considered a note which should form the basis of a letter from the D.G. to 'G' on the White/Easton agreement. The terms were agreed and the D.G. instructed D.O.S. to draft a letter for his signature. D.S.O. instructed Kellar and Kellar asked Dick White!

George Bishop, Strachey's secretary, rang me up about BUNTING, having had a tip to do so from Victor. I said that I understood he had got all he wanted from Graham Mitchell and that there was no particular point in our discussing the matter until we had seen the documents which he had promised to send to us. He said that these would be sent over.

 Humphrey Legge, C.C. of Berks. looked in. He had seen the D.G. and was worried about his responsibilities in regard to Harwell. He told me about the recent incident of the three men who tried to break in to Harwell in order to steal a consignment of lead, which they were proposing to sell at £175 a ton. Apparently the Oxford Police had got the information from an old lag, who had not told them where the burglary was to take place. This information had been passed on to Berkshire who had alerted Harwell and other places. It was in this way that the W.D.C. were lying in wait. The present proposal is to charge the three, including the informant, with conspiracy, although I gather that the evidence is somewhat thin.

10th January.

At the D.G. meeting to-day, Dick told us that he had seen Murrie of the Home Office about the naturalisation of Carol STRAUSS, the Czech agent. Apparently our letter did not reach Jamieson of the Naturalisation Branch, although a receipt was received here for the actual envelope. The Top Secret receipt, however, for Jamieson's signature has never been returned and it can only be assumed that the letter is lost somewhere in the Home Office. We did put a minute on the Home Office file, but this was ignored by the officer dealing with the case and the naturalisation went through. Dick said that Jamieson claimed to have heard nothing of the case until he, Dick, spoke to Murrie.

I said that this raised the whole question of keeping a check of top secret receipts. I asked Potter to devise a scheme for ensuring that a check could be made on these receipts.

As regards STRAUSS, I said I thought the Home Office should be told that they cannot do anything until we have considered ways and means of dealing with the matter.

Dick spoke about the question of setting up Local Intelligence Committee throughout the Commonwealth, about which J.I.B. have written a paper for the J.I.C. After a good deal of discussion, I said I thought we should have to consider very carefully where these Committees would serve a useful purpose and where they would not. I asked Alec to study the problem and let me have his comments.

Furnival Jones said that Sir Daril Watson, of the Railway Executive, was anxious for some guidance on the question of a delegation of Russian railwaymen visiting this country in order to inspect our railway system. The difficulty was that in 1946 a delegation from the N.U.R. had visited Russia, and the Russians had now asked to come over here for a return visit.

It was decided that Furnival Jones should speak to the representative of the Ministry of Transport on the Committee for the Security of Economic and Industrial Information, in view of the fact that that body had just reached a decision that certain types of information of an economic and industrial nature should neither be published nor disclosed. It must also be discovered from the N.U.R. exactly what their delegation saw when they

visited Russia, and also if possible what the Russians wish to be shown when they come here. The J.I.C. should be informed at the O. & S. meeting on Thursday, when the views of J.I.B. should be obtained. F.J. said he would inform J.I.B. in advance.

Graham Mitchell told the meeting about Operation "Lancashire Hotpot". He explained the case for the benefit of those who were not au fait with it, and said that his section is now working on the documents, which were proving to be of vital interest. He said that a close liaison is being kept with the Lancashire Police.

Graham then told the meeting about the BUNTING case, when it was agreed that the latter's machinations seemed to amount to no more than his being a focal point for the grievances - some of them well-founded - of the groundnut staff.

Alex Kellar said that _____ the new C.I.A. representative here, has written about the setting up of C.I.A./WT stations in Hong Kong and Ceylon. He said he felt this problem should be discussed with Dick and Shaw. He added that the Hong Kong Government had now agreed to set up stations there, provided it was essential for intelligence purposes. I said, with regard to Ceylon, that there is a Y station there and it is not known whether G.C.H.Q. would be worried if the Americans put up a station beside it. I said I thought we should get their views when we knew definitely what the American proposition for Ceylon was.

I spoke about a proposal for an S.O. organisation for Hong Kong. The Governor does not apparently want it, since he feels that in a project of this kind it would not be possible not to recruit Chinese agents, in which case he thought there would undoubtedly be leakages. He is, however, prepared to agree to the training of about a dozen Europeans. DI said that there had been a Chiefs of Staff meeting on this matter on Monday last, which we had not attended as we were at this stage not concerned. The only way we could possibly be concerned would be to get our S.L.O. in Hong Kong to screen the people concerned.

I lunched with Carew-Robinson. He tells me that he has finished his memorandum for the Home Office on 18B procedure during the war, and has said that if any future planning is to be done on it we should be consulted.

De COURCY told us that a Russian atomic bomb was to go off on the night of the 5th-6th. He also informed the American press and 'C'. If the bomb goes off he wins: if it does not go off he will say that, owing to the press publicity 'Uncle Joe' changed his mind. In fact, as far as we know, the bomb has not gone off and there is, to my mind, quite a possibility of provocation - the Russians wishing to impress us with their progress with regard to the manufacture of the bombs.

11th January.

I spoke to Juxon Barton to-day at the J.I.C. about the _____ case. He told me that the Secretary of State had now ruled that no more candidates were to be selected from the Oxford Delegacy, and he has asked that we may be officially informed of his decision.

I lunched with Lloyd, C.C. Mid-Wales, who seems a very co-operative sort of person and thoroughly satisfied with his liaison with us. He was full of complaints about the Home Office and their short-sightedness with regard to Police matters, particularly pay and allowances.

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12th January.

Pat Reilly came over to see us on taking over as Chairman of the J.I.C. He had talks with various officers here. I explained to him the layout of the office and also told him about our discussions with S.I.S. on the integration that is proposed in the Middle East and Far East. I then spoke to him about a matter which had been worrying us for some time, namely, the large number of organisations with varying interest in Communism which were writing papers on the subject. It seems to me that there ought to be a focal point somewhere for clearing such papers. Reilly said that he had already noticed that this was going on and that he intended to do something about it.

I had a word with Battersby about the S.O.E. Club, of which he and I are members.

It did not seem to me that there was any reason why Battersby and I should not continue their membership, provided they did not discuss their business with other members of the club, and let us know if anybody appeared to be unduly inquisitive about their work.

14th January.

I have been reading the documents in the case of Dr. Richard SORGE, which Packard, the late D.M.I., obtained from G-2 through his personal contact, General Irvine, the American D.M.I.

We heard very briefly of the arrest of Dr. SORGE and his colleagues in Tokyo in 1941, but no details were then available. Some months ago when Hollis was in Australia, he read an account of this case which was a press release by G-2. Since then we have been trying to get some documents, but had always been warned off by the Americans. The fact is that all intelligence coming from Japan has been more or less a closed book to the British. G-2 have regarded it as one of their preserves, and I should doubt whether any other American service knows more about the matter than they have read in the press. SORGE's case is one of the most remarkable that I have come across in all the annals of espionage.

SORGE was born of middle class parents in Germany. His Grandfather, having been Secretary of the First International founded by Karl Marx, his father was on the whole bourgeois and reactionary. At school SORGE was morose and naughty. He joined the army in the first world war, was wounded three times and during his convalescence made a close

study of sociology and political movements. When disintegration began to set in in 1918, he joined in the movement and later became an active revolutionary in Hamburg. He was quite well-known in the movement up till 1924, when after a meeting with certain prominent members of the Third International at Frankfurt, he was asked to go to Moscow and work as an agent for the Comintern. He was a close personal friend of PIATNITSKY, KUUSINEN and MANUILSKY. He visited Scandinavia for the Comintern and was in England working on behalf of its Organisation Bureau in 1929. When he returned from England, he was assigned to the Ministry of War and given an important espionage mission on behalf of the 4th Department in China. He built up a considerable network and worked in Shanghai, as a representative of the Sozialogische Magazine, until 1932 when he returned to Moscow. His mission was separate from that of NOULLENS & Paul RUEGG, who was subsequently arrested as Head of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. In 1933 he was ordered to set up a similar network in Tokyo, when he transferred to the Comintern to the War Department before going to China. He still remained for Party purposes a member of what he described as "the secret department of the Central Executive Committee of the R.C.P.", to whom he always reported on his return. While he was in the field, however, the whole of his work was controlled by the 4th Department.

Before going to Tokyo, SORGE returned to Germany, and in the first flush of the Revolution in 1933 succeeded in obtaining membership of the Nazi Party without, apparently, any check by the Gestapo on his past record. He also obtained, probably through Agnes SMEDLEY, a representation in Tokyo for the Frankfurter Zeitung (SMEDLEY represented the Frankfurter Zeitung in China). Armed with these credentials he settled down in Tokyo and began to build up his network. He was joined from Paris by a Yugoslav, VOUKELITCH, who had cover from the French film paper "La Vue" and also from "Politica", a Yugoslav daily.

SORGE's other principal associates were OSAKI, the Japanese expert in Chinese affairs who was a representative of Asahi Shinbun and was later associated with the running of the South Manchurian Railway. MIYAGI, a Japanese American from Los Angeles, who was an artist. Max KLAUSEN, a German, who acted as SORGE's wireless operator both in China and in Japan. KALUSEN eventually billeted himself on a White Russian of Finnish origin called Anna WALLENIUS, who had escaped from Russia with her husband at the time of the Revolution and hated the Soviet regime which had deprived her of everything she had. It was not long before she fell in love with KLAUSEN, with whom she lived for two or three years before the Soviet Government would allow KLAUSEN to marry her. During this period she was kept in ignorance of what KLAUSEN was doing. When she became inquisitive about his nightly excursions, he told her that he was working for an anti-Nazi organisation. She finally discovered that the H.Q. of the anti-Nazi organisation was in Moscow. Although she stuck to KLAUSEN even after his release from prison by the Americans in 1945, and returned to Russia with him after his Chinese mission was ended, went again with him to Tokyo and is believed ultimately to have returned with him to Russia, she never became reconciled to the work that he was doing or the Government that he was serving. She refused to have a child by a Soviet spy and she frequently threw it up against him that he had merely used her as a cover for his nefarious activities. He told the court at the time of his trial that she had been held by threats from Moscow and by the money and good living which he had been able to give her as a result of his highly successful "business" for the production of presses used in blueprinting and fluorescent plates. This business was, in fact, used for the transmission of funds from abroad, mainly, I think, through the branch of the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank in Shanghai. At

first KLAUSEN had used the cover of an import and export business, which had not been successful.

Other collaborators of SORGE were Gunther STEIN, a British subject of German origin who subsequently became a naturalised American. He seems to have operated principally in China, but he did on occasions act as deputy for SORGE. He too was a journalist, representing the "Berliner Tageblatt" and in 1936 the "British Financial News". STEIN met a woman with whom he was intimately associated in Hong Kong, although whether he actually married here seems doubtful; her name was Margit GATENBERG. Agnes SMEDLEY, of whom we have many records, played at one time an extremely important part in getting the network established in China, although she had little to do with SORGE when he was in Tokyo. It seems probable that it was through her association with the Frankfurter Zeitung that SORGE got his credentials from that paper in 1933. She gave SORGE a great deal of assistance in the recruiting for his Chinese network. Both OSAKI and MIYAGI employed a large number of sub-agents, some conscious and some unconscious. OSAKI's ramifications extended at one time into KONOYE's Cabinet.

SORGE's great strength was his immense knowledge of affairs in China and Japan. He had made it his business to study not only current affairs but Chinese and Japanese history. He refused to be merely a post-box and, in the light of his knowledge and that of OSAKI - with whom he had frequent discussions - he was able to make an accurate assessment of both overt and covert information. More valuable still was the entry which his superior knowledge gave him to the German Embassy, who came to rely on him more and more. He had already been friendly with the wife of General OTT, the Ambassador, when she was the wife of an architect in Munich, and there are strong grounds for thinking that he frequently slept with Frau OTT. General OTT had a great respect for SORGE's knowledge, showed him telegrams and memoranda from Berlin, and asked his assistance in replying to them. Finally, he made him his Press Attache, and when he was arrested did everything he could to get him released. He also knew well the Military Attache and the local head of the Gestapo. His downfall came in October, 1941, owing to a chain of circumstances which he could not have foreseen. There had been Communist activities in the offices of the South Manchurian Railway, and the Japanese decided to have a round up. Among those arrested was RITSU, now a Communist member of the Japanese Diet. Under pressure, without any knowledge of SORGE's network, he made a statement that a woman named KATABAYOSHI, who had formerly lived in Los Angeles, was a Communist. This woman had been on fairly intimate terms with MIYAGI when he was in the U.S.A. and, under pressure, she disclosed that MIYAGI also was a Communist, although she knew little of what he was doing. Observation on MIYAGI connected him with OSAKI, and observation on OSAKI connecting him with SORGE, KLAUSEN, and VOUKELITCH. Before this disaster the work had become increasingly difficult owing to a general tightening up in security due to war conditions. The practice of sending couriers to Shanghai had ceased and wireless communications were less frequent. It had, in fact, been found necessary to make contact with the Soviet Embassy or Consulate for the transmission of information and funds. The system was for KLAUSEN to receive, for himself and his wife, two tickets for the theatre or cinema and pass the microfilms to the man on his right and receive dollars in exchange. The Russian employed by the Consulate was ZAITSEV.

Before the network was closed down, SORGE had transmitted three vital pieces of information to the Russians. Firstly, he told them of the refusal of Japan to make a military alliance with Germany in 1939 against Russia and England. It is claimed that this was a deciding factor in causing the Russians to make their non-aggression pact with the Germans.

Secondly, he warned the Russians that the Germans were mobilising 170 Divisions against Russia's western front a month before the attack took place. Thirdly, he was in a position to assure the Russians that the Japanese mobilisation in 1941 was directed not against their eastern front, but against the British and the Americans in a southward movement.

SORGE and OSAKI were hanged on the 7th November, 1944. VOUKELITCH and MIYAGI died in prison - or may well have been murdered. KLAUSEN escaped the death penalty through fairly full disclosures of the part he had played, of his wireless technique and of his codes, which must have enabled the Japanese, who had monitored certain of his communications, to decipher them. He and his wife were released by the Americans and are believed now to be in Russia, if they have not been liquidated. Gunther STEIN is said to be in Paris, and Agnes SMEDLEY is in the U.S. Some of the Japanese confederates have been released, but others may still be in prison.

The most important lesson, to my mind, of this case is that SORGE and his associates could not possibly have carried out their assignment except under the cover of journalism. Not only were SORGE, VOUKELITCH, OSAKI, Agnes SMEDLEY and Gunther STEIN working as journalists, but also a number of OSAKI's Japanese confederates. Personally I think that we ought to look at some of our high-grade journalists of the type of Freddie KUH, from this angle.

16th January.

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I spoke to Arthur Martin about the details disclosed in the SORGE report about KLAUSEN's code and wireless technique. I did not know whether this had already reached G.C.H.Q. He said he would make enquiries on his next visit.

 has disclosed that a secret courier is visiting South Africa and Australia in order to establish a line of communication with the C.P.G.P. in the event of the Communist Parties in South Africa and Australia being proscribed. South Africa and Australia are being informed.

17th January.

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day, Dick said that no steps can yet be taken to get Karel STRAUSS denaturalised, since the whole of our documentary evidence cannot be put before a tribunal without jeopardising our source. He said that abject apologies have been received from the Home Office for having naturalised this man against our advice, and Murrie has given his assurance that such a thing will not happen again.

D.B. said this might make the denaturalisation of STRAUSS easier, but nothing could be done for the moment.

Dick told the meeting about the who is now over here and has been interrogated by S.I.S. Two major issues in which he has reported are:

(i) that from telegrams he sent from Paris to Warsaw, he is certain that the Polish Intelligence in France have an agent at a high level on the French General Staff, who appears to be in contact with the Americans at Fontainebleau and who has given Polish Intelligence the entire

air defence plans for Western Union. Owing, however, to the fact that the Poles are suspicious of telegraphic communication, _____ was unable to get more than a reference to the matter and could not get the name of the man concerned. _____ as the former will have to carry out the investigations.

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I saw Nicholls, who is I understand to take over the S.B. in Malaya. He has been in the country a good many years both before and since the war. He is fairly young, keen, and enthusiastic, and has a good deal of practical experience. He is perhaps not of sufficiently high calibre to take on the job in hand - indeed, he himself seemed to be rather astonished that he was selected; he felt that with his language qualifications and his practical experience he could be more use to somebody with longer and wider experience in organisation than he would be if he were put down to a desk at the head of the organisation. He realised, however, that there was a great shortage of people with the right kind of experience, and that he would have to do his best. I told him what I thought was necessary on the Intelligence side, and that it was difficult to bring the operations in Malaya to a successful conclusion unless intelligence could produce a reliable order of battle.

Meanwhile, there has been talk of getting someone of a higher calibre. Gray approached Morton and suggested either Maffey-Smith, late of D.I.B., or Wace, or "George" Jenkin. There is, however, a reluctance here to make suggestions to the Colonial Office on the Police side. Personally I think the matter is so important that we should do all we can to get the right man into the job. If "George" Jenkin would take it, it would be admirable. I gather that he is fed up with the C.R.O. and had made up his mind to resign on February 24th if the Labour Government are returned to power.

Dr. Watts, the explosives expert in the Home Office, came to see me on the recommendation of Burt. He said that during the war ships had been allowed to load and unload explosives in harbour. Formerly, explosives were taken off in barges at sea in order to avoid the possibility of a really big explosion. The wartime practice had continued and explosives were, in fact, being loaded at places like Liverpool, many of which were of an extremely sensitive type. If a consignment of 500 tons went up the damage would have a radius of something like a mile and would be extremely serious. What worried him more, however, was the fact that the

Americans were doing the same thing in order to supply their Air Force units in this country. He wondered whether there was a chance of elements in the U.K., who disliked the presence of American troops here, committing any act of sabotage. I said that if he was thinking in terms of the C.P., I was fairly confident that their Executive Committee would not countenance any act of the kind. This did not entirely preclude the possibility that some disgruntled individual with Communist sympathies might not attempt such an act, but on the whole I thought it was unlikely. He said that he had put in a report to the Home Office, advising that in future all explosives should be landed at some suitable port in Scotland where there was no population in the vicinity of the harbour. I then talked to him about explosives in coal. He said that pieces of gellignite were still being found in coal, and that there were on an average three incidents a week. I asked him if he knew what the basic cause of the trouble was. He told me that the suggestion had been made at one time that Scotland Yard should carry out an investigation, but that this had been turned down by the Coal Board. He felt fairly confident that the basic reason for the trouble was nationalisation. The incidents had commenced then and had included sabotage to fire-fighting equipment, electric cables, etc. He said he had never known anything like it since 1925, at the time of the miners' strike. He thought that the workers had believed that nationalisation meant that they would manage the mines and get very large increases in wages, & proceeds of sums formerly dealt out to Directors, mine-owners, etc. This had been a disappointment to them and they were registering their disapproval by acts which could in the long run only damage themselves. There was a possibility that the present arrangement, by which shot-firers did not pay for their shots, and consequently did not require reimbursement for those that they did not use, had caused them at the end of the day just to throw them down anywhere in order to avoid the trouble of taking them back to the office. There are apparently quite a number of court actions, brought by people who have had explosions in their fireplaces, against the Coal Board, and attempts are made to bring Dr. Watts in as an expert witness.

18th January.

At the J.I.C. to-day, Sir Ralph Murray came to discuss his proposal that the fighting Services should give him some reassuring propaganda material which could be given to our representatives abroad for countering defeatist propaganda, particularly in France, which suggested that there was little that could be done against the enormous strength of the Russian forces if they were to attempt to invade Europe.

The Army said that they could not provide much comfort; the facts were that the Russians had 172 Divisions mobilised and we could only put two Divisions in the field at the end of a month - and that with some difficulty. They had, however, noticed that in manoeuvres the Russians had a great many breakdowns and occasionally there was a shortage of petrol, but they could not make any useful comparison with similar incidents which probably occurred during our own manoeuvres.

The Air Force said that their picture was equally gloomy; the facts were that the Russian Air Force was 16 times as big as the British Air Force, that the Russian jet fighter at present in production was superior to anything we had got - although, of course, we had some very important projects coming along - that the Russians had a number of long-distance bombers of the B.29 type, whereas attempts by ourselves to obtain some of these from the Americans had failed.

The Navy did not really come into the picture, since although they might be able to bottle up the Russian Fleet pretty successfully, this would

provide no cause for optimism by the French, who were thinking in terms of invasion by huge land armies.

The discussion then turned to the possibility of disclosing something about our research and development in scientific weapons, which would compensate for the deficiency in manpower. It was agreed that an approach should be made to the Research Policy Committee, but the general feeling was that they would be reluctant to disclose information of the kind to Western Union countries.

An espionage case of some magnitude has blown up in Tripoli. The Italian representative died suddenly and an inspection of his premises, in order to discover the cause of death, which was understood to be suicide, led to the discovery of vast quantities of documents and details regarding a network of Arab spies throughout Tripoli. The Italians here had evidently heard about the incident and a demarche had already been made to the Foreign Office, imploring them, in the interests of Anglo-Italian relations, not to raid his offices. This, however, is going to be done.

I have read a paper on a discussion with the J.I.C. about possible Russian indications in regard to the use of atomic weapons. The view seems to be held that on the whole it would not be in the Russians' interest - at any rate for the next few years - to start atomic war, but that they might do so to get in first if they thought that it was our policy to use atomic weapons. The Americans are estimating that the Russians will have something between 120 or 200 bombs by 1953, but we think that this probably may be grossly exaggerated, and that in any case sufficient evidence is not yet available to show how far the Russians have progressed; nobody yet knows whether the explosion a few weeks ago was from an experimental bomb or from the first bomb off the line. Everyone, however, is agreed that if atomic warfare does start, the primary target of the Russians will be the U.K.

19th January.

Viv,
to-day.

came over to discuss the case of HOOPER

A notice appeared in the papers a few days ago, that HOOPER's expenses in regard to a legal action for the custody of his twins was financed by Wilhelm PIECK, the former Soviet agent who recruited KING of the Foreign Office.

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I said that we here had considered this matter and had come to the conclusion that, in the light of HOOPER'S previous conduct, it was impossible for us to employ him any more, although we realised his capabilities and had turned the idea down with some reluctance. As we saw the position, HOOPER would be quite capable of stringing us along indefinitely about PIECK in order that we might pay his business expenses in going to Holland, which would certainly be considerable. He would probably keep our appetites whetted with regard to PIECK in order that we might continue to pay him, and we should never know the real truth. Apart from that, if he ever had the opportunity of selling us and it was to his advantage to do so, we could not place the slightest reliance on his integrity.

we would certainly give them every assistance in checking HOOPER'S

correspondence between this country and Holland. Meanwhile, there was an answer required by the Board of Trade in connection with a proposa for various exhibitions in this country which would be partly run and financed by PIECK, with HOOPER acting as his agent. The Board of Trade had evidently heard from the Commercial Attache at The Hague that HOOPER was not a reliable person and were seeking our advice.

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We had a meeting of the Appointments Board to-day, when we selected a promising looking engineer, a Yorkshireman, slightly tough, but seemingly an excellent fellow, for C.2 Sab. I do not know whether he will be able to run the section, but he should certainly know his stuff in regard to machinery, particularly on the marine side. Meanwhil I have heard from Sinclair, who would consider giving us _____ if th latter were prepared to come, in nine months time.

I raised at the meeting the question of minutes. Joe Spencer will give us a careful minute of the Board's proceedings to-day, but there remained the question of minutes of the Directors' meetings. I thought personally that there ought to be an agenda, and that when a matter of policy was decided, or the D.G. gave instructions for any action, it should be recorded and circulated to the Directors. On the whole I was inclined to think that this work should be undertaken by one of the Directors. Shaw was very much in favour of something of the kind. I explained to him afterwards that I had raised this matter several years ago, but that the D.G. had said that he did not want any more paper circulated. We might, however, perhaps reopen the question.

20th January.

a Dutchman, formerly employed by _____, came to see me. He is now Security Officer at Fokkers, which Company is half owned by the Dutch Government. He receives his pay from the Company. Paynter has been having discussions with him and is taking him over Vickers aircraft factory, where he will be shown the various security arrangements. He told me that security at Fokkers was practically non-existent. There were no ordinary prophylactic security measures in force, and there were a considerable number of known Communists employed. He hoped to get all this straightened out in due course, but clearly his task was no an easy one. He mentioned to me that he had left _____ owing to a disagreement, but that he still had the support of the organisation in his work at Fokkers.

late of the Marines and formerly A.D.N.I. during the war, came to see me about his son-in-law, one Captain _____ at present working in the A.G.'s department of the War Office. _____ did not see much chance of promotion even if he passed the Staff College and was looking elsewhere. I did not think that he sounded very promising as a candidate, and I made it very clear to his father-in-law what the limitations of this organisation were. Neverthe less, as a matter of courtesy I said that I would see

Boddington came to talk to me about Northern Ireland. He wondered whether the Northern Ireland Police should be a commitment of P.L.C.

In view of his past connections with the Northern Ireland Police, he said he thought he could effect a very considerable liaison.

I told him that I felt it difficult to separate the South and the North, in spite of partition. There appeared to be little going in the North with regard to Communism, due of course to the major preoccupation, Orange and Green. There would certainly be no chance of bringing them into any of our S.B. schemes, and I thought, therefore, that things had better remain as they were. I knew Roger Moore personally and he always came to see me when he was in this country. As a matter of fact it would be unwise, I think, for Boddington to handle this liaison, since there was some incident there during the period of the Black and Tans which resulted in Wickham, the Inspector General, having Boddington thrown out of the country. This incident is certainly still present in the mind of Roger Moore, whatever the other Police Officers in the R.U.C. may think. I do not in the least know what the facts of this issue were.

23rd January.

 I saw Newsam to-day. Firstly, I talked to him about the case of three Russians who are to come over from Germany to broadcast for the B.B.C. for propaganda purposes. He agreed to these people being allowed to come. I explained that we had gone into the matter as carefully as we could, and that it also had the approval of the J.I.C. We could, of course, give no guarantee as to how the people concerned were likely to turn out, but on the whole the case seemed to be a reasonably straightforward one and justified on the facts.

Newsam then told me that a meeting had been held last week to discuss the defectors paper and the recommendations about rehabilitation, etc, but that he did not know the outcome. He understood that we had been represented at this meeting. He himself had nominated Hutson and Wheeler to look after these matters in future, and said that unless the circumstances were very exceptional, they would be empowered to deal with any future cases.

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Carey Foster came to see me about Guy BURGESS. He is speaking to Ashley-Clarke, who is now head of the Personnel Dept., having succeeded Harold Caccia (the latter has gone as Minister in Vienna). He wanted to know my views. Hill had told him that a prosecution under the Official Secrets Act would lie against Guy BURGESS, but that for various reasons it would be undesirable to proceed. I said that he could be quite sure that Hill would be right on his facts; it would be undesirable to proceed, for two reasons. Firstly, that one would not wish any further publicity in regard to S.I.S.'s affairs, and secondly, that Counsel for the Defence would be able to say, for example,

Although a technical offence was committed, we never liked to prosecute in cases of this kind. My own view was that Guy BURGESS was not the sort of person who would deliberately pass confidential information to unauthorised parties he was, however, extremely keen and enthusiastic in matters which interested him and would be easily induced by a man like Freddie KUH to say more than he ought to. So far as his drinking was concerned, I had gained the impression that owing to a severe warning from a doctor, he had more or less gone on the wagon. I did not think that he often got wholly out of control but there was no doubt that drink loosened his tongue. Personally I should have thought that a severe reprimand from somebody he respected might be the answer to the present situation.

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day we discussed, at his request, the question of Aubrey going to the Middle East. It seemed that Bill Magan had made a request for this visit some time ago; this had been postponed until Aubrey became thoroughly acquainted with the work here. Magan had, as late as December, expressed a wish that Aubrey should visit Fayid, Baghdad and Cyprus. It was more the ciphering procedure that he was going to look into than the routes of communication, which might in future be through S.I.S., to a greater degree than at present.

I told the D.G. about confidential waste from Mrs. Grist's department which had been put into the incinerator and had blown clean up the chimney, when bits of the material were found on the roof, in the street, and elsewhere - in fact one bit had blown into Malcom Cumming's window. Search parties have been sent out and it is hoped that all was recovered. In view of this incident, somebody from the 6th floor is personally supervising the burning of the material. This has raised the question of a shredding machine, which cuts paper up into pieces the size of a pin head. This is, I think, the real answer. Everything in the Gristery should be shredded before it leaves the 6th floor. It may be that certain of our other confidential waste should also be shredded. The D.G. has asked me to look into this.

I also spoke about the case of Elwell, who is going to Jugo-Slavia for a holiday to stay with Charles Peake. The D.G. agreed to his going, provided his documents were satisfactory and provided, if he were interrogated at the frontier, he told the same story as Charles Peake when the application for his visa is made in Belgrade.

I had a short talk with Walter Bell. He is evidently very interested in Kenya and thinks there is a lot to be done, particularly in the way of moving about and seeing people, not only in Kenya but in the adjacent countries. He thinks that the organisation is at present too much rooted to its desk.

Holmes talked to me about Detective Officers' Conferences. He thinks that we should say something to them about the general lines on which we are working with the S.Bs. Things have rather changed in the Police Force lately, owing to the build up that we have given to the S.Bs. They are no longer the Cinderellas, but the Glamour Boys of the C.I.D. feel slightly hurt at being left out of the picture. The answer is, I think, to talk to them on general lines, but to keep them off the B.I.A. lectures.

Sir John Shaw, Kellar and Bamford came to discuss the transmission of information to Pakistan. [redacted] has arranged for the passing of information about Pakistanis between the two countries. This is not wholly satisfactory, but there is little that we can do. We want to avoid, if possible, creating a precedent for passing information to the Pakistan High Commissioner here in London.

24th January.

I discussed the case of Aubrey with Spencer again, and subsequently told the D.G. that I thought on the whole there was a case for Aubrey going to the Middle East. The D.G. accepted this and Aubrey is to go.

I also arranged with Spencer to get shredding machines, if this did not involve too much expense. He thought that we should probably get them for nothing.

I then mentioned the case of the keys. He said he thought the proposal was quite feasible and that he would get out a chart for the night duty officer to check against the board when it was locked up.

I took the D.G.'s meeting to-day. Graham said there had been a certain amount of Right Wing subversive activity. The Union Movement had announced that they did not intend to contest the General Election since they considered themselves too realistic a party to do so! One Mosleyite is, however, standing as an Independent. He is one, Symington, of soup fame. MOSLEY has been planning a further round of foreign visits. He and Lady Mosley were intending to leave for South America in the near future, but this has now been postponed owing to the non-receipt of a message from Madrid. B.I. said the reason for these trips abroad, which were becoming more and more frequent, was somewhat obscure. It was thought probable that the visit to South America might be in connection with the recruiting of former Nazis. Graham went on to say that he thought this R.W. activity should be kept more in mind than hithert I asked him about the Fascist National Congress of Labour, which appears to

be a movement to recruit people from the Trade Unions. Graham said he did not think this had very much significance at the moment.

I asked how the case was progressing. John Marriott said that [redacted] was still under interrogation by S.I.S., but it seemed to be going at rather a leisurely pace. The Surete have now been told, but so far there have been no reactions. John said that the S.I.S. [redacted] had been approached by an English newspaper correspondent and asked if there was any truth in the story about the Polish Vice Consul at Lille, in whose office were found documents which indicated a leak from Fontainebleau. The correspondent had been told that copies of the documents had been handed to the British Embassy in Paris. This was not in fact true, [redacted] was told by Wibot that the documents had been "planted" on the Polish

[redacted] In spite of this, however. the man is to be tried. I then asked what the outcome of the case was vis a vis the French and the Americans. John said it is not known who the American is who may have unwittingly divulged the Western Union defence plans to the member of the French General Staff concerned, whose identity has not yet been discovered. Roger said that as the plans concerned were Western Union ones, the French would be bound to say something about the matter. It was agreed that as this matter was one of some urgency, S.I.S. should be urged to speed up their interrogation of [redacted]

Hill said he had attended a meeting at the Home Office about the J.I.C paper on defectors. The Home Office have now agreed the paper. They were apparently worried about the security risk of bringing a larger flow of defectors to this country. They have rather changed their tune it seems, since they had brought vast numbers of D.Ps over here in the past, which would seem to constitute a far greater security risk. Dick asked under whose authority it rested to encourage defectors to come over here. Serpell said that the Chiefs of Staff have agreed with the thesis that defectors provide the most productive source of intelligence at the moment. I said that Newsam had ruled that these cases should in future go direct to Mr. Hutson and Mr. Weiler, unless they were exceptional - in which case he himself should be consulted.

Perfect said that the general opinion of the Police was that the the new scheme for holding the meetings on a C.P. area basis was highly satisfactory. I asked Mann how things were going in Scotland in this respect. He said that the system had been working up there for some time now, since there was in fact only one Communist area.

Perfect said that it had now been arranged that there should be an interchange between Police Forces of C.2 lists of Category B. firms.

Perfect said he had had a meeting with General Watson and Mr. Richards of the Railway Executive regarding their future liaison with this office. It had been agreed that their S.B. officers, who had been hand-picked, should attend the ordinary Police S.B. conferences. As they are not, however, very well versed in Communist matters, it was agreed that they should come here for instruction. Perfect said that Mitchell had agreed to this

Furnival-Jones spoke about the Americans placing secret contracts with firms in this country, and in particular with Flight Refuelling Ltd. He said this latter arrangement was made direct by Washington through the Assistant Air Attache at the American Embassy here. It was at the

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latter's suggestion that Air Commodore Paynter went down to discuss the security of the contract. The Assistant Air Attache is now going back to Washington, his mission having been completed, but when saying good-bye it emerged that the Americans are going to put a number of technicians and demonstrators into the Ministry of Supply to work there as part of that Ministry. This will mean a good deal of placing of secret American work, particularly in connection with the aircraft industry.

It was agreed that this new contingency would have considerable repercussions on C.2., but that the Security side of the matter must be dealt with by us and not the Americans.

Furnival-Jones spoke about the recent visit to this office of now Security Officer at Fokkers in Holland. He said it had emerged in conversation with that the security of defence projects in industry in Holland was non-existent. He said he felt that we should possibly have to report this fact to S.I.S and the J.I.C.

Roger said that this question was to be raised at the next meeting of the Military Security Committee of the Brussels Treaty Powers, in connection with the firm of Phillips. He said that a paper is being prepared in this office, but he felt that we should also ask for contributions from the other members of the Committee.

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Furnival-Jones spoke about a very interesting report obtained from Hone Kong on an investigation, carried out by the C.I.D. Superintendent there and a Government chemist, regarding an undoubted case of sabotage to a ship which was sunk in the harbour as a result of a home-made bomb placed on board. The culprits were apparently two northern Chinese but it was thought that it would probably be impossible to identify them. He said he was going further into the matter and hoped to get details of the mechanism of the bomb.

Kellar said that a telegram had been received from the Governor of Hong Kong to the effect that if there should be a blockade of the Island he could deal with the situation until reinforcements arrived. The general opinion of the meeting seemed to be that he would find this difficult if the Chinese population adopted a policy of non-co-operation.

Potter said that the Chief Constable of Pembrokeshire had asked this office to vet a candidate for his Police Force. We all agreed that we could not create a precedent by taking on this commitment, and that the C.C.s should be told that he would get a far better answer if he applied to the C.C. of the area from which the man came. It was agreed that D.C. should deal with this matter.

Roger told the meeting that a new officer had been found for the sabotage section, namely Mr. Fenton, who is a trained engineer and is to join the office on February 6th.

Peter Reid came to lunch with me and returned to the office, when he saw the D.G., Dick and Roger. He seemed to find this useful.

I saw _____ at the request of _____ his father-in-law. _____ a Marine, was A.D.N.I. in the early stages of the war.

_____ is going up for the Staff College, but even if he gets in he says that there are about sixty or seventy other Captains senior to himself who have also passed the Staff College, and that he does not consider his prospects in the Army to be particularly bright.

I told him that we were always reluctant to dig people out of a pensionable career, and I impressed on him the limitations that there were to promotion in an organisation such as ours: the field was small and highly competitively as far as the higher grades were concerned. Apart from this, if he failed to make the grade during his probationary period of two years, he might find himself in serious difficulties. He would clearly like to think all this over, but on the whole seemed prepared to burn his boats.

I cannot say that I found him a very impressive character, although there may be more in him than appears on the surface. His father-in-law evidently thought highly of him, but I cannot attach any importance to that. His qualifications are not, _____, very impressive. He has virtually no languages, but it could, I suppose, be said that the entrance examination to Woolwich is harder than Sandhurst! If attached officers were wanted in S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E., I think _____ would be keen to go, but it may be that the Army could produce somebody of higher calibre.

Skardon went down to Harwell to see FUCHS at the latter's request. He has just telephoned to say that FUCHS has confessed that from 1942 to February 1949 he was active as a Soviet agent and had given the Russians everything he could, including details about the manufacture of the atomic bomb.

Dick and I discussed the matter with the D.G. and came to the conclusion that there was nothing that we could do to-night. We must wait until we hear Skardon's full account.

25th January.

Skardon gave an account of his interview with FUCHS to the D.G., Dick, Marriott, Robertson and myself. It is difficult to say what the deciding factor was in FUCHS' mind when he asked for the interview. It is believed that Cockcroft had said to him, when he was told that he would have to leave Harwell, that it was a pity he had not been frank with the security authorities, and it was also thought that he had some conversation with Skinner, his immediate superior at Harwell. Meanwhile his somewhat intimate relations with Mrs. Skinner had come out. All these factors, coupled with a certain amount of erosion due to his earlier interrogation by Skardon, may have caused him to unburden himself. In the light of what he has said, it is clear that vanity plays a great part. For two hours he tried to explain his own mental make-up, without saying anything about what he had done as a result of it. He talked a good deal about his earlier life and his fight against the Nazis; he had not felt that any country except Russia was really sincere in their efforts to defeat them and all that they stood for. He had to some extent been reinforced in this view when he was arrested on the outbreak of war and deported to Canada. He would like to have taken a more active share in the efforts of this country. He then made it clear that he had a completely split personality; he believed that there were certain ideological loyalties which transcended all personal loyalties. The conversation continued in this way until lunch time without any statement as to what he had done. Skardon lunched with him and as soon as they had

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finished FUCHS appeared anxious that the interrogation should be continued immediately. He had considered it a duty to the world that he should pass information regarding his work on atomic energy to the Russians. He was anxious to do something to help them in 1942 and had consulted a friend whose name he refused under any circumstances to divulge. In this way he had obtained an introduction to a Russian, whose name he did not know: he had met him on a number of occasions, and when he went to the U.S. he was contacted there in the usual clandestine way without knowing the names of any of the individuals. He met people in New York and in Boston and in Santa Fe when he was at Los Alamos. He had begun by passing the products of his own brain, (this, I think, had obviously eased his conscience at the outset) but ultimately had passed everything he could lay his hands on down to details of the atomic bomb. He was asked whether he was surprised that the Russians had succeeded in letting off the bomb. He said that in fact he was, although, of course, he knew that they had the requisite data to work on but did not think that they would be able to complete the engineering project so quickly. After his return to this country his connections became less frequent until February 1949, when they ceased altogether. His reasons for cooling off were that although he still thought that Communism was the thing for the world, he did not altogether like the Russian Government. In his conversation he made it perfectly plain that in his view he was quite indispensable at Harwell, that the work must go on, that Cockcroft was no good, and that therefore from the point of view of the project and also the welfare of the staff at Harwell, his services should be retained. He evidently thinks that he can, without too much difficulty, persuade the authorities to retain his services. This is, I think, where his vanity and megalomania come in. He did have to admit under pressure that, in spite of the fact that he was a law unto himself, the giving of the atomic bomb to Russia was a bad thing. It occurs to me that he may have been disillusioned by their attitude on the Atomic Energy Commission. He admitted having received roughly £100 for his services: he had at first been reluctant to accept any money and this sum had barely covered his expenses. He had finally agreed to accept £100 and no more, purely as a token payment and as an indication of a bond between him and the ideas for which the Russians stood.

FUCHS is clearly about as good an example of completely muddled thinking that it would be possible to find. Psychologically the case is of very great interest as showing the type of person we are up against. He referred to his previous connection with Skardon, when the latter said to him that if he had not been engaged in espionage, it must have been his twin brother. He told Skardon he was right; that his twin brother was the other half of him which enabled him to betray his comrades and the people he was working with for a higher ideal - he, in fact, kept the two things entirely apart.

Dick and Roger and I have been reviewing this disclosure from the point of view of the action that we have taken in this case and in many others. During the war, when FUCHS was sent to America, people like Beaverbrook - and even Winston - all took the view that anti-Nazism was a positive asset. It was in this atmosphere that FUCHS had been taken on. When he returned he was already in Harwell before we were asked to vet him. There was a considerable amount of argument and we finally decided that it was our duty to inform Atomic Energy of what we knew, and to say that in our view it did not add up to anything positive. All that we did know at the time was that FUCHS had been associated with some youth movement which was fighting the Nazis in Germany, and that when he was interned in Canada he had associated with the Communist Fritz KAHLE in the camp. This did not seem surprising, since a large number of the other inmates were pro-Nazi. It

would, of course, have been possible for us to have taken a stronger line about FUCHS' establishment at Harwell, but I am quite certain that in view of his past services to atomic energy and the importance of the position he held in the whole project, it would have got us nowhere. If we always took a completely rigid line, Government Departments would merely get into the way of saying: "Oh well, of course the Security Service would turn a case of this sort down", and ultimately any advice we gave would be disregarded. On the counter-espionage side, I think there is no doubt that if we had turned the heat on to FUCHS when he came back to this country, in the same way that we have been doing in the last six months, we should undoubtedly have bowled him out. But it is difficult to see in the light of the information available why we should have made him the subject of special investigations any more than many others whom we have got on our books. It is quite clear from what FUCHS has said that no agent would have disclosed to us what he was doing, since with the exception of his one friend, who effected the original introduction, he maintains that he has no other collaborators outside the Russian circle. This leads one to a general consideration in regard to Poles and others who are employed in places like R.A.E. Farnborough; they are all, I think, a security risk, and the safe thing would be of course to turn them all out but I am pretty certain that no Government Department would stand for it. One interesting point that I have forgotten to mention was that FUCHS said, in the course of the interrogation, that one of his reasons for ceasing to pass information was that he had come to the conclusion that he liked the way of life in this country. It will be seen how inconsistent FUCHS is in his reasoning: on the one hand he sets himself up as a kind of God and talks of ideological laws which transcend all personal loyalties, and on the other he admits his fallibility both in regard to assessing the Russian Government and the mode of life for which this country stands.

26th January.

I saw Perfect and Mann about the Detective Officers Conference which is to be held in Edinburgh on February 28th. I asked Mann to ascertain what subjects Edinburgh would like us to talk on. The D.G. has expressed his willingness to be present.

 I discussed with Miss Bagot and Kitchin further revisions to the paper on Communism in Africa. It seemed to me that we had now reached the stage where we must make representations to the J.I.C. It seemed fairly clear that the J.I.S. are not really competent to handle a paper of this kind unless we and S.I.S. are sitting on their laps. The possible solution would be for us to attend a meeting with the J.I.S. when the general planning of the paper is discussed, and thereafter to consider the first draft in conference with the J.I.S. team. This might in the end save us a lot of trouble. I have asked that a letter should be prepared, stating what has happened in this particular case and making proposals.

27th January.

Max Knight has had a discussion with William Norman EWER, who was apparently quite friendly and ready to disclose his past when he was working under cover of the Federated Press for the Russians. I have not seen Max's report yet, but I understand that quite gratuitously EWER issued a warning about Freddie KUH, who certainly had worked for the Russians in the

past and might well be doing so still. _____ of course, knows more about Freddie KUH than anybody else. We know of his contact with the Russians, Czechs, and the Poles, but such is the nature of his work that it is impossible to say, by the ordinary means available to us, when KUH's work passed from high-grade journalism to espionage.

 FUCHS has made a statement to Skardon which incriminates him fairly well. This will be supported by statements from Arnold and also from Cockcroft. The difficulty is to avoid any accusation of inducement of a temporal kind, e.g. if he could say that he was told that he could remain at Harwell if he made a complete confession and that he acted on that motive in making his statement both to ourselves and to Arnold, a prosecution would be extremely difficult if not out of the question. If, on the other hand, he was merely urged to get the whole thing off his chest and put himself right with his employers whom he had been deceiving, the case would be a clear one. In fact, in his statement he has very much stressed the moral side, although I should be inclined to think that his motives may well have been mixed. It could, of course, always be said that if any suggestion were made of his continuing his work at Harwell it only applied to a confession that during the war years he had let his enthusiasm run away with him, and that such activities had ceased when he joined Harwell. In fact, of course, he now tells us that he was active up to February, 1949.

 Irvine came to tell me about his visits to Western Union countries on the question of a War Room. He has had a fairly satisfactory answer from Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, and has got some concessions out of the French, although the position there cannot be said to be wholly satisfactory. _____ clearly wants to maintain control outside the immediate zone of the fighting; this will not, however, necessarily preclude a discussion on the lines that we had previously suggested.

 28th January.

I discussed with the D.G. the case of _____ Mayhew, the Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, when visiting the I.D.C. the other day noticed an old University acquaintance, one _____, whom he described to Admiral Daniel, the Commandant, as a "fellow traveller". When Mitchell called on Mayhew, he expressed regret at having made this statement; he said that _____ had been a member of the Labour Club in 1938 and often seemed to take the Communist viewpoint in discussions. His information did not go further than that. He said, however, that he would like to ring up Dennis Healey, a University friend of his, who had known _____ well. Healey said that _____ had been a member of the Communist underground. When Mayhew asked him how he knew, he said that he had been a member himself! The Admiral, who is purple at the gills and threatening to throw _____ out of his establishment neck and crop, has been calmed down on the understanding that we will conduct a careful investigation.

On looking up _____ records it appears that his real name is _____ and that his father was of Russian origin, naturalised British, and that his mother was nee _____ (a Latvian name).

_____ is now employed at the I.D.C., dealing with administration matters and seeing most of the papers that go through the institution.

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Graham Mitchell has at last received voluminous papers on the activities of BUNTING and others in the groundnuts scheme. They do not alter our previous views, that Strachey is seeking a cloak to cover up the deficiencies of the Groundnuts Corporation by drawing the Communist red herring across it.

There is no doubt that BUNTING is a Communist, and there may be others there. He has consequently become a focal point for grievances, of which there are probably many justifiable ones. The Corporation could quite easily refuse to renew his contract, which in any case terminated on his return on leave to this country. They are, however, trying to get the Colonial Office, and in particular Cohen, to say that his presence in East Africa is undesirable on Communist grounds. Unfortunately the P.M. has endorsed the recommendations of Strachey - that the Security Service should carry out a thorough investigation and that careful consideration by the Secretary of State for the Colonies should be given to the risk that he may be accepting in BUNTING's return to East Africa.

30th January.

Glazebrook arrived to-day and was seen by the D.G. and myself. He asked for our views about an M.I.5 in Canada. I said that I would not like to tender views on what should be done in another country without a great deal of knowledge, which I did not altogether possess. On the other hand, it seemed to me that it would be a mistake to set up an M.I.5 in Canada, and that it would be far better to build on the existing resources of the R.C.M.P., to give them powers of interception and generally enhance the importance of that side of their work.

It was fairly evident to me that Glazebrook had more or less reached the same conclusion. The D.G. told him about his experiences in Africa and his recommendation that our activities there should be carried within the S.B. and the Police.

 We had an Appointments Board to-day, when we saw _____ of the Foreign Office. We thought that, subject to his Foreign Office reference, being satisfactory, he would certainly be worth a trial. There were one or two minor things about his slightly Foreign Office manner that did not altogether meet with the approval of the Board.

 At the D.G.'s meeting, we considered a proposal to buy or rent further property in Hong Kong. We decided that it would be unwise to buy, and authorised Joe Spencer to negotiate with the Office of Works on

the rental, which is about £1,350 a year.

31st January.

I discussed with Hollis the line we should take about the Security Executive at next Wednesday's meeting.

 At the D.G's meeting to-day Dick White told the meeting about the latest developments in the _____ case.

Dick said he did not think the Surete would have much difficulty in pin-pointing the member of the French General Staff concerned, since there were in fact only five French officers at Fontainebleau and there was other evidence for identification. As regards the American in the case, _____ has said that he sent out a message requesting funds for a Frenchman and an American, which seems to indicate that the American was not acting unwittingly. He should be easy to identify since there are only two Americans at Fontainebleau.

Graham Mitchell said there was not much more to report in the "Lancashire Hotpot" case. We are in close touch with the Chief Constable through B.I.F. Everything so far confirms our original view, that this is a defensive security measure on the part of the C.P. There are continuing indications of contact with the Russians through channels at King Street, and there is still some indication that work is going on in connection with D.Ps, but the position is not yet clear.

Graham told the meeting about the documents received in the case of BUNTING. The Ministry of Food have apparently asked that in addition to handling the case of BUNTING, we should also vet all the white members of the groundnuts scheme. It was agreed by the meeting that we should protest against this latter suggestion.

Joe Spencer said that he had had an official note from the War Office on the irregular disclosure of official information inside the War Office, where there had apparently been a number of examples of intentional and unintentional disclosures of this kind. All staff have apparently been advised to tighten up their security measures.

Perfect said he had had a talk with Mr. Richards of the Railway Police, when it had been agreed that the Railway S.B. officers, covering the six railway regions, should come here for courses in the same way as the ordinary Police S.B. officers. He said the C.Cs are to be approached and asked to invite the Railway S.B. officers to attend their S.B. conferences in the various regions.

Perfect referred to a point which was decided at one of the D.G's meetings in December last, namely, that P.L.S. should be informed, for record purposes, when officer of other sections visited the various Police Forces. He said this had not altogether worked out, particularly in the case of the Metropolitan Police. I pointed out that the Metropolitan Police, unfortunately, did not come in under the general scheme. I said I had spoken to Howe and Burt about this, who were both in favour of coming in under the scheme, but there were others who would not agree.

Alec Kellar said we had been asked by the Home Office whether we had any comment to make regarding the granting of political asylum to personnel of the Chinese Embassy who do not agree with their present regime. He said we had replied that we had no objection in principle, but that it must be borne in mind that there may be Communist sympathisers amongst them.

Roger Hollis said we have heard from Washington that Portugal and Italy have agreed to the security check under the Atlantic Pact, and are anxious that it should be carried out as soon as possible. We have, however, as yet had no reactions from the Northern Group.

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Colonel Warren, Chief Constable of Buckinghamshire, came in to pass the time of day. He reminded me of the _____ case during the war - one of the first parachutists who came down in Bucks. Just as he had got his aerial up, a pig charged the whole thing and crashed it to the ground!

came over and I gave him the story about FUCHS, in the presence of Dick, John, James, Skardon, and Hill. He realised, perhaps more than anyone else, what the dangers of the confession gave thrown out on the grounds of inducement, but on learning of the full statement he thought that we ought to get away with it. He suggested that on Skardon's introduction he might take another statement, but in discussion we realised that if it was the kind of statement we wanted, namely, that it was principally his desire to put himself right with his friends and to make retribution that had caused him to come clean, there would be considerable advantage in the course proposed. If he refused to make a statement, it would not really matter, but if he accepted the proposal and then said that he had confessed owing to a suggestion made to him that if he did so he might possibly remain at Harwell, we should be very awkwardly placed indeed.

said that he would like to talk to Howe, for whose opinion on matter of law he had a great respect, and that he would come and see us again in the morning.

1st February.

At the J.I.C. to-day we considered only the report on Hong Kong. _____ had just received a telegram about the recent disturbances there in connection with the tramway strike. It appears that a representative of the L.W. Federation of Trade Unions in Hong Kong had recently been to Canton, and there was a report to the effect that he had instructions to hot things up. The result had been a demonstration and inflammatory speeches, ending in something of a riot with the use of tear gas; 50 people had been injured, but the matter had been successfully handled. What seemed significant was that the trouble makers were not employees of the tramway company, but from other Unions. Several arrests were made and there are to be deportations. It is possible that this may foreshadow the beginning of internal disturbances in Hong Kong prior to a demand for the return of the Colony, but it is early days to express any firm opinion.

I told _____ about the BUNTING case, and he was somewhat irritated by the fact that nobody had said anything to him in his own department.

Burt came over, when we had a further discussion about the FUCHS case. We concluded that the best thing was to hear first the views of the D.P.P. If he was not satisfied with the case as it stood, then we should be very grateful for Burt's offer to take a further statement. Hill and Skardon are to see the D.P.P. this afternoon.

Roger and I went over to a committee meeting, chaired by Cornish of the Home Office, to consider the future of the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and its shape in war. We did little beyond clearing up various points in the papers already circulated. I made it clear that the purpose of the Security Executive, as set out in the papers, namely, an organisation to deal with all Fifth Column was correctly stated, in that in 1940 Lord Swinton had so described its functions, having entirely overlooked the fact that the Fifth Column was the sole raison d'etre of the Security Service. The result had been serious confusion and a diversion of energy from the things that mattered to trivialities and scare reports. Ultimately, however, the Security Executive had settled down to a useful task in co-ordinating Interdepartmental Security matters, in that it had a real function and would certainly have a similar function in any future crisis.

At our next meeting we are to consider the structure of the organisation and its position in relation to higher authority. We think that the Chairman should be a high-grade Civil Servant who would carry weight with the Cabinet Committee if necessary and should come under the Minister of Defence, or if he does not exist, the Cabinet. Only in this way can Interdepartmental disputes, unresolved as between Ministers, be finally and expeditiously settled.

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Hill and Skardon went over to see the D.P.P. and showed him statements that had been obtained from FUCHS. He swept aside all the arguments about inducement and expressed himself as confident that a successful prosecution could take place. Without even collecting his pyjamas he left for Cardiff to obtain the Attorney General's fiat.

The proposal is that FUCHS should be arrested to-morrow at Shell Mex House. Immediately afterwards, his premises at Harwell should be searched. Perrin will summon FUCHS and Burt will make the arrest.

2nd February.

I saw Newsam about a case of _____, to which he readily agreed.

I told him, off the record, about the FUCHS case. We warned the F.B.I. several days ago about FUCHS's imminent arrest and they are now sending over a special agent.

Dick and I attended a meeting in Roger Makins' room at the Foreign Office, at which Perrin was present, to discuss a point made by Portal.

Portal had felt that, as a matter of policy which might have far-reaching consequences on Anglo-American co-operation in the atomic field, it was essential that it should be made clear to the American authorities and the public at the outset that FUCHS had transmitted information to the Russians both in the United States and in the U.K. If this were not done, it was certain that the arrest of FUCHS in the U.K. would cause an outcry against British security, and that even though subsequent disclosures would make it plain that the major leakage took place from Los Alamos, a good deal of the original mud was likely to stick.

To meet this point two charges have been framed. The first one, relating to FUCHS' activities in the United States, and the second one to those in the U.K. We emphasised, from the purely technical angle, that the Security Service would prefer to see the American charge omitted, since it might possibly embarrass the F.B.I. in the investigation of the American end of the affair.

The Foreign Office, while expressing a certain anxiety that the American charge might appear to be dragged in by the heels and to savour of pölicital manoeuvring, agreed that the point made by Portal was an overriding one.

It was therefore decided to allow the American charge to go in and to send a telegram to Hoyer Millar in Washington in answer to a request, through Patterson, instructing him to inform the State Department of the broad facts and of the charges which were being made, but in dealing with the Press to say merely that the whole matter was sub judice and could not

therefore, be disclosed.

On returning to the office I found that Hill had been having some difficulty with the D. of P.P., who, for legal reasons, was anxious to leave out the American charge. I told the D. of P.P. of the conversations that we had just had with the Foreign Office and he subsequently decided to reverse the order of the charges, putting the British charge first and the American charge second. He thought this could be properly explained by the fact that the second charge needed additional proof of FUCHS' British nationality. In the American charge he had omitted the reference to Boston, Massachusetts, as the place of FUCHS' meeting with the Russian agent and had substituted the words "in the U.S.A".

I then spoke to Sir Roger Makins and gave him clearance for his telegram to Washington. He told me that he had just seen Sir William Strang, who entirely agreed with the proposals, with the exception of one comment; that in the original draft charges we had pin-pointed Boston, Massachusetts, and the British charge had only mentioned the U.K. (the reason for this had been that there was no mention of London in the statement that FUCHS had made to Skardon, although this had come out in other conversations). Sir William Strang's point, however, was met by the exclusion of Boston, Massachusetts in the final charges.

I gave a talk to some S.B. officers on the general principles of our work here.

Owing to delays in framing the charges against FUCHS, Burt did not arrive at Shell Mex House until 3.45, FUCHS having waited three quarters of an hour. He was then introduced to Burt and arrested. He subsequently asked to see Perrin, to whom he said: "You realise what this means?". Perrin said: "I realise it means that we shall be deprived of your services at Harwell". FUCHS said: "It means more than that - Harwell will not be able to go on". According to what we heard from Burt afterwards, FUCHS was not in any sense in a communicative mood; he seemed stunned by events.

3rd February.

FUCHS appears to be in better shape, but we cannot, of course, approach him unless he makes a request.

Newsam asked to see me about H.O.Ws on de COURCY and his associates.

He questioned the propriety of using the Home Secretary's Warrant in the case of de COURCY and his associates. He thought that the H.O.W. could only be justified in a case where the Defence of the Realm or the security of the State was involved and that, if our sole interest amounted to curiosity about the sources from which de COURCY obtained his information, the use of the H.O.W. would not be justifiable.

I explained to him that part of de COURCY's technique was to talk to Government officials and to imply that he himself already knew a great deal owing to his connections with British Intelligence sources. This had in the past led to rather serious disclosures and in one case some years ago had involved a high-ranking officer in Court Martial proceedings. Apart

from this, there was a danger that de COURCY's sources might be used by the Soviet Government for deception purposes. Further, that the Chiefs of Staff had now become so interested in de COURCY's "Digest", due to his prophecy about the atomic bomb explosion in Russia, that they were inclined to think that his sources might be more valuable than Government sources. It is, therefore, extremely desirable to ascertain precisely what these sources were. There was moreover an added risk in that it seemed likely that de COURCY was also imparting his information to the Americans.

Newsam appreciated all these points but stuck to his view that unless we could satisfy the Secretary of State that the action we proposed was necessary from the point of view of the Defence of the Realm, or the security of the State, he felt that he would be in difficulties if he asked him to sign the Warrant. I said that we would review the position and see whether we could justify the Warrants on these grounds. I asked S.L.B. to let me know how he thought we could comply with the S. of S wishes.

4th February.

Cumming came to tell me that PEIERLS had asked to see FUCHS, and S.B. are going to try and install a mike in the waiting room. As this was clearly a matter between S.B. and the Governor, I did not feel it incumbent upon us to make any approach to Newsam. We confined ourselves to saying that if there were any results we should be interested.

6th February.

Lish Whitson has arrived and Johnny Gimperman is somewhat hurt that the Bureau has not kept him informed. We have explained to him that it was difficult for us to do so as this was a matter of indoctrination. We have shown Lish FUCHS' statement, and have had to tell him that we cannot give him a copy of the statements as the whole case is sub judice; we cannot, in fact, at the moment give him any very useful intelligence leads.

 Perfect and Holmes came to talk to me about the Dockyard Police. When alleged acts of sabotage take place in H.M. Dockyards, involving ratings or dockhands, there is no officer to whom we can go to get starting points. There should really be a properly trained Security Officer in the Dockyard and, outwardly at any rate, a member of the Dockyard Police. Only in this way would it ever be possible to get to the bottom of cases of the kind. I said that I would take the matter up with N.I.D.

 At the Directors' meeting to-day we reviewed the new Chart. I suggested that I should be shown as covering all Divisions, including Finance, since I was one of those who had to sign cheques in the absence of D.F. The D.G. agreed that this was right.

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7th February.

The wires are red hot. Hoover, finding himself in something of a jam, is obviously taking British security for a ride. He has testified before the Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and told them, off the record, that FUCHS had made a confession. This appeared in the New York Times. We have pointed out very forcibly to Lish, and also to Patterson, that if such a thing were published over here it would be contempt of court and might jeopardise the whole case. We have equally made it plainer than ever to Lish that we cannot in the circumstances give him copies of the statements put in in evidence.

Hoover's next move was to go before some other committee and say that the British made a muck of the FUCHS case, ~~and~~ that British legal procedure was cumbersome, and that British security was non-co-operative. These statements appeared in the Press, when Hoover sent for Patterson and denied their authenticity. We are fairly confident, however, that Hoover is being somewhat unscrupulous. His position is particularly awkward, since his appropriations are up before Congress and he is asking for an increase of his grant.

We have explained to Lish that the double charge on activities in the U.K. and in America was necessary, as FUCHS had admitted handing over information in both countries. In fact, it was in the U.S.A. that he handed over the know-how of the atomic bomb and this information would weigh very heavily with the Judge. The second charge has, of course, increased Hoover's difficulties, since he may well be asked how it was that FUCHS could be meeting this Russian agent in Boston, New

York, and Santa Fe, without the matter being detected. His only answer is that British security cleared FUCHS, and this will clearly be played up to the full.

There have been demands from B.J.S.M. Washington that we should give them details about the security clearance. We are quite determined that this would be wrong in principle; we have the support of the Foreign Office and D. At. En. Meanwhile, the P.M. has asked for a statement on how the security clearance was given. We have given him a detailed reply, stating that if he wants to know the fuller circumstances these can be supplied. On review of the whole case, we are certain that in similar circumstances we should act again in precisely the same way, and indeed, nobody would have listened to us if we had not done so.

 Mrs. PEIERLS has written a first class letter to FUCHS, in which she tells him that the only thing he can do is to assist the authorities in every way he can. She reproaches him for having deceived her and her husband and for having let down all his colleagues, both here and in America.

 Graham has been to see me about the arrival here of a foreigner, believed to be a Czech, who has an urgent message for Harry POLLITT personally. It has been arranged that one of the Welsh detective officers, who is here on a course, should travel on the same train and point the man out to the local Police. The idea is to house him (?) and establish his identity. We do not know the purpose of his visit, except that it is highly secret; he may be carrying election funds for the Party.

 Newsam said that we could obtain clearance for any visitors to FUCHS direct to Philip Allen of the Home Office.

Dick then spoke about the Czech agent, STRAUSS. He said he had not got clearance from the Home Office for applying for a search warrant. The man is also to be interrogated. We are putting up the evidence to Special Branch in the near future, when the action to be taken in this case will be decided. He said he felt there were ample grounds for taking action in this case, since we had copies of questionnaires passed to STRAUSS by the Czech Embassy, and also one of his own reports to the Czech Embassy

I raised the question of informing the Foreign Office and S.I.S. of this case. It was agreed that they should be informed.

The D.G. asked Dick to say something about the FUCHS case. Dick said that the position had not materially altered from the reports

given in the newspapers. Hill said he thought there would be a committal for trial on Friday next, in which case the trial would probably take place at the end of February.

In this connection, Perfect said that he had been asked for an account of the case by C.C. Berkshire. Dick said he thought the C.C. should be told that the case was all in the newspapers and that we could not give any further information while it was sub judice. We would, however, probably be able to let him have a report at the conclusion of the case.

I said that Lish Whitson seemed to be far more concerned with finding out exactly where the offences in America were committed than anything else. He wondered if this was perhaps a question of jurisdiction. It was agreed that as Lish had seen the actual statement, and as we did not in fact know the exact location of the meeting places, we could not do more.

Roger said he had had conversations with Reilly of the Foreign Office on the question of the security check of the Atlantic Treaty Powers. He said it is hoped that Irvine will go to Rome for this purpose on the 14th of this month and then on to Portugal. He said there had still been no clearance for the Scandinavian countries.

The D.G. asked Roger what the position was with regard to the booklet on Interdepartmental Security. Roger said that this had not been generally issued yet, but that he would speak to Mr. Hewison about it.

I told the meeting which Roger and I attended on the shape and form to be taken by the Security Executive in time of war.

Gerald Templer rang up. He was just back from the United States, where he seems to have reached a fairly satisfactory agreement about the passing of information to third Powers. He said that he was seeing the Chiefs of Staff and would probably want to know the reactions in America to the FUCHS case. I told him roughly what had happened and impressed upon him the importance of not disclosing anything while the case was sub judice.

Dick, Roger, Irvine and I had a discussion about our attitude to the Western Union's War Room. We agreed the paper, which is to be incorporated in Irvine's memorandum setting out the views of all the Powers concerned.

I was slightly embarrassed, as the Clandestine Committee had apparently been bounced by [redacted] into an agreement that C.I. organisation would not be touched on pending a solution of the French ministerial difficulty. For this reason, [redacted] took exception to some of the wording.

In the end it was decided that Irvine would put up a further draft for clearance with S.I.S. It seems that the Dutch and Belgians are not quite so scrupulous as S.I.S. and are quite prepared to talk with one voice at the Clandestine Committee and another at the S.I.C.

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8th February.

Dick had a meeting at 10.45 with Roger Makins and Perrin to discuss replies to Washington telegrams. These drafts were subsequently considered at a meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, which Dick and I attended.

The first point was the attendance at the trial. It was agreed that if possible permission should be obtained for Cimperman to attend the proceedings and to remain in Court if it were decided to hold part of the trial in camera.

Philip Allen, representing the Home Office, raised a typical Newsam point. Having indicated the dangers of a leakage of the camera proceedings in the U.S., he asked what Minister would be responsible for Questions in Parliament. He thought that either the Foreign Office or the Attorney General should reply. Newsam evidently wanted to protect the Home Secretary against having to "carry the can".

It was decided to refer the matter to the Attorney General.

The impossibility of handing over the statements was emphasised. and with regard to the accusation of cumbersome procedure, it was thought that the Americans might be reminded of the HISS case which had just been concluded after hearings lasting two years!

Brigadier Cornwall-Jones then piped up on behalf of the Chiefs of Staff. What steps, he said, are being taken to see that this kind of thing does not happen again. All eyes were turned on him. I replied that ways and means of obtaining this sort of thing were under constant consideration, but that in cases where a man was so well-placed as FUCHS, the possibilities of detection were bound to be slight - in fact he would not probably make contact with the Russian agent more than three or four times a year. It was, however, possibly for consideration at a later stage whether people of alien origin should be employed on projects of this kind and whether a more rigid standard of vetting should be undertaken. This matter had also been discussed on numerous occasions and there were many weighty arguments on both sides. This reply seemed to satisfy the meeting, except Cornwall-Jones, who came up to me afterwards and suggested that possibly the D.G. might come and talk to the Chiefs of Staff before the next meeting. I said that I would certainly mention the matter, but that in fact I thought the proposal was a bit premature, since the whole matter was sub judice.

In one of the telegrams Acheson is to be asked, if a suitable opportunity occurred, whether he was entirely satisfied that his own house was in order, since we had reason to think that it was not.

Jim Skardon, at FUCHS' request and after clearance with FUCHS' solicitor and the D. of P.P., has seen FUCHS who was probably moved by Mrs. Peierls' letter. He gave a description of the Russian agent who contacted him in the U.S.A.; he has offered to pin-point the meeting places in Boston, San Francisco, and New York and has given a map. He has told us that his Russian contact in London is known by the name of ALEXANDER - We believe him to be Alexander KRAMER. He also said that he was told, if he wished for a further meeting, to throw a magazine into a garden in Kew with an indication of the rendezvous on page 10. X He has refused to give us the name of the person who introduced him to the Russian agent in this country; he pleads that

X See over

this man is a good fellow at heart and that he did not know that FUCHS was going to have more than one visit, or that he was going to hand over documents; that he is now out of the country and that he would not like to prejudice his chances if at some future date he wanted to enter this country as a refugee. We think this man may be Engelbert BROWDER, who is in Austria.

X If the meeting was to take place, there would be a chalk mark on a local lamp post. This is interesting as it is the same technique given by _____ to SHAG. Lastly, FUCHS made it fairly clear that he did not intend to go back on his confession.

I spoke to the D.G. about the de COURCY case. He agreed with my proposal to reply to Newsam, informing him that both the P.M. and the Minister of Defence were interested in this matter.

Lish Whitson has been given a description of FUCHS' American contact. He is believed to be a "first generation" American. Lish is, I think, relieved at being able to send something to his boss, of whom everybody in the F.B.I. is terrified!

Kellar is having difficulty in keeping Shaw's trays filled up. He sends him long memoranda, with minutes on files flagged, but they are back again in a matter of five minutes! Shaw is very anxious to press on with the recruiting drive, and in this I am sure he is right, but the task of getting suitable people is not so easy.

9th February.

I discussed with D.B. and D.O.S. a note on the D.G.'s conversation with Newsam and Baker some days ago about our relations with the Police. It now appears that Baker made a suggestion that Police Officers should be seconded to this department for periods of two years.

I said that for many reasons, which I would state at the meeting to-morrow, I thought the course undesirable. If a Police Officer is here for two years, he must have learned about all our methods; he would then go back to his Force and would necessarily be employed on S.B. work - in any case, he would be going for promotion. At the end of two years he might just be starting, if he were the right kind of chap, to be of some use to us. He would then be removed and we should have to start again with another.

Dick thought, however, that there might be something in having one or two very carefully selected officers on a permanent basis.

10th February.

We have now received the minutes of the meeting which the D.G. had with Newsam and Baker about two weeks ago regarding the secondment of Police Officers for periods of two years to this department. The D.G. has asked us to consider the matter. We therefore had a meeting of the Appointments Board.

It was not clear whether these secondments were designed to improve our liaison with the Police, or whether the Police Officers

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were to take over certain duties here which would release officers for overseas. If the former was proposed, we all felt that if the existing arrangements for liaison with the Police were not satisfactory, there was little chance of any improvement through the measures proposed. In fact, however, we had reason to believe that the present arrangements were working well.

We then considered the possibility of such Police Officers being taken on to the staff permanently. We were all agreed that they could not replace our desk officers, but that there might possibly be room for one or two additional to our present establishment. There might be work of the type done by Skardon; there might be work in C.2. on sabotage cases, and if our watching staff is to be increased, an extra officer might be useful for supervisory work. We felt, however, that a good Police Officer might at a later date suffer from a feeling of frustration, because we could not see that he could ever rise to the rank of Senior Officer and would have to remain confined to the particular sphere for which his training fitted him. We did not like the idea of secondment, involving a complete disclosure of all our work here to a man who would be leaving us after two years.

Shaw did not feel that Police Officers would be any use to him for overseas work, unless they were exceptional men and had had a considerable training here. They could not, therefore, provide any solution to our present staff difficulties.

Kellar and Bamford came to talk about our representation in Pakistan. They had been waiting to hear whether _____ Head of D.I.B., was going to visit us. Bamford thought that if he did not come next month we ought to consider sending someone out. It was agreed that Bamford should write, asking when we might expect him.

Lish Whitson asked me whether there was any objection to a statement being made to the Press that the F.B.I. had a representative over here. After consulting Hill, I told him that there was none.

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13th February.

At the Directors meeting to-day, I asked the D.G. what precisely he had in mind about the employment of Police Officers here on secondment. He said that this matter had nothing to do with our Police liaison; he merely thought that there might be certain functions here which the Police, by reason of their experience, would be in a better position to carry out. I said that we had already had a preliminary meeting and that we would consider the matter further.

Shaw told the meeting that after receiving a bombardment of messages about sending staff out to the Far East, he had now received a letter from Horrocks, saying there was no accommodation, not even for Tolson.

We had a meeting with _____, Dick and Irvine to decide on the British view on C.I. co-ordination for Western Union in time of war. The fact is that S.I.S. had pledged themselves at the Clandestine Committee meeting to discuss C.I. organisational matters outside the War Room itself, and feel bound by this agreement in the S.I.C. We said that we were not parties to the Clandestine Committee agreement, and that we were against any statement by the British delegation to the S.I.C. which would tie our hands indefinitely owing to a dispute between S.D.E.C.E. and the Surete. We had

a definite mandate to consider these matters and we felt that we should get on with the job. We finally managed to discover a formula satisfactory to S.I.S.

Irvine is off to Italy to-morrow to look into the security position under the Atlantic Treaty Cosmic system.

14th February.

I spoke to the D.G. about the lack of anybody in the Home Office with any knowledge of foreign affairs. It seemed to me extremely important that the Home Office should appoint a sufficiently high grade officer who would know about Intelligence matters and about defence policy. Only in this way could we hope that the Home Office would take a sensible view about problems which affected us on the J.I.C. as a whole. I suggested that I should have an informal talk with Pat Reilly, which the D.G. agreed.

 I had a talk with Shaw about the Interrogation Centre in Hong Kong. Apparently there is some legal difficulty about setting it up until an emergency arises. I said that I entirely agreed with the War Office point of view, that to set up an Interrogation Centre at a time of crisis would be a hopeless task, as it could not possibly get on its legs for six months. It seemed to me that there was a vital need for such a centre now. The excess of exits over entries was now about 2,000 a week and the Colony obviously had no idea what it was getting. I thought that if the Colony had the right to refuse entry it would surely have the right to say that those coming in must pass through an Interrogation Centre. I further agreed with Hollis's view, that the idea of sending suspects down to Singapore for interrogation was a hopeless one; you could not possibly interrogate a man satisfactorily unless you had all the local records behind you.

It was agreed that we would await the reply to the J.I.C. telegram on this subject before taking the matter any further.

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John Marriott spoke about the two former Czechs, now naturalised, STRAUSS and REIDL. He explained that [redacted] has now been recalled to Prague with his family, but he has resigned and is being given asylum here. It has been possible, therefore, for Special Branch to interrogate STRAUSS and REIDL. STRAUSS confessed that he had been spying on his fellow nationals in this country since 1945, but in the case of REIDL there was not so much success, although John said he thought there was enough evidence against him to convince the Home Office that there was a case for denaturalisation.

I said I thought it would be a good move if the Home Secretary were to make a statement in the House, to the effect that he would not tolerate cases of this kind. He said I felt that this might act as a deterrent to others. The D.G. agreed that this might serve a useful purpose. I went on to say that I had recently had a telephone call from Hutson of the Home Office, who was somewhat perturbed by something he had seen in the papers to the effect that we were reviewing all naturalisation cases. I said that this was not in fact the case, although we probably would, in the light of the FUCHS case, be looking more closely into these cases.

Graham also said that the Foreign Office (I.R.D.) have raised a point regarding visits to this country of cultural, scientific, etc., delegations from Russia and Satellite countries. They feel that they are not kept sufficiently informed about these visits and are anxious to know whether subversive propaganda is put over by these people to British hearers, and if so, what the reactions of the British hearers are. They think that M.I.5 should be "stimulated to more intensive activity" to get this information. Graham said a reply to the Foreign Office is now in course of preparation, putting the matter into wider perspective, and pointing out that our primary interest in these visits was the danger of leakage of information.

I asked if the Home Office had been consulted in this matter. Graham said there was no indication to show that they had been. I said I thought the Foreign Office, when they had obtained our views, should speak to Newsam.

Roger said that the J.S.T.I.C. had just put up a note to the J.I.C. saying that they were not anxious for visas to be refused to members of these delegations, as they felt they might be able to get information from members of them. I said I thought I.R.D. had raised this matter in connection with furthering their "cold war" activities.

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Roger said he had had a visit from a member of the German Travel Section of the Foreign Office recently, who had asked whether we had any objection to letting German Consulates, which are to be set up over here in the near future, have our Stop List. Roger had said that as our contribution to the Stop List consisted of German Communists, Fascists, and German scientists, he had informed the Foreign Office that we did not wish to put our part of the list into the hands of German Consuls. He said he had also written to General Haydon of Int. Div., who supplied the bulk of the names on the list, asking him whether he felt that the withdrawal of our names from it would embarrass him. -----

Graham tells me that McGIBBON is a Communist. This man was employed by M.I.3 at the Embassy in Washington at the material time of the leakage which has been under investigation for nearly a year. McGIBBON got a clearance from here, although there was some slight evidence of interest in Russia.

Dick and John Marriott discussed with me the repeated demands of the F.B.I. for fuller information. They now wanted to know precisely what FUCHS had passed. I said that I thought this must be a matter for consultation between ourselves, the Foreign Office, and D. At. En. I was all in favour of satisfying Hoover's vanity if this were possible.

I have arranged a meeting with Roger Makins and Perrin.

It seemed to me that if possible FUCHS's statement ought to be read in full in open Court. This would get over all the difficulty of camera proceedings and the subsequent ban on the transmission of the confession to which Hoover appears to attach so much importance, even though Lish has read it and it contains no further Intelligence leads.

15th February.

At the J.I.C. to-day, the Colonial Office sent a telegram indicating that the situation in Malaya had somewhat deteriorated and that Gurney was asking for more troops. We have embodied this in our report to the Chiefs of Staff. There was a proposal that we should get into touch with shipping firms trading to the Far East and warn them about Communist penetration by members of the W.F.T.U. We have been asked to approach the Minister of Transport, but before doing so we shall have to be clear as to precisely what we want the shipping companies to do.

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We attended a meeting in Sir Roger Makins's room, at which Perrin and Philip Allen were present. Perrin has very much eased the situation by agreeing that FUCHS' statement can be read out in full in open Court. This should mean that there will be no camera proceedings and ensure that the F.B.I. get what they want. The Embassy are, however, being warned that they should have a man in Court, since camera proceedings are possible.

We then considered the passing of more detailed reports on exactly what FUCHS had handed over to the Russians. The F.B.I. were demanding these on the grounds ~~of the McMahon Act~~ of the McMahon Act they were the body charged with the security of Atomic Energy in the U.S. Perrin said that he had received a similar demand from the Atomic Energy Commission of C.I.A., and he expected to have one from the American Atomic Energy Commission.

We were all clear that the Americans must have the full facts, but it seemed to be for the Americans to say what was the appropriate channel. It was agreed, therefore, that the Foreign Office should telegraph to Washington, asking them to clarify the position. We

made it clear that if possible we would like to pass to Hoover what he wanted, even if the information went through other channels. Meanwhile we shall tell Lish that if he does not have a man in Court, he may risk not getting a transcript copy of FUCHS's statement, and that while we will at the conclusion of the trial give him a copy of Perrin's statement, there will be further and fuller details which we would like to pass, but concerning which we must be bound by an American decision as to the appropriate authority. It will, therefore, be up to Hoover to knock on the door of the State Department, where he should make his case.

16th February.

Guy BURGESS came to see me this morning. He told me that he had had two interviews with Middleton of the Foreign Office. At the first one he was accused, in somewhat general terms, of grave indiscretions in Gibraltar and Tangier. He asked for full particulars, and at his second interview Middleton read out to him certain more specific charges, of which he had made a note; they related more particularly to his indiscretions about S.I.S., although in regard to currency smuggling he appeared to think that he was accused of referring to the work of Mills, rather than that of [redacted]. Nothing had been said to him about his alleged remarks in front of the Princess de ROHAN and Mrs. OLIVER in Gibraltar, and nothing had been said to him about [redacted] incident. I therefore took it upon myself to make these two specific charges. I told him that, according to our information, he had intimated both to the Princess de ROHAN and Mrs. OLIVER that Mills was not only Defence Security Officer [redacted]

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BURGESS said that he could not possibly have said anything of the kind to the Princess de ROHAN or Mrs. OLIVER, as in fact he did not know until I told him that Mills [redacted]. It was possible, however, that he had said something which had conveyed such an impression to Mills. He could not recollect anything, but he could not be positive that he had not made some remark about Passport Control which had conveyed the wrong impression.

From what he said, I do not think that BURGESS regarded the Princess de ROHAN as being wholly outside the family, in view of the fact that she had been in charge of Swiss affairs at the M. of I. during the war.

When I talked to BURGESS about [redacted] Incident, he said he remembered the discussion well: it had started by the Princess de ROHAN saying to him that she knew [redacted] to be mutual friend, what an excellent he was, and what splendid work he had done for the Allies during the war, and for her in particular.

I then asked BURGESS what his next move was. He said that there was a serious accusation on his file, which he considered to be ill-founded, and that if it stood against him his career in the Foreign Office would, to say the least, be seriously blighted. He wondered, therefore, whether, in view of his explanations, the whole thing could be expunged from the record. I said that as far as I was concerned I could not answer for the Foreign Office, but that I would certainly let them know about the

specific charges which I had made and BURGESS's replies.

Butler spoke to me about a candidate for the Travellers Club named OHMEL, who appears to be of Czech origin. I said that I did not feel that we could take on the Travellers Club as an extra vetting commitment, although I saw there was a certain security issue due to the large number of members from the Foreign Office and other Government Departments. Even if I were to say we knew anything about him, the Secretary would mention the matter at a Committee Meeting and thereby give the impression to members that M.I.5 were consulted. This would be extremely undesirable.

I spent the evening with Lish Whitson and Johnny Cimperman. Rather significantly, Lish asked me who was going to be the scape-goat here for the FUCHS affair. I said that as far as I knew there would be no scape-goat - in fact, I could see no reason why there should be one. In similar circumstances, without previous knowledge, we should probably act in exactly the same way that we have in this case. I referred to all the excitement that was going on in the U.S.A. and said that I thought it would be a pity if it had any lasting effect on Anglo-American co-operation. The Russians have gained two victories; one in getting information from FUCHS, and two, in depriving Atomic Energy of the services of one of its most valuable people. It therefore seemed to me a mistake to allow them to gain a third victory by throwing a spanner into the works of Anglo-American co-operation. In mentioning a scape-goat, it was quite clear that Lish was thinking about a scape-goat in the U.S. and had concluded that there would also be one here.

17th February.

I saw Mills to-day and asked him to give me a brief account of his association with Guy BURGESS, when the latter visited Gibraltar and Tangier in November last.

Mills said he had never heard of BURGESS until the latter rang him up late one evening immediately on his arrival, introducing himself as a friend of Robin Maugham. Mills could not see him that night as he had a previous engagement, but called on him the next morning. BURGESS said he was going on to Tangier and asked about currency. Mills said that he could take out up to £10 in pesetas, although this was, strictly speaking, against the law. However, everybody in Gibraltar did it because there was simply no alternative. BURGESS evidently did not wish to run any sort of risk and said he would change his travellers cheques in Tetuan, where this could be done quite legally. He then asked Mills where they could get a drink. They went out to a hotel and, while Mills had a Bass, BURGESS had three double brandies. Later, Mills took BURGESS and his mother up to the Yacht Club in order that they might be introduced to various local residents.

A day or two later, BURGESS called on Mills and his wife, when he consumed quite a lot of whiskey. He told them that he had met Princess de ROHAN and Mrs. OLIVER at the Rock Hotel, that they were extremely nice people and he hoped that Mills would look after them. As was subsequently learned from Princess de ROHAN, BURGESS spent an evening with her and Mrs. OLIVER in their room, where he got very drunk at their

expense. It was apparently on this occasion that the indiscretions took place, about which the Princess de ROHAN later made a statement to

Mills, from his knowledge of the behaviour of all three, feels that it is highly probable that they were all pretty drunk and that none of them would have a very clear idea about the indiscretions of the other.

Before leaving for Tangier, BURGESS rang up Mills and said he was not really sure about de ROHAN or Mrs. OLIVER and that they might, in fact, be up to anything.

Ten days later, when Mills was in Tangier, he met BURGESS at a hotel where he was having a drink with one of his contacts. BURGESS, in a somewhat inebriated state, insisted on joining the party. Eventually Mills had to tell him to go away. The same thing happened when Mills was lunching with the American Vice-Consul and his wife. On this occasion he had to go outside with BURGESS, who apparently resented being asked to go away. BURGESS was clearly drunk at the time and apologised later for having been a nuisance. The next occasion on which Mills met him was in [redacted] office. BURGESS had called on her as the result of a letter of introduction that he had from [redacted]. He was sitting in her office drinking whiskies and sodas. Mills was anxious to conduct his business with [redacted] and eventually they had to ask him to go.

It was in Tangier that Mills first met Princess de ROHAN. [redacted] saw her come into the hotel and suggested that Mills should hear from her first-hand about BURGESS's indiscretions.

I had a meeting with D.B., B.I., Thistle and [redacted]. We discussed "Lancashire Hotpot", and [redacted] visit to Lancashire to see Hordern. Hordern is worried not only about "Lancashire Hotpot", but other cases such as that of [redacted] who is employed in one of the atomic energy establishments, & His great difficulty with surrounding Police Forces. He said, with some bitterness, that for the Royal visit it had been arranged as usual that Lancs County should provide the escort, but one of the Borough C.Cs had said that he would not have a Lancs. County car going through his Borough. If that was the attitude in a matter of that kind, we could imagine what it was in the case of our enquiries. He clearly thought that if we had an officer who could visit him at least every other week, it might be possible to make more rapid progress. He realised that a lot of information obtained by his officers might mean more to them. Apart from this, there was the difficulty that Dayson is a man who very seldom commits anything to paper. If, therefore, an M.I.5 man were there to talk to him if he had seen an informant, a good deal more information might be forthcoming. A further advantage would be that when C.C. Lancs got a lead into some other C.C.'s area, the M.I.5 officer could take up the running with far better prospects than one of his own officers. There is undoubtedly a lot in this and we shall have to consider the matter very carefully.

We considered and amended Hollis's note about the employment of Police Officers here.

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I had a talk with Newsam to-day about de COURCY. He still felt nervous about the case and was reluctant to go forward with it until he knew whether there was going to be a change of Home Secretary.

I argued with him for some time on the wider implications of the case, and the importance from the national point of view of getting it cleared up, but he continued to revert to his old argument that de COURCY had done nothing against the law, and, from the evidence available, had no intentions in that direction; he was merely a high-grade journalist acting in the same manner as similar people of his kind.

I told Newsam that we should be reluctant to hold up the enquiries until after the Election, since there was an insistent demand for further particulars by the Chiefs of Staff about de COURCY's sources of information. I therefore suggested to him that we should slightly amend the warrant on de COURCY, and leave the other warrant on _____ until a later date. Newsam agreed the following formula for the warrant on de COURCY:

"I hereby authorise and require you to detain, open and produce for my inspection all postal packets and telegrams addressed to or emanating from.....believed to be intended for or sent by agents of a foreign power."

This in fact means that we shall have to open everything in order to discover who the letter is from or to, and thereafter it will be a matter of speculation as to whether it is going to or coming from the agent of a foreign power! I therefore asked S.L.B. to amend the warrant accordingly and also the caption.

I then gave Newsam a short account of the FUGHS case, pointing out the immense difficulties in detection and prevention.

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20th February.

I had a talk with Hollis about the case of one _____ a compositor (?) in the Stationery Office, who has in my view been somewhat doubtfully cleared by the Three Advisers. We do not know from our files precisely what kind of person _____ is; he was certainly at one time a member of the C.P., but has alleged that his recent renewal of membership was not of his own seeking and, in fact, that his name had been sent in by someone else. This may or may not be so, but assuming the best, do we know whether if he became disgruntled _____ would not be prepared to betray secrets to the C.P.? There is another aspect of this case, namely: what precisely are _____ opportunities? We cannot assess these without seeing the Compositor's office, and acquainting ourselves in detail with a considerable number of facts. It may be that in so doing we could make certain recommendations which would at least make _____ task far more difficult, if he were minded to become a Communist agent. We might also get some idea as to whether his case could be written off or whether it should be periodically reviewed.

Hollis seemed to think that this was a matter which should be undertaken by B.I.A. rather than C. Division. I am not wholly convinced about this. Clearly we must not get ourselves into the position of taking responsibility for other peoples' security, but other Departments are not so acutely aware of the things that may happen to them as we are, and I think that we have something of a role to play in advising them in greater detail, if they are prepared to accept such advice.

At the D.G.'s meeting I talked to him about our deliberations in connection with the employment of Police Officers. I explained that having reviewed the position we thought that there were only three places where they could usefully be employed. Firstly, in P.L.S., where no increase of staff could be justified; secondly, in B.5, where an extra officer might be useful if the staff were increased; thirdly, in B.2.c., where there might be work for one other officer surplus to establishment.

The D.G. then asked about the secondment of officers for a period of two years or more. I said that we had also gone into this; we did not think secondment was a good idea because such officers would have to become aware of all our methods of investigation. They would then go back to Police Forces, others would take their places, and so knowledge would spread. The D.G. said: "What you are implying is that Police Officers are not trustworthy". I said that I did not wish to imply this; I should feel just the same with Army, Navy or Air Force officers, but that I thought the matter ought to be considered on the basis of the "need to know". We were already doing an immense amount with Police Forces to make them better acquainted with our work and I do not think that we could usefully do more.

The D.G. seemed to be convinced that these officers would go back to their Forces and would themselves give us more assistance and influence others to do so, and he was anxious that we should explore the matter further.

Horrocks has returned. He talked about the urgency of giving further assistance to S.I.F.E., but had to admit that the housing problem made things very difficult. As regards S.I.M.E., he said the new building would cost about £30,000 and that five flats would be necessary in Ismailia to house the staff - the move, therefore, would be pretty extensive.

The D.G. remarked that, from a paper he had seen, the Egyptians were insisting that our troops should leave Egypt altogether; he did not, therefore, feel inclined to go forward in building projects or moves until this issue had been finally decided.

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I had a word with Perfect about the proposal to second high-ranking Police Officers for a period of two or three months. I frankly could not see what we could do with them for more than a week at the outside. He agreed and said he would discuss this point with Holmes.

C.I.A have now come forward and asked for all the statements and documents in the case of FUCHS. We can conceive of nothing that will irritate the F.B.I. more! We feel that we must suggest to them that they apply to the appropriate authorities in the U.S.A., since the case is still under investigation.

Hoover has been belly-aching over the week-end. Lish had instructions yesterday to deliver a message to the D.G. in person, which was to the effect that Perrin and Portal had made some statement to representatives of the American Atomic Energy Commission over here to the effect that we had a representative in Washington, and that someone

had been over there on the case in 1949. Further, that one BOSKY, an American official, had said that we had been making disparaging remarks about the F.B.I. The whole of this, of course, is nonsense, and we have said so. We have also added that misleading statements in the U.S.A. attributable to the F.B.I. have caused considerable embarrassment to us here.

21st February.

I went to see 'C' about the case of SERPETTE, a Frenchman attached to the Embassy here, who is believed to be an agent of the S.D.E.C.E. Our reports show that he is rather inquisitive about political matters. He is clearly doing nothing that one would not expect any ordinary diplomat to be doing, but if he is an agent of the S.D.E.C.E., we should have been told about it. The suggestion is that I should speak to 'C' said that he had no objection to this, but he thought there might possibly be some COPSE material which would make it quite clear what the position was.

'C' told me, completely off the record, that he was by no means convinced that the Russians had made an atomic bomb; that it was in fact possible to explode a pile which might have given the same results, and that the particles collected by the aircraft were to some extent consistent with this theory. He was further reinforced in this view by a statement made by FUCHS to Perrin that the Russians had made enquiries about a pin in the atomic bomb, which seemed to indicate that they were very wide of the mark.

I lunched with George Jenkin. We talked about the proposal that he should act for us [redacted] where it was thought necessary for someone to give advice to a foreign Government on security matters. Cases in point would be the Lebanon, recently visited by Graham Mitchell, or Persia, who had asked for assistance only a few weeks ago. I said that while I thought his help in these matters might be extremely valuable, I doubted whether there would be a sufficient number of cases to keep him occupied.

I asked him about the proposal that he should go to Malaya to run the Special Branch, or to take over the Police as a whole. He did not seem very keen about this, owing to the internal dissensions which are known to exist; he thought that he might have to say that quite a number of people should go, and that there might well be nobody to replace them. He had not, however, entirely dismissed the proposal from his mind. I said that if he were thinking of taking the job on, I thought he ought to go out there and take a preliminary look. There was no doubt in my mind that there was a big job to be done and that those who were at present in charge had very little idea of how to do it.

At the D.G's meeting to-day, the D.G. asked if there was any further information or developments in the cases of [redacted] and FUCHS.

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Dick said there was nothing further to report in the case. they are apparently far too busy over the case of General Revers, who accused Wibot of the Surete of being an ex-gaolbird, to pay much attention to the leakage from Fontainebleau.

Dick told the meeting of a rather puzzling case of a man who has recently been posted to the Cabinet Office from the Ministry of Education and now comes into the secret field for the first time. His wife is a Communist, but his own sympathies are not known. The Cabinet Officers are, therefore, considering whether or not they can deal with this case on the lines of discipline, since the man did not disclose the fact that his wife was a Communist before being taken on. We have warned them, however, that our information is not the kind we can put before the Tribunal, since there is nothing against the man himself. They have agreed to refer the matter to us before taking any action.

Dick said that B.C.A.C. and B.E.A., with whom we have an intelligence contact, have now asked for a list of Communists employed by them. After a good deal of discussion it was decided that this matter should be cleared with the Ministry of Civil Aviation before we could give an answer.

Perfect talked about courses given to Police Officers. He said that Chief Constables are now taking the initiative in asking that their officers should attend courses. He said he thought this was a good sign, but that the matter should be regulated as the officers here might find that they had too many Police Officers to cope with at a time. In this connection, Shaw said that the Colonial Office are issuing a circular to Colonial Governors, saying that this office would be holding courses for Colonial Police Officers about once a quarter, which would last about a week, followed by a week at Special Branch. The D.G. said he thought these latter course should be dovetailed with the courses arranged by Perfect. Shaw and Perfect said they would discuss the matter.

Shaw spoke about the attempted assassination of the Chief Secretary in Nigeria, Foot. He said nothing had been heard yet as to whether this was merely an act of a disgruntled African, or whether it was part of a plan for organised subversion. There had, however, been rumours in Nigeria of such a plan which, after the recent assassination in Sarawak, was somewhat disturbing.

Roger told the meeting of a discussion at to-day's J.I.C. on the disclosure of classified information to the U.S. and third countries. He said that as a result of Gerald Templer's mission to Washington, the D.M.I. informed the meeting that this country's methods for dealing with this matter were far behind those of the Americans, who had a series of committees for clearing every bit of information before passing it to a third country. The Templer mission had had considerable success in getting agreement to the exchange of information, but that were left in no doubt at all that if there was any further example of insecurity on our part the Americans were going to close down on us completely. There is, therefore, to be a new and strict organisational procedure. A high level committee, known as the Release of Information Policy Committee, is to be set up under a Foreign Office chairman; this will decide the policy as to the exchange of information. There will also be a new Exchange of Information Sub-Committee at a working level, which will carry out the rulse laid down by the high-level committee, and all information will be fully screened before passing it out of this country. This latter committee will have an Admiralty chairman and will have on it representatives of the Ministry of Supply and the Foreign Office. Roger had told the J.I.C. that

he did not think it necessary for this department to be represented, provided we saw all the papers we should see. This, he said, also applied to the J.I.B., S.I.S. and the C.R.O. The Secretariat will have the task of keeping the registry and records of all information exchanged so that it will be possible to trace in detail all information which has gone out and to whom it has been sent.

Dick asked if the results of the Templer mission were now approved. Roger said he thought so, but he did not know whether they had been ratified by the Americans yet. Serpell said that, according to the Chiefs of Staff minutes, he did not think this had yet been done.

 Guy BURGESS telephoned to ask me whether he should put in his note to Middleton. I told him that I should be forwarding my note on our interview and that I found it a little difficult to advise him. I had no objection to his referring to the discussions with me, to the allegations that I had made and to the answers that he had given.

22nd February.

I had a meeting with _____

_____ and that Vivian and Hill would see Carey Foster again.

 We discussed the note which is going to the P.M., showing the circumstances under which FUCHS obtained entry into the atomic project. It is merely factual and shows that when FUCHS was taken on the evidence against him was from Gestapo source, dated 1934, saying that he had engaged in anti-Nazi activities and had associations with the Communist Party. This in itself was not anything in the nature of firm evidence, since it was known by experience that the Gestapo did not discriminate between Communists, Jews, or Social Democrats. Against this report there were Police reports which did not indicate that FUCHS had taken any active part in political activities during his stay here since 1933, and there were glowing reports from Edinburgh and Bristol University about his ability as a physicist mathematician. The Ministry of Supply had accordingly decided to take him on. When he returned from the U.S. he was spoken of in the highest terms as having made a major contribution in the atomic energy field. In spite of this, certain further enquiries had been made which had produced negative results; he had consequently been admitted to Harwell.

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23rd February.

We had a Directors meeting to discuss the question of the secondment of Police Officers. This had been at the D.G.'s request that we should look into this matter further. We all of us felt that no very useful purpose could be served by such secondments, for three reasons: officers would have to start in the lowest grade and could not really get the hang of things for about six months; they would then, presumably, pass to another section. During all this period they would merely be a drag on the organisation, as they would have to be supernumerary to establishment to a considerable extent. They could never fulfill all the functions performed by other officers in liaison work with Government Departments at all levels. By the time we got them fully trained, they would be leaving us, when we should have to start again with a new lot. From the point of view of the man, we did not think that he would appreciate working in a subordinate position, and that when he went back to his Force he would not necessarily be employed on S.B. work and might well have lost promotion. He would probably be told that he was not up to date in his Police work. Lastly, from the point of view of the Chief Constable, we could not see that a Chief Constable would feel happy about losing the services of one of his best Inspectors for a period of two to three years.

The D.G. called a meeting at which he explained about the attachment of Police Officers. He said that his idea was that a few high-ranking Police Officers should become fully acquainted with our work and that they would then go back to their Forces with the right ideas about M.I.5. and a readiness to assist us. He envisaged a possibility of their doing a period of attachment abroad. After criticising our note in detail he instructed Horrocks to go into the matter with Baker of the Home Office to find out whether the proposal was a practical proposition.

27th February to 1st March.

Hollis, Marriott and I went up to speak at the annual Scottish Detective Officers' Conference in Edinburgh. The D.G. was going, but asked me to take his place on account of his attack of lumbago. Both Hollis and John gave extremely good talks; Hollis on protective security, and John on certain aspects of espionage. A few questions were asked after the meeting. The talks were, I think, well received and our visit was a most cordial one.

2nd March.

Graham has got an awkward case in the Cabinet Office. A man called _____ has recently been taken on there from the Ministry of Education. He was being "groomed" for Norman Brook's P.A. It has now transpired that his wife is a member of the Communist Party (see 2nd para. on p.50). The proposal is that _____ should be interviewed and reprimanded for not telling the authorities about his wife's political leanings. He himself is to be sent back to the Ministry of Education. Personally, I feel it is difficult to believe that _____ himself is not pretty far to the Left, if he is married to a Communist woman.

FUCHS was tried yesterday and received a sentence of 14 years.

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Owing to the onslaught on this department by the Press, and the Beaverbrook press in particular, a statement has been prepared which the D.G. is going to show to the P.M., with a suggestion that the balance might be corrected either by a statement to the Press or in Parliament.

 3rd March.

At the J.I.C. to-day it was announced that the French had addressed a request for assistance in Indo-China to the U.S.A. and the U.K. There was a hint that if this could not be given, presumably in arms and equipment, the French might be forced to withdraw.

'C' mentioned the PEYRE - REVERS scandal in France, which appears to be very serious and to penetrate both the S.D.E.C.E. and the Surete.

We discussed at some length a J.I.C. paper on Soviet intentions and the possibility of war. It was felt that the earliest date on which ~~Soviet~~ aggression could be regarded as a reasonable risk by Soviet Russia would be early in 1955, but a more probable date would be sometime in 1955 or 1956. It was felt that this information was not firm enough to warrant a recommendation that planning should be advanced to that date. Indeed, it is extremely doubtful whether if such a recommendation were made, any advance in planning is feasible. One of the factors is that even if the Russians have got a stock of atomic bombs, they have not got the aircraft suitable for their delivery in all weathers. They would be unlikely to risk their delivery in bad weather unless they had very large stocks. It is not anticipated that their Air Force will be suitably equipped for this purpose before 1955. It is estimated that the Russians must think that we or the Americans are going to use the atomic bomb, in view of the publicity given to this matter in the U.S. and the President's determination to continue not only with the manufacture of atomic bombs, but also of the Hydrogen bomb. It is, therefore, thought possible that at some stage the Russians might try to anticipate such an event by some form of Pearl Harbour action. This cannot at least be entirely ruled out. It is thought, however, that the most likely eventuality would be that the Russians, feeling themselves strong enough to risk a major war, might press their "cold war" to limits which the Allies would be bound to resist, unless they were prepared to climb down completely and suffer serious loss of face - in other words, a war might arise with the Russians in much the same way as it did with the Germans.

 The D.G. saw the P.M. at 2.30 to-day. He told us that the P.M. was in clearly fighting form and that he proposed to defend the department; and that the occasion would probably arise during the debate on the King's speech on Monday next. He had no intention of allowing an enquiry into the activities of the Security Service and was entirely satisfied with the work of the department.

The D.G. left with Ricketts, the P.M.'s Private Secretary, two copies of the note we had made out for the P.M., which contained the factual statement on the case and certain debating points. Meanwhile, the attacks on the Department by the Press are continuing. The D.G. mentioned that the other sections of the Press heartily disliked the Beaverbrook press and that they might perhaps give out statements in our support.

 About seven o'clock a reporter from the "Daily Express" called to see the D.G. and was told that the D.G. was not in and that he did not give interviews.

I dined with Tommy Lascelles, who was anxious to know about the FUCHS case, concerning which, he said, the Monarch was somewhat puzzled! I gave him the story in broad outline, both from the C. Division and the B. Division side, and I think he fully understood the position.

I also spoke to him about "Palace News", appearing in "Time" and "Life" and the offer made by the correspondent of these papers to a reputable journalist friend of Battersby's. The offer, which was to supply Palace News to an informant, was refused. It seemed that there was probably somebody on the Palace staff who was giving information away. Tommy said that he would not be at all surprised, and mentioned to me the lamentable incident of Miss CRAWFORD, the Governess to the two Princesses, who had just written a book about them containing somewhat intimate details, for which she had got the sum of £26,000 from some American firm. He had heard about this in advance and had spoken to Miss CRAWFORD, who had dissolved into tears. It was, therefore, a great shock to him when the book came out. The worst feature of it is that it will encourage others to do the same.

4th March.

I extracted from my diary an interview that Victor had with "Beaver" in 1940, in which the latter described us all as "a bunch of witch hunters". I took this over to show Rickett in case he wanted to use it as background in the P.M.'s statement. He told me that enquiries showed that Beaverbrook was not concerned with employing FUCHS, since he left his Ministry in May, 1941. He drew my attention to an article which appeared in the Telegraph, which stated that M.I.5 came directly under the P.M. and was controlled by the J.I.C., and other details to the effect that, contrary to statements in the Press, there would be no reorganisation of M.I.5. Rickett wanted to know whether we had put this out. I said that we had not and that in fact we were not controlled by the J.I.C.

I took the opportunity of explaining to Rickett all aspects of the FUCHS case, both on the vetting side and on the investigation side. I think he appreciated the enormous difficulties that we were up against. He asked me whether I thought that, as was the case during the war when Swinton had charge, we would benefit through having a Minister other than the P.M. He thought it might enable us to get our requirements met more easily, since clearly we would not wish to bother the P.M. with day-to-day matters. I said that in my opinion things were much better as they were, since Intelligence matters were usually of such complexity that the less Ministers had to do with them the better. It was far better to get things settled, if possible, on a lower level; Ministers had not really got the time to go into all the details. If, therefore, they were required to make a decision, it is as likely as not that it would be the wrong one! I said, of course, that there were occasions when we were attacked by another department; it was then very convenient to have an appeal to the P.M.

6th March.

Rickett telephoned to me about a statement which the P.M. is to make in the House on the FUCHS case. There is really only one point, namely, should he say positively that the Security Service was responsible direct to him and not to the Minister of War, or whether he should confine himself to a general statement to the effect that he accepted full responsibility for the work of the Security Service.

After consulting the D.G., it was agreed that he should take the latter course, unless the P.M. was particularly concerned about getting Strachey out of his difficulty.

Dick and I lunched with Philip Vickery, who is just back from Germany. He has had a very complicated job in trying to cut down Int. Div. The fact is that Int. Div. is not only concerned with internal security matters, and political matters, but also with a large commitment for procuring information from the Eastern Zone and, indeed, from Russia and the Satellite countries through the interrogation of line-crossers, returning Ps. of W., and defectors. There is an added complication in that Land Commissioners wish to receive political information direct from the local branch of Int. Div. The dividing line between political intelligence and security intelligence is very often a difficult one to define. Robertson wants the whole thing to be under the Land Commissioner rather than under General Haydon. He seems to be afraid of General Haydon setting up a private army. This is all rather nonsense: it should be quite easy for General Haydon to control the whole thing, and for his representative in the Land to have a responsibility for the supply of political information to the Land Commissioner, in the same way that we have a responsibility to the local Defence Committee in the Middle East and Far East.

Vickery has got agreement to cuts involving some 150 people, who were largely engaged in duplicating activities.

The D.M.I. came on a visit to this office this afternoon. I went through the Chart with him and explained our general functions. I also explained to him the difficulties of the FUCHS case.

Burt came to see me. He had a piece of information about the origin of Mrs. SKINNER, which in fact was already on our records. He also had a photograph of Edgar SANDERS as a young man. This individual, who is on record here for gun-running to Bolivia, is said to be identical with the Edgar SANDERS recently sentenced to 15 years for espionage in Hungary. Burt thought that he was an agent of S.I.S. I told him that this was not the case. I gave him my reasons for SANDERS' fantastic confession.

7th March

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The D.G. then referred to the case of MARTINOVITCH, a Yugoslav who had committed suicide on being refused admission to the U.K. D.C. said that the case had not in fact been referred to us: the man had arrived here, his papers were found not in order and he was accordingly sent back to Switzerland, whence he had come.

The case of Mrs. O'GRADY was referred to by the D.G. This woman had just been released from prison after serving ten of the fourteen years to which she had been sentenced during the war for espionage. She claimed that her activities were nothing more nor less than exhibitionism and that she had never in fact given any information to the Germans. She also claims to have appealed to the Home Office to this effect. The D.G. asked if the Home Office had informed us of this appeal by Mrs. O'GRADY. I said that her behaviour had certainly justified her conviction and that she had, in fact, at first been sentenced to death. S.L.B. then said that there was a good deal of correspondence on the case between the Home Office and Brigadier Hinchley Cooke.

The cases of _____ formerly of the Ministry of Education and later transferred to the Cabinet Office, and whose wife had been discovered to have been a Communist for some considerable time, and that of _____ of the Imperial Defence College, had both been cleared up. B.I. said that a full report on the latter case is to be sent to the Commandant of the I.D.C. who intends to show it to the Chiefs of Staff. It is being recommended that _____ should be permitted to remain at the I.D.C.

The questions of Mr. Haldane Porter's mission to Persia and of Mr. Irvine's security checks in Italy and Portugal on behalf of the Atlantic Treaty, were touched upon. In the latter connection, Mr. Irvine said that in Italy the position was fairly satisfactory; but that in Italy there was virtually no security at all. He said that it now rested with the members of the Atlantic Treaty to decide what should be done to rectify the position in Portugal. The Scandinavian countries are still outstanding as regards the security check and, D.C. said, due to a quarrel between the military and civil authorities, the security position is probably none too good. D.C. hoped that Mr. Irvine would be released to represent us on the Atlantic Security Committee. A request for a British representative for the South European Planning Group and for the North European Planning Group had been made and discussed at the J.I.C., but up to date there had been no nominations.

D.C. then mentioned the trouble the Ministry of Supply had had in connection with a leakage to _____ about the new atomic stations set up in the North. Circumstances seemed to show that the leakage came through Air Commodore Crerar, Assistant Managing Director of the firm handling the contract for the project. S.L.B. would be consulted as to the best means of handling the matter.

_____ gave me lunch today. I expected that he might want to make some special request, but I was entirely mistaken: it was merely a friendly tête-à-tête. He mentioned to me that he had spoken to Dick White à propos of FUCHS, expressing his distress at our being pilloried in the press, and offering, if we thought any useful purpose would be served, to present our case, in any form in which we might like to put it forward, to the National Council, C.I.A. I thanked him very much for his kind offer, which we would certainly consider, although I thought that the balance had to some extent been redressed by the Prime Minister's statement in the House. For the rest, our conversation was confined to generalities about Russia and Germany.

Barnes Stott, who has been in Passport Control and is now employed I think in the Department of the Custodian of Enemy Property, came to see me about a job. He is at present employed as a Principal, but he thinks that before long his work will be wound up. He is therefore trying to forestall events. He said that Jeffes of Passport Control would be able to speak to him. I told him that we had nothing to offer him at the moment, but if he liked to fill in a form we would consider his application if a suitable vacancy occurred. He did not seem to be a bad fellow, but somehow I was not particularly attracted by him.

I went to see Newsam about certain _____ to all of which he agreed. He handed me a letter from someone in America addressed to FUCHS, which he said we could open clandestinely provided we returned it to him within 24 hours. I told him that we should want to see FUCHS' communications and to know about his visitors, and that we were arranging this through Paice of the Prison Commission. He seemed quite satisfied about this.

8th March

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I discussed with Dick, Roger and John Irvine the question of the latter's future as Secretary of the S.I.C. We felt that, if the S.I.C. at the next meeting on March 14th were not prepared to allow John Irvine to act for us in regard to COSMIC security, we should have to reserve our right to withdraw him and suggest that some other country should take on the job. It is abundantly clear that there is not really a full-time job as S.I.C. Secretary. In fact, for the last month before the meeting, by which time all papers have been circulated, he cannot possibly have anything to do; neither has he really got a full-time job for the first two months between the meetings.

At the Directors' meeting we discussed various staff matters. It was agreed that, in spite of a slightly adverse account from S.I.F.E., we should see FAY, late of the Singapore Police, who is at present on leave. We also decided that any move to Moascar could not be considered until it was clear whether G.H.Q. was going to remain in Egypt or remove to Cyrenaica. Lastly, there was a long discussion on whether our overseas stations should receive the air mail "Times". This apparently costs us about £260 a year. It was finally decided to send a circular letter asking the views of overseas stations and telling them to explore whether they can get the paper locally from any other sources.

I gave a short talk to the Railway Police officers who had been doing a course here. One of the points I raised with them was the assistance that they might be able to give us in procuring a letter sent by railway post. The procedure is that the letter is handed in to Parcels Office, where the sender need not disclose his identity. Thereafter, the letter goes from the Parcels Office to the guard, and from the guard to the Parcels Office at the destination, receipts being taken. The letter is then delivered by a railway official, either to someone who calls for it or actually at the address. A book is kept which shows the names and addresses of all letters delivered by railway post at each station. It occurred to me that it might be of interest to know, for example, the names of the people receiving such letters over a period in certain places where there are District Party HQ, or possibly elsewhere. There was a time when the Communist Party used this method of communication, but there has been no evidence for some years that this has continued to be the practice. The Railway Police could also shadow a suspect travelling by train and point him out to one of our watchers, though there might be difficulty about doing this at very short notice. There is no doubt that we now have the goodwill and co-operation of the Railway Police, who seemed pleased with their visit.

9th March

Cumming came to talk to me about a project of the Americans, who believe that they can cause the defection of six or eight members of the Czech skating team which is about to visit this country. It was generally thought that, if this could be brought about, it would have a certain "cold war" propaganda value. The proposal has been endorsed by the J.I.C. The Americans are apparently prepared to put up £15,000 to settle these skaters in the United States. We shall clearly have to say something to the Home Office.

I asked Horrocks how he was getting on with his enquiries about the Police Officers who it is proposed should be seconded. He said he had seen Baker and had left with him certain points to which he wished to give further consideration. So far Baker had not replied.

I spent a very enjoyable evening at a dinner organised by Ian Wilson Christopher Harmer and Bill Luke, at which a number of old war-time B Division officers were present.

A.C.A.S.(I) - Air Vice Marshal Ogilvie-Forbes - has been round the office. He was formerly our Air Attaché in Moscow. He seems a nice person who is obviously fairly at sea. Curiously, he suggested to me that it must be very difficult for us to deal with constantly changing personnel in Service Intelligence Directorates. I told him that that question was an old war horse of mine and that I had always thought that it would be advantageous if there were quite a small permanent civilian nucleus in each department to give continuity to the work and to advise incoming officers. I had in fact suggested this on many occasions to successive A.C.A.S.(I)s, D.M.Is. and D.N.Is. and had always found them in agreement. There appeared, however, to be a number of snags on the establishment side, but I could not feel that these were really insuperable. He seemed very convinced that something of the kind was necessary.

10th March

There was quite an interesting discussion with the Planners on the paper entitled "Likelihood of War with the Soviet Union and the Date by which the Soviet Leaders might be prepared to risk it". I have already recorded our conclusions, one of which was that the date might be advanced from '56/'57 to '55/'56. There was doubt in the J.I.C. as to whether they should recommend the consequent advance in planning or whether this should be left to the Joint Planners. The point was somewhat complicated by the fact that, whatever anybody recommends, it is extremely doubtful whether anything can be done to step up production or, more important still, scientific research. The Planners seemed to think that it was their business to consider these points and that there might well be merit in advocating an increase in the tempo, as this might at least ensure that '47 did not become '48 or '49. A new point of some interest and importance was introduced. Our paper had considered the likelihood of the Russians starting a major war and had suggested that there might come a time when the Soviet leaders would consider themselves strong enough to counter any military action by the Western Powers, when they might press on with their plans to extend their influence and control regardless of Western reactions. In these circumstances the Western Powers might be compelled to go to war to protect their vital interests. Nobody, however, had specified, in respect of different countries, where this limit would be reached. For example, what would happen if we woke up one morning to find that the TUDEH Party was in power in Persia "by the will of the people" and that Persia was therefore virtually another satellite state, that the Russians had been granted oil concessions in the North, and that we were under notice from the Persian Government to quit Abadan? Would this lead to a world war, if we were in a position to take counter action? If not, what "cold war" or other measures to prevent such a thing happening could be put into force?

A new paper has to be written on this subject with terms of reference as follows:- "Steps short of embarking on a major war which the U.S.S.R. might take, which would put it in control of territories whose loss to the Western Allies would critically prejudice our ability to fight a war and/or constitute a major defeat in the cold war. How could such steps be forestalled or countered without precipitating a major war?"

B.I.A have discovered a Party member in the Immigration Service at London Docks. He frequently goes aboard Soviet ships to act as an interpreter. His name is Jack HOBBS.

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11th March

X I went to see Newsam about the Czech Ice Hockey players who the Americans have told us are likely to defect. The Americans were prepared to put up £15,000 for their rehabilitation in the United States. Newsam informed Murie about this and seemed quite satisfied. He appreciated that it was purely a cold war point.

Graham Mitchell came to discuss with me the case of HOBBS, the Immigration Officer who is a Party member. He will have to go before the Purge Committee. I wondered whether there was anything to be gained by giving him a run. Graham thought that, rather remotely, there might be but that the time and energy involved would mean that something else would have to be dropped. We decided, therefore, to proceed on the basis of liquidation.

Lish Whitson came in to say goodbye and I went out to lunch with him and Johnny Cimperman. I did not touch on the point that he had not been allowed to interview FUCHS, but I do not think that there are really any hard feelings. It is now up to the F.B.I. to get hold of Joseph ROBBINS, who was FUCHS' contact in the U.S.A. Jim Skardon had been able to get this information out of FUCHS yesterday, identification having been made by photograph. It may of course mean that ultimately FUCHS will have to go to the United States as a witness. I discussed one or two old cases. Lish told me that Jacob KIRCHENSTEIN was last heard of in Paris under the name of KLEGES, where he is, or was, running an import and export business. He also told me that, since the war, FEIERABEND, under some other name, had been unearthed in Shanghai. Both these cases are interesting as showing how old hands active in the '20s are still going on.

13th March

Sir John Shaw discussed with me the draft of a JIC paper on Communism in the Middle East which is based on a JIC(ME) paper. The draft is really fourth-form stuff, whereas the JIC(ME) paper prepared by S.I.M.E. is extremely good. It seems to us all that this is a frightful waste of time.

X Had a talk with Philip Vickery on the possibility of his taking over the Secretaryship of the S.I.C. vice Irvine. He would have been quite willing to do the job, only unfortunately he does not think that his French is good enough. Roger is very anxious to get Irvine back as he has a lot of work for him to do. We may have to say to the S.I.C. that one of the other Powers should provide the Secretary, but this is not likely to go very well. One of the main difficulties is that in almost all the Benelux countries there are two distinct camps - one the military and the other the Sûreté. If either party appointed a Secretary he would be regarded with suspicion by the other. This is the only country where there is any semblance of unity between the two Departments

14th March

Archie Hordern came in with Thornton. I explained the FUCHS case and also told him what we were doing about Lancashire Hotpot. He was as usual extremely pleasant and co-operative. I wish all C.C.'s looked at Special Branch work in the way that he does.

I attended the S.I.C. lunch. The French Surete had only just arrived; there was apparently a strike by the mechanics which had delayed the 'plane's departure. Dick White had had to put on a cabaret show on the FUCHS case to keep things going. who is now Chairman of the S.I.C., expressed himself once more very forcibly on the question of direct liaison with ourselves. He is anxious to raise it when Dick White and _____ visit him next week.

15th March

I gave a short talk to Police Officers from Northern Rhodesia and British Guiana. They are doing a course here.

We had a large agenda at the J.I.C. today. I raised the question of the wasted effort in the J.I.S. re-hashing of the report on Communism in the Middle East prepared by J.I.C.(M.E.). Pat Reilly took the point and said that he would like to go into the matter more carefully. Meanwhile, he gave instructions that the J.I.S. were to discontinue work on the draft.

_____ of the Sûreté looked in for a few minutes. He was interested in the case of SOUKHOMLINE, a White Russian in Paris, who had been mentioned by FUCHS. FUCHS, if he went to Paris, was to have used him as a contact man for scientific circles. The Sûreté apparently know SOUKHOMLINE and will be making further investigations.

Neville Bland looked in for a gossip and was clearly anxious for some dope on the FUCHS case.

According to press reports, the Czech Ice Hockey team are not coming. Clearly there must have been too much talk about defection.

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17th March

The D.G. called a meeting for the purpose of conducting a post mortem on the FUCHS case. He began by congratulating all those concerned in bringing FUCHS to justice within the short space of six months. He said that he had satisfied the Prime Minister on the brief which was given to him when he visited the latter on March 3rd, but at that time he had not seen the file. Had he done so he would have been extremely apprehensive, and had an enquiry been ordered he felt that he would probably have lost his job and the Department would have been split from top to bottom. He then criticised the action during the earlier stages of the enquiry. He drew attention in particular to a minute by Tar Robertson which had expressed the view that FUCHS might well be a spy, and also to one by Michael Serpell expressing the view that both FUCHS and PEIERLS might well be spies. He could not understand why, in the light of these minutes, more had not been done to investigate the case, beyond the imposition of a H.O.W. for a period of two months. He also criticised a letter by Garrett in which it was suggested that details of the slight suspicion against FUCHS should not be communicated to the Americans.

Various people spoke in answer to these criticisms, which have of course to be considered in the light of events at the time. As Bennett pointed out, a statement, even though it may in the light of events have proved to be prophetic, is of very little use unless it is supported by facts. The only facts that were known showed FUCHS in no more sinister light than literally hundreds of other cases. Skardon pointed out that there was not one single material fact on the files which contributed anything to FUCHS' interrogation or which, in fact, had any real significance. The association with Hans KAHLE in the internment camp in Canada, to which the D.G. drew particular attention, had had no bearing whatever on the espionage case: it was merely a political factor which was quite reasonably explained by the fact that the camp in which FUCHS was interned was largely composed of Nazis. It is not therefore surprising that he should have associated with Hans KAHLE. Apart from this, the information against Hans KAHLE, as Miss Bagot pointed out, was from a highly dubious source. It seemed therefore dangerous to reorientate one's whole machinery on the basis of the FUCHS case, which was in many respects exceptional.

Mitchell made it clear that enquiries which we made during the war about internees in Canada had produced absolutely no results. The individual in charge with whom we had been in touch seemed quite incapable of giving any assessment of the people under his charge. Enquiry about FUCHS in those quarters, therefore, is unlikely to have told us any more than we knew already and which we felt was satisfactorily explained by the fact that FUCHS had been engaged in anti-Nazi activities and in so doing had had Communist associations in Germany prior to the Hitler régime. As regards telling the Americans, this seemed to be a matter of major policy which had been considered at the time. I said that if the Ministry of Supply sent FUCHS to America as a British subject and a British official, it was difficult for them at the same time to say to the F.B.I. that we regarded him with suspicion. It seemed to me that it was up to the Government Department concerned to establish a standard on the basis of whatever information we could give them, and either to send the individual out or not to send him. In estimating the standards to be established the matter could only be considered in the light of the information available at the time and of the whole circumstances of the case.

FUCHS, as far as we could ascertain - and indeed this was supported by his own confession - had not engaged in any political activities while he was in this country. He had received glowing chits from Edinburgh and Bristol Universities, and was a man of outstanding ability. He was only one of many others concerning whom there were much more sinister indications, whose brain was so formidable as, in the opinion of the Ministry concerned, to justify his employment, the more so since, at the time, we were fighting the Germans and not the Russians. Mitchell pointed out, and was supported by Hollis, that there were, certainly now and to a large extent at the time, many other projects of equal, if not greater, secrecy and importance than the atomic bomb, and that even today, in Category I there were no less than 61,000 employees. Marriott made it clear that, in a case such as that of FUCHS, only an intensive investigation of a continuous period of three to four months could even hope to give any results and that, at the outside, our resources would only allow two to three such cases to be investigated simultaneously. We had therefore to deal with those which, on prima facie evidence, appeared to us to be the strongest. I said that I did not see how we could do otherwise unless we were going to increase the staff ten-fold, and then we should probably defeat our own object, since the right hand would not know what the left was doing.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the D.G. asked me to hold a further meeting in order to establish whether there were any points where a small Strengthening of the staff might help. After the meeting I spoke to the D.G. privately. I said that, if one sat down and tried to think of current cases where the evidence was no greater than that in the FUCHS case in 1941, we should not be able to cope with them, even if we had ten times the staff we had now. We cannot even cope with those where the evidence is much stronger. I instanced people like BLACKETT, Solly ZUCKERMAN and, indeed, BERNAL, who was deliberately taken on, as a full-blown Communist, as Scientific Officer to the Commandos in 1943. The fact was that we had to realise that we were permanently sitting on a hornet's nest. A huge increase of staff would not produce the answer. It would only turn us into a mass-production organisation like the F.B.I. It would not be tolerated by the public, and it would produce no better results.

I drew the attention of the D.G. to the fact that we were now operating 200 letter checks and 100 telephone checks, on cases which seemed to us to be, on prima facie evidence, far more important than the FUCHS case at any time before 1947, but these figures were peak figures and we had to bear in mind that the Post Office resources were by no means unlimited. The more checks we put on the fewer the number of letters opened. He had criticised the fact that only a letter check had been put on in 1947 and this in spite of the fact that we knew that, in general practice, spies did not communicate their secrets through the post. I said that the purpose of the letter check was to get some idea of the man's general background and the names of the people with whom he was communicating and the kind of circles in which he moved. This was often a valuable pointer to further enquiries in other directions and possibly to an approach to someone with whom he was found to be innocently in quite intimate touch.

The D.G. had made the point during the meeting that he had never been informed at the time the FUCHS case was re-examined in 1947. I said that I accepted responsibility, but that he must realise that the case as it appeared then was only one of a very great number which might have been held to be of equal or greater importance. The D.G. subsequently made it clear to Dick White that he did not wish to imply in any of his remarks that the brief which had been put up to him when he visited the Prime Minister was in any way intended to be inaccurate or misleading.

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20th March.

_____ came to see me and left me a note for the D.G., which I subsequently delivered, in which he asked for various particulars in connection with the FUCHS case. He said that if I would like him to modify this letter in any way before delivering it to the D.G., he would be pleased to do so. On the other hand, he would have to give some answer to the points raised to his Head Office in Washington. I promised that I would consider the matter and let him know.

22nd March.

I had a talk with Tolson before he went off to S.I.F.E.

23rd March.

We had a preliminary meeting to discuss whether there were any measures which we could take which might minimise the risk of another FUCHS case. I did this at the D.G.'s request. We reached no firm conclusions, but agreed on certain lines to pursue. It was decided that we would have a further meeting.

24th March.

Johnny Cimperman has delivered to the D.G. a message from Hoover in which the latter describes himself as outraged at the lack of co-operation that he has received from the Security Service in the FUCHS case. He complained, firstly, that he was not given a copy of the confession, and secondly, that his representative was not allowed to see FUCHS, and thirdly, that we did not discuss the case with Cimperman before it broke. There is, of course, a complete answer. Hoover was given twenty-four hours notice before the arrest in case he wished to raise any objection or to take any action on his side of the Atlantic. Simultaneously, he was given such Intelligence leads as there were from FUCHS's confession. Immediately his representative arrived here, he was shown a copy of FUCHS's statement, from which he took notes. He was told that he could not keep a copy, but that one would be given to him as soon as the proceedings were no longer sub judice. This very naturally covered the period of appeal. We had never refused to allow Hoover's representative to see FUCHS at any time, but we had thought it important both in our interests and in Hoover's to re-establish contact and good relations with FUCHS through Skardon after the trial before anybody else was allowed to interrogate him. In fact, Skardon would have been strongly opposed to anybody, even from this office, seeing FUCHS until a later date.

The D.G. offered there and then to communicate with the Home Office, with a view to getting permission for an F.B.I. representative to see FUCHS.

As regards co-operation with Cimperman, this was purely a matter of indoctrination and a question of normal procedure between our two offices. It was really for the F.B.I. to notify us if they wanted the case discussed with Cimperman. Although the latter was indoctrinated in general way, we had not been notified that he was specially indoctrinated in this case and had, in fact, been warned by SIGINT against his being approached without the proper authority from the U.S.A. Apart from this, it was our general custom not to institute a two-way correspondence. If the case started in Washington, we communicated with Geoffrey Patterson. If it started in London, we communicated with Cimperman.

27th March.

Burt and Thompson came to see me about information which they had received, through the C.I.D., from _____ who claimed that he could introduce anybody we liked to THOREZ, the French Communist. He also gave information allegedly relating to the transmission of funds to this country for the Daily Worker, etc. They both seemed to think that _____ would not be anxious wholly to mislead us; they thought his purpose in volunteering information was probably in the hope that he might one day be re-admitted to this country.

I said that we would look into the statements, but that they did not seem to us to be very promising.

 German of the G.P.O. came to see me. He is succeeding Firth.

 Kim Philby came over and he, Dick, Roger, John Marriott, and I had a discussion about the F.B.I. being allowed to interview FUCHS.

Kim was anxious to emphasise the importance which the F.B.I. attaches to this interview. He was afraid that if it could not be agreed, Hoover was quite capable of reducing our liaison to a pure formality, regardless of the loss that it might be to his own organisation. He confirmed my view that Hoover would be totally unaware of what he was losing, and that even if he did know he would not care in a matter where his own position and prestige was concerned. We are still hoping, however, that we might be able to persuade the Home Office to allow the interview. Our case has been perfectly clear all along; it would obviously have been undesirable, before or immediately after the trial, for anybody to approach FUCHS except Skardon. We have made this clear without closing the door, that as soon as Skardon could report that FUCHS, in spite of his sentence, was in the right kind of mood to co-operate, we could see no objection from an intelligence point of view to the interview taking place.

28th March.

Kitchin came to see me before leaving to take up his post in Delhi. Andrew Feiling also came to say good-bye.

 29th March.

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General Sir Harold Briggs called, but I was unable to see him. He was seen by Shaw. He is to take over the co-ordination of Police and Military activities in Malaya.

I saw Newsam. He talked to me about the FUCHS case; he seemed to think that the matter was now dead. I said that I thought there would be further representations through official channels - in fact I had just heard that such representations have come through to the Foreign Office.

31st March.

We had an Appointments Board meeting to-day.

There has been a lot of trouble at the Canadian end of the FUCHS case. Pearson of External Affairs has stated that information regarding FUCHS in the HALPERIN diary was passed to us. Meanwhile the Lord Chancellor, in making a speech on the FUCHS case in the House of Lords, had stated that no such information was passed. In fact what happened was that Peter Dwyer, who was in Canada at the time, was told that he could have access to the enormous number of documents seized in a raid on HALPERIN's house. Included among these documents was the diary, which he did not see. He was working closely with the Canadians and relying on them to bring to his notice anything of special significance affecting this country. The Canadians passed on a photostat copy of the diary to the F.B.I., but did not send one to us; the first we knew of it was when we started intensive investigations into FUCHS. The information was received from the Americans, but ~~not~~ from the Canadians. In fact it had very little significance, since when the entry was made FUCHS had made no decision to act as a spy. Had we known of the existence of this entry, it might have caused us to make closer enquiries and it might have influenced us when the decision was made to allow FUCHS to go to Harwell after his return to this country.

1st April.

The D.G. has seen both the P.M. and the Lord Chancellor, who now realises how the mistake occurred. I am afraid, however, that we have to admit that our statement in the Lord Chancellor's brief, that the Security Services were not informed about the entry in the diary, was not strictly accurate. It would have been possible, I suppose, for Peter Dwyer to wade through every single document and to send us a copy of the diary, and it may well be that if we had had our own representative there, who would have had an M.I.5 rather than an M.I.6 approach to the problem, this would have been done. The Lord Chancellor took the whole thing extremely well and will correct his statement in due course.

7.
17th April.

18th April.

Stephens came in to see me. He is worried about his staffing problems. He now feels that not only does he want the officer who has just been sent out to Nigeria, but also one in the Gold Coast and one to act as Staff Officer to himself in Accra. He clearly thinks very little of

I told him that in so far as overseas organisation was concerned, we had in a sense bitten off rather more than we could chew. We could not deprive sections here, who are already overworked with highly important matters, beyond a certain point. Neither could we go out into the street and find ready-made Intelligence officers. We were trying to get away from the practice of recruiting a man and sending him straight out to a Colony, since we were very conscious that what mattered was that such officers should have at least an adequate knowledge of Head Office work and methods. It followed, therefore, that the build-up would have to be a gradual process.

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We emphasised the importance of taking no action which would in any way disturb the ground.

Burt telephoned to say that there had been a further communication from _____ to Thorp of the C.I.D., in which _____ alleged that he was in touch with THOREZ, the French Communist, and could effect an introduction if anybody was interested.

19th April.

Thisle came to talk to me about the Lancashire case. We have got an office fixed up _____ with ten lines running in. The Police are co-operating.

The tragedy in Lancashire is that Archie Hordern has died quite suddenly. We have lost in him a great ally and a very charming person.

20th April.

We held an Appointments Board to-day and selected four fairly promising candidates - _____ and VERNON, whom we had seen the previous week.

21st April.

Bamford tells me that Sir William Jenkin is likely to accept the job of Inspector of Police in Malaya. It will be a great thing if he does.

Murrie telephoned to know whether we had any objection to the Home Secretary sending a letter of notification to FUCHS that denaturalisation proceedings would be opened against him. I said to Murrie that it would suit us far better if this could be delayed for a matter of two months. We did not wish to give FUCHS a body blow until we had got all the information we wanted.

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24th April.

I gave a talk to Colonial Police Officers from Malaya and Africa - East and West.

25th April.

We had a further discussion on the case of WYBROW with Kenneth Strong and Martin Watson of J.I.B. We outlined to them our suspicions of WYBROW and brought to their notice the War Office papers which we had obtained, showing that WYBROW was threatened with Court Martial when serving as an A.S.O. in Palestine during the war. He had apparently been getting money from influential Jews in order to pay informants, who were ostensibly giving information about the Irgun and Stern groups. Such an arrangement, even if it was a bona fide one, was clearly unwise and contrary to all regulations. WYBROW had been sent home, but the Court Martial dropped and an enquiry was to be held. There appears to be no record in the War Office of this enquiry, and nobody knows whether it was ever held or not. The next thing that appears in the War Office file is WYBROW's posting to I. S. T. D. at Oxford, and in 1946, when J.I.B. was being formed, he was given his discharge and taken on as a civilian employee. We felt that if this record had been made available to J.I.B., WYBROW would never have been taken on. J.I.B. agreed. On going back to our records, we had found a trace of WYBROW being associated with LANDMAN's daughter, but apparently Joan Chenhalls, thinking that J.I.B. had taken WYBROW on with their eyes open, did not draw their attention to this matter until she had made further enquiries. In point of fact, I think she should have done so, since our records made it clear that WYBROW was a J.I.B. employee.

Further enquiries, as a result of J.I.B.'s intimation that WYBROW was a possible suspect, had thrown up other connections with suspected members of the Israeli Intelligence Service. Strong felt that, on the basis of this information, he could not afford to keep WYBROW in his employ a moment longer than was necessary. We felt,

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26th April.

Charles Haydon came to see me. I asked him about McGIBBON, who had served under him as a G.2. in Washington. I told him that we had definite information that McGIBBON had at one time rendered valuable services to the Russians and that this had linked him up in our minds with a leakage of information which took place in Washington early in 1945. Haydon said that he had never heard McGIBBON discuss politics and that he had always found him an efficient officer. Haydon's office in Washington had not been concerned in any way with Balkan affairs, although it was possible that they might have seen a certain number of telegrams about the general progress and intentions of the Soviet Armies at that time.

Cumming tells me that the Treasury have agreed to the setting up of a research branch in the Post Office, the head of which will be McMillan. The Treasury will make a special grant to the Post Office for this purpose.

 Newsam asked to see me about FUCHS' denaturalisation. He was worried about delaying this matter in case of questions in the House of Commons. I said that if he could agree to give us until the 31st, we would see no objection. Meanwhile we were anxious not to disturb FUCHS' mind in case he had anything more to say either affecting us or the Americans. It seemed to me that it was of paramount importance not to jeopardise any chance of getting leads which would assist in the elimination, either here or the U.S., of people working on the atomic energy project.

Newsam said that he thought the proposal by the Americans to interview FUCHS was now dead. I said that I was not quite certain about this, since Hoyer Miller was over here and was, I understood, extremely concerned about the refusal to let the Americans interrogate FUCHS. I knew in fact, that Roger Makins, whom I have seen at the Travellers, was putting up a suggestion that the difficulty should be overcome by the matter being presented in the form of a request by M.I.5 for a representative of the F.B.I. to assist them in a further interrogation. This, Makins felt, would get over the question of precedent.

 Shaw brought Luke in to see me. He is succeeding Seel at the C.R.O.

 Cumming tells me that the Post Office have been granted a telecheque by the Home Office to assist them in investigating a Post Office fraud.

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28th April.

Lt. Cmdr. Bowlby, Canadian D.N.I., came to see me with an introduction from Nicholson of the R.C.M.P. I gave him a general outline of our work; he was interested in naval contracts, so I passed him on to F.J.

 The D.G. has seen the P.M. about the case of FUCHS. The P.M. was slightly peeved at not being told earlier. The D.G. pointed out to him that he had up to now been dealing with the matter on a departmental level, since both the Foreign Office and the Home Office were concerned. The D.G. mentioned the Home Office view, that an awkward precedent might be created if the representative of a foreign power was allowed to interview one of our prisoners. The P.M. gave the impression that he would not have paid much attention to this and would have, in fact, granted the interview at the outset. He remarked that precedents did not mean a great

deal, since we were living in an unprecedented world. The D.G. asked whether he could inform Patterson that permission had been finally granted on his intervention with the P.M. The latter replied that he would rather keep out of it, but that there was no objection to our giving advance information to Patterson for transmission to the F.B.I. A telegram to Patterson was accordingly despatched, in which it was made clear that on our intervention the matter had been re-considered.

Perfect tells me that naturalisation in the Channel Islands is carried out on local authority, although where a man has been resident in this country Police reports are called for.

Holmes has returned from Lancashire. The case of "Lancashire Hotpot" appears to be going fairly well, although so far there have been no sensational results. It appeared fairly clear from what Holmes said that the local Police in the area are not geared for an enquiry of this sort.

Holmes had a discussion with various C.Cs on E.V.Ws in their areas. They seemed to be generally somewhat uneasy. There are two main transit camps at Inskip and Full Sutton. When the E.V.Ws leave these camps for employment, they become the responsibility of the employing firm in so far as accommodation is concerned. Some of the aliens are housed in hostels, and others in private lodgings. Most of the hostels are provided by the National Service Hostel Association, which is a private corporation and closely connected with the Ministry of Labour. Some accommodation is provided by local agricultural committees, and some by the Y.M.C.A. The hostels are normally in charge of a Warden of the ex-Army N.C.O. type. The only way that the Police can obtain information is either from casual informants, who are rare and unreliable, or through denunciations which are often prompted by personal spite. The use of agents is practically non-existent. Two ex-members of the Polish Resettlement Corps in Cheshire, who assisted the C.I.D. in crime enquiries are well-known to E.V.W.s as being attached to the Police, and they are of little value for security purposes. C.C. Cheshire said he could not sort the sheep from the goats, and that if there was any trouble he would arrest the lot.

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D.N.I. rang me to say that he had had a satisfactory interview with [redacted] who has been told to put his case in writing. [redacted] is a scientific officer who was sent to America as part of a team. The American D.N.I. alleges that he made statements on several occasions to the effect that he did not approve of our Government or the American Government and preferred that of Soviet Russia. [redacted] says that 75% of the conversation came from the American side. He also says that he is a staunch supporter of the Labour Party and is not in the least interested in Communism. The trouble is, however, that he has created the wrong impression in the U.S.A. by talking about politics instead of confining himself to his official duties.

1st May.

Dick White has returned from leave.

I saw Newsam about _____ WYBROW, and _____ He was a little worried about _____, but when I explained to him how essential it was to establish _____ bona fides, he gave way. He asked me whether we had lists of Communists ready to effect arrests in case of trouble. I do not know exactly what he had in mind, whether it was a war or the suppression of the Communist Party, both of which seemed to me to be somewhat remote. I think he had been reading about the banning of the C.P. in Australia and South Africa and he asked me if I could procure for him copies of the Government Acts. He said that he did not wish to go to the C.R.O.

At the D.G's meeting to-day, Roger Hollis asked for guidance about positive vetting of certain highly important categories. This matter arose from the FUCHS case and the P.M. had the idea that something ought to be done on these lines. Winnifrith had been placed in charge of a Working Party. Roger's view is that we should not undertake enquiries of relatives and neighbours, but that if the departments themselves were engaging a man, or promoting him to highly confidential work, they should perform the role of any employer and question the applicant very closely. There was general agreement with this view.

'C' rang up to tell me that there was a Foreign Office proposal that visas for Germans should be cancelled on a reciprocal basis. There is to be a meeting on Wednesday. Everybody, except the Foreign Office, appears to consider the idea a bad one.

There is a telegram from Singapore, stating that four members of the Singapore Town Committee (?) of the Malayan C.P. have been arrested, and also another Chinaman suspected of being the culprit in the three recent grenade instances, including the attempted assassination of the Governor, Gimson, on the 29th April. Documents seized disclosed the M.C.P. programme for the next six months; this included strikes, arson, and murder.

There has been a case of sabotage on H.M.S. Illustrious. Somebody had placed a number of flares round the boiler, which would have gone off when the boiler became heated.

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John Marriott said there had been a satisfactory confirmation of our records as regards the number of Soviet diplomats in this country. After several Questions in the House on the subject, the Foreign Office eventually wrote to the Soviet Embassy and asked them how many diplomats

they had here. The Soviet Embassy replied by sending a complete list, which, Marriott said, tallied with our records. He said this was satisfactory and that it also confirmed his own belief that the Russians are punctilious on formal matters of this kind. He went on to say that the Foreign Office have put up a paper to the J.I.C. suggesting that Russian diplomats should not be allowed to travel more than fifty miles from London without giving notification of the fact. This paper is to be discussed at the J.I.C. (O. & S.) on Friday next. I asked if, provided the paper is agreed, a list of Soviet Embassy cars would be circulated to the Police, and whether the latter would have instructions to pull them in if necessary. Serpell said there was a minute of the J.I.C., now in circulation, which made this point.

The D.G. asked about the operation in the North-West. Malcolm Cumming said it was going well.

Dick said that nothing of interest had yet come out of the two weeks check. A certain amount of watching is now being contemplated, although this cannot be carried out by the Police, as they are too well-known both in the district and to the individuals concerned.

Malcolm Cumming said that the scheme for trying to develop our own technical aids is going ahead. McMillan of the G.P.O. is here for three months, and, although he is to visit Australia to carry out a special job shortly, he will be returning here for another two months. McMillan has asked that he may be kept up to date with the Intelligence problems of the day, which, he said would greatly assist him in his examination of technical methods. Malcolm asked Dick and Shaw if they would have talks with McMillan on this subject.

Furnival-Jones told the meeting about the sabotage to the "Illustrious". He said the ship has now sailed for Mensey Bay, but Holmes is in touch with the Admiralty and will, if it is thought necessary, go to Liverpool to investigate.

Stone said that the Military Security Committee of the Brussels Treaty Powers had expressed a desire to be advised by the Security Service on counter-sabotage and general physical security. Exercises are at the moment being carried out in France, where our technical advice would be welcomed.

Hinchley Cooke spoke about a conference which he has to attend in the near future at the Foreign Office on the subject of the abolition of visas. He said that P.C.D., the Home Office, and ourselves are going to resist this to the utmost.

Alec Kellar said that the Australian High Commissioner, who is also Minister of Defence, had complained to the C.R.O. about the lack of information received by Australia on Malaya, particularly Intelligence information. Alec said he had discussed the matter with the C.R.O. and had informed them of the general set-up in Singapore. The Australians have, in fact, a representative on the J.I.C. (FE) who should be au fait with everything that is going on. There is also Courtenay Young's close contact with S.I.F.E. The fact is, however, that there is a general shortage of information coming out of Malaya as a whole.

Shaw spoke about the raid on the Communist H.Q. in Singapore and the following attempt on the life of the Governor. He mentioned the four arrests made in this connection, and said that when the documents concerned had been examined they should produce quite a lot of further information.

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The D.G. told the meeting of the trouble that had been experienced with the F.B.I. as a result of a representative of that body not being allowed to see FUCHS. He said that as a result of further representation to the Home Office, this permission had now been granted. He hoped, therefore, this would smooth things down with Mr. Hoover and that normal relationship with the F.B.I. would be restored once more. John Marriott said that Johnny Gimperman had been informed of this decision.

 Perfect is rather worried about the relation between C.Cs and factory managers. C.2 officers are inclined to say that C.Cs will help factories, with the result that long lists of employees are sent to the Police for vetting. Clearly this is wrong and unnecessary.

 Wakefield has returned from sick leave. Baskervyle-Gleeg will to to B.4., Clayton to O.S., and Mills to B.4.c.

 3rd May.

At the J.I.C. to-day we were given a somewhat gloomy picture of Russian air superiority. The display in Moscow on May 1st was somewhat impressive: there were T.U. 4s (the equivalent of the American B.29), and both single jet fighters and twin jet bombers with swept-back wings. An important deserter from the Soviet Air Force, who is under American control, states that the tactical Air Force in Germany has 800 fighters, 300 of which are jet-propelled, and 250 light bombers - probably twin jets. The photographs of these planes, taken in the air, have been submitted to aero dynamic experts in our principal factories here; they say that the planes are more advanced than anything that we even have on the drawing board.. It is, however, difficult to say this with any degree of certainty without knowing more about the aircraft's performance. It is hoped that the new defector may be able to enlighten us on this.

 Martin Watson told me that Tizard is always accusing J.I.B., and Intelligence generally, of over-estimating Soviet capabilities. Watson is inclined to think that perhaps there is a tendency to underestimate. From time to time samples of various tools, pots and pans, etc., are obtained from Soviet Russia: on examination these articles prove to be made of extremely inferior material, and from this the possibly fallacious deduction is made that Russian aircraft and other equipment are equally faulty. But, as Watson pointed out, the screwdriver which the ordinary housewife buys in Russia for 5 roubles and which anybody here would be ashamed to sell for 6d, probably serves its purpose perfectly well, and that it is entirely erroneous to conclude that screwdrivers and other implements used in the manufacture of aircraft are of a similar quality.

 I had a conference with Kellar and Shaw on the WYBROW case. We agree that we would discuss with Strong whether to let the case run [redacted] or whether J.I.B. are ready to disclose WYBROW's name and details of documents in J.I.B. to which WYBROW might have access. We did not think that we should discuss [redacted] Israeli Intelligence on general lines at the moment. Lastly, [redacted]

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Lester Pearson, Canadian Commissioner for External Affairs, has made a statement which has appeared in the Press, to the effect that the Canadians not only gave us FUCHS's name, but those of four others. This has been followed by two questions in the House here. At the moment we have no idea who the other four are.

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4th May.

Colonel Knight, Canadian D.M.I., called. He talked about positive vetting for the Canadian Army which is conducted by Intelligence Corps personnel after names have been passed over the R.C.M.P. records. I asked what form this vetting took and whether it did not cause resentment. Colonel Knight said that it took the form of enquiries from relatives, neighbours, former employers, etc., and when conducted by Army personnel with Intelligence Corps badges on their shoulders it apparently caused no resentment. On the other hand, positive enquiries of this kind by the R.C.M.P. usually resulted in complaints being made.

Colonel Knight was interested in security matters generally and I passed him on to Hollis.

At the J.I.C. to-day Strong gave an account of the impressions of a German General on the Russians, as a result of his experiences in the Russian campaign when he commanded a Division. Strong had known this General intimately when he was Assistant M.A. in Berlin before the war. The German, who was here on an official mission of some sort, made it clear that he had no subsequent knowledge about the Russians, and that his views were based entirely on his former experiences. He thought that the present strength of their land Armies was due in large measure to their appreciation of the immense importance of armoured units, and particularly artillery. With regard to supplies, he would feel it wise when estimating Russian capabilities to calculate that the Russians only needed about one third of what any other Army would require, although this did not of course apply to ammunition. He believed that the Russians would always fix their objective, and having reached it would not be inclined to go further until they had reassembled their Forces and taken stock of the position. They would be too afraid of things getting out of hand; in other words, they would probably not be good at exploiting a victory by giving rein to local initiative. He thought, therefore, that the Russians would undoubtedly stop on the Rhine if they met with any sort of opposition, and would attack elsewhere, possibly in the Middle East or in Scandinavia.

The General made the astonishing statement that the Russians were on occasions capable of not only shooting their own wounded but eating them. He would not have believed this had he not witnessed it with his own eyes.

We discussed a possible break with China, which might result from a refusal by the British Government to allow the Chinese to establish Consulates in Malaya. The Services were certainly worried about sources of intelligence if all their Attaches were withdrawn, but a more serious

aspect would be the effect upon Hong Kong; it might lead to an increase of both overt and covert propaganda within the Colony which might culminate in serious disturbances. The Garrison had been reduced and the difficulties in increasing it again would be considerable in view of the pressure upon our troops in Malaya.

Philip Vickery's report on the reorganisation of Intelligence Division in Germany was generally approved, and the importance of the parts of security within Int. Div. were stressed. It was realised that Int. Div. might now expect attempts at penetration by the new German Intelligence Service. The hope was expressed that the re-interrogation of Prisoners of War would not be hampered by the proposed reduction in staff. It was recommended that the existing organisation should be retained until the task was completed.

 We had an Appointments Board and selected RICH, an ex-Indian Policeman, MORTON (Jack Morton's brother), _____

 Robin Fyfe, a candidate for employment whom we had seen previously, came to tell me that he now had a school for teaching Russian at a castle in Scotland, which could take on about twenty students. I said that I would mention the matter to the Service Departments. Fyfe also said that if we had any opening for him he was still anxious to get some regular employment.

5th May.

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6th May.

The Daily Express has come out with a front page article on the FUCHS case, stating that after considerable pressure, due to objections raised by the British, permission had finally been granted to the F.B.I. to interview FUCHS. It had, of course, been a condition that no publicity would be given.

A telegram of protest has gone from the Foreign Office to the State Department and Mr. Douglas, the American Ambassador, has told the State Department that it is impossible to expect the co-operation of the British if all his telegrams become the subject of a hand-out to the Press.

This is about the fourth serious leakage through hand-outs to the Press by the Americans in the last few weeks. Others were even more damaging both to us and to the Americans and related to the monitoring of Russian wireless. It appears to be impossible to do anything in the U.S. without consulting the Congressional Committee or the semi-public (?) Commission on representatives of the Press take copious notes.

8th May.

Burt came to see me. I explained to him what was proposed with regard to WYBROW. It had occurred to us that if after dismissal we got certain reactions which made it clear to us that WYBROW was retaining official documents, we might want to operate a search warrant at short notice. We could not, however, afford to do this unless we were working on an absolute certainty: to search and to find nothing would cut the ground from under J.I.B.'s feet, since WYBROW was being told that his dismissal was due entirely to administrative reasons. He was only a temporary Civil Servant and his job should be held by a permanent official. Burt said that if we gave him a statement to be produced to the Magistrate, he would arrange for an officer to be on tap; it would not, however, be possible to actually apply for a warrant unless we were going to execute it.

The D.G. told us for the first time that he was proposing to go to Canada on a short visit to assist in the reorganisation of the Special Branch and the Intelligence Branch of the Canadian Police. Commissioner Wood had asked that we should either give him an officer, or second one for a period of two years. There was no mention of the officer whom it was proposed to send. The D.G. said that he would not be going to Washington or to Ottawa; this might give rise to speculation and to further discussions in Congress or Parliament about the FUCHS case.

Val Boucher telephoned to say that Tubby CLAYTON is worried about Communism in Toc H, and wanted to see a representative of the Security Service. I said that if he could tell us when and where, we would see what we could do. It would not, however, be possible for us to advise on the subject of a purge of Communists from Toc H.

9th May.

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day, Dick said that we had had some warning from an agent regarding the May Day demonstrations which took place last Sunday and we had passed this on to Special Branch. As a result of this warning, the Police were in complete control from the start, 69 people were charged. He said that these demonstrations arose out of the refusal by the Home Secretary to meet members of the Trades Council regarding the ban on May Day rallies. The Communist Party had accordingly organised shock parties to break up Police cordons.

Perfect said that the Chief of the Railway Police had rung up on Saturday morning in order to give some information about these demonstrations, which he had accordingly passed on to B.I.A. He said he thought this was a good example of the willingness of the Railway Police to co-operate with us.

Dick said we had warned the Australians about one a Communist, whom they were proposing to employ in a branch of their Broadcasting Corporation in this country. In interviewing the man, however, they had informed him that what they called "the Security chaps" had something against him and that they had been warned accordingly. Dick said this is the second time this has happened with the Australians, although he did not think anything more would be heard of this case as the Australians had turned down for the job, and in any case our information had been derived from TABLE sources. He said he had given instructions to his officers that when visiting the Australians, they should ask the latter how they intended to handle our information and give advice when necessary.

Malcom gave the final instalment in the case, so far as the disposal of his person was concerned. Having arrived in Montreal, telephoned here to say that he had forgotten the addresses given to him and could we please supply them again! He is apparently now quite happy.

Hill said that O.S.3 had passed to him a draft Bill which the Southern Rhodesian Government have drawn up in order to combat Communism there. This will enable them to ban public meetings and to stop Communist propaganda coming into the country, etc. Hill said, however, that he was not at all happy about the section of the Bill dealing with the control of persons, which lays down that when a Minister makes a decision regarding an individual, the matter must then be referred to the Courts in order to decide whether or not the decision was justifiable. He said this is entirely contrary to our own constitutional practice and that it could not possibly work out satisfactorily, since the question of endangering sources would be involved. A Minister would probably be in possession of secret information which could not be disclosed in court, in which case the Court would be in no position to give judgement. We do not, Hill said, want a precedent of this kind established.

Serpell said that when the D.G. was in Southern Rhodesia a similar point arose in connection with immigrants, when the D.G. made it quite clear that we could not allow our evidence to be used in Court.

It was finally agreed that Shaw and Hill should look into this matter and, if necessary, point out to the C.R.O. Hill's doubts. If they agreed with this line, it was thought that the C.R.O. should be asked whether they would consider informing the Southern Rhodesian Government what they were letting themselves in for.

as a general principle we thought it was entirely wrong to think of keeping the man in a job because he had had access to secret information. The matter should be dealt with in a disciplinary way under the Official Secrets Acts. He asked Mr. Johnson to let us have details of the case, in order to have on record the name of a man who had been indiscreet. The Ministry of Defence are handling the matter as a disciplinary one and are not asking us to involve ourselves in the case.

 _____ came to discuss the WYBROW case. I explained to him that General Strong felt that he could not delay matters any longer. This did not mean, as Washington seemed to think, that all future leads into Israeli Intelligence would be broken; in fact, we hoped to devise ways and means for getting rid of WYBROW without his being too apprehensive. I said that I would like to think that Washington appreciated the dilemma, and felt reassured _____

As soon as the dismissal took place we would acquaint him, for the information of C.I.A., with the name of the person dismissed, and that individual's connection with Israeli Intelligence agents here. Thereafter, I think we might have a useful pooling of information as between ourselves, S.I.S., and C.I.A. We are already giving C.I.A. any memoranda on potential enemy Intelligence Services which we produce here, and there seems no reason why we should not do the same with regard to Israeli Intelligence. We should also, of course, pass a copy to the F.B.I., who might have considerable knowledge about Israeli Intelligence activities in the U.S.A.

During the course of this discussion, poor Alec unfortunately let out the name of WYBROW, not once but three times, and indeed showed the document in which WYBROW's name was mentioned to

With the utmost tact, _____ affected not to have hoisted this in! However, no damage has really been done.

10th May.

_____ brought his successor _____ in to see me and others in the office.

11th May.

Michael Cresswell, Chairman of the J.I.C. (FE), attended the J.I.C. to-day. He first reviewed the various countries in his area. In general he thought that the pace of deterioration had somewhat slackened. In Hong Kong there was no evidence of attack. In Indo-China there seemed to be a fair chance of cleaning up Tongking: if this was achieved, there was a reasonable chance that the French might make good. In South Korea the situation was much better: the Koreans seemed to be doing well with American assistance. In Siam things were improving. In Burma there was just a gleam of light, but a certain amount depends on what they may be able to achieve during the next two months. The situation in Indonesia is not too bad.

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As regards the military threat to Hong Kong, Cresswell thought that there were now enough Chinese troops in the area to constitute a threat, and that if they really contemplated action, we might not have more than about a week's warning. At the same time, he saw no signs of action.

The L.I.C. in Hong Kong was doing quite well; one had been started in Borneo and was beginning to get under way. In Malaya, however, the position was rather disquieting; he thought it was a matter of great urgency to get Jenkin out. It had not yet been finally decided what Jenkin's position would be, but he thought that it should be under General Briggs.

As regards the Interrogation Centre; this was not yet a going concern; there appeared to be some argument as to who was going to pay for it and there was a tendency in the Union to say that they never asked for it and that it was, therefore, up to London to supply the funds.

In talking to Cresswell afterwards, I was satisfied that he realised the importance of getting the Interrogation Centre going at the earliest possible moment. I gathered, too, that we are likely to refuse the Chinese the right to establish Consulates in Malaya. There is a certain exchange of information with Indo-China, up to and including "secret" on the basis of the need-to-know. The French are asking for information about Malaya, but this, for obvious reasons, cannot be supplied. At present our information about relations between VIET MINH and the C.C.P. is inadequate.

The draft security agreement between Australia and the Americans appears to be hanging fire. The Australians are sitting on it and the Americans are restive. It was suggested that the J.I.C. should communicate with Shedden.

The Chairman raised the question of the reduction of staffs behind the Iron Curtain, apparently on grounds of expense. He said that the Moscow Embassy now cost roughly £1,000,000 a year. The Services are anxious to maintain their staffs and a suggestion was made that bachelors only should be sent.

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We had a staff meeting on postings. We still have a certain number of vacancies.

12th May.

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I told Irvine that the J.I.C. had discussed a proposal to raise the issue of French security in a big way. This is due to disquieting reports, particularly in regard to the French Air Ministry. He thought that the matter would be better handled through N.A.T.O. than Western Union.

I lunched with _____ He told me that he was rather worried by certain apprehensions of S.D.E.C.E., particularly in the mind of _____ that Dick and Irvine were trying to build up the Surete at the expense of S.D.E.C.E. One of the instances which had caused this was a failure to let _____ know sometime ago that Irvine was going to Paris.

I told _____ that Irvine had quite properly notified Andre, presumably because he was the servant of the Permanent Commission. We had been scrupulously careful to avoid any suggestion that he was still the servant of M.I.5. Andre ought, of course, to have notified _____ and _____ but unfortunately Andre had omitted to do this. The first _____ knew of Irvine's presence in Paris was a telephone call after his arrival. I told _____ whom he would be seeing on Monday, that the last thing in the world we wished to do was to get mixed up in French intrigues; we had one aim and object and that was to get on with the job, and so long as there were two or three French Departments who had information bearing on our subjects, we should wish to be in touch with them all.

_____ quite understands the position and will do his best to smooth things over. He thinks that _____ will get a kick upstairs; _____ may then be recalled, but will certainly not be head of the organisation. It is likely, too, that _____ and _____ will also get a kick upstairs, in which case Vidal may take over. _____ has already promised the S.D.E.C. that he will regard _____ as his liaison officer in London. This sounds too good to be true! I gather, for some reason or another, that _____ still has confidence in me.

I attended an extremely dreary meeting of the Jebb Committee with Warner in the Chair, when we discussed the J.I.C.'s paper on subversive movements in Africa. The Chiefs of Staff want to know what is being done about this paper. A great deal of time was wasted in explaining to the Committee that in the British Colonies there were no Communist Parties and, indeed, with one or two exceptions, no Communists. Most of the movements were indigenous, but some of the African nationalists, perhaps not surprisingly, thought that Stalin was a good fellow as he kept on saying that they ought to be ruling themselves. Equally, I had to explain that most of the T.U.s were only in embryo and that, with the exception of the Miners Union in the Copper Belt, Northern Rhodesia, none were affiliated with the W.F.T.U.

Noel Wild came to see me to tell me about the reorganisation of L.C.S. I gather that Drew is to take over. Wild's view is that as the armed forces are so limited, the only chance is to go in for cold war in a big way. This may be so, but I am not quite sure whether Wild and Drew are the people to undertake the task. Wild has evidently been talking to TOKAYEV at very great length. The latter has persuaded him that there is a considerable amount of disaffection in Russia and that if these

elements were exploited, something in the nature of a counter-revolution might be started. I cannot help feeling that TOKAYEV has rather let his imagination run riot on this. Even if Stalin and Molotov go, it does not follow that there will be any change in the regime, for the very good reason that there is unlikely to be anyone there who would know how to change it.

 We had a staff meeting to-day. Roger is to create a new section to deal with security in Government Departments. We selected officers - VERNON, ELWELL is to go to S.I.F.E. and will be replaced by WAKEFIELD, who is returning from sick leave. Baskervyle-Glegg will go to B.4., Clayton to O.S., and Mills to B.4.c.

15th May.

Kerr of Glasgow S.B. came in to see me with Mann. Glasgow have done a really good piece of work in getting the membership of the Party in the Glasgow area. I congratulated Kerr on his coup and on the way which he had tabulated the information to suit our files.

 brought the American D.N.I., Admiral Johnson, and the head of Air Intelligence, General Corbell, to see me on a courtesy visit. It seemed a little odd that this introduction should have been effected through C.I.A., although I believe C.I.A. relations with the Navy and the Air Force are better than they are with G-2 and the Army.

16th May.

In Graham Mitchell's absence, Dick said the problem as to what policy should be adopted with regard to stopping the entry of foreign Communists into this country was becoming acute. He mentioned the case of a French African Communist who had visited this country twice during the last two months, and had announced his intention of visiting it again in the near future for the purpose of talking to Colonial students over here. We have put up a proposition to the Home Office, with the agreement of the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office, that although this man is a French Deputy, he should be refused permission to come again for the purpose of spreading Communist propaganda amongst Colonial students here. It is thought, Dick said, that the Home Office will accept this proposition. Dick also mentioned the case of another French Communist, closely associated with the Cominform, who had visited this country recently. We had warned the Home Office but they would do nothing as the man had stated that he was only visiting this country to place his child at school. It transpired, however, that the headmaster of the school in question was a member of the C.P. Executive. Conferences were, in fact, held, which were designed to bring the C.P.G.B. under the Cominform. Dick said attempts were being made to learn more about what was said at these conferences, and in the meantime he thought the Home Office should be warned of the extent to which people of this kind lie as to their intentions when they visit this country.

Dick went on to say that the Daily Worker of 15.5.50 gave plans for a World Peace Conference to be held on May 31st, to which many delegates from abroad will obviously be coming. He said that, unlike the Americans, our Government had hitherto done nothing to stop people

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coming here to attend such conferences and he felt it was time that some definite policy on the subject should be adopted as soon as possible. He said he would ask the Aliens Branch of the Home Office to inform us what decision is taken eventually.

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I asked if there was any suggestion that this case might be a "plant" by the C.P., in order to try and find out what our sources of information were in these cases. Dick replied that he did not know, but it was a possibility. I then went on to say that I thought it was a mistake to put up cases where there was only one piece of evidence. Dick said that we had not urged that the case should be put up, but the department concerned were most anxious that it should be. The D.G. asked whether when an individual comes before the Tribunal he is shown the evidence against him, or whether the accusation is made verbally. Dick said that the man is merely accused of being a member of the Party and that he is not shown the actual form of evidence.

Marriott spoke about the recent closing by the Czechs of the British Council and the British Information Service in Prague, and our retaliatory action in closing the Czechoslovak Cultural Institute in London. He said this latter move did not amount to much, since the Institute had not really functioned as such for about two years and in any case it was now technically a British concern and would continue to flourish. He said the Czechs had also been asked to close down their Information Service over here but he did not think this would have much effect either. He hoped, however that the ineffectiveness of these efforts might make the Foreign Office take notice of our annual expulsion of the Czech Military Attache!

Malcom Cumming told the meeting that the Americans had been perturbed over mysterious knockings which had been heard in the house next door to Admiral Connolly, C.-in-C. U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Having visions of microphones being installed the Americans had sought our aid. It transpired, however, that the lady next door was merely having her house redecorated!

Perfect said that the Home Office have set up a committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Alexander Maxwell, to enquire into the organisation of the Jersey Police. This had arisen out of a Scotland Yard enquiry last year into cases of arson on the Island, when the local Police had been most unco-operative. Sir Alexander Maxwell and Mr. Tarry had left for Jersey.

Shaw said he had been informed by Walsh-Atkins of the C.R.O. that a conference was to be held on the 17th May for Commonwealth High Commission when the question of Communism in their various countries was to be discussed.

He wanted to know if we could send somebody over to a briefing meeting this evening, when the Secretary of State would be in the Chair, to discuss the line to be taken at the forthcoming conference. It was thought this office could give information on Communism, which the C.R.O. could use in encouraging High Commissioners to make their own contributions on the subject. Shaw said that Keller and Oughton were to attend the meeting.

Shaw spoke about the importation of half-inch steel tubing into West Africa from this country. This matter was brought to our notice by the firm of Accles and Pollock, who, amongst other firms, had had orders for this material from West Africa. They said that this tubing had been used in the past for the manufacture of Home-made weapons, although now it was said to be needed for the manufacture of bicycles, etc., which would in fact not be made of this high-grade material in the ordinary way. He said this was a serious matter and S.L.O. Nigeria has been asked for his comments. The Nigerian Government have asked the Board of Trade to stop these supplies being sent out, but the Board of Trade replied that they could not do this as it might interfere with our export drive. Shaw said that orders had also come from South Africa for this tubing, which, he said, was curious as they had large supplies on the spot out there. The argument between the Board of Trade and the Nigerian Government is still continuing.

Furnival-Jones said we had now heard from Alan Roger that the aeroplanes which were sabotaged on the airfield at Hong Kong were the property of the Chinese Communist Government. Investigations were still going on and we are to receive a full report in due course. Unfortunately however, judgement was given in favour of the Chinese Communist Govt., since it was maintained that when they took over in China the air service concerned was automatically taken over by them. This had caused great embarrassment to the Government and to the C.R.O.

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Strong telephoned to me about a disciplinary matter in his office. His military representative had intimated to D.D.M.I. (O. & S.) that there was a leakage in J.I.B. Strong was anxious to know what his powers were for dealing with this man. I said, after consultation with Hill, that while he could proceed under the Army Act and under Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, this would obviously get him no where. It seemed to me that if the officer refused to disclose from whom he got the information in J.I.B., Strong was perfectly within his rights in saying that he had no further use for his services and that he should go back to his Regiment.

came in with a letter which he was proposing to send to the D.G. a propos of an incident

had by that time opened and read it. I do not think much harm has been done, because before we can collaborate with C.I.A. on Israeli Intelligence, we must know exactly where they stand. I could be referring the matter to Washington for their comments. I said that I thought when he had done so, it would be useful to have a round table discussion

seemed to be genuinely distressed about Kellar, who had, not unnaturally, been in a frightful state about what he had done. He hoped that Kellar would not get into any serious trouble as a result of his indiscretion.

17th May.

The D.G. left for Canada to-day with Michael Serpell.

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Holmes talked to me about the case of the "Illustrious", where flares were placed against the boiler. He was anxious to take finger prints of those who might be concerned, since prints had been discovered on the flares. I said I rather doubted whether this would be acceptable to the Admiralty, who were of course running a certain risk of being accused of forcing ratings to have their prints taken, even if this were done on a purely voluntary basis. Provided, however, he could carry the Board of Admiralty, I saw no objection.

Miss Chenhalls talked to me about the WYBROW case. It is now coming out fairly clearly that WYBROW was definitely the man responsible for the leakage from J.I.B.: he is obviously closely tied up with the Israeli Intelligence, and both his behaviour and that of his secretary are extremely dubious.

I held a meeting to-day with Hollis, Furnival Jones, Perfect, Holmes, Oughton and Mann on the question of Police vetting. It was agreed that there should be no alteration in the terms of the letter, addressed by B.L.A. to Chief Constables, when it is proposed to place a secret contract with a particular firm in a Chief Constables area. It was agreed that in future P.L.S. should make it clear at S.B. Officers' meetings that the results of any security vetting which they might carry out at the request of a firm should not be transmitted to that firm direct but through this office. It was felt that no further instructions to the existing ones given to C.2 officers with regard to their relations with the Police were necessary. C.2 undertook to inform the Chief Constable of Dorsetshire that in our view the demand made by Sir Alan Cobham's firm for the vetting of their employees was throwing too heavy a burden on the Police and should be resisted.

18th May.

At the J.I.C. to-day Blount gave an account of his visit to the Far East. On the whole what he had to say was already known; he did, however, draw attention to the dangers of spreading disease in rubber plantations. The Americans are very largely dependent upon the rubber they get from Malaya. The Russians are, however, also getting considerable quantities and will probably, therefore, be opposed to the spreading of any disease until they have completed their stock-piling. It appears that the disease could be very easily spread with no more than the contents of a fountain pen; it would spread rapidly and could not be checked. The young rubber could be destroyed in twelve minutes. Blount

appears to have met Jack Morton, and other M.I.5 officers, and to have formed a very good opinion of them wherever he went. In India he met Kitchin.

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Cresswell, Chairman of the J.I.C. Far East, was also at the meeting. He mentioned the demand in Malaya for good Intelligence Officers; they are for the purpose of collating information received and no linguistic qualifications are apparently required.

We discussed a paper placing restrictions on the movements of members of the Russian Trade Delegation. It was agreed that the number of members of the R.T.D. could not be regarded as excessive, in view of economic and trade factors. It appears that we are already restricting certain types of machinery being sent to Russia; meanwhile, we learn that other European countries are selling the same articles. The question of restricting the movements of members of the Russian Trade Delegation may be considered further. It is realised, however, that it presents a formidable administrative problem. The Services said they had noticed that certain members of the R.T.D. had a military background; they thought that if we could supply lists of members of the R.T.D. since 1946, it might be worth checking the names against the Services personality index. It was finally decided that no request should be made to cut down the size of the R.T.D., but that recommendations should be made to harass both Service Attaches and members of the R.T.D. The Russians should be asked to state by what routes they intended to travel and the Passport Control should demand fuller particulars of reasons for visits.

D.M.I. raised, off the Agenda, the question of the application of the purge system to employees of SIGINT. He quoted the case of a man named _____ in Cyprus, who had written to the Greek League for Democracy in London, asking for literature and to be informed whether his letter had been censored. On present information, the man could not be brought up under the purge system. Even if it were permissible to post him elsewhere, there is no place to which he could be sent where he would be likely to less damage than he may be doing in Cyprus. D.N.I. had another case, and

It was agreed that before proceeding further with this matter, 'C' and I should consult with Bridges.

I was talking to Graham and he tells me that eighty-nine cases have been dealt with under the purge. In 44 cases there was no counter-challenge by the accused: Among the 40 challenged who were seen by the Advisers, 14 had the charge upheld; in three cases the prima facie ruling was withdrawn; in two cases there were extenuating circumstances; in 18 the case was not upheld, and in three the accused declined to appear. There are some 185 cases being investigated, where there is only suspicion. In some 67 cases Ministers to whom a prima facie case has been submitted have decided to take no action, owing to the innocuous employment of the accused.

Wild came to tell me that Drew had been appointed as head of L.C.S. He seemed pleased at this idea, as he thought it might lead to more positive action.

I went to see Howe and Burt, at Burt's request. Howe told me that two things had recently come to his notice about which he thought I ought to know. He had been dining with Doughty, who is I believe Recorder of Brighton, when a _____ had been present and was evidently a great friend.

of Doughty's. It seemed on the whole to be extremely undesirable that he was boasting a great deal about his own importance; he travelled a great deal and offered to get Howe through the Customs if he was ever in difficulties, etc., etc. In fact, he gave the impression of being a kind of _____ a dubious financial adventurer who gave us a lot of trouble during the war. The conversation turned on the FUCHS case, when _____ said that he understood from a friend of his in M.I.5 that in fact all the newspaper talk was nonsense; that M.I.5 had had the whole thing taped and were employing sixteen watchers to unravel the FUCHS network. Ronnie Howe eventually asked _____ who his informant was, when the latter replied that it was a man named _____. I said that I should like to take this up, but Howe was anxious that I should say nothing until he had made further enquiries about _____

Howe then asked me about _____ Did I realise that he had been brought up in the very worst possible Police circles, namely, under two Brighton Police chiefs, Griffin and Gentle. He said that in the whole annals of the Police it would be impossible to find two more shocking characters. He knew nothing against _____ but it did of course often happen that if the heads of a Police Force were bad, the subordinates were of the same vintage. I said that if he had anything positive about _____ I should naturally wish to go further. He promised that if anything did come to his notice he would let me know.

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19th May.

I attended a further meeting of the Jebb Committee, with Warner in the Chair, when we discussed affairs in the Middle East and the possibility of assisting Middle Eastern countries to improve their security forces. We had, of course, done this in the Lebanon, where after a visit by Graham Mitchell a Police officer had been appointed. We had also sent an officer to Persia, and hoped to get a Police Adviser. I said that I thought a Police Adviser was the best solution, but that it would generally need a visit beforehand to ascertain precisely what was required.

Glegg and Lamphere of the F.B.I. have arrived to interrogate FUCHS. They have brought with them some reasonably good photographs of a man called Harry GOLD, whom they believe to be identical with FUCHS's contact in the U.S.A. They sent us a somewhat phoney photograph of this man several weeks ago, which FUCHS had failed to identify. I believe they also have a movie of Harry GOLD. It seems to us that it was their intention to represent this visit as a scoop for the F.B.I. where the British had failed.

20th May.

The F.B.I. interrogated FUCHS and showed him photographs. He would go no further than to say that he would not discard the possibility of identity. Meanwhile, I warned Pat Reilly of what we thought was going on. We also sent a telegram to Geoffrey Patterson.

22nd May.

The arrest of Harry GOLD has broken. As re rather expected, the reflection in the Press here is that the Americans told us about FUCHS, leading to the latter's arrest, but we refused to allow them to

interrogate FUCHS, but that now we have done so they have solved their case in forty-eight hours, where we failed. The question arose as to whether I should have said anything to Clegg before the break. I took the view that it was difficult to accuse the F.B.I. of trying to make a scoop before they had done so, and that in any case we had to reckon with the fact that we were dealing with a cross between a political gangster and a prima donna, who had no intimate knowledge of the case and who, even if he had, would be quite prepared to sacrifice anything and anybody if his own position was at stake. He would have no idea of the measure of our co-operation and, indeed, it would be in the interests of his own people to keep the information from him. If, therefore, there was a total break, Hoover would never know what he had lost.

23rd May.

I talked to Boddington about interviewing certain people in the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office on the subject of the leakage of information concerning the Templer Mission. It seemed to me that Boddington had done well in a similar case affecting the Admiralty some time ago, and that he might well undertake this work under Hill's direction.

At the D.G meeting to-day I told them about a criticism of the purge system by the Ds of I., which is based on one or two cases of SIGINT personnel. They have expressed anxiety regarding the security of SIGINT and intend to put the whole matter to the Chiefs of Staff. I said I had pointed out to them that there was a constitutional issue in this. We had made it quite clear that there were many disadvantages in the purge system, but we had been overruled and we had, therefore, operated it to the best of our ability under instructions from the Prime Minister. We could not be a part to any joint criticism put up by the Ds of I., but if they did so the matter would automatically be referred back to us for comments. This, I said, was accepted by the Ds of I., but it was decided that as a preliminary step 'C' and I should see Bridges.

In this connection, Graham Mitchell said it might be possible for Departments to ring off a very small number of highly secret jobs, in the same way as is being done with the Ministry of Supply at the moment in connection with positive vetting. It would be possible, he said, without damaging the purge system, for Departments not to post people to these jobs when their reliability was in doubt.

I asked Graham to study the situation and to let me know, as far as he could, what the concerted view was in order to make some concrete proposal to Bridges.

John Marriott said he knew nothing about the Russian trawlers which have recently been anchored off Plymouth. He said it was interesting, however, that two travelling Russians who were concerned with the distribution of "Soviet News" were due to have made a trip to Birmingham but suddenly turned up in Southampton instead. It was thought that this was probably due to the fact that Western Union naval manoeuvres were shortly due to start. I said I would probably hear more about this at the next J.I.C. Directors' meeting. Dick thought something interesting in this connection might turn up on the B.2a checks. Alec Kellar expressed the view that this move by the Russians was purely cold war

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propaganda. When our ships stray into Russian waters they are arrested and there is a tremendous fuss, but the Russians are allowed to come boldly into Plymouth harbour unimpeded.

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Graham spoke about the Working Party of the Jebb Committee and discussions which had been going on regarding the admission of leading members of foreign Communist Parties into this country to attend conferences, etc. This had arisen in connection with the World Peace Conference, which is to take place next week. Oughton and Miss Bagot had attended the meeting of the Working Party last week and had found themselves in the extraordinary position of having to explain to the Foreign Office that the Home Secretary had certain powers to refuse people to land in this country! Graham went on to say that it had been suggested that the whole matter should be put up for a high level decision on policy between the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary, who were the two people immediately concerned; it will then probably go up to the Cabinet. He said it was unlikely that a policy decision would be reached before the World Peace Conference takes place. A report on the subject is being prepared by the Working Party.

Vickery reported U'ren's return to this country. He said that India is relying more and more on us and they could not do without our S.L.O. there at all. This is satisfactory.

I gave lunch to the F.B.I. Everything went off quite pleasantly. Their interrogation was continuing, but they are already covering ground which has been covered by Jim Skardon. I learned off the record from Thistle, who has seen something of Bob Lamphere, that my estimate of Hoover is not very wide of the mark. He clearly

did not know what he was doing when he sent Fletcher to his outstation in San Francisco, and relegated Lish Whitson to a junior position. Fletcher had more knowledge of Soviet espionage than anybody else in the Bureau and all Hoover has really done is to dislocate his organisation. A similar position would be reached here if the D.G. suddenly sacked Dick White and John Marriott.

 George Jenkin came round. He has accepted the post as Adviser to the Malayan Government on Intelligence matters, but is still in the air as to his precise position vis a vis General Briggs. I told him all I could, and said how glad I was he was going as I was sure that he could get the S.B.s on to the right lines. He said that he thought he would be able to effect a very satisfactory liaison with S.B., Singapore, as the head of it was a personal friend of his.

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 25th May.

I went to see Pat Reilly to ask him whether the Foreign Office had considered the political aspects of the proposal to hold the World Peace Conference in London on the 31st May. From the security point of view we did not mind, provided _____ was not admitted, since we thought it might be his intention to establish contact with West African students. If, however, the matter was being considered by the Gold War Committee, on the lines of getting some joint action in Western Union about such conferences, it might be a pity to allow London to be the centre of such an important meeting. Alternatively, if the delegates were turned back the publicity and propoganda might be worse. It seemed to be an open question but one that should be considered on a high level.

Reilly did not know who was handling this in the Foreign Office; whether it was the Northern Department or I.R.D. He said there was a question of setting up an anti-Communist section in the Foreign Office to deal with these matters in future and that he hoped it would be under himself. On this occasion he finally ran the problem to earth in I.R.D. They said that they had been considering it carefully and that they were putting a recommendation up to Kenneth Younger that _____ and _____ should be refused. I heard later that Younger had suggested to the Home Secretary that Russians and Stellites should be refused, but that Western Europeans should be given admission, although what the logic of this decision is I fail to understand. Ultimately it was decided to stop nobody; this presumably on the Home Secretary's recommendation.

I mentioned again to Pat Reilly the question of bringing the Home Office more into the Intelligence picture. He apologised for having done nothing beyond speaking to Strang. I gathered, however, that it was his intention to tackle the problem on the first appropriate occasion.

 Perfect came to talk to me about the sabotage case on the "Illustrious" at Plymouth. The Admiralty have now got cold feet about taking the finger prints of ratings. The Board agreed that this was to be done, but C.-in-C. Plymouth got rattled and approached the First Lord, who reversed the order. All very typical.

 30th May.

The D.G. returned from Canada. He wishes to see Clegg, as he is profoundly dissatisfied with the reports in the American and Canadian press on the FUCHS case. I gave the D.G. an account of what had happened since his departure. I told him that I was proposing to see Bridges with

'C' to-morrow on the question of unpurgeable people in SIGINT.

 Telegrams from Hong Kong show that the C.I.A. incident is calming down. C.I.A. will, I think, withdraw at an early date.

 Hutson of the Home Office rang about the letter to FUCHS informing him of the Home Secretary's decision to denaturalise him. I said that it would be most unfortunate if this letter arrived in the middle of the American interrogations, and, indeed, that there was still, we hoped, one more identification on this side in which we thought FUCHS might be able to assist us. I had spoken to the D.G. and he wished to have a word with Newsam. This he subsequently did and obtained a respite until the 15th June.

 Thistle brought me in a draft on the E.V.W. situation, which I am sending to Newsam.

31st May.

'C' and I saw Bridges about non-purgeable cases in SIGINT. Winnifritth was also present. It was agreed that administrative adjustments would have to be made, where this was possible without recourse to challenge. If a dismissal had to take place, it could only be done on grounds of inefficiency, etc. These grounds would have to be carefully considered by us in conjunction with the Department concerned and the Treasury. In either case we should be given a month to six weeks for intensive investigation before action was taken. This, it was hoped, would reduce any question of victimisation to the minimum.

Bridges mentioned that in conversation with the Prime Minister and Bevin, a desire had been expressed for an enquiry on a Ministerial level into the activities of M.I.5 and M.I.6. Although the FUCHS case was obviously the cause of this, the enquiry was to be of a general nature. Bridges had stalled on this, as he thought it unnecessary, but had been obliged to compromise by suggesting that Norman Brook should conduct the enquiry, possibly with the assistance of Drew. He hoped we would not mind. Feeling that it did not matter much whether we minded or not, we made no comment. Bridges had also been asked whether he thought there should not be a Minister in charge of Secret Services. This he had vetoed successfully; he could think of nothing more undesirable - the more so since we should probably get some low-grade Minister Without Portfolio who had nothing else to do.

1st June.

Langley, Director of Scientific Intelligence in Canada, spoke to the J.I.C. about his work.

I presume that he has now become a Canadian citizen. What seemed to be of interest in his brief talk was the similarity between geological and meteorological conditions in Northern Canada and in a large part of the North Eastern sector of Soviet territory. He appeared to have made a very careful study of this.

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The D.N.I. mentioned that Schofield, his representative on the J.S.M. in Washington, had recently paid a visit to Canada. He had found that, in Service circles at any rate, de COURCY's recent lectures had made a very deep impression. It was even suggested that his remarks about Russian developments of atomic energy were so depressing as to cause people to wonder whether it was worth while proceeding with the cold war - in fact he was trying to engender a defeatist attitude, although with what measure of success he did not know.

It was thought desirable that the Foreign Office should inform the C.R.O. and let them have the note on de COURCY which they had circulated to their Ambassadors.

The D.M.I. said that he had recently had a long talk with King Carol, who apparently had an elaborate intelligence system and seemed to be well-informed.

A.C.A.S.(I) said that Air Vice Marshal George was reassuring about the state of security in the Air Ministry; which was not as bad as he thought. He could not, however, speak about the position in Civil Affairs Ministries. The Ministry of Defence, he thought, was trying to get down to the Communist problem.

The Directors of Plans attended the meeting for a discussion on French insecurity. They said the present position was leading to a deadlock all round and was hampering the preparation of papers. This was the more important, since it seemed that the Standing Group for NATO in Washington was really to become a kind of Combined Chiefs of Staff in peace and war. If we could not talk freely to the French, this was going to be very difficult.

As suggestion was made that the Minister of Defence might approach the French Minister of Defence, Plevin. I said I thought that this ought to be followed by a discussion on security standards, on somewhat similar lines to those that we were proposing to hold in Washington with the Americans. Such discussions would deal with vetting, the purge system, and the METRIC and COSMIC systems.

Wild and Drew came to talk about deception. Drew has just taken over the L.C.S. He said that his aim and object was to obtain the channels and to pass something through them which would produce a reaction which could be noted. I pointed out to him the great difficulty of providing such a channel. While it was possible to find people who would receive information on behalf of the Soviet Government, it was extremely difficult to know what they thought of it when they got it, and still more difficult to know what Moscow thought of it. Apart from this, reaction on information of this sort was less likely in time of peace than in time of war. Drew thought that we might from time to time come upon channels which obviously, from a C.E. point of view, would lead us nowhere, but which might be of interest to him. I said that this was possible and that we would certainly keep our eyes open. Drew subsequently saw the D.G., when it was arranged that he should come and talk to Directors.

Clegg and Lamphere came to say good-bye. The D.G. had seen them on the previous day. He referred first of all to Mr. Hoover's message, in which he had spoken of his sense of outrage at the lack of co-operation. He hoped his reply had made it clear that he considered Mr. Hoover's criticisms to be unfair. He did not like the references that he had seen

in the Press, while he was in Canada, to the FUCHS case, and in particular the arrest of GOLD; the implication was that the F.B.I. had succeeded where M.I.5 had failed, or had been obstructed. He said that if there were further press comments reflecting on the reputation of his Service, they might well lead to Questions in the House of Commons, and he would not hesitate to put forward factual statements on the real relations between M.I.5 and the F.B.I in reply to such Questions. He felt that his Service had shown considerable patience up to the present time, but this patience was not inexhaustible.

Clegg replied that he would have no objection to such statements being made; there was nothing to hide, and that the F.B.I. had a clear conscience. He said that Hoover's sense of outrage was not directed against M.I.5, but against officials of the British Government.

The D.G. saw Newsam yesterday about the denaturalisation letter which the Home Office were proposing to send to FUCHS. It was agreed that the despatch of this letter should be postponed until June 15th.

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"The Giant Panda" (Denham) came in to talk about a recent visit of his to Malaya. He seemed to think that S.O. activities were called for. I do not quite know what his business is, but I gather that he travels about looking at rubber plantations, not only in Malaya but also in Java and Sumatra. He was anxious to have returned to him his notes on his visit to the Caribbean. I told him that nobody was allowed to take away their diaries, and that in fact the late D.G. had destroyed his before leaving. I would, however, have a look at these notes and let him know my views.

2nd June.

I saw the D.M.I. and the D.N.I., in order to explain to them what Bridges had said in regard to jumping the purge system for SIGINT employees. I made a point of telling them how necessary it was to allow for a period of a month to six weeks intensive investigation, in order to avoid as far as possible any accusation of victimisation. I cited to them the examples of a woman in the A.T.S. and of the case in the I.D.C., and pointed out that where the facts were absolutely correct, the circumstances as finally disclosed put a completely different complexion on each case. They were much impressed and interested by these two examples. I said that there were quite a number of others of varying kinds. I then pointed out that while the purge system was clearly necessary, since, although every Communist was not necessarily a spy, the temptation to become one if he had access to secret information was obviously very great; he would probably start by disclosing some confidential information to his local group; this would get to the ears of the District Party Committee, who might ask him to elaborate. Finally, he might well be asked to produce a document or a copy of one. I was, however, important to realise that it was not always the Communist who was the spy - a review of cases over a period of twenty years revealed that something between 60% and 70% of the British subjects involved were not Party men; they might have a Marxian background; they might believe vaguely in the Russian experiment; or they might be pro-Russian for other reasons. Equally, they might be subject to certain vices which got them into debt, or they might quite unwittingly drift into espionage through some apparently innocent commercial enquiry which they had been asked to make. The element of blackmail sometimes entered into the picture. The

number of potential spies in these categories was, of course, very large, and detection extremely difficult. The lesson of the FUCHS case showed that in similar circumstances another man of his kind might well be recruited for a secret project. Once the decision had been made to employ FUCHS, there were two fields of detection. Firstly, the field where he obtained the information, and secondly, the field where he transmitted it. In the first field there was really no prospect of success, since the information was either the product of FUCHS' brain, or he was entitled to it in view of his position. In the second field there was a period of a year when he did not operate at all, and thereafter he only made contact about once every three months. It followed, therefore that unless you were behind him continuously for three months without his becoming aware that he was the subject of observation - in itself an extremely difficult task - there was very little chance of obtaining a result.

When you considered that there were literally hundreds of cases of a prima facie kind, where the evidence was far stronger than in the case of FUCHS, it would be realised that we were up against a formidable problem.

I then explained that our machinery was designed, as far as possible, to concentrate on Party members, associates, and anybody who was believed to be engaged in underground activity. It was on the basis of this information that we tried to obtain from the centre that we carried out our vetting commitment. To approach the problem from the circumference involving the Ministry of Supply, industrials, involving some 300,000 people, would merely clog the whole machine. I wondered whether for SIGINT personnel it would not be possible to get them under some sort of ceiling. This would remove them from the purge procedure and enable the authorities to deal with them administratively or by Court Martial.

D.M.I. said that this had been put up but had been shot down on grounds of economy. I wondered whether it would not be possible to reopen the matter on a really high level, but what shook me far more was the fact that conscripts were being taken into Eastcote and employed in SIGINT establishments abroad; then passing out fully indoctrinated at the completion of their service. Firstly, they left the Service just at the time that they were becoming most useful, and secondly, since many of them were about twenty years of age, their political views might not have formulated, and nobody knew whether they would go Right, Left or Centre. This, surely, was a very great danger. Both Shortt and Longley-Cooke agreed, but did not see what could be done. They both seemed extremely grateful for what I had told them and, I think, considerably enlightened and reassured about our work.

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6th June.

I attended the J.I.C. to-day, when we discussed French security. I put forward a suggestion that ~~to~~ an approach by the Minister of Defence,

we should send over a commission to discuss security standards on the basis of: (a) vetting. (b) the purge system, and (c) METRIC and COSMIC security. To soften the blow, we should say that the Americans had expressed anxiety about our security; that we were not wholly satisfied with theirs, and to resolve the difficulty we had agreed to a meeting in Washington. Whether their doubts were legitimate or otherwise, it was essential to clear the matter up, otherwise there would be a restriction in the flow of secret information which could only be detrimental to the Allied cause. We were anxious about the French position, not unnaturally, since there were one and a half million Communists in France and 168 Deputies in the Chamber.

It was generally agreed that this was the right approach. It was felt, however, that we should tell the Americans what we were doing and about our anxieties, since the matter had a bearing upon the affairs of the Standing Group of NATO.

I had lunch with ~~XXXXXX~~ He was worried about the election of the new Secretary to the S.I.C. We had put forward a candidate; one had also been put forward by the Surete, an ex-Prefect and a member of Berthaux's Cabinet(?). If the Surete representative were elected, participation by the S.D.E.C.E. in the affairs of the S.I.C. would cease, at any rate in all but name. The S.D.E.C.E. were, therefore, hotly in favour of a British representative being appointed. ~~XXXXXX~~ thought that if the French stood down, it was by no means certain that the French, Belgians, and Luxembourgers would elect the English candidate. I said that whatever happened it would have to be subject to the approval of the Permanent Commission, and that in the event of things going wrong they might act as a long-stop.

~~XXXXXX~~ then asked me about co-operation with the Americans. He thought that the F.B.I. must be pursuing useful enquiries as the result of the arrest of GOLD. Could we pass on to them such information as we received, or would it be better for them to approach the Americans direct? I said that we could not pass anything on without F.B.I. approval, and that I felt it would be far better if the French made a direct approach. In this way they would build up a useful liaison for themselves on an exchange basis.

~~XXXXXX~~ then asked about Stephens' visit to Paris. He said he thought it would be an excellent thing if I could accompany him, as he was sure that such a visit would be appreciated by ~~XXXXXX~~. I said I would do my best to go.

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~~XXXXXX~~ came to see me. He had had a visit from Carrol of the Garda, who was definitely worried about the drilling that was going on quite openly in Phoenix Park. He said that although this matter was reported to the authorities, there was not one of them who would interfere - least of all McBride. Costello might not approve such activities, but politically he would not like to interfere with any anti-partition move, as in so doing he might hand a stick to Dev. Carrol had also heard that certain members of the I.R.A. were definitely gunning for Roger Moore. He apparently warned Roger about this, as he took the matter seriously. He said that when Roger left there would be no co-operation with his successor, Kennedy. Carrol also told ~~XXXXXX~~ that he himself should be more circumspect in the contacts that he made in Dublin; Carrol was glad to meet him, but thought that if he were coming over they should meet down in Wexford.

I suggested to _____ that Carrol himself might be the subject of attention by the I.R.A., in view of the liaison that he had now had for many years with the North, and that he was, therefore, anxious to cease contact with Roger Moore and was consequently trying to scare him out of the Force: then saying that he could not conduct a liaison with his successor. _____ said that of course this was a possibility, but in his view an unlikely one.

I talked to _____ again about _____ I had respected Howe's wishes, but I was nevertheless anxious to clear the position up with _____ undertook to have another talk with Howe.

Drew addressed a meeting of Directors on his deception requirements.

Jim Skardon interviewed _____ yesterday. _____ went so far as to say that he had met CLAYTON and MILNER in the Communist Society (?) and that over a few drinks he might have been indiscreet in 1945. He was generally evasive when he had the facts formally put to him by Skardon, and was told that we were quite certain of our information. He made no real denial. Skardon is to see him again to-morrow.

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7th June.

The boredom of the Deputies' J.I.C. meeting to-day was relieved by a statement from Rankin of the Air Ministry, by an explanation of a brief statement that had appeared in the press about a "flying saucer" over here. One of our jet pilots, flying at 20,000 feet off the South Coast, had seen several thousand feet above him, what he described as a flying saucer, some 50ft in diameter. It was flying considerably faster than his own plane. Curiously enough there had been some confirmation of this by local RADAR units; at the material time an object had appeared in the screen travelling very fast, and had suddenly been noticed to travel equally fast in the opposite direction. The turn of an aeroplane is done visibly in the screen, but on this occasion nothing was visible; the object merely started going in the opposite direction. We have been promised a further statement on this matter. At the moment one can only remain sceptical. The curious thing to me is that these flying saucers never seem to come to earth, but that, of course, might possibly be due to the very high speed at which they are travelling, if in fact they exist at all.

I had a meeting with Hamblen, Miss Bagot, and Serpell about the Foreign Office proposal that in future when any Department is about to write a paper on any aspect of Communism, the facts should be noted to Reilly, so that other Departments can either contribute or stake a claim as users. The meeting appeared to be rather concerned that this business should be centralised in the Foreign Office instead of in the J.I.C.

I said that I did not think it really mattered and that there was some point in getting things centralised under Reilly. It was agreed, however, to notify the Secretary that in our view there should be consultation between the parties concerned before the report was drafted and after the first draft had been prepared.

Hutson rang about the S.I.C. memorandum on the Transport Workers section of the W.F.T.U. which is going before the Permanent Commission. It contains a recommendation that the Western Union Powers should agree to put the gate up against certain black-listed personnel. I said that I had discussed this matter with the French, as I felt that it did clearly impinge upon the powers of Ministers of the Interior. The view was that the Permanent Commission could either accept or reject the idea, and that the Foreign Office concerned would then pass the proposal to their respective Ministers of the Interior, who would have the final say. If, therefore, our Foreign Office representative on the Permanent Commission agreed to the proposal, it would presumably be submitted to the Home Secretary. Hutson wondered, perhaps wisely, whether the Foreign Office would consult the Home Office and thought that he had better enter a caveat. I suggested that he should communicate direct with Jebb.

Wild rang up to tell me that he was proposing to see Admiral Daniel of the I.D.C. about his lecture, in view of the presence of Indian students. I said that if he could arrange a meeting, I should be very glad to go with him. I did not feel that I could say what I normally do if the Indians were there, and that if I did not tell the whole story it was difficult to make sense of our activities during the war.

Hollis tells me that Fenton has put in a very good report about the Ipswich sabotage incident, involving considerable damage to a Power Station. The trouble was caused by someone turning off all the oil cocks. Fenton's solution is that there should be no oil cocks, but plugs. So far the Police have not succeeded in discovering the culprit. Meanwhile Holmes is interviewing a man called _____, arrested on a charge of larceny, at Hove. _____ alleges that he was associated with a Russian and a Pole who were intending to blow something up with gelignite, either at Harwell or at the Royal Ordnance Depot at Didcot. We have to take this seriously, although I feel convinced that it is a mare's nest.

8th June.

I saw Sir Ralph Stephenson, Ambassador to Cairo, in the D.G.'s absence, with Shaw. I explained to him the general set-up of S.I.M.E., and in particular the duties of Emery and Ffoulkes, who are members of his staff. I explained to him that our relations with the Egyptian Police, although somewhat expensive, were on the whole good.

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Stephenson asked about Sansom, the Security Officer at the Embassy, whose services were to be dispensed with. He wondered whether they would be of any use to us. I said that we should have to refer the matter to S.I.M.E.

Stephenson said that Slim's conversations had been very sticky at the outset. The Egyptians had been adamant about our leaving Egypt. Finally, Slim had said that if that was their final word, they have to understand that we should rely upon the Treaty, which was valid until 1956, and that we should then leave Egypt never to return. It would be useless for the Egyptians to invoke our aid when they were in trouble. This somewhat dangerous bluff seems to have been successful; it was followed up by a large cocktail party, when various hints and suggestions for a

solution were thrown out. The atmosphere was so alcoholic, however, that nobody knew quite what they amounted to and there was a great deal of eleven-hour coming and going, even to the extent of officials arriving with documents at the Air Port. There is apparently some suggestion that the Egyptians might agree to joint air defence, which would have to involve the preparation of aerodromes and the leaving of various dumps required for starting up operations immediately in a crisis. There seems, however, to be some doubt as to whether we could afford to move the Army to Cyrenaica. Stephenson thought, however, that these proposals, if they were confirmed, might form the basis of further negotiations. The whole business was typically oriental; the Egyptians keeping their rock-bottom price until the last moment.

The Chiefs of Staff have produced a paper on their defence policy on global strategy, dated 1st May, for discussion by the Cabinet. They have four major priorities:

1. a. A.A. air defence of U.K.
- b. Maintenance of the American and European lifeline.
- c. The European military front.
2. Adequate striking power from suitable bases.
3. Minimum land, sea, and air strengths to hold the position during the cold war in the Middle East, Far East, European theatre, and the Pacific.
4. Minimum forces to hold the Egyptian (?) bases.

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The report also recommended that Ministers should review the existing position, that so long as the Communist Party remained a legal political organisation, H.M.G. should not undertake anti-Communist activity at home; this, of course, for the reason that the Government in power cannot use Government funds to attack another Party which is legal. The Cabinet discussed this paper on the 25th May, and more or less approved the Chiefs of Staff report. On the question of the legality of the Party, the Foreign Secretary said that the cold war activities at home were an extremely delicate issue; he thought that the adoption of more offensive tactics against Communism in England might very well provoke the very state of affairs we should be trying to avoid.

Skardon has seen [redacted] again and has induced him to write a statement. There is no doubt in our minds that [redacted] is a guilty party. He telephoned to his wife from a callbox immediately after the first interview, but said no more than that something extremely serious had happened in regard to something that he had done.

I saw A.C.A.S.(I) on the same subject which I discussed with D.N.I. and D.M.I. I found him very receptive. He had evidently been giving the subject considerable thought. I had the impression that both he and the D.M.I. felt that the legality of the Communist Party should be brought to an end. In fact, A.C.A.S.(I) definitely said so. Clearly it is also the view of the Chiefs of Staff. A.C.A.S.(I) probably feels more hotly about it, as he was formerly our Air Attache in Moscow. I said that on the whole I was against it, certainly at the present time. So far experience had shown that ~~that~~ the Party was better dealt with by pulling away the bricks from under it than by using the bludgeon. I advanced all the usual arguments. During the last thirty years it had kept the T.Us alive to its responsibilities and so prevented a serious upheaval in the Labour movement. In spite of the fact that it was now the only Party telling the workers to do less work for more money, it was making

no substantial headway. Its membership of 46,000 was constant, since while 10,000 new members joined yearly, 10,000 fell away. The unreasonableness of the Soviet Government, demonstrated in a blaze of publicity on U.N.O., had had a considerable effect, particularly on those who are always anxious to make a case for Russia. As an illegal party it would be more difficult to deal with. If it re-emerged under a different name with a "Peace and Democracy" cry, it might gain more adherents and would maintain precisely that element which by throwing dust in peoples' eyes was really dangerous. The out and out Communist who preached violence did not get very far. The T.U.s were making a real effort to put their house in order. This did not say that there might not come a moment when the Left would get out of balance and action would have to be taken. It certainly would have to be taken in a crisis.

 Skardon has seen a Lithuanian, who with EGOROV of the Soviet Embassy has been travelling about in the midlands in connection with the same of "Soviet News". He denied that he was engaged on any other sinister activity; he gave the impression that he did not wish to betray his masters. Skardon impressed on him that it was his duty to assist the authorities and that, even if he and EGOROV were doing nothing illegal, he would render a service if he reported precisely what they were doing. Skardon will be seeing him again.

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 9th June.

I had a long talk with Hill about the legality of the Communist Party. Hill thinks, and apparently Oughton and others, that the C.P. should be declared illegal. They do not think that our work would be hampered, as they feel that such action would reduce the hard core of the Party to about 5,000. Hill would proceed by having a Royal Commission, with Goddard in the Chair, although he was not too sanguine when I asked him what sort of case he thought the office could present. While, of course, it was an easy matter in the old days to prove that the Party which adhered to the Comintern was an illegal conspiracy against the King Emperor, such proof would now be extremely difficult. The evidence to be presented could only be circumstantial, unless admissions could be extracted from C.P. officials who would be sub poenaed. Personally I am still convinced that such action now would be unwise; we should inevitably get driven into the position of penalising any party which had any sympathy with Russian foreign policy. Even Dick seemed to be veering towards illegality for the C.P. I think, however, that I have convinced him that while it is always well to have an open line, any such action would be undesirable. I shuddered to think of the publicity that this Department would get if all its officers were sub poenaed before a Royal Commission. It would, moreover, be extremely difficult to conceal our sources.

 A notice appeared in the Evening News yesterday, suggesting that the M.I.5 representative in Australia was going to take over the Australian Security Service. We have asked Courtenay Young for his views.

 Geoffrey Patterson has written an account of the somewhat unsatisfactory relations that now exist between ourselves and the F.B.I. Our representative was given no intimation prior to GOLD's arrest and nothing is being said to anyone about subsequent developments. Mickey Ladd has made it clear that this is due to an order ~~the~~ from "the Boss", who thinks that the

previous close liaison may lead to undesirable disclosures. There appears to be a firm idea that the British have been trying to put the screw on the Americans. This is a criticism not so much of M.I.5, but of the Home Office action in turning down the original request for an interview with FUCHS. The American attitude is, of course, wholly wrong, stupid, and unreasonable; it merely shows how utterly incapable they are of seeing anybody's point of view except their own, and that they are quite ready to cut off their noses to spite their faces! It would, of course, be easy for to clamp down on everything and refuse to answer any further American enquiries. I think, however, we can be relied upon not to do anything so foolish. The whole business is utterly childish.

I understand that Clegg reported by wire, and in person his interview with the D.G. We do not quite know yet what the reaction to this has been.

10th June.

Potter came to discuss with me a number of erroneous reports which have been submitted to us from time to time by Special Branch. A typical example was a long report with a list of people described as "members and supporters of the Communist Party", with no indication as to which were members and which supporters. In twenty-seven cases taken at random, Special Branch mention individuals reported by us to them as 1950 members. We do not know whether in reporting these people back they have confirmatory evidence, or whether they are merely quoting from our reports. There is a lot of this sort of thing going on and I shall have to try and get it straightened out with Burt.

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12th June.

I took the Directors Meeting to-day. It was agreed that each Division would prepare a memorandum on its aims and objects for the Norman Brook enquiry, and that I should brief the D.G. for Brook's visit when terms of reference are to be discussed. It is by no means clear at the moment whether the enquiry is to extend beyond ourselves and S.I.S.

Horrocks said that S.I.F.E. were pressing for Oughton to go out before September. It was agreed that we could not spare him until after the leave period, but that we would fly him out instead of sending him by ship. Morton is still jibbing about having Elwell; I gather mainly because he does not want a married officer. He ought, in fact, to be extremely glad to avail himself of the services of Anne Elwell, if she is prepared to work. Horrocks seemed to think that it might not be a good thing to have husband and wife in the same office.. Personally I do not

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think this matters.

Shaw raised a point about getting a list of agents from all overseas stations. This had been put up to him by Alec, but he did not seem very sanguine about its value. Horrocks appeared to think that it ought to be done having in mind the case of [redacted] but the rest of us agreed that overseas officers must be responsible and that even if such a list were received, it would not mean very much to Head Office. It was agreed, however that Shaw should consult with Finance in order that he might be informed if there was any undue increase in payments to agents; he would also discuss the matter locally when visiting overseas stations in October.

I asked Shaw about the situation in Hong Kong. Mackintosh has apparently written a long diatribe against C.I.A., suggesting that they be banned from the Colony, and this is supported in a covering letter by Grantham, the suggestion being that the matter should be passed for consideration by the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff. Shaw has got the Colonial Office to hang on to this document until Grantham arrives.

I said that if Grantham was not amenable to the proposals already agreed with C.I.A.; that they would in due course withdraw we should bring the J.I.C. and S.I.S. into action. Hong Kong seemed to be regarding this whole business in rather a parochial way, not realising that relations existed with C.I.A. all over the world. There is no doubt that C.I.A. have been in the wrong, but it would be the greatest mistake to antagonise them permanently.

Dick is working out with Shaw some line of demarcation between S. and B. Divisions.

Hollis explained the position reached in Winnifrith's committee on the question of positive vetting. Winnifrith seems to have come round to our point of view; that such vetting should to a large extent be done by normal enquiries as between employer and employed through establishment branches. Such enquiries, if they cannot be satisfied from existing records and local information, should in such cases be referred to the Police. Baker has agreed to this and is prepared to give instructions that such enquiries should be carried out by a senior Inspector. Newsam suggested that if it were considered necessary, to institute such enquiries, the individual concerned should be warned. This seems entirely wrong, for the very good reason that if the man were warned and subsequently did not get the job, some explanation would have to be given; this might be extremely awkward. It was felt that whenever enquiries were made, they should be filtered through us. There is to be a further meeting to-morrow, which Graham will attend.

13th June.

I attended the J.I.C., when we had a further discussion on French security. The paper which we had prepared jointly with S.I.S. was in the main accepted. The Foreign Office, however, thought that before anything was done an approach should be made to our Ambassador in Paris, to seek his advice on the channels through which we should put our request to the French Government. There was still some doubt about whether the approach should be a joint Anglo-American one, or on a unilateral basis. I thought the latter was preferable in view of French susceptibilities. The Chiefs of Staff are to be notified of the general state of ~~the~~ French insecurity, with particular reference to the NATO Standing Group.

The D.G. has received a letter from Geoffrey Patterson, giving an account of an off the record talk with Mickey Ladd. The latter is clearly perturbed about the present state of relations between ourselves and the F.B.I. The D.G.'s interview with Clegg and Lamphere appears to have caused a reaction, although how violent we do not know. Patterson got the impression that Mickey was afraid that the letter might draw another volley from us; he hoped that it would not and that things would be allowed to die down. Meanwhile, Hoover has reduced our liaison to a mere formality.

I attended the S.I.C. luncheon. The question of the Secretary is to be dealt with this afternoon on the arrival of the delegate from the Surete. Meanwhile, the S.D.E.C.E. have put forward as a candidate. Andre pointed out that as the Committee, and in particular the French, had objected to Irvine being employed on part-time duties, if he were appointed, would be the S.D.E.C.E. representative in London and the Secretary of the International Committee. We intend to propose that the matter should be settled by the Permanent Commission, assisted by a delegate, not French or English, from the S.I.C.

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I spoke to Vickery and then to Easton about Intelligence Division. The Deputy Directors (O. & S.) had considered the run-down and appeared to have accepted a doubling of the cut recommended by Vickery. We are now asked whether we wish this matter to be considered by the Directors. We are not, of course, directly concerned, although we should benefit by any Russian or German intelligence coming from the British Zone; it is really a matter for the Ds of I. Nevertheless, as members of the J.I.C. I think we ought to protest against the arbitrary cut, seeing that Germany is probably one of the best potential fields for intelligence work that we have. Vickery made his report on the basis of a 50% cut, and to double this cut is tantamount to tearing up Vickery's report and cannot obviously produce an efficient service. If the argument is that the service is not efficient anyway, the J.I.C. should consider how it could be improved. Easton said he would consider the matter and ring me back.

The D.G. has suddenly been asked to attend a meeting of the cold war Committee to-morrow, when it is proposed to discuss cold war measures in the U.K. The question of the legality of the Communist Party is not being challenged, but suggestions are made about work in Trade Unions, the teaching profession, youth movements, and the co-operation of the Churches. How this is to be done without the use of Government funds I do not know. Although a certain number of people might be induced to co-operate free, there is always the payment of the salaries of officers engaged on the work. Perhaps this is a point which could be ignored. The main argument, of course, against the cold war in the U.K. is that as long as the Party is legal, you cannot use Government funds to pay for propaganda against it.

FINGAL has now reached a point where it seems almost certain that MARTHA is the talent spotter, although whether she intends to recruit FINGAL is still an open question. She has recently put him through a

fairly grilling examination, out of which he came quite successfully, in spite of the lacunae in his story.

14th June.

Val Boucher mentioned that one, Soviet Assistant Military Attache, was regarded by certain of the Western Union countries as a possible defector. He told me afterwards that he got his information from whom he would endeavour to obtain further particulars.

Johnny Cimperman has been asked to carry out a loyalty test here with regard to one of our atomic scientists in America. This matter was already the subject of discussion in the State Department, and agreement had been reached on what we should tell them. What the Bureau are thinking about, I cannot imagine; we certainly cannot tolerate enquiries of this kind being made about British Government officials in the U.K.

15th June.

At the J.I.C. to-day I mentioned to D.N.I. a suggestion I had in mind that we should address a protest to the Americans, through the State Department, regarding recent leakages in the U.S. Press. In some cases protests had already been made on a departmental level, and the reply had been received that it was impossible to control Congressional and Senatorial Committees. This answer is clearly unsatisfactory. It seemed to me that even if this line were not considered expedient at the moment, it would be valuable to have a careful record kept of these cases, as they might be useful in arguments with the Americans on future occasions.

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I spoke to _____ to-day regarding the case of _____ who is demanding money to be returned to her, which was taken from her during the war and part of which was used for OSTRICH, presumably by O.S.S. I explained to him that Rothschild was no longer a member of this department and I felt, therefore, that the case could be more appropriate handled here.

_____ told me that _____ (whose letter to Rothschild was forwarded to us by the latter) was in fact a C.I.A. representative absorbed from S.S.U., and that his present task in Paris was to deal with the liquidation of cases of this kind. He undertook to communicate with _____ and to let me know the result in due course.

The D.G. called a meeting, at which Miss Chenhalls, Dick, Malcom and Winterborn were present, on the subject of defectors. He was worried about the recent developments. There are, of course, two problems:

- (a) the handling of defectors who have a real intelligence value, and
- (b) the line-crossers and deserters whom the Services in Western Germany and Austria wish to re-classify as defectors in order to get them off their hands.

The argument of I.R.D. and the J.I.C. is that if these people are not generously handled they may be induced to return to Russia, and that this would be damaging to the efforts that are being made to cause high-grade Russians to defect. Personally, I think that this view is somewhat exaggerated. The D.G. does not wish to accept commitment (b), although he is prepared to agree to the payment of a limited sum of money from the Secret Service vote to some other Department prepared to undertake rehabilitation. We have said that we do not think that more than

_____ This would in fact only provide at the outset for twenty defectors. Personally, I feel it difficult to see why the burden should not be carried on the open vote. The Ministry of Labour are already looking after 86,000 subjects from behind the iron curtain, and often recruited from camps in Germany. They state, however, that these people are required for special types of work in this country and that their Charter would not permit them to look after them for purely intelligence reasons.

I saw Major for a moment. He has just returned from Malta, where he seems to be doing well.

Hollis left for Washington to-day.

16th June.

Val Boucher rang me to say that he had seen _____ regarding _____ The information was apparently obtained from _____ the Finnish Attache. There was a time when M.I were slightly worried about _____ but they now appear to regard him fairly favourably. _____ asked _____ whether he had had any indication that _____ was likely to defect, as he was prepared to bet £5 that he would before very long.

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When [redacted] as asked for his reasons, he said that [redacted] was constantly going to see people privately and alone; he had in fact spent quite a lot of time at [redacted] house. An additional reason was that [redacted] had lived for a considerable time abroad in the U.S.A.

It was agreed that [redacted] would tell [redacted] that he had reported this matter to Boucher, and Boucher expects that before long [redacted] will discuss it with him personally. In this case he will let us have more details.

Boucher also mentioned that the wife of the Czech Military Attache appeared to have considerable funds. It is alleged that this money is derived from the property which she has in South America. She and her husband appear to do a certain amount of travelling on the Continent.

Sir Norman Brook came here to-day to see the D.G. about the enquiry which he to conduct. This enquiry is apparently to cover all Intelligence, and the emphasis is apparently more on finance than anything else, at any rate at the outset. Brook wishes to compute, in so far as this may be possible, what total sum is expended on Intelligence, not only from the secret vote but also the open vote. When he has obtained this information he will wish to see Directors and to get some idea of the purposes for which the money is used.

It was explained to Brook that it would be quite impossible for us to compute what the War Office, the Post Office, or the Ministry of Works spent on our behalf. We could do no more than to say that they rendered us considerable services. The D.G. stated specifically that if it were found that the Post Office were spending, say, £100,000 on our behalf, he hoped that this item would not go down in that form in the document submitted to Ministers; this would inevitably raise questions which would be difficult to answer to anyone except the P.M. himself. Brook said that he fully understood this point and would submit a draft to us before he sent it in.

The task of computing what is spent on Intelligence is clearly going to be extremely difficult, for example, how much of an M.A.'s work should go down as intelligence cost? While an M.A. might, and quite obviously does, do a certain amount of intelligence work, he also adorns the Ambassador's Embassy and he is concerned with pushing the sale of British weapons.

19th June.

I saw [redacted] and Potter. Potter explained to [redacted] the inaccuracies which appeared in a number of reports on Communists which we have been receiving from S.B. [redacted] was clearly very perturbed by what had been going on and he took notes and expressed his intention of going into the question thoroughly. He seemed to be a little surprised that Jones had not spoken to him about it. I suggested that when he had made his enquiries we should send over Potter, and perhaps somebody from B.I., with a view to reaching agreement as to the best lines on which S.B. reports should be submitted to us in future. In particular, it seemed to me desirable that we should have some standard phraseology. What, for example, was a Communist supporter? Did this mean that he was actually a member of the Party, or a sympathiser, or a person who put a Communist plackard in his window during the elections? I explained to [redacted] that accuracy in these matters was of paramount importance to us, particularly when we had to put people before the purge tribunal.

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20th June.

Stephens and I went over to Paris, primarily to discuss liaison with the French in West Africa. We were extremely well received, and whether anything comes of the meeting or not, I am sure that goodwill has been created. [redacted] was charming and took immense trouble to look after us and entertain us. He opened the discussion by impressing on us the widespread activities of S.D.E.C.E., as compared with other Services. He clearly wanted us to feel that they were the up-and-coming organisation. He referred quite openly to the "war" with the Surete, and in particular the Surveillance du Territoire under [redacted]. He said, I think rather over-confidently, that his department were going to win this "war". What, unfortunately, he does not understand is that wars of this kind get nobody anywhere. Even if he gets a decree from the President du Conseil, it will avail him nothing unless his relations with the Surete at all levels are satisfactory. The Surete is bound to be paramount in times of peace and they have the investigating officers on the ground. If they are unsympathetic to D.E.C., the information will not be passed. This, I am afraid, is rather characteristic of French politics and it can only lead to inefficiency. In actual fact we do not believe that D.E.C. are particularly well-informed and, indeed, this is not surprising as they get virtually nothing of any importance from the Police.

I asked [redacted] whether his organisation had any responsibility for security on C. Division lines. He said that he had not, but that there was some question of his organisation taking over such responsibilities. I explained to him roughly the lines on which we worked. He said that it would be useful to him if he could have a note on the question. Having in mind the present proposals being made through the J.I.C. to tackle the French on their security standards, I did not press the conversation very far, as I was afraid that if and when the blow fell it might be attributed to anxieties on the part of the Security Service rather than the Service Departments. On the other hand, if these conversations are to take place, there might be some advantage in getting the D.E.C. on to our line of thought. Would it be possible in due course to let them have a copy of the revised Bridges Panel booklet? [redacted] was interested, too, in learning that we had definite responsibilities in regard to secret contracts placed with firms. Clearly this matter has caused the French some anxiety.

As regards liaison with the French in West Africa [redacted] opened the discussions by explaining that French Colonial territory varies in status; in some cases it comes under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in other cases under the Colonial Office, and lastly, under the Ministry for Overseas Territories. In so far as West Africa is concerned, the territories come under the Ministry for Overseas Territories. B.E.C., coming under the President du Conseil, has the right of representation in all these countries and is in course of building up its organisation.

There is no representation for the Surete of metropolitan France in West Africa. Each Colony has its own Police Service, coming under the local Minister of the Interior.

Stephens' working liaison, apart from his connections with Governors and other high officials, has been with [redacted] in Dakar and [redacted] in Brazzaville. Both these officers are responsible to the local Colonial Governments for the supply of information on all subjects - administrative, economic, and political. In this capacity they have access to a certain amount of information procured by the local representatives of D.E.C., Colonel [redacted] in Dakar and Commandant [redacted] in Brazzaville.

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While no objection is raised to Colonel Stephens maintaining his contacts with _____ and _____, or indeed with any other of the local officials, it is suggested that for information on C.E. and subversive movements he should in future have a direct contact with _____ and _____. To cement this liaison, two proposals were made and accepted by _____ and his chief, Colonel _____

- (a) that a meeting should take place in Accra between Colonel Stephens, Colonel _____ and Commandant _____ to discuss matters of local interest and settle methods of communication;
- (b) that D.E.C. should have a representative in the French Consul-General's office at Accra, with facilities for wireless communication both with Dakar and with Brazzaville.

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I said that, subject to anything my Director-General had to say and to British Colonial Office approval, such an arrangement would be entirely acceptable to ourselves, and should do much to improve the flow of information. The French will, therefore, expect confirmation of the tentative agreement reached.

D.E.C. welcomed Bell's visit to Madagascar between the 8th and 13th July, and have already communicated with their representative, Tananarive. They are also quite prepared for Bell to visit their representative in Jibouti, Captain _____, at whatever time is convenient. We have only to suggest a date and the necessary arrangements will be made.

The question of Hong Kong was not mentioned, _____ and the French will be expecting a reply through the normal channels.

Certain other matters were discussed in general terms, but it soon became evident that they had not been receiving information supplied by Stephens through _____ and _____. It was agreed that they might more profitably be the subject of discussion in Accra, when Colonel _____ and Commandant _____ pay their expected visit.

Colonel _____ whom I had not seen before, struck me as a somewhat dour personality and, frankly, not very well-informed. He readily gave his agreement to the proposals about liaison with his Department in West Africa, which was in fact all we required of him. He did not seem to think that it would be necessary to obtain the agreement of the local Governors for these proposals.

I paid a courtesy call on _____ when I told him about Peter KERRIGAN's visit. He was extremely cordial, but I thought looked a bit worn. Doubtless neither he nor _____ know where they stand in view of the Revers scandal. He told me that he had just heard from _____ that General Revers and General Maast had been put on the retired list. I said that the whole case was so complicated that I really had found it impossible to follow. He replied that the case was not really complicated, but that it had been made so by the politicians. He spoke a lot about a report that his Department had received to the effect that possibly some deal was going on between Franco and Stalin, by which Franco was to be given a free hand to deal with Spanish Communists in exchange for

air bases for the Russians in Spain, if and when this was required. This all seemed to me rather fantastic and unlikely. In support of this, he said that there were certain indications that the Russians were inclined to encourage the French to liquidate Spanish Republican groups in France. There was a possibility that the informant, who had put the French on to the cache of arms in Toulouse, was a Russian provocateur.

I asked about the French Communist Party and the question of its legality. He said that he had always been against proscribing the Party; he thought it would only aggravate the situation. He was not worried so much about the Party itself, but about important "fellow travellers" amongst the intellectuals and professional classes; he mentioned in particular the doctors. He was worried about the defeatist attitude of these classes, which he thought had a certain influence. My general impression was that in a crisis little, if any, reliance could be placed upon the French patriotism (?), and that unless they can succeed in removing some of the inequalities, they will never be able to pull the bricks away from under the Communists and reduce the extent of their influence. They have 168 Deputies, a hard core of half a million, and probably another million "fellow travellers".

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22nd June.

The D.G. told me about his meeting yesterday with the Cold War Committee. He said that he had been extremely well briefed by Mitchell and had succeeded in demolishing all the various arguments for action which had been put up by the Committee. He was astonished by their general ignorance and the stupidity of some of their proposals.

23rd June.

came in to see me. He is just back from Singapore on leave. He seemed pleased about the arrival of General Briggs, and even more pleased that George Jenkin had gone out. He also, on the whole, had a good opinion of Gray, with whom he said Jack Morton was on excellent terms. The fact was that, outside Catling, there were very few people on whom Gray could rely. thinks that there is a great deal to be done in regard to the organisation of the S.Bs, particularly in outstations, but the difficulties in getting the right people are considerable. Briggs' plan, apparently, is to clean up the settlements outside the jungle area. At the moment these settlements are harbouring bandits, and there is no organised Police Force to keep them under control; it was largely a question of numbers. The policy adopted in India in dealing with the recalcitrant villages, was to surround them completely and let no-one go in or out until the subversive elements had been handed over. The method was apparently extremely effective.

telephoned to ask me about my visit to France. I told him of the tentative agreement which we had reached.

I lunched with and with the American D.N.I., Admiral Connolly's representative over here, whose name I cannot remember and The meeting was purely social.

(11).

At Bill Stephenson's request, I went up to Claridges to see him and General Donovan, late of O.S.S. They both seemed in quite good form.

Donovan reminded me of the GARBO story that I had told him in Washington towards the end of the war. He said that he had never forgotten it and that he thought it was the finest job done by any Service. He thought it was a pity that it could not be published. I explained to him the reasons why we thought this inadvisable; we did not wish the Russians to think that we had had a major success. Donovan seemed to doubt this argument; he said the lessons of one war are never applied to the next. There is, of course, a certain amount of truth in this. Be that as it may, I am sure L.C.S. would view the proposal with grave concern, and I am personally convinced that the less said about these things the better. Donovan, of course, knew all about it because his officers were sitting alongside ours right up till D. Day.

He then discussed the cold war; he did not think that enough was being done. This raised the question of declaring the Communist Party illegal. I said that while this might apply elsewhere, I thought it would be unwise to do anything of the kind here. It would invite the creation of a "progressive" party, which having freed itself to some extent from the taint of Communism, might gain a considerable number of adherents who would support the really harmful and insidious organisations of world peace and democracy" and the abolition of the atomic bomb. The Party itself was small and had lost its Members of Parliament and a number of seats in the municipal elections; it was poorly regarded by Moscow, and the Daily Worker was short of funds. To declare it illegal would give it a certain advertisement and would in other ways make our task more difficult. Donovan was not wholly convinced by this argument, although I do not think that he had any valid reply.

In regard to the cold war, I told Donovan that for two years I had been trying to find someone who would get Walt Disney to do a cartoon of "Animal Farm" by George Orwell. Donovan had read the book and thought the idea an excellent one. He expressed his intention to approach R.K.O., with which company he is either connection as a Director or as legal adviser.

Donovan was extremely freindly and asked me to visit him without fail if I were in America.

Bill Stephenson, too, was very friendly. He evidently wants to see me again before he goes back. I suspect that he wants us to employ him in some way or another, and this, of course, would be impossible. He told me that he had met _____ and liked him.

26th June.

At the Directors' Meeting to-day Dick spoke about "Lancashire Hotpot", which is to be wound up at the end of this week. The whole experiment has worked smoothly and the various points which were worrying us have been more or less cleared up. _____ at Liverpool has been raided and interrogated; not much has come out of this beyond his Party membership and the fact that he apply for Soviet citizenship.

A Czech espionage case has been discovered, involving one _____ tried to recruit Peter ASTBURY, who, in view of his past experiences, consulted Party H.Q., as a result of which _____ was

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forced to resign and is somewhat disgruntled in consequence. The Party obviously could not fact up to being connected with an espionage case.

, who was employed at one of the atomic energy plants and whose name was supplied on a piece of paper by Dayson's agent, is apparently entirely innocent.

Sir John Shaw mentioned his agreement with S.I.S. in regard to the appointment of officers who, having been trained here and in S.I.S., would be prepared to assist foreign Governments in building up their counter-espionage departments.

Roger talked of his visit to the U.S.A., which he thought had on the whole been extremely satisfactory. It seemed that in general terms the Americans were prepared to accept our standards of security, which they thought were in certain ways better than their own, although Arnison of the State Department seems to have had certain reservations due to Clegg's report on his interview with FUCHS. We are dealing with these reservations, which in substance do not amount to very much. We were throughout strongly supported by the Canadians. It was disclosed during the meeting that neither the Americans nor the Canadians had got anything out of their loyalty tests - in fact they regarded them as a serious embarrassment; they could not be completed under about three months, at the end of which a voluminous report of some seventeen to eighteen pages is produced by the F.B.I. It contains everything for and against the man, including every kind of tittle tattle. The Atomic Energy Commission, having read it, find it extremely difficult to assess its value. The F.B.I. express no opinions. There was an added difficulty about the loyalty test, namely, that a man could appeal and Brief Counsel, who could call in all the witnesses mentioned in the F.B.I.'s report. Witnesses were not, however, bound to attend if they did not wish to. The effect of this was, certainly in the case of the Canadians, not to present evidence which through cross-examination would cause the source to be revealed. There was a special discussion on the FUCHS case, during which Hollis and Perri explained the circumstances in which FUCHS came into the atomic energy project and the reasons why he was not detected for so long. Roger had a talk with Mickey Ladd, who was obviously a bit sheepish about the F.B.I.'s attitude towards ourselves over the FUCHS case. Patterson had, meanwhile, had an interview with Laughlan, the F.B.I. liaison officer, who, with the exception of Ladd, is now his only line of contact with the F.B.I. Laughlan, who was clearly very sympathetic, intimated that he had instructions to read out sections of Clegg's report, which had been endorsed by Hoover. In this report Clegg said that the D.G. had accused Hoover of certain leakages which he considered detrimental to M.I.5, and that in fact no such leakages had taken place. In the circumstances Clegg thought the D.G. ought to have tendered an apology. As he had not done so, Clegg recommended retaliatory action in confining our liaison to Laughlan, and withholding any information which did not specifically concern this country on the GOLD case. Geoffrey Patterson said that he could not really accept this ruling, which was tantamount to treating him and M.I.5 as if they were outstations of the F.B.I. and would have to be disciplined. M.I.5 was not an outstation of the F.B.I., and such a communication really created an international incident between the U.S.A. and the U.K.; he could only regard it as such unless he received some better explanation.

We now await the better explanation. Meanwhile, we have made it perfectly clear that we do not intend to embark on this childish kind of activity in withholding information from Johnny Cimperman - he will have access to everybody in this office as usual.

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I mentioned to the D.G. the sabotage case in Plymouth on the submarine "Tally Ho", about which a leakage appeared in the press. Skittery, the C.C., was apparently worried because Pelling had not called upon him. In fact, Pelling deliberately refrained from doing so owing to the leakage about the "Illustrious", which he attributed to the Plymouth Police, and not, I think, without reason. It was agreed that in future we would arrange for our officers to call on the Police, whether they needed their assistance or not.

 rang up about my visit to France. He was going over himself and wanted to know the form. I told him about our arrangement with regard to West Africa, and warned him that the question of D.E.C. representation in Hong Kong might be raised. If it was, he had better say that the matter was still under consideration.

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 Freddie KUH has been fishing round on a story which connects the D.G.'s visit to South Africa with the banning of the C.P. there.

 I spoke to Burt about the case in which one, _____, had given information to the American Embassy about the alleged interception by Greece of arms being sent from the U.S.A. to Italy - the idea being to divert these arms to Pakistan. One, SOKOLOV, a former employee of ARCOS is said to be the central figure. The Americans had asked us to supply an agent who could probe the matter, since it was already in the hands of Burt and Superintendent Lee of the C.I.D., I told Burt that we would fade out of the picture. I subsequently rang Cimperman and explained the position.

 Cecil tells me that at the 3rd Divisional dinner last Friday, Monty made a very outspoken speech about the state of affairs in Western Europe. He did not anticipate war, at any rate at the moment, but he said that the Russians were leaning against the Western Wall and that if we did not step up our armaments and take a stronger line, they would hop over into Europe. He had expressed this view very forcibly to the P.M. and Shinwell, and told them that he thought that the public should be made aware of the position. Not more than about thirty people were present at the dinner.

 Stephens said good-bye to me. He is going back to West Africa to-morrow.

 The news broke this morning of the attack by Northern Korea Forces on South Korea. This seems to raise an extremely grave issue. As Manchukuo was to the League of Nations, so this act of aggression will be to the United Nations, unless the attack is forcibly resisted by the Allied Powers. The matter is being raised at the Security Council. Meanwhile, MacArthur is reported in the press to be sending 10 Mustangs.

27th June.

The Governor of Hong Kong, who is home on leave, does not like the idea of a D.E.C. representative in Hong Kong, but is prepared to give way

if it is considered that wider interests make their presence there necessary. He has recommended that the Acting Governor should be consulted. Meanwhile, we are asking S.I.F.E. for their views.

Graham tells me that the Ministry of Supply have sent their file containing three of our documents connected with a purge case to the A.E.U., the secretary of which is a Communist. The file was returned immediately with a letter initialled by a typist, and as there have been no repercussions so far, it may well be that we have got away with it. Jagger is extremely penitent - sad well he may be!

I saw Drew for a moment and suggested to him that B.J.S. might provide him with a deception channel. G.C.H.Q might be able to tell him what ciphers the Russians were reading, or at any rate what foreign ciphers were weak. In this way he might pass information to, for example, the Turkish Military Attache, who would wire it back to his own Government. This telegram would be read and deciphered by the Russians, and would probably be given an enhanced importance owing to the manner in which the information was obtained. Drew seemed to like the idea.

Callaghan, one of our R.S.L.Os during the war, called to see me to-day. He is now working for a soya bean company in this country which has relations with similar companies in the U.S.A. and Canada. The London company has certain propositions to make to the Ministry of Food with regard to the importation of soya beans. One of the Directors had met Wilfred MACARTNEY, who had offered to effect an introduction to Maurice Webb; this would be done through Aneurin Bevan, with whom MACARTNEY was on intimate terms. Callaghan had heard from other sources that MACARTNEY was undesirable, that he had a strong Communist background, and that he was intimate with Bevan. He had in consequence advised his Directors against having any dealings with such a person. I told him privately that MACARTNEY was the author of a book called "Walls Have Ears", and that in general I thought he was concerned more with MACARTNEY and his future than with anything else; his Communism was only a very dim background. I told Callaghan very forcibly that he should on no account tell his Directors, or anybody else, that he had obtained confirmation of his views about MACARTNEY from this office. He assured me that he would make no mention of his visit here. His own advice to his Directors has already been against any dealings with MACARTNEY, but some of the less scrupulous members of the Board are rather inclined to play with him. I said that, purely as a matter of curiosity, I should be interested to know how MACARTNEY became introduced to the firm, and if he was employed whether he could fulfill the promise he had made to effect an introduction to Maurice Webb.

_____ came to tell me that General Johnson, commanding the American Air Force units here, had asked whether, as a result of events in Korea, the Communists here were likely to take any action in the way of sabotage which might affect his units. I told _____ that we had nothing here to suggest a positive policy by the Communists in the matter of sabotage, and that in normal circumstances we believed that they would keep clear of it. It seemed to be their policy to keep the Party clear of espionage and sabotage, as they did not wish to increase their difficulties which were already considerable. I promised that if we heard anything to the contrary, we would let him know.

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Malcom tells me that King Street have an idea that the purges of Party members are due to information being transmitted from their registration department. They are pressing to have a meeting about this on Saturday. We shall endeavour to cover it.

King Street are also extremely worried about the Korean situation, which they think may lead to the Party being declared illegal.

I discussed with Roger and Irvine the question of the approach to the French regarding their security. Irvine points out that in so far as the COSMIC and METRIC systems are concerned, the matter has already been discussed in the Standing Committee and by the Permanent Commission. The latter appeared to be extremely averse to any international body looking into the workings of the METRIC system, which they think is their own domestic concern.

28th June.

At the J.I.C. to-day we had a discussion about Korea. The J.I.S. have been instructed to prepare a report for the Chiefs of Staff, who are meeting the Defence Committee in the House of Commons at 3.30. The report is to show whether there are any signs of Soviet aggressive action in any other area which might affect British interests. Persia would be a case in point. Brain informed the Committee that the State Department had communicated Truman's statement about support for Southern Korea and Formosa to the Western Ambassadors. Kennon (?) of the State Department had explained that the American action was restorative. The Americans did not anticipate that the Russians wanted a major war. The North Koreans presumably started operations as they thought that their forces had been sufficiently trained and the Russians had made up their minds that they would not participate in the Japanese Treaty. Strategically, the Americans were not too worried about South Korea, but they were convinced that Formosa would be the next to be attacked, and that if action was not taken against Korea the position was bound to deteriorate. Operations referred to as "coverage" by Mr. Truman will be as much as General MacArthur can carry out with his Far Eastern Forces. It is recognised by the Americans that there is an element of risk in their policy, but they think that the risks of being nothing are immeasurably greater. Their action they consider to be within the charter of the United Nations.

Malcom and [redacted] came to discuss with me the question of making a meeting at which the Party are going to discuss with Communist members of the Civil Service Union what they consider to be a leakage of information on the identity of Party members. They believe that this information is coming from the registration department of London District. [redacted]

29th June.

I had a long discussion with Dick and Hollis. The D.G. has asked Dick who is responsible for his work he is away. Dick replied that his three Senior Officers were each responsible for their own particular department and that there was no real point in making any one of them senior to the other; it would only hold things up, and clearly Mitchell could not make any contribution to Marriott's problems. If any of the Senior Officers were stuck they came to me. While in my view this is undoubtedly right, I think there is something to be said for Dick having a Deputy with clearly defined responsibilities. It would be no use having a man who was merely looking over his shoulder; the Division would have to be run as Dick and I ran it during the war. We were both in each other's pockets all the time and each of us took certain sections as a primary responsibility. The only man I think who could be of any real help in the present circumstances would be Hollis, which would mean having two Directors in B. Division.

De COURCY has asked _____ whether she can ascertain the reactions of the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party to recent events in Korea. She replied that this was not entirely in her line, but she thought that her son, might be able to help him. The methods of herself and her son are, of course, purely psychic. I suggested to Dick that Perhaps Max Knight might get someone in alongside _____ who could extract from him the fact that he was working for de COURCY and so give the necessary cover for our source of information.

Graham tells me that Tim BUCK (?), who is on his way back to Canada from Moscow, has been told that the policy is to use the Peace Committees as the principal Party organ. In France the Party apparently contemplates going underground to a large extent, particularly in connection with the sabotage of arms destined for Indo-China. This seems to prove my point that it would be madness to declare the Party illegal here; they would merely create a Peace Party which would gain a large number of non-Communist adherents. The Peace Committee here have been making a number of alterations to Crown property and have in consequence been given orders to quit immediately. Piratin is running round in very small circles!

30th June.

Thornton of the Lancashire Police came here. He was a little apprehensive lest there be any repercussions from the search of _____ premises, and had a slight feeling that we had perhaps rather prematurely troubled the waters, but on the whole he was extremely friendly. He is worried about his E.V.W. problem and agrees with me that the first step is to get an intelligence Camp Commandant with a language-speaking staff. He does not think the Police could possibly undertake interrogations.

1st July.

I had a talk with Inspector Dick of the R.C.M.P., who is concerned with Internment Camps in time of war in Canada. He is also interested in the protection of Vulnerable Points and with the recruitment of Port Control staffs. I mentioned to him the possibility that, as in the

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last war, this country might like to send a considerable number of enemy aliens for internment in Canada. He said that so far no provision had been made for this; he quite understood the possible necessity if this country showed signs of being besieged. He thought further that the Government ought to give early consideration to the point in order that the Canadian Government should be warned.

We have now ascertained through _____ that IGOROV of the Soviet Embassy is engaged in certain clandestine dealings with _____ concerning the distribution of Soviet literature to E.V.Ws.

I met Guy BURGESS last night. He said that it had occurred to him that Moscow's action in instructing the Chinese Communist Party to come out against the American occupation might be associated with the recent action in Korea. He also mentioned that General Briggs had got himself into a certain amount of trouble, owing to a Press report in which he was quoted as suggesting that the British Government would now withdraw its recognition of Communist China.

The operation to cover the Communist meeting which is to discuss the purge has been wholly successful.

The first impression is that the methods employed by M.I.5 are of a somewhat haphazard kind, although there was a certain amount of comment on the case of a man who was purged within three months of his joining the Party.

I have had a rather pointed letter from Clegg, addressed to my private address, in which he expresses to me personally the deep appreciation of my thoughtfulness, personal consideration and hospitality on the occasion of his recent visit to London. What the inner meaning of this is, I do not know.

Clegg, in fact, put in a report in which he said that the D.G. made false accusations and should have apologised, and then he went on to recommend that M.I.5 should in consequence be penalised by not being allowed access to all members of the Bureau. He also submitted a report of an extremely tendencious kind, which had been produced by Arnison of the State Department to our Embassy in Washington after the conversations on atomic energy security standards, at which Hollis and Perrin represented this country. This had in some ways raised doubts in Arnison's mind as to whether our standards were in fact as good as Hollis had made out. This is perhaps the more reprehensible since it had been agreed that the interrogation of FUCHS should be confined solely to affairs in America. A report on these lines has been drawn up and signed by FUCHS himself, a copy of which is in our possession, but we have no copy of the other report which Clegg appears to have submitted.

3rd July.

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day we were informed that Norman Brook intends to come here on Friday. He will see the D.G. first and then Directors. We are sending him a memorandum on the work of Divisions, an Organisation Chart, and a copy of the Charter.

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I have arranged with Baker of the Home Office that Inspector Dick shall see Cornish on internment questions. The idea that the Home Office should commit themselves to asking the Canadians to prepare some accommodation in the event of war for internees from the U.K., appears to fill them with alarm, although Baker seemed to agree that in the event of war such a proposal might well be made. We should then get the answer that the Canadians had no accommodation.

 4th July.

A very good report has come in from J.I.C. (F.E.), dated 13th June. Its conclusions are as follows: (J.I.C. (FE) Memo (50) 23 (Final), Appendix A.)

- (a) Owing largely to external factors, particularly events in China, but also owing to the threat of arrival of Communist Consuls, the co-operation of the Chinese with the Government in the campaign against the bandits must be expected to diminish;
- (b) For the same reasons, the morale of the bandits must correspondingly be expected to increase;
- (c) The peak of the effort of the security forces has been passed, unless materially reinforced.
- (d) The strength of the bandits has not materially been affected but they may be running short of arms and ammunition.
- (e) The programme of squatter resettlement is of the utmost importance in denying food and other aid to the bandits. The resettlement areas will, however, be a target for attack by the bandits and it will be essential to protect them and all squatter areas in which screening has taken place. This protection is an additional commitment for the Security Forces.
- (f) Assuming no change in the strength of the Security Forces or the development of any new method of attack, the situation is likely to deteriorate slowly during 1950. Owing to the importance of external factors and the impossibility of predicting developments in surrounding territories further ahead, it was not considered that an attempt to forecast the course of events in Malaya in 1951 and 1952 would be of any value.

This report also contains some interesting information about developments in Sarawak and Borneo, and it makes a strong recommendation that something should be done throughout the whole Far Eastern area to deal with the dissemination of Communist literature, particularly in schools.

 The D.G. went to see Ricketts about the case of de COURCY. There does not, however, seem to be much prospect of getting the matter ventilated in the House of Commons in the near future. If and when an opportunity occurs, it will be possible to use the information about the DAVIDOFF PLAN, which the "Digest" alleged had come from most secret sources and had been smuggled out of Moscow. In fact we now know that it was broadcast from Budapest and discussed in a German newspaper.

5th July.

Burt tells me that he was sent for by Shawcross, who wishes to institute prosecutions for conspiracy against the Smithfield strikers. Miss Nunn, whom I saw subsequently at the Home Office, told me that this was a question which had come up frequently but it had always failed, owing to lack of evidence, or at any rate evidence that could be used. The prosecutions for a breach of contract in not giving sufficient notice before strike action were generally cumbersome and ineffective.

 We had a discussion with the D.G. on the papers submitted by Divisions to Sir Norman Brook. The D.G. thought that we ought to be ready to give as many positive facts about our achievements as possible. We all agreed that this was desirable and that it could quite easily be done.

 I talked to the D.G. about a proposal that we should have a more open liaison with the Egyptian Police in efforts by them to deal with Communists and 5th Columns in Egypt. This has been put to us unofficially through our contacts in the Police. I said that in my view we should keep clear of this, since it would be likely to bring us too much into the political limelight and would ultimately get us into difficulties. Apart from this, the Istakal Muselmein might well make it profitable to leave a bomb in the S.L.O.'s office.

 rang up to ask me to let him have anything that might have even a remote bearing on the war in Korea.

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6th July.

I had a meeting with all the Directors on war planning: Joe Spencer represented D.E./A. The following points were agreed:

- (i) In time of war an E. Division should be set up. In peacetime a shadow section of E. should be formed which would be responsible to the D.D.G.
- (ii) A sabotage (?) section should be set up. Investigation being the responsibility of B. Division, and counter-measures and technical measures the responsibility of C. Division.
- (iii) There should be an enlarged legal section. The present S.L.B. would be broken down and leakage of information would become the responsibility of B. Division.
- (iv) The Regional organisation would be set up and P.L.S. would become the Regional controlling section in London.

- (v) A training centre should be set up under an Officer i/c responsible both for training and recruitment. This would be an A. Division responsibility.
- (vi) A Secretariat should be formed which should be the responsibility for the co-ordination and policy of the Divisions and Sections.
- (vii) That a study should be made of plans drafted on the organisation of M.I.5 staff to meet all conditions.

Sinclair telephoned to say that in answer to my query his office were considering the employment of _____ but had come to no conclusion. We then discussed _____ in connection with recent proposals that one or two officers should be earmarked to visit foreign countries and advise on security matters. Sinclair did not seem to think that _____ was wholly suitable for this job, but I did not feel that Sinclair had a very clear conception of what the job was! He ended by saying that he thought _____ could be considered among others.

Major Croker rang up for Harding-Newman to know whether the A.M.S who was seeing the bad _____ could give him any information as to why he was considered unsuitable for promotion to confidential work. I said that as far as we were concerned there was no objection to his using Int. Div. He could not, however, say anything about _____ activities in 1940, when he and his wife were apparently in touch with the Soviet Embassy.

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_____. We said we saw no objection to this in principle.

_____ then reverted to his original argument about the difficulty of providing a representative here, but agreed to my suggestion that it might be possible to make some nominal appointment in the High Commissioner's office. In this connection he thought that Brigadier Garvas, the Military Liaison Officer, might be suitable on account of his former connection with the Peshawar Intelligence Bureau.

_____ is advising _____ to come here and see us at the end of July.

In the course of a general discussion on the operations of S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E., Ahmed asked what would happen to S.I.M.E. if H.M.G. was compelled to leave the Suez Canal area. He wondered whether at some future date the question of using Pakistan as a Security Intelligence base might not be considered. He was obviously putting the idea out very tentatively and admitted that he had not thought over its implications very deeply, since at the moment all eyes in Pakistan were turned towards India. I explained to him that

S.I.M.E. was to some extent an integral part of the military machine in the Middle East and would have definite responsibilities in connection with the counter-intelligence order of battle. This meant, of course, that S.I.M.E. could not be separated from G.H.Q. Ahmed made no comment on this and whether he envisaged the possibility of G.H.Q. M.E. moving to Pakistan as well, I cannot say. This is a new thought and a rather interesting one. The possibility of using air bases in Pakistan in the event of war with Russia, of course, been considered. The general feeling was that if such a request were made to Pakistan, it would provoke the natural reply that the invasion of Pakistan territory by Russian forces might well ensue. However, as nobody knew the answer regarding what assistance would be forthcoming from the British Government in such an eventuality, no further action was taken. Ahmed is now one of the leading members of Liaquat Ali's Cabinet Secretariat.

We had an Appointments Board to-day. The D.G. suggested that before people were asked to attend a Board their papers should be considered by the Directors. He had the impression that the time of the Board was often wasted by considering candidates who on their records were obviously unsuitable. In this I think he is quite right. We considered the cases of five candidates, all of whom we thought should be given a trial. We also discussed the case of [redacted] of J.I.S. who was applying to come to us. I told the meeting what I had learned about [redacted]. He clearly had very considerable ability, but was self-opinionated and argumentative to a degree which had obviously got him into trouble on a number of occasions. It seemed to me that if he came into this office it would be difficult, owing to his age (42), to place him under a younger man and that inevitably he would have to move up the scale quicker, owing to his [redacted] and qualifications, unless he was going to suffer from a feeling of frustration which might well bring out his worst characteristics. To accelerate his promotion would be unfair to a large number of highly qualified officers who had been here for a considerable time. The number of potential senior officers who will be coming up for consideration within the next five years is very considerable. For all these reasons I do not think that we ought to offer [redacted] a job.

Beaumont-Nesbitt came in to see me. He told me that he was now head of Civil Defence in Northern Ireland and that Pym was worried about the lack of information from the South: could we provide him with any contacts in Southern Ireland? I said that this was right off our beat and that our connection with Southern Ireland were purely unofficial.

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7th July.

Norman Brook, Cliffe and Drew came to begin their enquiries. The D.G. introduced the Directors and after I had explained my position to Brook, and the two sections, S.L.B. and P.L.S., which I control, we got in Dick and discussed the work of B. Division. Dick put his case extremely well. Brook wondered whether there was not too much emphasis on B.1 rather than B.2, but I think was satisfied when it was explained to him how much B.2 was dependent upon B.1. Later Brook went up to see the establishment on the sixth floor. He is coming back on Wednesday to see certain section officers of B. Division.

8th July.

Inspector Dick looked in again. I told him about the arrangements that I had made for him with the Home Office, and suggested he should make it very clear to them that if they wanted accommodation they should stake a claim now. He will let me know the result on Monday, when he is coming to see Hill.

Colonel Spry, late Australian D.M.I., has taken over A.S.I.O. in Australia.

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10th July.

I gave a short talk of the usual kind to Colonial police officers. There were some from West Africa, East Africa, Malaya, Cyprus and the Caribbean.

[redacted] came to talk about one, ALI SHAH, a Moslem of Afghan origin who has resided in this country off and on since the first world war. ALI SHAH had apparently ingratiated himself with [redacted] who, backed by industrials in Holland, had put up the sum of £6,000 to assist in running a Moslem Union. He believed that in so doing he was helping anti-Communist activities in Indonesia. It looks as if ALI SHAH and his rather dubious Dutch associates, having got hold of the money, used it for promoting arms deals with Pakistan and other countries.

main object was to assure me that motives were of the very best; his error had been to dabble in intelligence matters without consulting his advisers. I told [redacted] that I would look into the whole matter and let him know how we regarded ALI SHAH.

We had a staff meeting, when we discussed the case of [redacted] of J.I.S. I was on the whole rather against taking him on; it seemed to me that if we employed him he would be bound to go over the heads of people younger than himself, which would be bad for morale, and that if he were made to serve under his juniors his known characteristics (not suffering fools gladly and being self-opinionated) would show up at their very worst. The general feeling of the meeting, however, was that he should be seen by Shaw, when the limited chance of promotion in this office should be forcibly explained to him. We could then consider whether he should come before the Board.

We then considered several other candidates, in accordance with the D.G.'s instructions, and decided that with the exception of one, they should be brought before the Board.

11th July.

Dick and I saw King, who is to work under Pat Reilly in the co-ordination of Russian or Communist affairs as between the Southern Department, I.R.D. the Russia Committee, and outside bodies like ourselves and S.I.S. This, I think, is a step in the right direction.

12th July.

At the J.I.C. to-day I raised again the question of exploring the possibility of using the S.B.O.N.R. (Vlasov Movement) Centre in Munich as a place for rehabilitation for Russian defectors.

I told Val Boucher about _____ recent remarks about the possibility of establishing S.I.M.E. in Pakistan if we had to move out of Egypt. I told him it was not clear whether _____ had in his mind the question of H.Q. also moving to Pakistan. Val felt it was an interesting thought and that he would watch for any further hints in this direction.

13th July.

_____ called again. I assured him that nobody here would think the worse of _____ for his excursions into the intelligence field, and that he should rest assured that the information in our possession would not go any further. He seemed quite happy about this. I gave him the note on ALI SHAH. He is very anxious that I should go to Holland and inspect his frontier posts; he has been so insistent about this that I suppose I shall have to go sooner or later. It seems from what he said that he is having a certain amount of trouble with _____ whom he refers to as "a very good chap, but difficult about what he regards to be his own particular reserves".

 The D.M.I. asked me to go and see him. He told me that for a long time he had been a fairly intimate friend of LANGDON-DAVIES, whom he met originally in 1940 when they were both conducting a Home Guard campaign. He had since stayed with LANGDON-DAVIES, whom he regarded as an extremely intelligent man and a very likeable person.

LANGDON-DAVIES spends most of his time now in Barcelona, but comes over here periodically for a week or so, when he generally lunches with the D.M.I. He is in fact over here now but will be going back to Barcelona again towards the end of next week. Discussing matters a few days ago, he expressed the view that if the authorities here concentrated on a limited number of people whom he considered to be really important in the Communist movement, they might obtain interesting results.

I asked the D.M.I. if he could recollect any of the names mentioned by LANGDON-DAVIES. He said the only ones he could remember were Dudley COLLARD, Ivor MONTAGUE, Geoffrey BYNG, and a man called GOLDBLUM, who, I think, he said was the Managing Director of Marks and Spencer. There were apparently a certain number of others on his list, and he said that if anyone was interested he, LANGDON-DAVIES, would be glad to discuss these people in greater detail.

I told the D.M.I. that we knew a considerable amount about the people mentioned, although I could not recollect anything about GOLDBLUM. I said I would consider the question of someone meeting LANGDON-DAVIES and let him know.

I have since discussed the matter with Mitchell, after looking at the LANGDON-DAVIES file. It seems that some approach was made by LANGDON-DAVIES, through Archie Rowlands, about two years ago, and at that time he was associated with a Mr. DICK, who subsequently went into a mental home; While I do not think we are likely to get a great deal out of this, it may be that LANGDON-DAVIES might have his uses in putting us in touch with other people. I think that Max Knight would be the most appropriate contact. Owing, therefore, to the shortness of time available I asked Dick to speak to Max on Monday and to let me know the result so that I can fix up a meeting through the D.M.I.

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14th July.


Sir Norman Brook and Cliffe came again to-day to continue their enquiries. He dealt first with the O.S. Division. Brook was interested in the measure of elasticity which now existed between ourselves and S.I.S.; a hard and fast line of the three-mile limit had been abandoned in exchange for the integrated S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E. which, I explained, I might have added, as I learned from Jack Morton this morning, that in S.I.F.E. this evaluation has led us to the conclusion that the local J.I.C. are apparently getting quite restive on the subject.

Brook then saw the Registry and subsequently Hollis, who gave him an account of C. Division.

After lunch Brook made a visit to B.2. I think on the whole that he has gained a fairly favourable impression of the office.

Jack Morton, whom I saw for a minute, is full of woes which are, in order of priority, as follows:

- (i) Housing and staff, and (ii) Colonial Police Forces and S.I.S.



George Jenkin has been a great success with everyone and has already got the S.Bs on to better lines.

15th July.

Newsam rang up to know whether we had any information about the sabotage case in Portsmouth. I told him that we had send down an officer at the Admiralty's request; that he had seen the C.-in-C., who had expressed the view that it might be due to an accident following the escape of gases, or that it might be due to sabotage. There is to be a Court of Enquiry on Monday; meanwhile he did not wish our officer to conduct any interrogations. It was unlikely, therefore, that we should have much news for about a week. I explained to Newsam that we were acting on behalf of the Admiralty and that possibly, therefore, N.I.D. might be able to give him more information, but I doubted it.

Roger Hollis has seen de Putron and the American General commanding the U.S. Air Force units, in regard to vetting the personnel employed on the aerodrome and any security information which might affect the American forces. This followed a letter received from the General, stating his security responsibilities, which he exercised through what is known as the Office of Security Intelligence (?). This is a new organisation which is peculiar to the American Air Force. It has been agreed that we will continue to vet personnel for the Americans through the Provost Marshal's branch of the Air Force, who are represented on all aerodromes used by the Americans. The present arrangements with the Police, Customs, etc., appear to be satisfactory. We also made it clear that we could not

conduct loyalty checks, as was done in the U.S.; we would in fact do for the Americans precisely what we did for our own people. We also made it clear that we should take a poor view if the Americans on their own tried to conduct a loyalty check. This was all accepted in good part and finally it was agreed that the O.S.I. should have a liaison with ourselves through which any major complaints or policy matters could be discussed. The main reason for this is that if any sabotage of American aircraft takes place, Congress would be critical of the American Air Force if they had not established a liaison with M.I.5.

 I spoke to the D.G. about the proposal that _____ of the J.I.S. should be taken on as a member of this office. I told him that we had had a meeting as he instructed, and that we had agreed that Shaw should have a personal interview with _____ making it perfectly clear to him that if he joined this office he would be likely to find himself working under people who were his juniors and that his prospects of promotion in a narrow field would not be very good. He accepted these conditions whole-heartedly. _____ then told Shaw about his domestic difficulties. Shaw said that obviously this was a matter where the final decision would have to rest with the D.G., but that if he himself were asked he would have to say that it would be impossible to employ _____ abroad, since local gossip was bound to ensue and be detrimental to his work. The D.G. agreed that we should discuss this matter at his meeting on Monday.

 I spoke to Horrocks and told him that I wanted a cockshy war plan for discussion on Wednesday, since I did not wish this matter to drag over the holidays.

 17th July.

Newsam rang me up about the sabotage case at Portsmouth. I said that we had nothing to say; we were sitting in on the Board of Enquiry and until it published its findings we could make no comment. He was seeking information in order to advise the Home Secretary, who was attending the Cabinet where this matter was going to be discussed.

 At the D.G.'s meeting to-day, Shaw made it clear that he could not employ _____ Hollis did not want him as a replacement for Bennett, and Dick was then asked if he could use him. I told the D.G. that there was a matter of principle to be considered. We were in the habit of ~~xxxx~~ telling all officers joining this department that they would be called upon to serve overseas; certain exceptions had been made in the case of highly technical personnel, but it was obviously bad policy to have a number of people who could not be moved abroad in case of emergency. If it were not for his domestic complications, _____ was clearly a man who could be very usefully employed in either S.I.M.E. or S.I.F.E. The D.G. did not consider that _____ should be barred if B. Division thought they could give him employment.

 Jack Morton and Bamford came to see me about a request from George Jenkin that we should find him a man with a certain knowledge of business and, above all, intelligence work who could be placed in some firm in Singapore and build up a secret network in Malaya. The trouble was that although it had been made plain to the community that they should impart information about subversive activities to the Police, the Police were not generally trusted. It was, therefore, necessary to collect this information by other means. George Jenkin himself intended to be at the

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receiving end. Neither Jack nor myself were very clear as to how this was going to operate. I rather wondered whether it was necessary to place this man in a firm; as I saw his job, he would have introductions to various business firms who would assist him in the selection of a reliable Chinese in their employ who could give him either first or second-hand information relating to various walks of life, e.g. seamen. I gather, however, that Goerge Jenkin wants to go a little deeper; he wants to find one or two really high-grade agents who will have access to officials of the Executive Committee of the Malayan C.P. It was agreed that Jack Morton would communicate with Jenkin and get a clearer definition of what he had in mind.

18th July.

I had a long talk with Jack Morton, who is still very worried about the administration side of S.I.F.E. As a result of one discussion that he has had here with the Office of Works, certain of his difficulties have been ruled out; he cannot understand why this could not have been done before. It is indeed difficult to see any reason for this. The housing problem in Hong Kong is still unsolved.

There is to be a meeting with S.I.S. to-morrow to discuss the basic charter of the integrated M.I.5/M.I.6 unit (J.S.S.).

Morton told me about the case of a Chinaman, LI PING, who had been employed on the staff of the Consulate at Taipei in Formosa.

This man had been sacked and subsequently arrested by the Nationalists as an agent of the Chinese Communist Government, if not a Russian agent. S.I.F.E. had only heard of this through reading a report in the Press; they had then made a demand to see the interrogation reports, which were obviously of considerable interest to S.I.F.E. After a certain amount of trouble, these were being produced.

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 Burt came to see me about the case of a Canadian Communist named CARON. We had asked Immigration to give us particulars about him and only rather late in the day had Immigration informed Special Branch. Burt thought it might be desirable in such cases if we sent a copy of our letter to Special Branch, so that they could inform their officer. Hollis, when consulted, saw no objection to this in principle.

Burt was very conscious of the age-long friction between Special Branch and Immigration. He did not disguise from me that this was not always the fault of Immigration; wherever he saw his men were inclined to assert themselves too much he withdrew them.

 Anthony Blunt came in to tell me that Andrew REVAI had had his naturalisation certificate turned down. I got the file and subsequently discussed the matter with Hill and Dick. Anthony had REVAI's side of the story and would like us to look at it. We explained to him, however, that it was difficult for us to intervene with the Home Office, as we had lately been trying to stiffen them up in regard to naturalisation cases.

19th July.

At the J.I.C. to-day, Baker-Cresswell mentioned that the P.M. had sent for the D.N.I. and asked him about the explosion at Portsmouth. It seemed that the Admiralty Court of Enquiry would find that an act of sabotage had been committed, despite the fact that the evidence on this subject seems to be extremely slender.

I forgot to mention that last Wednesday Val Boucher told me that representatives of the American First Army had arrived here entirely unheralded for a conference with War Office officials. They said that they wanted to know exactly where their units would be stationed in the event of war, as they would constitute the first army of occupation. They had a Security Officer with them, who said that he would wish to know about security arrangements generally, and also what the British would be doing in regard to screening Europeans fleeing from Western countries in front of the Russian invasion.

While it is clearly quite right and proper that the Americans should reconnoitre the ground, it does show a certain state of hysteria that they should arrive here without any previous consultations.

We had a meeting on mobilisation plans, at which Horrocks, D.O.S., D.B., D.C. and Hill were present. Horrocks had a number of points which he wished cleared up in order to produce his war chart. I should like to have had it before now, as the next step, namely, earmarking people for specific jobs, cannot make much progress until after the holidays.

20th July.

I discussed with Perfect the question of the Admiralty Police organisation. He feels that both as head of P.L.S and as responsible for the areas where these Special Branches are to be set up, he personally should make the initial arrangements. Later he should go to Scotland and visit Rosyth with Jack Mann.

I spoke to Roger about this and asked him to arrange for a meeting between Perfect and Clayton of the Admiralty. Roger seemed worried about Perfect doing the job; he would have preferred Holmes, owing to the latter's more recent and more extensive police experience. I said that it was difficult to put Holmes in the deal with Chief Constables, who were normally dealt with by Perfect. Clearly the Chief Constables would have to come in right at the start, since it will be extremely important to ensure that whoever is placed in charge of Special Branch activities in the Docks is persona grata with the local police. Hollis thought that we ought to tell the D.G. that Perfect was going, and I told him that I had no objection to his doing this.

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Van Moyland mentioned the Dutch report on S.O.E., which has now come out in the form of a White Paper. I gather that it is highly critical of Dutch authorities over here during the war. Van Moyland says that it

is a hopelessly distorted account of affairs. That S.O.E.'s purpose in dropping unfortunate Dutchmen into the arms of the Germans over a period of eighteen months was a truly lamentable one, there is no doubt whatever; I do not think, however, that it can be regarded as more than stupidity or lack of judgement.

 I lunched with Simmons of the P.L.A. Police, who is retiring, and Cox his successor. They were full of stories about smuggling in the docks. They are on the whole a pretty efficient organisation. If the Admiralty had something comparable, it might make our task considerably easier.

21st July.

I went over to see Newsam to tell him about the Portsmouth explosion. The D.G. saw the D.N.I. yesterday, and recommended to him that the whole matter should now be taken up by the Police. Hampshire Constabulary should be in the Chair and call in Monmouthshire and Portsmouth. We would hold a watching brief and render any assistance we could. D.N.I. agreed and obtained the First Lord's concurrence. Meanwhile, Hollis had seen Admiral Willis, who was in a co-operative frame of mind and ready to give us anything we wanted.

Newsam approved of this arrangement and agreed that I should get into touch with Dr. Watts and make any use of him that I liked.

 Des Graz, of the embryo Censorship Committee, came to see me last week. He told me that H.G. Valentine, who in the last war was in charge of censorship in Trinidad and now works in Thomas Cook & Sons, will be leaving in the middle of September for Trinidad, Jamaica, British Guiana, Antigua, St. Lucia and the Bahamas, to make certain preparatory arrangements on behalf of the Censorship Committee. He will wish to make contact with our representatives in Trinidad and Jamaica. This information may, of course have reached Shaw from other sources.

Des Graz himself intends to visit Washington on a somewhat similar mission during the first ten days of September. He would like to establish contact with Geoffrey Patterson.

 Dr. Watts, the Home Office explosives expert, came to see me. Fenton gave him a very lucid explanation of what had happened and of the experiments that had been carried out under his direction. Watts was pensive and, I think on the whole, slightly sceptical about an act of sabotage having been committed. He was anxious to conduct experiments with Torpex, which he said contained a considerable amount of aluminium. It seemed possible that if Torpex were burned, it might produce similar phenomena to those described by the various witnesses. The really lamentable aspect of the whole incident is the lack of security precautions. Before the loading took place there should have been a hose attached to the hydrant ready to be turned on at a moment's notice. In fact there was difficulty in finding the cock and when the hose was produced it was not long enough to reach the barge. It had not been possible to do more than get two buckets of water to the scene of the fire. Dr. Watts says that if the hose had been in position there is no doubt that the fire would have been put out, and that £1,000,000 might have been saved. It is clear, too, that the depth charges, one of which originally caused the fire, were lying about more or less unguarded for a matter of days, both en route and in sidings at the dockyard. Dr. Watts has agreed to go down to the Chief Constables' meeting on Monday.

The "Giant Panda" (Denham) came here to ask whether he could be given his diary and files relating to his Caribbean visit during the war. I told him that I had taken a cursory glance at them and that, in view of the of the material they contained, I thought they should remain here. He readily agreed.

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I gather that at last accommodation has been obtained in Hong Kong.

25th July.

Colonel Darling came to see me. He has just been appointed as Planner to the Jebb Committee. His business is to follow up the Jebb Committee's conclusions and ascertain what is being done. He reminded me of the recent meeting, which was attended by the D.G., when the cold war in the U.K. was considered and it had been asked what we, the Home Office or any other department concerned was doing in this respect. He said that although the Cabinet had decided that there could be no expenditure of Government funds in combatting the activities of another Party which was legal, there might be various forms of action that could be taken. Colonel Darling clearly had no knowledge of Communism or of the work of Government departments which were interested in the subject. I explained to him on very broad lines what we were doing. I then gave him a rough sketch of the Communist Party and its potentialities as we saw them. We were dealing with Communists or associates in Government departments under the P.M.'s ruling, and for this purpose had a considerable coverage, although we did not presume to know the identity of every Communist. It seemed to me that the field in which the Communists were doing the most harm was the industrial one; this was, however, clearly a matter for the T.Us themselves; they were thoroughly aware of the position, as was indeed the Government, and it seemed that some progress was being made. As regards teachers, it was a curious fact that, as far as we could see, the Communists were not taking special steps to exploit the situation. There was, of course, the added difficulty of teachers who were appointed by local councils. I made it clear that we were by no means complacent and that if the Jebb Committee had any plan or any views we should be very ready to consider them. The only suggestion that I could make was that a film might be made of "Animal Farm" by George Orwell. I gave him a copy of the book which I asked him to return.

, late of the L.R.C., came to see me. He travels a lot in Europe for a Bradford firm dealing in wool. In his spare time, which seems to be considerable, he studies psychology and religions. He has apparently worked for a long time with a Dr. Jung, said to be the greatest psychologist in Europe, who is now about eighty and lives in Zurich. who is a Catholic, seems to have met all the leading lights of almost every religion, and about a year ago attended an International Convention of Religions in Switzerland. He is a member of the Vedanta Society, 51 Lancaster Gate. The purpose of his visit was to say that a conference of religions was to be held in London in August, which is to be attended by high Church dignitaries from all over the world. has been told by one, GHANANADA, a Hindu from Hollywood, that the organiser of this conference, AVYAK-TAMANDA, a Hindu Vedantist and monk of the Rama Krishna Order, is playing politics and is likely to present the conference at the end of its deliberations with some political resolution possibly on peace or the abolition of the atom bomb. I said I did not think that there was anything to be done, but that as he was attending the

conference I should be interested to hear what happened.

26th July.

At the J.I.C. to-day I said a word to Pat Reilly about West Africa and our proposed liaison with S.D.E.C.E. there. There appeared to be some hitch in the Foreign Office about the proposed appointment of a representative of S.D.E.C.E. in Accra. I told him that we had agreed this between S.I.S. and ourselves and that I hoped we could get on with it as the French, with whom I discussed it more than a month ago, were willing and anxious to appoint somebody.

 I saw Newsam to-day about our old friend Maria BUDBERG, who is to be visited by McGIBBON, the British Communist who is strongly suspected of acting as a Soviet agent while employed on some Staff Mission in Washington during the war. He now runs a publishing business, for which we understand he has received a grant of about £2,000 from the Soviet Government in recognition of his past services. Maria BUDBERG is a friend of the HALPERNs (Security Co-Ordination) and was at one time mistress of Maxim Gorki.

I told Newsam about the alleged sabotage case at Portsmouth. I could not understand what had prompted the Prime Minister to make his statement in the House of Commons, since recent evidence seemed to indicate that the explosion was due to faulty construction of a depth charge. We now know that the depth charge came from Dene Hill and not from Glencoeed, which means that it is probably of ancient manufacture and also that the substance which came out of the depth charge and impregnated the clothing of one of the loaders was torpex, and not thermite. It looks as if the P.M. had accepted the assurances of his brother-in-law, Admiral Willis, C.-in-C. Portsmouth. There may well be two factors operating in this case. One, political wishful thinking about a Communist plot, and two, anxiety on the part of the Admiralty to cover up faulty construction, bad inspection and a general lack of security. In both cases the cry of "sabotage" is a convenient one.

 Brigadier Mellor and Colonel Barton of the W.D.C. came to see me. Mellor has a moan about our not collaborating directly with him and supplying him with the names and particulars of Communists in the Government establishments for which he has a Police responsibility. I told him that we were the servants of the Ministry of Supply and that for a variety of reasons we had to maintain that position, particularly where the question of personnel employed on secret work were concerned. The fact is that Mellor is leaving very much in the past, when the W.D.C. was about the only justification for the existence of M.I.5. It was then under the command of Colonel Holt-Wilson, who designed for its officers and himself, as Colonel in Chief, a beautiful blue uniform covered with silver braid!

The Ministry of Supply do not want Mellor to be pursuing Communists within their establishments, but have recently agreed, as has also the War Office, to supply him with those particulars which they supply to their own Superintendents. I told Mellor that I would look into the matter and communicate with him further.

27th July.

I have spoken to Horrocks to-day about getting on with our war chart. We said that he would have it ready for the time when I came back from leave. I replied that I did not think this was good enough and that I did not feel inclined to go on leave until I was satisfied that considerable progress had been made. It seemed to me that there were certain key matters which we should clear as soon as possible; we had to decide in principle whether a Director of E. Division should be found from amongst the existing staff, or whether he should be one of our ex-wartime employees. We had to make progress with the Regional organisation and we had to consider whether in wartime B. Division would not want another Director, in which case we should have to find someone else for C. Division on the assumption that Hollis would be the right man to assist Dick in B. I have arranged a meeting for to-morrow and have asked Dick to come up from Barrow Elm.

Air Marshal Tedder and our Ambassador had a discussion with General Bradley and Mr. Jessup in Washington on the 25th July. There are to be joint talks on; (a) how far a large-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea is likely to affect the situation in Korea and whether war there can be localised; (b) an examination within the U.N. framework of the eventual disposition of the Korean problem - possible reoccupation of North Korea by the Soviets is envisaged; (c) an examination of the whole Middle East problem; (d) an urgent study of the Iranian situation, including the problem of the conservation or denial of the oil in the event of Soviet invasion; (e) a study to determine the capability of Allied Forces in West Germany and the Western sectors of Berlin to withstand an attack by the East German forces; (f) the capability of Bulgarian forces to invade Greece, and the question of assistance if necessary to the Greek Government; (g) a joint Intelligence conference on Soviet capabilities and intentions, to be followed by a meeting of the joint Chiefs of Staff for discussions in regard to global strategy; (h) a conference between the U.S. and the U.K. military representatives concerned with the problem of cover and deception, to be held in Washington. Meanwhile, the defence debate is going on and we are pledged to send land forces to Korea.

I went down to see Little and Barnett. They were worried about certain Terminal Exchanges, both from the point of view of espionage and sabotage. They had in mind that we might possibly vet some 3,000 employees who were in positions where they might do harm. Barnett said that it would be quite easy for an engineer to tee-in on important Government lines and that the chances of their being detected would be fairly remote. I explained the principles of our vetting policy and our reluctance to depart from them. We proceeded from an investigation of the Communist Party and its membership and notified departments concerned of members or associates who were in their employ. This system was not infallible, but neither was the vetting system.

I undertook to let the G.P.O. know roughly the number of cases of Post Office employees about whom we had notified them already, and I asked them to let me have details of their new V.Ps.

I ascertained on return to the office that we had notified them since the beginning of 1949 of 569 cases, 60 of which had since left the department. This figure was a considerable shock to Barnett, as indeed it was to me. He had found on enquiry that these names had been coming in to one section of the Post Office, which had been sitting on them. He now proposed to find out where the 569 people were. I suggested to him that he should keep files of his V.Ps so that if we got authority in time of emergency they could easily be laid off the moment the flag fell. He agreed to do this.

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Sir Norman Brook came to-day to discuss with the D.G. and myself the results of his enquiries into the work of this department. Before he gave his views, the D.G. told him that he had been summoned this morning to the P.M. to Downing Street. The P.M. said that he had heard from Air Marshal Elliott that two further acts of sabotage had occurred, one at the new House of Commons and the other at the American aerodrome at Layton(?) Heath. As regards the latter case, the action had been traced to one of the guards in the Ulster Rifles; this man had slashed the tyres of some of the aircraft with his bayonet. Enquiry had led to the discovery of particles of rubber on the end of his bayonet and the man when challenged confessed. The P.M. was inclined to think that the I.R.A. might be responsible and was anxious to know what was going on in this field. The D.G. told him that the I.R.A. were the responsibility of the Scotland Yard. The P.M. said that he would like the D.G. to find out about this incident and also to obtain particulars about the one at the new House of Commons, where it was alleged that the disconnection of certain wires would cause a boiler explosion on its opening day. This had a real Guy Fawkes ring about it, but there was no dynamite! The P.M. suggested that the D.G. should see Air Marshal Elliott. The D.G. had warned the P.M. that the incident at Portsmouth was looking more like a technical defect in the depth charge than an act of sabotage. The P.M. was surprised to hear this.

Sir Norman Brook said that Elliott had suggested to him that in view of the various sabotage incidents, it might be a good thing to consider whether some warning should not be issued to V.Ps and that in any case there should be a meeting of Cornish's committee on the subject. Brook himself saw no harm in a meeting, but was doubtful whether there was anything that could usefully be done. Brook then told us that the Cabinet had been considering some form of legislation which would supercede the Malicious Damage Act and make it a criminal offence to impede in any way the measures being taken which affected the security of the State. Brook pointed out that unless this legislation covered ca'canny unofficial strikes or failure to carry out certain duties, not only would it be useless but it would make it clear to any disgruntled elements that ca'canny was the line to pursue. The Government had apparently consulted the T.Us, who were adamant about anything of the kind being excluded. Brook said that he had for years been telling the Government, and particularly Morrison, that failure by the Government to act in this matter was, in the industrial field, highly detrimental to the security and efficiency of the country. Morrison knows this well enough, but finds himself powerless to act. It is clearly

an issue that will have to be faced before long. Brook thinks that the basic trouble may well be that the workers think that their T.U. leaders are too much identified with the Government and are not, therefore, to be trusted to represent the workers' interests impartially; they have, therefore, lost control of their members.

Brook then gave us his views on the enquiry he had conducted into the work of the office. He said that there was really practically nothing that he could criticise. He had been enormously impressed by the difficulties and complexity of the problems with which we had to deal, but, with the exception of one or two minor suggestions, he could think of no way of improving our knowledge of Russian Intelligence activities that was not already being pursued. He had at first been inclined to think that the manpower and efforts devoted to the work of B.1 were perhaps out of proportion with those of B.2, but in arguing his case with the officers concerned he had been entirely convinced that this was not so. He recognised that there was an awkward gap in our knowledge of Marxians who were not members of the C.P., but felt themselves ideologically sympathetic towards the Russian regime. He realised the enormous difficulties of finding starting points which would help us to disseminate in this very large field, but he thought that the reorganisation plan in B.1 should help us in tackling this problem. He asked whether we had our feelers out in scientific circles. I said that we had certain contacts of our own in the scientific world, to whom we could go for assistance, and that we were also in close touch with J.S.T.I.C., who were operating in this field and were able to get at any branch of the scientific world. It might be, however, that we could develop these lines a bit more.

Brook then gave us his views about our relations with S.I.S. He was glad to find that reason had at last prevailed and that the work of counter-intelligence, at any rate in the Middle East and Far East, was being considered more on a functional than a territorial basis. He wondered whether this principle should not be extended elsewhere. (The D.G. then left the room to attend another meeting and I continued the conversation with Brook).

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Brook said that he had been talking to Drew about deception plans. He said that while he had the highest regard for Drew and was conscious of the necessity for maintaining some embryo deception organisation for expansion in any future crisis, he had always been somewhat sceptical about the possibilities of practising deception in peace time. Drew had told him about a project for starting up the manufacture of some "notionally" secret weapon at Ford's factory at Dagenham, where there are a certain number of crypto-Communists. The idea was that this special work, which would be screened off, would become the subject of gossip; that the crypto-Communists would be interested, and ultimately the Russians.

Brook understood that Drew had quite properly consulted the relevant sections in this office, but he wondered whether L.C.S. were not encroaching on our preserves. This seemed to him to be a straight counter-espionage job. I said that I thought Drew probably had something more in mind and that his proposal was really a development of a former scheme which had been agreed to by the Chiefs of Staff. It had been felt that as we were unable during the next few years to mass sufficient ground forces in Western Union to cope with Russian aggression, we might try and persuade the Russians that we had a secret weapon of such devastating effect that they would be unwise to risk the possibility of starting another world war. Admittedly, the possibilities of achieving this object by the means suggested seemed pretty remote, to say nothing of the time, labour and cost involved. It was, however, for the L.C.S. to decide whether it was worth while trying. We had the closest possible relations

with Drew and we should, of course, do anything we could to help him, provided his project did not place too great a strain upon our resources.

From the strictly counter-espionage point of view, I saw no merit in the proposals, which at best would only lead to the provocation of a certain number of crypto-Communists at Dagenham and the identity of some Russian, probably already known to us, to whom they would be reporting. We had, I thought, other and better fish to fry.

I spoke to Brook about SIGINT. I said that we were now represented on the Deputy SIGINT Board, which assesses priorities, and that we had a liaison officer who was persona grata with all sections of the organisation. We were getting everything we needed within the limits of SIGINT's resources; we were not, however, represented on the SIGINT Board, although we were the greatest users of its products. The reason given was that the Services and the Foreign Office made a contribution to the organisation, either financial or with equipment and manpower. This was not so in our case. It was, therefore, contended that if we were admitted to the Board, a claim might be made by all other users. We were not worried about representation on the Board in peace time, but we had a strong feeling that in time of war pressure would be exerted by the Services to ensure that all their resources were used for obtaining operational material, and that the needs of counter-intelligence would be neglected. During the war it had been largely due to the initiative and pressure from our Department that, somewhat late in the day, counter-espionage material had been intercepted and a special section set up to deal with it. In any future war the remedy seemed to be in our having an allocation from the Treasury, which would be handed over to SIGINT for use in the development of our work. We should then have a stake in the organisation and a seat on the Board, which would enable us to see that our interests were safeguarded.

Brook seemed to agree with what I said and will bear the point in mind when he visits Eastcote.

Lastly, I talked to Brook about the relations between the Home Office and the Foreign Office. It seemed to me that since Soviet Russia and world Communism were subjects from which no Government Department could now divorce itself, there was a danger in the fact that the Home Office were not represented on any of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committees; they worked rather in a vacuum, and consequently when matters arose which vitally affected them and other Departments of State, they had no frame in which to put them. Their line of thought and action seemed to be out of harmony with that of the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff. There was, moreover, an embarrassing tendency on the part of the various committees on which we served to use us as their agent in dealing with the Home Office, whereas in fact the matters in question should really be the subject of direct discussion between the Under-Secretaries of State in the Foreign Office or the Service Departments and the Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office.

Brook seemed to agree entirely with what I said. He had indeed noticed it himself and, as an old Home Office man, he was convinced that the higher staff were too much rooted to old-time liberalism and the protection of their Minister in the House of Commons. He agreed with me that they ought to have a senior officer - for preference Murrie, an Assistant Under-Secretary of State - who, either through attending Intelligence committee meetings or by receiving papers, should keep the Home Office in the picture of international affairs, and so enable them to deal more intelligently with any questions which might arise. I told him that I had spoken rather tentatively both to Newsam and to Reilly on this subject, but that the latter had found it rather difficult to know how best to set the ball rolling. Brook

31st July.

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I obtained the D.G.'s approval for all the measures which we had tentatively agreed on on Friday in connection with war planning.

I attended Ronnie Howe's celebration dinner given by Wing Commander Hulbert. I sat next Marcus SIEFF, whose father, Israel SIEFF, was also there. Ronnie certainly has some queer friends!

Ronnie was a bit naughty about discussing my work in front of young SIEFF. In fact he went no further than to say that he thought that we ought to go in for much more publicity; whether the Yard was efficient or not, it had a name which was extremely valuable. Of course the answer is that there is every difference between ourselves and the Yard and the disadvantages of being a public department far outweigh the advantages. I did not argue the matter, for obvious reasons.

1st August.

I lunched with Victor. He said that he thought that in any future war he would be likely to suffer frustration, and to make himself unpopular, owing to characteristics that were well-known to us both! He had, therefore, decided that he might be better placed in some job under Tizard. I said that, much as I should regret his not being with us in any future war, if there was one, I thought he was right and that we might find it difficult to give him the scope that he would want. He could, however, be extremely useful to us if he were working with Tizard.

Kened'hu, the new Secretary of the S.I.C., came to see me and stayed for a considerable time. He is very voluble, but earnest, about his job. Irvine had told him that in the normal course of events he would not have more than a few hours work a week: this clearly would not suit him and he is looking round for ways of stimulating the organisation to greater and better activity. This is all very laudable, but I am not quite sure where it is going to lead us! He talks of fortnightly interim meetings. He asked me quite frankly whether I thought that people here were worried about French security. I said that quite definitely they were and that the presence of Communists in Government Departments was a serious source of anxiety. He said that quite a lot had been done to remove them unofficially but that nevertheless there were some quite highly placed operators still in position. I said that such a situation was bound to act as a kind of blight upon the exchange of information. He quite realised that this was a serious matter and was much interested by my explanation of the workings of the purge system here. He has during the last few months been in a department of the Ministry of Defence, dealing with cold war propaganda, but that department has not got much further than considering ways and means. He said that he personally was seriously worried about the defeatist atmosphere created in France by the Peace Campaign. He was quite certain that if a war arose now, France would not fight. I told him that I thought the most important work for the Committee was in connection with war planning. He

agreed and said that he was going to do his utmost to get over the impasse that the French situation created. He thought it important that the heads of organisations, or at least their deputies, should be present at S.I.C. meetings. This is a sad blow and I can only hope that his views on this point do not prevail!

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Graham told me about a purge case of one _____ in the C.R.O. He was in the Party from 1933-1944, since when there is very little information. Leisching, however, wishes to purge him and to do so while the Prime Minister is responsible for the affairs of the C.R.O. Graham says that there is very little likelihood of the three advisers giving their support, but Leisching wishes the P.M. to overrule them. This case may well end in the P.M. giving a ruling which is contrary to his own instruction.

Strang, on the advice of Bevin who received a letter from Lord Jackson, has asked us to investigate the case of Ian JACOB, responsible for foreign broadcasts at the B.B.C. Neither Strang nor ourselves think that there is a vestige of truth in Lord Jackson's allegations, which so far we have not had in detail. We do not intend to carry out any detailed enquiry.

2nd August.

At the Appointments Board to-day we selected five candidates.

Holmes is going over to Northern Ireland to interview a _____ whose name was found in HALPERIN's diary. _____ wife is said to be a Communist.

Murrie told me about McCARTNEY. He said that Peter Thorneycroft had written to De Freitas, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, pointing out that MACARTNEY was in the habit of frequenting the House of Commons, in particular the bar, and that people were often somewhat indiscreet in his presence. He also pointed out that MACARTNEY appeared to be hanging on to Lord Strabolgi. I said that none of this surprised me!

3rd August.

Jimmy Dixon came to tell me that the Police were trying to get a statement from one of our girls, _____ of B.L., who is conveniently situated between two of the Soviet Embassy buildings in Kensington Palace Gardens. She apparently witnessed the scene the other day when the

Fascists broke some of the windows of the Embassy. I said that there was no harm in her making a statement, or even appearing as a witness; if we tried to call off the Police she would immediately be regarded as a S.B. or M.I.5 agent by the local station. Dixon thought that S.B. might subsequently try to employ her as an agent. I said that if they did that I would speak to Burt.

The D.G. tells me that at the J.I.C to-day Perrin announced that we were sending a delegation to Washington to discuss Russia's progress in the atomic energy field. There was likely to be a discrepancy of views, since it was understood that the Americans believed that the Russians might be in a position to wage a major war within the next twelve months. The Americans estimated the Soviet production capacity far more highly than we did, although on what evidence nobody knows. It is quite possible that they have been influenced by De Courcy, or that they find it convenient to engage in wishful thinking in order to get the necessary appropriations from Congress for stepping up their own production and for the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb.

I had a talk with John Marriott to-day. He does not feel that the new organisation proposed for B.1 really meets B.2's demands. He thinks, and I am inclined to agree, that there still ought to be a section carrying the duties formerly performed by B.1.F., namely, the investigation of the underground section of the Party and all likely Marxians.

I discussed with Spencer our military, naval and air ceiling in the event of war. It seemed to me that we had not made sufficient provision for expansion in the Colonies.

The F.B.I. and C.I.A. have surpassed themselves by asking us to put a H.O.W. on some man in Brighton whose daughters are said to be illegally in the U.S.A. Johnny Cimperman appears to have got the Brighton Police to interview the father, who gave the appearance of being reluctant to disclose the whereabouts of his daughters. It was thought that a H.O.W. might provide the answer. In asking for this enquiry, it was made clear that no security issue was at stake. We have replied that in those circumstances it is quite impossible for us to impose a H.O.W., since the Home Secretary would refuse his warrant. We have been given no background to this case at all.

4th August.

I had a war planning meeting to discuss our military ceiling both here and in outstations. It is extremely difficult in advance to calculate what will be required. It will be even more difficult to decide what rank the officer should hold, since this invariably depends upon the rank of the opposite numbers with whom they have to deal. We have decided to step our requirements both for existing staff and for new staff on the home front; we have accepted the figures of S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E. and we have considerably increased those of other overseas stations, taking into account the doubling of existing staffs and the creation of new posts in Bermuda, British Guiana and British Honduras.

Hill has had a discussion with Perrin, who over the weekend is endeavouring to get agreement with the Americans on an estimate of Soviet Russia's atomic bomb potentialities. The Americans on some information, the nature of which is not known to us, are inclined to believe that the Russians

are much further advanced than we think. It may be that the Americans are working on information obtained by the F.B.I. from GOLD and others arrested, or that they have been influenced by de COURCY. We, on the other hand, are not inclined to believe in these extravagant estimates - indeed, we think it possible that although the Russians have had an atomic explosion, they have not necessarily made the bomb. The effect of the information received by the Americans has been once more to create a somewhat uncomfortable atmosphere of the necessity of a preventive war. Perrin has been briefed with all our information about De COURCY.

Derbyshire has done some good work in regard to E.V.Ws. He has had a talk with the Latvian Consul here, who seems to know quite a lot about his own nationals. While he thinks that the majority of them would be loyal to this country, he is positive that there are a certain number who are definitely disloyal, and he knows of a woman, Anna YAKOBLEVNA SKALBERG, who is an agent for Soviet propaganda among Latvian refugees. Our files show that this woman is in touch with various members of the Soviet Embassy, who are providing her with Communist literature for distribution. The Latvian Consul will provide us with reliable interpreters for use by Camp Commandants, or by the Police. Derbyshire is now going to approach the Lithuanians and the Estonians. Meanwhile, he has seen the Poles and has a considerable amount of information about Left Wing Polish associations. He is also seeing SKOROPADSKI about Polish Ukrainians. From what Derbyshire tells me, there is obviously going to be a job for a fairly responsible officer to tackle the whole E.V.W. problem. Logically, this officer should form a section in B.1.

I talked this matter over with Hollis. While he agrees, he feels that in the present state of affairs B. Division cannot take on any further burdens, unless they are broken down into sub-divisions or unless a new Division is created. We shall have to discuss this with Dick when he returns.

I notice in Anglo-American planning papers that considerable importance is now attached to Persia and that attempts are being made to reach agreement on the stop-line which should be imposed.

5th August.

A return which has been got out by B.1 shows that the total number of Communists in the Civil Service is estimated at about 14,047, of which roughly one-third are in the G.P.O.

There is to be a World Peace Conference in London in November, with a large attendance from abroad. An endeavour is being made to bring in as many non-Communist elements as possible. Graham is anxious that we should call a conference not later than September to decide what the policy is to be. The matter will be more difficult to deal with, since a number of delegates will not be Communists. It is arguable, I think, whether a ban on the conference here might not cause it to be held in France, where its effect would be far greater. The fact that such a conference is being planned may be an indication of Russian nervousness, but in these matters it is always difficult to tell whether the basic motive is aggressive or defensive.

Evidence seems to be increasing, which points to the Portsmouth incident being due to some defect in the depth charge due to the instability of Torpex. Although the fourteen depth charges loaded at Dene Hill were labelled as having been inspected, it has been admitted that the labels were put on before the inspection was carried out. They had been lying at Dene Hill for several years. The Admiralty are naturally reluctant to face this issue, since it means the withdrawal of all Torpex if there are reasonable

grounds for thinking that existing stocks may at any time ignite from spontaneous combustion.

8th August.

I saw Brigadier Mellor and Colonel Barton to-day. I told Mellor that I had looked through the files and that I had also discussed his complaint in some detail with Hollis. I could find nothing to suggest that we had in any way endeavoured to persuade the Ministry of Supply or the War Office to withhold from him information about individuals in establishments for which he had a Police responsibility. The fact was that we were in an extremely difficult position. The Ministry of Supply and the War Office, for reasons of their own, clearly did not wish to pass on all information they received from us to their Superintendents. I could see, therefore, that they would find it difficult to pass information to the W.D.C. which was not given to the Superintendents. It was impossible for us to pass the information direct to the W.D.C., since it related to employees of the Ministry of Supply and the War Office and we had to be guided by their wishes. It seemed to me that under the present arrangement Mellor was getting from the Ministry of Supply and the War Office a considerable number of names, although whether he had all of them I could not say.

I made it clear to Mellor that if he was not satisfied, the only thing he could do was to take the matter up with the Ministries concerned, and that he could be quite sure that we should not be in any way obstructive. If we had an anxiety, it would be that if a dead set were made to keep under observation all the Communists about whom we had records, the security of our sources might be prejudiced. It was essential that if any observation was kept by the W.D.C. it should on no account come to the notice of the suspect. Mellor assured me that he had always exercised particular care in this respect.

Mellor repeated his former statement, that when he went to the Ministry of Supply and the War Office they had told him that M.I.5 objected to his being given the names of Communists in establishments where he had a responsibility. I told him quite frankly that this was not true. He asked me whether I would mind his telling Jagers that he had spoken to me on this point. I replied that there was no objection whatever.

I sincerely hope that this is the last we shall hear of this matter.

9th August.

I had a two hour meeting at the Home Office with Newsam in the chair. Harold Scott, Philip Allen, Cornish and Oakley were also present. Hollis, Graham Mitchell and I represented this office.

We estimated that there are about 980 men and 100 women for internment when the flag falls. One third of them were in London. Newsam thought that particulars of these British subjects should be seen by the Home Secretary, who would have to state on oath that he had considered each case individually; there would not be time for him to do this immediately before the war and, off the record, nobody remotely believed that he would look at them now! However, the formality has to be gone through and B.I.A., who are already overworked, will have to get out lists as soon as they can.

For enemy aliens it was estimated that there might be at least 1,500 men and 1,300 women plus 150 Soviet citizens, but I made it clear

that as nobody had really sorted out E.V.s, it might well be that these numbers would have to be added to.

British women are to interned at Holloway and Manchester. Holding Camps are to be established at Ascot (2,000), Rhyl and Epsom. The police are to supply the Commandant and the Deputy Commandant will be from the Prison Service. They said that we might wish to provide a welfare officer who would really be an intelligence officer. Two permanent camps are to be established in the Isle of Man, with 4,000 in each. I said that we should want welfare officers in both these camps.

With some reluctance it was agreed that we should have both O20 and Huntercombe. The Deputy Commandant should be a Home Office nominee and we should have military guards. Both these camps are filled up with Borstal boys at the moment, and much work would have to be done on them before they were fit for our purposes. It was made clear that the two camps were necessary, since owing to the Geneva Convention an individual who had once been in O20 could not go to another camp without full rights under the Convention. I mentioned the desirability of an isolation camp. Although no concrete proposal was made, Newsam seemed to think the idea was sound. The purpose of this camp would be to hold aliens wishing to return to their own country for a sufficient period to render their information out of date.

Lastly, I drew attention to the probable influx of aliens from the Continent at the outbreak of war. This influx had been considerable in 1940 and the L.R.C. was not designed to cope with it. People would arrive in fishing boats, rafts, rowing boats and other kind of craft, and there would have to be some sort of organisation for segregating them and possibly for screening them. Newsam was rather inclined to play this down at first, but I got strong support from Harold Scott.

I had a long talk with Courtenay, who has returned for a few weeks from Australia. He takes a favourable view of Colonel Spry and thinks that he is likely to cut out a considerable amount of dead wood. The case is not really progressing very much and it seems doubtful whether it ever will. Meanwhile, if the anti-Communist Bill is passed, it will be extremely difficult to bring Communists under its terms without disclosing sources of information, since there is the right of judicial appeal.

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11th August.

Malcom Cumming has told me about a Ukrainian E.V.W. case in Lincoln, from which it appears that the individual concerned has been asked to supply certain information about aerodromes. We also have a current Polish case, where the Military Attache, aided by a member of his staff, is trying to blackmail a Pole into supplying similar information.

Hill has talked to me about a case relating to COLLET's Bookshop, who have been trying to purchase £4,000 worth of maps, obviously on behalf of the Russians. These maps cover the east and south coasts of the industrial areas. We have stalled for the moment. It seems that Stanfords are the only people who could supply these from stock and we are therefore suggesting to the J.I.C. that all demands on ordnance survey should be scrutinised by the War Office and abnormal demands turned down.

12th August.

 Information from Portsmouth indicates that the dockers concerned have now confessed to have lied in their previous statements in order to protect WEBB, the man who actually handled the depth charge which ignited. Apparently they allowed the depth charges to fall over on their sides before rolling them into position, and that immediately this particular one fell over a flame was seen, not from the prima hole but from some other part; it is therefore quite possible that the casing split and that a spark was caused through its striking an iron rivet in the bottom of the barge.

 There has been another case of sabotage on board the Theseus, due to sail for Korea on Monday. The compass wires have been cut. Holmes is investigating.

14th August.

Perfect has visited all the East Coast Chief Constables in whose areas American aerodromes are situated. They have been warned to let us know of any gossip about stocks of atom bombs.

 I saw Burt this morning about a tendency by the F.B.I. to ask us to make loyalty enquiries over here on lines practised in the U.S. While, of course, it was of the utmost importance that the F.B.I. should not think that we were ganging up, I felt that we should speak with one voice. Burt saw the implications and assured me that he entirely agreed with our point of view and would act accordingly.

I also asked Burt to call off the police from _____ one of our secretaries living in Kensington Palace Gardens. The police want to call her as a witness against certain Fascists who broke the windows of one of the Soviet establishments last July.

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8th September.

When returning from Ireland after my holiday, I took the opportunity of staying two days in Dublin and of making contact with the British Ambassador (Laitwaite) and the

Although there is, of course, a good deal of talk both in diplomatic circles and in the press about the possibilities of getting rid of partition, no really serious moves are being made, or are likely to be made, in the near future. Suggestions have been put forward by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the British Government should take a positive hand in bringing about a settlement between North and South. The British Ambassador's retort to this was: "What sort of an answer do you think they would get and what view do you think the other members of the Commonwealth would take of such proposals?". There was clearly no answer to this and the question has not been pursued.

There is a certain amount of anxiety about Eire's position in any future war. Clearly the idea of the majority of the politicians is to remain neutral. While they think that we might be content with the northern ports, they rather wonder whether the Americans will not bulldoze their way into the southern ports.

There is, however, a desire to be helpful in meeting the various requests that have been put through the Ambassador for certain measures of co-operation in time of war, e.g. censorship, control of shipping, etc. The Irish Government do not, however, wish to put anything down on paper, as they are afraid that if there were a change of Government the information might be used against them.

I asked the Ambassador whether anything had been said about routing of communications through this country, as was done in the last war. He said that he had not touched on this question but that he would bear it in mind if a suitable occasion arose.

I had several long talks with _____ We discussed the situation as regards:

(a) The I.R.A. While about a year ago the I.R.A. had been written off as completely dead, it had during recent months shown some signs of activity, although these were not in any way regarded as serious. There are four I.R.A. units in Dublin, involving about 160 members, but, with the exception of Cork where a small unit was believed to exist, the total membership for the whole of the rest of the country would not amount to more than about 150, thus making a total of about 310. This did not, apparently, include individuals in the North, about whom _____ seemed to think the Ulster Police were fully informed. Numerically he did not believe that they amounted to very many.

Drilling was going on more or less openly in the vicinity of Dublin, but nobody thought anything of this as it had been part of the life of the country for hundreds of years and had very little significance.

While the I.R.A. had a certain number of arms, it was not thought that they had any ammunition. In February last they had succeeded in getting hold of a dump of about 200 Thompson machine guns, which had been stored in a bottle factory within a stone's throw of _____ office. The cases containing these arms had been found by some of the employees, who, wishing to enrich themselves, thought that the ~~Irish~~ ~~Republic~~ would provide a good market. The I.R.S.,

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however, considered that the arms belonged to them in any case. They accordingly kidnapped two employees of the bottle factory and took the arms away at night in lorries. The Dublin Brigade also have about a dozen Bren guns, but ammunition is lacking in every case.

Cowan's Anti-Partition League is not taken seriously, although the possibility of its being penetrated by the I.R.A. and subsequently controlled by them is envisaged.

(b) Communism. The Irish Workers' League is small and ineffective but the recent activities of Tweedie are considered to be somewhat suspicious. As agent to the Ohio Brass Company, Tweedie received monthly commission from the United States amounting to something like £2,000 a year, and there has recently been talk of the Irish Workers' League buying a house. Whether these payments are merely a cover for the transmission of funds, or whether they have any real commercial significance is not entirely clear, although it is difficult to see how Tweedie's services could really be worth £2,000 a year to the Ohio Brass Company. Tweedie has apparently made contact with the London representative of this firm, who is situated in the firm of Kinnon (?) in Victoria Street, London.

This information has, I understand, been reported in detail with a request that we should make enquiries.

The only other bit of information which might possibly have some significance is the arrival of a foreigner from Paris to visit of the Irish/U.S.S.R. Cultural Organisation. Particulars of this individual have been, or are being, forwarded to us.

told me that a request had come through officially from the Admiralty here for naval reporting in regard to ships from satellite countries. He said that he thought this request could be fairly easily met and that most of the data required was already available.

mentioned that some Irish member of a team of historians at Cambridge had talked to him about the publication of German Foreign Office documents which were being examined. He had intimated to that there were likely to be some rather sensational revelations as to the part played by certain Irish officials during the war. He had told that he could not give him the details, as he felt that this would be a breach of confidence. I asked, therefore, whether it would be possible to bootleg him an advance copy so that he might warn the Government a few weeks before publication. I said that I would look into this and let him know.

of course, knew of certain officials who had acted in a highly improper way in connection with the GOERTZ case.

In the strictest confidence, told me that: (a) Plan April 2010 KATHLEEN for the attack by the I.R.A. combined with the German landing at 'Derry had been written by some official of the Ministry of Trade and Industry who had been consulted at the time. When, however, GOERTZ found that the I.R.A. were all at sixes and sevens, he tried to interest certain members of the Irish Government in the proposals. Carney, the Irish representative in Madrid, had evidently been talking optimistically to the Germans about the warm welcome they would get if they landed in Ireland, and General O'Duffy had been in communication with a General in the Irish Army, clearly General McNeill (?). Meanwhile, McCrory, the aged Archbishop had been approached by certain associates of GOERTZ with a view to his influencing the Irish Government to encourage a German invasion of the North. McCrory had actually gone down to Dublin with this object

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in view but had received a rebuff. It was possible that details of any of these instances might come out in the German documents. I promised that I would look into this question and, if possible, bootleg him an advance copy of any further publications.

_____ proposes to pay us a visit some time between now and Christmas.

 On my return from leave I found that we had 236 H.O.Ws and 192 telechecks operating. I asked Colonel Allan whether this was taxing his resources too far. He said that, with the exception of King Street and probably the District Committees of the Party, we could take it that all these checks were being dealt with in a fairly comprehensive manner. In the case of C.P. H.Q., it was of course necessary to be somewhat selective.

 _____ came to see me this morning. He had a message, which he had received through an intermediary, from _____ to convey unofficially to S.I.S. and to ourselves. It was that _____ was "on his way out" and that _____ former head of the Surete and now a Prefect, was to take his place for a limited period.

_____ agreed with me that this perhaps meant that _____ was to endeavour to reconcile the point of view of the Surete and the D.E.C although the choice did not seem to be a particularly happy one. Meanwhile, Moch of the Ministry of Defence, had asked _____ to resign. _____ had refused and had said that if he were dismissed, he still had his dossier about the political scandals surrounding the _____ and other incidents and would use them. _____ principal lieutenant, is on indefinite leave and _____ no longer has any executive powers in D.E.C. He has not been attending the office during the last six months but is still on full pay!

_____ is a little worried about _____, the new Secretary of the S.I.C., who never stops talking and is full of rather impracticable ideas about putting new life into the organisation. He says that _____ is a careerist; he is a Sous-Prefect and hopes one day to be a Prefect. He is not, therefore, likely to risk antagonising anyone who might be of assistance to him in the future.

 Nothing very interesting seems to have been going on since I have been away, except new developments in regard to the Washington leakage. Eastcote have clearly been doing some good work on material which has now been made available to them. Geoffrey Patterson is paying a short visit to this country. Although the position since the FUCHS case has slightly eased, he still only has one contact in the Bureau. Hoover is away in California and it is hoped that there may be a chance when he comes back, if he is in a good temper! The D.G. has asked to see him if he goes to America to attend the Colorado Police Conference, but has so far had no reply to his letter.

 Apparently Hoover's attitude with regard to the _____ case is based largely on a desire to be able to tell Congress that he has investigated every aspect of the case about which they may have information. He has turned over no less than ten principal agents to make enquiries in the U.S. and elsewhere. He is neither pro nor anti _____ but just wants to enhance his personal reputation by being able to answer any questions about the matter which has featured so prominently in the public eye.

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11th September.

Charles Haydon came to see me. I gather that some progress has been made with the Federal Security Service and that agreement is shortly to be reached about the appointment of someone to run it. A further point has arisen in connection with permission being granted to the Germans to run a Secret Service. Haydon feels that the only thing is to get American agreement and to go ahead; if the French are consulted, they will certainly say "no". Haydon says the Germans will run, and are running already, something of the kind and that we would do better to go in with them and get the benefit of anything they do, rather than pretend that we do not know that it is going on, or try to close it down.

I lunched with Geoffrey Patterson. He told me a lot about his difficulties in Washington. He agreed with me that the only thing with Hoover was to take his kicks and hope that things would right themselves in the course of time.

At the D.G.'s meeting, when I was in the chair, Shaw said that the Americans, through diplomatic channels, were enquiring about the security of certain key points in the Colonies - bauxite in British Guiana was a case in point. The Americans either wanted to consult in London about these matters or to send a joint commission to investigate, or, alternatively, to send a commission on their own. The Colonial Office were worried about this and the D.G. had offered to tackle the State Department when he was in Washington. The Colonial Office have accepted this offer. It seemed to us that in some ways the matter might be better dealt with on diplomatic lines. Clearly we did not want a joint commission, and still less an American one; we would have to say that the security of the Colonies was a matter for the Governor, but that our Overseas Defence Committee was considering V.Ps in the Colonies and that in certain areas we had a Security Officer who would be participating in local defence plans. In practice it seemed to us that there was very little that could be done at the present juncture. Luke will, I gather, be seeing the D.G. on this matter on Thursday.

12th September.

I had a long telephone conversation with Howard of the Home Office about E.V.Ws. We are having another meeting on Friday. Having got returns from the Police, I thought that the next step was to try and arrange for local Commandants of camps and hostels to procure the basic information about E.V.Ws that we required. We can assist them by getting reliable interpreters, as far as we were able. I explained to Howard that the idea of a ring of fences was not practical. Our opposite

Where E.V.Ws were dispersed in billets, it would be for the Police to obtain the basic records. Meanwhile, I am told that a case has just arisen of an approach being made by the Soviet Embassy to an alien, who is to conduct propoganda in E.V.W. circles. This alien will be working for us and we may in that way get to know more about the methods employed.

Howard mentioned to me that there was a move to abolish controls between this country and Ireland; the idea was to get the Eire authorities to collaborate in letting us know about the arrival of undesirable aliens who would be on our Stop List, and that there would be a mutual understanding that those who came from Eire would be accepted back there if they were found to be undesirable, and vice versa. To reinforce this, all aliens coming from Eire would have to register within ten days.

I explained to Howard that the idea of a ringed fence was not practical. Our opposite numbers in Eire placed no reliance upon it, since there are not sufficient personnel on the ground. Moreover, we know that the Irish are more or less indifferent about the aliens who enter their country, and any arrangement made with them would be subject to political considerations(?) at the moment. Registration within ten days is no real safeguard, since we shall be unaware that the man is in the country at all.

I had a long talk with Kim Philby. I do not think he is very happy in America: he clearly feels that he is not really getting enough scope. I thought I discerned a fly thrown over me in the form of a suggestion that it was really unnecessary for us to have a Washington representative, and that he could carry the whole business, but I may have been wrong. I certainly gave him no encouragement - in fact I told him that whatever the flow of information, I was quite convinced that we ought to have a man in the Western Hemisphere.

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13th September.

At the J.I.C. to-day a report was handed round from the Colonial Office to the effect that half a dozen Chinese, who had been arrested for criminal activities in Hong Kong, had confessed that they were members of the Nationalist guerilla forces. There seemed to be some suggestion that they were being at least encouraged, if not financed, by the Americans.

and I said that we would be very surprised if C.I.A. were behind them, and that in the absence of any positive evidence it would be difficult to suggest to them that they were not keeping to their bargain. I thought, however, that O.P.C. might quite possibly be up to something and that although they were a part of C.I.A. they could be approached.

Baker-Cresswell referred to the possibility of German rearmament and asked what could be done to vet officers of the armed forces if Germany were permitted to reconstitute her Army, or to form a contingent to work with the Western Union nations. While it seemed to me that the only records would be the old M.I.19 C.S.D.I.C. records, I doubted whether the work involved would really be worth while, since it seemed to me that it was extremely unlikely to be effective, would merely cause irritation, and would always be evaded if the Germans were so inclined. It is difficult to see what kind of a record would constitute a bar.

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I went to see 'G'. He was pleased about the appointment of Bedell-Smith as head of C.I.A. and thought that this might do something to reconcile C.I.A.'s point of view with that of G-2.

He asked me about Norman Brook's enquiry, which had caused him and his staff a good deal of work. I told him what the results were here and that we had found him a very satisfactory person to deal with. 'C' asked whether he had said anything about interchangeability of staff. I said that we had of course mentioned the integrated units and had also said that some form of integration would take place in London if we both got into the same building. We had not, however, discussed any general interchange.

14th September.

At the J.I.C. this morning Wallinger, our Minister in Budapest, gave a talk. He said that there were certain basic facts which should be borne in mind; they might seem elementary but they were important. There was no doubt in his mind that Hungary had absolutely no independence at all; even in minor matters he thought that they had often to refer back to Moscow. Secondly, a gradual and ruthless Sovietisation of the whole country was taking place. The influence of the Church had been seriously impaired by its latest agreement with the State. The peasants were being collectivised and there were signs of a strong attack on the remaining social democrats. While it might be said that 80% of the population were out of sympathy with the Government, there was no prospect of a counter-revolution. While there were sound roots in the ground, no plants would ever be allowed to flower. Racosl (?) was probably the most respected

Stalinist among the satellite states, although in some matters he was not quite so doctrinaire as others. All economic decisions were subordinated to political considerations: we had been conducting trade negotiations, and so had the Americans, and these involved as a quid pro quo the release of both _____, but on the opening of the war in Korea all discussions had ceased.

Wallinger said he could not describe the feeling of depression and frustration which surrounded ^{the} work of himself and his staff. There was very little opportunity of obtaining intelligence or of normal discussion with anybody official or otherwise. It was only possible to play a rather unpleasant game of poker with Beret, the Jewish Under-Secretary in the Hungarian Foreign Office. All that his staff could do was to read the newspapers and keep their eyes open when travelling about the country. Movement was on the whole unrestricted, although supervision is believed to be constant if not apparent. I gathered that a good many of the staff, i.e. chauffeurs, servants, etc., were Hungarians. As regards the Army, Wallinger said he did not think that there were any senior officers who were thought to be politically reliable enough to take command, and that new cadres had not really been effectively trained. In spite of all this, there are still a few jokes going round the cafes in Budapest. When potatoe queues began, one man said to another: "I hear that there are American Fortresses flying over the country, I wonder what the reason is?". The other replied that they must be dropping potatoes in order to keep the Colorado Beetles alive! Another story was about an Inspector who was visiting one of the schools. He asked two of the pupils what their great ambition was; they each said that they wanted to be a pilot a fly one of the latest Soviet fighters. A third said that he would like to kick President Truman. The Inspector was much impressed and congratulated the headmaster on having instilled such ideology into his pupils: he was disappointed, however, when he asked the reason. The boy replied: "Well you see, if I could kick President Truman, either President Truman would have to be here or I should have to be in America." ! The American Minister reported this story back to Washington and added that as long as this kind of thing was going around, there was still hope.

Des Graz came here this afternoon and saw Geoffrey Patterson and myself. He has been to Washington and Bermuda and is thoroughly satisfied with his copyright plans, which seem to be fairly far advanced. He is a little worried about accommodation in the event of war and has asked Patterson to keep this in mind. There will also be the question of accommodation for us in Bermuda, where there will obviously be a fairly big job owing to the airline which will be passing through Bermuda from South America. The traffic in the last war was roughly about 800 a week.

15th- 17th September.

I attended a course at Worcester College, Oxford, which had been _____ with several speakers from outside. I found the whole thing extremely interesting and I am sure the institution is a very good one.

The first speaker was Professor Popper, who started by saying that he was surprised that the pull of Marxism was not stronger than it was. The idea of a supreme deity ruling over a finite universe having been severely questioned by modern research, Marxism with its offer of power to the man of science, and its claim that history could be predicted, must be expected to exert a tremendous pull. Marxism also had the appeal of wishing to help those in distress. To put things in their proper perspective

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it began with the philosophy of Hegel, which held that progress could only come through discussion. You had a thesis and an antithesis which produced a synthesis, but Marxian theory rejects discussion and the thesis, therefore, becomes the synthesis, since there could be no antithesis and progress is impossible.

Professor Popper then discussed: (a) dialectics, (b) economic interpretation of history, and (c) political theory. According to Marxian theory the produce economic and social changes which result in an ever-widening gap between the capitalist class and the workers; ultimately this must result in a revolutionary clash. Marx held that this was inevitable and that it was, therefore, better not to resist it since there would thus be less bloodshed. Ruthless extermination of all opposition was necessary, since in the long run it would cause less bloodshed. In any case capitalism was causing the death of thousands of workers every day and revolution, though bloody at the outset, would lead rapidly to the millenium and peaceful conditions. Marx was disturbed to find that his doctrines were not working out in practice in England and began to search for an explanation. He finally concluded that a state of revolution had not been reached, as the British workers had exploited the Colonial workers. His beliefs, therefore, would work themselves out to their logical conclusion only when the gap between colonial workers and their white capitalist employers reached the point where revolution was inevitable. Professor Popper held that the Russian revolution had proved the falseness of the economic interpretation of history, since it did not arise from industrial causes but was imposed upon the ignorant masses by a handfull of intellectuals. He believed that Marxian doctrine could only be attacked by modesty and the pursuit of democratic ideas. In other words, humanism was the only effective counter weapon. He had always found it impracticable to argue with Marxists.

The other speaker was Professor Katkov, who spoke about the "Soviet Man". He said that it was wrong to get the idea that the average Soviet citizen had any political convictions at all; he was wholly preoccupied with trying to exist. The State told him that he had to weild a pick, drive a motorcar, be an engineer or a doctor, and if he wished to exist, the only course was to conform. During the last thirty years he had come to regard it as the business of the State to provide him with whatever vocation suited his qualifications. When he came but of Russia he was inclined to judge the new State by its ability to provide him with employment in his particular calling, whatever that might be. Katkov cited the case of a trombone player, who on arrival here had been told that (presumably on the advice of the Musicians Union) alien trombone players were not wanted and that, therefore, he should become an agricultural worker and go to Australia. He had replied that if this was the case he would return whence he came; he realised that the consequences would be serious and that he would undoubtedly be placed in a concentration camp, but he seemed to be consoled by the possibility that there might be a band in the concentration camp in which he could play the trombone!

This was interesting from our point of view, since it provided an explanation for the peculiar behaviour of the Soviet doctor who could not understand that in order to practice in the U.K. it was necessary for him not only to pass the British Medical Association examination, which would take him from two to three years, but also to become proficient in the English language.

Katkov was asked many questions about emigre groups and the best methods for encouraging defection. He thought that the Russians would be

more likely to defect to an emigre movement - such as that of VIASOV, if the latter were still alive- than to a foreign Government. He thought emigre groups should get together and endeavour to choose a leader of standing. Someone suggested that these groups might quarrel, to which Katkov replied: "Of course they quarrel - why should they not quarrel - everybody quarrels!" He thought it important that such a group should have a very definite policy worked out, but that in conducting propaganda in Russia, by means of broadcasts or leaflets, no attempt should be made to say what this programme was; they should merely be given to understand that everything had been taken care of. His reason was that if a programme were broadcast, it would immediately become the subject of discussion which would be followed by heavy repressive measures.

Katkov had some authority to speak on the subject of defectors, since he had recently made a tour of Germany and had long discussions with newcomers from Russia and ex-members of Vlasov's Army.

18th September.

Drew came round to tell me about a defector who signed a letter for ALEXANDROVITCH and addressed it to Air Commodore Cousens, one of the Directors of Plans. He stated that he was employed by the meteorological department at Leningrad, and that he was over here to see the Birmingham Exhibition and wished to defect.

I understand that a Colonial Office Security department is to be established, presumably on lines similar to those of the Foreign Office.

I talked to Joe Spencer about accommodation in peace and war. The D.G., whom I consulted, agreed that it was essential that in wartime we should move the Registry and certain of our personnel to the country, and that steps should be taken now to earmark some sort of accommodation through the Padmore Committee.

Isaacs, the Minister of Labour, has made a stupid speech about Communist plots. It is likely to recoil on our heads. He had little or no evidence on which to base his statement; it was connected with the busmen's strike.

19th September.

The defector incident mentioned to me by Drew yesterday is "duck soup". A letter, obviously from the same author, addressed to the Director of Plans War Office, was passed on to us and we now have a confession from the secretary of the Director of Plans that the whole thing was a practical joke designed to get the Air Ministry and War Office representatives to meet outside the Junior Carlton Club with melon hats and red flowers in their buttonholes! B.2 are not too pleased as B.6 have been fully mobilised to cover the meeting!

A man called Shears, late of the Malayan Security Service, and now Stipendiary Magistrate in Singapore, came to see me about one, ELIAS, a wealthy Jewish barrister who had been employed on security duties during

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the war in India and was very anxious to get into our officer. It transpired that ELIAS had already made some attempt to get into S.I.F.E. Shears merely wanted to say that he knew ELIAS well; that he was anti-Zionist, wealthy and wholly reliable. If we wanted any further information he would be pleased to give it. I thanked him and he left.

Personally I do not think that we should in any circumstances employ ELIAS.

Major came in to see me before returning to Malta. He had no particular business to discuss. His job is a fairly straightforward one.

Thistle and Derby came to talk to me about E.V.Ws. Derby can provide interpreters if they are required.

20th September.

At the J.I.C. to-day we discussed a paper on Pakistan. The Pakistan authorities appear to be somewhat worried about the spread of Communism and the spread of Soviet activities in Karachi, but their apprehensions do not appear to be based on much evidence. It was also mentioned that the Chinese Communist armies are regrouping on the Indo-Chinese border, but whether this is preparatory to an entry into Indo-China is not clear.

Hollis and Perfect came to see me about an alleged sabotage case at Chatham on one of H.M. ships. We are asking the Admiralty to allow the Kent Police to assist as we have nobody available.

I discussed the staff position with Joe Spencer to-day and, after going into the whole matter very carefully, he finds that we have only one vacancy that we can fill in this financial year.

Dick is worried about the commitment for E.V.Ws being in B.I.G. I said that logically I thought they were rightly placed in that section, since the potential alien 5th Column in this country was as much a B.I. commitment as the C.P.G.B. On the other hand, I fully understood that they had many other fish to fry. If instituted an embryo E. Division and passed the problem to them, we should have to have someone of ability to carry on the work that Thistle has been doing.

21st September.

[redacted] came to see me. He is a [redacted] but the position is somewhat precarious and he is anxious if possible to get back into intelligence. He wondered whether there might be a niche for him here. I told him that I did not think there was the slightest chance, but sometimes we heard of jobs outside which might be up his street and that I would certainly bear his name in mind.

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I had a discussion with Dick and Kellar about West Africa and appointment of a S.D.E.C.E. representative in Accra. We decided that we should first co-ordinate our policy with S.I.S.

 Thistle has had a satisfactory meeting with Ruck and Howard of the Immigration Department about E.V.Ws. A start is to be made in Lancashire and Combs, who handled E.V.Ws in Germany, is to be in charge of the party of Immigration Officers who are to conduct the interrogations. For the moment no interpreters are required.

 At the J.I.C. to-day it was agreed that the Services should go to their own Establishment branches about personnel they thought suitable for purging, and not to the Chiefs of Staff.

A proposal was made by Drew for encouraging Services personnel to join the Communist Party for L.C.S. purposes, but this was turned down for the moment.

Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, has told our High Commissioner about his recent visit to Japan. He said to McArthur that while he would support the U.S.A. in Korea, he thought the move was wrong; we ought to make up our minds what is important strategically and stick to it.

 Thistle tells me that observation on Mrs. SKALBERGS led her to the house of TERESHENKO, one of the Directors of Hambros Bank who worked in S.O.E. during the war. Mrs. SKALBERGS stayed there for three hours, having previously taken a good deal of propaganda literature to the Post Office for despatch to E.V.Ws. The reason for her visit to TERESHENKO is not clear, but it is presumed that she was having a talk with some member of the staff.

 22nd September.

Dick, Roger and I discussed the embryo E. Division, but did not make a great deal of progress. I said that if anybody were detached to take on this job, it would have to be a person with considerable qualifications, and that logically at the moment E. Division was rightly placed as a section of B.1, however burdensome this might be. There were two potential Fifth Columns in this country; one British and the other alien. B.1 were dealing with the Communists as a political party and sifting them for B.2 if they were spies. In the same way B.1 should sift the alien population for B.2. The problem of E.V.Ws needed someone of Thistle's calibre if it was going to be done properly.

 I had a meeting with _____ and _____, Alec Kellar, Derek Hamblen and Clayton on policy in West Africa. We discussed the question of the D.E.C. representative at Accra, and S.I.S. agreed with our view that this appointment should be permitted.

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I took the opportunity of mentioning to _____ the present proposals for combing out the E.V.W. population in this country, as I thought that possibly we might come across some S.I.S. recruits. _____ seemed to think that this might be a matter of some interest to S.I.S.

155.

I had a talk with Holmes. He is worried about the present arrangement by which provincial Police Forces are to deal direct with the Yard in regard to formulating a conspiracy case against Communists working in the ports, and against those concerned with road haulage to and from the ports. This scheme was put into force at the request of the Attorney General, the D. of P.P. and the Home Office. Holmes thinks that it may encourage the Police to deal with the Yard rather than with this office, and that the Yard may ultimately set up a duplicate collating centre.

23rd September.

Norman Brook has seen the Left Winger working in the Cabinet Offices, and on the whole has formed a favourable impression. One remark of has rather worried us. He said that it was a matter of opinion as to the degree to which the British Communist Party is the tool of, or wholly subservient to Moscow - this depended upon one's political orientation. said that he accepted Marxism, but had never thought it out to its logical conclusion. Brook thinks his beliefs are in a state of suspense and have no influence on his actions. has undertaken to speak to Brook if he ever senses that a conflict of loyalties is arising in his mind. Brook does not think that is a Communist or even a sympathiser.

We are not altogether satisfied with this, since we feel that should have been sent away to make up his mind precisely where he stood. He may feel later on that he has a conflict of loyalties, by which time he will go away with a good deal of highly secret knowledge.

Roger had a talk with Cimperman on the subject of manganese. At the instigation of the Department of Defence, Washington, a high official of the Manganese Corporation in the U.S. had been sent over to see his British counterpart here and suggest a visit to enquire into the security of the manganese mines on the Gold Coast. Cimperman was insistent that this visit should be kept from the State Department. We told him that the State Department had already raised the matter through diplomatic channels, as Gold Coast manganese is apparently the only source outside Russia.

We are going to see one, Coward, of British Manganese before he goes to the Gold Coast, and arrange with him to get into touch with Stephens.

25th September.

I discussed the question of the reorganisation of the Admiralty Dock Police with Holmes and Hollis. We agreed that the short-term and long-term policy suggested by Perfect was a mistake, and that on no account could the Metropolitan Police take charge. It would be better to decide at the start that the local police should take over, but the Working Party seems to be packed with those who have a vested interest in private police forces, and I doubt whether we shall get away with it.

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156.

of C.I.A. has been over talking to Graham Mitchell about a proposal from his Head Office that the Communist Party should be closely watched for indications that the Russians are about to make war. He got a clear answer, that if the Soviet Government were intending to make war, the last people in the world they would tell would be the C.P.G.B.!

26th September.

I had a discussion with Dick and Roger about _____ We are going to re-establish contact with Hewison and, if necessary, Brook, with a view to resolving the doubts in our minds.

I gave lunch to the S.I.C. to-day. _____ held forth at some length on Communist activities in France. He said the real danger was not the French Communist Party, many of whose members were basically nationalist, but a potential 5th Column of something like 1½ million aliens. He thought that by paying too much attention to the French C.P., the French Surete would be "taking their eye off the ball". It was for this reason that the French had been carrying out extensive raids; their idea was to "ballayer le terrain".

Dick did not feel _____ argument was wholly convincing, but rather an excuse by the French for inaction against their Communists, who presented them with an extremely delicate political problem.

I had a talk with Haldane Porter about the Planners' paper on oil in the Middle East and Far East. Haldane Porter was worried because no mention had been made of our security liaison with oil companies in the Middle East, and other political factors. While I agreed with him, I did not see how we could go back to the Planners or Chiefs of Staff at this stage. In any case, our action would be somewhat academic, since in the event of trouble at least a Division would be required, but in fact only a rather scrappy Brigade could be got together.

27th September.

It has been decided to refuse admission to any individuals wishing to attend the Peace Congress in November who have engaged, or are likely to engage, in activities detrimental to the internal security of industrial peace, and that this also should be applied strictly. It has also been decided not to allow foreigners to come to the U.K. in advance to organise the conference. LAFITTE and five Soviet citizens were turned down on these grounds.

The above was a Cabinet ruling.

Holmes tells me that as regards the Dock Police, the Home Office are going back on their previous view, that the Police should take over. Some compromise was now suggested.

I spoke to the D.G. about our war H.Q. and the movement of personnel in the event of war. He agreed that we should get on with this at the earliest possible moment and to consult the Padmore Committee. I passed this on to A. Braach in writing.

Oughton is leaving to take up his job in S.I.F. _____

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28th September.

I spoke to GARDNER at the J.I.C. Directors' meeting to-day about AMOS and General MORGAN, who are running a Digest and were offering information about the illicit export of arms. I said that provided it was understood that there was no quid pro quo, I could see no harm in their feeding in information which came to their notice to the Department of the Controller of Export Licences, where it could be properly assessed.

Franklin of the Foreign Office attended the J.I.C. in connection with the F.O. telegram to Washington about the Korean situation. The telegram was concerned with the possible reactions of the Russians and Chinese if the Americans advanced beyond the 38th Parallel. This anxiety had been largely brought about by Pannikar, the Indian Ambassador in Peking, having been hauled out of his bed in the middle of the night to speak to CHUEN-LI. The latter had told him that if the Americans crossed the 38th Parallel, China would be bound to act. Nobody was very clear whether this was a bluff or not.

There is a certain amount of disagreement in the U.S.A./U.K. Intelligence appreciation of Russian indications. The Americans feel that war is imminent between now and 1952. We do not feel that there is a serious possibility until 1952. The American view is that the Russians may want to attack before the build up of N.A.T.O. forces is completed in 1954. Our Foreign Office and the State Department's assessment agree, but G-2 is in violent opposition. C.I.A.'s views do not coincide with either. All these departments have their own economic section and each has a different viewpoint. The meeting in Washington is probably the first occasion on which they have ever got round a table together.

29th September.

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Hollis has gone on a week's leave. The D.G. leaves for America to-morrow.

I spoke to D.O.S. about
subject to Magan's views.

He agrees to

staying here,

2nd October.

Holmes talked to me about the Dock Police. The Home Office are taking the view that the responsibility should remain with the Admiralty, but that the Dock Police should be properly staffed and trained by a regular Police Force.

 rang me up about the D.G's visit, about which he had read in the papers. He said that he would like to draw the attention of his H.Q. to the D.G's presence in Washington, in case they could be of any assistance. I told him that he was certainly at liberty to do this and suggested that his H.Q. should get into touch with Patterson, who would know the D.G's movements.

 Air Marshal Elliott sent a telegram about a dinner that he had with Jessup, M. Moch - the French Defence Minister, and Shinwell. Moch had been extremely defeatist. The French are objecting to the establishment of a Gendarmerie, and indeed to any German rearmament.

3rd October.

Ken Mills and Graham have information that GREY, of the finance department of the Communist Party, has a number of dollars brought in here illegally. The Customs would be quite right to search his premises which they have power to do. If this money is for the World Peace Congress the prosecution of GREY might be valuable from the propaganda point of view. It was decided to consult the D. of P.P., but the latter did not think that the case was good enough as it stood and there was, moreover, always a risk that we should not find the dollars.

 The Chief Constable of the Isle of Man came to see me. He drew my attention to the excursions which ran from the Isle of Man to Dublin during the summer months. It would be perfectly easy for anyone to get into the country as a member of one of the excursion parties.

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4th October.

At the J.I.C. to-day we were told about Nehru's anxiety, due to a conversation between his Ambassador in Peking and CHUEN-LI, that if the Americans advanced beyond the 38th Parallel, the Chinese, and possibly also the Russians, would intervene. This matter has been discussed by the Chiefs of Staff. Sir John Slessor had taken a strong view, that the risk of Chinese intervention was a really serious one. He did not think there was a case for advancing beyond the 38th Parallel, since wherever the frontier was there would be guerilla activities across it.

 Dick saw the D. of P.P. about the question of GREY, when it was decided that nothing could be done. The D. of P.P. said that the prosecution of the gas strike leaders had been somewhat muddled, since Jack TANNER had never been told. It appears also that Isaacs made his statement about a Communist plot without any prior consultation.

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A grey-haired and impressive, who appears to be the "Queen of Passport" in the U.S., came to see me with . She was anxious to know if we had had any cases of forged American passports. She was being pressed to re-validate all American passports, but before doing so had decided to visit countries abroad in order to establish how far this was really necessary. I told her that we knew of no such cases, although in the past we had known of cases where American passports had been obtained by improper means- in particular by the presentation of a false birth certificate.

5th October.

At the J.I.C. to-day a paper from the Chiefs of Staff was considered, which instructed the J.I.C. and Joint Planners to revise their papers in the light of the latest warning about Chinese intervention received from the Indians. Sir John Glessor's views have been accepted, and it seems that our advise to the U.N. is that no-one should go beyond the 38th Parallel except Koreans. The Americans apparently wish to go beyond the 40th Parallel, which would leave nothing for North Korea except mountainous country.

Proféssor Blount complained that he had not been informed about a Czech unheralded arrival. I said that it was our practice to inform the department most concerned, and to rely upon that department to inform others, if this seemed necessary, after interrogation. Blount said that he was interested in any aircraft, in spite of the fact that this one had turned out to be an old Dakota.

Ronnie Howe and I went to see Sir John Anderson, now Chairman of P.L.A. Burt was also present. Anderson said that he was anxious to ensure that the inside information which his Dock sergeant was given was passed on to the Police. Burt replied that this liaison was excellent, and told me afterwards that it was his informant in the Dock Committee who was passing information to the Dock Police through the S.B. sergeant, but, with his usual tact, he did not mention this to Sir John Anderson!

Anderson said, too, that he had read reports about the Portsmouth sabotage incident and also speeches by Ministers. Of course he knew a good deal about the speeches by Ministers and he realised from long experience that they did not always mean what they said. We all smiled and gave no answer. I said that as far we knew there was no sabotage planned, but that we always t ought it possible that some disgruntled individual, or some C.P. member, acting contrary to the orders of his H.Q., might commit such an act if he saw a suitable opportunity. With that the meeting terminated.

Jopson came to see me. He is now 60 and can stay on as a Professor of Slavonic Studies at Cambridge for another five years. He feels, however, a little restless and if he could find suitable work in London with us, or with any other department, would be glad to accept it.

I said that it was just possible there might be sufficient to keep him busy in G.C.H.Q. or S.I.S. and that from time to time we might have one or two things where we should value his assistance. I also told him, very confidentially, that there might be some question of setting up a Service school for teaching Russian; I would explore all these possibilities and let him know.

6th October.

I saw Sir Thomas Lloyd. Some complaint had reached his Minister from Fenner BROCKWAY that he had been followed by the police in Uganda and that instructions to this effect had been given by Hall, the Governor, who was on leave in this country. Fenner BROCKWAY quoted the number of the telegram alleged to contain these instructions. I said that the telegram certainly was not ours, but that I would make enquiries as to precisely what telegrams we had sent relating either to Fenner BROCKWAY or to MUSAZI, who was to travel with him.

9th October.

I lectured to Colonial Police officers.

In the afternoon I saw Sir Thomas Lloyd and handed him a copy of our telegrams to East Africa in connection with BROCKWAY's visit. It was clear from our telegrams that our real interest was in MUSAZI, whom we suggested might be worth observation. We pointed out that he would be travelling with BROCKWAY, and later we informed S.L.O. Nairobi that MUSAZI had abandoned his visit and that BROCKWAY would be travelling alone. We had also informed Khartoum, where the plane was likely to land en route. There was nothing in our telegrams to suggest that BROCKWAY should be kept under observation. Even if there had been something, it would not have been wholly unreasonable in view of the trouble a man of that kind might cause in Uganda at the present moment.

Lloyd told me that in fact the Uganda Police had taken it upon themselves to keep BROCKWAY under observation. He did not seem inclined to blame them in so doing. Nobody had apparently been able to trace the telegram which had been mentioned by BROCKWAY to the Minister

I suggested that as it had a U.P. prefix, it might have been an inter-police message from the Uganda Police which had been given away to BROCKWAY by some native clerk. It seemed to me important to get to the bottom of this.

Lloyd kept a copy of these messages, which he intended to show to the Minister. I emphasised that we did not wish ^{them} to go any further and would like them subsequently destroyed.

I left for Zurich at mid-day to attend the Mendelssohn wedding.

11th October.

I returned from Zurich at mid-day, when I had a talk with Dick and Roger. There has been a certain amount of trouble over a statement by the Ilford Conservative member, who had said that on information he had received from M.I.5 he knew there were several Trotskyists in the local Labour Party. It turned out that in fact his information had been passed by an S.B. officer. It was made clear to the Prime Minister's office that M.I.5 were not concerned, and the P.M. so replied in the House of Commons.

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Hollis mentioned the publicity that had appeared in the press about

a projected purge of Communists from the L.C.C. We were rather in the dark about this matter, having only a letter from the Chairman, addressed to the D.G., and accompanied by a list of names for vetting. We finally agreed that Hollis should go round and see the Chairman and explain to him that in view of the publicity, we could not proceed any further in this matter until the D.G.'s return, and that it was essential that we should have our hands clean if any question were raised in the House.

 I attended a meeting at the Foreign Office on 11.10.50, at which Reilly took the chair, Barton represented the Colonial Office, and Cotton the African section of the Foreign Office. Jack Easton was present on behalf of S.I.S. We are to be supplied by Jackson with a copy of the minutes.

I put forward all the arguments which I have already advanced in favour of the project:

- (a) whatever we might think of the D.E.C. as a producing agency, we had to work with them both here and Paris, and elsewhere. We were also collaborating with them through the S.I.C. In collaborating with them - as indeed with other foreign Governments - we tried not to think of intelligence exchange in terms of a balance sheet, but to give all we could consistent with security and to get back as much as we could from those with whom we were in touch.
- (b) We had recently - and with good reason - been forced to turn down a request by D.E.C. to appoint an officer to Hong Kong. Unless, therefore, there were overriding reasons, we were anxious to meet their request in West Africa.
- (c) It was possible that a liaison with D.E.C. might produce better results than a liaison with the political sections of Colonial Governments, since D.E.C. had a mandate to operate in all colonial territories, regardless of the Ministry under which they came in Paris. I could not see, therefore, how a report by the new British Consul in Brazzaville, Mason, was likely to affect things.
- (d) I could not see why the Colonial Office should be apprehensive about the appointment, since if it was the intention of the French to report on subversive movements in British Colonies in West Africa, they already had a Consul in Accra who had probably been doing this for some time.
- (e) A.D.E.C. liaison officer in Accra might just possibly improve the flow of information between ourselves and the French, and might well save us a number of journeys between Accra, Brazzaville and Dakar.

Cotton seemed to be full of a good deal of prejudice against the French. Firstly, because Wikeley, our Consul in Leopoldville, had received a rebuff from Bourge, the Chef de Cabinet in French Equatorial Africa, last April (Bourge had said, that on instructions from Paris he would not communicate any information about political conditions in the Colony), and secondly, because Coat, the I.R.D. representative, had received no co-operation and had been regarded as a spy.

I said that I was not altogether surprised that the French regarded Coate as a spy, since the French might well say that we already had a liaison officer dealing with Communist matters in the area, and that Coate's position, therefore, was somewhat difficult to explain.

Barton said that the Colonial Office would be worried at having a D.E.C. representative at Accra, as he might obtain information about various movements in the Colony which would ultimately reach Paris and leak to the Russians. This seemed fairly remote, particularly in view of para (d) above. Reilly said so, and obviously felt that this objection could not be sustained.

S.I.S. supported our view, but were anxious, as was also Cotton, that if the D.E.C. appointment was to be allowed, we should at least say to the French that, if and when occasion arose, we hoped that no objection would be raised to the appointment of an S.I.S. representative in one of their colonies.

Reilly in the chair found himself in something of a difficulty. As Chairman of the J.I.C. he would like to see D.E.C.'s request granted, but as a representative of the Foreign Office he felt rather reluctantly bound to compromise. Two decisions were made:

1. that the Colonial Office should get on with consulting Governors, and
2. that I should see [redacted] and inform him that I had met with considerable difficulties owing to security issues affecting the exchange of information with the French, and in particular over the attitude of Brazzaville, to any sort of exchange with the Foreign Office representatives, and over the mission of Coate of I.R.D.

It was felt that this might cause the D.E.C. to make representations to the Ministry concerned and so improve Mason's position.

I shall be seeing [redacted] but I regard the whole position as extremely unsatisfactory.

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When I was at the Foreign Office I saw Geoffrey Wethered, who told me about a telegram which had been received by the C.R.O. from our Ambassador in Dublin to-day to the effect that the former Czech Minister in Dublin, Major RUZICKA had invited the U.S. Air Attache to inspect the contents of his Chancery, as instructions had been sent to Miss HARTIG (who kept open the Chancery after RUZICKA's resignation) to transfer the contents of the Chancery to London. In the absence of the U.S. Air Attache, however, the Military Attache accepted the offer and removed two ciphers which he had sent to Washington. As the move was likely to take place within the next few days, Geoffrey wanted to know if we had any interest in the matter.

I said that on the facts as stated, I did not think that, even if such a thing were possible to arrange, there was much likelihood of obtaining any information of value from the Czech records in Dublin. Since Major RUZICKA and Miss HARTIG are both defectors and would probably have been regarded as unreliable, it does not seem likely that the Czech

documents at the Dublin Legation will have much Intelligence interest. Clearly they have not been trusted and the decision to close down the Czech Legation must imply that it is serving no useful purpose. Further, if there had been anything of any importance one would have imagined that Major RUZICKA would have indicated where the particular documents were to be found and something regarding their contents.

The only possible action would be for the U.S. Military Attache to question RUZICKA on this point. If there is anything, the latter might get Miss HARTIG to do the necessary. I rather doubt, however, whether it is worth it. John Marriott agrees that the matter is not worth considering, owing to the fact that there could not conceivably be anything of interest now.

12th October.

At the J.I.C. to-day, Malcolm MacDonald, Commissioner General for South-East Asia, gave a survey of the situation in his area. He emphasised that he had been out of touch with recent developments during the last two weeks.

1. Korea.

MacDonald said that he could not emphasise too strongly the stabilising effect of successful United Nations action in Korea. Had the invasion of South Korea been allowed to go by default, or had the American counter action failed, the effect would have been disastrous. He did not, of course, minimise the difficulties which were likely to ensue before a final settlement was reached, but so far United Nations action had given immense confidence to the vast majority in South East Asia who were struggling against Communist domination.

2. Hong Kong.

In Hong Kong morale was on the whole good; better, in fact than it had been for a long time. From the defence point of view the Colony was not at the moment regarded as a top priority.

3. Burma.

MacDonald thought that the situation had really improved and that this improvement was likely to be maintained. Militarily the Government was stronger, and political authority had been restored in many places where formerly the Government's writ did not run. THAKIN NU seemed to be wholly on our side and inclined to rely upon support from the Western democracies. It was vitally important that he should remain in power and be kept from going into a Monastery.

From the defence point of view, Burma should not be regarded as a top priority at the moment, since she did not provide the best road down to Malaya.

4. Indo-China.

MacDonald thought that Indo-China was the real danger spot at the moment in South-East Asia. He felt that the only policy for VIET MINH was to try and force an issue there before the end of this year, when the French and the Vietnamese should be in a stronger position owing to the receipt of arms and equipment from the Western democracies. He was

worried by the French attitude to the problem, both military and political. When he had visited Indo-China about a year or more ago, he had been impressed by the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, Alessandri, who seemed to have a positive plan for military action. Since then, however, Alessandri had become the Civil Governor and General Carpentier had taken over the military commitment. The French had recently taken a serious knock, and he thought that there was a tendency to sit in the Delta and to refrain from taking any positive action to liquidate VIET MINH'S forces in the hills.

MacDonald had a good opinion of BAO DAI, whom he considered was shrewd and an honest patriot. It was, however, important that he should return to Indo-China as soon as possible if his prestige was to be maintained. He had started badly with only about ten percent of the population behind him, but now had at least a fifty percent backing. Nobody had so far come to the surface who, politically, would be capable of challenging his authority or taking his place.

BAO DAI had been in Paris for three reasons. Firstly, to visit his wife and to allay gossip that he had become estranged from her - this was important and it was even more important that he should, if possible, induce her to return with him to Indo-China. Secondly, in order to press his claims with the French for some progressive scheme leading to Vietnamese independence, and thirdly, in order to take a holiday. MacDonald felt that it was of immense importance that the French should give BAO DAI more enlightened support and that if they failed in this it was just possible that BAO DAI would not return, although before he left he had expressed his firm intention of so doing.

5. Malaya.

The Briggs Plan was beginning to take effect, but it was of course dependent upon the build-up of the civil police organisation and this would take time. Meanwhile, confidence was being built up and he felt that by far the greater majority of the population were behind the Government.

Recognition of China had at first given the Colony a serious set-back, but gradually information had been seeping through to Chinese in Malaya from their relatives, that conditions in the new China were not much better than they were before, and that in certain respects they were worse. This had had a considerable effect and had left the majority of the Chinese with an open mind about the future of their country.

It was generally accepted in Malaya that self-government was not a possibility for a good many years to come, and this view had been supported by Nehru, who had said that self-government could not be achieved until Malaya, Indians and Chinese were all working in harmony together.

I asked MacDonald about the production of intelligence in Malaya and Singapore. He admitted that this had always been a weakness, but said that the operation of the Briggs Plan and the efforts of Sir William Jenkin were beginning to bear fruit. The great difficulty was in finding suitable personnel for intelligence duties. There was a lot of leeway to make up.

I had a word with Blount about unheralded arrivals. I gathered that he would be satisfied with the present procedure, provided we notified him in the case of any aircraft that land in this country, as well as notifying the Air Ministry. In future we shall notify all

members of the J.I.C. by letter, but the department principally concerned will be notified by telephone.

I had lunch with Dan _____ He asked me for a list of Israeli officials in this country, which I promised to let him have.

He also talked to me about Isaacs' statement on Communist plots; this had caused a good deal of anxiety in the U.S. and naturally they wanted to know the truth. I said that in a way I was in rather an embarrassing position, but as he received our regular monthly summary he would know the real position.

Jack Mann talked to me about the distribution by the Scottish Office Health Department of certain secret documents to municipal authorities.

I said that he should let me know in greater detail what these documents were, otherwise it was difficult to express an opinion.

Mann was rather anxious about the new arrangement by which Scotland Yard is to act as a reporting centre for information on the movements of strikers, etc. He said this had caused some confusion, as it seemed to be a duplication of M.I.5's functions. I explained to him the limitations of the new arrangement, and assured him that it was not intended that this should go beyond the docks and transport workers and was only for the purpose of obtaining evidence for a court case.

Dick is starting up a German section, as it is clear that, now that the Germans are to have their Consulates, commercial espionage at any rate was likely to start before long. Klop has established a very good liaison with the Germans here which we hope will bear fruit.

I had a long discussion with Ken Mills about the suggested action against GRAY, who is in possession of dollars brought in to swell the finances of the C.P.

I said that on the whole I thought it was right to refrain from taking any action now; the finances of the Party had been a gap in our information for some considerable time, and there now seemed a chance that we might become better informed. I was reluctant, therefore, to drive the whole business further underground at this moment, unless there was some major advantage to be gained. Since the money in possession of GRAY was not for the purpose of financing the World Peace Congress, a prosecution would lose something of its propaganda value.

13th October.

Coveney came to see me. He said that while he was quite happy where he was, he would not like to miss an opportunity of joining the staff of M.I.5 should the occasion arise. I said that I knew of no vacancy at the moment, but would bear his name in mind.

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Roger is sending Irvine to Washington ~~taxWashington~~ for the tripartite talks on French security which are to take place shortly.

Alec talked to me about technical aids for Colonial services and for the Persians. I said that as regards the Colonies, I thought we ought to be very sure that sufficient security could be achieved to make technical aids profitable before we started to lecture on the subject. As regards the Persians, I gather that Malcolm Cumming could give some wholly innocuous talk.

Holmes told me that the deliberations of the Dock Police have now reached an advanced stage. It had been agreed that certain regular police officers should be drafted in, and that there should be close liaison with the local police. Proper records should also be kept. He should also have a liaison with ourselves as heretofore.

14th October.

Hanley came to talk to me about KIRCHENSTEIN, who seems to be identical with a man called KLEGES, who some time ago had an office in Paris. The Americans are re-opening the case and want as much information as they can get from us.

16th October.

I saw the Chief Constable of Durham, who has just taken over his new job. I told him something about the work of the office. He seemed a pleasant and co-operative person.

17th October.

Baker-Cresswell came to see me about MINCEMEAT. He said that the D.N.I. had heard, very confidentially, from Godfrey, the late D.N.I., that Duff Cooper was writing a novel, the basic form of which was Plan MINCEMEAT. D.N.I. had written to Duff Cooper who had called at the Admiralty and had been seen by Baker-Cresswell. Duff was apparently somewhat irritated; he said that he had consulted Johnny Bevan, and certain other security authorities in the War Office, and that they had seen no objection. Moreover, Winston had freely recounted the story at dinner parties.

It seems a little odd that if Duff wanted to do something of this kind he should not have consulted his old department. It looks as if Duff and Montague had got together: the latter has always been anxious to publish MINCEMEAT.

Johnny Bevan is clearly not in a position to give the "all clear", as he is no longer in Government employment. It is quite possible that he may have said that he could see no particular objection, but that is not quite the same thing.

I told Baker-Cresswell that as the story was entirely a matter for L.C.S., as there was no C.E. interest in it - in spite of the fact that we had elaborated very considerably the mounting of the plan. We had, however, already intimated to L.C.S. that we would give them any legal advice they might require.

The plan was designed to mislead the Germans about the place of attack: in fact to make them think that Sardinia and Greece would be objective rather than Sicily. To carry this out the body of an unknown individual, who had committed suicide, was obtained from a Coroner through the agency of Sir Bernard Spilsbury. This body was dressed up in a Major's uniform with the identity of "Major Martin". He was carrying despatches from General Nye to General Alexander which, in no very positive terms pointed to an attack on Sardinia and Greece. He also carried innumerable other documents, including letters from his girl-friend, a photograph, theatre ticket counterfoils, cheque book, club membership card, etc., etc. His despatch case was strapped on to him. Ostensibly he was supposed to have been the victim of an air crash in mid-ocean: in fact, his body was taken from a submarine and floated ashore off the coast of Spain, near Cadiz.

The plan worked 100%, since the body was washed up and the documents were examined by the Spanish Police. There was evidence to show that the envelopes had been tampered with, and the letters rolled up and extracted sideways from under the flap. Later we saw their contents being transmitted on the ISOS from Madrid to Berlin. The despatch case and the documents were eventually handed over to our Consul, and the body was buried with full military honours, a wreath being despatched from notional relations - "Pam" and "Dad" in this country.

18th October.

I saw Newsam to-day, when I handed him a copy of our note on the Sheffield "Peace" Congress. I also showed him the folder enclosing a list of the more important delegates. I explained to him that the present proposal of the Home Office, to stop only those delegates who were likely to engage in espionage or in creating industrial disputes, meant virtually that none of the delegates would be refused leave to land, and that this seemed to go slightly against the spirit of the Cabinet ruling. It seemed to us that the security issue, outside any general boost that the conference might give to the C.P.O.B., might be slight, but that the international effect of the conference - which quite clearly was being organised in a really big way - might be considerable. It would be difficult, for example, for Western Union, who had banned the conference in their countries, and also the U.S.A., to understand our action, and they might well draw the wrong inference from the fact that the conference was to be held in Great Britain.

Newsam took the view that to stop the delegates would only lead to endless telegrams of protest which would receive publicity, and that the body politic here was quite capable of absorbing the virus of the conference and throwing it off. There were really only two things in his mind: firstly the maintenance of the principles of freedom of speech, etc., and secondly, internal security, which he did not consider to be a risk. He was not really prepared to consider the international effect, and expressed the view that he did not think we should be affected by what the Americans thought. The British Government had made clear its position, both to the Western Union countries and to the United States, and that should be sufficient to allay any apprehensions.

I said that while this action had been taken in regard to Governments, it did not follow that the people of Western Union countries, or the American people, would understand our action. I further stressed the significance of the conference being held in Sheffield, where it might well disturb the minds of those working on the rearmament programme.

I think that Newsam will bring out note to the notice of the Home Secretary, but I am certain that he will not recommend any change of policy.

Murrie (who was present?) said that when the Home Office representative visited the Polish Acting Consul. with the customary request that he would accept some 10 Poles engaged in various forms of espionage for deportation.

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19th October.

At the J.I.C. to-day we discussed a paper for the improvement of Intelligence on Soviet Russia. One of the measures suggested was the classification of all deserters as defectors, in order that they could be housed in better conditions and so encourage others. We said that we would accept this, subject to some regulation in the flow and some limitation in numbers.

I told the meeting that we were examining E.V.Ws, and that possibly there might be some recruits amongst them for M.I.6.

Reilly mentioned the World Peace Congress, scheduled to be held in London on November 13th. He said that the Foreign Office were not satisfied with the present decision and intended to reopen the matter in the Cabinet. I told the meeting that we had, in the light of additional facts, submitted, a note to the Home Office, recommending that at least the bulk of the delegates should be stopped, but that Sir Frank Newsam held the view that we should only give the Congress more publicity, and that the body politic here was quite capable of absorbing the virus and throwing it off.

We then discussed various papers on the subject of defectors. Charles Haydon, representing Int. Div, Germany, undertook to have an enquiry made about the possibility of carrying out rehabilitation work in the British Zone, although he was not too sanguine about the possibilities. In any case, he would have to have a considerable staff with the requisite knowledge of Russian. There were also psychological factors: a deserter did not like to be accommodated with other deserters - at any rate not in the initial stages - and, generally speaking, the Russians were nervous about being rehabilitated in Germany, which they felt was too near the Russian frontier. I asked that whatever the outcome of his enquiry, an officer should be appointed in Germany and, if possible, in Austria, who would be entirely responsible for all the nuts and bolts of defector work; such officers to be placed in direct touch with our representative carrying out this work here.

Hutson of the Home Office was present and suggested that the Ministry of Labour should be broached, so that suitable trades could be taught to defectors and deserters, offering them some prospect in this country when their training is completed. The C.R.O. undertook to approach New Zealand and Canada on the question of resettlement. A working committee is to be set up, consisting of I.R.D., M.I.5/6, the Home Office, and the War Office.

Chinese defectors were then discussed. It did not seem likely that there would be a great many, since the tendency of the Chinaman was to remain in his own country and to conform to the majority view. He might, however, be prepared to accept a bribe and remain in situ. I asked that, in the event of rehabilitation being necessary, the position should be clarified as regards financial responsibility.

I.R.D. then explained the uses to which they had put defectors in Germany. First, an attempt was made to get a man to broadcast immediately. Thereafter he became a kind of news peg for other propaganda; he might, for example, have been in a forced labour camp. Later he might make a carefully

prepared broadcast, or write articles for the Press.

The Committee thought that I.R.D. should have a representative in Germany. I made it clear to the I.R.D. representative that there was no greater security in bringing a man to this country unless there were ways and means of getting him into congenial work: it was just as easy for him to desert to the Soviet Embassy as it was to recross the frontier into the Eastern Zone of Germany.

I saw _____ in connection with the appointment of an SDECE representative to Accra. I said that in regard to the appointment we had met with certain difficulties. Firstly, our Consul in Leopoldville, Mr. Wikeley, had visited M. Bourge, the Chef de Cabinet in Brazzaville, last April to discuss an exchange of information, but had been told that on instructions from Paris, no information of a political kind relating to French Equatorial Africa could be given. Secondly, Mr. Coate, after a diplomatic exchange with the Quai d'Orsay explaining his mission, had gone out to Brazzaville in an endeavour to obtain a wider picture of Communist activity in West Africa generally. He had found the authorities there extremely unforthcoming and was ultimately withdrawn as there seemed to be some suggestion that he was acting as a spy. Lastly, I mentioned the reports that had been appearing in the local press, alleging that British spies were operating in Equatorial Africa, and added that they had further aggravated the situation, since, as his organisation would well know, there was no foundation whatever in the allegations made.

I told _____ in view of these incidents, that the view held by the Foreign Office was that unless there were a change of heart and some indication that the local authorities were prepared to collaborate with the new Consul-General, Mr. Mason, who had just gone out to Brazzaville, little advantage could result from the appointment of an S.D.E.C.E. representative in Accra, one of whose duties would be to obtain from the S.D.E.C.E. representative in Brazzaville information regarding subversive individuals and movements.

_____ was clearly ignorant of the political difficulties which had arisen between ourselves and the French in Brazzaville, but he said at once that he did not think that they were wholly relevant except on a tit-for-tat basis, since the S.D.E.C.E. was entirely independent as an organisation and was not subordinated to local political considerations. The S.D.E.C.E. representative in Brazzaville would be his own master in the matter of transmission of information to ourselves. As regards Coate's visit, he could well understand, in spite of the diplomatic exchange of correspondence before the visit took place, that the French authorities would be puzzled by Coate's mission. They would understand the position of a Consul, who would clearly report on local conditions in the country which he resided. They would also understand the functions of M.I.5 and M.I.6. but they would find difficulty in fitting Coate's roving commission into this pattern.

_____ said that he was going to Paris this week-end and that he would do his best to see if there was not some way in which his organisation could induce the local authorities in Brazzaville to be more forthcoming in their dealings with Mr. Mason.

I then told _____ that, as he well knew, there was a sort of general malaise about French security, and an anxiety that information about subversive movements in British colonies might leak back to the

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Russians from Paris and so cause the latter to pay more attention to these movements than they were doing at present. _____ did not entirely see the force of this argument, since our liaison on these matters both in Dakar and Brazzaville was already agreed, and the present proposal for a representative of the S.D.E.C.E. in Accra was only to facilitate its workings. He did not think that if at some future date M.I.6 felt that they could profitably appoint somebody to work on similar lines in one of the French colonies, S.D.E.C.E. would raise any objection.

I shall be seeing _____ on his return from Paris next week, when I shall hear the reactions of his Headquarters to our conversation.

20th October.

_____ came to see me with a long questionnaire about Communist Parties all over the world. He said he had not the heart to pass a copy to Graham Mitchell, but he hoped we might be able to do something for him in the Middle East and Far East. He clearly was not in sympathy with the whole project and more or less apologised for passing the buck to us, which he said he was bound to do on instructions from Washington.

There seems to be some idea in the American mind that a close study of underground activities of Communist Parties will indicate to them when, where, and if the Soviet Government intend to make war. Their real answer, of course, is that the last people who would be told about Russian intentions would be the C.P.s, and particularly the T.C.P.G.B. COPY

21st October.

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Easton and _____ came over with the latest news about the disappearance of PONTECORVO, a scientist at Harwell. On information that had been received _____ in March of this year, intimating that PONTECORVO and his wife were avowed Communists, a decision was reached, -aft. an interrogation of PONTECORVO by Henry Arnold, when the former admitted to having Communist relations- to get rid of him and find some employment for him at Liverpool University. PONTECORVO went on leave at the end of July or beginning of August and left the country with his family on a camping holiday in Italy. He has now been traced as far as Helsinki, where he arrived on September 2nd on a Canadian passport, which was impounded as it had no visa. His wife and children were travelling on Swedish passports which do not require a visa. PONTECORVO had not applied to the Ministry of the Interior for the return of his passport and had not been heard of since.

There are, apparently, three ways in which he could go from Finland To Russia without the knowledge of the authorities. These are; by Soviet ship, by Soviet aircraft from one of the military bases, or by C.D. car across the frontier.

It seems that in 1943 the F.B.I. sent certain reports to British Security Co-Ordination, New York, indicating a search of PONTECORVO's house, when Communist literature was found. Nobody knows what happened to these reports, since the records of B.S.C. have been destroyed.

PONTECORVO went from Rome to Paris in 1936, and from Paris, where it was believed he worked for a time under JOLIOT-CURIE, to Oklahoma, where he was employed by an American firm. It was from there that he was recruited, in 1943, into the British Tube Alloys contingent which worked

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at Chalk River. In 1946 we asked Canada for information about any of the scientists who would be likely to be returning here; they had nothing to say about PONTECORVO. He was taken on by Atomic Energy in 1946, and after two short visits in 1947 and 1948, he took up permanent residence at Harwell in February, 1949. From 1946 to 1949 our records showed no trace. Had we, of course, had the F.B.I. reports, we might have made further enquiries.

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23rd October.

I saw the Prime Minister to-day. He asked me about the case of PONTECORVO.

I said that PONTECORVO went from Rome to France in 1936, where it was alleged that he had worked for a time under JOLIOT-CURIE. In 1940 he went to California where he worked both at the University and in an American oil company. At the beginning of 1943 he went to Canada as a member of the British contingent working on atomic energy. In 1946 he joined the staff of D.At.En. in Canada. On 7th February, 1948, he was naturalised a British subject, in absentia, by the Home Office. It is believed that he had already taken out first papers in the United States, but he had expressed a preference for British naturalisation if he could get it. In February, 1949, he came to Harwell. At that time there was no adverse record of him in our files, although it was alleged by the F.B.I. that certain reports had been passed to British Security Co-Ordination in New York - a body on which we were not represented - and also to the F.B.I. representative in London.

British Security Co-Ordination had been dissolved at the end of the war and a number of its records destroyed; those retained had not contained the F.B.I. reports, but a natural inference is that Security Co-Ordination would have passed on the reports to Canada, where PONTECORVO was the employed. So far we had not succeeded in tracing copies of the reports in London. If they were received by the F.B.I. representative, he might well have taken no action, since the report had already gone to New York and the man was in Canada. In point of fact, these reports said no more than that PONTECORVO was believed when in France to have worked under JOLIOT-CURIE, and that in a routine search of his house in the United States Communist literature had been found. Such a report in the atmosphere of 1943 would not have been likely to arouse any suspicion in Canada.

On March 2nd, 1950, we obtained information indicating that PONTECORVO and his wife were Communists. The Security Officer at Harwell had a talk with PONTECORVO about this time, when the latter volunteered the information that although certain of his relations in Europe were Communist sympathisers, he and his wife were not Communists. He realised, however, that he might be a bad security risk, and intimated his desire to obtain an appointment at one of the Universities. Such an appointment, at Liverpool University, was subsequently arranged. PONTECORVO had left this country in July with his wife and family and had now been traced positively as far as Helsinki, where he arrived on September 2nd. There was a press rumour that he had gone on to Soviet Russia, but this was at the moment unconfirmed.

The P.M. then asked how far PONTECORVO had had access to vital information. I said that, according to the answer to the Question to be put down in the House to-day, D.At.En. had expressed the view that for several years PONTECORVO had hardly had any contact with secret work,

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having been mainly concerned with cosmic ray projects. In the earlier period of his appointment in Canada he had been employed on pile work.

I explained to the P.M. that on the information available, there had been no grounds for bringing PONTECORVO before the purge committee and that, therefore, D.At.En. had concentrated on eliminating him amicably so as to avoid, if possible, the course which he has now apparently taken. This course could not have been prevented unless there had been evidence of an indictable offence; in fact there was none. It was impossible to say whether PONTECORVO had committed acts of espionage here or in Canada which might have made him feel that he could only be secure behind the Iron Curtain, or whether he had gone to Russia from purely ideological motives.

24th October.

I saw O'Brien, the Colonial Secretary at Gibraltar. He seemed thoroughly satisfied with our D.S.O. I spoke to him about the Local Intelligence Committee, and the proposal that our officer should take the Chair. I explained that while normally we preferred not to do this, we had agreed in the case of Gibraltar, where the circumstances appear to be exceptional, that if we were not in the Chair there was a risk of duplication of the D.S.O.'s work. I told him that the suggestion, of which he had not yet heard, was that the Committee should meet about once a month, or more often if necessary, and that it would have no executive powers; it was merely a liaison Committee.

25th October.

Graham has brought to notice the case of three people up in Lancashire: [redacted] who is on one of the American aerodromes and [redacted] They appear to have obtained information in relation to the arrival of certain dummy atom bombs at Liverpool. As one of Dayson's informants is concerned, we are sending Skardon up to obtain further particulars. [redacted] has apparently remained on the American aerodrome, at the request of Dayson, who is in touch with him through his informant.

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26th October.

I made a statement to-day about the PONTECORVO case at the Directors meeting of the J.I.C., but, owing to the very heavy agenda, it could not be a very full report. The Directors expressed anxiety about the whole position. It was understood that we should be consulting with D.At.En. as to whether anything could be done to prevent further occurrences of this kind, and we were asked to let the J.I.C. have our recommendations.

27th October.

I had a discussion with Dick & Roger about an analysis of the PONTECORVO case, in answer to the J.I.C.'s request. Dick and Roger will be producing something.

Perrin has told Dick that Portal, who dislikes Civil Service contr. of D.At.En., intends to get rid of anyone who is in any way tainted, and the Ministry of Supply refuse to act, he will make it clear to the P.M. that he cannot any longer accept responsibility. Portal is suggesting

restrictions of movement and power to dismiss at one month's notice. The restriction of movement was what the Directors of Intelligence had uppermost in their minds yesterday. I explained to them that it would be extremely difficult to make such restrictions effective; firstly, scientists would find them irksome, and the more important of them might well refuse to serve under such conditions. Secondly, a British subject could leave the country at any time and, although there were technical powers by which an alien could be refused leave to embark, they would have to be justified up to the hilt: a mere statement that he might be going to Russia, or might communicate information to a foreign power because he had secret knowledge, would not be sufficient. Any agreement among Scientists to conform would merely be distasteful to the good ones and would not prevent the bad ones from leaving if they were determined to do so; they could go on a Soviet ship, on a Czech aircraft, or by private aeroplane - like Sydney Stanley.

30th October.

I discussed with Haldane Porter the course for the Persians. It seemed to me that we ought to know more about the set-up in Persia before we started talking to them, otherwise we might be wasting our time in trying to teach them methods which they could not implement. I thought we ought to try and get back here. I had a word with Jack Easton about this, but after consultation with ^{him} he seemed to think that a questionnaire telegram to

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31st October.

I had lunch to-day with Anthony ^{Blunt}, when he told me that PADGHAM was exercised in his mind about a statement in the file of the PUTLITZ establishment branch of the German Foreign Office, that, owing to his relations with Willy SCHNEIDER, he had been blackmailed into acting as a British agent. He appears to be considering some court action to get the position regularised, and wondered whether it would be possible for anybody from this country to give evidence to the effect that he voluntarily decided to assist the British in their fight against the Nazis.

I told Anthony that I would consider the point and let him know.

 The Cabinet have now completely reversed their policy about the World Peace Congress, to be held here on November 13th. They have decided to exclude the whole of the Executive Committee, members of the W.F.T.U. and the W.F.D.Y., in addition to certain other categories.

Information coming in shows that considerable sums of money are being transferred from Paris to finance the Congress, in addition to the £30,000 originally received. A further £200,000 is likely to be available. Graham Mitchell asked me whether, in the light of the reversal of the previous Cabinet decision, we should go on with our preparations in Sheffield, to cover the Congress, which are in effect considerable. I felt that in view of the importance attached to this Congress, it would still be necessary for us to render a report upon it, even though the principal delegates might not be there. It was decided, therefore, to continue our preparations.

 The P.M. is proposing to make a statement to the Press Association to-morrow and we have provided a short paragraph on finance (?), which should not jeopardise our sources.

We had a discussion to-day on preparations for the Commonwealth Security Conference. B. and C. Divisions have been asked to state the subjects on which they would prepare papers. O.S. will will consider these and put up a programme for the Directors to finalise.

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1st November.

I gave a talk to newly-joined officers on the history of the office, from 1891 onwards when Captain Edmonds, (General Edmonds, if he is not dead, the author of the History of the First World War) was the recipient in the War Office of all information dealing with espionage. When visiting Berlin and Moscow and after his return, he gathered that the Germans had opened a section of their Intelligence Service to deal with England. It took over 18 years before the decision was reached, in 1909, to set up a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to enquire into the whole matter. By that time, however, all sorts of scares about spies on the East Coast were rife, and of course all German officers during their leave period had reconnaissance assignments. People were publishing books like "The Riddle of the Sands" and the play, I think by Du Maurier, called "The Englishman's Home" was causing considerable alarm and depicted an invasion and the shooting of innocent British subjects outside their homes. The C.I.D. Sub-Committee decided to appoint Captain Kell, and, on the basis of a report that he put in two years later - working more or less on his own in rooms in the Temple - resulted in the Official Secrets Act of 1911, the re-imposition of the H.O.W. and the beginnings of alien registration. The H.O.W. was hotly opposed by the Postmaster General, who argued that in any case it would produce no results as spies did not communicate by letter. In the event he was proved to be wrong, since on the outbreak of war 21 out of 23 German spies were arrested and the whole organisation broken up. Kell's section, which was originally called M.O.5, became M.I.5 acting for all three Services and establishing a close liaison with the

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Police. Before the O.S.A. of 1911, espionage was not even a felony and the Commissioner of Police had refused to have spies followed, as he thought his action might lead to awkward questions in the House.

In 1917 the functions of C.2 as it is to-day were taken over from the Ministry of Munitions.

I then gave a brief account of the work between the two wars, which led in 1931 to the Branch of Scotland Yard, to which I belonged being taken over by M.I.5. I then traced the developments up to the outbreak of war, and the subsequent activities until the department was taken over, in 1946, by the present Prime Minister.

I then said a few words of the principles on which we conduct our work and on the channels through which our information is fed into the Government machine.

I attended a session of the Immigration Officers' Conference to-day, when the question of a Home Office letter on the subject of tourists being landed unconditionally was discussed.

With regard to the possibility of an alien leaving on the last day of his three months and coming in again for a further three months without the necessity of having to register, the Immigration Officers pointed out that it would be normal practice for them to bring such cases to notice.

I drew attention to the fact that if, as seemed likely, further attempts were made to withdraw Immigration control from the western ports for traffic coming from Ireland, no such notification would be possible, since there would be nothing to distinguish an alien from a British subject. The old back door would then be open and the period before which registration was necessary would be three months instead of two. For other reasons, however, the Immigration Officers reacted very unfavourably to the Home Office proposals; they felt that the effect of stamping every passport with a three months time condition would reduce the Immigration service to a 'rubber stamp' organisation. They had been training their junior officers for some time to use their intelligence in the granting of time conditions, and the only effect of the present proposal would be to discourage them from conducting a careful interrogation, and so from getting to know more about the travelling alien population.

The Home Office undertook to reconsider the matter.

3rd November.

Ronnie Howe asked me to lunch. He had one or two things he wished to discuss with me, after which he told me that he had just had a visit from Johnny Cimperman. Cimperman told him that the D.G. had asked him whether he would be prepared to tell the Lord President what Hoskins, the "Daily Express" crime reporter had said in relation to the orders that he had received from Beaverbrook to write articles showing that M.I.5 was inefficient. Being anxious to help the D.G., Cimperman had said that, subject to the Bureau's approval, he would be prepared to do this, although on reflection he was in some doubt about the advisability of such a course. Ronnie told him that he thought he would be most unwise even to suggest such a thing to the Bureau, since he would be bound to get the answer that he should not be mixing himself up in British politics. Moreover, the

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Bureau might well think that M.I.5 as a department should not have made such a request. Johnny had decided to go back to the D.G. and explain the delicacy of the position, suggesting that he should not intervene. This he subsequently did, and the D.G. readily accepted his view.

Meanwhile, I had a call from Norman Brook's secretary, Marshall. Norman Brook had been summoned to see the P.M. at 4 o'clock on this very subject and was anxious to have the D.G.'s views. The D.G. saw Marshall, to whom he explained the whole circumstances. He had been attending a dinner the night before for South African Police and had sat next to Gordon-Walker, with whom the proposed articles in the "Daily Express" were discussed. Gordon-Walker was highly incensed and undertook to inform the Lord President. Marshall thought that the only possible way of dealing with the matter would be a question to be asked in the House, to which the P.M. would reply, giving facts about Hoskins' approach and Beaverbrook's intention to find fault with M.I.5, regardless of the facts.

We came to the conclusion that this could not be done without embroiling Cimperman, and that even if it were possible, it would probably not stop the publication of the articles but would merely cause them to be more venomous. It would therefore be better to leave things alone and deal with the articles afterwards if necessary.

These views were transmitted to the P.M. by Brook, who agreed that no action was the better policy.

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6th November.

I gave a lecture to four Persian officers, two from the Police and two from the Persian G-2. The senior policeman was about the toughest looking individual I have ever seen, rather short and immensely broad, with drooping eyelids and a sinister expression! - None of them

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understood much English, so I had to go very slowly and say everything at least three times! I tried to give them a rough idea of what the Security Service was like and what it should do. I began by telling them that it should be wholly non-political and merely concerned with the security of the State, regardless of the Government in power; otherwise it could have no stability and no continuity. This did not, of course, mean that it was not entitled to investigate the activities of political parties which advocated the overthrow of the State by unconstitutional means. I realised from the expressions on their faces how unpractical they felt my suggestion was! However, on the whole they were quite enthusiastic and may have absorbed one or two ideas.

Hollis, who followed me later, tried to talk to them about security in a more detailed way. He tried to explain that in dealing with aircraft there were certain parts of the machine which needed safeguarding by various security measures, whereas the machine as a whole might not be classified as secret. He opened by saying that the wings, for example, were not secret. When he had finished this subject, the Chief of Police, who had been writing copious notes (backwards, in Persian) heaved a great sigh and said: "How many wings you say?!"

Roger then passed on to the classification of documents - top secret, secret, confidential and restricted, and, after a discourse on this subject, the Chief of Police heaved another sigh and said rather pathetically: "Please, you say more about the restricted!"

At Malcolm Cumming's lecture on technical aids, which involved showing them the crudest form of microphone, which was of no practical value, but nevertheless effective. It amused them all intensely and they were unanimous in saying at the conclusion: "Please, you come back and play more tricks!"

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I sincerely hope so.

We discovered, rather tardily, that one of the G-2 officers was an ex-agent of the Abwehr. S.I.S. had known this but had said nothing. Thistle had interrogated the man on the frontier during the way, and at the conclusion of the interview the agent had made the typical Persian remark: "I swear on the Koran that eighty percent of what I am telling you is true"! This was an encouraging start for us all!!

I had a talk with _____, who is over here for discussions with S.I.S., the Norwegians, and I believe, also the Swedes on S.O. activities in any future war.

Joyce SMITH and BERNAL have been searched at the port on their return from Paris. It was thought that they might be carrying funds for the Peace Congress. Nothing was found. Other couriers are to go almost daily and will receive similar treatment.

7th November.

I had a visit from the Chief Constable of Leicester City, who seemed pleasant and co-operative.

At the J.I.C. to-day, the view was expressed that the Chinese were still not out for a major war, in spite of the presence of Chinese troops in Northern Korea. I told the Committee about the rather sensational telegram that we had received from Hong Kong, to the effect that the Chinese were going to declare war upon the U.S. on the 14th November. I urged that it should be treated with the utmost reserve.

While I was at the meeting, the P.M.'s office rang about the incident reported in the Press that the firm of POWELL and DUFFERIN had closed its works, pending a reorganisation. The inference was that certain scientists who were Communists were likely to be discharged. The P.M. seemed to have a "Nobody tells me" complex. The facts are that, for some time Atomic Energy have been wishing to place a contract with this firm, and had sought our good offices in an approach to the management to see what could be done. We did in fact tell Foote, one of the Directors, about the Communists in his employ, but we made no suggestions as to action. He has evidently taken the matter into his own hands.

I gave a talk to two Pakistani officers, Major Sidiqui and Major Arif, on the work of the office. They both seemed intelligent and interested. They were particularly anxious to know what we did about Soviet officials, of whom they now have a considerable number in Karachi. They wondered whether there was not a possibility of cutting them down.

I said that we had gone into this question here, but had come to the conclusion that as foreign trade was a state monopoly, it was difficult to reduce the numbers as long as there was a trade agreement. As regards Attaches, there was no point in reducing them as long as the Trade Delegation existed, since they could quite easily reappear disguised as engineers.

I saw Newsam in the afternoon.

I told him, too, that we were searching couriers, but so far without result. BERNAL had now gone to Prague and was presumably considering whether it was going to be worth while holding the conference at Sheffield at all. Newsam thought that we ought to try and get the French to stop their delegates from starting. I did not, however, give him much encouragement - indeed, it was difficult to see why the French should be expected to do this when the Home Office would surely be opposed to any sort of reciprocal action here.

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9th November.

At the Directors meeting of the J.I.C. to-day, the D.N.I., who took the Chair, referred again to the question of restricting the movements of scientists, whether British or foreign, who wished to travel abroad. He thought that such restrictions should extend to all scientists working on defence, and also to outside consultants.

Young, who was representing D.S.I., pointed out that his department were often anxious that the right type of scientist should be allowed to go abroad, since he would have an opportunity of finding out what was being done by foreign workers in his field; he had in mind a conference at Leningrad for astronomers. There was apparently some suggestion that Colonel Stratton, a Professor of astro-physics, might attend this conference.

I made the point that if certain Professors were restrained from going to such conferences, where others were encouraged, it would tend to pin-point the latter as agents of the British Government.

The Ds of I. still seemed to feel that some method should be devised, by legislation if necessary, to prevent British subjects or aliens with important defence knowledge from travelling at least without permission and, with a view to giving this matter further consideration before informing the Chiefs of Staff, they were anxious for a statement on the exact position in regard to the Home Secretary's existing powers.

I explained that we could let them have this information, but that our constitutional position was a slightly delicate one if it came to making recommendations which might well conflict with Home Office policy.

There followed a discussion on the Security Service paper: "Employment of Aliens and Recently Naturalised British Subjects on Defence Work". I gather that the Admiralty have put in their views in writing on priorities. Only one was added by D.S.I., namely, electronics; this category may need defining more closely. The Foreign Office thought they might have one or two foreigners, or naturalised British subjects, whose cases they might wish to review. The Air Ministry did raise the question of Czechs in the Air Force. To this latter proposal I said that we had a fairly good coverage from the espionage point of view in regard to Czechs, but that to keep them

under observation or to review all their cases would present us with yet another formidable task, which was not likely to produce any satisfactory results. I said, moreover, that it had always been our policy - which had indeed been endorsed by the J.I.C. and the Chiefs of Staff - to advise against the employment of aliens in defence work, and that in any case the matter should only be considered where the qualifications were exceptional and nobody of comparable ability was available. In spite of this, a large number of aliens were working on various research projects, and it was quite impossible to do more than keep a very limited number under close observation if there was prima facie evidence to warrant such a course. The real answer was to get rid of them and cut our losses. I also made it clear that, in order to reduce the vetting problem to manageable proportions, our policy was to build up the best records we could about Communists and those associated with the Party, to discover their place of employment and inform the department concerned. The vetting of hundreds of thousands of names was the only alternative, which was not in our opinion the right answer; it merely swamped the machine and would cause the records on which the actual vet was made to become progressively out of date.

2. A proposal was made by the D.M.I. that Ambassadors in certain countries should be "cosmicised". This was vetoed on the grounds that if this policy was carried out, the Portuguese and other Ambassadors would have to receive similar treatment.

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5. J.I.B. mentioned that there was a report on a secret clause in the Russo-Afghan Treaty, by which Russia would supply arms to Afghanistan. Although this might be an indication that Russia had no aggressive intentions against Afghanistan, it might well mean that she wished to encourage the Afghans to create trouble with Pakistan.

6. The D.N.I. said that he had heard from the First Lord that the Prime Minister was now considering the question of the publication of Duff Cooper's book on Plan MINCEMEAT. It was clear that in stating that Goebbels had already reported on this operation in his diary, he had further misled the authorities, since the reference showed only a certain scepticism by Goebbels in a conversation that he had had with Canaris.

Duff Cooper is now quoting 'C' as being one of those who gave his approval to the publication of the book. 'C' says that as he was leaving his club, Duff Cooper told him about his interview with Baker-Cresswell. 'C' had made no comment.

7. The D.N.I. is putting up a paper to the Chiefs of Staff with a proposal that diplomatic relations should be re-established with Spain. In this he received the support of the other Ds. of I. He said that the Spanish ports were of particular importance to the Navy and that the present impasse was a serious matter.

 _____ came and brought his two new officers to introduce them to the D.G. They were accompanied by the two outgoing officers, _____ and _____ both of whom are going back.

 Roger and Hill talked to me about MINCEMEAT. Hill had a letter from Admiral Thomson regarding an approach by one, Jenkins, of the "Evening Standard" with an official request to interview Ewan MONTAGU in relation to Duff Cooper's book. Thomson had replied that nothing should be published in regard to this interview without its being vetted by the appropriate authorities, including himself. The real answer, of course, was that MONTAGU should not see a representative of the "Evening Standard" at all, since being an Admiralty official he should not discuss a confidential matter of this kind.

 I rang up the D.N.I. and told him this in case he would want to give MONTAGU a warning. He told me off the record that MONTAGU was extremely incensed about Duff's book and was proposing to move the D. of P.P. to bring an action against him. Presumably MONTAGU would be the common informer. If this is really so, I have maligned MONTAGU in thinking he was the person who inspired Duff to write the book. Meanwhile, of course, a synopsis of the book has been published in the "Sunday Express" and the obvious inference drawn, that since Duff was officially associated with the Security Executive during the war it must have been based on fact.

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 Dick has attended a meeting at the Home Office, who are altering their policy once more about delegates to be admitted to the Peace Conference at Sheffield. The total number of delegates to be admitted is not to exceed 500; it is, therefore, necessary to work on a percentage basis. This means that some of those who have received visas will be turned back when they arrive. 230 only are to be admitted from non-visa countries. Out of 390 Frenchmen only 100 will be allowed in, and out of 100 Italians only 30 will be allowed in. Three-quarters of the delegates from other countries are to be eliminated.

 We had made it clear that we can no longer accept any responsibility with regard to those who are let in or kept out. It is clear that if the Home Secretary is asked in the House why he let in X and kept out Y, he will have no answer.

I lunched with ~~Anthony~~^{Stuart} He said that PADGHAM had now given up his idea about bringing an action against the German Foreign Office.

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It was agreed that in the Middle East and Far East no problem of American integration would arise; it would merely be a question of liaison.

The matter is to be considered in greater detail.

The Peace Committee are all at sixes and sevens, and the same remark might easily apply to the British Government! There is evidently a great shortage of funds, and all sorts of people, including old Eva RECKITT, are being asked to give guarantees. Bob STEWART appears to have a cache somewhere in the country and is going to collect the money to-morrow. POLLITT has given him a guarantee that it will be returned, but Bob is evidently slightly sceptical.

I have read a paper on the recent discussion of the Chiefs of Staff in Washington. It seems fairly clear that if trouble broke out in the Middle East, the Americans would not be in a position to do much for two years, although they might send a small strategic bombing force. Equally, in Persia no very great assistance would be forthcoming. Nobody seemed very clear about the oil situation; the Americans were remarking that everyone they asked seemed to hold a different view. The matter is, I gather, to be carefully examined to see how dependent both ourselves and the Americans would be on Middle East oil in the event of hostilities breaking out.

Our position in Hong Kong was explained. It was made clear that we intended to fight, even though it was admitted that the Colony was quite indefensible against an organised army.

11th November.

I came in this afternoon to see how the "peace" room was getting on. It was clear by then that the Conference in Sheffield had been abandoned and that there was to be a meeting to-morrow, and a protest meeting on Monday. The delegates would then leave for Warsaw, where the conference would be held on Thursday.

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I had a talk with Ruck. He seemed thoroughly satisfied with the arrangements made here, but not too pleased about the vacillating policy of the Home Office, which had clearly caused his officers an infinity of trouble.

13th November.

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day I raised the question of grading this office as a V.P. Horrocks had suggested that we might be graded IC. Hollis, however, feels that we ought to be IA, at any rate until such time as we had been able to make provision for documents in the country. This raised the question of a house in the country. Clearly nothing has been done, in spite of the note I put in several months ago, after discussing the matter with the D.G. Horrocks was asked to proceed as early as possible and also to consider the numbers of staff who could be evacuated.

The D.G. has just returned from a Cabinet meeting, when our paper on positive vetting was discussed and also a paper on whether extra powers were necessary.

As regards positive vetting, Winnifrith appears to have done extremely well. As Chairman of the Working Party, he told the Cabinet that it was absurd to expect M.I.5 to do their job properly if Ministers did not accept greater responsibility when taking people on for employment; there were many enquiries which could be made within the Ministry, and in such cases - but only in special cases - some positive enquiry might be conducted by the local Police.

The paper was accepted, subject to the proviso, that if local enquiries were thought necessary we should have the sanction of the Minister, who would inform M.I.5; M.I.5 would then notify the Chief Constable concerned. Chuter Ede asked that in any such cases he might also be informed.

+++++

14th November.

Colonel Darling came to see me while I was out. He is the Chiefs of Staff representative on the Dixon Cold War Committee. He returned my copy of "Animal Farm". He said he did not think that he could do anything about getting Walt Disney to make a cartoon. The book has, of course, had a very wide circulation, but that is not quite the point.

He saw Roger Hollis, who regarded him as being particularly offensive! He wanted a copy of the paper we were preparing for the J.I.C. on the legal position in regard to the control of movements of British subjects and aliens employed on important defence projects. Apparently the Dixon Committee are writing a similar memo.

Mackenzie, the Secretary, rang me up later - I thought somewhat apologetically - to explain Colonel Darling's visit. He said that his Committee were considering the matter more from the point of view of the movements of foreigners to Prague, Moscow, or elsewhere. I said I doubted whether our memo would be much help to him, but that I would certainly let him have a copy unofficially.

+++++ Mitchell and Ken Mills failed to get into the Conference of the British Peace delegates to-day. The Assistant Commissioner of Sheffield was, however, admitted, but nothing was said which would warrant any action. There is to be a protest meeting to-night, which Graham hopes to attend.

15th November.

I saw Graham this morning, just back from Sheffield. He got in to the Conference with the other Police representatives, but when credentials were checked he and several others were asked to leave. The Assistant Commissioner then consulted Mr. Rothwell, who was in charge of the hall, and the two of them had a consultation with BERNAL, resulting in a compromise. The Assistant Commissioner and one member of his staff were allowed to remain. The proceedings were quite orderly and nothing was said which necessitated any action. The protest meeting in the evening was rather a damp squib.

At the J.I.C. to-day the Chinese situation was debated. The War Office view is that the Chinese forces already encountered were a kind of cover force for the Chinese main build-up in the reservoir area. It is estimated that there are now about 90,000 Chinese troops in Korea. Nobody is at all clear about Chinese intentions, and the Committee still felt that it was unlikely that they would make any sort of declaration of war. Nobody knows what MacArthur's intentions are, or how confident he is of being able to clear Northern Korea. There is very little information about the extent of Russian assistance, neither is it known whether the recent visit of Chuen-Li to Moscow was in order that the Russians might encourage the Chinese to be more aggressive or to exercise a restraining hand upon them.

In the midst of these imponderables, the Foreign Office pressed for a paper to be written on the Chinese conception of their ability to engage in war with the United States. The Services said that logistically such a proposal was out of the question, and that in the absence of any information as to what might be in the Chinese mind, any such report would be pure crystal gazing. The Foreign Office still wanted the task to be attempted and intend to put forward a first draft and ask the J.I.C. to clear it.

The Air Force spoke about the Russian M.I.G., several of which have been shot down, but none apparently within the U.N. lines. From such data as has been received, including photographs, a mock-up of the machine has been made. The experts calculate that it has a speed of 545 knots, which is faster than any machine in the air or are likely to have in the immediate future. The data is, however, lacking on its manoeuvrability; it does not appear to be able to turn very quickly and it is for that reason that the Mustangs have been able to deal with it. Nothing is known of its fire platform (?). It is being produced at a considerable rate. There are 500 in the Eastern Zone of Germany, and there are likely to be about 800 at the end of the year. Its engine is a modification of the nene, which goes to show how stupid we were to sell nene engines to the Russians, even though they were out of date. At the time we recommended against this proposal, on the grounds that it was teaching the Russians their A.B.C. in jet propulsion, and the question of obsolescence was not relevant. Elmhirst, who was A.C.A.S.(I) at the time, was all in favour of letting the engines go.

Ross asked me after the meeting to let him know what arrangements were being made to assist the German Consul in his task of granting visas. He thought that if he did not get some list to work on he was likely to be severely handicapped. I said that I knew certain discussions had been going on and that, as far as we were concerned, there was the difficult point of giving information about British subjects. On the other hand, it seemed wholly logical to allow British agitators to go to Western Germany. I undertook to make enquiries and to let him have further particulars.

General Briggs is over here and a paper of his on Communism in the Far East is going to be discussed by the Chiefs of Staff on Wednesday.

Dick made a claim for Simkins and asked whether his return could be expedited. He is sorely in need of an experienced officer to look after some of his juniors, who from lack of knowledge or experience are committing a number of errors which might at any moment get the office into serious trouble. De Quehen is apparently quite ready to go out earlier, and Horrocks will explore whether it is possible to get a passage for Simkins in the New Year, if not before.

Lastly, it was decided to recruit at least two more officers and to hold an Appointments Board as soon as possible.

16th November.

The D.G. went to the J.I.C. to-day, when there was a discussion on MINCEMEAT. Drew is still fussing about whether Duff legitimately had access to Plan MINCEMEAT, and he wants us to ask J.C. whether he ever discussed it. There is apparently no question of a prosecution.

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I had a meeting with D.B., D.C. and O.S. about the Commonwealth Security Conference, and have agreed terms of reference. We thought that it was better not to give lectures but rather to invite discussion. There is slight difficulty in discussing Russian espionage, since the only case in Australia is of course based on extremely delicate sources, which could not be the subject of discussion with any of those present. We thought, however, that if we had a word with Spry we could obviate any embarrassment.

Admiral Godfrey, war time D.N.I., came to see me. He is writing up a number of monographs on naval intelligence work for the D.N.I. and was thinking of writing one on deception and one on double agents. He said he had discussed the matter with Drew, who viewed the proposal favourably, except that he would like copies of the one written on deception. He then asked me whether we had anything written up on our double agent cases, which he could study. I said there was a pamphlet written up and that I would arrange to make it available to him at the L.C.S. offices. This seemed to me to be the best way out, as clearly I could not hand him a copy of a Top Secret document to work on at his own home

Ross of the Foreign Office rang up about the granting of visas to suspects going to Germany. The German Consul was shortly taking over and Ross was not very clear about the procedure. I told him that, as matters stood at present, the Germans were going to be given the Central Travel Bureau index, containing some 32,000 names, compiled by Int. Div., Germany. We had a few names on this list, but were not worried about its being given to the German authorities for use here in the granting of visas. The present British Permit Office was to continue on a reduced scale and would have a special list from us of about 100 names of aliens and British undesirables. Before granting a visa, the Germans would check with the Permit Office and, if there was an adverse record, would be able to withhold the visa pending instructions from their Government. Meanwhile the facts would be committed to the British High Commissioner in Germany, through Int. Div., who would pass them to the German Government, who in turn would give the Consul his final instructions.

Ross seemed to think that the Permit Office ought also to check against the Home Office Suspect Index. I explained that no foreign Government had this index and that, so far, there had been no check by the Permit Office. Most of the names on the list were criminals and share pushers, and there was a certain objection by the Yard to giving such names to foreign powers, since it precluded their chances of getting rid of undesirables. He said he would consider this point.

17th November.

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Victor came to see me. He said that an atomic physicist, who worked with our team in Canada and at one time with JOLIOT-CURIE, would be prepared, if he were given a list of scientists, to put a cross against any whom he thought doubtful from the political angle. Victor thought that we should be well advised, if we could manage it, to get hold of some reliable personalities in the scientific world to sound out their fellow workers. He said that while Arnold might be a good Security Officer, he would always have difficulty in finding out scientists' political views, because he could not talk scientific jargon. It was when you entered into conversation with a scientist on a subject of mutual interest, his political views nearly always became apparent one way or another. I said I agreed that this might be so, although it would not have applied in the case of PONTECORVO, who was regarded by his fellow scientists as 100% reliable. In thought, however, that we should be very glad to submit a list for to look at.

20th November.

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day we discussed the question of an S.L.O. being posted to Nigeria. We all of us felt that four officers in West Africa in the present circumstances was rather a luxury, but nobody could say with any confidence, on the basis of first-hand knowledge, what was really required. Tin-Eye kept on telling us that we were sitting on a seething cauldron, but we never got anything positive in the way of evidence. It seemed, moreover, that he had ideas about running a network of agents himself, and this seemed to be going rather outside our functions. The running of agents in an African Colony was really a matter for the Police. In view of all this uncertainty and the probability that Shaw would not be able to visit the Colony until the late Spring at the earliest, the D.G. has asked me to go out before Christmas.

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Wild came to see me. L.C.S. are posting two officers to the Far East and the British Defence Committee think that the rank of Brigadier is rather out of balance for the senior officer. This appears to be + view of M.I.6 and ourselves, who in the military hierarchy would only rank as Lieut.Cols. Wild was rather worried about this, as he said he doubted whether he could get anyone to go out to do a job of that sort with a lower rank, and consequently lose pay. I said that we had no information from S.I.F.E., but that a Brigadier did seem to me to be a little out of balance. In point of fact, I should not worry too much if the man was made a Lieut-General! I feel very sceptical about his powers of doing anything useful, but I suppose somebody has got to try.

I had a talk with Kellar about my visit to West Africa. I am anxious to see everything that is coming in from West Africa and, as far as possible, everything that has come in during the last two months. I also propose to look at the out letter book. In this way I may get a better idea of what is going on.

~~21st November~~

Perfect came to see me about the course for Police Officers which begins to-morrow. He wanted to know how far officers were to go in giving details about our sources of information. I said that on the whole I thought that they should not discuss H.O.Ws and telephone checks, at any rate unless they were specifically asked. We had divulged these sources to certain Police officers on the basis of the "need to know" in any particular case, but I am sure the less the subject is discussed in a general way the better. There is already too much talk about it in the Metropolitan Police, who run checks for criminal purposes.

I gave lunch to [redacted] He told me that [redacted] accepted what I had told him about the appointment of one of his officers in Accra. While the official reply might not be very helpful, since the French still did not understand the reason for Coate's visit, he would certainly do everything he could to smooth things over in Brazzaville and to see that Mason, the British Consul, got a fair deal.

[redacted] told me that everybody was in the dark about [redacted] position. He had first resigned, but on reflection had come to the conclusion that he had no very good prospects in the business world. Although he would like to be quit of S.D.E.C.E. in some ways, it seems that he would rather like to remain, for political reasons. Meanwhile, the Government, having got over the Revers scandal and being occupied with Indo-China and Korea, are clearly inclined to let things drift.

[redacted] is still paid by the S.D.E.C.E., but now has a job in the Ministry of Information. [redacted], a close ally of [redacted], remains in the S.D.E.C.E., but apparently has nothing to do. The whole position is about as unsatisfactory as it can be.

21st November.

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Martin Charteris came in to say that there is a proposal that Princess Elizabeth should visit West Africa in the Autumn of 1951. He

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asked me whether I thought there was any serious risk involved. I said this would of course be a matter for the Governors, but taking a very superficial view, I should have thought that it would have been all right and that she might well have a tremendous success. One could, however, never be sure about the odd lunatic. I made it clear that the security arrangements would be entirely a matter for Special Branch of Scotland Yard, in conjunction with the local police.

Dick, Perfect and I lunched with the Chief Constable of Dorset, Major Peel-Yates. He has just produced rather a useful informant who has settled in his area. The man was formerly a high official of the _____ became disillusioned and has now retired. We have established direct contact with him and hope to get some useful information. The man's name is _____

I gave a lecture to Detective Superintendents, which was the first of a series given to officers of this rank, on the assumption that they ultimately have the responsibility for S.B. work, and that if we could carry them with us their own officers would get greater support.

I confined myself to giving them an account of our objectives, the principles on which we work, and the organisation which we had set up to deal with enemy Intelligence organisations, subversive movements, and security.

22nd November.

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I spoke to Strong about naturalisation. We have been asked for a paper by the J.I.C., showing what the powers are to prevent both aliens and British subjects leaving the country, and that the general procedure is in naturalisation. I am completing this paper to-day, sending a copy to the Cold War Committee, who appear to be interested in the same subject.

Admiral Godfrey telephoned and asked whether I had sent over our memorandum on double-agents to L.O.S. I told him that I had.

Howard of the Home Office rang me to say that he was thinking of approaching the Baltic Consul here on the subject of recruiting reliable instructors in Slav languages. This was in connection with the Working Party which is considering the setting up of an Inter-Services School of Slavonic Languages. After speaking to Derby, I told Howard that the Consul was, as far as I knew, a reliable person. I emphasised, however, that in recruiting instructors in a language, it was of paramount importance that the instructor himself had a first-class knowledge of English.

I lunched with Van Moyland. He asked me if I could say a good word for GOOSSEN of the Department of Justice, who was going to America to discuss drug traffic and smuggling. I said that I could probably do something, and subsequently wrote a line to Cimperman.

We gave a cocktail party for the Superintendents attending the course. Most of them seem to have enjoyed their stay and to have found it profitable.

23rd November.

D.B., D.C. and I had a meeting about staff requirements and the new system of grading. We were all of us extremely doubtful about the establishment of new grades between Senior Officer and Director. While we agreed that this would provide opportunities for young officers, and secondly, an incentive to join and remain in the organisation, we all felt that it presented very serious problems. Firstly, the Senior Deputy or Assistant Director would have to be the next Director-designate, and this was a very difficult decision to make until a vacancy actually occurred. Secondly, the more grades we made the more difficult it was to place officers in jobs which they felt to be commensurate with their rank. This would particularly apply in the case of overseas officers returning. In general, the more grades you make the more inflexible the organisation becomes. We thought that while it might be useful to have sanction for these grades, it might be unwise to use them now, and in any case they would have to be used very sparingly. We had a large number of new officers and it is early days yet to say who would ultimately be capable of carrying really responsible jobs.

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I had a post mortem on the course with the Detective Superintendents. They all seemed to have been most impressed by what they had heard, although they thought the lectures might have been spun out over another two days, which would have given more time for questioning and more time for the officers themselves to absorb what they heard without too much fatigue. They were extremely impressed by the two women speakers, Miss Bagot and Mrs. Towndrow. They admitted that they had started prejudiced, but were won over in the first five minutes by the obvious fact that both of them not only had a complete mastery of their subject, but knew how to put them over. Several of them had the frankness to say that in the past they had been rather inclined to snigger when they heard the name of M.I.5, but that this course had entirely changed their views.

28th November.

Thistle told me that considerable progress was being made in regard to E.V.Ws. He thought that probably about 3% of the cases might be of interest to us, but there might be certain doubtful characters-like those who had served in the Russian forces during the war. There were apparently quite a number of these who had got into this country disguised under various nationalities. I said that I thought that the Home Office would always have to consider the possibility of a certain amount of general internment, on the grounds that Slavs would always consider in a crisis whether their bread was buttered on this side or that, and that if the Russians were making progress they might well, as they did in the last war, be swayed by a wave of enthusiasm for the "old country"! The proper course in an invasion crisis would be to clear the decks here by sending most of them to Canada

We are getting further details of this conversation before taking the matter up with 'C'.

29th November.

At the J.I.C. to-day we had a long discussion on the situation in Korea, which is now critical. 200,000 Chinese troops are involved and have driven a considerable wedge in the lines of the United Nations. We were called upon to put up an interim report to the Chiefs of Staff. We had to accept the view that Chinese and Russian activities were co-ordinated; that the Chinese had been building up for this offensive for some time; that although they had obviously accepted the risk of a major war and had taken considerable preventive action by air raid precautions, etc., in Mukden and Peking, it seemed doubtful whether they wished, or whether the Russians would like them to have as their objective the clearance of the whole of Korea of U.N. Forces, since this would be almost bound to lead to a world war. Although this possibility had to be envisaged, an alternative was that the Chinese- who had always objected to the crossing of the 38th Parallel by American Forces and had, in fact, intimated through the Indian Ambassador in Peking, Pannikar, that if this happened they would intervene- might have as their present objective the driving back of U.N. Forces to the 38th Parallel, after which they would be prepared to negotiate. Whether they are in a position to carry out this commitment is another matter. They are believed to have very large reserves in Manchuria and there is no doubt that they are receiving both advice and assistance from the Russians.

The French are extremely nervous about the situation, which is of course linked with Indo-China, where an offensive by VIET-MINH, supported by the Chinese and probably Russian advisers, may take place at any moment. The American reaction has been to denounce the Chinese as aggressors at the United Nations.

The D.D.M.I. (Johnstone) asked me again about the case of Nicholas STRAUSSLER, the tank expert whose services the British Government wished to use to an even greater extent than they are doing to-day. Johnstone said that STRAUSSLER frequently visited Hungary, and the War Office are anxious to have some assessment of the man from us.

I said that we had, of course, known this man well during the war, but that he had at that time been accepted in the absence of anything known against him.

 I had lunch with TAR to-day.

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I took a case _____ to Newsam. I also talked to him about the internment of 5th Column here in time of war. I said that although the sorting out of E.V.Ws was proceeding satisfactorily, he would always have to reckon with the fact that a situation might arise where general internment of all those who were not specially organised on war work would be demanded by the military. I went over with him the history of internment during the last war, and the confusion that had resulted when the general internment order was given, owing to the reversal of Home Office policy and the consequent occupation of all the reserved camps by the military. It seemed to me that we ought to be prepared for some clearing of the decks by getting these doubtful elements, who might well sway this way and that in accordance with the successes or failures of the Russian Forces, out of the country to Canada. I told him that Dick of the R.C.M.P. had been specially charged with internment camps in time of war in Canada, and that he had visited me here and said that if we wanted to reserve accommodation, it should be done now and not at the last moment. I told him that as this was a matter for the Home Office, he ought to see Cornish, and I had in fact arranged an interview after speaking to Baker. I do not know what the outcome of this was, but I thought the matter was still in the air. Newsam expressed his intention of doing something about this, although I am not very confident that he will.

Newsam then asked me whether we had been having any conversation with Norman Brook. I said that Norman Brook had of course been over here and seen a number of our officers when making his enquiry into the whole organisation. He also discussed the question of Ministerial control. I said that I thought his mind had rather been veering towards the Ministry of Defence. Newsam said: "No, he has had three talks with me and his view is that you should come under the Home Office". He was going to let Newsam have a copy of his draft report. I said that although we did of course have certain definite responsibilities to the Home Office and derived certain of our files from the Home Secretary, we were primarily concerned with defence. Moreover, he would have to realise that we now had a considerable organisation overseas which was also landed with defence planning, and in the Middle East and Far East we were an integral part of the British Defence Committee. Another factor was that these organisations were partially integrated with M.I.6, although remaining still under our control - the reason being that both counter-espionage and subversive movements had their roots abroad. Similar plans were on foot to achieve some measure of integration here in London, although this could not happen until the new building in Horseferry Road was completed. In addition to the two organisations in the Middle East and Far East, we had stations in East Africa, West Africa, the Caribbean, Malta, Gibraltar and Ceylon, and liaison officers in Washington, Canberra and New Delhi. He would see, therefore, that the establishment and balance of the organisation had changed considerably in recent years. On the other hand, I said that, as I had previously mentioned to him some time ago, it was undoubtedly necessary for someone in the Home Office to take a wider interest in international affairs, since as at present constituted, they had no frame into which to put various questions affecting them which arose from time to time.

Newsam's reply to this was: "Oh, yes - I know. I know - I am going to be on the J.I.B." I asked him whether he knew what the J.I.B. was. He blustered. I then explained its functions and the extent to which it had taken over certain responsibilities from military intelligence, and the reasons for its being in the Ministry of Defence. It seemed to me that if J.I.B. were already there, there was no particular reason why we should not be there also.

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Newsam seemed to think that J.I.E. would not be interested in our work. He himself in any case had always said that we ought to be under the Home Office. It was quite clear to me that he had not the slightest conception of what he would be taking on, and personally I should view with horror any proposal that would tie us up with the bureaucracy of the Home Office!

I cannot imagine what Brook is thinking about. Clearly Newsam's presence on the J.I.C. - which he is obviously confusing with the J.I.B. - might be a step in the right direction if he had the time and capacity to cope with its problems, both of which I doubt. It is difficult to know what to do about this, as Newsam was clearly in an after-lunch and rather expansive mood and would be seriously embarrassed if we took his question up with Norman Brook. However, the latter promised the D.G. to let him see his proposals before he submitted them, and it may be that we shall have to wait until we hear from him.

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Alec and I went to see Sir John Macpherson, Governor of Nigeria, who is home on leave. I told him that we were extremely hard-pressed at home and therefore in difficulties in regard to sending another officer as S.L.O. Nigeria. I thought a possible solution might be to send the S.L.O. Accra to Nigeria and let Stephens carry S.L.O. Accra, assisted by whom we had just sent out.

Macpherson said that he quite understood our difficulties and that he would not presume to interfere with any of our administrative arrangements he could only say that the presence of an S.L.O. in his area would be extremely welcome, as he often needed advice on security problems.

I explained to him that we did not want in any way to duplicate the work of the Police, or assume their responsibilities. Our role, as I saw it, was to bring to the Colony any information which might imply control of indigenous organisations from the outside. Equally, we would undertake, as far as possible, to pin-point West Africans who came here and got into touch with Russian or Satellite-controlled organisations. We could also give advice on security matters of a preventive kind, although some of that advice might not be applicable to local conditions.

30th November.

At the Appointments Board to-day we agreed that a further Senior Officer post should be made for C.3, the new section to be formed under Graham Mitchell, dealing with departmental security. B.1, B.2 and A.1.

We thought that the responsibilities of Head of S.I.M.E. and Head of S.I.F.E. would best be made by the granting of duty allowances to the holders of these posts, who normally would be of Senior Officer rank.

It was also agreed that duty allowances would be appropriate for the Deputy Heads of S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E., for so long as these stations were on present importance. Such allowances would bring the holders of the posts

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to approximately the grade of Senior Officer.

It was not considered advisable to make any recommendations for appointments to the rank of Deputy Director.

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I spoke to the D.G. about my conversation with Newsam, which I thought might provide the answer to the present delay in regard to increases of salary under Chorley for officers of Director rank and upward.

and Colonel [redacted] came to see me. They wondered whether it would be possible for us to inform the S.I.C. on how this department had been organised to meet its commitments during the war, both in this country and when it sent a contingent overseas.

I said that if they liked to put forward a request to the Secretary, we would certainly give it consideration. I explained, however, that when we went overseas we had not gone under our own colours; we had merely provided officers who had counter-intelligence experience who would therefore be useful to the Army in the field.

[redacted] said he was asking for this information, as of course S.D.E.C.E. had had no really war time experience in counter-intelligence duties.

I think that any statement that we do make on this subject should include some reference to the Theatre Security Service.

1st December.

The Dixon Committee are reviewing Communism at home and have asked the D.G. to attend their meeting on Monday. We have done a paper, drawing attention to what we considered to be the danger spots in this country; they are: the armed forces, industry, teachers, and scientists.

I telephoned to Brigadier Johnstone, D.D.M.I., and gave him a brief resume of what we knew about Nicholas STRAUSSLER. He told me that the Director of the Royal Armoured Corps was anxious to bring STRAUSSLER into consultations on new tank designs. As it was quite clear

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from our information that STRAUSSLER was now the U.K. representative of Hungarian heavy industry, and visited Hungary from time to time, any question of employing him could not be considered. Johnstone intended to so inform the D.R.A.C.

STRAUSSLER seemed to be the rather unscrupulous business type without any real loyalty to this country, and through his ability in tank construction will discover precisely what we are doing and, if it is to his advantage, will pass the information on to the Hungarians and so to the Russians.

I had a meeting on West Africa, when we reviewed the whole situation. I feel that I am now fairly well briefed.

There is no doubt in my mind that a large amount of paper is coming back here which the office does not really require. It should be collated in West Africa and only a periodical report sent in, unless any item seems to be of particular urgency. Above all, we should not receive telegrams about minor riots, which are merely the result of one black man disliking another. I shall endeavour to persuade Stephens to carry the S.L.C. job on the Gold Coast in addition to his wider duties, and transfer Rich to Nigeria.

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I gathered that both we and the Americans are agreed that in time of war we shall have to have a base in Egypt, but that in peacetime it would be possible to make other arrangements.

So far as it could be ascertained from the Chiefs of Staff Committee, no proposals for joint action between ourselves and the Americans have been made on the lines outlined in the report. This does not, however, preclude the possibility that the Minister of Defence may have had such proposals in mind, although he did not state them at the Cabinet meeting on November 30th. There is a review being made by the Joint Planners at the moment of the possible alternatives to Egypt, and Israel was mentioned.

As regards the rest of the report, the statements made are broadly true, although they may be inaccurate in certain details.

It is within Brook's knowledge, from reliable sources, that the Minister of Health is in favour of the Government going into opposition, since he believes that they could make it impossible for the Conservatives to govern and the Labour Government would come back with a sweeping majority within six months. He rather fancied himself in opposition.

As regards future action, Brook would like Dick, in my absence, to go over and see him in ten days time, and, in the meanwhile, let him have any further reports of the kind. He would also like us to consider whether any action is possible by the Prime Minister, and if so, what form it should take.

I threw a fly over Brook by asking him how he was getting on with his report on the Intelligence organisation. He said that he

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had finished his enquiries, but that he had not yet had time to write the report. He did not think that it would contain anything very sensational. He did not volunteer any information about Ministerial responsibility, and I did not feel able to press him on this point, which was clearly a delicate one.

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4th December.

I saw Luke, Goresuch, Johnson, and Barton of the Colonial Office, when I told them the purpose of my visit to West Africa. We discussed various problems, including the matter of distribution of Communist literature. They mentioned the question of passports for West African students, which they were thinking of limiting to a visit to the U.K., although this presented certain difficulties since a restriction would obviously be resented by all, including the students who were in no sense communistically inclined.

I said that I wondered whether this measure would be effective in any case, since the Home Secretary had no powers to prevent a British subject from leaving this country unless a charge were preferred against him. In any case, even if a West African student did have such a passport, he could always get on a Czech aircraft, if the company were prepared to carry him. This one did not seem to have occurred to the Colonial Office.

The only additional point which we had not already considered here, was a proposal that I should impress upon Governors the necessity for each Colony to provide a better welfare organisation for their students in this country. I said that while I had no doubt that they would be all in favour of such a proposal, they were almost certain to say that they had no money and that the commitment was one for the British Government.

This raised a storm of protest, and I was told that the marketing boards for cocoa and other commodities in West African colonies were making huge profits and could well afford to spend half a million on the welfare of students over here.

I went on to see Pat Reilly, with whom I discussed the question of French representation in Accra. I told him what I had said on his return from Paris. I also made it clear that while we did not expect anything sensational from an S.D.E.C.E. liaison in West Africa, we had to get on with the French. Provided, therefore, that their officer in Accra could do no harm, it seemed to me politic to give them what they wanted. I felt that the Colonial Office argument, that an S.D.E.C.E. representative would be reporting about affairs in the Colonies and that information would get back to the Russians, with serious results, was really nonsense. The French already had a Consul in Accra and were probably reporting already.

Reilly agreed with me. I said I would talk the matter over with Stephens and let him know the result of my return.

At the Directors meeting to-day, Hollis raised the question of giving lists of suspects to the German Consul, which is what the Foreign Office now want us to do. We came to the conclusion that we could not possibly do more for the Germans than we were prepared to do for the Americans and our other Allies. It was, however, quite clear that our lists would ultimately get into the wrong hands. Hollis is going to reply on these lines.

Holmes is a little worried about a lecture given by Fenton to Police Superintendents. He thought Fenton was too inclined to lecture to them on points of investigation, which they either know or should know already. I have asked Holmes to talk to Hollis.

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21st December.

I returned from West Africa yesterday and came into the office to-day, where I found things fairly slack.

Before reporting on the office of S.L.O. West Africa, it is necessary to say something, however superficial, about the local situation which forms the background to his work.

The Administration are loyally endeavouring to implement the policy laid down by the Home Government, involving a fairly rapid progress towards self-government based on European democratic principles. To the West African such a policy implies little more than the right to manage his own affairs now and to profit from the fruits of office. Some of the Administration may regard the policy of the Home Government as right and inevitable, but few believe that the West African will be mentally or morally equipped to comprehend democracy, or to manage his own affairs, for a great many years. They take things as they come and hope that by careful handling control can be maintained, at any rate for some time.

The police and the military see in this endeavour to uphold the freedoms of the Western democratic system, a form of weakness leading only to disorders which they are called upon to suppress. They rarely emerge from such encounters without severe criticism from the local Press or from a Commission of Enquiry, whose findings they regard as unjust on account of the prejudices of those who are appointed to take part. There arises, therefore, a sense of frustration among the forces of law and order, who feel that a weak Administration is creating situations which the executive forces are powerless to prevent and for which they have to incur the odium.

It is in this atmosphere that the S.L.O. has to operate and endeavour to strike a balance.

I should like to pay special tribute to the achievements of Tin-Eye, who for a considerable period of his term of office has been working single-handed. There is no doubt that his energy and drive have contributed largely to a general awareness of security problems by the Administration, the police and the military, and to the establishment of machinery for the co-ordination of security not only in each individual Colony, but throughout the area. As far as I can ascertain, he has earned the respect and confidence of all the higher authorities in the Colonies I visited, and it is on this account, perhaps, that they have in some degree imposed upon him obligations and responsibilities which are not strictly within the charter of an S.L.O. It was my task to see how far this position could be adjusted without detriment to our work and prestige in the area.

Before leaving this country I had seen Sir John Macpherson, Governor of Nigeria, on the question of our representation in Lagos, and acquainted him with our staffing problems. He fully understood our difficulties and, while he would not presume to interfere in any way with our administrative arrangements, he wished us to know that he would always be pleased to have an S.L.O. in his area.

(On my arrival in the Gold Coast I discussed with the Governor, Sir Arden Clarke, the possibility of transferring Rich to Lagos; and leaving Stephens to carry S.L.O. Gold Coast, with _____ to deputise for him when

he was visiting the other Colonies or adjacent territories.

^{Charles}
 Sir Arden Clarke made a special plea that Rich should be allowed to remain as S.L.O. Gold Coast, at any rate until June, when the elections would be over. He said that the eyes of all West Africa would be on the Gold Coast during the next six months and he wished for every possible assistance on the security side that he could have. Rich had his confidence and also that of the other authorities with whom he was in touch; he was, therefore, particularly anxious not to disturb things at this moment.

In these circumstances, I did not see that I could do otherwise than accede to his request.

On December 11th, Stephens and I left for Lagos, where we spent two days with Mr. Foot, the Acting Governor. I met most of the leading officials in the Administration, the G.O.C., and the Commissioner of Police.

The agenda of our discussions at Government House was as follows:

1. Communism - Co-ordinated drive against:-
 (with particular reference to
 - a) banning of literature.
 - b) B.C.P. approaches to W.A. students in U.K.
 - c) Exclusion of Communists from Government (and University?) service.
 - d) Communist capital from abroad.
2. Immigration and Emigration policy;-
 (with particular reference to:
 - a) naturalisation,
 - b) visas for students,
 - c) East German Scholarships.
 - d) Prohibited immigrants.)
3. Defence Plan - Progress of.
4. Illegal arms traffic.
5. Anglo-French co-operation in Security matters.

While the present arrangements for handling these matters, through visits from Accra and direct communication with the Commissioner of Police, are satisfactory, I think we should retain our office in Lagos and aim at sending out an S.L.O. as soon as someone suitably trained and capable of carrying the necessary weight can be appointed. I do not feel, however, that this is a matter of great urgency.

On the Intelligence front there are perhaps three matters which are of major importance for S.L.O. West Africa.

- a) the importation of literature,
- b) the sale of steel tubing for the manufacture of Dane guns, and
- c) the transmission of funds - so far only a sum of £2,000 - from the W.F.T.U. to the Nigerian Labour Congress.

As regards (a), the Gold Coast have proscribed certain publications and have held them up in the mails. They propose to do this more extensively in the future and are anxious for any assistance that we can give them.

In Nigeria they are somewhat averse to carrying out this policy, but it is hoped that they may be persuaded to come into line at the conference of the Governors' Council which is to be held in January, 1951.

As regards (b), the situation is certainly a serious one. Sufficient steel tubing for the manufacture of a very large number of Dane guns has already been imported, and although powers have been taken to prohibit in the future its importation, except under licence, little has so far been done to discover the whereabouts of consignments which have already entered the country. I have suggested to Stephens that if no progress can be made in this matter, he should recommend the issue of an ordinance, making it obligatory for all the holders of steel tubing to declare the amounts in their possession to the police. Meanwhile, enquiries are going on both here and in West Africa to discover who is financing the importation of this material.

As regards (c), it is hoped that enquiries here and in West Africa may lead to the detection of any other sums of money which may be reaching the Colonies from W.F.T.U. sources.

On my return to Accra I turned my attention to the internal administration of the office, where it seemed to me that the burden of the work could be considerably reduced.

(i) The fact that so much of the security work in the whole area has been initiated by Stephens has caused his office to be regarded, to some extent, as a distributing centre with all the consequent work that this implies. A case in point was a despatch sent home by the Acting Governor of Nigeria on the banning of Communist literature. No copy of this was sent to Monson, of the West African Council, in spite of the fact that he is responsible for preparing the agenda for the Governors' Council which is to discuss this matter in January. It fell to the S.L.O.'s office to send a copy of this despatch to the West African Council.

While the task is not an easy one, I urged Stephens tactfully to persuade the Colonies to give their own documents the proper distribution.

(ii) While it is, of course, important to obtain information from adjacent foreign territories, I think the French have more to fear from the general trend of events in our Colonies than we have from the activities of the R.D.A., or other subversive organisations in theirs. In point of fact there is very little collaboration between subversive organisations in French territories and our own Colonies at the moment, although there is talk of a joint conference in the early part of next year. An enormous amount of information has been received on the activities of the R.D.A., which has been sent to London uncollated; it is carded extensively in Accra, translated, and given a wide distribution to the Administration, the Police, the Military in the four Colonies, and to Consuls in adjacent territories. I expressed the view that if a basic paper were written on this subject, it need only be necessary thereafter to report monthly on any new developments of real significance. The same would apply to indigenous movements in the four Colonies.

(iii) A considerable amount of time is taken up with ciphering and deciphering telegrams. I told Stephens that it was unnecessary to wire about local disturbances unless they appeared to be of particular gravity. I think, too that some of our own telegrams could go in the form of an air mail letter, which take on the average five days, or else reduced to a bare minimum and

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followed by an air mail letter.

(iv) I laid down that the basic B. Division functions in West Africa were:

- a) to supply information received from home on international movements which may have a bearing on the internal situation in West Africa;
- b) to obtain from the Police, or other authorities, information which appears to link up with subversive movements abroad, and to advise on its significance.
- c) To initiate on behalf of the Police or other authorities in West Africa, enquiries in regard to the activities of West African nationals in the U.K.
- d) To obtain from the Police and other official or unofficial sources a general picture of the strength, leading personalities, structure and trends of indigenous nationalist movements, particularly where such movements are likely to be influenced from abroad.
- e) To exchange with adjacent foreign territories information on the movement of subversive individuals and co-operation between subversive organisations.

On the basis of (b), (d) and (e) above, the S.L.O. West Africa should report once a month, in accordance with the following pro forma, as soon as basic papers on the various organisations have been prepared.

1. International Communist Connections.

- a) Within West Africa.
- b) Outside West Africa.
 - i) Personalities and Organisations.
 - ii) Funds.
 - iii) Propaganda and Literature.

Extensive carding in Accra and Lagos; Selective carding in U.K.

2. Indigenous Nationalist Organisations.

- Strength, policy, structure, programme, leaders, trends.
- 1) Gold Coast. C.P.P., Ghana Calling Assn., Labour.
 - ii) Nigeria. N.L.C., Eikist Movement, N.C.N.C., N.E.C., Y.C.N.C., Ex-Servicemen's movement.
 - iii) Sierra Leone. As necessary.
 - iv) Gambia. As necessary.
 - v) French Territories. As necessary.
 - vi) Liberia. As necessary.

Very limited carding in U.K. Limited selective carding in W.A. (carding sheets on S.Fs), with precautions against duplication with Police records.

3. Arms Traffic

4. Conclusions and General Remarks.

The pro forma will, of course, be subject to modification from time to time, but the contents of the monthly report should only deal, at any rate so far as indigenous movements are concerned, with any major

alterations in policy or tactics which have occurred in the intervening period. I also gave general direction about carding.

I think that when basic papers have been prepared, the monthly report system established, and carding rationalised, a considerable reduction in the work should be effected. It ought then to be possible to run the station with a competent S.L.O. in Accra and another in Lagos, with S.L.O. West Africa to supervise and to visit the Colonies and the adjacent territories. Meanwhile, the station can I think carry on quite effectively by direct communication with the Police in Lagos and a monthly visit of three or four days by someone from Accra. We should aim, if possible, at appointing a suitable S.L.O. for Lagos sometime within the next six months. Stephens still thinks that it will be necessary to have four officers, but I am inclined to think that when the rationalisation of the work at Accra begins to take effect this may no longer be necessary, and that could then be withdrawn.

I was impressed by what Stephens had done, but it was clear to me that through his personality and drive he had rather become the supreme Security authority in the area. I told him that while I understood that it had to some extent been imposed upon him, it was important that a Governor, if he felt apprehensive, should first of all call his Commissioner of Police and his Administration, and that if he thought that there was another aspect of the problem, namely, influence from outside, he should call us into consultation as well. It was not for us to say whether in this or that situation - which would almost certainly have arisen from indigenous causes - that the troops should be called in. Such a situation had not arisen, but it might, and if so it was the kind of responsibility that we as an office could not accept, however flattering it might appear.

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The real danger in the Colonies I visited would seem to be the policy of the Home Government, to which we are now committed. It is misunderstood by the West Africans and creates a spirit of appeasement, in the Administration, and frustration in the forces of law and order. There is in fact a slight feeling that we are on the way out, and I cannot see that, if NKRUMA's party, for example, in the Gold Coast gets to power after the elections in April, we shall not reach a situation where the Governor will have to go on saying "no", which will cause the natives to say that the Constitution is a farce, or where we shall have responsibility without power. A more or less "black" Cabinet would be creating situations which we shall be powerless to prevent and which will lead to disorders which British troops will have to suppress. There is no doubt in my mind that the West African native is wholly unfitted for self-rule; he is backward in every possible way. "Expatriates", which is the name now given to the whites, are not allowed to occupy Government jobs which can be carried by blacks. You only need to try and buy a set of stamps up to 1/- at the Accra Post Office on a hot afternoon; the place is a seething mass of blacks milling round the counter. After a long delay a black clerk will endeavour to add

add up the sum; it will come out wrong, but it is better not to argue as the delay and frustration would only be greater! He then tells you that you can buy a 2½d stamp at his counter, but that a 6d one will have to be bought elsewhere, and he ends up by giving you the wrong change! Again you do not argue because it is too hot. The telephone is equally inefficient; it is much quicker to get into a car and go and see somebody. If Tin-Eye wants anything from the Post Office, he rings up the Postmaster General!

Then take a trip into the hinterland, where you will find a moderately good road, which has been constructed for several years. While it was being made one of the steam rollers fell over, but as there was no crane about to set it on its feet, nobody thought of taking it to pieces and it was just built into the road and tarmacked over with the roller sticking out at the side! The West Africans are furious drivers, particularly when they are drunk. All their transport wagons carry slogans - generally Biblical ones; one was seen the other day in a dilapidated condition, with its back sticking out of a house; the slogan on this vehicle was "Faith can remove Mountains"!

28th December.

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came to see me. He told me that he had attended certain sessions of the Congress of Religions, but had not been present at every meeting as he was feeling rather sick at the time. He said that very few people turned up and the meeting as a whole was of little consequence. One of the delegates had made it clear at the outset that it was a Congress of Religions and not a political meeting. This may to some extent have damped the ardour of those who intended to make it so. Meanwhile from such enquiries as he could make, is quite satisfied that AVYAK-TAMANDA (?), former secretary of the VEDANTA Society, has clearly been won over to Communism. He has apparently visited Russia on a number of occasions and has persuaded himself that what is going on there is the "Heaven on Earth" which his religious beliefs have caused him to look for!

has apparently completed his studies under Dr. Jung of Zurich and is now practicing analytical psychology. He is a Catholic himself. He tells me that most of his patients so far have been frustrated Priests and Nuns, who have entered rigid Orders for which they were temperamentally unsuited. Apparently the Church is taking a somewhat enlightened view of the whole subject.

had received a notice from the War Office asking for particulars about his Intelligence career and whether he was prepared to serve in a similar capacity. I asked Joe Spencer to let him know what reply he should give, as I think we might use him again at the L.R.C.

29th December.

Major Freeth, introduced by M.I.L.A., came to ask for our assistance in a military exercise. It was apparently intended to infiltrate escapers and invaders (?) into the London area, through various "safe" houses. It is Freeth's job to detect this operation. His opposing commander is a Colonel Neame, who has a private business somewhere in the City. Freeth thought that if we could follow Colonel Neame from his office immediately prior to the operation, we might be able to track down the "safe" houses.

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I asked whether this was "cricket"! Freeth seemed to think that it was. We have accordingly undertaken to help him.

