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SAVED

1951
VOL 20

NOTE.

For numbers with the letters A. or B. after them please see envelope at the back of the diary. These are copies of the D.G.'s Tuesday Meetings.

1951.

1st January.

I cannot remember what I said last year about the prospects for 1950, but I am sure that I did not consider that they were too bright. We have since become embroiled in a war in Korea, clearly provoked by Moscow and possibly designed to weaken our powers of defending the West. The effect has been to intensify feeling both here and in America and indeed to some extent in Europe, as to the dangers of the Russian menace.

In America, as usual, the dangers of another world war have been pitched, I should say, somewhat higher than the situation really merits, but in some ways this is all to the good, since it has roused everyone to an appreciation of the urgency of adequate defence measures. An extensive programme of rearmament and increased mobilisation is going on, on the basis that only when we reach parity with the Russians shall we be in a position to talk to them with any possibility of finding a reasonable solution of the present state of affairs. This has had the curious effect of bridging the dollar gap, owing to the rapid increase of prices of raw materials within the sterling area. The Government, of course, are taking credit for this fortuitous situation, which has been achieved mainly on account of rearmament and, to some extent, on the hard work and privations which the British public have endured. Meanwhile, a gradual inflation is going on and the value of our £ in purchasing power is probably somewhere around 7/6d. My last new suit cost me £41; before the war it would have been £15.

In Korea the initial quick reaction of the Americans was obviously right, but, difficult as the decision was, the U.N. were I think wrong in going beyond the 38th Parallel. Slessor, Chief of the Air Staff here, was the only high-ranking personality who definitely opposed the move; he argued that whether you stopped on the 38th, 39th, or 40th Parallel, or the Manchurian border, you would always have a guerilla force on the other side of the line, and that the greater the area you covered the more troops you would require to maintain order. Had we remained at the 38th Parallel, I do not think that the Chinese would have intervened, although they would have obviously assisted the North Koreans to rebuild their forces and possibly to engage later in further hostilities. The major blunder was, I think, taken by the United States, when, without consultation, they undertook to defend Formosa and refused to recognise the Chinese Government, even de facto. It is now difficult to find any solution in Korea until the U.N. Forces have driven the Chinese back at least to the other side of the 38th Parallel - anything else would involve us in considerable loss of face. At the moment we are supposed to be making an ordered retreat to a bridge-head round Pusan. All through these operations we have been dependent for information almost entirely on MacArthur's H.Q., which keeps on making irresponsible and inaccurate statements. The Liaison Officer there, Air Vice Marshal Boucher, appears to get no more than the Press hand-out, which we read in the papers and receive in Top Secret form the following day from the J.I.C. No information comes from our officers commanding the British contingent.

The position in Indo-China is none too good, but the French are showing a rather more offensive spirit. If, however, Vietminh are reinforced by Chinese Divisions, anything might happen.

In Malaya the position has certainly deteriorated. Shaw thinks that this is to some extent due to Guenry being unable, or unwilling, to regard himself as a Military Governor with his Colony in a state of war. He

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confines himself to administration and political policy and does not give the Military the support they need. A demand has been made of us to release some of our ex-Indian political officers, but this is being resisted on the grounds that they would not provide the real solution.

In Western Europe Eisenhower has been appointed Commander-in-Chief, and an increased armament programme is being put into effect here and in Western European countries. The French do not feel that they can do any more in Indo-China without detriment to their commitment in Western Europe.

In the Middle East things are more or less quiet at the moment, but there are certain ominous signs in Persia.

I saw Newsam about S.F. on HAFFKIN, a jeweller, whose house is being used as a rendezvous for high-ranking members of the Communist Party, including Bob STEWART and Harry POLLITT. It is just possible that HAFFKIN may play some part in the Party's finances.

2nd January.

For the minutes of the D.G. (Tuesday) meeting held to-day, see envelope at the back of the diary.

I went to see the D. of P.P. about a chapter on the FUCHS case which Rebecca West is publishing in her revised edition of "Famous Trials". Hill had heard that she had been given a copy of FUCHS' statement, in which he had mentioned that the worst thing he ever did was to give the plutonium bomb to the Russians. It would obviously be extremely undesirable if this particular passage, which had been omitted from all the proceedings, were to reawaken American hostility over the whole incident.

The D. of P.P. told me that Rebecca West had asked the Attorney for a copy of this statement, but that the Attorney had passed the matter to the D. of P.P. He had blue-pencilled the offending passage and also one which referred to FUCHS' contacts, and returned the papers to the Attorney's office. Unless, therefore, they had slipped up, all should be well. He undertook to get the manuscript from Rebecca West before it went to the publishers.

Jackson of the Foreign Office telephoned about Otto JOHN, the new head of the Federal Security Service in Western Germany. JOHN had been over here and had met the D.G. and Dick White. This fact had reached the ears of Kirkman, who is taking over Intelligence Division from Charles Haydon. Kirkman wanted to know what advice we had given Otto JOHN, as he would be seeing him shortly and was anxious to speak with one voice.

After checking with Dick White, Jackson was told that the meeting had been a purely social one, arranged by Wheeler-Bennett and Kenneth Strong, and that in fact no advice had been given. Otto JOHN had been told that he could re-establish contact here if he came to England, and that we should be glad to help him in any way we could.

3rd January.

Wild, Charles Cholmondeley and [] came to talk to me about their mission to the Far East. It is purely exploratory and designed to see whether they can implement any purely tactical deception in the area, or engage in wider forms of deception.

I told them as best I could what the difficulties were, namely, that there was not sufficient information coming in from the ground forces, and that channels to the Chinese, as far as I knew, were non-existent. I doubt myself whether they will be able to do anything effective, but Charles Cholmondeley, (the author of Plan MINGEMEAT), is a resourceful chap and may think of something. His handle-bar moustache is not quite so long as it was! Since he left us he has been pursuing locusts in the Middle East and in Kenya.

WALLACE came to see me. He was recommended by Herbert Hart, whose pupil he is. Dick and I both thought he was a useful candidate, but he is at present doing the Foreign Office examination. He seemed quite anxious to come to us, but he will not be available until June.

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5th January.

I saw Pugh, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gold Coast. He is going on leave and will come in again in March. I gave him my general impressions, with which he seemed to agree.

I attended a meeting at the Home Office, on the subject of E.V.Ws, with Thisle.

15,000 cases have been dealt with so far, but it has only been possible to type 4,000 of the more important reports. Steps are being taken to get extra typing assistance.

The major question to decide was whether the operation should go on throughout the year. We were all in favour of this and a recommendation is to be made that 25 extra hands should be recruited for the purpose. There might then be a chance of completing the work by April, 1952.

There is no doubt that the efforts made so far have been well worth while. It is already possible to give some assessment of the potentialities of this 5th Column. The position is fairly reassuring, although there may be a small category for internment.

It was thought that Chief Constables ought to be instructed to pass on these basic reports to other Chief Constables if the alien left their area. Newsam will take this up at the next Chief Constables' conference. It was also necessary that Chief Constables should look at the suspect aliens (?) from time to time. It had been rather a shock to Lancashire to find that a certain number of people had emerged who had either not been registered at all or were wrongly registered. The same situation appears to exist in the Metropolitan area.

Cumming and Winterborn came to talk to me about the Censorship meeting. Right at the end Des Graz put over rather a fast one about sending Montgomery Hyde to the Middle East to look into censorship problems. Winterborn said, quite rightly, that it might be well to ascertain first the views of the Chiefs of Staff on where our H.Q. was likely to be. Montgomery Hyde was to proceed on the assumption that the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean would be open. This seemed at least doubtful from the Naval reports. Des Graz then announced that Montgomery Hyde had booked his passage and would be leaving at the end of the week. I rather gathered that the Foreign Office were likely to intervene.

I should not be altogether surprised if Montgomery Hyde, late of Security Co-Ordination, were not writing another book and needed local colour from the Middle East!

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I had a meeting with S.I.S. - [redacted] an myself, on [redacted] visit to the Belgian Congo. The purpose was assess whether S.I.S. needed representation in West Africa.

I gave some account of the position in West Africa as I saw it and said that I did not think that [redacted] would learn very much from conversations with Humblet, the Belgian Security Officer at Leopoldville who was unco-operative, either because he disliked us or on instruction from his superiors. I disliked, too, the idea that he should go as a representative of the Security Service, which would obviously provoke question as to why Stephens had not made the visit. If, however, he was asked if he knew Stephens, there would be no objection to his saying that he did.

Personally I think the whole question could have been decided in the negative in London, and that the net result may be to increase Belgian suspicions of ourselves and the Americans, whom they already think have designs on their uranium mines. [redacted] will be carrying recommendations from Brussels, but as the Congo are extremely independent and dislike Brussels, I do not think they are likely to help him. He S.I.S. seem committed to make this reconnaissance for better or for worse.

The D. of P.P. telephoned to say that he had seen Rebecca West's manuscript and that it contained nothing to which exception could be taken. There was a slight dig at ourselves and the Americans: she said that we failed to collect information and that the Americans, who had it, had failed to appreciate it. This, of course, is inaccurate, but probably harmless.

6th January.

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I saw [redacted] and told him that I had seen [redacted] man in West Africa. I mentioned that Liberia was rather a gap in our West African intelligence and that I had suggested that possibly [redacted] could obtain the required information through a suitable contact in [redacted], if C.I.A. in Washington could arrange this. [redacted] said that he had already written about this, but would take the matter up again. [redacted] thought that the Consul could very well pass all information to [redacted] for Stephens' information. He did not mind Stephens maintaining contact with the Consul, but hoped that by degrees most of the information would be canalised through [redacted]. I told him that I had sensed a certain hostility to his organisation in West Africa, but that I had made it clear to Stanton, the Consul, that we were prepared to co-operate with any American and that it was for the American Government to decide who this individual should be. It is, of course, a question for D.I.A. and the State Department.

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Kennedy has obtained some quite useful correspondence between KWAKYE and _____ which he is sending out to West Africa at which may possible form the basis of a prosecution, or at least further enquiries in regard to the importation of steel tubing.

I saw Johnson of the Colonial Office. I told him that S.Bs in Accra and Lagos were both very hard worked and that if they could each receive one or two more officers it would undoubtedly be a good thing. He promised to see what he could do. He told me that he was still pursuing the matter replacing Court Messengers in Sierra Leone by white officers. This was another point which Stephens had mentioned to me.

9th January.

For the minutes of the D.G. (Thesday) meeting held to-day, see envelope at the back of the diary.

Murrie telephoned to me about the case of one WALLRAFF, a German who is up for naturalisation. He was interned during the war and our opinion at the time was, that although he liked the English and English life and had benefited considerably from the hospitality in this country, he was still at heart a German and would have been prepared to assist them if he could. It is possible, however, that in recent years there has been a change of heart. I got the impression that the Home Office intend to be rather tough in cases of this sort in future.

I presided at the S.I.C. luncheon. I gathered from _____ that _____ was now in charge of S.E.D., that _____ had been thrown out, and that some attempt was going to be made to reconcile the difficulties between S.E.D. and the Senate.

S.E.D. was only represented by _____ who clearly resented Berthaux's statement.

I had a talk with Pat Reilly about the meeting which is to take place to-morrow about the future position of the J.I.S., and also on a point raised by Reilly, that Service Departments might employ civilians who would be permanent and so give some continuity to the work. I told Reilly that while I had no particular wish to attend the meeting, I had very considerable sympathy with the idea of a permanent civilian nucleus in each Service Intelligence Department; I had in fact been trying to propagate this idea for years, but without success. My ideas had even further, in a suggestion that there should be some Inter-Intelligence Service appointments board and that people within this circle should be moved around from one department to another in order to gain different types of experience. I thought that in this way we should have a better trained nucleus of Intelligence officers in time of war.

Reilly seemed to like the idea, and I gathered that he was going to air it at the meeting.

I also told Reilly about West Africa, and about the views of the two Governors on the proposed appointment of an S.E.D. representative in Accra. He said that he would arrange an early meeting with the Colonial Office and his own West African Department, in order to try and get the matter settled.

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10th January.

and David Haldane Por

I had a meeting with Dick, Roger, Shaw and Kellar, when we agreed to write to S.I.S., expressing the view that the course we gave to the [redacted] was valueless from their point of view and incurred a certain security risk. We thought that if any further courses were to be given, we should be given a better idea about the organisation we were trying to improve and the practicability of any measures we might suggest. Merely to give a recitation of what we do here did not seem to us to be very much good.

I saw one ELIAS, who is a lawyer in Singapore and has already tried to join S.I.F.E., on the recommendation of Shears, a Magistrate in Singapore who was formerly in the Malayan Security Service.

While ELIAS may be all right, I cannot possibly see him in our Service.

I had a meeting with Dick, Hill, Graham Mitchell, John Marriott and Thisle about the internment of aliens in war. We came to the conclusion that it would be better, if possible, to avoid any form of category internment, and that if we thought that Russians who had served in the Soviet Armies during the last war would be a danger in any future war, we should include them in our lists. We should also warn the Home Office that whatever we did in this regard there might still be pressure from the Military for category internment if the Russians reached the Channel Ports.

11th January.

At the J.I.C. Directors meeting to-day I raised the question of abolition of the visa. I said that this piece of counter-intelligence machinery was being gradually whittled down by the Foreign Office, who were now asking for agreement in the cases of the Argentine, Cuba and Spain. These countries were not asking us for the abolition of the visa system, it was the Foreign Office who were pressing them to do so rather against their will. We wondered whether this was wise in the present circumstances.

I was strongly supported by 'C', and in fact by the whole Committee. Reilly asked me to let him have a letter on the subject.

8.

I asked Joe Spencer whether he was prepared to accept the appointment of Deputy Head of S.I.M.E. He told me that he was definitely unwilling to do this for family reasons.

Ferguson looked in to see me. He has just returned from Greece, where he has been working under Wickham. Wickham's mission to reorganise the Gendarmerie is known locally as "Wickham's Follies". With the exception of a few Irish stalwarts, his whole staff are cleared out about once a year. Wickham is the mission and it is quite useless for anyone to suggest anything: he has resolutely turned down the idea of the Greeks having a Security Service, which apparently they sorely need.

Fergie is once more looking for a job.

Desmond Orr rang up to say that on the assumption that we had no job for him, he had offered his services to Jeffes in the present emergency. He asked me to say a word on his behalf if Jeffes referred to me. I said I would certainly speak to Jeffes if he rang me up.

I could only feel that, emergency or no emergency, Desmond Orr is the last person I should wish to see back in this organisation.

12th January.

I had a meeting about the interception of West African mails, with Allan. It was agreed that we should give Allan the names of suppliers of Communist literature in this country, and also the names and addresses of recipients in West Africa, and that armed with this information he could conduct a survey of the West African mails with a view to seeing whether we could assist the West African in the interception of Communist literature in the Colonies. We were agreed that it would be a waste of time to try and get the Home Office to stop the literature here.

 came to see me. I told him the state of the game in regard to the posting of a S.E.D. officer to Accra. I said that I hoped that I had cleared a good deal of ground and that in a very short time the appointment would be agreed.

 told me about having taken over the S.E.D. and the fact that was no longer employed. He did not know what the implications of this might be; he could only wait and see. He had not seen himself, but doubtless would be summoned to Paris before long.

15th January.

I gave my usual talk to a number of Colonial police officers, who are attending a course here.

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16th January.

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Three Australians came to see me. They form the embryo Australian S.I.S., which Menzies has decided to set up. They are doing a course with S.I.S.

I explained to them what this organisation did and how important it was for them to work in the closest possible touch with the A.S.I.O. under Colonel Spry: this was for their own protection and for the avoidance of overlapping. I urged them that, if they possibly could, to get into the same building as Colonel Spry. This might appear to them a small administrative matter, but I assured them that it was the crux of the whole problem. It was no good even having an office on the other side of the street; it must be in the same building, and if possible, there should be common access to records.

I had a meeting with Cooper of the Nigerian Police, Dick, Ales, and members of O.S. Division, B.I.B., etc., on the question of running an African agent in the U.K. Max Knight, who was present, at first seemed diffident about handling an African, but Cooper was, I think, able to reassure him that it was not in fact really necessary for us to know a great deal about his background in Africa, although, of course, the more knowledge we could acquire on that subject and on the man's personality the better. We should be judging him largely on the material he produced in this country, which will be checkable against our own records.

Cooper had a particular character in view, and steps are to be taken to get him over here before Cooper returns to West Africa in April. This would enable the latter to effect the introduction.

The object of the exercise is two-fold: firstly, to get information about the intentions of the Communist Party and its contacts with any other West African students, but, more important perhaps to get a line in on Paris and Prague.

De Quehen came to say good-bye. He is replacing Simkins in Salisbury.

17th January.

I gave a talk to a number of Detective Superintendents who are doing a course here.

I lunched with [redacted] I am impressed by his sense of balance and his ability to see both sides of the picture in regard to Korea and China.

I had a meeting with Goresuch of the Colonial Office, to tell him what I had done in West Africa. Very tentatively I gave him my views about the general situation, making it clear that I was only a "new boy" and had spent two weeks in the country, and so therefore not qualified to speak at all! He seemed to agree with my estimate of the dangers

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of the present situation; he was inclined to think, however, that even though NKRUMA might sweep the board in the elections, his Ministers would find the difficulties of running the country so great that they would neither have the time nor the inclination to press for further concession in the matter of self-government. He admitted, however, that this was something of a gamble.

 [redacted] told me that Colonel Hubert MARTINEAU was anxious to talk to a representative of our Service and would I get into touch with him. I had a L.U. and found that MARTINEAU had caused considerable trouble to Security Co-Ordination, New York, during the war, and, amongst other things, had posed as a representative of the Secret Service. I told 'C' that for these reasons I thought it would be better if MARTINEAU put his information on paper and sent it in to the U.S. of S. at the Home Office. I asked 'C' to pass this on to Peter.

18th January.

We had a long session at the J.I.C. (Directors) meeting to-day, when the likelihood of war with Russia was discussed.

While it was agreed that ultimately Russia wished to dominate the world to the creation of Soviet Socialist Republics in all countries, we did not think that she would deliberately embark upon a world war during the next two years, for a variety of reasons. This did not, however, mean that she would not continue her policy of war by proxy and cold war. If war came in the interim, it would be due either to the domination by cold war or war by proxy means on some area, the loss of which would seriously embarrass the Allies if they were called upon later to fight a world war; or it would be due to American action, having regard to the war psychosis so prevalent in the United States.

The purpose of this memorandum is to brief the Chiefs of Staff in their demands to the Cabinet for increased rearmament.

 Roger and I called on the D.N.I. at his request. D.N.I. had received an anonymous letter addressed to C.-in-C., Portsmouth, indicating trouble over food in certain units of the Fleet, which were going on exercises.

On seeing the message, which was typed on a signals machine, we came to the conclusion that the writer was a rating of some sort, who rather lightheartedly thought that his action would lead to some improvement in the diet on board his ship, since the authorities would be particularly anxious to avoid trouble.

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We gave a party to the Police Superintendents, which seemed to be a great success. I was particularly impressed by Lindsay, the new Superintendent for Lancashire County. He told me that after hearing the course here he realised how futile it was for provincial Forces to think they could embark on agent operations within the Communist Party without closest possible consultation with ourselves. He felt that the work we were doing was far above the heads of the Police, and as about as different to crime work as anything could be. He had been immensely impressed by all the speakers that he had heard and felt that the value of getting our point of view over to Superintendents could not be overestimated. I got

similar expressions of appreciation from almost all the other Superintendents. The only criticism was that the seats were a bit hard and not quite broad enough for some of the students!

19th January.

I went to see Newsam about the possibility of a very large influx of refugees from the Continent of Europe in the event of a future war. I talked to him about this. It seemed to me that on any showing this is likely to happen, since Europe was still more than conscious of the rigours of the German occupation, which they would not wish to endure a second time from a nation whom they feared even more. We had been reinforced in this view by a conversation with Einthoven of Dutch Security, who had said that there was already a tariff for bringing people over and that some of them had already made reservations. He estimated that we might get anything up to half a million from Holland alone.

Newsam said that he did not know what had been done about this problem in the event of a future war. He seemed to recollect that there was a camp at Southampton during the last war. I told him that refugees had arrived at ports all over the country and had ultimately been collected at various hostels where we had endeavoured to screen them. In any future war the Dutch had undertaken to let us have a team of interrogators, plus all their records, during the "yellow light period", but to my mind by far the most serious aspect of the problem was the possibility that such an influx would gum up the whole works and be a serious embarrassment to the defending forces.

Newsam took the point and said he would make enquiries.

Vivian came to see me about the case of []

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[] telephoned to me to say that the D.E.C. had already nominated a representative for [] for whom they had applied for a visa. I said that I would endeavour to get into touch with [], who was going to Paris on Sunday, and ask him to suggest to [] that this application should be withdrawn for the time being. He could assure [] that we were doing everything possible to arrange matters, and that it looked as if we would be successful in the course of a few days.

The action in appointing a man now might just spoil all our efforts.

We had a post mortem on the Superintendents course. There were very few criticisms, and they were all full of praise for what they had heard and for the hospitality which had been extended to them.

I attended a meeting with Carless, A.D.N.I., about the charter of S.O.(I) Simonstown. Carless said that S.O.(I) was adviser on all security matters in the area to the C.-in-C. He thought that if S.O.(I) could be supplied with general information, and possibly basic papers, plus the monthly report, his requirements would be met. He thought, too, that it would be quite simple to arrange that if S.O.(I) wished to approach the French or the Belgians he could do so through S.L.O. West Africa.

Carless rang me later to confirm that this arrangement was approved by the D.N.I. I said that I thought Stephens would be able to iron this out locally, which would probably be preferable. Carless said that if there was any difficulty the Admiralty would send a signal to S.O.(I).

22nd January.

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Reilly held a meeting with Barton of the Colonial Office, and representatives of the West African Department of the Foreign Office, about the appointment of a D.E.C. representative in

Barton put forward his former obstructive arguments, which I think were fairly successfully demolished. He was asked to submit the minutes of the discussion to his West African Department, in the hope that they c agree to the appointment being made. If not, it is to be submitted to the J.I.C. Reilly hoped that this could be avoided.

4.

23rd January.

For the minutes of the D.G. (Tuesday) meeting held to-day, see envelope at the back of the diary.

24th January.

I lunched with Vickery, who has completed his task of reorganising Intelligence in Austria and is now at a loose end. It occurred to me - although I did not say so - that we might employ him on a charter basis to hold the fort in one-man stations abroad while our officer took his leave.

_____ telephoned to say that he had just heard that by some accident, Passport Control had granted a visa to the D.E.C. representative to _____. We agreed that he should consult the Foreign Office. He rang back later to say that he was telling Passport Control in Paris to approach D.E.C. and persuade them to refrain from taking advantage of the visa for the time being. This was successfully achieved.

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25th January.

Clifton, who worked for us in the Bahamas during the war, came to ask whether we had anything for him to do. He went back into the export business but has not made good. He wants to feel that at the age of 41 he is on firm ground. I had to tell him that we had nothing for him.

Incidentally, he told me that a great many firms here could export as much as 25% more than they were doing already; they were anxious, however, not to lose their markets in this country for something they regarded as transitory.

Carless telephoned to say that the D.N.I. agreed with the proposals about the charter of S.O.(I) Simonstown.

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26th January.

I have read an extremely interesting account of an interview between Air Vice Marshal Boucher, our representative in Tokyo, and General MacArthur.

MacArthur's view is that any form of appeasement in regard to China can only lead to further trouble. He thinks that we should hold our position in Korea and bomb China into submission. He thinks that she is extremely vulnerable, since she only lives on a shoestring. He does not believe that Russia would live up to her obligations under the Sino-Soviet Treaty. If we come to terms with China on the basis of her admission to the United Nations and the cession of Formosa, we are only laying up trouble for ourselves in Indo-China, Siam, Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong.

While disagreeing fundamentally with Britain on Far Eastern policy, apparently has a great admiration of the resistance put up by this country during the war. He doubts at the moment whether any of the other Western

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European countries will fight if put to the test, and he recommends that Britain should retain her Forces in England until she sees whether there is going to be any resistance on the Continent, since he does not believe that we should be able to carry out another Dunkirk.

There may be something in what MacArthur says, but it is perhaps questionable whether China can be brought to her knees by strategic bombing and, what is more doubtful, is that Russia would refuse to honour her obligations under the Sino-Soviet Treaty: she certainly could not do so without very serious loss of face, although she might try and limit her assistance to the supply of war material and military advice.

MacArthur has been wrong in calling Chinese bluff, and he may well be wrong in the idea that he can call Russian bluff. His remarks to Boucher were given in the strictest confidence- so much so that Boucher wondered whether he ought to report them.

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We had a long discussion about the case of SHAG. SHAG has been asked by [] to recruit []. They believe that [] is financially embarrassed and therefore approachable. The Russians would offer [] as much as £800 for a really valuable document.

We are inclined to go ahead with this, as we think it will really put SHAG on his feet, but before doing so we shall have to have some guarantee from [] that the supply of chicken food does not dry up. Moreover, the food has got to be something pretty substantial. We then hope to persuade the Russians that we cannot any longer conduct operations through a member of the Embassy: this we hope may lead us to some unknown resident agent.

We are considering the possibility of walking in on [] at a meeting between him, SHAG and [] and then trying to blackmail him into working for us or defecting. We came to the conclusion that such an operation was not likely to succeed in the case of a man who was a dyed-in-the-wool Communist. Money would mean very little to him unless he had decided to burn his boats completely, and we frankly did not see why he should.

27th January.

Victor came in. I gave him the list of scientists and explained its contents. He will show it to Hans.

I also showed him the report on the "curious phenomena" detected by our Air Attache in Moscow several months ago. My own view, on hearing of the general state of insecurity at our Embassy in Moscow, was that the Russians probably inserted microphones in the room above, or in the lamp recently fixed to the wall outside.

Kellar talked to me for a long time about the tasks of African stations. He was particularly concerned about what he constantly refers to as "the regional focus" on such problems as African nationalism, the Afrikaan problem and the Indian problem.

I said that as far as I knew there was very little tie-up in Africa on these matters; that it was the duty of any S.L.O. to know what was going on in his area; that he would mention it in his monthly report, which he would circulate to his colleagues, and if there seemed to be any inter-Colony tie-up of any significance, we could call for a report on the subject.

31st January.

Desmond Orr came in to pass me some information about a Communist bus driver called WARMAN, and to offer his services in what he describes as the "present emergency". He appeared to be anxious to go abroad and had already communicated with Jeffes, so far without result. I did not encourage him to think that there would be any opening for him here - such a thing would, of course, be quite impossible.

John Shaw says that he is worried about war planning. He seems to have got a long letter from Jack Morton, in which he wants us to consider the provision of male clerks, if all women have to be evacuated from the area as a result of a state of war existing with China.

I think the answer is that they will just have to get on as best they can. Certainly the idea of a team of male clerks standing by to take over is quite out of the question.

I had a word with [redacted], who leaves for Australia to-morrow to take over from Courtenay. I told him to press both the Australia S.S. and Colonel Spry to get themselves housed in the same building. He might also mention this point to Dick Casey. He should make it clear that it was not just a small administrative matter, but one of fundamental importance, which if tackled now may save an infinity of trouble later on. It is just as important to Colonel Spry as it is to the Australian S.S.

I gather that the Australian case is more or less at a dead end - at any rate for the moment. The only possible course is to try and get a defector.

1st February.

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3rd February.

Thistle, Mrs. Towndrow & Kenneth Mills came to see me about the case of [] who was shown by an intercept on King Street to be a member of the Monmouth Police Force, who joined the Party from the Army of the Rhine in 1945. He was reporting his new position and saying that it was somewhat ironical that he should be seeing M.I.5 enquiries about Communists in ordnance factories. We put a check on [] in case King Street sent him any reply, which we thought was most unlikely. If no reply was sent we should then have to invite the Chief Constable to exercise some control over his action to safeguard the source.

5th February.

 I saw Miss Weldsmith and told her about the female staff and their conditions, ~~accommodation~~, etc., in West Africa.

Miss Weldsmith had just got back from her tour of the Middle and Far East.

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 Colonel Gardiner, Squadron-Leader Bryant-Fenn and Major Wilson of the J.I.C. Secretariat visited this office. I explained to them its general structure, and passed them on to Dick White, Roger Hollis and

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6th February.

_____ came to see me with two requests. He wanted us to review a report which we had made previously about industrial activity by the Communist Party, particularly in connection with the rearmament programme. Were there any further developments? Secondly, whether the Governor of Cyprus was indoctrinated, as the American Consul would like to talk to him about SIGINT matters. I ascertained that he was and so informed

For the minutes of the D.G. (Tuesday) meeting held to-day, see envelope at the back of the diary.

I lunched with _____ We had a long discussion about the organisation of counter-espionage, with particular reference to _____ had told _____ that he would have to make up his mind pretty quickly on what the relations should be between the Surete, and in particular the Surveillance du Territoire- and the D.E.C. _____ seems to think that the D.E.C. should carry more or less analagous functions to M.I.5, except, of course, that it would have the additional advantage of the control of foreign stations- and that the Surete should supply all information relating to espionage and accept direction. I said that this seemed to me logical. The great thing, however, was to decide where the focal point was to be - either in S.E.D. or in the Surete - since at present they were obviously overlapping functions.

7th February.

I had a meeting with D.B., D.G., ~~and~~ D.O.S. and O.S.I to discuss the line we should take with the Cold War Committee in connection with the building up of foreign Police Forces in security matters. We had received a draft memorandum from the C. Committee, which we thought was unrealistic in its approach to the whole problem. We wished to point out, first of all, that we were bound to look at the problem to some extent from the point of view of defence priorities. This caused us to feel that in the matter of building up foreign security organisations we should do more profitable work with the Western European countries, who thought, at least to some extent, on the same lines as ourselves. We appreciated, however, that there was a problem both in the Far East and in the Middle East, and that while S.I.S. would obtain a more profitable exchange and goodwill for any operations that they might wish to mount from the territories concerned, there was little chance of improving national security services

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in the Middle Eastern and Far Eastern countries except through local liaison by Security Service trained personnel or by Police advisers.

It was agreed to draft a memorandum on these lines.

Brigadier Johnstone, D.D.M.I. (I), asked me to lunch after the J.I.C. I told him that I was rather worried by the attitude of the Chiefs of Staff, the Cold War Committee, and, to some extent, the Ds. of I., on the question of Communism. Very broadly, I thought they had the impression of a widespread underground organisation directing strikes and sabotage all over the country.

Johnstone said that what I said was roughly true; he himself had had questions directed to him of this kind. While there was not exactly criticism of M.I.5, it was felt that they had an enormous job which was overwhelming them.

I explained to Johnstone that the views held by the Chiefs of Staff were not our views and the views of other departments on the working level. It seemed to me, therefore, somewhat dangerous that they should be so misguided at the top. I would welcome any suggestions from him as to how things could be adjusted. The only way really to inspire confidence would be to get those concerned to attend a course of lectures or to visit this office and talk to people on the working level who were immersed in these affairs. Obviously they had no time for this. If, however, Johnstone himself would care to come round, I was sure that everybody would be delighted to answer any questions he liked to ask. Broadly, our view was that the disturbances in the country were due to a lack of trust by the rank and file in their T.U. leaders, whom they regarded as too much identified with the policy of the Government; they therefore took matters into their own hands. The Communists were generally a bit slow off the mark, but of course always tried to exploit any situation which arose - this was common form. They hardly ever initiated anything. We had considerable coverage and, although we were in no way complacent, we did think that if there was anything in the nature of a widespread plot we should at least have a sniff of it - in fact we had not. Moreover, we knew that the Communists were extremely anxious to keep their hands clean, both in matters of espionage and sabotage, since it was clearly not in their interests to be tarred with either brush. We had positive evidence in two cases that Communists had been dismissed from the Party for engaging in espionage, and, with regard to sabotage, it would clearly be folly for them to disclose their organisation and methods until a real crisis arose. This did not, however, rule out the possibility that disgruntled elements, or even individual Communists, might not commit acts of sabotage contrary to the advice of King Street.

I had a meeting with Easton, Fulton, Cope, D.B., D.C., and D.O.S., when we discussed our proposed paper to the C. Committee. They agreed with our views and we undertook to let them have a copy of the memorandum which we propose to discuss with the Secretariat of the C. Committee, and to suggest that the Committee's own memorandum should be recast.

8th February.

Hill and I went to a meeting at the Home Office, with Murrie in the Chair, to discuss various problems in connection with the internment of aliens and the preparation of lists.

I saw Newsam, at the D.G.'s suggestion, about the case of [redacted] Newsam sent for Baker, and asked him to get C.C. Mommouthshire up to London next week.

21st February.

We received a note from the Colonial Office, saying they agreed to the appointment of a D.E.C. representative in [redacted] provided he had no wireless set, and provided the D.E.C. undertook to give us similar facilities in French territory. Both these provisos are of course nonsensical and we shall have to get them wiped out.

John Marriott has taken over B.1. He seems to think that the section has been spending too much time on writing reports on Party policy based on public statements in the Daily Worker, and that they ought to concentrate more in pursuing Communists who are in places where they may do harm.

Graham Mitchell is going to South Africa to instruct the South African Police, at their request, on how to set up a Security Service. A Cope goes as head of C.3 on his return.

12th February.

I had a meeting with Mackenzie of the C. Committee, Fulton, Cope, Dick and Roger. Mackenzie accepted our memorandum and is going to recast his own to the C. Committee.

At the Directors Meeting I told the D.G. that in accordance with his instructions we had thrown all the names back into the melting pot and endeavoured to recommend four more officers to fill the remaining Senior Officer posts, for which sanction had been obtained from the Treasury. I said that while we had managed to reach agreement by compromise on [redacted], I felt bound to record that, with the possible exception of [redacted] I was apprehensive about the capabilities of the other two to hold down a Senior Officer's job. I should further like him to hear the views of the other Directors. I then told him that we had failed to agree on the fourth vacancy, as between [redacted] and [redacted] The D.G. said that he could not understand why [redacted] name was being

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considered at all. I told him that, with his approval, in so far as seniority was concerned, we were treating everyone who joined up to the 1st January, 1946 as of equal seniority, owing to the circumstances of the war, but that since our primary consideration was merit and our secondary considerations were seniority and age, any other officer was eligible for consideration - in fact only joined in May, but throughout the war had been performing a task which was primarily in aid of this department.

The D.G., however, encouraged by Horrocks, decided to rule out. He wondered, however, whether we had considered and also I said that we had considered both, and a number of others as well and I gave him the short list. While we thought he had done an extremely good job in Washington, we did not think on our experience of him here that he was a particularly good desk officer; his strength lay in his public relations qualifications. We were all agreed that on merit was probably the pick of the bunch; we felt, however, that he was young and would have his chance, with other people, such as - , at a later date.

We then tried to establish whether we were selecting these people on merit, or on seniority. The D.G. said on merit. Dick then said he would like to vote for and Hollis and I agreed - if in fact we were selecting personnel solely on merit. Shaw objected, and it was clear that only by reconsidering all the names and having a further Appointments Board which would probably lead to the same impasse - could we meet Shaw's objection. The D.G. thereupon decided that it should be either or and asked each of us to give our views. With some hesitation I voted for as I thought that in fairness to him he should be given his chance. Hollis voted for Shaw and Dick for.

I am no wiser than I was before as to the basis on which these selections have been made.

13th February.

Hutson telephoned about the naturalisation of Andrew REVAI. He said that Anthony Blunt had spoken to him in the Club; he had told Blunt that the case rested solely on the advice of M.I.5. I told Hutson that that was not strictly true; my recollection was that we had given no firm opinion, but that I would look at the papers and let him know.

I mentioned that Blunt, who was one of REVAI's sponsors, had never in fact been interviewed by the Police. Hutson said that in the London area the Police did not interview sponsors.

I telephone Hutson later to tell him that while we had pointed out certain inconsistencies in a statement by REVAI, we thought it fair to say that, in the opinion of one whose judgement we respected, REVAI was no longer a security risk. Further, that while we were not entirely happy about his naturalisation we did not wish to press the Home Office to withhold it. Hutson, who apparently knew REVAI personally, thought the only thing to do was to let the case rest and consider it again in six months time, when REVAI should make a further application.

For the minutes of the D.G. (Tuesday) meeting held to-day, see envelope at the back of the diary.

came to see me about his failure to get promotion to Senior Officer rank. He thought it must be due to some dissatisfaction over the way he was carrying out his job. I said that in so far as his work for me

was concerned, I thought that the Police Liaison Section had done a good job in building up relations with the Police, and that probably these relations were better now than they had ever been. On the other hand, he had to realise that we were selecting officers on the basis of merit and ability, tempered by age and seniority, and that he was up against pretty keen competition. We were trying to select people for Senior Officer jobs whom thought could control a group of sections in any of the Divisions. We had given the whole question much time and thought and, frankly, if he asked me I did not think that he would be competent to carry such a position anywhere in the office, or at any rate his claims to do so were not anything like as strong as those who had been selected, and indeed others. His chance would probably come later: the fact that he had not been selected this time did not necessarily mean that he would never be selected, but if he were asking me about his chances, I thought he had some pretty formidable rivals. He said that this was a great blow to him, since he was getting on in age and he did not wish to remain in his present grade for the next seven years - so I give him any advice as to what he should do. I said that I found it very difficult, but that I would always advise anybody who came to me and said that he had a better job outside to take it. He then referred to conversations that he had had with Harker about an Assistant Chief Constable's job that was offered to him at the end of the war. Harker had persuaded him to stay on, although he had given him no definite assurance that he would become a member of the peacetime staff. Finally, had made representations to the D who had established him as an officer of the department. I said that had he come to me, I should certainly have advised him to take the Police job.

 Norman Brook rang up to ask whether he was correct in stating that more than half the staff in London were employed upon investigations into the activities of the Communist Party. I said that to the best of my knowledge that would certainly be a correct statement. He then went on to say that he was of course qualifying this statement by drawing attention to the fact that this work was in aid of all branches of this department, including the espionage department. I informed the D.G. about this telephone call.

 I saw Alderson, Chief Constable of Monmouthshire, in Baker's room at the Home Office. I showed the intercept on [redacted]. He is quite determined to get rid of the man, but thinks that it may take some time before he can find a suitable opportunity which will not endanger the source. He will only be taking one officer at Bedwar into his confidence.

Alderson was obviously a little disturbed that a uniformed police constable should have been able to see enquiries from M.I.5, but he will be looking into this. If he finds a pretext for getting rid of RUFFLE, he will unless it is a very straightforward one - consult the Home Office before taking action.

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14th February.

I had a meeting with Dick, Thistle and Martin about E.V.Ws to readh certain conclusions about internment policy. We agreed to put up a note on the subject. It seemed that we had read enough of these Immigration Officers' reports to formulate certain views. Out of the reports seen there were some thirty odd which were of interest, and roughly about 160 who had formerly been members of the Red Army who should be included in our general list.

15th February.

Burt came to see me. He told me about his various exploits in connection with the arrest of members of the Dockworkers' Committee. He said that he had run considerable risks in obtaining information and asked whether we thought our various technical devices could assist him from time to time, since he realised that our equipment was probably far superior to his own. I showed him the piece of telecheck on which suggested that somebody had been leaking from S.B. about the arrests. Burt said he was a little worried about this and would look into it. He mentioned that although C.I.D. officers could not get S.B. files without reference to himself or Thompson, the S.B. Registry was of course open to all members of his branch - some 200 in all. He of course did all he could to check up on their bona fides, but he could not be certain of the loyalty of every one. I then asked him whether he had anything on the lines of our Y. Box system. He said that he had not, but he thought that it might be a very good thing to establish something of the kind. He intended to look into this matter, with particular reference to his recent operations in connection with the Dockworkers' Committee.

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It was agreed that at the meeting on Thursday next, consideration would be given to war planning.

I talked to Hill about the reference in De COURCY's Digest to an alleged private statement by the C.I.G.S. to the effect that the Russians were likely to make war in 1951. Hill did not think there was anything that could be done about this. I said that as far as official documents went it did not represent the C.I.G.S.'s point of view; I thought that he accepted the J.I.C.'s view that the Russians were not deliberately seeking a major war at the moment, but that it was always possible that they might think that if Germany was going to be rearmed, time was not altogether on their side. Certainly Sir Gerald Kelly, our Ambassador in Moscow, had expressed this view to the Chiefs of Staff when he saw them about ten days ago. Kelly clearly thought that we had made a mistake in deciding to rearm Germany. The C.I.G.S. had replied that the United States had made this a condition of the assistance they were giving to European rearmament. The alternative, therefore, was either no rearmament in Western Europe or rearmament with German assistance.

Hill thought that any move against De COURCY by the C.I.G.S. would only give the latter undesirable publicity.

16th February.

Murrie telephoned to say that in regard to my letter to Newsam on the European refugee problem in time of war, this matter was being referred to a sub-committee of the Defence Transition Committee, and that when the meeting was called we should be asked to attend.

I lunched with [redacted] and met a Captain Fabian, who is Admiral Carney's assistant over here. Also present was a Captain Carey (R.N.), who is attached to C.-in-C's staff, Middle East. The conversation was general.

26.

The D.G. had a visit from Sir Norman Brook, who outlined to him what he was going to say in his report. Firstly, he was going to express himself as entirely satisfied with the work that was going on here and the way it was being handled. He was going to be somewhat critical of S.I.S. He had, however, come to the conclusion that our position under the Prime Minister was wrong, and that the department should really be placed under the Home Secretary. The D.G. drew his attention to various matters in which the P. was interested, such as the case of Shinwell's son, who had leaked to the Israeli Intelligence. In such cases it would obviously be difficult if the D.G. had to go through the Home Secretary. In general the D.G. did not agree with the proposal.

Norman Brook seemed to think that Findlater Stewart in his report had exaggerated the defence of the realm side of our work, and that it was more appropriate for us to have our roots in the Home Office. These were his views and were going forward, but we should of course have an opportunity of stating our objections before a final decision was reached on a Ministerial level. H would be sending us a copy of the report but would be glad if we would limit the circulation to Directors only, owing to the criticisms that have been made of S.I.S.

Brook appeared to be in favour of the measure of integration that had been going on in S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E. and would ultimately be extended to this country when an appropriate building could be found. He did not, however, believe in a single head for S.I.S. and the Security Service. He thought that where the Security Service found it profitable to station a man in foreign territory for liaison purposes, they should be allowed to do so as a right.

In discussing Brook's views about Ministerial responsibility, with the D.G., we all of us made it clear that we thought that while there might be something to be said for our being rooted in some permanent Government Department, there were grave objections to the Home Office. Our work was primarily defence work in preparation for a future war and would be appropriate placed under the Ministry of Defence. We were not studying the Communist Party here primarily because we thought it was likely to create a revolution or resort to acts of violence in peace time: the basic reason was that the Party was a vehicle for espionage to Russia. It followed, therefore, that B.I. activities were mainly directed towards identifying Communists and Fellow Travellers and keeping them away from places where they might do harm. They were also concerned with the more important members who were likely to be running an espionage network or laying plans for sabotage in time of war. The whole of C. Division work of protective security could be classified as defence planning. The same applied even to a greater degree in S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E., where we are partially integrated with S.I.S. and form part of the defence forces. It would, in our view, be disastrous if when speaking at the J.I.C we had to represent the views of the Home Office; we should certainly lose the confidence of the fighting services who would feel that we could no longer give an impartial view.

I find it difficult to understand how a man of Brook's intelligence could make such a recommendation. Quite apart from anything else, Newsam will never have time to deal with our problems. We can only wait for the report and put in our written criticisms.

17th February.

[redacted] rang me up about a letter which de COURCY had written to 'C'. De COURCY is complaining that his cousin, (or nephew), Michael, with whom he has had a row, was interviewed in the United States by certain individuals who have not been named. They apparently disclosed to him

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correspondence about the differences of opinion that he had had with his cousin (nephew?) and endeavoured to persuade him to divulge information. They had also told him that his cousin (uncle?) was not what he made himself out to be and that his grandfather was called Rosenbaum. de COURCY apparently intends to ask for an enquiry.

I told [redacted], and subsequently [redacted] that as far as we were concerned we knew that there had been a difference of opinion between de COURCY and Michael, but that we had certainly never passed any of that information to the Americans.

'C' intends to tell de COURCY that the story conveys nothing to him and that if he wants it looked into he will have to give a good deal of factual information.

It seems to me quite possible that the Americans may have been getting access to correspondence between de COURCY and Michael in the United States. We have been particularly guarded in anything we have told the Americans about de COURCY.

19th February.

I lectured to the Police course at present going

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'C' telephoned to say that he had told de COURCY that he knew nothing about the alleged interview with Michael de COURCY. Kenneth then said that it was odd that 'C's name should have been mentioned under the pseudonym of [redacted]. 'C' did in fact use his pseudonym at the time of the alleged atomic bomb explosions. This, of course, would all be consistent with Michael having blown the gaff, wishing to cover up his tracks. Michael, who knows all de COURCY's informants would undoubtedly have known about 'C' using the name of [redacted] which I gather he has only done in connection with his relations with de COURCY.

20th February.

For the minutes of the D.G. (Tuesday) meeting held to-day, see envelope at the back of the diary.

I lunched with Shaw and Johnson of the Colonial Office. Johnson obviously suffers a good deal of frustration; he shares whole-heartedly the views of most Colonial Police Forces that their Administrations are weak and are merely laying up trouble for the forces of law and order; e.g. they thought that the Governor should not have released NKRUMAH. Shaw felt that in the circumstances the Governor acted rightly. Personally I think he did although in principle he was wrong. To my mind it only goes to show the extent to which the Gold Coast is on the slippery slope.

Shaw feels that before the new Constitution had power without responsibility; they now had a mixture of power and responsibility. It seems to me, however, that the Governor is left with responsibility but very little power to prevent situations arising which may have to be dealt with by force.

22nd February.

At the J.I.C. Directors meeting, Kenneth Strong gave an account of his visit to America, where he studied the workings of the Office of National Estimates. It is to O.N.E. that the J.I.C. have been asked to ser

a representative by General Bedell-Smith. O.N.E. is a team of experts, headed by Dr. Langer, and a number of working teams. A paper is to be put up to Langer's committee of experts at Princeton University, headed by George Kennan, late of the State Department. It then goes back to Langer, who may possibly recast it before putting it to the Advisory Council. Here it is again examined before it goes into its final draft.

It is thought that our representative should be of the rank of Colonel, who should sit in on Dr. Langer's first draft committee. C.I.A. are sending [redacted] here to work, as and when necessary with the J.I.S. [redacted] will be Head of C.I.A., but in fact will leave all the work outside the J.I.C. to [redacted]

We had another meeting of the Appointments Board to-day, when we arrived at the following decisions.

1. War planning.

(a) Directors would prepare outline schemes of the organisation of their Divisions in the event of war together with an estimate of the number of officers required for the manning of each section.

In this connection, it was recognised that no exact estimation of the requirements of overseas stations could be given at this stage.

(b) It was decided to recommend to the D.G. the formation of a War Planning Section, to work in A. Division, and to nominate [redacted] to this Section upon his return to the U.K. The Section would be concerned with the planning of war-time organisations at home and overseas, where necessary in relation with the Service Departments; administrative problems and the personnel problems which would arise. It was anticipated that it might be necessary for Mr. [redacted] to be occupied in this work for about six months.

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I met the Superintendents for their criticisms of the course. They all seemed to have enjoyed it and found it extremely useful. Some of them thought that on the whole they would like to start with the Registry and then go on to the Divisions.

23rd February.

De COURCY's solicitors, Churchill Clapham & Co., have written in complaining that Michael has been interviewed by an American and three other officers, who showed him files from Sir Vernon Kell's office. These documents purport to be either originals or copies of letters concerning De COURCY's family affairs. The solicitors suggest that if the War Office know nothing of this matter, the Police should be asked to conduct an investigation.

It looks rather to us as if Michael had blown the gaff to the Americans, but the Americans say that they know nothing about the incident. We are putting up a draft reply to the War Office, in which they deny any knowledge but draw attention to the fact that it is not uncommon for people to represent themselves as being from M.I.5., and that we should therefore like to know when and where the meeting took place and the names of those present.

Highett is back here on leave from West Africa owing to his father's death. I asked him about the work of compiling basic papers. He tells me that he is getting on with this but that the prerequisite is to get the files in order; for example, on subjects such as the R.D.A. a good deal of the information is to be found on DARBOUSSIER's personal file. He hopes to get things in order before very long.

It looks to me as if nobody had really thought out the Registry problem on sensible lines.

Tommy Lascelles asked me to go and see him to discuss the proposal that Princess Elizabeth should visit West Africa, and possibly also Kenya. Michael Dean and Martin Charteris, who is the Princess's Controller, were also present.

I said that any comments that I might make must be completely off the record, since the question was really one for the Colonial Office. Apart from this, I was not really very well qualified to do more than take a general common-sense view of the proposal. I had, of course, talked with a number of people in West Africa, but I had only been in the country a couple of weeks. It seemed to me that in principle the idea was a good one. It also seemed likely that the visit would be met with enthusiasm by the local population. I thought, however, that it might be wise to wait and see whether NKRUMAH was going to take office before any announcement was made. If he could not get all the seats on the Council that he wanted he might prefer to remain in opposition. It is possible that in such circumstances he might wish to stage demonstrations, but on the chances of this the Governor was the only person who could express a view.

Tommy then said that the Governor had welcomed the proposal, but did not wish to commit himself until March when he would have a better idea as to how the new Constitution was likely to settle down.

I explained the extent of Communist influence, which was really confined to the distribution of literature, since there was no Communist Party and no individual Communists, in the normal accepted sense of the word. The risks, therefore, of any sort of incident would be much the same as they are anywhere; it was never possible to be certain that some lunatic or Ju-Ju man might do ^{not} something stupid.

26th February.

At the Directors Meeting we put forward our proposals about planning, which were accepted by the D.G.

[] telephoned to me again about Accra. He is going to Paris over the weekend and would certainly like to have an answer if possible. I tried again to get on to Jackson, but without result.

Johnny Cimperman came to tell me that after exhaustive enquiries in all American offices, he could find no trace of any interview between Michael de COURCY and the American authorities.

27th February.

For the minutes of the D.G. (Tuesday) meeting held to-day, see envelope at the back of the diary.

I saw 'C', who showed me a copy of a letter that he had received from America from de COURCY, in which he alleged that he had heard through a contact of ROMER's that M.I.5 were trying to spike the guns of the Digest by extracting information from Michael de COURCY. He mentions three people who he believed attended the interview: Philip FARRER, an American called Henry MAY, and the Duke of RICHELIEU, also alleged to be an American.

I told 'C' what we were doing and that in the proposed reply to the War Office we had asked for some facts. At present the whole case seemed to rest on a statement made by Michael, which is almost certain to be untrue. 'C' told me that de COURCY had asked him a short time ago to spend ten days at his villa in Nice, since it was probably the last holiday that he was likely to get before the next world war. 'C' replied rather stuffily! 'C' knows, through a contact, that de COURCY is very anxious to ascertain what 'C's views are. de COURCY would offer him almost anything he liked if on retirement he would join the Digest, which shows clearly enough what kind of a man de COURCY is. I gather that the villa he runs in Nice is extremely luxurious and was formerly occupied by the Duke of Windsor. de COURCY has about five men servants, all dressed in dove-coloured uniforms!

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28th February.

I saw Sir George Turner, P.J.U.S. War Office, and got his approval to our suggested War Office reply to the letter from de COURCY's solicitor. He is going to send it in the official form "Sir, I am directed, etc...." I had not met Turner before: he is of the tough variety and struck me as being thoroughly alive and sensible.

31.

Martin Forrest rang me up & say that he was applying for the job of Headmaster of the Academy School in Edinburgh - could I give him a testimonial? I said that I thought our usual practice was not to give testimonials "to whom it may concern", but merely to answer enquiries by a prospective employer: I would, however, see what could be done.

1st March.

I saw Buster Milmo last night who told me that he had been asked to represent a man called SILLARS, of the A.E.U. in Glasgow, who was bringing an action against the Union in connection with his recent election to the Council which had been declared null and void. The Union allow the circulation of one manifesto for each of the applicants, but it was ascertained subsequently that SILLARS had done a good deal of local propaganda in addition, and for this reason the Union were disqualifying him.

Buster thinks that SILLARS is a Communist. If this is so, it is interesting that, as a matter of tactics, he is not employing either solicitors or Counsel who have ever represented Communists before, in fact in briefing Buster they are briefing a Catholic!

I spoke to [redacted] about SILLARS. He tells me that SILLARS came down to see ALLISON, of the Industrial Department of the C.P., recently about some action, the details of which he does not know. This seems to establish fairly clearly that SILLARS is a Communist and that the action is being fought by the Party, who clearly wish to strengthen their representation in the A.E.U.

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9. Dick reported briefly on his negotiations on the Joint Planning Committee with S.I.S., at which D.O.S. was also present; he said that S.I.S. conception of the Committee seemed to be that they should deal with general and permanent as well as with war planning. It was felt that we had no objection to this point of view provided that we had the power to co-opt other senior members of the staff as might be necessary.

10. Horrocks reported that Spencer had examined premises in Princes Gardens which the Ministry of Works had offered for our overflow accommodation. The Board felt that the premises were reasonably satisfactory as to location and space, and that we should not turn down the offer, but we should support Spencer in his attempt to get something better. It was agreed that Horrocks and Shaw would visit the premises by arrangement with the Ministry of Works.

Jackson of the Foreign Office telephoned to say that the Colonial Office had agreed to send a telegram to Governors, asking them whether they would agree to D.E.C. representative in using wireless. I drafted a telegram to Tin-Eye, informing him of this and suggesting that he should get into touch with the West African Council, with a view to seeing that a speedy and satisfactory reply was sent from the Governors to the Colonial Office. I gave him three points: (i) the idea that a wireless set denote sinister clandestine activity is out of date; (ii) the D.E.C. representative would communicate in cipher, and it matters little whether his telegrams go through the Consulate by land line or over the air by wireless; (iii)

2nd March.

I discussed with Hill and Dick the position of the leakage section in time of war. It seemed to me that leakage was a matter with which B. Division did not wish to be concerned, unless there was a deliberate attempt at espionage. Leakage took various forms: It might be that an important document had been left in a railway carriage and that the Chiefs of Staff wanted Police enquiries made to establish whether the document was likely to have been compromised. I might result from a censorship product indicating careless talk; the police would then again be required to interview the individual and anyone else to whom he had spoken. Thirdly, it might be of the Freddie KUH variety, where the dividing line between high-grade journalism and espionage was difficult to define.

Dick seemed to agree that this function should remain in S.L.B.

Admiral Godfrey came to see me about a note which he had written on deception for the D.N.I., with L.C.S. concurrence. He wanted to know whether it was factually correct and to have my views about it generally.

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I told Godfrey that I would read his memorandum and let him have my comments. He will come and see me again in about three weeks time.

I had a word with Mary Lachlan and impressed upon her the importance of getting the files in Accra into order. Much depended on the product of the basic papers, after which the task of carding and filing should be considerably reduced.

I saw [] about the case of SILLIARS and arranged for him to see Milmo.

3rd March.

[] rang me up about the agenda for the next S.I.C. It seems the Surete are trying to force [] hand on the question of war planning. He was rather anxious to know what I thought. I said that I would look into the matter and let him know.

I had a talk with Hollis about our wartime organisation. I said I thought that the clutter of the D.G. staff, with the exception of the Secretariat, should form part of another Division. There should, in other words, be a Legal Division, carrying leakage of information, interment under 18B, prosecutions and general legal advice, while Regional Control should be under A. Division, as it was in the last war. Hollis thought that O.S. should also be in A. Division, since, like Regional Control, it was largely a matter for the Administration. So far as intelligence is concerned, both organisations are merely a conduit pipe. Ops. would go into C.3.

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5th March.

At the Directors Meeting the D.G. told us that he had a talk with Norman Brook; firstly, about Air Vice Marshal Slessor's request for further information about the act of leakage to Chapman PINCHER of the "Express" about Class 2 reservists. Brook had agreed to the D.G. telling Slessor that he could not give him any further particulars except through the P.M. [] has apparently denied the whole incident and Slessor is rather worried about the accuracy of our information. It is TABLE and quite unimpeachable.

The D.G. asked Brook about his report. Brook said that he would be sending over a copy in the course of a day or so and that he would ensure that before the Prime Minister made any decision he would hear our views. A copy of the report is also going to Bridges and to 'C'.

I saw Air Vice Marshal Graham of the Scottish Police College, who was to lecture. His College has only recently been set up.

6th March.

Pugh, Deputy Commissioner of Police Gold Coast, came to see me. He is very gloomy about the recent turn of events and seemed to think that there was no future for any Britisher in the Gold Coast. He told me that he had to live on £25 a month, keeping his wife and children in this country. He did not wish to be a "rat leaving the sinking ship", but

frankly he did not think that there was any sort of objective that was worth while.

I think that he was to some extent fishing for a job here. He evidently does not see eye to eye with the Commissioner of Police.

For the minutes of the D.G. (Tuesday) meeting held to-day, see envelope at the back of the diary.

Shaw has been round to Princes Gardens. He said the accommodation is frightful. Clearly we shall have to turn down the offer and ask the Ministry of Works to think again.

I went to see Burt about the case of [redacted] who wants to join the Officers Emergency Reserve and was the subject of a vetting enquiry by Special Branch. Apparently his landlord had been approached, and from what had been said to him about [redacted] early past in the International Brigade, had decided that he would not renew his lease. Moreover, someone seems to have had a look at his despatch cases in the basement, but whether this was Special Branch or the landlord I do not know.

I also talked to Burt about the case of one [redacted] who had alleged that M.I.5 were at the back of Police enquiries which had led to his being refused a job in E.M.I. This was pure surmise on [redacted] part, although in fact we were indirectly responsible.

7th March.

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I attended a meeting of the Dixon (Cold War) Committee and came away with my usual impression of its futility. We were discussing a paper on assistance to foreign Security Services in combatting Communism. The paper was by no means a good one, and one had the impression that nobody on the Committee had formulated any very sensible views: they rather took the attitude that S.I.S. and ourselves wanted them to give us their assistance and blessing, and that we in fact were responsible for the original proposals. Eventually, Maurice Dean, representing the Ministry of Defence, asked what we hoped to get out of this. This gave me an opening to explain that in so far as attempting to teach [redacted] in London how to set up an efficient Security Service in their own country, was concerned, it was to a large extent a waste of time; in fact M.I.5 did not stand to benefit at all, directly; the only percentage lay with S.I.S. who might acquire a certain amount of goodwill which would enable them to operate from bases in [redacted]. The only people we could teach profitably here were those from Western European countries whose conditions were in some measure comparable to our own; we regarded them as a first priority, since many of them were members of the Atlantic Pact and in receipt of important defence information. It was therefore of vital importance to our defence planning that they should have an efficient Security Service. Some sort of list of priorities was eventually agreed.

35.

I had a long talk with Potter about the filing system in our stations overseas. I showed him the pro forma that I had drawn up for West Africa, with which he was in entire agreement. He thought that all they needed was a limited number of organisation and subject files, plus a certain amount of carding of leading personalities.

Ronnie Howe rang me up to say that on reading de COURCY's latest number of the Digest, in which he alleged that there were two more agents like PONTECORVO at Harwell giving information to the Russians, he wondered whether it might not be worth while sending a Police officer down to see de COURCY. The officer would draw attention to the statement in the Digest, refer to de COURCY as a patriotic Englishman, and ask him for details. I said that I would consider this and let him know.

I subsequently discussed the matter with Hill, who seemed to think that Special Branch might find the connection somewhat tiresome once it had been established. On the other hand, he saw my point, that if an enquiry was made and subsequently there was another defector from Harwell, everyone would say that the authorities had been extremely lax in not asking de COURCY's assistance in view of the statement made in his Digest. I thought we might reconsider the matter when we got the reply from de COURCY's solicitors, via the War Office, to our request for further information about the alleged theft of his private correspondence.

8th March.

Burt rang to say that Carrol (of the Garda) had asked him to go over. He would let me know in due course what Carrol had to say. Burt seemed to think that there might be something cooking in the I.R.A.

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I had a talk with Shaw about his position in wartime. It seemed to me that he should have under his care both overseas and Regional Control. Both organisations had primarily an administrative function and acted as a kind of conduit pipe for information to and from outstations. I said, however, that in my view both these functions ought to go into A. Division. He entirely agreed with this view, but did not see how in the present circumstances we could put it forward.

9th March.

Sir A. Gascoigne, British representative in Tokyo, has forwarded a personal impression of General MacArthur by Mr. Clutton - presumably a British official who has been working with MacArthur for six or eight months.

The tremendous force of the General's personality struck Mr. Clutton in the same way as it has done so many others. He felt that here, beyond question, was a great man who still had greatness in him. The General's charm, though patently turned off and on like a tap and in some respects (for instance, the hand-clasp) grating, was difficult to resist, and his plausibility and persuasiveness in stating his case was so great as, at times, to make his argument well-nigh convincing.

Physically, the general appeared a much slighter and frailer figure than he seemed in his photographs or on the parade ground. Mr. Clutton was also struck by the general's physical vigour, his youthful appearance, and the clearness and brightness of the eyes in a face comparatively little lined. At the same time Mr. Clutton felt

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that he was meeting someone slightly unreal and that, within the surprisingly youthful body there was a mind no longer as young as the body and which was beginning to indulge in those searchings of conscience and the memory that occupy the old during the wakeful periods of the night. While the general's argument was lucid enough, his refusal to allow Mr. Clutton to get a word in edgeways, his insistence on remaining in his chair and continuing to talk despite the fact that his visitor had four times risen to his feet to take his leave, and his use in argument of facts and figures which he must have realised we knew to be untruthful or exaggerated, all seemed to Mr. Clutton essentially to be the habits of an old man. Again, throughout the interview, the general was on the defensive, explaining his actions and rebutting his critics; but here Mr. Clutton felt that he was not defending his actions in the context of the political and military situation of the day so much as defending his place in history, which was the only thing that now mattered to him.

Gascoigne more or less endorses these views. He recognises MacArthur's shortcomings, but says that he cannot but feel deep respect for this man who has, it must be remembered, performed valuable work for the Allies both in the war and generally in his administration of Japan during the period of occupation. That he has made serious mistakes, both in Japan itself and in his recent conduct of the Korean war, and in his attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek, there can be no doubt that this is due in great measure to his jealous nature and his overweening conceit and confidence in his own judgement. Nevertheless, when the dust settles upon this Far Eastern scene, Gascoigne believes that it will become clear that in the main, MacArthur's successes outweigh his failures. One thing is certain, namely, that MacArthur that MacArthur recognises the overriding necessity for Anglo/U.S. co-operation. Despite his sensitiveness to British criticism to his policy, and the fact that by many of his actions he has tended to bring about uneasiness in Anglo/U.S. relations in Asia.

I lunched with Mr. Pugh, Assistant Commissioner of Police Gold Coast. He gave me an interesting account of how graft penetrated the whole Administration, and also commercial circles.

In the schools a child is not likely to get its promotion from one form to another unless xxx is paid to the school teacher. The Customs are hopelessly corrupt, as has been demonstrated frequently and in particular in regard to the importation of steel tubing. I mentioned to Pugh the proposal I made to Stephens, that an ordinance should be promulgated which would make it obligatory on all holders of steel tubing to declare the amounts to the Police. He said that this tubing would be all over the country in the hands of the bush blacksmiths, who had no authority to make guns at all, and that by imposing this regulation you would only be giving the Police a further opportunity of graft. Already the Police took money in every direction; the traffic cops, who are supposed to bring charges for overloading mammy wagons, are almost invariably bribed not to prefer a charge. The driver, quite blatantly, takes out his £, and if the policeman still goes on writing down particulars, he takes out another £, and so on until the policeman stops writing in his notebook. This may provide a deterrent, but it certainly undermines the morale of the Force. Mammy traders, amongst whom are wives of officials and police officers, buy goods from the United Africa Corporation. If they want a box of biscuits, they may well be told that they can only have them if they take certain other

goods which have not been found particularly saleable. They generally accept this, dispose of the biscuits at a considerable profit, and sell the other goods at a slight loss. This is how your boy can sometimes obtain certain types of goods at a cheaper rate than the market price. The Courts are corrupt to some degree, as also is the Administration - both black and white.

I discussed Irish censorship with Winterborn. It seems to me that we must either have censorship against the whole of Ireland, or the North must impose a strict censorship as between North and South. We could only consider abandoning censorship on Southern Ireland if we could get a guarantee that their ships would call at British ports, and that their Continental aircraft would touch down somewhere in Allied territory where censorship could be carried out. Cables will, as in the last war, be routed through this country. The Home Office are consulting(?) with Northern Ireland.

I saw Group Captain Mears, who is succeeding Brodie on the J.I.C. O. & S

Haldane Porter tells me that Razmara had set up a committee to enquire into the technical possibilities of nationalising all the Anglo-Iranian oil wells, knowing full well that, for financial and administrative reasons, the project would be quite unworkable. The committee had produced their findings, which concurred with Razmara's views, and in another 48 hours the matter might have been by the Majlis. Now, of course, the whole question is once more in the melting pot.

We want a private share arrangement with the Persians on a 50/50 basis and, pending a settlement we hold £48,000,000 due to the Persians. They sorely need this money to back their new currency.

An interesting side-line was that the Persian Minister here, who had been mentioned as a possible successor to Razmara, sought an early appointment with the Foreign Office in order to inform them that he was likely to have to undergo a severe operation! He has no intention whatever of becoming Prime Minister, a post which he regards as altogether too precarious.

At his monthly meeting on Middle Eastern affairs at the Foreign Office, Haldane Porter was told by the Foreign Office representative that after visiting Palestine, General Robertson, on his tour of the Middle East, had been called back for another interview with Ben Gurion. The latter had proposed that Palestine should join the British Commonwealth of Nations, with a status similar to that of New Zealand.

It would be interesting to know exactly what is behind this. The idea may have started from the suggestion made by Shinwell at a Cabinet meeting, that Palestine could provide an alternative base for British forces to the Canal Zone. This piece of information we know leaked from Shinwell to his son, and through another intermediary to Israeli Intelligence in this country. The Arabs, of course, want stability and Palestine, financially and from the point of view of resettlement, is certainly in a very bad way. They would derive certain obvious benefits from coming into the British Commonwealth and the safety of their own frontiers would be assured. We should, of course, incur the displeasure of the Arab States, but we might be able to mitigate this by imposing conditions upon Israel. It will be interesting to see what materialises.

39.

Dick tells me that there is a Foreign Office telegram in from Moscow, announcing that at a sewing bee run by Mrs. Krapp of the Swedish Legation, a story was told and overheard by a member of the British Embassy, that a member of the Finnish Legation had told Mrs. Krapp that PONTECORVO had called at the Finnish Legation in connection with his passport. He had been told that there was nothing doing and had gone away.

12th March.

I spoke to Hill about an announcement in the Daily Mail that M.I.5 and Special Branch office s were going to interview de COUENCY on his arrival at the airport from America. He was going to be asked about the statement in his Digest, that two scientists at Harwell were giving information to the Russians. The D.G. had rung up about this on Saturday and had seemed rather perturbed about the Yard butting in. Hill told the D.G. about my conversation with Ronnie Howe, which had ended by our agreeing to think the matter over.

I rang Howe, who told me that he had done nothing, and in fact did not intend to do anything without our agreement. He thought the Daily Mail were simply guessing.

I spoke to the D.G. later, when I told him about my talk with Howe.

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13th March.

I had lunch with Bernard Machell. He is now diplomatic correspondent for the Empire News and is doing a weekly broadcast about foreign affairs to overseas stations. He thinks, however, that, owing to the newsprint shortage, Empire News may one day terminate his engagement. He wondered whether he might be able to get some employment with S.I.S. (and, I suppose also with us, although he did not say so). I suggested that he should get into touch with Vivian.

Hill has successfully got through the STRAUSS denaturalisation case, although there has not yet been any verdict. There was a slight contretemps owing to STRAUSS maintaining that he had worked for M.I.5. He wrote down the name of KLOPSTOCK. In fact we did receive some information from KLOPSTOCK, at second or third hand, in 1949, but this does not justify STRAUSS in saying that he was working for the British Government. In any case it does not seem to improve his case.

14th March.

After the J.I.C. meeting to-day I discussed with Johnstone, Ross and Baker-Cresswell the case of the Pakistani high-ranking officers who have been arrested. One of them has attended a Joint Services Staff College course and another the I.D.C. This would seem to raise quite a grave security issue. It seemed to us that the only solution was to run a special "milk and water" course for members of the Commonwealth. Otherwise the information supplied would have to be so downgraded as to render the course valueless to our own officers.

Holderness telephoned to say that a man called Charles Eric PATERSON was anxious to give information about STRAUSS. PATERSON was in Brixton Prison awaiting a charge of obtaining money by false pretences. I passed this on to Dick and Hill.

S.I.S. brought me over some copies of letters relating to de COURCY's finances. He evidently is short of funds here and wants to transfer some of his dollars from the U.S. without paying income tax. This can be done by a dubious bank in Tangier. De COURCY has already had a certain sum of money converted into French francs, which were sent to him at Cap d'Antibes, where he has an expensive villa, formerly occupied by the Duke of Windsor, and to which he recently invited both 'C' and [redacted] to spend the "last holiday they were to get before the next world war"! This in itself is an infringement of the British currency regulations.

15th March.

I have read a report by "George" Jenkin on his proposed build-up of the Malayan Police. He wants 257 more Inspectors and 207 Sub-Inspectors. His reason is that officers in his Force do not find it possible to use anyone below that rank for C.I.D. or S.B. purposes. He also has extensive plans for improving the quality of intelligence, but he does not see how all this is to get going for at least another two years.

At the Appointments Board to-day we considered our war organisation. We have created six Divisions in all, although personally I think that the O.S. Division could well be absorbed by A. Division. Once we have got the ranks and the approximate numbers - which we are now at last on the way to doing - we shall have to consider personalities and the effect of making appointments to the new Divisions of existing staff.

Dick is rather against creating a large number of Assistant Directors, and prefers the democratic system that we employed during the last war. I sympathise with this view, since, in B. Division at any rate, one had to be extremely flexible and the creation of a large number of ranks and grades can be extremely embarrassing.

MacDonald has refused the position of Deputy Head of S.I.F.E. We have, therefore, to consider posting a Deputy from here who will ultimately become Head of S.I.F.E. when Morton comes home next year. This is going to be a real facer.

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19th March.

I lectured to the Police course. John Marriott is sitting in through the whole course to see whether there is any overlapping.

At the Directors' Meeting we discussed Sir Norman Brook's report. We had only received an extract from that part of the report which dealt with Ministerial responsibility.

The D.G. had a note in front of him, prepared by Dick, which gave an answer to Brook's proposals that we should come under the Home Office. The main argument is that Findlater Stewart placed us under the Prime Minister in his capacity of Chairman of the Defence Committee pending the appointment of a Minister of Defence, because he felt that both constitutionally and factually any work carried out by the Security Service in a democracy should be justifiable on defence grounds. Otherwise it was open to the accusation of 'Gestapo'. Factually, practically everything we do can be justified on defence grounds. For example, we investigated the Communist Party and its membership in order to prevent leakage of defence secrets. Our protective security work is entirely defence work, as also is our work overseas, where in many places we form part of the local defence forces.

As regards being under the P.M., Dick argued that Findlater Stewart had had in mind that the Prime Minister would be called in in any question or debate where the Security Service was criticised, to give that personal assurance that the special powers under which it worked were in no way being abused. We did not, as Sir Norman Brook suggested, wish to be under the Prime Minister in order to enhance our prestige, or to use him as a stick with which to beat other Ministers. In fact we were responsible individually to any Minister for whom we were carrying out any particular work, and that the Minister answered any question that might arise from action that he had taken on our advice.

The D.G. intends to see the P.M., when the latter comes out of hospital. I suggested that he should hand him a reasoned answer to Norman Brook's query, and that this should be circulated to other Ministers attending the Cabinet meeting when the subject was discussed. The D.G. said that he did not wish to circulate a memorandum before he had seen the P.M.; if the P.M. said that he wished the Department to remain under himself, that would be an end of the matter. If, on the other hand, he thought that it should be the subject of a Cabinet discussion, the D.G. would then suggest to him that our memorandum should be circulated to those concerned so that they would not come into the meeting with a purely one-sided view based on Norman Brook's memorandum.

20th March.

I had a meeting with James Robertson, John Irvine and Leggatt with regard to a possible [] defector from the Legation in Holland. The man's son is a naturalised British subject living in England. The Dutch thought that if they could interview the man and persuade him to communicate with his father, the man in Holland might be induced to defect.

I said I could see no objection to the Dutch interviewing this individual, provided we were also present.

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I lunched at the Travellers with Ross, Deputy Chairman of the J.I.C. He told me that the situation in Persia was causing the Foreign Office a certain amount of anxiety and that the Americans, on the whole, were not being particularly helpful. He thought that ultimately things would be smoothed out. There was no evidence as far as he knew of Soviet intrigues, although of course they were jubilant about them.

21st March.

James Robertson, Nicholas Elliott and Hanley came to discuss the case of an agent whom they had been using who had been in touch with the

the agent was owed £1,000 and wondered what action he should take. S.I.S. were inclined to suggest that he should visit the Soviet authorities, telling them of his difficulties and his reluctance to go back to the Czech Embassy in view of the cases of STRAUSS and RAIDL and the insecurity of Czech operations. The hope was that the Russians would take him on.

I said that I did not think the Russians would touch him with the end of a barge pole, and that his normal course would really be to lie low. The Russians would know the extent to which we had penetrated Czech espionage and would either regard the agent as "blown" or as a "plant". The only possible course seemed to be a suggestion that somehow the agent's past career and achievements should be brought to the notice of the Russians by a sideline. We could then wait and see whether an approach was made.

I went to see Sir Frank Newsam. He asked me whether I had read Sir Norman Brook's report. I said that I had only seen an extract which referred to the question of Ministerial responsibility. Newsam seemed surprised that I had not seen the whole report. I told him that I understood that an abridged edition was coming out, since it was considered desirable that we should see the report on S.I.S. which, off the record, I believe to be somewhat critical.

Newsam then asked me what I thought about the question of Ministerial responsibility. I told him our views about the constitutional question, and I said that factually almost everything we did was in the interests of defence. Newsam did not seem to agree with this: he thought the Home Secretary should be the person who should say whether we were devoting too much time to the Communist Party and not enough to other matters. I said that our activities in connection with the Communist Party were primarily in the interests of defence and that many other Departments were concerned. We wished to prevent Communists from getting Government secrets. The revolutionary aspect of the Communist Party was much more a matter for the Home Secretary and the Police, although, of course, owing to our careful study of the movement we could make a contribution. Nobody, however, would suggest that we were on the brink of a revolution in this country.

I then explained that we had many commitments overseas, where we formed part of the defence machine and had responsibility to Defence Committees, the Chiefs of Staff and others. Would the Home Secretary accept responsibility for our activities in this connection? Newsam then said that the Home Secretary would do nothing of the kind; what he had in mind was that we should go back to our former status, where we were more or less responsible to everybody and nobody; he thought that there was much too much publicity given to M.I.5, which was a secret service, and that if questions were asked the affairs of the Department could not be discussed in Parliament any more than those of the Secret Service. The Home Secretary would deny knowledge of our activities and suggest that if we had infringed the law in any way the appropriate remedy was to bring an action against us

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I said I did not feel that this was very satisfactory; we had a pretty difficult time as it was and there were occasions when we wished to have someone to get up and defend us. If the idea was to disown us, there would not be much encouragement to the staff to take the initiative. If we were to play a purely safety first game, there would not be much information forthcoming.

Newsam then said that Brook had an idea that we might receive policy direction and financial control from a Committee of Under-Secretaries of State from the departments with which we were most concerned.

It is difficult to reconcile these views of Newsam's with the very categorical statement by Norman Brook that we should be responsible to the Home Secretary.

22nd March.

Mrs. Keene came to talk to me about a leakage from The Observer, in an article for which Alistair BUCHAN was responsible. The leakage gave information about the various personalities who were to take command under Eisenhower and was three days ahead of official publication.

Hewison talked to me about this case and was suggesting to Brook that a letter should be circulated to all those in possession of the information, asking them whether they knew BUCHAN and when they last saw him. Brook turned this down. We were asked to follow the case up if we could.

James Robertson talked to me about a Georgian who had been approached by a Russian woman called LIUBA (surname not known). This woman had reminded the Georgian about his relatives and had told him that the Soviet authorities were not at all satisfied with him and suggested that they should have a meeting to talk things over. The meeting was covered and the woman identified as the wife of some member of the Soviet Trade (?) Delegation.

I attended a post mortem on the Police course. A certain number of suggestions were put forward, but these have been put on record by P.L. on the appropriate file.

27th March.

I had a talk with Skardon about [redacted] who is deeply involved in our guided missile projects and has apparently, unknown to us, visited the United States on some semi-official mission. Skardon had a long talk with him. [redacted] quite understood his rather delicate position in view of the FUCHS and PONTECORVO disclosures: he said, however, that his attitude was exactly the same as it was when Skardon last saw him. He liked his work and his employer; he did not wish to embarrass his family or his employer or, indeed, the Security Service. He did not know what his attitude would be to a future war; it would depend entirely on how it arose. If he thought that he had a conflict of loyalties, he would resign his present position.

I asked Skardon whether in that eventuality he would still feel that he did not wish to embarrass the Security Service. Skardon thought that he would not wish to do so and that on the whole he was grateful to the Security Service for the way they had handled his case on becoming aware that he had been engaged in espionage.

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The difficulty of the whole case lies in the fact that is acquainted with our latest developments and, to some extent, integrated American developments.

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Patrick Reilly telephoned to say that the Foreign Secretary had received an application from ZILLIACUS for readmission to the Labour Party. The Foreign Secretary wished to know what ZILLIACUS had been doing since he was expelled from the Labour Party, and the extent of his connection with the Communist Party before his expulsion. This, of course, raises an issue of some importance - is the Security Service to be used to vet prospective candidates for the Labour Party?

'C' telephoned to say that de COURCY had sent him a copy of a long memorandum which he had addressed to Chief Inspector Jones of Special Branch, who visited him the other day. Jones presumably asked de COURCY as a patriotic citizen to divulge the names of the two people at Harwell whom he alleged were giving away information to the Russians. de COURCY has neither confirmed nor denied that he knows the names of these people, but has made a reply conditional on the redressment of a whole number of past grievances. These include the action against Colonel Pilcher and a warning to Queen Mary, but in particular an enquiry into the allegations of Michael de COURCY.

I shall doubtless be hearing about all this from the Yard in due course.

Baker-Cresswell brought his successor, Captain Hilken, to see me.

"Tin-Eye" has sent in a rather characteristic letter about the situation in the Gold Coast, which need not be taken at its face value but may well indicate what a good many of the British residents think about the new Constitution. He says the chaos in Accra must be seen to be believed. At one moment N'Krumah is necromancing in Kan Kan, but the next he is functioning as leader of Government business within the Secretariat itself. In one room His Excellency the Governor is handing out seals of office, in another the lackadaisical gentlemen of the Secretariat are playing liar dice while they await introductions to their new masters. Outside Government House, which has fallen down, there is much coming and going. No man can tell whether it is a bricklayer, a houseboy or a Minister who is crossing his path. Here and there coal black mammies appear, seeming to come from the bowls of the earth; one is pedalling insanitary "chop" to the clerks in the office; another, the P.A. to the Minister of Health, is

filching a file for corruption. Only Mrs. Speaker is sane (?); she continues to sell her confectionery, well knowing there is no future in the impartiality of her husband.

It is indeed a terrible picture of unnecessary, if not wanton surrender. My guess, for what is worth, is that there will be little disorder in the near future because the extremists, now Ministers, will be too immersed in corruption to attend to anything else. Certainly from a security point of view one is left with the speculation that there is little of Empire interest that remains to be protected.

28th March.

I asked Burt about de COURCY. He said that Jones had telephoned trying to make an appointment last week, but had been put off by de COURCY's secretary until he announced that he was from the Special Branch of Scotland Yard. de COURCY then wanted to see him at once and, in fact, came down to the Yard in person. He assumed that the reason for the interview was the Michael de COURCY incident and proceeded to pour forth his woes, past and present. Jones let him talk and then explained that what he really wanted to know about was the identity of the two scientists at Harwell whom Mr. de COURCY alleged in his Digest were giving information to the Russians. de COURCY immediately began to hedge and said that if he gave the information, he would jeopardise his source, that abortive enquiries would be made and that these would be followed by a statement in the House of Commons that there was nothing in the allegations; this would be seriously detrimental to the Digest. Until, therefore, his past grievances were cleared up and apologies made, he did not feel inclined to collaborate with the authorities. He followed the interview up by a long memorandum, which Burt is letting me see.

General Craig, of the Marines, a wartime A.D.N.I., came to see me to-day. He is a Director of the Air Survey Company, which is a subsidiary of Fairey Aviation. In this connection he has come into touch with a firm, FOTOGAMATRIE (?) of Munich, which has been taking aerial photographs of the American Zone in Western Germany - I presume with the approval of the American authorities. Connected with this firm is a certain Baron E.G. (or F.G.) von TCHIRSKY (or TSCHIRSCHKY) who has an address in America, one in Paris at the Hotel Continentale, 3 Rue de Castiglione, and another in London at 26 Upper Cheyne Row, S.W.3., telephone number FLaxman 9948.

General Craig, who is in negotiation with von TCHIRSKY - who claims to be an American citizen - in connection with a nine-lens camera for aerial photography at low altitudes which it is thought will be of considerable interest to British airmen, has been warned by an American that von TCHIRSKY is not really an American citizen and has a considerable past.

Craig's address is 4, The Gateways, Chelsea, S.W.3, telephone number KENSington 7722.

I told Craig that we were bound here by very strict rules as regards communicating information to outside persons unless there was a Government security interest, but that of course I was always very grateful to know about any alien who was misbehaving himself in this country. Craig said he quite understood the position, and it was left that I might, or might not, telephone to him as a result of any enquiries that we might make.

Dick has done a draft reply to Sir Norman Brook's memorandum, which seems to me on the right lines although there are one or two other thoughts that I should like to see introduced. I think we want to indicate a little more strongly the extent to which we are linked with the activities of Defence Committees and Commanders-in-Chief abroad through J.I.Cs, etc. We should also counter the argument that if we were under the Home Office Frank Newsam would be able to give us advice on policy matters. In point of fact our policy is framed by consultation with each individual P.U.S. whose department we may be working. If several P.U.Ss are concerned, Bridges calls a meeting and the policy is framed on an agreed basis.

Dick in his memorandum had suggested the possibility of our not having a Minister at all, as in pre-war days. I think this would be a mistake; firstly, we should not receive all sorts of papers which concerned us, and secondly, we should have no-one to defend us if we were seriously attacked either from within or from without. We are therefore concentrating on saying that the Ministerial control should be of an interdepartmental kind rather than departmental. The possible Ministers which suggest themselves are the Ministers of Defence or the Lord President of the Council. It is of the greatest importance that we should not be fobbed off to a Minister without Portfolio.

29th March.

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Cumming has produced a gadget from America. It is a small wireless set which can go easily into the inside breast pocket with an aerial up the arm. We have tried it out and can hear speech quite distinctly from someone walking in the Park or in the streets, or anywhere in the building.

Patterson seems to have procured this from the F.B.I. The job has been pronounced a good one by McMillan.

_____ who is to be the C.I.A. chief representative here for matters affecting the J.I.C., has arrived. He used to be at _____ and I think has been with C.I.A. for some time. As far as Dick's and my recollections go, he might have been hewn out of solid oak! It seems that he is going to have the agendas of the Wednesday and Thursday meetings of the J.I.C., with the right to attend their sessions. He will also receive papers. Such items as are not suitable for discussion when he is present will be kept off the agenda.

We are to have a high-grade individual working in C.I.A. - _____ group - where all C.I.A. appreciations are formulated and produced in final draft form to the Advisory Council. The idea is to narrow the margin between our J.I.C. and American Intelligence appreciations.

Taking a long view, this may be a good thing, but it will certainly be a considerable embarrassment to the W.I.C. and probably prolong their discussions, which will take the form of integrated crystal gazing!

I do not think that Betts intends to interfere with de Bardeleben's activities, although nominally he will be his chief.

30th March.

I had a meeting with D.B., D.C., C.2, B.2 and B.2.c. about the control on aliens in war. Irvine explained that the Home Office more or less agreed that the Immigration authorities should only send to us such post reports as seemed to them to be of security significance. We would be them some guidance in this matter. The reports would, however, go first to the Police for any comments that they might care to make, and in order that it might be impressed upon them that they had a responsibility for exercising some sort of supervision over the aliens' activities.

A number of other points were discussed and agreed upon, and these will be considered later at a meeting at the Home Office.

 Dick has written what we feel is an extremely good memorandum on the question of Ministerial responsibility for this department. I have passed a copy of this to the D.G. The idea is that he should hand it to the P.M. It treats the whole subject in somewhat general terms and does not take Norman Brook up on every point of detail; we felt that to do so might be a tactical mistake, although we agreed that the D.G. should have the previous memorandum which gives an answer to every specific point raised. We have concentrated on the major issue of the defence aspect of our work and the extent to which it is tied up with that of all Government Department, with J.I.Cs, Defence Committees and Colonial Governors.

5th April.

I came back to the office to-day, having been sick for three days.

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 Hanley came to see me about a visit he is paying to Germany, in company with a representative of S.I.S. He is to advise on the policy of Security Wing in Int. Div.

I said it was difficult to see that there could be a let-up in any direction: Russian espionage and penetration of the German Security Service by Left Wing elements was obviously of great importance, but so also was any attempt at penetration by the Right. It seemed to me there was always the possibility that the Right might get a foot in the door and one day attempt to do a deal with the Russians: it was certainly a matter which would always have to be watched.

Burt telephoned to say that he had had a letter from Cornish of the Home Office about the Syrians. He was proposing to tell Cornish that he would make suitable arrangements with ourselves for their instruction.

6th April.


7th April.

Dick Butler came to talk about MONTAGU, who just wont lie down on the question of MINCEMEAT. I am afraid it shows his character at its worst. Incensed by Duff Cooper's publication "Operation Heartbreak", he first approached the Attorney General with the suggestion that Duff should be prosecuted. In some ways he should have been, although the case might have involved us all in a certain amount of ridicule. It would have been rather like the prosecution of Compton Mackenzie after the first world war, which ended in his writing another book on the Secret Service called "Water on the Brain". Having got the Attorney General's decision, it was obviously difficult for the authorities to resist MONTAGU's request that he be permitted to publish the true story. The Attorney General told him, apparently, that he had better see the Minister of Defence. This he has done and obtained a sympathetic hearing. The Minister did not insist that MONTAGU should show his script and get it approved, but suggested that such action would be appreciated. MONTAGU had now gone to "Life", who had offered him several thousand dollars for the story, and he talks of getting it reproduced in the Sunday Express and on the B.B.C. series "Now It Can Be Told". This is, of course all contrary to the decisions reached at the J.I.C.

Rather belatedly, I think, MONTAGU has communicated with Charles CHOLMONDELEY, whom he thinks is entitled to his rake-off. Charles is at present in the Far East on behalf of B.C.S. He is endeavouring to see whether there are any opportunities for deception in the area. I shall think the worse of him if he does not write to MONTAGU in some disgust and say that he does not wish to have anything to do with the present proposals.

Dick Butler has been brought into this through confidences (?) from MONTAGU, and apparently because he represents Charles CHOLMONDELEY. I suggested that he should talk the matter over with Drew, who may not be aware of the most recent developments.

Howard rang up to say that Murrie was to have a meeting next week on the control of aliens intime of war. Newsam apparently objects to the Chief Constables being given any discretionary powers in the matter of imposing restrictions upon aliens. I said to Howard that if it was proposed to centralise restrictions on aliens through London, we should create the most appalling bottle-neck. Surely Chief Constables could be given some measure of discretion which did not even involve internment.



9th April.

I talked to Marriott about Godfrey's memorandum on deception. We both agreed that it contains a good deal of relevant matter and we neither of us are very sure that it will achieve its purpose, namely, to convince senior officers in time of war that deception is a good thing. Nor are we wholly certain that, in view of the existence of L.C.S., that senior officers will need too much encouragement; it might result in their pressing us to run every agent that we can lay our hands on as a double. In answer to Godfrey's question as to whether we can operate as successfully against the Russians as we did against the Germans, we are apt to doubt this possibility, unless and until any existing organisation has been mopped up here after the outbreak of war and the Russians are forced to improvise de novo.

 Burt telephoned to me about the Syrians. Cornish apparently thinks the Home Secretary may be alarmed if they are given instruction from Special Branch. I said that I found this difficult to believe; everybody knew what Special Branch did - that they publicly attended Communist meetings and took down notes, and they prosecuted in cases of espionage. It was quite natural that representatives of foreign Police Forces, with analagous interests, should visit them. Burt said he would go back to Cornish and let him know the result.

At the Directors Meeting to-day D.O.S. gave details about the proposed Commonwealth Security Conference, with particular regard to entertainment.

I asked the D.G. about our memorandum for the P.M. on Ministerial responsibility. He said that he had altered it very considerably and put more punch into it, and that ultimately he would let us see a copy. The P.M. was still in hospital and not apparently likely to come out for some days.

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10th April.

For the minutes of the D.G. (Tuesday) meeting held to-day, see envelope at the back of the diary.

I attended the S.I.C. luncheon. I had quite a long conversation with [redacted] who had not come over during the last year. He seemed pleased the agreement had finally been reached on the question of the D.E.C. representation in [redacted]. He told me that for some little time he had had a rather vague commitment for protective security, but that this work was likely to assume great importance in the near future. (Whether this is due to the security inspection by the Standing Committee of N.A.T.O. which is about to take place I do not know). [redacted] is, however, attending the conference in Washington. In the past the work of protective security has been very much hampered by the large number of Communists who still remain in the various Ministries. [redacted] told me that some months ago, when he asked for security representatives from departments to attend a course with the D.E.C., quite a number of Communists were nominated. I rather gathered that the work of protective security had rather foundered on this rock and that up to now not very much progress had been made.

[redacted] thought that his commitment would become a more definite one in the course of the next month or so, and he hoped that he might rely on our assistance in planning his work. He referred to a note which he had received about a year or more ago from Irvine on C. Division functions, which he had found extremely valuable. An illustration of the extent to which Ministries are penetrated, he told me, the extent to which documents from the Quai d'Orsay, the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior, the Surete and, indeed, the D.E.C. periodically get published in toto in the Humanite, without any legal action being taken. He said that the powers exist under French law, but that the fact that the Communists have one-third of the seats in the Chambre des Deputes, makes it difficult, for political reasons, for any Government to stage a prosecution. He told me that he had very considerably tightened up physical security in D.E.C., which in many ways was far from satisfactory. The position is not yet ironed out as between D.E.C. and the Surete, but he seemed to hope for some improvement. He was incensed at the idea of the Surete publishing a brochure on the Russian Intelligence Service. He said: "What do they know about the Russian Intelligence Service? They have never caught a single spy, whereas I have". In fact this spy is his one and only "cheval de bataille", a rather feeble case which occurred in Austria, I think a good deal more than a year ago!

I am fairly convinced that neither the D.E.C. nor the Surete know very much about what is going on in their midst, or that if they do they are not sufficiently skilled to exploit the situation, or are prohibited from doing so for political reasons.

I saw Ronnie Howe and Burt about de COURCY. It was agreed that Special Branch would interview Michael de COURCY, and possibly Philip FARRER and others on the basis that a complaint had been made involving the purloining of documents. I referred to Count ROMER's affidavit and said that we had received casual information from an individual who had known ROMER for eleven years and had been associated with him at Polish H.Q. during the war. It was possible, therefore, that ROMER was referring to this individual, whose name, in fact, I could not recollect. There was, however, nothing in the suggestion

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suggestion that the Security Service had the idea of using Michael de COURCY in order to discredit the Digest. In any case, it seemed to me that it would be better not to pursue the ROMER side of the story, but allow it to become swamped by the investigations into the allegations made by Michael.

After the meeting Burt asked me whether I had heard anything about certain changes over our way. I said that I had not and it was unlikely that if anything of the kind was contemplated I should know about it. I was not at all clear to what he referred: it may have been to the Norman Broenquiry, which I clearly could not discuss with him.

I dined with [redacted] were there from the D.E.C., [redacted] was in good form, relating his past experiences. He finally got on to the question of the "Spotted Dick", whom we have all known for a long time and exploited. The French, for some reason, have refused to allow him to go back to France; I think they suspect that S.I.S. make some use of him in France, but there was no mystery about his having been employed by us in the past, and possibly by S.I.S. as a casual informant. [redacted] seemed to think that he and Ivan POPOV were getting together and were likely to embarrass the French. [redacted] said that POPOV and [redacted] were not on speaking terms and that he could not see any real harm in either. He felt he owed a debt of honour to [redacted] to protest to the French about the treatment that he was now receiving. The whole conversation was taken in good part, but I had the feeling that the French, while they thought [redacted] was an amusing card - as indeed he is - were not inclined wholly to trust him.

This conversation was followed by [redacted] trotting out the names of Gordon CANNING and Miss HOPE, who he said were intriguing in Tangier. Everybody believed that they were British agents. I said that of course I had known about Gordon CANNING for years; he is an intriguer, has been a friend of ABDEL EL KRIM, and during the war was a Fascist and was interned by us. Certainly he had never been an agent of ourselves, nor did I know anything about Miss HOPE.

[redacted] equally denied any knowledge of either of these people. The incident, however, served to show that the French are obviously very sensitive and inclined to think that if they find a British subject anywhere who is doing something that they do not like, he is bound to be an agent of British Intelligence. [redacted] of course, affected to believe that this was only a thing people were saying, although I think that he had a lurking suspicion at the back of his mind that CANNING and Miss HOPE were agents of S.I.S.

There was a good deal of conversation about agents-double, which the French have on the brain. [redacted] seemed to think that if we pooled all our questionnaires and information received, we should know when the Russian were trying to practice deception upon us. He instanced a case where he had received reports about tank platforms going back to Russia from the Eastern Zone of Germany, from which the inference to be drawn was that the Russians were bringing forward tanks to the area. [redacted] said that he, too, had had these reports, and that the Americans had also had them, but the verification on the ground had not substantiated the allegations. I am quite sure that any scheme of the kind would be a waste of time.

11th April.

Dick told me about the case of a Soviet agent that we had been looking for, who leaked from the British Embassy in 1944 or 1945. It is now thought

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
is Rome?

that this individual may be identical with the Foreign Office agent reported by KRIVITSKY as supplying information on Imperial Policy back in 1937. KRIVITSKY said that he was the son of some titled individual. Recent ACORN material served to narrow the field; this material has been in the possession of the Americans for a long time, but for some unknown reason has only just reached us. There are two people who might possibly fill the bill; one, Donald MACLEAN and the other, John RUSSELL. MACLEAN is now head of the American Department in the Foreign Office and is the brother of Nancy Maclean who was formerly in this office.

12th April.

West Africa and Lagos. D.E./A. reported that he was concerned at the number of women staff in the West Africa station, which indicated that the suggestions put forward by D.D.G. for the limitation of carding had not been fully implemented. It was decided to recommend to the D.G. that a Registry expert should be sent out to West Africa to look at the records and to attempt to bring about a reduction in the amount of clerical staff on the Station. At subsequent discussion it was decided that Mr. Potter should go to West Africa, and this proposal has been approved by the D.G.

D.E./A. stated that he was very keen for action to be taken to assimilate the O.S.4 records entirely into those of the Security Service. He proposed to provide another secretary for O.S.4, liberating Miss Stewart to carry out this work, and asked D.B. if he would consider liberating Mr. V.W. Smith from B.I.G. to continue this task. It was agreed in principle that this was desirable.



 At the suggestion of Mr. Morrison, Mr. Nicholson, Secretary to the Lord President of the Council, called here last night accompanied by Mr. Lobb, the Architect on the Festival site. Mr. Lobb had apparently received a report from Special Branch to the effect that some act of sabotage was likely to be committed if and when the dockers at present on trial were sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Mr. Lobb said that there had already been a

number of minor acts committed over a considerable period of time: these included the cutting of wires, the filling up of pipes with concrete, and the slashing of pictures. It had been suggested to Special Branch that they should put in some agents on the site; this they declined to do on the grounds that their men would be bound to become known and further trouble might ensue. Mr. Lobb wondered whether we could put in an agent in order to find out exactly what was going on.

I said that even if this were possible, I doubted whether it would be a profitable line of enquiry, since it seemed probable that the acts being committed were those of individually disgruntled people, and, although two or three might get together, the probability was that there was no organised plan behind it. It seemed to me that the only appropriate measure was to increase the number of protective guards. Mr. Lobb told me that they already had a security force of 70 ex-Police Officers of their own, but the area was a very wide one and close supervision was difficult.

I undertook to get into touch with Special Branch and discuss with them whether it was possible to do anything further, but I made it clear that, as far as I could see, the job was primarily a Police one.

I spoke to Burt about this this morning. He told me that Mr. Nicholson and Mr. Lobb were over at the Yard. He had discussed the case with them and had come to the same conclusion as ourselves, namely, that it was primarily a job for the Police Division concerned.

I gather that Mr. Nicholson and Mr. Lobb are now discussing the matter with Sir Harold Scott.

16th April.

I gave a lecture to the Police course which is at present going on.

Chief Inspector Jones of Special Branch came to see me. He had called on Michael de COURCY, who had more or less given him a repetition of the information contained in John de COURCY's affidavit, and had refused to state the names of those who were present at the meeting. Jones did not seem to me to have a very clear idea of the purpose of his enquiry. I told him that it must obviously be confined to enquiring into what amounted to an allegation that certain private documents, the property of Kenneth de COURCY, had been stolen and that certain Government agencies were implicated. It seemed to me that we must at all costs avoid any suggestion that we were making a private enquiry on behalf of de COURCY. The position was that de COURCY had made these allegations on the second-hand evidence of Michael de COURCY. Michael had told John de COURCY, and the latter had made an affidavit. No proof or evidence of any sort existed. The only course, therefore, was to go to Michael de COURCY, get a statement from him and follow it up.

Jones told me that among other things Michael had said that de COURCY's evidence on the atomic bomb explosion had been got from a Mrs. THOMPSON, living in Highgate, and from a young student at Oxford, whose name he did not give, although he said that he had in fact taken a message from Kenneth de COURCY to this student. The student apparently goes in for some form of psychic research and obtains his information by consulting planchette.

At the Directors Meeting the D.G. said that he had heard nothing further from Bridges about salaries, and nothing about Norman Brook's proposals in regard to Ministerial responsibility for this office.

I told the D.G. about the latest developments in the de COURCY case.

'C' telephoned to say that de COURCY had written him a letter saying that as the War Office had refused to investigate the group of persons pertaining to speak on 'C's behalf, he was obliged to take political steps; he would also have to put the facts to the Editors of Conservative newspapers. He then complained that the Rector of Clifton, in Galway, had informed him that a member of the group which says it represents S.I.S. and M.I.5 actually went to the extreme West of Ireland only two weeks ago to enquire into de COURCY's old grandfather's origin. He concludes: "One cannot ask for more evidence of money, time and determination.....", and states that he has sent these communications to his lawyers.

'C' subsequently replied to him by telephone, saying that there was no question of any Government Department being involved in enquiries about his ancestry; they were all far too busy with other things. He thought that de COURCY seemed reasonably satisfied.

Edward Thornton came to see me, but really had little to say, except that AVYAKTANANDA was now striking out on his own and had refused to appear before the Ramakrishna Vedanta Centre in order to explain his present position.

I told Hill about my conversation with 'C' regarding de COURCY.

17th April.

Jones telephoned to tell me that de COURCY had rung up to say that he had been visited by Michael, who evidently gave a garbled account of his interrogation by Jones.

The view that de COURCY is unbalanced is increasing.

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18th April.

I asked Vivian about the records of the interviews with KRIVITSKY and subsequent enquiries which it was alleged were made through the Foreign Office in an endeavour to establish the identity of the individual alleged by KRIVITSKY to have passed information from Imperial Defence sources. This information has become particularly relevant in connection with the enquiries into Donald MACLEAN.

Meanwhile, there is another case of considerable importance. A man named _____, in the Ministry of Defence private office, is the husband of a woman in another Department - I think the Ministry of _____ - who appears to be a secret Party member, a record

of whose services is held by the [] Group. It seems unlikely that [] is not aware of his wife's political views, and he may indeed share them. We are turning the heat on, but Sir Harold Parker, the J.S. does not feel that he can allow the situation to continue for more than about a week or ten days without informing the Minister. If any action is taken against [] I am afraid the [] will be blown. It seems to me that if we are forced to take action, we ought to get a search warrant on [] and obtain her records of secret Party members in Government employ.

I talked to Mann about a complaint made by one of the Scottish officers attending the present course to the effect that he was often out of pocket in dealing with S.B. informants whom he entertained. In point of fact his Chief Constable receives a grant, although what he does with it nobody knows.

I told Mann that the officer should be advised to put in his expenses and, if necessary, could say that Mann had told him that there was a special grant from the Security Service to cover them.

19th April.

General Airey, Eisenhower's Chief Intelligence Officer at S.H.A.P.E. came to see us at the J.I.C. He was formerly British G.O.C. in Trieste.

Airey gave an interesting account of his difficulties. He had in all a staff of 21 officers from all the N.A.T.O. Powers, but very few of them (and this, I think, might apply to General Airey himself) knew anything about Intelligence. He said that the only man upon whom he could rely was an American called [] - the British contribution being, at the moment, totally inadequate. He was forced to make appointments to the various branches of his organisation in such a manner as not to give offence, particularly to the French who were extremely sensitive about any "ganging-up" between ourselves and the Americans. General Eisenhower had talked about the "Atlantic Man", but when one tried to put this into practice the results were somewhat alarming! The head of his Security Branch was a Frenchman. (This seemed a curious appointment to the Committee in view of their extended deliberations on the question of French insecurity.) The head of his Information Department was an Italian called [], who was a high-ranking official of the Italian Intelligence Organisation, S.I.M. He hoped that the War Office would supply a full Colonel as No. 2 to this Italian. He would have under him a French Capitaine de Vaisseau. Added to all this, he was living in a hotel with little security: the Americans had given him a full-blooded Hawaiian as secretary, who, they told him, had been "cleared for everything"! This was met with ribald laughter by the Committee. Other members of his staff were a British sergeant called Macarthur, whose name, at any rate, did not inspire confidence at this moment, and an Italian carabinieri.

In spite of this lamentable state of affairs, General Eisenhower was urging that he should receive as much intelligence as possible. He was pleased with the S.H.A.P.E. summary, which he valued particularly since his own Government were sending him nothing except raw SIGINT material, which goes to a special Box established in Paris. Nobody knows what this material is, which is presumably unprocessed and therefore dangerous, and it seems doubtful to G.C.H.Q. whether in fact there is a great deal that has particular reference to S.H.A.P.E.'s command. U.S.C.I.B. have suggested that as an interim measure, this procedure should go on and that G.C.H.Q. should brief General Airey. Meanwhile he, as head of Eisenhower's Intelligence, cannot see any of the USCIB material going to Paris, as the Americans allege that he has not been properly indoctrinated.

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The Committee felt that probably the flow of SIGINT material from the U.S.A. could be cut down if we knew exactly what was being sent, and that the box in Paris should be a joint affair between ourselves and the Americans with appropriate processing facilities. General Airey is taking the line with his liaison officers that there may be certain information which they do not wish to put in to the general pool but which they could communicate personally to the C.-in-C., or General Airey as his representative.

Airey hopes to receive officially processed Intelligence from Washington and London, processed Intelligence from Front to Rear in Europe, i.e. from all military organisations, including B.A.O.R., and lastly, processed Intelligence from all national organisations. An added complication is the interposition of General Juin's Headquarters, which controls all the land forces for S.H.A.P.E.

General Airey had the Committee's full sympathy, and everything possible is being done to help him.

We considered a note which stated that the Americans want British agreement to bomb Manchurian air bases if the United Nations are again attacked in force. Before giving their consent, the Chiefs of Staff want a report on the build-up in Manchuria in order that they can assess precisely what the threat amounts to.

The view of the Air Ministry, as far as I can gather, is that, for the next six months at any rate, the threat cannot be very great unless the Russians intend to intervene with their own pilots and machines. Even with the assistance of Russian M.I.G 15s, it is not estimated that the Chinese Air Force can do very much on its own, but there are signs that intensive training is going on and that airfields are being built in Northern Korea to take jet fighters.

A.C.A.S.(I) informed the meeting that Type 27 twin-engined light bombers had appeared in Poland, but not yet in Germany. They had been seen for the first time a year ago and 54 were recently seen in Moscow during a rehearsal for the May Day parade.

Reilly said that in Persia the Communists were definitely stimulating unrest in Abadan and Isbahan, and this might spread to Teheran. There was, however, no indication of direct intervention by Moscow. The new General appointed to establish order in the oil districts appeared to be a complete flop: he seems unwilling to take any drastic action and merely says that the present disorders are entirely due to the British. The probability is that he is afraid of his own skin, like most Persians.

The War Office explanation of the present reluctance of the Chinese in Korea to give battle is that they may be drawing the Allied Forces into a position which they feel will render them vulnerable to attack. This refers particularly to the front north west of Seoul, which forms almost a right-angle. There is said to be a Chinese build-up here of about 200,000.

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At the "post mortem" on the Police course, two of those present, and I think their views were probably acquiescent, felt that Hill's lecture and Leggett's lecture, although good in themselves, were not of much value to Police officers of their standing. They argued that they were not really concerned with the precise terms of the Official Secrets Acts; they merely received an order from the D. of P.P. or the Lord Advocate to prosecute under a certain section. In regard to Satellite Intelligence organisations, they did not seem to think that it helped the very much to know precisely how the Czechs or the Poles organised their Intelligence Service. This is, of course, a rather typically narrow Police outlook, but it may be that such information is rather remote from their kind of enquiries. Personally, if I were looking for members of the Czech and Polish Intelligence Services, I should like to know how they were organised. The Police, of course, only think in terms of an individual who is breaking the law and are not much concerned with the organisation behind it. If they were, they would often act in a much more enlightened manner!

20th April.

I saw Newsam about the cases of Donald MACLEAN and . He was rather shocked to hear that both of these people might be working in Russian interests.

21st April.

I received a long report from Special Branch on Superintendent Jones's interview with Michael de COURCY, and subsequent talks with Kenneth de COURCY.

Jones has not got a statement out of Michael, to the effect that he believes he was entirely mistaken in suggesting that the interview that he had with those people, whose names he still refused to disclose, was in no way inspired from Government sources and that those present were not representatives of either M.I.5 or M.I.6.

As regards the documents themselves, there was nothing to show that they emanated from official sources. In between the two interviews that he had with Jones, Michael went to de COURCY and made four statements about what had passed between him and Jones.

Somebody is obviously lying - probably Michael, or both. I rather feel that we have got de COURCY where we want him.

23rd April.

I spoke to Hill about the case of de COURCY. He seems to think that we should be fully justified in asking de COURCY to issue a denial that his troubles are in any way due to official activities in the next issue of the Digest, and if he does not intend to do this we shall have to use other channels for giving the matter the necessary publicity.

I showed the report to the D.G. He has asked me to discuss the matter with 'C' and with Ronnie Howe.

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Furnival Jones tells me that a man named Harwell, has committed suicide. There is some suggestion of Left Wing tendencies, owing to certain documents found, but a more probable explanation is that he had been having an affair with another girl, although he was already married, and she is going to have a baby. also appears to have been in debt to the tune of several hundred pounds, which hardly suggests that he has been receiving money from the Russians.

The worst feature of the case is that in September, 1950, the Hampshire Police sent in a report suggesting that was a Communist and stating where he was employed. For some reason or other this report was filed and never put up to any section by the Registry.

--24th April--

For the minutes of the D.G. (Tuesday) meeting held to-day, see envelope at the back of the diary.

Admiral Godfrey came to see me to discuss his memorandum on deception. I gave him certain comments which Marriott and I had agreed on. His main question was whether we should in a future war do to the Russians what we had done to the Germans. I said that in our view we had a completely different problem. There were three difficulties; firstly, it seemed unlikely that we should have anything comparable to ISOS, which had of course been invaluable in knowing exactly where we stood in our operations against the Germans. Secondly, we might well have an important stay-behind organisation in this country, which of course we had not had in the case of the Germans. Thirdly, that it would be extremely difficult to maintain the same degree of security, but that we achieved in the last war, since with a potential Fifth Column in this

country, the Russians would have far better opportunities for ascertaining whether the facts we gave them were true and whether our agents were under control. It seemed, therefore, that unless we could liquidate fairly effectively the Russian stay-behind organisation and force the Russians to build up a new organisation from the outside, we should find our task a very difficult one. If, on the other hand, we could liquidate the Russian stay-behind organisation, we might be able to "assist them" in building a new one.

I sent over the Special Branch reports about de COURCY to 'C'. He telephoned back to say that he was going away for ten days: that he did not wish the enquiries pressed any further unless S.B. felt that they wished to complete the investigation by visiting Philip FARRER and others. He thought the result of the enquiry was satisfactory and that de COURCY should be asked to publish a denial in the Digest.

25th April.

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Serpell tells me that there has been a great deal of trouble about the Mediterranean Naval command. When we suggested a British admiral, the Americans turned the idea down flat, saying that under no circumstances could units of the American Fleet be under the command of a British admiral. They suggested that our susceptibilities would be met if a British admiral were placed directly under Eisenhower to cover the whole of his southern flank. We made a counter proposal that we should hold the appointment they proposed, and that they should then appoint an Admiral between our representative on the Supreme Commander's staff and a British admiral commanding the Mediterranean Fleet. In this way it would always be open to the Americans to protect their own interests if they objected to decisions by the British commander in the Mediterranean. The Americans turned this down as well, and discussions became so heated that finally the Chiefs of Staff recommended the Government to accede to the American proposal that they should command in the Mediterranean and that we should have an admiral on Eisenhower's staff to be responsible for the protection of his southern flank.

The whole of this is interesting, since it was only a short time ago that the Americans were anxious to write off the Eastern Mediterranean entirely. Since then, however, they have established very close relations with Turkey and kept us in the dark about what they have been doing.

Meanwhile, Winston, in the House, has been prepared to give the Americans the Mediterranean, possibly because he thinks that if they have a firm commitment they will feel constrained to act if there is trouble,

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and that the Eastern Mediterranean powers will be stimulated to resist. He is, however, still disagreeing about the Atlantic command, on the grounds that it is impossible to defend these shores from Washington and that the British Navy knows more about the intricacies of European waters than the rest of the world put together.

26th April.

At the J.I.C. (Directors) meeting to-day it was mentioned that the Americans have refused intelligence to General Airey on the lines being given by us in the weekly S.H.A.P.E. summary. It is presumed that Eisenhower will take this up in a big way, since it is quite ridiculous that information should be refused to his Chief Intelligence Officer.

It was mentioned that, on the basis of a telegram received from Boucher in Tokyo, the Chinese new offensive is on a big scale and that the Chinese appear to be committed in Korea in a far bigger way than was at first anticipated. I gather that fresh units and arms have been identified. It is thought that we may perhaps withdraw about twenty-five miles or so, but that the Chinese will suffer extremely heavy losses. The feeling is that the more they commit themselves and pursue their present tactics, by coming on in hordes only to be mown down, the more likely they are to avoid committing themselves elsewhere and ultimately to be prepared for peace negotiations.

[] telephoned to me to say that [] has now been confirmed in his appointment. He thought this would mean that [] report about the future of D.E.C., which involves a far greater measure of collaboration by the Surete, rather on the basis of our own relations with the Police, has been accepted. He could not tell me much about [], the new Head of the Surete, except that he did at one time work on the administrative side in the Surete and had since held an appointment as Prefect in the provinces.

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Hanover Square. The proposals submitted by A.1 for the move to Hanover Square were in general agreed with the exception that Senior Officer C.2 should move there as well. D.C. also drew attention to the increased number of Officers in C.2. It was noted that pie-a-terre accommodation in Leconfield House should be provided for the Sections moving and that the Shuttle Service to and from Hanover Square should be as frequent as possible, probably every half-hour.

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27th April.

At a Directors meeting to-day the D.G. spoke to us about his interview with Bridges on the question of Chorley increases for directing staff, which up to the present has been held up.

The D.N.I. telephoned in reference to the explosion of the ammunition ship in Gibraltar harbour, which has caused widespread damage and the loss of twelve lives. He said that the depth charges, which contained Torpex, came from the same batch as those which went up at Bedenham. He thought I should like to know this as it seemed possible to confirm our view that the Bedenham explosion was accidental. He said that although Pelling might not be able to do very much, he thought it was well that he should proceed to Gibraltar.

28th April.

I saw Howe and Burt this morning. I said that while it was satisfactory to know that both Michael de COURCY and Kenneth de COURCY had reached the conclusion that the alleged incidents reported by Michael de COURCY in his affidavit to John de COURCY had nothing to do with any Department of the British Government, it seemed to me that as these false allegations had been broadcast in the Digest both here and in America, it should at least be suggested to Kenneth de COURCY that in fairness to the authorities he should publish something in the nature of a denial in his next issue of the Digest. Secondly, it seemed to me that he should clarify his position with regard to the case of the two scientists at Harwell who were alleged in the Digest to be communicating information to the Russians. He should say whether he knew their names or not, and if he did, whether he was or was not prepared to pass these names to the authorities.

While Howe saw the desirability of this, he was a little doubtful whether it was for the Police to carry the matter further. The Home Office had now come into the case, through an official request to the Home Secretary for a copy of the statement made by Michael de COURCY to Superintendent Jones of Special Branch. It seemed probable that Kenneth de COURCY wanted this statement for the purpose of future action against Michael de COURCY, and the probable answer will be that such statements, based on Police enquiries, are not given to members of the public.

Howe is away until next Thursday, when he proposes to have a discussion about the case with Oakley of the Home Office. It was suggested that meanwhile I should see Oakley and explain to him our

point of view as regards the whole matter.

30th April.

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Young of the Ministry of Defence telephoned about the case of a man called HOLLIDAY, who had been somewhat indiscreet in Cyprus and seemed to have been poking his nose unnecessarily into local politics. He said that although D.S.I. might have said that he would be interested to hear about affairs in Cyprus, a country with which he was personally acquainted, he is quite certain that he did not ask HOLLIDAY to make any enquiries in Cyprus.

I had a talk with Graham, as a result of which I told Young that there was no apparent security interest; it merely seemed that HOLLIDAY had been rather indiscreet and stupid. Young explained that HOLLIDAY was a historian and probably made enquiries from personal interest.

[] telephoned to say that [] would be coming over next week and would hope to see officers of this Department. He had thought of trying to arrange something of a programme for him; he would, of course, be going to S.I.S. as well.

[] also asked whether any arrangements were being made about accommodation for the Tripartite Cosmic Committee arriving from New York next week. I told him that as far as I knew, none, but that Andre of the Embassy was in touch with the Foreign Office, from whom he could get a firm answer. I ascertained later that there were no arrangements and told [] who is at his wit's end to find accommodation.

Later [] rang me to know whether there would be any objection to his attending the meetings of the Tripartite Committee. The reason I think is that [] do not really understand English.

I spoke to Hollis who had a word with Carey Foster. Carey sees no objection and will make the necessary arrangements.

King rang me about a Cold War Committee meeting on Thursday which is to discuss Cyprus. The Committee are proposing that AKEL should either be suppressed or severely harassed. We have been asked to send a representative.

Hollis has talked to me about the explosion at Gibraltar. The Admiralty, having been reprimanded in the Bedenham case for not calling in the local Police, telegraphed to Gibraltar to ask whether the Gibraltar Police were capable of dealing with the case. On getting an unfavourable reply they approached the Home Office and Scotland Yard. The result is that two Special Branch officers are now going out. As usual the Navy when not in their ships are inclined to get things a bit muddled. The purpose of calling in the local Police is because they have local knowledge and responsibilities. Two policemen from Special Branch are like fish out of water in Gibraltar; they cannot in fact do any more than what Pelling is doing, namely, take statements from suitable witnesses. It seems rather unnecessary to have three people doing this; two of them from a different organisation.

Hollis is a little inclined to think that the Admiralty may not altogether trust us, since we took a contrary view to the Board of Enquiry on the Bedenham explosion. There is in fact always a tendency in the Admiralty to think that everything is sabotage and to underrate our competence to judge correctly in these matters. I am inclined to think that our one concern is to cry "no sabotage" in order to cover our own yardarm!

Longley-Cook, however, seems to be on our side in this case.

1st May.

A telegram has gone to Pelling to tell him of the arrival of the two Special Branch officers and to instruct him to collaborate with them. Similar instructions have gone from the Admiralty, who wish Pelling to remain, instructing the Naval authorities to continue to give him all facilities.

Meanwhile, it appears that the explosives were being off-loaded from the ammunition ship on to a lighter. The ammunition had been piled up at each end and about 70 depth charges had been placed in the centre. As one of the hoists came down, there was a 'woof' and a jet of flame coming from one of the depth charges. The heat generated caused an explosion on the lighter within six minutes and the detonation set off the explosion on the ammunition ship, which was alongside the jetty. Its rear portion sank and the bows were blown on to the quay.

The ordnance department at the Admiralty received a signal to stop all filling of depth charges with Torpex for the time being. It is, moreover, stated that newly-filled depth charges are just as dangerous as the old ones.

The Police, on instructions from the Admiralty, are making enquiries both at Plymouth and Glascoed. It does not seem likely that they will get anywhere. Everything, in fact, points to Torpex being a thoroughly unsuitable explosive which should not be used in future.

Cumming and James Robertson talked to me about our Watchers. Robertson has reached the conclusion, which interests me since it is a point which I have emphasised for many years, namely, that an efficient watching service is absolutely vital if we are doing to detect a spy. In fact it is the only method in a large number of cases. It is of course an immensely difficult problem: we are up against two difficulties: one, that Storrier is not a very imaginative person and very reluctant to accept any ideas. The other is that we require considerably more Watchers than we have got at present. While Harry Hunter was here, I was always urging him to get more Watchers; the trouble was, however, that his standards were so high that he could never find anyone to meet them; progress was consequently very slow. We have gone quite a long way since then, but still have not got enough to enable us to ring the changes. Neither are the number of people we have of the right calibre. There have been a number of cases where the Watchers have been spotted. On the other hand, some progress has been made on the technical side by the use of cars with wireless and "walkie-talkies". It seems, too, that Storrier, who has been heavily pushed from behind for the last two years, is now inclined to contribute these advances to his own initiative!

I said that, if necessary, I should be quite prepared to raise the whole matter with the D.G., but Robertson seemed to think that, for the moment at any rate, Storrier was showing a greater interest in new developments and that it would be better to let things ride.

We are trying to get [redacted] on MACLEAN, but meanwhile we are entirely dependent upon Watchers, who in any case are an essential ingredient in an enquiry of this kind.

2nd May.

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Mackenzie of the Foreign Office rang up to say there was to be another meeting of the Cold War Committee on Wednesday next, to discuss priorities and the training of foreign police officers. A painful and boring subject!

I telephoned to Burt to ask him what was being done about the Syrian police officers who wished to come to this country. After speaking to Cornish, he said that Cornish had written to the Foreign Office, indicating to some extent that it would be undesirable for Special Branch to communicate very much about their work, although how Special Branch, who appear in every Communist and espionage case, can hide their heads under a bushel, I cannot imagine! The Home Office seem to think that it is not generally known that they deal in these matters!

3rd May.

At the staff meeting to-day, we first of all discussed the representation at the Commonwealth Security Conference, and then Morton's telegram about the status of S.O.C. S.I.F.E.

As regards the latter, we agreed that it was wrong that there should be any rigid arrangement by which the head of J.I.D. attended the J.I.C. He would do so more often than not in the absence of H/S.I.F.E., but there might be occasions when the Acting H/S.I.F.E. should be there to deal with matters of policy or C. Division matters. Sometimes it might be necessary for both of them to be present. We also agreed that there was no necessity to inform S.I.S. about this arrangement at present.

We then proceeded to discuss our wartime organisation, which can now be finalised. D.E./A would prepare lists showing what new appointments would have to be filled, either from existing staff or from new intake.

4th May.

Oakley came to see me about de COURCY. Hill and I explained to him our point of view. Firstly, some apology was due for the misleading statements about the Michael incident, but, more important, that something should be done about the allegation that there were still two professors at Harwell giving information to the Russians. There was a nasty inference that left wing officials were turning a blink eye. The effect of this message on Anglo-American co-operation in the atomic energy field was likely to be considerable. We felt, therefore, that the matter could not be allowed to rest where it was. If de COURCY would not disclose the names and the source of information. Section 6 of the O.S.A. should be invoked.

Oakley said that he was glad to have our point of view and that he would represent it to the Home Office for any discussion that they might be having with the Yard. It was agreed that, if possible, I should be present at such a discussion.

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The D.G. saw the P.M. at 5.30 in order to discuss the proposal that we should be put ministerially under the Home Office. The D.G. said that on the previous Tuesday he had discussed the same matter with Bridges, who had read the memorandum prepared by Serpell, which he thought was too long. The D.G. asked him if he would be kind enough to make him a short draft since he had the experience of the kind of thing required. This draft has been sent over and amended by Dick. I had not in fact seen it before, but it struck me as being singularly inadequate. It seemed to me that our original short draft really put the case much better. Bridges' view was that we should concentrate on the main point - that we did not wish to be departmentalised, since we had business with all Departments.

The D.G. handed the P.M. the amended Bridges note and then put over to him the various other points made in his long memorandum. The P.M. seemed receptive and, generally speaking, in agreement. He expressed his intention of seeing Brook.

5th May.

Dick Butler came to see me about Operation MINCEMEAT. I told him that I could not possibly say to Cholmondeley that I thought Montagu's proposal, to blow the whole Operation in "Life" and on the air, was a good one. My objection was that - regrettable as Duff Cooper's book was - it did not state the facts in black and white; in any case two wrongs did not make a right. Far the worst feature of Montagu's proposed action was the effect that it would have on others, who might well ask why they could not publish their reminiscences. I thought that Cholmondeley would ultimately regret his action; my advice to him would be to have nothing to do with Montagu's proposal.

Butler told me, off the record, that "Life" were now asking Montagu to give them a series of articles on deception generally. Montagu realised that this was impossible, but it shows how one thing leads to another.

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8th May.

Burt came to see me; firstly about a purge case relating to a certain [redacted]. Special Branch had visited the Establishment Officer at the outset of their enquiries. This had given an impression of inefficiency and caused irritation, since we had already been in touch with the Establishment Officer and obtained all the necessary particulars. Burt appears to have a counter-complaint, that officers when writing to Special Branch do not always give them the proper supporting points for their enquiries; they will give a man's home address but not his place of employment.

Burt gave me a copy of a letter from the Home Office to Cecil King of the Foreign Office, on the subject of the Syrians who want to be given a course over here. The letter seemed to me to contain a lot of nonsense about Special Branch not disclosing to the Syrians that they indulged in anti-Communist activity. As if everybody did not know that their main activity is anti-Communist! However, we are now left to work out details with Burt.

Lastly, I talked to Burt about the case of de COURCY and the use of Section 6. He seemed to agree with me that action should and could be taken. He asked me whether he could discuss the matter with Howe, and rang back subsequently to say that Howe was entirely in agreement. I acquainted 'C' with the position. He seemed to have no objection to the course of action proposed. I therefore took over, with the D.G.'s approval, a letter to Newsam. His reaction was that if we used Section 6 it would be tantamount to saying that we believed de COURCY's information to be accurate. I went into this point with Hill on my return and sent Newsam a further letter, in which I pointed out that the police officer conducting the interview was only called upon to suspect that a felony had been committed. There seemed to me to be a wide difference between suspecting and believing.

[redacted] arrived with [redacted] The D.G. was unable to see them as he was catching a train. [redacted] after making his apologies, asked quite a number of pertinent questions about our relations with the Police. I explained to him the whole system of our working with the Police; I made it clear that we had no executive powers and no powers for ordering the Police to do anything. Our liaison, however, was excellent and the results satisfactory. I think

he was seeking this information, since I know that he hopes to control cases of espionage which are now investigated by the Surete.

9th May.

We had a paper up to-day at the J.I.C. on "Post Report". We are endeavouring to get the J.I.C.'s support for the use of a Hollerith machine by the Home Office, which would enable Departments seeking information from Post Report to get an easy reply. The Home Office appear to be reluctant to undertake this work unless there is a demand for it from other quarters. This is rather typical of the Home Office; clearly it would be very much to their own advantage to have the whole of the enemy alien population on a Hollerith. They have made up their minds, however, that they will not go in for any form of category internment, and that the Hollerith is therefore of no use to them. Experience shows, however, that in wartime they may well have their hands forced, in which case their machinery will be found wanting.

The Committee were in favour of the project and have given it their support. The Chairman is to write to the Home Office.

I had lunch with the French Ambassador. 'C', [redacted] were representing S.I.S. [redacted] was the principal guest.

I attended a cocktail party at [redacted] and the Tripartite delegates.

asked me whether it would possible for somebody to speak to the delegates about the line of demarcation between military and civil security. I told him that the line was an extremely wavy one and the subject a little complicated, but that if he asked the question Hollis could give him a rough answer at the conclusion of his lecture to-morrow.

10th May.

Kazim Raza, head of the D.I.B. Pakistan, came to see me. I gave him a brief account of the work of the office, and thereafter he gave me his views about the state of the world in general and the reasons for discontent. He touched on the Pakistan plot. He was at some pains to explain that the Communist elements had come into the plot rather as an afterthought, as it was felt that a more popular backing was required and that the Soviet system, suitably dressed up, would have an appeal. In this the plotters had been mistaken. The real motive had been two-fold: firstly, a desire to see the departure of British officers and officials, who it was felt were blocking the road to promotion, and secondly, a feeling that the Kashmir dispute was not being pursued with sufficient vigour.

Kazim Raza did not explain why the Government, with full knowledge of what was going on, had sent the principal figure in the plot to attend a course at the I.D.C., and I did not think it politic to pursue this question. From official communications it seems that there was an idea that a course at the I.D.C. would get him out of the way and cause him to take a more favourable view of the British. From our point of view this is not very good security.

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The D.G.'s note to Directors about attending Divisional meetings was discussed.

O.S. have one meeting a week which lasts about an hour-and-a-half. B. Division have two meetings, one of B.1 officers, which lasts about an hour, and another of B.2 officers, which also lasts about an hour. B. Division also have a monthly meeting of the whole Division. C. Division have one meeting, of C.2. officers, which lasts about an hour.

It was agreed that D.D.G. should ask the D.G. the order in which he would like to attend these meetings and the times which would best suit his convenience.

There was a discussion, for which Spencer was present, about the staffing of our overseas stations in time of war. The meeting felt that the only obligation on Head Office would be to keep the existing Security Service element up to strength. The additional staff should come entirely from the military establishments provided.

In the case of S.I.M.E. the numbers had already been agreed, but, for various reasons, the S.I.F.E. figures were not yet available. As regards the other stations, it would have to be decided which of these might become militarised at any particular stage. In such cases a military establishment should be provided for in case it should be required. For those stations which need not be militarised, it was felt that S.L.Os should be told to keep their eyes open for any local recruits on the basis of a war time establishment which they will have.

11th May.

Mullik, D.I.B. India, came to see me. He is not such a pleasant personality as Kazim Raza; he gives the appearance of being rather shifty, but I think it is probably only nervousness. I gave him a talk on the work of the office and he appeared anxious to continue the discussion at a later date.

 We gave a lunch to the Tripartite Working Group at the Cripps Arms.

15th May.

George McClellan has turned up for the Commonwealth Security Conference which opens this week. He told me that Geoffrey Patterson and Kim had both witnessed, on the television, MacArthur's speech to Congress. Mickey had gathered a number of other staunch republicans from the F.B.I. for the occasion. When the speech came to an end with the words "Old soldiers never die.....", etc., Geoffrey and Kim looked round to see tears pouring down the faces of Mickey and his supporters. Geoffrey and Kim did not apparently find much difficulty in keeping a stiff upper lip!

By contrast, a very different scene was going on in the Pentagon, where Philip Vickery and Harry Stone were witnessing the same scene. The hostility was intense and there were shouts of "Liar!", etc., right through the whole proceedings. The reference to the alleged support of the Chiefs of Staff produced an uproar.

 The opening session of the Commonwealth Security Conference the D.G. read a message from the P.M. and then an address by himself. The proceedings did not last more than a few minutes as everybody had expressed agreement with the agenda and the meeting was adjourned. The J.I.C. and a number of officials from the C.R.O. were present. Subsequently we gave a cocktail party here.

It seems to me that we are making a rather heavy weather over this Conference; it is really only a meeting of experts - so-called - and I should have thought it would have been better kept on that level with as little formality as possible.

16th May.

At the cocktail party last night Ronnie Howe said that Burt appeared to be worried about Pelling's enquiries into the explosion at Gibraltar. I said that I could not quite understand what he was worrying about, although the Admiralty had caused a good deal of confusion by first

asking us to send out Pelling, and subsequently making arrangements, without saying anything to us, for two S.B. officers to go out. I told Howe that the real reason for applying to the police was that the Admiralty had a kick in the pants over the Bedenham incident, for not calling in the local police. On this occasion they had telegraphed to Gibraltar to enquire about the efficiency of the local police and budgeting a somewhat unfavourable reply P.U.S. Admiralty had approached the Commissioner. On hearing of all this after the event, we had telegraphed to Pelling instructing him to collaborate with the S.B. officers.

I saw Pelling this morning. He has just returned from Gibraltar. Skittery is, of course, co-ordinating the enquiries at Plymouth, Glascoed and Beith, but the S.B. officers will probably want to double-bank then in order to produce a gargantuan report on the whole incident, which few people will read!

Pelling himself sees no point in our pursuing the matter here, provided Bailey, the scientific armaments man, who is the real expert on Torpex depth charges, lets us know his findings. Pelling suggests that Skittery, Special Branch and the Admiralty should get together and decide what ground each will cover.

I cannot imagine what has aroused Burt's suspicions that we wish to interfere. I am afraid it is the old jealousy that always seems to come out when you get questions of police jurisdiction.

I had a meeting with Fulton, Cope, Kellar and Haldane Porter to decide on a joint line to be taken at the Dixon Committee meeting to-morrow, which is to discuss priorities for the training of foreign police forces in security matters.

Coveney came to say good-bye. He was surprised that his application to join the Australian Security Service had been so quickly accepted. I told him that his application had been referred back here, through our S.L.O., and that I had put in a recommendation. I explained to him the position of our S.L.O., of whom he would doubtless see a good deal, and I told him what I knew about Australian security. I advised him to see Colonel Spry, who was now in this country, and also to have a talk with Courtenay Young.

17th May.

I discussed with Howe and Burt the Gibraltar sabotage case, in the light of a remark that Howe had made to me at the cocktail party for the Commonwealth Security Conference delegates. He had said that Burt was rather worried about the sabotage case and certain enquiries that Pelling was proposing to make, and that he thought we ought to have a discussion. I said I thought it right that both he and Burt should know exactly how this case had arisen.

When the explosion occurred we and the Admiralty had received a telegram and the Admiralty had asked us to send out someone to assist in the enquiries. Pelling had arrived in Gibraltar within twenty-four hours, carrying with him of course, all his experience of the Bedenham explosion, and had proceeded to make enquiries. Subsequently we had heard from the Admiralty that two Special Branch officers were on their way to Gibraltar. We had not been consulted about this and had had no

previous warning either from the Admiralty or from Special Branch. We had, however, telegraphed immediately to our representative, instructing Pelling to give Special Branch all the information that he had and to assist them in any way he could. Before we had heard of the proposal to send two Special Branch officers to Gibraltar, Skittery, Chief Constable of Plymouth, had approached the C.-in-C. and asked him whether he should conduct investigations at Plymouth, whence the ship Bedenham had sailed for Gibraltar. The C.-in-C. had telegraphed to the Admiralty, and on getting a favourable reply had so informed Skittery. Skittery had then communicated with us, asking whether we could give him some of the background of the Bedenham case and suggesting that he should co-ordinate the enquiries in this country with the Chief Constables of Monmouthshire and Ayrshire, whence the depth charges had come. We put this to N.I.D., who asked us to send down an officer to see Skittery, give him the information he required, and request him to co-ordinate the enquiries in this country.

It was clear, therefore, that the Admiralty had asked three separate organisations to conduct enquiries, and that if anybody had cause for complaint it might well be ourselves, seeing that security in Gibraltar was our affair and that nobody had informed us about the proposal to call in Special Branch until well after the event.

Both Howe and Burt hastened to apologise for not informing us about the visit of the Special Branch officers, and for wrongly assuming that we had already been notified by the Admiralty. They were not in any complaining about Pelling's activities or about the action of M.I.5; they merely thought that the responsibilities were not clearly defined and that something should be done to straighten things out and to make provision for the future. They seemed to think that in a matter of this sort it would be preferable if Scotland Yard were called in at the outset, as they probably would be in any serious criminal case, and they undertook that, if such a solution were thought by the Admiralty and Home Office to be satisfactory, they would keep us informed if there was any suggestion that either a subversive organisation or a foreign Power was at the back of the incident.

I did not commit myself in any way as regards this proposal, but I made it quite clear that some clarification of the position seemed necessary and that we should be speaking to the Admiralty. I mentioned our circular letter, a copy of which was being sent to the Commissioner of Police and had already been sent to other Chief Constables, which showed precisely where our interests lay according to the Prime Minister's charter.

I gather that when the Special Branch officers returned to this country, the suggestion that they should visit Plymouth in order to continue their enquiries, was somewhat coldly received, when Skittery said that he had instructions from M.I.5 to co-ordinate all matters relating to the explosion. This, of course, was not true; the instructions had come from the Admiralty, and M.I.5 had merely been the channel for conveying them. There had also, it was alleged, been a certain amount of friction between Skittery and the Monmouth Police.

I spoke to Burt about the HOPKINS case, and the note which Burt had passed to me on the subject. I accepted the arrangement, that in cases initiated by us Special Branch would in future let us know if they wished to approach the Establishment Officer in a Ministry. I said that the way of informing us must be their own affair and that I quite understood that in a bit office things might get out of hand if all S.B. officers

concerned had access to junior officers here. On the other hand, I felt it was a pity that more S.B. officers were not personally acquainted with officers here. I pointed out that in regard to provincial Police Forces the liaison was now very close indeed, and covered not only Chief Constables but also Detective Superintendents and S.B. officers. A lot of goodwill had been generated and the quality of the information received had much improved. I thought that if similar arrangements existed with S.B. the resentment referred to in the S.B. note, which really had no justification in fact, would be largely dispelled.

I told Burt that if he could think of any way of achieving this end, I should be very glad to do anything I could to assist.

Burt did not seem anxious to dig out any past cases - possibly owing to doubts that such cases existed. I asked him, however, in future to let us know immediately of any such cases in order that we could see the officer concerned complied with our standing instructions.

I attended a meeting of the Working Party of the Dixon Committee, which consisted of the heads of Foreign Office departments, S.I.S. and ourselves, with Mackenzie in the Chair. We should be receiving a copy of the minutes in due course.

A letter from Sterndale Bennett in Singapore was distributed at the meeting, which gave details about training courses in the Far East.

I made it clear at the meeting that the training by M.I.5 in a general way could not last more than about four days, and in some cases not more than two days. It was necessary to take a realistic view of what the word "training" meant. You could explain the general principles on which security organisation worked, and in some branches you could give a certain amount of detail, but in other cases it was not possible to do so without running the risk of our own methods being used against us.

Mullik came to see me about six and remained here until eight o'clock, after which I dined with him and some representative from the Indian High Commissioner's staff, who, I understand from U'ren, has a large file within this office relating largely to his student days!

Before dinner Mullik asked me a lot of questions about the work of the office. Although somewhat tedious, he is very thorough in his approach and wants to know the why and wherefore, but his problems are, of course, very different from our own. On some subjects, such as subversive activities on the railways, he is engaged in feverish activity and was somewhat surprised to find that, in peacetime at any rate, we had practically nothing. His personality is not a very pleasant one, but I think this may come from the fact that as a rather young man he has been put into a very big job and is a little conscious of his position.

18th May.

I had a meeting on the MACLEAN case with Dick, James Robertson and Martin, when they outlined to me the position that had been reached and the future programme culminating in the interrogation of Donald MACLEAN.

The only interesting development has been a visit by MACLEAN to the V. & A. Museum, where he met Peter FLOOD, who is a known member of the

underground Berger Group. Whether he was seeing FLOOD about something in his own particular field at the Museum is not known, but apparently MACLEAN knew him very well. MACLEAN is evidently drinking fairly heavily.

We discussed the points for my meeting with Barty Bouverie and it was agreed that I should tell him frankly what we were after.

Barty Bouverie, late of S.O.E. and now Director of the London South American Bank, came to see me at my request. He is a wholly reliable person and during the war, when he was the S.O.E. representative in Washington, was indoctrinated.

I asked him whether I was right in thinking that I had dined with him at his house in Washington in July or August, 1944. He said that he was certain I was right, and that he had in fact been living at that time in the house of Michael Wright, who was then head of Chancery. He said there were other paying guests, but he could not at the moment recollect who they were. I then asked him if he remembered having a drink with Donald MACLEAN and myself at his house before dinner. He said he did not remember this but that it was highly probable, since now that I had mentioned MACLEAN's name, he remembered that the latter was also a P.G. with Michael Wright. There had been one other P.G., a Professor of Agriculture - he thought from Reading - aged about 50, whose name he could not remember.

I then told him that for some years - in fact since the beginning of the war - we had been looking for someone in Foreign Office circles who had been leaking to the Russians, and that considerable suspicion rested on Donald MACLEAN. It was important to establish whether on certain dates, which I did not give, he had in fact been in Washington. Was there any way in which he, Bouverie, could help? He said that as far as he could recollect he himself spent every weekend while in Washington with his sister, who at that time was living on Long Island. He left on the Friday night and returned on the Sunday night. He seemed to remember that when he returned Donald MACLEAN was sometimes not present at breakfast on Monday morning, from which he inferred that he had been away for the weekend. He seemed also to recollect, without any prompting, that MACLEAN had American relations and that his wife was certainly not with him. When I mentioned that she was having a baby at the time, he seemed to think that he had heard about this. He tried to recollect whether anyone else shared MACLEAN's room at the Embassy and was inclined to think that it may have been Betty Harcourt, then Betty Gibbs, who was a receptionist and was eventually given the rank of Third Secretary. She is now living at 23, Culross Street, W.1. He thought it possible that, if he remembered rightly, she might have known something about Donald MACLEAN's movements at the time, but he doubted whether anybody would be able to give exact dates. Others who might help, he thought, would be: (a) Michael Wright, who rarely went away, and more especially his wife, Esther, who was much brighter than he was; (b) the Professor of Agriculture, who was generally in Washington over the weekend and travelled only occasionally, and (c) Michael Wright's Egyptian servant, Abbas, who valeted the whole household and waited at meals.

Bouverie said he would turn the whole thing over in his mind and let me know of anything that he thought might possibly have a bearing on the problem. I impressed upon him the delicacy of the whole position, which, of course, he fully understood. I am quite sure that he will say nothing to anybody, even his wife.

21st May.

I saw the D.N.I. in order to discuss with him the Gibraltar sabotage case. I outlined the sequence of events and pointed out that the Admiralty had in fact employed the services of three different organisations to carry out the same task, and that this had led to a certain amount of confusion. Had we been consulted prior to the decision to send two Special Branch officers to Gibraltar, we might have pointed out that the decision to call in the Police in the Portsmouth case had been based on the fact that the Police would have local knowledge, since the incident had happened in their area. There was really no analogy in sending two Special Branch officers to Gibraltar from London; they could really do little more than what Pelling was doing. The D.N.I. saw the point and apologised for not having let us know until after the event.

I also told him that since now the whole case was being conducted by Scotland Yard, it seemed that Pelling's mission had been rather a waste of time and money. He had come back and made his report, but it had been considered that there was no particular point in his visiting N.I.D.

D.N.I. said at once that he had not been consulted about this and that he would very much like to see Pelling, with whom he fixed an appointment for tomorrow.

I then told D.N.I. that there was another point which had been worrying us. It seemed to us that somebody in the Admiralty, not N.I.D., had a feeling that perhaps we were not altogether to be trusted in our enquiries about sabotage, and that we took too complacent a view; our main concern was to clear our own yardarm. If this was the view of any particular individual or section, we should very much like to be confronted with those concerned in order to satisfy them that we were entirely objective in these matters and in no sense complacent.

D.N.I. said he was quite sure that nobody in the Admiralty held the views that I had described, but he knew positively that they were held in Portsmouth, particularly by the Chief of Staff at the time of the Bedenham explosion. He had doubtless influenced the C.-in-C. who had subsequently misled the Prime Minister. There was no point in our worrying about either of these individuals, since both of them had left Portsmouth.

The whole interview was most friendly and D.N.I. agreed that some conference between the parties concerned was undoubtedly necessary in order to clarify responsibilities in any future cases that might arise.

I informed the D.G., who agreed that probably some approach to Lang of the Admiralty would be the best way of starting the ball rolling.

I discussed this matter afterwards with Roger, and ~~xxxxxxx~~
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 Our view is that the local police in whose area the act of sabotage takes place should co-ordinate investigation with other Chief Constables and, as in criminal cases, call in Scotland Yard if they consider it necessary. In overseas stations the D.S.O., with his security records and liaison with local police, should be the focal point.

22nd May.

Roger and I went over to see Blount to try and reconcile our views about the continued employment of German scientists, which is to be the subject of discussion on Thursday. I said that we were not in a position to estimate the knowledge already in possession of the 64 German scientists which might be imparted to their Government or to the Russians if they were sent back to Germany, nor were we in a position to estimate the extent of dislocation in our rearmament programme which might result in their departure. We could only look at the problem from the purely security point of view. Nobody could tell whether in the next five to ten years the Germans would be looking east or west; we could not, on the other hand, wholly discredit the possibility that some future Government might consider a deal with the Russians if it involved the return of certain German lost territories. The regaining of her sovereignty and the recovery of lost territories must always be uppermost in the minds of any German, whatever his politics, but in any case we must envisage the possibility of both Right Wing and Left Wing elements in future German Governments - indeed, the security of the German Government to-day from that point of view was far from satisfactory.

It would be wrong to assume that even if these Germans became naturalised they would necessarily become assimilated; the odds were that their old German loyalties would remain. They would be visiting their country of origin and their relatives, and as they saw Germany getting on her feet and building up her armaments, there would be a strong urge to go to her assistance, or at least to share the knowledge that they had acquired through their researches in this country with appropriate officials in the German Government. What happened to the information after that would be difficult to estimate; it might reach Russia either through Left Wing or Right Wing elements. It was wrong, too, to assume that these Germans would remain permanently with us; they might at any time get a feeling of frustration, either because they had not got the scope they wanted, or because they did not think they were earning enough money. They might then offer their services to the highest bidder.

Taking the long-term view, there was the possibility that in time of war public opinion might demand the removal or internment of certain categories of aliens, which would be at the time when their services were most needed. Even if they were not removed it might be necessary to restrict the extent of their knowledge. Lastly, those concerned should realise that any idea that M.I.5 could keep an eye on these people and report to the authorities that they were going wrong was fallacious. Once a man was put in a position where he had rightful access to top secret information, investigation into the field of procurement was denied to the Security authorities; there remained only the field where the information was passed to an unauthorised person. This might not occur more than once in six months; the chances of detection in such cases were, therefore, extremely remote.

Blount delivered himself of certain remarks about the loyalties of the Germans and about the unlikelihood of their ever being on the Russian side, which seemed somewhat unreal, but admitted that we had made out a strong case. It was clear, however, that on balance he thought that the scientists should be allowed to remain.

From a fairly long experience, I am convinced that this idea of indispensability comes from about ten percent truth and ninety percent laziness; it starts from the place of employment and gets gradually magnified until it reaches the head of the scientific research. There is always a

reluctance to get rid of a good workman which involves temporary dislocation and a good deal of trouble in finding a suitable successor, but whenever removal is enforced everything seems to go on just the same. The embarrassment of having these people in time of war may be very great indeed, and the effect of the retention of LACHMANN's services by Handley Page between the two wars was virtually to immobilise it. It did not receive development contracts because LACHMANN was there, and it never really got into its stride after his removal.

I attended a cocktail party for the Commonwealth delegates given by Jack Easton.

I dined with Kazim Raza and Ahmed. Two points arose.

Ahmed said that the plot in Pakistan had not come to light through military, but through civilian channels, and that, rather fortuitously, this raised the question of security in the Army. At present the Army was responsible for its own security, and since those concerned were high-ranking officers, nothing had come to light through military channels. He wanted any advice I could give him on how to tackle this problem.

I said that it was a little difficult, since we did not envisage such a situation in this country: if the D.M.I. or the Vice Chief of Staff were secret members of the Communist Party and played their hand well, there would be no machinery for catching them out. Most of our cases concerned the rank and file, and just occasionally a junior officer. In a general way, it was we who were informing the Army about these people. No steps were taken to prevent the Communists from joining the Army, but their commanding officers were notified. Certain supervision by the military went on within the barracks, and for the rest, if the case was important, we should carry out investigations through our own channels. At the moment we dealt direct on these matters with the Command Security Officer: there was practically no risk here of any ordinary soldier spreading communist ideas within his unit: it would immediately come to the notice of his comrades or an N.C.O. Either his comrades would talk him out of it, or disciplinary action would be taken by Court Martial, if there was the basis for a case.

I undertook to give Ahmed an account of what our procedure was and also to let him know, if possible, what the French and Americans did.

The other points discussed was the acute embarrassment caused to us by two high-ranking Pakistani officers, now under arrest for sedition and association with Communists, who had attended the I.D.C. on a security guarantee from the Pakistan Government. Both Kazim Raza and Ahmed expressed their extreme regrets about this, which they said was as embarrassing to them as it was to us. They had no idea about the leanings of these officers at the time they were nominated to attend the course; the only thing they could say in mitigation was that the Communist side of the plot was very much dragged in by the heels, as it was thought that it might give the uprising more popular support.

23rd May.

At the J.I.C. to-day it was agreed that M.I.10 would in future be responsible for the collation of technical sabotage equipment. We would continue to pass them any information we received and anything that came from our links overseas would be passed through us in London to the War Office and not direct to local Commands.

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Overseas Establishment in war time.

It was decided that A.I. should consult the War Office and obtain particulars of the Army Establishments in war time to which our staff serving overseas (with the exception of S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E.) could be attached. On receipt of this information, consideration will be given to the strengths required, with a view to getting an agreed Establishment, and subsequently to the selection of local Reserve Officers who could be called upon to serve in our overseas stations in the event of emergency.

24th May.

Roger and I attended a meeting at the Ministry of Supply with Sir Harry Garner, the Chief Scientist, about 64 Germans engaged in scientific research. It was made clear by Garner at the outset that we really faced a fait accompli and that a meeting was only called to consider any security measures that might be taken to minimise the risks of their continued employment.

I put forward the security case on the same lines as Hollis and I had spoken to Blount. I think that Garner was a bit shaken, but clearly he was determined to keep his Germans. The only suggestion he made was that they should be confined to the narrow limits of their particular project, although as a scientist I should have thought that he might have known that this was

almost impossible. Little by little they will know almost everything within the fairly wide range. Apart from this, I pointed out that the more they were restricted to a narrow field and not taken into full confidence, the more they were likely to feel frustrated and to seek employment elsewhere.

We now have to report back to the J.I.C. who had asked us to present the security case to the Ministry of Supply. Hollis agreed that we should state our case fairly and possibly recommend that it should be brought to the notice of the Chiefs of Staff.

25th May.

I attended the final session of the Commonwealth Security Conference when the P.M. made a short speech and then left. There is a certain demand to send specialists over to study technical devices, which we shall probably have to meet, and Mullik was rather anxious to have more information about any special trends in Cominform policy or organisational changes. George McClellan made a short reply to the P.M.

Later I attended a lunch given by Gordon-Walker, Minister for the Commonwealth, to all the delegates and to the J.I.C. Gordon-Walker in his speech stressed the importance of security within the Commonwealth, since without it the basis of co-operation on the highest level was bound to be restricted. Mullik replied with an astonishingly good little speech; he said, quite frankly, that he had been diffident of the outcome of the Conference before he arrived, but that he had been much moved by the spirit of co-operation among all his colleagues and had learned much from what he had heard. He then referred to the importance of fighting Communism on the basis of our own moral standards, in spite of the fact that we were at a considerable disadvantage. To do otherwise would be to concede precisely what we were fighting for.

I went to see Newsam about de COURCEY. He told me that the legal advisers to the Home Office had been inclined to turn the case down, but that he had sent it to the D. of P.P., who had reported that in his view there was full justification in proceeding under Section 6, and in fact it would be very difficult for the Security Service and the Police, if challenged, to justify leaving the matter in its present position, when the legislature has provided in Section 6 another step that they can take.

Newsam mentioned to me that the D.G. was, he understood, still objecting to his Department being placed under any Minister except the P.M. He thought that the objection was not really justifiable, since, if necessary, he could always see the P.M., even on a matter which he did not wish to communicate to the Home Secretary. I said that that was not the only objection, and I repeated all the old arguments which have already been put forward. The impression I gained was that Brook must have gone back to Newsam after having been seen by the P.M.

One thing Newsam did say was that there was no question of our going under the Ministry of Defence. He also made it clear that in his view we were a secret service, and that nobody could be answerable for us in Parliament. I said that somebody had to answer for us, as was done in the FUCHS case, and it seemed to me that the P.M. was the only person.

28th May.

I lunched with Ahmed and passed him a copy of a note dealing with security in the Armed Forces, which he had asked me for. The lunch party was a large one, including the Pakistani Minister, who seems a genial soul, mainly interested in horse racing!

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29th May.

The Watchers failed to pick up MACLEAN since his departure for the country on Friday, and we now learn from the Foreign Office that he was given a day's leave on Saturday. He has not apparently been seen since and T.Cs indicate considerable anxiety in the family

telephoned to me at about 11.00 a.m. asking whether I had heard about Guy BURGESS. I said that I knew he had been sent home by the

Foreign Office on account of three motoring offences for speeding, which had caused the Embassy embarrassment.

[] then said that he was not referring to that but to Guy BURGESS' mysterious disappearance. He had not been seen since Friday and had telephoned either on Thursday or Friday to the wife of Garonway Rees, when he said, amongst other things, that he was not likely to see her for a long time.

Jack HEWITT, who shares an apartment with BURGESS at Clifford Chambers, 3rd floor, 10A Bond Street (opposite Aspreys), told [] that BURGESS had hired a car and had a good deal of money.

[] had dined with BURGESS on Tuesday or Wednesday, when the latter had been suffering from the effects of some drug which he normally took for insomnia. He had subsequently spoken to BURGESS on the telephone on Friday.

BURGESS should have dined on Monday night with Berry, who was going to see whether he could get him a job on the Berry press, but he did not turn up.

Other people whom Guy BURGESS had seen and might possibly know something were Peter POLLOCK, who has a farm at Hemel Hemsted, with whom Footman knows BURGESS has spent a weekend since his return, and a man called Freddie WARREN.

In view of the past association between BURGESS and MACLEAN observed by Watchers, it seems pretty clear that the pair of them have gone off.

Dick and I went to see Burt immediately after lunch and gave him descriptions of MACLEAN and BURGESS. They are communicating with all their representatives at ports and airports, instructing them to notify us immediately if either of them turn up, and to endeavour to hold them on some pretext until someone from here or from the Foreign Office can get down to see them. They are to be told that instructions have been given for them to return to the Foreign Office immediately. It was agreed with Carey Foster that their passports should be impounded and that the Foreign Office would write to the Home Office authorising this to be done. We got Ruck of the Immigration Service to join us in Burt's room. He said that he would first of all ascertain that MACLEAN and BURGESS had left and, provided we could get the necessary authority from the Home Office, he would impound passports if they were handed to one of his officers. He would also warn the Company that these two passengers had no documents. This should lead to the Company refusing to carry them. Dick and I and Ruck then went over to see Murrie, who said that he could not give authority without consulting the Secretary of State. He arranged to see the latter at the House of Commons at 5.45 p.m. and subsequently telephoned to say that the Home Secretary had agreed to the action suggested.

Later, in the evening I spoke to Anthony Blunt, who had been away all day until about 6 p.m. I asked him what he knew about Guy BURGESS' disappearance. He said that on Saturday last Jack HEWITT rang up to say that BURGESS had not returned the previous evening as expected, and that an American friend of BURGESS had been to the flat and found the latter packing. He had been out to buy a mackintosh. He had hired a car and had excused himself from spending a weekend with his American friend on the grounds, firstly, that he was going away for a holiday, and secondly, that he had to help a friend who was in difficulties.

According to a Club servant, sometime between 5.30 p.m. and 7.00 p.m. on Friday BURGESS was in the Reform Club. It was alleged that he was seen talking to a man of about 55, whose identity could not be established. He had

also talked to a Club waiter about getting a mpa, as he was intending to go north.

BURGESS's mother knows nothing of his present whereabouts. He had said several weeks ago that he had thought of taking a tramp steamer to France, and Blunt had heard - I think either from HEWITT or the American friend - that BURGESS had borrowed a car which had been hired.

BURGESS has been in the habit of taking codine and, it is believed, morphia for his insomnia.

I telephoned to the D.G. late in the evening, telling him what had happened and suggesting that he would wish to come up on the following day.

Later we received a message from Immigration to say that MACLEAN and BURGESS had left Southampton on Friday night for St. Malo, which they should have reached at about 10 o'clock on Saturday morning. They had apparently disembarked there contrary to the excursion terms on which they were being carried. The facts had been reported by the Captain of the ship "Falaise" on its return to Southampton.

We decided that the best thing was for Dick to leave on the first 'plane for Paris, in order to stimulate the activities of the Surete, who had already been alerted through [redacted]


Dick spent the night with me until 1 a.m. and left at 5.30 a.m. with an outdated passport.

30th May.

I gave the D.G. an outline of the case. He said that he had never heard about the BURGESS connection before. I told him that BURGESS was one of the people whom the Watchers had reported as meeting MACLEAN, but that no particular significance was attached to this; they would obviously know each other and they had been at Cambridge together. BURGESS might well be discussing his future, since it had been suggested to him by the Establishment Branch that he should resign from the Foreign Office on account of his behaviour in Washington.

Reilly arrived to discuss the matter with the D.G. It was agreed that other Police forces should be alerted through S.I.S., and that a certain amount of action might be taken to get further particular from relatives.

I telephoned to Dick White at about 11.30 a.m. I told him that the general policy for alerting security authorities in European countries had been approved by the Foreign Office; these countries to include Tangier. The authorities were to be asked to arrest and deport, as undesirable aliens, both MACLEAN and BURGESS, if found. The Foreign Office has been asked to consider circular instructions to consulates to impound the passports of MACLEAN and BURGESS if opportunity arose. The original plan of informing the Americans about developments had been somewhat telescoped. I also mentioned that BURGESS had said, several months ago, that he contemplated a trip by tramp steamer to Marseilles. The only other item of interest was that he appeared to have brought back from America a wad of sterling notes, the value of which we did not know at the moment. Lastly, I said that BURGESS had remarked that he was going away for the weekend in order to assist a friend who was in some sex trouble and was being blackmailed. It was just possible that this was true, although on the whole unlikely. It might have been a cover story put out by MACLEAN to deceive BURGESS, or a cover story put out by BURGESS to deceive his friends.



Bick telephoned back shortly afterwards to say that there had been no progress so far, but that the French had been thoroughly co-operative.

Anthony Blunt and Tommy Harris came to see me. I told them that the matter was a serious one; that BURGESS had left the country for France in company with another Foreign Office official, and that BURGESS had booked a ticket in the name of "MILLER", which had subsequently been used by his companion. Blunt asked whether the Foreign Office official was MACLEAN. I said that he was and asked him what he knew about MACLEAN. He said that of course he had known MACLEAN in his University days, but had not seen much of him since. He did, however, know him as a friend of Guy BURGESS, and as one who had been closely allied with him as a fellow member of a Communist group at Cambridge, in which were included people like John CORNFORD and Maurice CORNFORTH. Blunt had been astonished on returning to Cambridge in 1934, to find that these intellectuals had drifted right into the Communist camp. Guy BURGESS was a member of the group, but in 1935, for some reason or another, became embittered. He had wanted to blossom out as a Marxian historian, but evidently thought better of it and drifted away from the group. He had, however, always remained Marxian and had within recent years become bitterly anti-American.

BURGESS told Blunt, and also an American friend called Bernard MILLER, that he had to help a friend over the weekend who in some sex trouble and was being blackmailed. Both Blunt and Tommy Harris tried to speculate who this friend might be, and MACLEAN had been one of the suggestions, since it was known that MACLEAN was a homosexual. It was not thought that his wife was aware of this.

The American friend, MILLER, whom BURGESS had met aboard the "Queen Mary", had left the ship at Cherbourg but had subsequently visited this country, where he intended to study as a medical student. He is going back to the United States and will return here in July. He cannot throw any more light on the disappearance of BURGESS.

I asked Blunt and Harris whether they believed the story of MACLEAN being blackmailed, or whether they thought it was a story put over by MACLEAN to deceive BURGESS, or by BURGESS to deceive his friends. They said that quite frankly any of the above reasons were possible. Tommy Harris then mentioned that he and Blunt had discussed the possibility of BURGESS having been blackmailed in America and forced to disclose information. What I think had given rise to this in their minds was the knowledge that Jack HEWITT, when he unpacked BURGESS's suitcase on the latter's arrival from America, had found a large quantity of pound notes. Did these imply that BURGESS was now working for the Russians, or was it just a common Black Market offence? I think they both thought it was unlikely that BURGESS would have sold himself to the Russians, but they felt that he was such an unstable character that almost anything was possible.

BASSETT

We then discussed the anxiety of Mrs. (BURGESS) about her son. She had been anxious to go to the Police, but had been dissuaded from doing so. She had been told that the matter was already being dealt with by the Police on a high level and that she could rest assured that everything possible was being done. I told Harris and Blunt that she could be told that her son had been traced abroad. This would probably satisfy her.

Both Harris and Blunt assured me that they would on no account disclose to anybody that BURGESS had been accompanied by MACLEAN.

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At 6.p.m. Dick rang me up at the Foreign Office. He said that there was no trace of either MACLEAN or BURGESS having gone out of France either by sea or by land frontier; they might, of course, have crossed the frontier on foot or have gone as stowaways. The check on ships' manifests was a slow process with two or three days delay. I suggested that it might be worth while, in view of the previous information, to concentrate rather particularly on Marseilles.

Dick said that there were certain clues at St. Malo, but that we would not know precisely what they were until mid-day to-morrow, when a representative of the local police was expected in Paris. He said that the legal position was not an embarrassing one in France, since the whole action would be administrative. MACLEAN and BURGESS would be deported as undesirables without any right of appeal. It is thought that action elsewhere should take the same form. Lastly, he suggested that it might be worth while ascertaining the movements of Soviet or Satellite ships from European ports.

While I was at the Foreign Office a telegram came through from Geoffrey Patterson, in which he stated his fear that the F.B.I. would pass the information, which he had been instructed to transmit to them for their personal information only, might well go to the State Department and the Attorney General. In view of this possibility, the Ambassador wished to know:

- (a) what he was to say to the State Department, and
- (b) to the press if there was a leakage.

We drafted a telegram in reply with Reilly, which in effect said "If you cannot prevent the F.B.I. from transmitting the information in some form or other, endeavour to persuade them to omit anything relating to the security issue". The Ambassador should tell the State Department no more than was told to them by the F.B.I. To the press he should give the story relating to the disappearance of these two officers, keeping clear of the security issue.

Inspector Bridges telephoned to me at the Foreign Office to say that the Special Branch officer at Southampton had ascertained definitely that MACLEAN and BURGESS had dined on the "Palaise" at St. Malo on Saturday and left hurriedly after dinner, leaving their cabin in disorder. He asked whether he should make any further enquiries through members of the crew. I said he need not unless he received further instructions.

I had a long talk with Tommy Harris about Guy BURGESS which lasted until 2.00 a.m. and from which only the following material facts emerged,

based on the evidence of BURGESS' American friend, Bernard MILLER, who had called on him on Friday expecting him to accompany him on a weekend visit. He had found BURGESS packing his clothes. BURGESS had bought himself what is described as a "black homburg" hat and a black mackintosh, which was clearly intended for his companion. He packed one small suitcase with enough clothes to last him about a fortnight, and then placed it inside another larger suitcase. He said that he had borrowed a small four-seater car, and not hired it, and then later that he was leaving by the 7.30 train, without stating his destination.

BURGESS visited Tommy Harris and his wife, I think about last Wednesday week. He had previously been barred the house, largely owing to Mrs. Harris' intense dislike of him. On this occasion BURGESS asked whether he might be allowed to "work his passage back". When asked about Kim Philby, he put his hands to his head and said; "Don't speak to me of Kim - nobody could have been more wonderful to me" and then burst into tears, a thing which the Harris' had never seen him do before. There may possibly be some significance in this if, in spite of everything the Philbys had done to keep him straight, he had betrayed Kim through getting to know something about the MACLEAN case and acting on the information. There is no doubt that Kim PHILBY is thoroughly disgusted with BURGESS' behaviour both inside his house and outside it.

31st May.

I attended the J.I.C. (Directors) meeting on the D.G.'s behalf. I had a word with 'C', when I mentioned to him that BURGESS had been living with Kim and that Kim might have views on the case.

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 James Robertson, Arthur Martin and I went over to the Foreign Office for a meeting with Reilly in order to review the action taken regarding MACLEAN and BURGESS and to see what more could be done.

1st June.

I spoke to 'C' and told him that in his absence we had gone ahead with [] in the MACLEAN case, since nobody else was indoctrinated. I had, however, suggested to [] that if he wanted authority with regard to circulating instructions to his representatives abroad, he had better consult [] 'C' seemed quite satisfied.

Garonwy REES came to tell me about a conversation that his wife had had with BURGESS before the latter's departure. I said that I would very much like to have as accurate an account as possible. He promised to do this in conjunction with his wife and let me know. He thought the conversation sinister.

I lunched with 'Doc' Hayes. He seemed in good form. He had discovered two Swift documents, which the National Library could not afford (£200). He was proposing to offer them to Victor. I told him to ring Cambridge.

[] brought [] round. I gave him a talk on the office and passed him on to John Shaw and Hollis.

During the afternoon the D.G. suggested that MACLEAN and BURGESS if found should be interrogated on the spot by someone from here. He thought this very important, as otherwise we should have no chance of getting any case against them on which they could be detained on arrival.

I pointed out that this might well embarrass the foreign police forces and would be acting to some extent ultra vires. It would provide an opportunity for the two officials to establish their identity. The task of a foreign police force would then be extremely difficult. The D.G. was disinclined to agree with this.

Cimperman was acquainted with the information that we had passed to the F.B.I. and was told that we would keep him informed.

2nd June.

Anthony came up at my request, as information that Dick brought back last night seemed to indicate that BURGESS and MACLEAN, having missed an 11.20 train from St. Malo on Saturday morning, had taken a car and joined the train at Rennes. They were apparently heading for Paris. It was, therefore, desirable to try and find out whether BURGESS had any addresses there to which he would be likely to go.

Anthony supplied the addresses of three hotels, but knew of no particular contacts either there or in Italy. In Switzerland he knew BURGESS had spent a holiday at Ascona on Lake Maggiore, and that

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he has a friend, who probably lived in Berne, called Eric KESSTLER, although it was unlikely that either he or his family would be there now. KESSTLER is believed to be en poste in Roumania.

Anthony confirmed that to the best of his knowledge MACLEAN was a homosexual.

The D.G. received a note from the Treasury about higher salaries, which nobody thought was particularly satisfactory. The previous salaries had been agreed by the Treasury, from which it was clear that we should receive whatever benefits Chorley gave to all other Civil Servants. The Treasury were now proposing to reassess our salaries.

Personally I do not feel that I am worth any more than what is being offered to me, and maybe not as much! But if, four years ago the Treasury refused to give me any more than a token £25 above a senior director, and now consider that I should have £187 more than a senior director, I might well ask why they did not think of this one before - and £123 less than I am entitled to under Chorley!

12th June.

I returned last night from Wales.

The story of MACLEAN and BURGESS had appeared in the press on the previous Thursday. There was no further information as to their whereabouts. G.C.H.Q. reported an increase in the volume of traffic between London and Moscow as from the 25th May, the day BURGESS and MACLEAN left. Two or three days later there was an increase in the traffic from Berne, and about the 4th or 5th June an increase of traffic from Prague. These increases may, of course, have no connection with the departure of BURGESS and MACLEAN, but on the otherhand may be significant

Dick had had a talk with Anthony and Garonwy REES, which seemed to indicate that BURGESS had in 1937 been fairly closely implicated in Communist activities. He had in fact told REES that he was working for the Comintern and asked REES to supply him with political anti-Fascist information. REES thought that BLUNT was aware of this. One of the people BURGESS was in touch with at the time was Rolfe KATZ, alleged at one time to have been a Comintern official. He is a man of whom we have considerable records. Anthony seemed vague about this and, although he recollected that BURGESS was in conspiratorial mood, he imagined that his activities were connected with anti-Hitler propaganda and his association with the D. organisation of S.I.S. BURGESS had never told him that he was working for the Comintern.

Dick seems to have formed a rather unfavourable impression of the interview and remarked on the extreme nervousness of Garonwy REES. A number of other people who were known to be associated with either BURGESS or MACLEAN have been interviewed, but without any substantial result. All BURGESS's papers are being closely examined.

Tommy Lascelles asked me to go and see him in connection with the disappearance of BURGESS and MACLEAN, as the King was asking for information.

I told him that there was really no more news than he had seen in the papers; that the departure was either due to blackmail or to some espionage past. I was a little inclined to fear the latter, only there was no firm evidence on which to do beyond the fact that both parties had gone through a period of Left Wing activities at the University. It seemed to me unlikely that a man of BURGESS's intelligence could imagine that he had any future in Russia, and that I was rather forced to the conclusion that he might have thought that his past was catching up with him and that the alternative was a stretch in Maidstone gaol. Personally I thought I would sooner be in Maidstone Gaol than in Soviet Russia!

No mention was made of Anthony and his association with BURGESS, which had been referred to by at least one paper.

I dined with Victor and Tess yesterday. They were as confused about BURGESS as we were. Tess, however, thought that it would be worth our while to keep an eye on James KLUGMAN, who was at one time a fairly close friend of BURGESS and the moving spirit of his group at Cambridge.

Dick had a long interview with Kim PHILBY, who had arrived from Washington at 2.30 to-day.

Kim is obviously extremely worried. Dick did not think that he was wholly convincing about the possibility of a leakage having occurred through his office. There had been frequent conversations and meetings between Bobby Mackenzie, Geoffrey Patterson and Kim, which BURGESS might well have heard about. The fact that Bobby Mackenzie was called in might well have indicated to him that some security issue was being discussed, and BURGESS might have made it his business, either by keeping his eyes open or by interrogating Kim's secretary, Esther WHITFIELD with whom he has for a time been conducting a desultory affair. Kim was emphatic in his defence of Esther WHITFIELD. Personally I think it not unlikely that the papers relating to MACLEAN might have been on Kim's desk and that BURGESS strolled into the room while Kim was not there. Alternatively, of course, BURGESS may have learned something from the general administrative enquiries which were being conducted within the Embassy under the direction of Bobby Mackenzie, although it is alleged that every possible precaution was taken.

B.2's mind is now harking back to the case of the Russian, WOLKOF, who defected several years ago at Istanbul. He had given information to the effect that there were some seven people in British Intelligence who were in Soviet pay, and that provided satisfactory conditions were arranged, he would disclose all he knew. Unfortunately before he did so he was kidnapped by the Russians, carried on to a Soviet plane and carried back to Moscow. One of the British Intelligence agents was said by WOLKOF to be head of the C.E. department. Kim was in fact head of R.5 at the time.

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I dined with Anthony Blunt. He was a bit worried about the queries that had been going on during my absence. I explained to him that once the story had broken it was inevitable that enquiries would be made of anybody who was known to have associated either with BURGESS or MACLEAN. He quite understood this. Meanwhile, he was being persecuted by the press, whom he had refused to see. He was obviously worried about his whole position. No new facts emerged, except that I feel certain that Anthony was never a conscious collaborator with BURGESS in any activities that he may have conducted on behalf of the Comintern (vide REES's statement).

13th June.

Anthony telephoned about the press, who were still persecuting him. I advised him not to speak to them, and if accosted outside to say that he knew nothing about the matter and had nothing to say.

There are a number of P. Qs which are slightly embarrassing, and the P.M. has asked the Foreign Office to let him know about BURGESS's government service, including that in M.I.5. Our answer is that BURGESS was never employed by M.I.5, but that during the war we were in contact with him in connection with information which he brought from a friend (Eric KESSTLER), relating to German activities. The Foreign Office asked us to vet BURGESS in January, 1950, and we replied that although we had no security information against him we regarded him as both as untrustworthy and unreliable. We had at the back of our minds both the incident at Gibraltar and Tangier, where he committed every kind of indiscretion and also what appeared to be a disclosure of Government information to Freddie KUH about our policy towards China.

The D.G. has telegraphed to say that he has had a satisfactory interview with Hoover, who at the moment at any rate seems to be "holding everything".

14th June.

At the J.I.C. to-day D.M.I. mentioned that an officer of M.I. was now in Teheran, where he will be met by a representative of A.I.O.C. He will fix up an arrangement by which A.I.O.C. will pass any operational intelligence to the British Consul at Kermanshah for onward transmission.

D.N.I. asked for information about the two Foreign Office officials who had absconded, and said that he was constantly being asked questions by higher officials and did not know what to say. His query was addressed to Ross of the Foreign Office, who said that at the moment it was very difficult to make any statement and that the whereabouts of the two officials was at present unknown.

Michael Cresswell, the outgoing Secretary of the J.I.C. (F.E.), and Michael Stewart, his successor, attended the meeting. Cresswell gave his views on the situation in the area.

(a) He said that feeling was hardening in the Far East on the point that there was some advantage in continuing to fight the Chinese in Korea, since otherwise the Chinese would be active in places which were far more vulnerable. In support of this view, he said that it was known that at the outset of the Korean war, when the Chinese were meeting with success, preparations were being made for operations in the south which seemed subsequently to have been abandoned.

(b) The tripartite meeting between the French, the Americans and ourselves in Singapore had, on the whole, produced useful results. De Lattre de Tassigny had emphasised the need for Intelligence, and had implied that we and the Americans had a great deal of information which would be useful to the French, but which was not being passed to them.

The idea of the omniscience of ourselves and the Americans in the Intelligence field seems to be prevalent in every area where collaboration with the French is going on. Efforts were being made to dispel this idea. It was explained to de Lattre de Tassigny that all information which might have a bearing on Indo-China was passed to him, and that in fact we and the Americans were as much in the dark as he was about Chinese and Soviet intentions.

(c) Cresswell said that the D.E.C. in the area was somewhat ineffective and that their assessment of information was often bad.

(d) It was arranged that there would be tripartite Intelligence meetings every three months, alternately in Saigon and Singapore. While it was not intended to discuss sources, it was hoped that as much information as possible could be given to the French on the "need to know" basis.

(e) There is also to be an arms traffic committee - I think on a tripartite basis - in which both the Navy and S.I.F.E. will participate.

(f) While considerable progress has been made with fortifications in the Delta area since the advent of de Lattre de Tassigny, Tonking still remains a danger area.

(g) It is recognised that the improvement last year in Burma has not been maintained, and that should there be any serious Chinese intervention, it would have a serious effect upon the position in Indo-China.

At point to note in connection with Burma was the emergence of the Workers' and Peasants' Party as a local branch of the Communist Party.

(h) Asked about Chinese expansion, Cresswell said that it was difficult to express a view, although it seemed at least that China would be interested, as and when opportunity arose, to create a cring of satellites in adjacent countries. He thought it would be a mistake to over-estimate internal difficulties as a brake on Chinese external policy; much had in fact been done in connection with rice distribution and other matters in China itself.

(i) Questioned about the purge, Cresswell said that he thought it was a normal precaution for any Communist State to adopt, the more so since the Chinese had clearly accepted the risk of open war at the time of their intervention in Korea.

(j) I asked Cresswell whether there were any problems with regard to S.I.F.E. He said there were none and that things seemed to be going pretty well.

The D.M.I. spoke to me before the meeting about the Pakistan Military Attache, who seemed to be worried about Army security. I told D.M.I. that I had already discussed this matter both with Ahmed and with Kazim Raza, to whom I had given a note on the subject. He said that he would tell the Pakistan M.A. that the matter was already being dealt with through D.I.B.

A.C.A.S.(I) spoke to me about the case of one [] a civilian employee in the Air Ministry, concerning whom an anonymous communication had been received. [] was about to go abroad and C.A.S. was apparently of the opinion that his movements ought to be watched. I explained to A.C.A.S.(I) that this would be a matter for S.I.S., but that they could do little without the assistance of the local police authorities. If the latter were informed there would almost certainly be publicity. I promised to look into the case and communicate with him further.

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I had a long talk with Stourton, Commissioner of Police, Nigeria, who told me that he was worried by the discovery that a number of passports had been issued to undesirables who had given false particulars and that several other passports had been taken away by an absconding official. He said that it all went to show that unless these things were closely supervised by white officers, and the passport office turned into what would amount to a one-man show, there was practically no guarantee against such things happening. He proposed, however, to tighten things up considerably on his return and to have a review of all passports issued. This had in fact already begun, and it had been disclosed that certain references from Barclays Bank had clearly been forged.

I asked Stourton about Dane guns. He agreed with me that it was disturbing that so much steel tubing had come into the country and that a little trace of it could be found. The difficulties in dealing with the matter, however, in the present circumstances seemed to be almost insuperable. The police were concentrating as far as possible on the ex-service men who had been preciously a source of trouble. I gained the impression that very little would be done in this matter. The main difficulty is the shortage of white officers, who alone can be relied upon to do anything effective.

I asked Stourton what he thought of our activities in the area. As regards Nigeria his experience had, of course, been unfortunate owing to the inability of Johnson to carry out his task. Since Johnson's departure, he had had no security officer and had dealt direct with Accra. He thought Stephens had done well and had certainly stimulated security consciousness throughout the area. I explained to Stourton exactly what the S.L.O.s Charter involved and that it was not our wish to be involved in matters outside it.

 came to see me and pump me about MACLEAN and BURGESS. He seemed to think that there was a good deal of background information here which might be useful to the French and which we had so far failed to impart. I told him that at the moment we were almost as much in the dark as he was himself. We naturally felt that either the motive was blackmail or that there had been some case of espionage. These seemed to be the only two reasons that could possibly account for so sudden a departure. At the moment, however, there was no positive evidence of either. He went away reasonably happy, but now wholly convinced that we knew no more. He seemed a little hurt that the Surete had been called in without the D.E.C. being told. I said that as it was purely a police matter, we had rather naturally gone to the Surete. I wondered - I thought rather maliciously - whether the leakage had not occurred for this reason. I said that that was a risk which we should clearly accept in communicating particulars to any police force; clearly hundreds of people would be alerted and it was inevitable that sooner or later something would appear in the press. He then told me that Hirsch had handled the matter himself without even telling who was extremely annoyed and dis-covering what had been going on. He hinted that perhaps had deliberately notified the press.

It is really rather sickening to see how the French can only consider Intelligence matters in terms of the war between the Surete and the D.E.C.

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 Dick had a long interview with Kim Philby and had submitted a note on all that he knew about BURGESS. He denied emphatically that he had ever discussed MACLEAN with BURGESS or that Esther WHITFIELD, his secretary, who was extremely discreet, would have been likely to do so either. He did agree, however, that if BURGESS had been intent on finding out something, he might have gathered certain straws in the wind through a possible knowledge of meetings between Patterson, Bobby Mackenzie and himself.

Dick then questioned him about his first wife. He said that he had married her in Vienna in about 1934, knowing that she was a Communist, but that he had subsequently converted her. His marriage had broken up in 1936 and, so far as he knew, she was no more than a left winger. He himself had never been a Communist, but his sympathies with the left had been strong when he married his first wife in 1934. Dick intends to question him further about his own position.

Meanwhile a telegram has come in from the D.G. saying that C.I.A. are already conducting enquiries about Philby, whom they regard as persona non grata, and that the F.B.I. may take up the running before long. He thinks, therefore, that we should disclose to the F.B.I. now that Kim's

first wife was a Communist. I felt a little doubtful about volunteering this information at the present moment, when we had not even been asked. We have, therefore, left the decision with the D.G., emphasising that if he feels it necessary to communicate this information now, he should make it clear that no proper assessment of Philby's position has so far been possible, and that they should not prejudge the issue on the information about his former wife. This is to be subject to 'C's' approval, which we cannot get until-to-morrow.

15th June.

We got 'C's' clearance for the telegram to Washington. Meanwhile we have been dealing with rather difficult P.Qs about the screening of BURGESS. We have replied that there is nothing in BURGESS's record to indicate that he was a Communist or associated in such a way as to cause reasonable doubts about his reliability. In fact he had already been in the Foreign Office for several years before his name was referred to us in January, 1950. We gave an N.R.A. on the strictly security side, but drew attention to discussions with the Foreign Office security branch with regard to BURGESS's conduct in Gibraltar and Tangier, in which we had stated that we regarded him as thoroughly untrustworthy and unreliable.

 I spoke on the telephone to A.C.A.S.(I) to-day and read out to him a letter regarding [redacted] which we had received from the Americans. He had not known that this information had come from the Americans originally. I told him that we had arranged with Immigration to check [redacted] passport on his way out, to see whether he had in fact been paying frequent visits to the Continent. We had also asked Immigration to let us know the name of anyone who was accompanying him. I had explained to A.C.A.S.(I) yesterday at the J.I.C. that although S.I.S. might be able to take some kind of limited action on their own, it would be difficult for them to do anything really effective without alerting the local police. If they did so, it would almost certainly lead to publicity. So far, therefore, we had confined action to anything that S.I.S. might be able to do on their own. A.C.A.S.(I) agreed that, for the moment, at any rate, no further action was necessary.

16th June.

[redacted] came round to see me. Telephone checks had indicated that he had rather got his ear to the ground in S.I.S. and was trying to find out for Kim where the latter stood. He did not, however, attempt to pump me and prefaced his remarks by saying that he knew nothing whatever about the case. He had, however, seen Malcolm Muggeridge, who wondered whether the publicity aspect of the case had been properly considered and was in responsible hands. Muggeridge said that the press of the whole world was gaping for news of BURGESS and MACLEAN, and that if it broke that they were behind the Iron Curtain, the Russians were likely to cash in first with stories about the altruistic motives which had prompted the departure to Moscow. Muggeridge thought it was extremely important that the Foreign Office should get in first by drawing attention to the moral character of these two officers, and so negate the propaganda value which the Russian statements would subsequently have.

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_____ came to see me about a report that he had received that two British diplomats were seen leaving Berlin by Soviet civil aircraft on the 13th June. I ascertained from Carey Foster that these were the normal couriers, and so informed _____

_____ is still very inquisitive and very suspicious that he is being kept in the dark.

The D.G. telegraphed to say that he has had a very satisfactory interview with Bedell-Smith, who has suggested that in future we should carry the liaison instead of S.I.S. This is, of course, not a very practical idea; we cannot do S.I.S.'s work any more than they can do ours. On the other hand it is arguable that S.I.S. might be able to do without a representative in Washington. Certainly with the F.B.I. we could easily carry the burden.

18th June.

The D.G. returned about mid-day. He seems to have been successful in keeping Hoover quiet. The only grievance seems to be that we did not tell the F.B.I. about our short list, but I think we shall be able to weather that one. Our stock at the moment seems to be good both with the F.B.I. and with C.I.A. The only complication is that the F.B.I. know about _____ whereas C.I.A. do not.

The D.G. has seen Strang, and later the P.M. _____ and Cimperman.

'C' telephoned to say that he had had a letter from de COURCY, containing suggestions about MACLEAN and BURGESS being behind the Iron Curtain, according to his informant. He goes on to discuss PEIERLS and Max BORN as two atomic scientists who should be regarded with suspicion. He emphasises the difficulties of disclosing either information or its origin to the Government Departments without endangering the informants. It looks to me as if he was afraid that Section 6 was going to be used on him.

20th June.

I saw Burt and Nott-Bower (in Howe's absence) and showed them 'C''s letter from de COURCY, in which the latter discloses the names of PEIERLS and Max BORN, the two scientists at Harwell concerning whom he had doubts. We all agreed that this should not prejudice in any way the proposal that S.B. should interview de COURCY under Section 6 of the O.S.A.

I left with Burt a note setting out certain proposals with regard to vetting which we had previously discussed. He expressed his appreciation of this and said that in future if S.B. were approaching an Establishment Officer in an enquiry case initiated by us, they would let us know before doing so.

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The D.G. saw the Home Secretary at the latter's request. The D.G. had spoken to Strang on his return about the possibility of the use of l8D in cases such as that of MACLEAN and BURGESS. Strang had spoken to Morrison and Morrison had spoken to Chuter Ede. Chuter Ede had expressed interest and said that he would have the matter examined. The D.G. explained to him.

I had previously briefed the D.G. that the Home Secretary might ask him about the case of [] a Foreign Office official who had at one time had strong Communist sympathies. The Home Secretary had asked, through Newsam, to be informed whether the Foreign Secretary knew about the matter. It was explained to the Home Secretary by the D.G. that we did not bother Ministers unless there was a possible case for action. We were, however, in consultation with the Establishment Officer who was informed that we were making enquiries. He would not, however, be told - nor did we think it desirable that he should be - that a H.O.W. was in operation. The Home Secretary accepted this procedure as being the right one.

21st June.

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At the J.I.C. to-day 'C' expressed considerable apprehension about the very wide distribution of Chiefs of Staff papers, some of which contained details of his plans and information.

The Secretary endorsed 'C's' views about the distribution of Chiefs of Staff papers. He expressed similar anxiety about general security in the Ministry of Defence. Two highly important documents - one relating to chemical warfare - had disappeared somewhere between the Ministry and the Admiralty. He went on to say that physical security in the Ministry was bad. M.I.5 had been called in to advise on this subject, but no action had been taken on their recommendations. Junior personnel were moved from one place to another, e.g. COSMIC registries, without anybody giving consideration to the suitability of the appointments. Sir Norman Brook seemed to think that the integrity of all civil servants must be accepted, but the Secretary felt this view was a little out of date!

I gathered that Gardiner was putting up certain recommendations to General Maclean, but that if he did not get satisfaction he proposed to come back to the J.I.C. for support.

We discussed a paper which it is proposed should be written on possible 5th Column activities in relation to any of the campaigns which it is envisaged the Soviet Government might launch. The proposal had been put forward that this survey should cover the U.K. It was agreed by the Committee that a separate paper on the U.K. and the Colonies should be written. I explained that the size of the 5th Column in this country, at any rate, would be to a considerable extent dependent upon the way in which the war arose. If there was a definite act of aggression on the U.K. by the Soviet Government, the 5th Column would be small: if, on the other hand, we appeared to be the aggressors over some obscure interest, which the British worker could not easily understand, we might be faced with serious strike action. Another limiting factor, of course, in this country would be the putting into operation of the counter-measures which we had in mind. It was not possible to say whether such measures would in fact be put into force, since this would be a matter for the Home Secretary of the Government of the day. It was thought that possibly some indication of this aspect of the problem might be introduced rather tentatively into the paper, but care

would obviously have to be taken not to tread on the toes of the Home Office.

The D.M.I. made a suggestion that some assessment of Soviet espionage activities in time of war might be made. I said that any such assessment would be pure crystal-gazing and, in my view, valueless. This proposal was dropped.

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I saw Newsam about _____ and I gave him an answer about _____ informing him that the Secretary of State had already questioned the D.G. about this at yesterday's interview.

Newsam then raised a point that the D.G. had made about 18D. He seemed rather irritated that D.G. had gone over his head. I said that the D.G. had been summoned by the Home Secretary on the advice of the Foreign Secretary. Newsam said that he thought the proposal was not a good one and that 18D was not really applicable. He was, however, having the matter looked into.

I was rung up by Wing Commander Crouchley who wanted to know whether I had seen Roy de GROOT's letter to the P.M. regarding de COURCY. He suggested that somebody of the name of Orvall (or Orbevall), who is something to do with Exchange Control (U.S.A.) on our behalf, would be the man to see de GROOT. Subject to anything that S.L.B. (who is at present away on sick leave) may have to say, I think it might be useful to send a wire to Geoffrey Patterson, suggesting that Orvall (or Orbevall) would be the best man to handle the case. We do not, however, wish to get across any Treasury arrangements that may have been made on other lines. Our sole interest in de GROOT's information is to discredit de COURCY and all his works.

Superintendent Jones of Special Branch called on de COURCY yesterday, as a result of my talk with Burt and Nott-Bower, and, after making his position quite clear, requested him to furnish further particulars about

the statement that he made in the March issue of the Digest. De COURCY was clearly much confused and perturbed, but asked for time to consider his position. Subsequently he rang up 'C' and had a conversation with him, from which it was clear that he fully understood the weakness of his position. He talked a lot about his valuable sources and the dangers of disclosing them, hoping that 'C' would intervene and get the proceedings called off. 'C' made it quite clear to him that since the matter was in the hands of the police, he could not possibly intervene in any way.

This has clearly brought about a change of attitude in de COURCY, who has rung up to say that he is forwarding a copy of a letter that he wrote to "a certain person" to Jones, and that he wishes to see the latter again.

The police intend to stick to their guns and to insist on knowing where the information has come from. If they are told that it comes from the Archduke Otto, they will wish to know whence the Archduke receives his information. If de COURCY says that he does not know, we shall have him more or less where we want him, since at any convenient moment it could be disclosed, through question and answer in the House, that he bases his categorical statements in the Digest on information received from sources of which he did not know the origin. From conversations with 'C', it is clear that this is precisely what de COURCY fears most.

Alec showed me a telegram from Hong Kong which was very obscurely worded. In effect it seemed to indicate that a rating on one of H.M. ships called PATTERSON was operating under control in a case involving a Petty Officer named COLVERT. COLVERT was apparently supplying a microfilm to contacts in Singapore and Hong Kong and receiving something in exchange. I told Alec that he should consult B.2, but that as far as I could see the point was to discover COLVERT's contact and arrest both COLVERT and the contact when one or other of them was passing the microfilms. It might be necessary to get the Admiralty into line.

23rd June.

Field Marshal Montgomery attended the 3rd Division (World War I) annual dinner at the Trocadero on 22.6.51. After dinner he made an off-the-record speech, drawing attention to the importance of his remarks not being repeated. He said that as far as he was concerned he did not mind, but when things got into the press international complications often resulted. Most of the officers present were fairly senior in rank and age and numbered about 40.

After explaining how his Headquarters at Fontainebleau had now been transferred to N.A.T.O., he himself being deputy to General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Montgomery made the following points.

1. Mr. Winston Churchill had maintained that the only real deterrent to war to-day was the fact that the Allies had a preponderance of atomic weapons. He did not believe that this was the predominant factor, in Russian calculations and had so informed Churchill. He was doubtful how far Russia, which was a large country with industry widely distributed, would really be affected by the dropping of atomic bombs.

2. The real key to the situation, in his view, was the proposal to rearm Germany. Until that happened he did not think that a war was likely, but as soon as a settlement on this point was reached and it would be reached - the cards would be face upwards and war became a "probability". The Russians would then have to consider whether they would attack before the weapon of the Western Allies had been forged, or abandon their ideas of world conquest.

3. Before taking the Germans to our bosom and rearming them, it was essential to absorb them politically into the scheme of Western European alliances. For this three conditions were necessary:

- (a) The occupation would have to cease.
- (b) Germany would have to be given full sovereign rights and complete equality.
- (c) It would have to be made perfectly clear that we were not rearming the Germans in order that they could fight our battles for us, but in order that they might play their part in the general defence plans for Western Europe.

Pending the solution of these political difficulties, it had been made clear to the Germans that we did not intend to discuss their rearmament.

Montgomery believed that these difficulties would be solved before very long and that the crucial period would be the summer and autumn of 1952.

4. Eisenhower had to be left free to deal with co-ordination; and the actual "forging of the weapon" was Montgomery's principal task.

Of all the Powers of Western Europe there was at the moment only one nation which was preparing itself in the right lines. As an International Commander, he referred to them as "the British", and at times, when they did not do what he wanted them to do, he referred to them as "those British"! They were ahead of the other Powers because immediately after the war they had overhauled their whole war machine and were adapting it to modern methods. He had visited all countries from Norway to Italy and had met many curious people - some efficient, others not - but, in order to force the pace, he had told them what their contribution must be and that he would be holding full-scale manoeuvres in the early summer of 1952. He had, moreover, insisted that commanding Generals should take the field themselves, and not direct their operations from an armchair; It was he who would be telling them what to do and he fully expected that a considerable number of them would be found wanting. He had told the Norwegians, for example, that they would have to provide two full-scale Divisions. They had said that this was impossible, but he had insisted. He was going there next week to make sure that preparations were being carried out.

As regards ourselves, he had made it clear that, apart from our regular forces, which would be immediately available, two Territorial Divisions would have to be in the field within a month of the outbreak of war, and that to increase their efficiency they would have to train for four weeks instead of two this year. This had been agreed by the Defence Minister.

5. Field Marshal Montgomery then referred to General Eisenhower's southern flank, and the necessity for its proper protection. What was required was a Supreme Commander in the Middle East. We had proposed a Britisher, but the Americans had turned the proposal down flat. The real point, however, was to commit the Americans in the Middle East, and this could only be assured by giving them command. General Eisenhower had threatened to resign unless this matter was settled. Montgomery had asked him whether he really meant this and, getting a reply in the affirmative, had asked that his name should be coupled with that of the Supreme Commander. It was at this stage that he had, at Eisenhower's request, come over here to force a settlement with Mr. Shinwell. Admiral Carney's appointment had been the result.

He went on to say that matters of this sort did not present much difficulty as between Service chiefs; they could always find a way: it was when the politicians intervened that difficulties arose.

6. The only other remark of interest Montgomery made was that during his visit to Italy he had had a long interview with the Pope, who had created a profound impression upon him. He had found him extremely sound and very well informed through his Intelligence Service, which was second to none.

25th June.

I talked to Farid Shehab, Head of the Lebanese Surete, who seemed to be an intelligent man trying to achieve an almost impossible task.

I gave him the usual talk about the basic principles of security, for which he seemed grateful. Moreover, he seemed to think that they were important. He painted rather a lamentable picture of his own organisation. He said that he had told Kyles, when the latter came as Police Adviser, that he would not be able to stick it for more than six months. In fact Kyles had stayed for eight months and had put forward some very sound recommendations about police reorganisation. They had, however, been shelved and a kind of ring had been placed round Kyles which made it impossible for him to operate.

Farib Shehab's organisation had been cut down from 200 to 100 and out of the 100 there were barely 5% upon whom he could positively rely. If he could ever bring this up to 10% he would feel that he had achieved a good deal, but in fact such a possibility only appeared extremely dimly over the horizon. He could place no reliance upon the ordinary police, who were both venal and stupid: they either warned a suspect and allowed him to escape or they bungled the case through sheer inefficiency. Whenever he warned the police about a Communist demonstration, the information reached the Communist Party within an hour; he had now cut such warnings down to about five minutes before the incident was supposed to take place, but the Communists had countered his action and discovered his informant by feeding him with false information and watching police reactions. In Ministerial circles he got little support, and undesirables were frequently protected by their Ministers either because the latter were soft or incredulous or for motives of a more sinister kind. In one case he had reported a man who was working for the Russians, but nothing had been done.

I told the D.G. that de COURCY had been seen last week by the police and had promised to send them a copy of the letter that he had sent to 'C'. From a subsequent conversation that he had had with 'C' it was clear that he was extremely perturbed about his position; he realised that he was in a position in which he had either to disclose his sources - if in fact he knew what they were - or lay himself open to a charge under the O.S.A. It was pretty clear that he did not have any knowledge beyond what the Archduke told him. He had asked for time to consider his position. I told Special Branch that they could not be content that he got his information from the Archduke Otto; but that if of course he was prepared to say that he did not know anything about the origin of his reports, our job would be more or less achieved. De Courcy would then be open to the charge that it was a highly irresponsible act on his part to make such categorical statements, that a felony was being committed at Harwell with the connivance of the authorities, if he had not taken the trouble to verify the accuracy of his sources. Moreover, at any moment this point could be brought by question and answer in the House of Commons. Special Branch have this matter well in hand and will push it to the utmost limit.

Meanwhile de COURCY seems pretty vulnerable on the financial side, and one of his representatives in America, de GROOT, who has recently resigned from the organisation, is prepared to divulge currency evasions to a suitable representative in New York. Kennedy has seen O'Donovan of the Treasury on this point and action has been concerted through Geoffrey Patterson.

26th June.

Kellar came to talk to me about his report. I said that it was clear from the statements made by our S.L.Os. in agreement with S.I.S., that there was no real security threat in the West Indies either from within or from without. The proposal for integration, therefore, was designed against possible developments in future and in particular to deal with a situation that might arise in time of war - all somewhat remote. It seemed to me that before considering integration, we should be quite clear about its effects on both the F.B.I. and C.I.A. Two of the territories in which S.I.S. would be operating would be Mexico and Cuba, both of which are regarded more or less as part of the American Colonial Empire, where there was both C.I.A. and F.B.I. representation. The Americans were very jealous of these preserves and had quite openly refused in the past to give us any information coming from those territories, and indeed from the whole of South America. If, therefore, S.I.S. got across their tracks it would be our office in Jamaica which would incur the odium. There was, moreover, an added difficulty owing to the BURGESS/MACLEAN case which had caused grave misgivings in the minds of the Americans about the security of S.I.S. It was possible, therefore, that the only effect of integration would be to cause doubts of both our offices.

 I attended the S.I.C. luncheon. Fock mentioned to me a Dutch scientist who had been causing him a certain amount of anxiety through his contact with the Polish Legation. He was passing the facts to us and asking for advice on how to deal with the case.

D.D.M.I. (Johnstone) rang me up about the International Federation of War Veterans. The D.R.A. had been asked to attend a meeting in Rome. I made some enquiries and told D.D.M.I. that although the aims of the organisation were sound on paper, there was reason to think that it had been penetrated and that there might be a strong French delegation of a Communist kind. We agreed that it would be better if the D.R.A. did not attend. I gather, however, that some Admiralty representative was going to be there.

Potter came to see me about an approach that he had had from an Assistant Editor of the Daily Mail, with whom he was friendly. Some three or four months ago this man had told Potter that he was proposing to write a series of articles to counteract those produced by the Daily Express under the signature of Chapman PINCHER. Could Potter give him any assistance? Potter had replied that he was unable to help. The Assistant Editor had now returned to the charge and had asked Potter to lunch on Thursday, when he was proposing to show him the articles and obtain his observations and approval. Potter wanted to know whether there was any particular line that he could adopt.

I told him he had fallen into the classic press gambit, which was to show a draft and then draw him into conversation and criticism. I said I would think the matter over and let him know what he should do.

Air Commodore Constantine rang up to say that Mackay, the Air Liaison Officer at New Zealand House, was trying to arrange for his Defence Minister, MacDonald, to see the D.G. We had already heard that MacDonald was seeing the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations about the setting up of a new Security Service in New Zealand.

I told Constantine that I would communicate with Mackay and arrange an appointment.

I saw Victor and Tess at Claridges. He said that he, Tess and Stewart Hampshire had a long discussion over the weekend. They felt that there were a certain number of people whom they knew who had had a considerable Left Wing past at the University, and who should in present circumstances come forward and assist the authorities. They were considering the desirability of going to these people and urging them to do their duty; failing which they would have to take the matter into their own hands. They would not themselves have taken this action during the war, but in the present circumstances they thought it was right and would like to have my views.

I said that in the first instance I thought it was desirable that we should know who these people were and possibly make some enquiries about them, since otherwise they would be presented with a glorious opportunity of whitewashing themselves. It was possible that some of them might have continued their activities since their University days, and before talking to them we should like to ascertain whether they were current secret members.

Victor saw the force of this argument. He was going away for two weeks and would get into touch with me immediately on his return.

27th June.

I attended the J.I.C. (Deputy Directors) meeting to-day when we considered the paper from Intelligence Division about their powers of detention and interrogation under Z.E.I. 68. The question arose as to whether these powers should be retained with or without the agreement of the German authorities. From the Intelligence point of view it seemed to be of paramount importance that they should be retained.

I advanced a view that it would be better for us to retain these powers, since criticism would be greater if we encouraged the Germans to formulate a new law giving their Government what here would be regarded as Gestapo powers. This view was generally accepted.

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The D.G. saw Bridges to-day and I gather that, after a somewhat difficult interview at which Horrocks and Padmore were present, a decision has been reached about the higher salaries, which will not be the full Chorley allowances.

Horrocks still maintained that in equity the decision was unfair, since our previous salaries had been agreed and confirmed on no less than three or four occasions by the Treasury and we were ~~not~~ the only civil servants who were not granted the Chorley rates.

We have heard to-day that a friend of an ex-employee of S.I.M. in Italy has offered to disclose the whereabouts of BURGESS and MACLEAN in Italy for a sum of £1,000, to be paid only after identification has been established. The offer has been accepted, subject to suitable arrangements being made.

Dick has agreed a memorandum with S.I.S. on the subject of Kim Philby, which is to go to the F.B.I. I have made various amendments, and in particular the exclusion of a reference in Garonwy Rees' statement to the effect that BURGESS thought that Kenneth Younger would be sympathetic to his views about China.

Rees's remarks about Anthony Blunt have been allowed to remain, but I have said that I thought that Anthony's answer to them should also be included.

I am a little worried about the report, since it seems to me to be too categorical about matter on which there is no real evidence. Garonwy, in his statement, says that BURGESS told him in about 1937 that he was working for an anti-Communist organisation which was a secret branch of the Comintern and was collecting information of a political kind. He had asked Garonwy and Blunt to co-operate with him. How far they actually did so has not emerged, nor indeed were they really in a position to give very much assistance. Blunt says that he never knew that BURGESS was working for a Comintern organisation, but thought that it was something he was doing for our Secret Service to combat Nazi activities. Personally, I feel that, whatever the facts, Anthony would have been far more interested in his artistic pursuits than in politics, although his friendship with BURGESS might well have led him into doing something rather stupid. I find it difficult, too, to imagine BURGESS as a Comintern agent or an espionage agent in the ordinary accepted interpretation of these terms. He certainly had been Marxian and, up to a point, an apologist for the Russian regime, and would have been capable of discussing in a highly indiscreet manner with anybody almost anything that he got from official sources. He would have done this out of sheer political enthusiasm without any regard for security. Dick's report does not convey this, and it may be rightly so. In any case the Americans in these matters are incapable of assessing the finer points in a case like this; a man is either black or he is white. It seems to me that as a result of this report, Blunt will be blacklisted in America, which, whatever the facts, of his past, seems hardly justifiable.

On my return from leave a couple of weeks ago, I learned that the Government had decided against our going under the Home Office. We are to remain under the P.M. and from time to time certain aspects of our work will come under scrutiny of a P.U.S. committee, consisting of Bridges, in the Chair, and P.U.Ss from the Home Office, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. At the moment we have received no direction about this.

The decision in the Cabinet was due first to a statement by the P.M., and secondly, and largely, on a statement by the Home Secretary that he did not wish for control of the department, provided he was kept adequately informed, as in fact he was, about the reasons for the imposition of warrants. In face of this Sir Norman Brook said he did not wish to press his point.

Anthony Blunt telephoned to say that BURGESS's mother was upset by a statement in the Daily Express that BURGESS had been dismissed from the Foreign Office on account of his activities in America. She thought that the Foreign Office should issue a denial and wished to suggest this to Mr. Seddon.

I spoke to Skardon (@ Seddon) who rang up Mrs. Bassett and told her that her point would be given consideration.

28th June.

I attended the J.I.C. on behalf of the D.G. to-day.

Malik's new proposals about an armistice in Korea were considered. It seems that the Russians have benefitted by these proposals, whatever their outcome. First of all they had the kudos for coming forward as "peacemakers" and this fitted in with their "peace" campaign. Secondly, the line we held at present was far more defensible than any line we have yet held. If, therefore, the proposal is that we should go back to the 38th Parallel, our position would be much weakened. Thirdly, the Chinese clearly wanted a "breather". Fourthly, if they really wanted peace in Korea, it might well be because they wished to liberate forces for activity elsewhere.

Reilly said that Drake, the Managing Director of the A.I.O.C., had seen the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. He was certain that if strong action were taken the Persians would, even at this late hour and in spite of the extent to which they had committed themselves, decide to give in and negotiate on a proper basis. The Commanders-in-Chief, however, had instructions to do no more than to evacuate British personnel, if and when this became necessary.

We discussed a paper on the probable Soviet capabilities and strategy in the event of total war in 1952. Some members of the Committee, and the J.I.S., thought that our former view, that the Russians would attack on all fronts, should now be modified in the light of two factors: (i) the establishment of N.A.T.O. forces, which would render their task in Europe more difficult, and (ii) the alignment of Yugoslavia with the West, and the clear warnings that the Americans have given about any attempt by the Soviet bloc to attack her. The matter is to be given further consideration.

General Kirkman attended the Committee to discuss various matters concerning Intelligence Division.

I spoke to Potter before going to the J.I.C. and told him that he should warn his friend that after mentioning the matter to higher authority, he had definite instructions that he could not either indicate any lines on which the article on security should be written, or criticise any draft which might have been made.

I lunched with [] and General Wood, who is the Military and Air Attache. In discussing Malik's latest offer, they thought that one point which the Russians had in mind was the "cease fire" in the field, which was precisely what MacArthur had offered. Truman had been considering doing the same thing, but had been prevented from doing so owing to MacArthur's action. The American attitude to Malik's proposals had already caused a reaction in MacArthur's favour; people were saying that the President was now agreeing to say precisely what MacArthur had suggested.

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I have read a report from Tin-Eye on the visit of an officer from S.I.M.E. to the Sudan to enquire into the causes of the mutiny in the Police. The report is all right in itself, but in forwarding it to the Commander-in-Chief, Tin-Eye has suggested that as our link in the Sudan was the Police and the Police had failed, the remedy was for us to appoint a D.S.O. to the Sudan who would cover both Aden and Somaliland.

It is, of course, utterly wrong that Tin-Eye should make such a suggestion without prior reference to ourselves. It also shows that he has the wrong idea about a D.S.O.'s functions. The real answer to the situation in the Sudan is that a new Commissioner of Police should be appointed. While it is true that a D.S.O. might have heard a certain amount about pending disturbances, in the main he would rely upon the information that he received from the Police.

29th June.

Burt telephoned this morning to say that Jones had seen de COURCY again at Alderbourne Manor. De COURCY's tone had changed completely; he was polite and accommodating. He has given a good deal of information which will be embodied in the report, but it seems fairly clear that he knows nothing about the source of his information, except what the Archduke Otto may have told him. He has now offered to get the Archduke over here. I think this offer should be accepted. Alternatively, the Archduke should be seen in Paris.

 I saw 'C' for a moment in Dick's room, when I told him about the case of de COURCY. He seemed to think that it would be preferable for the Archduke Otto to be seen over here.

 Sir Frederick Shedden and McBride, Australian Minister of Defence, saw the D.G. and were then passed on to me. I gave them a general talk on the work of the office. Shedden seemed interested in the case of BURGESS and MACLEAN, to which I was obliged to give a non-committal answer. In fact I could say, quite truthfully, that we did not know their whereabouts, nor had we any positive information as to their motive in leaving the country. He asked whether the F.B.I. had developed their cases as a result of information received from FUCHS. I told him that they had and I made it clear to him that the discovery of FUCHS was, at any rate in part, due to a very careful analysis of a limited number of facts. I made it clear to both him and McBride that the difficulties of detecting Russian espionage were very great indeed. McBride mentioned his law against the Communists. I told him that we were not contemplating anything of the kind here at the moment, as we did not think that in conditions here such action would either be justifiable or profitable.

 I had a meeting on the report of the Working Party to consider measures for coping with the increased vetting commitment. We agreed

to an immediate increase of registry staff, bringing the figures up to 150 - we were not about 25 to 30 short. We agreed that we should aim towards having something like 85 people in the L.U. section, although it was admitted that recruitment under present conditions was extremely difficult. We agreed to a special effort being made to bring vetting, now 15 days behind, up to date and to the setting up of a section to carry out the destruction of useless files and cards. It was thought that possibly Stanley Strong might be placed in charge of this section and that Graham Mitchell might take over his C.I. commitment. We also agreed to put lower category people on the Index instead of on the files - Fascists, Pacifists, and certain other individuals would be regarded as N.R.A.; Communists, whose membership dated from January, 1948, onwards would be stopped, as well as anybody engaged in espionage. Doubtful cases and in particular Communist Party members prior to 1948 would be marked "enquiries needed" and should be resubmitted by departments for a full-scale vet if necessary.

2nd July.

I gave my usual talk to a course of Colonial police officers. One of them is in charge of the Interrogation Centre in Malaya. He told me that this Centre was now a going concern and producing very useful results. The method of approach is to try and convince the Chinaman about the fallacies of Communism. This is an extremely uphill task, but by perseverance has been achieved in a number of cases. It is only then that information begins to flow, the previous attitude having been "I no speak". The women are in many cases more difficult to deal with than the men, but once they break them they generally have a fund of information, since they are almost invariably used for courier work.

Mr. Macdonald, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, called here to see the D.G. about the necessity for improving the work of the Special Branch of the Police. The D.G. offered to go out, but Mr. Macdonald is apparently apprehensive about the possible publicity that might result. He does not want to run any risk of an attack in Parliament on the lines that a Gestapo is being set up, neither does he wish to offend the susceptibilities of the New Zealand Commissioner of Police.

I did not see Macdonald myself, but I suggested to Shaw that when he saw him he might devise a possible compromise course, which would involve the setting up of a committee with a representative of the Prime Minister's office in the Chair and members from the three Services, and the Commissioner of Police to cover matters connected with security. This would enable the Government to keep a closer grip on what was being done. Macdonald is to communicate with us if he wishes for our assistance in any way.

At the Directors meeting to-day Horrocks made a statement about the final adjustment of the salaries of the higher staff.

I mentioned the proposals to meet our vetting commitment which had been put up by the Working Party, and got the D.G.'s approval to go ahead. Hollis said that if these measures were to be effectively carried out, it

was essential that Graham Mitchell should take over C.I. and that Stanley Strong should be given the commitment of reviewing files for destruction. The D.G. agreed.

Money told me that Inspector Cooper of the Gold Coast Police, accompanied by a Special Branch Inspector, had just returned from a visit to the House of BOWMAN, a Communist, where three Nigerians were housed. The object was to interrogate these Nigerians about the falsity of their passports and about their proposed visit to a University in Eastern Germany. BOWMAN had refused S.B. entry to the house and, unfortunately, the Inspector had made it clear that he wanted to interrogate the Nigerians about their passports. It seemed likely, therefore, that the Nigerians would move to another house or leave the country. Would I authorise B.6 observation? I said that I did not think that we could profitably use B.6, since to be of any value the watch would have to be a 24 hour one and might go on for some time. It seemed to me better to put a T.C. on BOWMAN. I rang up Saffery and got this done.

3rd July.

I was told shortly after my arrival that the Nigerians were at Heathrow airport and about to take off. I rang up Burt. He said that he was prepared to take a chance and would cause them to lose the 'plane, on the grounds that their passports were out of order. Meanwhile Cooper would go down and interrogate them. Unfortunately, Immigration were not particularly co-operative and instructions reached the S.B. officer too late. The Nigerians were already in the air on their way to Amsterdam in transit to Prague.



O.S. then asked me whether the Dutch could be informed. I said I thought there was little likelihood of co-operation from the Dutch, since they would have no powers upon which to act. There would be no harm, however, in giving them the facts. If they of their own volition send the Nigerians back, so much the better. Later I discovered that this had been passed on to S.I.S. almost in the form of a request for detention. I spoke to Geoffrey Wethered, who got on to the Hague. It then appeared that the Dutch did not feel that they had any powers under which to act; the only thing they could possibly do would be to lose the passports and so cause the Nigerians to miss their 'plane. I felt that any action of that kind would inevitably lead to serious questions in the House. We should be accused of requesting the detention of British subjects by a foreign Government without any satisfactory evidence that a crime had been committed. I therefore telephoned S.I.S. that the Nigerians should be allowed to go on but that if there were time we should be glad to have photographic copies of their passports. From these we may be able to produce evidence of forgery.

Kazim Raza came to see me. I gave him a copy of a note on military security which I had already given to Ahmed some weeks ago. He had been impressed by the organisation of C.I.C. in America and thought that the Pakistan Army should have something similar, but he was afraid of accusations of setting up a Gestapo. I said that C.I.C.

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was a normal organisation to have in any Army Field Intelligence, and that it could quite easily act as a cover for a Security Wing. In order to avoid another plot in the Pakistan Army by high-ranking officers, he should establish liaison with the Security Wing in the Army at all levels, as in fact was done here. He seemed to think this idea was a good one.

I had lunch with Stourton.



I arranged for Kennedy ~~to see~~ ~~Hellis~~ and Marriott.

4th July.

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I had a meeting with Dick, John Marriott and Hill about a meeting which is to take place at Room 055 with a pressman from the Daily Mail who wants to write a series of articles on security. The Daily Mail had communicated with Downing Street, who in turn had spoken to the D.G. Downing Street thought we might like to give the Daily Mail some sort of a line through the Press Relations Officer at the Home Office. The D.G. said that he would like the pressman to be seen by one of our officers. Hill thought that we should make it clear that the interview was entirely confidential and conditional on there being no mention of the fact that any of the information had come from ourselves. We should then listen to what the pressman had to say regarding what he thought of writing, and make no comment until we had had time to consider matters further.

5th July.

I attended the J.I.C. Directors meeting to-day. I had a word with 'C' after the meeting. He told me he was very worried about the case of [] in I.R.D. who saw a lot of CX material. I told 'C' that we were turning on the heat and that we hoped to clear the case up as soon as possible; probably by an interview.

I also had a word with Peter Shortt. He seemed very worried about the lack of any Government action in Persia, but said that it had now been decided to carry out certain troop movements rather on the lines previously adopted, which might conceivably bring the Persians to reason.

I also spoke to Dick about the long lists of Czech visas which were supplied with ACORN material. In the last list that I had seen I noticed that BOWMAN had been to Prague in May. BOWMAN was the Communist who was housing the three Nigerians - was there any record on his file to show that such a visit had taken place? Apart from this, there was a long list of delegates going via Prague to a conference in Russia, which in addition to the usual list of fellow travellers, included BURHOP, formerly of atomic energy, and McGIBBON, the Soviet spy. Dick did not seem to know what happened to these lists, but said that he would find out.

F.J. came to tell me that there had been some sand put in the bearings of a destroyer called H.M.S. St. Kitts. The ship had orders to put in at Portrush. How did we warn the R.U.C. and ask for their assistance? As Kennedy was over here, I suggested that we should get hold of him.

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The Daily Mail representative was seen by John Marriott and Courtenay Young at Room 055. He did not seem to have a clue and opened by saying that clearly security here was in a bad state, what was the story? Marriott and Courtenay replied "What is your evidence that security is in a bad state?" This rather nonplussed the pressman, who could merely think in terms of PONTECORVO, MACLEAN and BURGESS escaping from this country. It was agreed that he would write a series of articles and then let us see them.

At the staff meeting to-day D.E./A reported that a letter had been received from Australia asking for the loan of Mr. Potter to assist in the organisation of their Registry and records. It was agreed that D.E./A. should discuss this letter with the D.G. and inform him that in the opinion of the Board it was not possible for Mr. Potter to be released at the present time.

D.E./A reported that a letter had been received from Mr. A.F. Giles, formerly D.I.G. (CID) Palestine Police, enquiring into the possibility of a post with us. The Board agreed that there were no present opportunities for which Giles could be considered, but that his name should be kept before us as a potential reserve.

S.I.M.E. D.mentioned that possible developments in Persia made it undesirable that both H/SIME and his Deputy should be away from S.I.M.E. at the same time. The Board agreed that D.O.S. would cable this decision to H/SIME, in view of the projected visit of Mr. Stewart to Head Office.

There was a discussion on the relative functions of the O.S. Sections and of B. Division. It was felt generally that some clearer definition of functions could be reached, and it was agreed that D.B. would examine the matter and in conjunction with D.O.S. would arrange for further discussions at a working level.

A draft cable to S.I.F.E giving information on the attitude to be adopted towards the request for the appointment of Port and Travel Control Officers in the S.I.F.E area was discussed and agreed.

Vetting. D.E./A reported that the back-log on the Index had been reduced from 8,600 to 7,100 names, largely as a result of overtime work. It was agreed that, if the need continued, consideration should be given to the possibility of drafting down ex-members of R.2 staff from other sections, to assist in disposing of the arrears. Arrangements could be made by negotiation between the Lady Superintendent and the Senior Officers concerned.

Kennedy came round and spoke to the I.G. in Belfast. The R.U.C. are sending one, Davidson, to Portrush to meet the St. Kitts at 10 a.m. tomorrow.

6th July.

I spoke to Burt and suggested that perhaps a copy of his report on de COURCY should go to the D. of P.P. After consultation with the Commissioner, he had rung me back to say that a copy had gone to the Home Secretary, who would doubtless be sending it on to the D. of P.P., but that if we liked to show it to the D. of P.P. there would be no objection. He had also told Paling about the enquiries that he had been making in connection with de COURCY and the contents of his last report.

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Dick told me that Askew, who was formerly in charge of ciphers at the Foreign Office and has since retired has, with Carey Foster's agreement, given an interview to the press on the subject of security. Amongst other things he told the press that all ciphering and deciphering was done under the supervision of Sir Edward Travis of Eastcote.

The irresponsibility of encouraging a man like Askew to talk to the press is beyond belief. Doubtless he has made many other indiscretions. We only learned about the interview through the pressman's notebook which was left in a public lavatory and picked up by the Police.

7th July.

I had a talk with Dick, who tells me that there is to be a highly confidential enquiry in the Foreign Office about the security risks of employing homosexuals. Sir Norman Brook is to be in the chair, and the other two members are Cadogan and Bland.

Dick was summoned to a meeting at Broadway at which 'C', [redacted] and [redacted] were present. They were extremely worried about Philby's position and anxious that his case should be further investigated before he returned from leave. Dick said that it would be difficult for him to carry the enquiry any further on the assumption that Philby was identical with "ELLI" of the Gouzenko case, or that he was the "C.E. officer" mentioned by Wolkov. He suggested that Edward Cussen or Buster Milmo should be given all the evidence and conduct an enquiry. He doubted, however, whether

any such enquiry could be conclusive: Philby would have to be told that the Americans suspected him of being "ELLI" and that it was up to him to do everything he could to produce factual evidence to the contrary. This might, however, be extremely difficult.

Meanwhile, O'Malley, late of the Foreign Office, has been to Strang to say that he had positive evidence that Anthony Blunt had been a friend of Guy BURGESS and that while at Cambridge he was a Communist. Strang thought this information should be given to Sir Alan Lascelles and thought that it should be transmitted through us rather than the Foreign Office. Dick thinks that the only way out is for me to see Lascelles.

Dick wants Antohny to see James Robertson and Arthur Martin on certain points which have cropped up in the Guy BURGESS correspondence taken from his flat in Bond Street. I am going to arrange this.

9th July.

The Chief Constable of Stockport (Mr. Rees) telephoned this morning to say that the firm of Merlees, Bickerton and Day, who are making diesel engines for the Russians, are having a lot of trouble with inspectors, in particular one OTCHINACH. They have a contract for 15 diesel engines; 13 have been shipped, but as there is no transport for the other two, the Russian has been insisting that they be taken to pieces and re-examined. No. 14 has been taken, but No. 15, although it complies with all the requirements, has up to now been rejected.

The Russian made two curious requests, both of which were refused. The first was for microfilms of component parts of the engine, and the second was for photographs of the outside of the factory. When asked why he wanted this he became incoherent.

Merless, Bickerton and Day are apparently seeking for guidance and would welcome either a telephone call or a visit from us. I understand that Hill is in touch with this firm.

Dick reported, at the Directors meeting to-day, on the agenda for to-morrow's meeting of the Home Cold War Committee. The question of Communists in the armed forces was being raised on the basis of a suggestion that serving officers should lecture to their men on the subject.

We all agreed that this would be highly undesirable, since many of the men might know far more about Communism than the officer, who was likely to make a fool of himself. Dick suggested that we should recommend the exclusion of Communists from the armed forces, even though such a proposal would obviously open the door to those who wanted to avoid military service.

Both the D.G. and I felt that there was little really to show that Communists in the armed forces were in any way making themselves felt, even though it was true that some half dozen cases had been brought to notice of service men who had declined to fight in Korea. In a

general way it seemed that a service man would get no opportunity of propagating his views without the fact coming to notice, and disciplinary action being taken. Provided, therefore, he did not get into a position which gave him access to secret information, it did not seem that he could do much harm. There was at least a chance that having served two years under military discipline, he might come out of the service a better man.

Dick said there was a view in the Services that it was a waste of time to train men who in war were going to desert to the enemy. While this may be so, I think it is difficult as long as the Party remains legal; to make a stronger case for the total exclusion of men from the Services than their total exclusion from the Civil Service.

I attended a cocktail party at Thames House to meet the Tripartite delegates to the Atomic Energy Security Conference. Hollis is representing us and has a difficult job putting over our point of view on security screening in such a way as to convince the meeting that by and large our methods are as effective as those of the Americans. It is easy enough to argue on a particular case that if a full loyalty enquiry had been carried out, certain facts might have come to notice. The point is, however, that as hard cases make bad law, so it may in the long run be a waste of time and money and, indeed, of efficiency, to frame security regulations on the basis of one or two cases.

I met Roach, the F.B.I. delegate, and I also had a talk with Nicholson, the new Commissioner of the R.C.M.P., who is basically in agreement with our point of view. Portal was the host. He is leaving atomic energy next month - I think with considerable regret. Some people do not seem to think that he has been the success that he should have been, but whether it is his fault or that of the Government I do not know.

10th July.

I had lunch with Anthony. He told me about the recent activities of Jack HEWITT, who seems to have sold himself to the Daily Express and to be in a highly neurotic condition. The Daily Express have been taking him on trips to Paris to try and obtain evidence about the whereabouts of BURGESS and MACLEAN. Meanwhile, he has given them several highly indiscreet interviews. Both Anthony and Garonwy REES have reprimanded him severely, as a result of which he is threatening to undermine Anthony's position. On one occasion he went so far as to say that he would commit suicide. Garonwy REES informed the Police, through a friend of his, and some action was taken by them to calm HEWITT down.

I took the opportunity of asking Anthony again about his views on Marxian doctrine and the extent to which at any time he had been associated with Communist activity. He told me that in his early days at Cambridge he had been associated with a number of Communists, many of whom were fellow "Apostles". He has always been interested in the Marxian interpretation of history and artistry, but he had never believed in the way in which the Russians applied it, nor had he ever accepted or been interested in the purely political aspects of the Marxian teaching. He was quite emphatic that when BURGESS approached him, I think in 1937, to assist him

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in obtaining political information of an anti-Fascist king, he was firmly under the impression that BURGESS was working for the Government. BURGESS had never said to him anything which would imply that he was working for the Comintern.

I subsequently saw Dick, Robertson, Arthur Martin and Burbidge, and I think that what I had to tell them dispelled suspicions on a number of points which had been aroused through a number of conversations on the T.C.

12th July.

I saw Kenneth Page for a moment. I asked him what he thought of our set-up in the Caribbean. He said that he liked both Beith and Lee and that he thought they had done a good job. He felt that having established ourselves there it would be unwise to withdraw at this stage, although the security threat was not at the moment in any sense a serious one.

At the staff meeting to-day we got Ferguson, the J.I.D. representative in the Middle East, to talk to us about his staff problems. He said that while he could generally manage with the staff he had dealing with Communist matters, when the problems were not of an urgent character, he could not do with less than three officers of reasonable competence to handle espionage cases. He now had six D.A. cases of some importance, and it was therefore impossible for him to spare without a replacement. We all felt that he had made out a good case. Dick is to consider whether he can spare anyone from B. Division. He will give us three names from which to choose after assessing the relative claims of home and overseas.

Dick drew Ferguson out on the question of integration in this country. Ferguson feels that integration in the Middle East has been of enormous benefit to both M.I.5 and M.I.6 and has enormously increased the quality of the information obtained. He has reservations, however, on the extent to which integration can be carried out in this country. Dick argued that Communism, in its international sense, was being carried to a large extent by the Foreign Office; R.5, therefore, no longer had a function in educating the Foreign Office on this subject. Ferguson thought there was something in this, but he still felt that espionage presented a difficult problem owing to the different approach in S.I.S., who were always concerned with the security of their operations. Apart from this, they had to operate much more quickly. Their filing system was different, since it was to a large extent run on the basis of the information produced by each particular agent. He did not see how files could be amalgamated at home; he agreed, however, that a good deal of streamlining could be done if the two organisations were in the same building.

Johnstone saw me about a ship being built in Sunderland on behalf of the Polish Government, which the Admiralty now intend to take over. I signed a letter to the police warning them about this and asking them to give any protection they could against possible sabotage by members of the Polish crew who were intending to take over the ship on Monday.

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13th July.

I had a talk with Nicholson (RCMP). I think he finds himself in agreement with us on the vetting problem. He thinks, however, that we may have to make some slight concession to the American point of view in particular cases.

He told me about Kelly's appointment, and I explained to him that we proposed to give Kelly a free run in the office.

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I saw Tommy Lascelles, at the D.G.'s request, in order to convey to him a report made by O'Malley to William Strang to the effect that Anthony Blunt had been a Communist and might well be one to-day.

I told Lascelles that I had known Anthony Blunt for about ten years; that he had in his University days associated with a number of Communists; that he did believe in the Marxian interpretation of history and artistry, and that he had no sympathy with the theories as applied by the Russians. I was convinced that he had never been a Communist in the full political sense, even during his days at Cambridge.

Tommy said that he was very glad to hear this, since it was quite possible that the story might get round to the Royal Family; he would then be able to say that he had already heard it and looked into it and was satisfied that there was nothing in it. He told me that Blunt had on one occasion intimated to the Queen that he was an atheist - Tommy thinks he may well have said an agnostic - and that the Queen had been a little shaken by his remarks. He was certain that if he now went up and told her that Anthony was a Communist, her immediate reaction would be "I always told you so"!

I spoke to Cumming about the honour for Briscoe, which 'C' was pressing to put forward, and for which he hoped to get our backing. I had consulted the D.G., who if approached would be ready to give the matter his support.

16th July.

I saw Kelly of the R.C.M.P. this morning and told him about the lay-out of the office. I introduced him to Sir John Shaw. It was

agreed that O.S.2 would act as a point of contact for Kelly until he knew his way about the office; thereafter he would make his appointments direct with sections and have the same freedom in the office as Johnny Cimperman.

I talked to the Head of the Siamese C.I.D., Colonel Schamros Madukananda, at a flat rented by S.I.S. An S.I.S. officer, [redacted] using the name of [redacted] was present.

I gave the Siamese a general talk on security principles and then got him to talk a certain amount about his own problems. He said the Soviet Legation had no real raison d'etre in Bangkok and that the authorities were aware that they were making contact with revolutionary Chinese. His main task was to deal with the Chinese community and also with the half-Chinese; the latter were on occasions of considerable value to him and on the whole loyal to Siam.

Colonel Madukananda did not seem unduly worried about his problems. He mentioned among other things that his department had the task of settling disputes between Capital and Labour; not only did they intervene when a strike occurred, but the position had now been reached where a representative of the workers was inclined to approach him with their grievances before they presented them to the management. Colonel Madukananda said that the police by no means sided always with the management; on numerous occasions they had succeeded in obtaining better conditions for the workers. The effect of this had been good in that the people had come to realise that the police were not there solely to oppress them.

Ronnie Howe rang me up to-day to tell me that one Maurice RICHARDSON, who is Assistant Editor of "Lilliput", is inclined to tell his friends that he is working for us.

Whether this be true or not, there is apparently some question of RICHARDSON being concerned in a new publication by the Hulton Press in conjunction with Claude COCKBURN. Howe thought that if RICHARDSON was telling COCKBURN that he was an agent of M.I.5, it might not be too good.

17th July.

'C' telephoned to say that MacMillan was concerned about a statement made to him by de COURCY to the effect that Vansittart, more than a year ago, had said in the House of Lords that there were 12,000 Communists in the Civil Service, and that he was prepared to supply details to the Government. In fact nobody had approached him.

I told 'C' that I would look into this.

19th July.

Colonel Francis, Deputy Chief Censor during the war, called to see me at the suggestion of Sir Edwin Herbert.

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Francis is a member of the solicitors firm Herbert, Smith & Co., 62 London Wall. He is also a Director of Head, Wrightson & Co., Ltd., the steel company, and of Head Wrightson Processes Ltd. His private address is 4, Wythburn Court, Seymour Place, W.1. (Paddington 6928).

* Since
checked
to E.J.
DAVIS.

He said that Sir John Wrightson had spoken to him about Jack HEWITT, who is apparently in charge of all staff entertainment for Head, Wrightson & Co. Wrightson seemed to think that because of his association with BURGESS, HEWITT, and another man called GOODES, an accountant in the firm, might be forming a Communist cell, although he had no evidence whatever of any subversive activity in the firm. His suspicions had then wandered to one Raoul Conrad FISHER, who is the Managing Director of Head Wrightson Processes Ltd. The only grounds on which this suspicion was based were that FISHER was formerly German and was employed with the company of Borsig in Berlin. He had subsequently joined a man called FOSTER-WHEELER, an oil distillation expert in the United States. He travelled a great deal in the course of his business and was proposing to spend his holidays in Yugoslavia, where it was stated he had an old mother.

I asked Francis whether there was any national security interest in all this. He said that Head Wrightson Processes Ltd. were the only company here doing oil distillation on a highly scientific basis. They had no contract with the Government at the moment, but might possibly get one with D.At. En. in the future.

I told Francis that I did not think he need worry too much about any Communist activity by Jack HEWITT, and that as far as FISHER was concerned there was nothing from the national point of view that he could disclose - indeed, it seemed unlikely that he would mix himself up in anything of the kind, since he was earning something between £5,000 and £10,000 a year.

I attended the J.I.C. (Directors) meeting to-day. Mention was made of a new paper in English published and circulated in Russia; the paper was called "News". The Committee were anxious to know if it was getting any circulation in England. I said that as far as I knew it was not.

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The subject of defectors was considered. D.M.I., who was in the Chair was anxious that the whole question should again be reviewed and that publicity should be given to the measures taken to rehabilitate Russians.

I made it clear that the measures being taken in Germany were purely Service measures, designed to teach Russian defectors a trade and also the English language in order that they might more easily take up jobs in English-speaking countries. There had, however, been difficulties as the Army appeared to resent these Russians being given better conditions than troops.

Hilken, speaking on behalf of the D.N.I., said that he had discussed the matter with his own people in Germany recently, and also with the other Services; he thought that the Navy were looking after their people well, but that the other Services regarded defectors as a nuisance and took little trouble about them. He mentioned that most defectors brought a German mistress, from whom they were immediately separated on arrival in the Western Zone: this was bound to cause resentment.

I told the meeting that, in spite of the many difficulties, we had coped with any defectors sent to this country, but that our task would be very much facilitated if we could come out in the open and make use of Government resources. In this connection the Cabinet ruling, that all expenses were to come from the secret vote, was acting like a blight. The meeting decided to give directions to the Working Party to put forward a report embodying the following points: (a) that defectors were the most valuable contribution to Intelligence; (b) that the volume had not increased; (c) that arrangements were not adequate, and (d) that publicity was desirable.

The D.M.I. seemed to think that the Services were not adequately represented on the Working Party. I told him that we had also reached this conclusion, particularly with regard to the War Office representative

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Scramblers for use in S.I.M.E. - A.1 reported that a demand had been made for these by S.I.M.E. as the Army had refused to issue them on the grounds that they were insecure. D.C. asked A.1 to find out whether this was a general Army instruction, as it was contrary to the decision reached at a recent meeting on communications.

Dictograph system - A.1 reported that the dictograph system would be installed in Hanover Square for the use of O.S. Division. Both D.C. and A.1 pointed out that conversations between two people talking on the system could be overheard by a third person who turned down his tab on the buzz-box connecting with either of the two concerned. It was agreed that a warning to this effect should be issued to all users of the system.

Hanover Square - D.C. asked that an interview room should be allowed for the use of C. Division Officers quartered in Hanover Square, and A.1 said he would examine the possibility.

D.O.S. asked what Canteen facilities would be available and he was advised that transport would bring staff back to Leconfield House for luncheon, and a light Canteen would provide coffee and tea at Hanover Square.

Staff - a general discussion on staff was held and D.B. said that he would probably require a further six officers. A.1 felt that, before accepting any commitment to engage staff, we should first examine the relation between the Estimates and costs on the staff side, as he did not feel sure that this number of vacancies was available from the estimates. The Board decided that the Estimates 1951/52 should be examined and the results submitted at the first available opportunity.

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20th July.

I have just heard that Abdullah of Transjordan has been assassinated on the steps of a Mosque in Jerusalem by a Palestinian Arab.

Johnny Cimperman brought his assistant, O'Brien, to see me, although why he has been given an assistant both he and I were far from clear. I can only think that he is going to carry Johnny's golf clubs!!

Burt telephoned to me this afternoon to say that he had heard from a press contact of his that the London office had received notification from their representative at the London Airport that BURHOP had had his passport withdrawn and that the press intended to publish this information.

David FLOYD, the Foreign Office official, has also had his passport withdrawn, since he came forward and expressed a wish to make a statement about his past. He disclosed to Skardon that he had been a Communist in his University days and intermittently since then, although he had completely given up his Communist ideas since 1945. He had been employed on the British Military Mission in Moscow during the war and before going had got an introduction from WINN(?), which led to his meeting a Russian on some twenty occasions. He maintained that he had never imparted any information, although the Russian had pressed him hard about the personnel of the Mission. It is difficult to see how FLOYD could have told them much, since he was mainly in charge of the catering.

21st July.

I spoke to Hill about the case of FLOYD. He feels that we should put the matter to the D. of P.P. - the more so since there has been publicity about the Foreign Office official who has also had his passport withdrawn. This should not, however, prevent us from recommending against a prosecution, which so far as we can see will do nobody any good and may have the effect of preventing others like FLOYD from coming forward.

A press statement has now been put out to the effect that 10 other people have had their passports withdrawn. This information may well refer to a list on 10 people connected with the BURGESS/MACLEAN affair whose names we circulated to Special Branch only under very strict reservations about secrecy.

The D.G. has been told by his contact that the information came from the Yard.

23rd July.

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We had a long discussion about the difficulties of watching. The Egyptians apparently use as many as three cars to watch one suspect and cause the cars to rotate in order during the operations.

I had ten minutes talk with Mr. ~~Mada~~ Hooja, whose name suggests a mythical animal in a child's story book! He is ~~Muvik~~'s deputy in Delhi. He seemed intelligent and receptive. I talked to him about the general principles of security.

At the Directors meeting-to-day we discussed the press leakages. The D.G. was convinced that they came from the Yard and thought that we might consider a T.C. on _____ Meanwhile he asked me to find out what Burt had to say.

Battersby came to see me about the approach by MacMillan to 'C' a propos of Vansittart's information. I subsequently telephoned to 'C' and told him that we had not made any approach to Vansittart, who in the House of Lords had suggested an enquiry about Communists in the Civil Service and had offered to assist with certain information at his disposal. The Government had turned down the question of an enquiry. We had, however, subsequently made contact with at least one of Van's informants: this man had given us some information that we already knew about Communists in Inland Revenue and a good deal of other information which was clearly very wide of the mark. Their intentions had, however, been honest. Lastly, we felt that if Van really had anything important he might impart it either to 'C' or to myself, or indeed to Dick, who knows him well.

'C' will advise MacMillan to let the matter drop.

I told Burt that the D.G. was worried about the leakage of information with regard to the list of 10 people, since their names had been passed to Special Branch only. We were extremely anxious that these names should not be given any publicity, since should this happen it would be extremely embarrassing. Burt said he would look into the matter and ring me back.

24th July.

Burt telephoned to me this morning, suggesting that the notice in the Sunday Express indicated that the Foreign Office had leaked about the 10 individuals. On looking at the paper it was clear that a passage which Burt attributed to Ridsdale was merely a speculation by the Daily Express correspondent. I told Burt my view and made it clear that the information which we had passed to him had not been divulged to anybody in the Foreign Office or any other department outside our own. He said he would go into the matter further.

Emery came to talk to me

I asked him about counter-espionage in Ismailia. He said that since he took over, all reports had been given to S.I.S. and after processing they passed the relevant portions to J.I.D. or to CX, Middle East. Counter-espionage, Ismailia, had formerly been done by Geoffrey Jenkins, and could again be done by himself direct from Ismailia, although

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most of the informants formerly used by Jenkins had been got rid of as S.I.S. did not want them.

Dick and Hill, with Reilly present, saw the D. of P.P. on the FLOYD case. The D. of P.P. was quite clear that as matters stood a prosecution was not possible, since there was no evidence of any information passed by FLOYD to his Russian contact. It was suggested that possibly WYNN might be interviewed.

It transpired during the meeting that Morrison is taking a very aggressive line about the staff of the Foreign Office. He thinks that the Establishment Branch have been far too soft in the past and that a number of people ought to have been eliminated. He thinks that if grounds exist there should be a prosecution of FLOYD.

We have taken the view that this would be a mistake, since the man came forward voluntarily, and to penalise him would discourage others from volunteering a statement about their past. Apart from this, a successful prosecution seemed extremely unlikely. We have only submitted this case to the D. of P.P. in view of the publicity which has arisen over the withdrawal of FLOYD's passport and the possibility of questions in the House. We should, in my view, be in a position to say that FLOYD's case has been considered by the D. of P.P.

The D.G. told us that he has just attended a luncheon party with Robertson, the editor in chief of all the Beaverbrook press, Gordon, I think of the Sunday Express, and Elland, editor of the Evening Standard, although how this was arranged I do not know.

An off-the-record conversation took place in which the D.G. asked his host exactly what the policy of the Beaverbrook press was. In the case of PONTECORVO they blackguarded the authorities for allowing him to leave the country, but now that the authorities had withdrawn the passport of BURHOP, they complained about a "Star Chamber". Was their policy to pick up any old stick and beat the Government? Robertson was evasive and tried to make out that the case of PONTECORVO was much more serious since he would have been carrying current information. The D.G. said that he did not think this in any way affected his argument, and would like to know what the Beaverbrook press expected the Government to do; they could not have it both ways - either it was right to stop both these people, or it was wrong to stop anybody. No satisfactory reply was forthcoming.

The D.G. then complained about the onslaught on the Security Service, which he imagined must be due to orders from "the Beaver". Surely it was not necessary to talk about the D.G.'s imminent resignation and splurge the worst photograph they could find of him across the front page, regardless of the facts. In any case the attack did not come very well from that quarter, seeing that it was Beaverbrook who was raking the internment camps during the war and filling up our research with people of the type of FUCHS. Moreover, in so doing he was going directly against the advice of the Security authorities.

In reference to the case of BURHOP, Robertson referred to the list of ten other people who had had their passports taken away, and to an infringement of the rights of citizens caused by this action. The D.G. said "Well, here again you have got your facts wrong. The passports have not been withdrawn

and there is no intention of withdrawing the passports of ten people.

Gordon told the D.G. after the luncheon that he was very glad that he had said what he did.

The D.G. has been summoned to a meeting on Monday of the P.U.S.'s Secret Service Committee, when the question of our representation abroad and our position on the SIGINT Board will be discussed.

I told the D.G. that I so far had not seen Norman Brook's report and I thought that we were going to get a bowdlerised version of it. The D.G. then handed me the full report from his safe, but I only had time to read a few pages before he left and wished to lock it up for the night. I noticed that it had been seen by Serpell, and D.O.S., and I understood some time ago that it had been read by Horrocks.

25th July.

At the J.I.C. to-day there was a discussion on the Chiefs of Staff ruling that the J.I.C.'s report on the scale of attack by Russia on the U.K., which was for the purpose of civil defence planning, should be returned to the J.I.C. to be re-written. The Chiefs of Staff seemed to think that it took no account of the potentialities of our defence and therefore exaggerated the probable effect of Soviet bombing.

This raises quite a fundamental issue. The duty of the J.I.C. is to supply factual information and to assess in relation to all campaigns the forces that the enemy can put into the field. The only people who can assess the extent to which these forces are likely to be successful are the Air Defence Committee or the Planners. In its covering note the J.I.C. have made special reservation in this sense, but of course it had not been read or hoisted in by the Chiefs of Staff. We all came to the conclusion that such J.I.C. reports ought not to be released at all until the Planners had expressed their views. In other words, that such papers should be a joint assessment by the J.I.C., the Joint Planners and the Air Defence Committee.

Reilly came to see the D.G. on three points.

As regards the Brook report, he fully supported the view that we should be full members of the SIGINT Board.

As regards representation overseas, he seemed satisfied with Brook's recommendation, provided there was no question of high-handed action without prior consultation with the Foreign Office. The D.G. made it clear that while we were reasonably satisfied with the present arrangements, we did not wish to feel that if we suggested representation in Paris or elsewhere at any time we should not automatically become involved in a battle with S.I.S. - as had been the case over our representation in the U.S.A. We wished to feel that our request would be accepted as a right, subject to any serious overriding objection. Reilly seemed fairly happy about this.

We then discussed monitoring by TASS. The question had been taken up again by the Air Ministry through the Brook Committee. Reilly thinks it ought to be put back to the J.I.C. for further examination. We made it clear that we were all in favour of clipping TASS's wings; our disagreement with A.C.A.S.(I) was solely on the point that his evidence, that monitoring had been going on during manoeuvres, was questionable, and we pointed out that it was always open to the Soviet Embassy, the Trade Delegation, or the Soviet rest home at Seacroft Hill, to monitor communications whenever they liked.

ACORN BRIDE tells us that in 1944 and 1945 Moscow was interested in BURHOP.

26th July.

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There was no opportunity to consider the following points:-

- (i) Move to Hanover Square
- (ii) Joint accommodation with S.I.S. in Horseferry Road
- (iii) Use of Conference Room as temporary offices to meet the present need for accommodation.
- (iv) War organisation. . -----

27th July.

Drew came to see me about the deception plan (Operation INDEX) involving the use of "Duff". He is holding a scientific journal, about 30 copies of which are normally sent to various institutions in Russia. On one of these copies he will have little spots made, intended to show that "Duff" has been affixed, and subsequently removed. Later he will actually affix "Duff", which will contain information designed to imply that someone in the institution was working for the British. A completely different channel will be used to indicate to the Russians that these communications are being passed: they will first of all discover that a number of copies indicate the removal of "Duff", and will then institute a watch and discover the actual messages. The idea is to cause dislocation in the whole institution through an impression that a spy is working there and cannot be identified.

I pointed out to Drew that his main difficulty would be to synchronise the operation: he would have to ensure that his indication to the Russians that "Duff" was being used coincided with the actual use of "Duff". His purpose in visiting me was to get my co-operation in obtaining a H.O.W. on the address in Moscow to which the publication was being sent.

28th July.

I have seen the minutes of meetings between D.O.S., D.B., Magan and Kellar on the future of O.S. Division. Magan divides the office at home and overseas into local, regional and global, and concludes that while O.S.1 and 2 are within their charter, O.S.3 and 4 tend to go outside it and to usurp the functions of B. Division. He puts B.1.B. and B.2.b. under a Senior Officer, as he regards them as global and the counterpart of R.5.

While there is a good deal in his arguments, it is, I think, questionable whether B.2.b., under another Senior Officer, would operate satisfactorily. If it had not the stimulus of B.2 it might relapse into doing research for the sake of research, and lose some of its practical force.

30th July.

I saw Newsam about the case of SHELLEY, the Assistant Legal Adviser in the Home Office who was dismissed from Government service during the war on account of his connection with the Fascists. Newsam said that the Home Office had taken SHELLEY on again with their eyes open and with the official approval of the Treasury. He was, however, rather shocked to hear that SHELLEY was still a supporter of MOSLEY in 1948. He does not intend to take any action, but thought it right that we should have brought the matter to his notice. Our letter will be placed on the record. SHELLEY is at present employed on drafting laws for the Channel Islands.

I had a talk with Kirby-Green and gave him my views on what he should be doing in West Africa. He raised a point in regard to the defence plan for the Gold Coast, in which it is stated that it is the business of the police to detect and prevent espionage, although it is mentioned that constant liaison should be maintained with the S.L.O. Kirby-Green thought that we ought to direct espionage. I pointed out to him that we were not in a position either to detect or to prevent espionage, since we had no machinery for the purpose.

Provided, therefore, we were informed whenever a case of espionage or sabotage arose, it seemed to me that our needs would be met, unless we happened to run up against a particularly difficult Chief Constable. Such a point might, of course, arise in a place like Hong Kong. On the whole, however, and after consultation with Hollis, I am inclined to think that things can stand as they are. If our S.L.Os have the standing that they should have, they ought to be able to iron out any difficulties that they have on their own or with the assistance of the Governor.

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The D.G. attended a meeting of P.U.Ss to discuss the Brook report this afternoon. He told us afterwards that the first point had been the discussion of our representation as a right in certain countries abroad, if we thought a useful purpose would be served. 'C' had raised a number of difficulties, in particular in connection with the French, who had used the old argument that M.I.5 might be played off against M.I.6, and vice versa. The D.G. had replied that our relations with M.I.6 were now entirely friendly and that he would not allow anything of the kind to happen, and he imagined that 'C' would take similar steps. He instanced the case of our representative in Washington, which had proved to be an unqualified success and of considerable value to both parties. While it was true that the present arrangement allowed us to put forward a case for representation in any particular country abroad, we should be doing so rather on the basis of asking for a special dispensation. Norman Brook thought, and the D.G. agreed, that we should do so as a right, although, of course, we would always put forward a case and consult the Foreign Office and S.I.S. Curiously enough, Strang supported this view whole-heartedly and Newsam, who knew nothing about the matter but had been prompted by me in the morning, drew attention to the fact that if we had had a representative in Lisbon during the war, ~~the~~ mistakes might have been avoided and a considerable advantage to counter-espionage would have resulted. The meeting agreed that Sir Norman Brook's proposal should be adopted.

The next point for consideration was our membership of the SIGINT Board. This proposal seems to have been accepted nem con, although, for the sake of decency, Bridges seemed to think that it should be given a little more thought.

The object of our representation is that now, and particularly in war time, the Services and the Foreign Office, who make a financial contribution, might decided that all their resources should be turned on to operational Intelligence. Once we are established on the Board, I think that we should make some approach to the Treasury and ask that a sum of money be allocated to G.C.H.Q., which should be our contribution to the general pool. This would certainly strengthen our hand in getting our requirements met.

Thistle tells me that [] is on the point of becoming a member of the Communist Party.

31st July.

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D.O.S. talked to me about Magan's report on his Division. He seemed to think that Dick was solely interested in getting the services of certain O.S. officers and that having done so was not much concerned about the future of O.S. I said I did not think that this was intended.

D.O.S. felt that Magan's proposals relegated O.S. to the position of a caretaker section. I said that in fact it recommended that the functions of O.S.1 and 2 should continue, but that certain functions of O.S.3 and 4 should go to B. Division.

D.O.S. seemed to think that the Overseas Division seemed to carry some sort of expertise in overseas matters, and gave the case of a Chinaman called LIM FAT, who had been admitted to atomic energy on the grounds that he was born of naturalised Chinese parents in Mauritius. Enquiries after the event have shown that LIM FAT's brothers favour the Communist regime in China; meanwhile LIM FAT, who is taking a holiday in Mauritius, has announced that he does not intend to return to this country. He has a certain amount of information about Harwell and Winscale, but nothing very serious. D.O.S. contended that had the case been preferred to O.S. at the outset, they would have advised against the man's employment. I said that I could not see that any expertise was necessary in a case of this kind; it seemed to me a matter of common sense. LIM FAT should never really have been employed. As against this, however, one had to bear in mind that atomic energy employed a number of foreigners and that enquiries in regard to their relatives had not been a normal procedure up to the present, although it seemed likely that as a result of the Tripartite conversations, some alternative would be made.

I reminded D.O.S. of our original memorandum to the D.G. on the question of an overseas division. I still felt that we were right in what we said. Nevertheless, the D.G. had decreed otherwise and we had to work the overseas division as best we could. D.O.S. agreed that some fundamental reorganisation embracing O.S. functions within the administrative division was really the right answer.

1st August.

At the J.I.C. to-day I spoke to Ross and to Young about the report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, published as an official document in April, 1951, in the United States. I have been reading this report in some detail; it is generally designed to show that such leakage of information as has occurred is due to the activities of NUNN MAY, FUCHS and PONTECORVO, rather than to disclosures made by agents such as GOLD, GREENGLASS and ROSENBERG in the United States. It is a record of the Court proceedings in the U.S.A., which show that GREENGLASS disclosed details to ROSENBERG of the manufacture of the atomic bomb, although how far these details are accurate I do not know. Before the evidence was given there had clearly been discussions between the Court, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other Departments of State. It had been held that

under a democracy it was right that the prisoner should be confronted with all the evidence against him, but, as an alleged precaution, the Judge had cleared the Court before the evidence was given. He had, however, failed quite deliberately to exclude the journalists, with the result that all the evidence, which is detailed in the report, was published on the following day in the New York Times. While it might of course be argued that Russia has already had the information, it was clearly not in the interests of Allied security that the I's should be dotted and the T's crossed in open Court. This must, moreover, have been the view of the authorities, otherwise there was no point in clearing the Court - ineffective as such a measure was bound to be if the journalists were allowed to remain.

As far as I know, no action for contempt of court is possible in a case of this kind. I recollect that in the Nazi spy trial in 1938 the whole proceedings before the Grand Jury, which were held in camera, were published on the following day in the New York Times. I raised the matter with the District Attorney, and was then told that the Federal Court had no redress.

I also mentioned to Ross and Young the recent proceedings before the Senatorial Commission, where all the leading personalities had been questioned on matters of defence and foreign policy vis a vis Russia, which affected not only the United States but all the Allies. While only an expurgated version of the proceedings was published in the press, the full stenographic minutes were in every press office and must, therefore, have leaked to the Russians.

As proof of the importance of the statements made, I quoted General Marshall's answer to one of the Senators, to the effect that he was being turned into one of the best agents that Soviet Russia had ever had. It seemed to me ridiculous that the Americans should come over here complaining about our screening tests and loyalty enquiries, when they themselves were handing out top level information in a big way. I had raised this matter more than a year ago on the J.I.C., when Service Directors were complaining about harmful disclosures in the United States affecting British armament design and British Intelligence. It seemed to me that such instances ought to be carefully listed and used to counter American allegations of insecurity in this country.

Ross entirely agreed with me, but I did not have the feeling that he was going to do very much.

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I have seen the stenographic minutes of the meeting of P.U.Ss to discuss the Brook report, from which it appears that although Strang, in spite of C's representations, said that he would have no objection to our representation abroad, and that it was indeed right and necessary for the two Services to co-exist on foreign territory in certain places, provided that the Foreign Office and S.I.S. were consulted before the post was established, Bridges had suggested that any remaining difference of opinion might be made if Brook's recommendation was interpreted as follows:

"It should be open to the Security Service, with the concurrence of S.I.S. and the knowledge of the Government concerned, to maintain liaison officers in foreign countries, the division of responsibility between the Security Service and S.I.S. being regarded as more functional than geographical."

The words "with the concurrence of S.I.S....." seem to me to put us back exactly to where we started.

Hill spoke to me about the case of Max BORN, which caused him a certain amount of uneasiness, particularly in view of the Home Secretary's suggestion, based on the information of de COURCY, that BORN's case should be investigated.

Firstly, the file showed that as late as 1950. BORN, in a college debate, had expressed the view that it was the duty of all scientists in this country or in America who were in possession of atomic bomb secrets to give them to the U.S.S.R., and secondly, that although he had been naturalised a British subject he had made it clear to the Head of his University that on the expiry of his contract in two years time, he intended to return to Germany.

It is of course true that Max BORN has not been connected with atomic energy for a good many years, but he doubtless moves in atomic circles, and if he feels no particular loyalty to this country and thinks that all information on the atomic bomb should be given to the Russians, he ought to be, if only for our own protection, further investigated.

2nd August.

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At the Appointments Board to-day the following matters were discussed.

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Accommodation.

- i) The Board was advised by A.1. that it is expected to move into Hanover Square on about 30th September. A.1. will then ask Directors for their demands for the space created in Leconfield House.
- ii) The Board was also advised that the Conference Room was being taken over as Office space owing to acute crowding in Leconfield House. This was approved.
- iii) A.1 raised the question of Plan-7 telephones, pointing out that the G.P.O. were growing more and more reluctant to instal them on account of the complicated wiring and expense. The Board decided that only Senior Officers and above should use Plan-7 telephones.
- iv) [redacted] The Board agreed that there was no post in the Service for this candidate, whose name had been put up by O.S.

3rd August.

Hill talked to me about the case of Max BORN. It seemed to him that our file was somewhat incomplete. Although we knew that BORN had been employed by Tube Alloys, we had no idea of the extent of his knowledge on atomic projects, from which it follows that we are unable to assess his

potentialities for doing harm. The file shows that he held the view, as recently as 1950, that all information regarding the atomic bomb in our possession or in that of the Americans should be given to the U.S.S.R. He was a member of the Russian Academy of Science and, unlike Sir Henry Dale, had refused to resign. Lastly, he had expressed the view to Sir Edward Appleton, Vice Chancellor of Edinburgh University, that when he retired in two years time he would settle down in Germany. He had been naturalised on the 31st August, 1939, presumably as a matter of expediency. He could not, therefore, be regarded as a loyal British subject. I have minuted the file accordingly, suggesting that some enquiries should be made.

Madan Hooja came to see me before his departure, when I continued my talk about the work of the office and answered a certain number of questions. He struck me as being more balanced and intelligent than his chief, MULLIK.

4th August.

Arthur Martin and Ronnie Reed came to tell me that T.C. disclosed that PHILBY was going yachting from Chichester with a friend. His wife had said, apparently in jest, to Nicholas Elliott: "I suppose he is not doing a 'dis'?" I got Ronnie Reed to listen to the conversation personally; he confirmed that Eileen's remark was in jest and ascertained that PHILBY's companion was someone in business in the City.

I was also told that T.C. disclosed very definitely that PHILBY was very active in looking for a job here. In all the circumstances, it seemed to me that no action was warranted, even if any appropriate action were possible. It was already too late to stop PHILBY getting into the yacht and it seemed equally unjustifiable to issue any warning to the French. I decided, therefore, to do nothing.

Miss Weldsmith showed me her minute on the recruitment of female staff. She considered that although useful progress had been made through the approach to schools, we should fail both now and in the future if we did not a) improve pay conditions, and (b) make the work of the Registry more interesting. She is quite convinced that some alteration in regard to registry work, which will give girls an opportunity of following a case right through, is essential. She points out that if the girls now being recruited go back to their schools and complain about the dullness of the work, our new sources for recruitment will inevitably dry up.

7th August.

Ronnie Reed and Martin came to tell me that on Friday two drafts for £1,000 each had reached Mrs. MACLEAN. Alan MACLEAN had tried to get in touch with Skardon, but having failed did nothing until Monday. One draft was on the Swiss National Bank, and the other on the Swiss Union Bank. The money was transmitted by a certain BECKER to Mrs. Melinda DUNBAR, the girl's mother. Evidently the man who remitted the money thought that to address it to Mrs. MACLEAN might arouse suspicion. The drafts were in an

envelope posted from the Reigate-Redhill area. Enclosed in the envelope was a letter written by MACLEAN, dated July, in which he said that he was well, sent messages to his children, and assured his wife of his continued affection for them all; he was unable to disclose his whereabouts.

Enquiries have been set on foot in Switzerland to see what is known of BECKER, who gave a hotel address. Ronnie Reed has been down to see Mrs. MACLEAN, who seemed on the whole unmoved: she identified the handwriting as being that of her husband, but said that it seemed a little bit shaky and more widely spread than usual.

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Simkins and David Whyte came to see me about the case of [redacted] The D. of P.P. has given his opinion that no case can be mounted against [redacted] on the evidence. This is satisfactory from our point of view. The Foreign Office are being informed.

I saw Horrocks about the case of HODGSON and gave him the file to read.

We discussed our responsibilities overseas for espionage, sabotage and subversive movements in relation to the appropriate wording in overseas defence schemes. These responsibilities, of course, differ as between one overseas station and another, e.g. in West Africa we act only in a liaison capacity, whereas in Gibraltar we have certain executive responsibilities with the machinery to carry them out. There is, therefore, no single formula which will fit every station.

As regards African and Caribbean stations, it seems to me that we should be guided by the following considerations:-

a) Broadly speaking, our overseas representatives advise and act as a two-way channel for information passing between Head Office and the Colonies. This information relates not only to espionage, sabotage and subversive movements, but also to advice on how to set up a suitable protective security machine to operate both in peace and war.

b) In these territories we can neither detect nor prevent espionage, sabotage or subversive activities, since we have neither the powers nor the

machinery. The responsibility, therefore, is rightly placed on the police, and we should avoid any form of wording in defence schemes which might give rise to the suggestion that we had executive authority.

c) Our organisation in these Colonies must remain flexible. If we become an indispensable cog in the local defence scheme, we shall be unable to dispose of our manpower to the best advantage. We might at some future date feel that we could profitably reduce or close down one station and open up another.

d) An S.L.O. who is going his job properly will have established a degree of confidence between himself and the local authorities sufficient to ensure that all our liaison requirements are met, and if he runs into difficulties he can always invoke the assistance of the local Governor or ourselves and, in the last resort, that of the Colonial Office.

If, therefore, we appear in Colonial defence schemes, it should be clear that we are only performing a liaison function which involves a free exchange of views and consultation on all matters which are of interest to this office.

S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E. are very definitely an integral part of the defence machine, by virtue of our membership of the local J.I.Cs and for other reasons. But there are, of course, very great differences in the role each has to play for the reason that S.I.M.E. (with the exception of Cyprus) is based on foreign territory, and S.I.F.E. (with the exception of Burma) on British territory.

In so far as S.I.F.E. is concerned, I should feel that para. 2(b) should apply, provided that the necessary appeal machinery, either through the J.I.C. or the B.D.C.C., is recognised in any case where we feel that the police are taking action without proper consultation.

In Gibraltar and Malta we are an integral part of the defence forces and have control to some extent of sources of information not available, to the police. In any defence scheme our responsibilities in these Colonies should, I think, be more closely defined.

In India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Washington and Australia, the question does not arise.

8th August.

I lunched with [redacted] The conversation was general.

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9th August.

[redacted] of Broadway came over to see me. He was seeking information about the planning of Counter Espionage in S.H.A.E.F. during the war. He wished to see how far our experiences were applicable to the present situation in S.H.A.P.E. Miss Russell-King was able to supply him with the lay-out of Dick's office when he was with S.H.A.E.F., which showed the main headings under which the department was organised.

I had a long talk with Macdonald about our role vis-a-vis the Police and overseas stations. He thought that the arrangement reached with George Jenkin, which allowed for close consultation in all cases of espionage and sabotage, was really satisfactory, since it was quite clear that we should neither conduct nor prevent such activities ourselves. On the other hand, he thought that there ought to be some sort of appeal machinery, possibly through the J.I.C. and the British Defence Co-ordinating Committee, in case we ran up against troublesome Commissioners of Police, like Mackintosh in Hong Kong.

There seems little doubt that S.I.F.E. is now very firmly established, and even something of a Power in the Land.

I saw Patrick Rilly and cleared with him, and subsequently of S.I.S., a letter which the D.G. is sending to Hoover, suggesting the indoctrination of Bedell-Smith into basic material connected with the MACLEAN case. In spite of the fact that Bedell-Smith is Chairman of U.S.C.I.B., the equivalent of SIGINT, he is unaware of the source of our information. This causes his subordinates to worry both S.I.S. and ourselves with wild theories about the disappearance of BURGESS and MACLEAN.

10th August.

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Admiral Buzzard, the new D.N.I., called. He seemed rather a different type, intelligent and keen. I gave him the usual talk about the office. He saw the D.G., D.O.S. and, in D.C.'s absence, Furnival Jones. He also saw Marriott. He hopes to return for another visit in the Autumn.

Martin and Reed came to see me to tell me that Mrs. DUNBAR had rung up, asking to see Skardon before paying in the two cheques. There was a certain moral issue which she wished to discuss before she put her signature to the cheques. Ronnie Reed had arranged to go down to see her at 5 p.m.; he would listen to what she had to say, which would probably be that by accepting this money her daughter might be in the position of living on the proceeds of her husband's treachery - a point which had already occurred to us. Ronnie would say that there was nothing illegal in the transaction; we had already ascertained that it did not contravene the Treasury exchange regulations, nor, even on the assumption that the money came from Russia, could it be liable to confiscation, unless we were at war with the Soviet Union.

The issue, therefore, was purely a moral one and perhaps Mrs. DUNBAR might like to satisfy herself as to the origin of this money before paying it into her account. At the moment we could not help her, since enquiries in Switzerland and in New York, where BECKER had also given an address, are not yet complete.

I reported developments in the MACLEAN case to the D.G., who said that he would like to see the officers concerned and also Hollis, after lunch.

This meeting took place, when the whole ground was gone over. The D.G. felt that something might be gained by Mrs. DUNBAR writing to the two Swiss Banks, asking for information about BECKER and the origin of the funds. Arthur Martin, with whom I agreed, felt that while this course might possibly produce something, it would be better to await the result of the enquiries in New York and Switzerland. It was finally agreed that the matter must be one for Mrs. DUNBAR herself, but that if she was prepared to write to the Banks she should be encouraged to do so.

The D.G. took exception to the fact that these developments in the MACLEAN case were not being handled through Hollis, in view of the instructions that in Dick's absence Hollis would be in charge of B. Division. Reid explained that when he spoke to Dick over the weekend, Dick had told him to report the facts to me on Tuesday morning, and that this morning Hollis was away at the J.I.C.

I explained that I had passed all the information on to Hollis immediately I received it.

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11th August.

A wild story came in from Special Branch that a man called DAKER had told the Police that he had seen BURGESS in a pub. BURGESS had said that he had come from Strasbourg and gave DAKER a bundle of franc notes which were exchanged for pounds. He said that he had known BURGESS personally.

Subsequent enquiries by Special Branch proved that DAKER was off his head.

13th August.

Speake, who was formerly in the Immigration Branch and has been working with Oakley for some time, is now taking over Oakley's liaison duties with us. I impressed upon him the importance which we attach to his job, since if the Home Office was not in the picture, it was often difficult for them to assess the importance of certain action which we might wish them to take from time to time. I gave Speake a general account of the work of the office. He is seeing other officers in the department.

At the Directors' meeting Hollis gave some account of the meetings he had been attending in regard to the interrogation of applicants for D. At. En on their political views. The matter is to be discussed by the P.M. at a Cabinet meeting on Friday.

Perfect mentioned to me that Boddington's talks to the Police and sabotage have been well received, and that at a recent meeting a man called Parkes, of the Forensic Laboratory at Bristol, had been present. He had expressed a wish for Boddington to talk to his fellow Directors.

I am speaking to Hollis about this - I am not quite sure that Boddington is the person to give such a talk.

15th August.

Ross rang me to ask whether the D.G. would have any objection to his raising the Tass Monitoring problem at the J.I.C. to-morrow, in view of the fact that he, the D.G., had been unwilling for his letter on the subject to be circularised to other Directors.


I told Ross that I could see no objection, but would let him know if the D.G. had other views.

I subsequently spoke to the D.G., who said that his only reason for objecting to the circulation of his letter was that a memorandum was being prepared on the whole subject and that he thought it better not to go off at half-cock.

16th August.

I had a talk with Geoffrey Patterson, having previously spoken to Horrocks, on the subject of going to Washington. It seemed to me that in view of our knowledge of her acquaintance with the whole of the MACLEAN family, we could not accept the risk of her going to Washington, where she would become aware of the strong pointer towards Donald MACLEAN having engaged in espionage in 1944 and 1945. This implies no reflection on , but I do not think that we can run the risk of placing her in that position. When the MACLEANS, who have so far been engaged in a good deal of wishful thinking, come to suspect that Donald is a spy, they may attempt to communicate with or write to each other suggesting that it might help. This would be quite sufficient to put us in the dog house with the Americans.

I told Geoffrey about my proposed visit to Canada and the U.S.A.



17th August.

The D.G. attended the P.M.'s meeting on the question of approaching candidates for D.At.En. about their political views. He told me afterwards that the suggestion was hotly opposed by Chuter Ede, on the grounds that we were on the slippery slope of the Gestapo and pandering to American procedure. The P.M., Lord Addison, Lord Portal Alexander, and Strauss all took the contrary view.

The D.G. said that in his experience, both as a policeman and as head of this department, direct interrogation was likely to be of very great value. He was thinking of the problem purely on grounds of national security.

The decision was reached that the new procedure should be adopted and a suitable announcement made in the House of Commons.

20th August.

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I had a talk with Martin about the various entries in the PHILBY file. There seemed to me to be a few loose ends. He said that it was all being worked through again and most of my queries he had already answered. There is no doubt that he knows his cases inside out and backwards.

I am still rather inclined to think that it was not a leakage which caused MACLEAN and BURGESS to make their hurried departure. It seems to me quite possible that BURGESS had discussed with MACLEAN on his return the two memoranda which he had put up to the Foreign Office on our policy in regard to China. BURGESS had tried to get the Embassy in Washington to forward them to London and, on getting a refusal, was anxious to put them in himself on his return. He would quite naturally have discussed this matter with MACLEAN, as head of the American Department, who is a friend and would be likely to take a sympathetic view. Such a conversation, over a good deal of drink, might well have led both to express their innermost feelings about Russia, to vent their dislike of U.S. policy, and to come to the conclusion that they must do something to prevent a third world war. At that stage MACLEAN might well have talked about his past and his apprehension that it might one day catch up with him. They might then have decided to leave the country - BURGESS taking the initiative. If this is true, it would account for BURGESS's remark that he was going to help a friend who was in difficulties.

_____ said that he had been asked by Washington whether we would be interested in their comments on our paper about PHILBY, since Washington appeared to take the view that we were no longer investigating PHILBY's case. I said that I thought this misunderstanding had possibly arisen because we had expressed the view that an interrogation of PHILBY at this stage could not produce any useful results and might in fact dry up certain sources which could possibly help us to find a solution. We had in fact, and were still, making exhaustive enquiries. Meanwhile, it was useless to interrogate a man who had all the cards in his hands. Until we get some fresh cards, and some pretty high ones, there was nothing in the way of interrogation that would be profitable. I hoped that he would express this view, with which he agreed, upon his superiors in Washington. They have been urging us to interrogate immediately on the more sinister allegations against PHILBY arising from both the GOUZENKO and WOLKOV cases. He asked whether we should be making any interim reports. I said that we might in a month or two's time when we should obviously have to take stock. This would be a normal procedure. We might then conclude that we had come to a dead end and take a chance on interrogation.

21st August.,

I gave a talk to Mr. _____ of the Danish Intelligence Service. He is responsible for the civilian side of things, whereas his colleague, I imagine, of equal rank, has similar responsibilities within the Armed Forces. They both work closely together. Although _____ has close liaison with the police forces, he has powers to send down his own men, either to ports or frontiers or internal police districts, if he thinks that this is necessary. His relations with the police appear to be satisfactory. Precautions on matters which concern him cannot be instituted without his approval.

Mr. _____ has recently taken over and has reorganised his department. It was for this reason that he wished to know something about our system and the principles on which we worked. He seemed to me intelligent and friendly. It was clear to me from what he said that many of the sections under him were running little Registries of their own. I impressed upon him the dangers of this system and the importance of having a central registry. I think he was impressed by what he saw here

Hollis and I gave him lunch at the Gripps Arms. He was accompanied by _____ I should say an ex-sold of Colonel's rank.

 Miss Chenhalls told me that _____ had been approached by the Russian Assistant Military Attache, who had asked him to lunch. They apparently had a common interest in sport. In the course of conversation the Russian had asked _____ what the French and the British thought of the Centurion tank. _____ had been non-committal. I said that I did not think any useful purpose would be served by giving _____ technical information to pass on to the Russian, or of using him for a deception channel. _____ would inevitably show his ignorance in the discussion. He should, however, keep up the connection.

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22nd August.

Irvine came to tell me that he had attended a meeting at the Foreign Office, with Reilly in the Chair, at which Helm, our ex-Ambassador in Israel, and Evans, his successor, were present.

23rd August.

I attended a farewell dinner party to Longley-Cook at the Senior last night. All members of the J.I.C. were present. I had a long conversation with A.C.A.S.(I) on a variety of subjects.

Going home, Longley-Cook said that he was very glad that we had been found to be right in our view that the Bedenham explosion, and the subsequent one in Gibraltar, were not sabotage but due to some technical defect in the Torpex used in the depth charges. I asked him what was happening. He said that a decision had been reached within the last three days to scrap all Torpex throughout the Navy, since the view was held that it was an unsuitable explosive.

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To-day's J.I.C. was more interesting than most. We discussed the Perimeter Review. There is a certain amount of anxiety about the Soviet build-up in the West, and particularly by the satellites vis a vis Yugoslavia. Kenneth Strong was inclined to link this up with the talks at Kaesong, which looked as if they were going to break down.

The general opinion of the meeting was that Russia might be trying to work a war of nerves in the West while intending to make an all-out drive in Korea as soon as the Chinese had had a breather. Such a drive might be undertaken by what has been referred to at various times as the 'International Force', equipped with Russian material. There were a considerable number of Migs. on the Manchurian side of the border, but against this there were no aerodromes in Korea from which they could operate in support of advancing troops; all such aerodromes were kept under constant observation by the U.N. Forces.

The Committee felt that an urgent report should go to the Chiefs of Staff on Soviet and Chinese Intentions in Korea.

We discussed the D.N.I.'s memorandum, entitled "Where are we going?". I did not feel that it was a very good document, and although the Committee were loud in saying that it stimulated an extremely interesting discussion, I do not think that any of them really agreed with the D.N.I.'s point of view. They refused to pass it to the Chiefs of Staff with their comments, but did not object to the Ds. of I. showing it to their respective chiefs. It had already been seen by the First Lord, who had not approved it.

D.M.I. said that he did not see how we could criticise the American rearmament drive, and although there was a good deal of talk in the U.S. of preventive war, both he and Pat Reilly felt that it would take a great deal to push Congress over the edge in that direction. The meeting felt that until we reached parity, or something near it, it would be impossible to get rid of neutralism on the Continent of Europe. By the time I was asked for my comments, most points had been covered: I did, however, say that the document gave me the impression that we ought to be saying something to the Americans now which we were not in fact saying. If, as all believed, the D.M.I. was right in his view, the sooner we reached something near parity with the Russians the better. It seemed to me that any expression of anxiety to the Americans, that we were being dragged by them into preventive war, would only instil distrust.

Kenneth Strong made a point that much of the talk about the Russian menace in official quarters was unavoidable if Congress were going to be induced to vote the necessary appropriations for Western rearmament.

At the end of the meeting I think the D.N.I. was fairly well flattened out, although it had all been done very nicely! It was his

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"swan song" and nobody wanted to be unkind!

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24th August.

I had a discussion with Drew, Anthony Simkins and Martin on Drew's deception proposal (Operation INDEX). In the end it was agreed that it would be better merely to put little flecks on the scientific journals, indicating that DUFF had been removed, but not to follow this up with actual messages. I agreed to see Little about the necessary interception.

27th August.

Dick came back from leave and I put him into the picture as far as possible as to what had happened in his absence. I asked him to pay particular attention to our 5th Column contribution to a J.I.C. paper. It seemed to me important that we should not only indicate the strength or weaknesses of both the British and foreign potential 5th Columns, but say something about the measures proposed to counter them in the event of war. Both the Ds of I. and the Chiefs of Staff were a little inclined to exaggerate the potentialities of the 5th Column: it was therefore necessary to give them thoroughly reasoned argument.


[redacted] came to say that he had seen the man who had told him that his information about 11,000 Communists in the Civil Service, quoted by de COURCY, came from two Civil Servants with whom he was in touch; he would, however, be quite ready to give us the names of these people, with a view to our talking to them direct. Dick is accordingly making an appointment.

We think it almost certain that these are the two men that we saw early in the year; they had a certain amount of information, which was confirmed from our records, about Communism in the Inland Revenue. We know most of these people; they are not purgeable as they are not engaged on secret work. The remainder of what they said was somewhat tendencious.

I saw Sir Alexander Little and told him about Drew's operation to sow discord in Soviet scientific establishments in Moscow. He said that he had no wish for any warrant and would instruct Allan to intercept the scientific journal for special treatment.

We also discussed our establishment in the new building. We felt very strongly that considerable economies could be effected by ourselves and S.I.S. being serviced as far as possible by the Post Office and placing our equipment in close proximity. Little agreed and said that as far as he could understand S.I.S. were coming round to our point of view.

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1st October.

I returned from leave to-day.

Since I have been away the case against PHILBY seems to be somewhat blacker, although we are still working on what may be pure coincidences. While all the points against him are capable of another explanation, their cumulative effect is certainly impressive. It now seems that his first wife made a number of journeys to the Continent at the time when Kim was living with her in London. The inference is that she was then acting as a courier. These facts were never revealed by Kim, although they must have been within his knowledge. His association with her only ended in 1940.

Dick tells me that traces have now been found of E.H. NORMAN which show very clearly that he was one of the Cambridge group in 1934-36, and that at that time he was closely associated with BRADLEY, of the Indian Communist Group in London. Somewhat regrettably, this matter was not reported to the R.C.M.P. Vickery put a ban on it and Jane Archer acquiesced. Infantile Leftism was not, of course, at that time taken so seriously as it is now. We are, however, putting the R.C.M.P. in the picture, although I do not think the information adds a great deal to what they already know.

I saw the D.G. who told me about his interview with Bedell-Smith. Bedell Smith was given certain facts about the PHILBY case, which he was told were still under investigation. It was, however, made clear to him that up to the moment these could only be regarded as a chain of coincidences, all of which might have a different explanation. He seems to have got a somewhat false impression of this interview and told 'C' that we were now confident that PHILBY was identical with the man mentioned by GOUZENKO and by WOLKOV. This of course is far from the case.

2nd October.

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Ronnie Howe rang me up to say that a Swede named Södermann, who has apparently been assisting the German Police in their reorganisation plans, was anxious that the head of the German Special Branch should come over and make contact with the Special Branch of Scotland Yard. This could not be done, however, without the agreement of Kirkman, whom Södermann believed to be our representative in Germany. I made it clear to Ronnie Howe that Kirkman had nothing to do with us. He said that he would so inform Södermann.

I talked to D.O.S. about the Cairo Station. Stephens, in a well-expressed letter, thinks that while it is necessary to have someone with an understanding of orientals, the job should not be one for a specialised officer who remains in it indefinitely: he was, therefore, opposed to Giles.

I told D.O.S. that in my view it would be better if he consulted Foulkes on the question of the necessity of two or three officers in the Cairo Station, since I felt that Foulkes would take a more rational view than Emery.

3rd October.

Ross of the Foreign Office telephoned to ask for information about the continued activity of the Tass Monitoring Station. I told him, when I saw him at the J.I.C., that we knew that the Station was still operating last Monday, and we had, moreover, a copy of the Tass Bulletin dated four days after instructions were issued for the Station to be closed down. I said that if he wished to challenge the Soviet authorities, I thought we could devise a formula for telling them that H.M.G. were aware that the Station was still in action.

At the J.I.C. to-day we considered a paper by the Security Service on the "Peace" Campaign both here and in the Colonies. There was unanimous praise for the paper and the members of the Committee were impressed by the amount of information on the subject that was in our possession.

Thistle came to talk to me about the finances of the C.P. I gave him the back history of the machinery by which subsidies have been received since the early days of the Revolution in Russia. He then told me that we learned that Bob STEWART had recently been to Sheffield: he first made contact with George Henry FLETCHER, Jnr., and had then gone to George Henry FLETCHER, Senior's bakery. He had collected a suitcase believed to contain some £20,000. that this was Russian money and part of a regular subsidy. We do not know at the moment how it reaches Sheffield.

Bob STEWART has brought the money back to London and deposited about £10,000 with Sam COHEN in Hertfordshire. The money is presumably required in connection with the Communist election campaign.

It is interesting to note that both STEWART and FLETCHER have been doing this job since 1922. I cannot help feeling that had Miss Saunders' History Sheet on C.P. finance been available, this might all have been discovered long ago. This is a clear instance of the value of records which are nearly thirty years old.

I had a discussion with Dick, James Robertson and Simkins. Robertson and Simkins were anxious to get going on Anthony (BLUNT) and on Tommy HARRIS, as they felt that something might emerge in regard to Kim. Distasteful as this would have been, I did not wish to interfere in any way with the enquiries now proceeding if any useful results were likely to be obtained. It seemed to me, however, inconceivable that either Anthony or Tommy, had they known that Kim had been a Soviet spy while he was working for S.I.S., would not have come forward and exposed him. The most, therefore, that they might discuss would relate to Kim's attitude and activities from the time of the war of intervention in Spain. Whether Tommy was associated with him at that time I do not know, but it would not be wholly improbable. In any case, the picture of Kim at that time is a fairly clear one: it is his subsequent activities which really interest us.

By general agreement the proposition was turned down.

4th October.

At the J.I.C. (Directors) meeting 'C' made a statement about the atomic explosion reported in to-day's press. He said that the time and date of the explosion - I think September 25th - were known. Recording instruments, which were now extremely good, pin-pointed the explosion within about five miles of and in the vicinity of Lake Balkash(?) in Eastern Siberia. The violence of the explosion was the equivalent of about 100,000 tons of H.E. The Americans had already picked up certain particles of the cloud off Japan. The Canadians were operating as the cloud passed over Canada and we

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were picking it up again over the Atlantic. An analysis of these particles would give the positive answer as to the nature of the bomb, believed to be plutonium. The cloud, apparently, circles the earth twice before disintegrating to a point where the picking up of radio active particles becomes unprofitable. Aircraft may have to operate at 35,000 feet.

SIGINT material indicates that the whole area near Lake Balkash was cordoned off by the M.G.B. and that a number of people went down to witness the explosion. There is, however, some mystery over the fact that the explosion took place under extremely unfavourable meteorological conditions. If the explosion was a purely experimental one, it would clearly have been more profitable to have it under good weather conditions. The assessment of weather conditions in Eastern Siberia is apparently now a fairly simple matter, and far simpler than assessing them in the Atlantic. This, I gather, is due to the fairly stable meteorological conditions in Siberia.

Riley told us that Airey was having considerable difficulty in carrying out his task as Chief Intelligence Officer at S.H.A.P.E. It seems that a good deal of American information from General Gruenther to General Eisenhower by-passes Airey. I think he intends to raise this issue, since it violates the whole principle of integration.

Riley also read out a report on the Abadan situation. He said that as regards foreign exchange and payments, Persia would not reach a crisis until the end of this year or the beginning of 1952. Evidence showed that the Tudeh Party had about 8,000 supporters and 30,000 sympathisers. There was no indication, however, that during the dispute the Russians had intervened. Clearly they had felt that everything was going their way and that had they done so they might have interfered with the purely nationalist lines on which the crisis had arisen and developed, in a manner highly gratifying to the Russians. There was, however, evidence that they had recently made approaches to the Persians offering them economic and technical assistance.

I spoke to A.C.A.S.(I) after the meeting and told him of my talk in Dublin with Liam Archer and Dan, from which it had transpired that in the middle of June the Roscatta Group of the I.R.A. (the "Ginger" Group which had been responsible for the raid on the Londonderry Barracks some months ago) had been contemplating similar action on one of our aerodromes five to seven miles outside Londonderry. The Irish clearly had a good source in the Roscatta Group which they were anxious to safeguard; it was, therefore, essential that if any warning was to be given to Northern Ireland it should be of a general kind, urging that in view of what had happened at Londonderry Barracks, every possible step should be taken to tighten up security of dumps of arms and ammunition at Air Force stations.

I lunched with [redacted] Nothing discussed.

of special interest was
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We had a staff meeting, when D.O.S. disclosed the offer that had been made to Jack MORTON to take over the S.B. in the Malayan Union on secondment for two years or more. At the D.G.'s request he had seen Lloyd, who had

said that it was a matter of national importance that MORTON should be offered the job. Authority had therefore been given to the Governor to discuss the proposition direct with MORTON.

Hollis said, and I agreed with him, that it was difficult to see how MORTON could be of much value to us in the future if he stayed for more than two years in Malaya. The only argument in favour of the project would be that we should have someone in charge of S.B. who had the right ideas and intelligence, although I think this equally applied to "George" Jenkin. I cannot help feeling that he would not have resigned had there been any possibility of doing anything useful.

5th October.

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Ronnie Howe rang me up to draw my attention to the Intelligence Digest for October which contained a diatribe against the Police, the Home Office, and ourselves, and also an allegation that [redacted] was a Communist. Howe seems to think that something ought to be done about this.

I reported the matter to the D.G., who spoke to Baker of the Home Office who suggested that I should go over and see him, since it seemed that the Chief Constable who had written a letter to de COURCY in highly improper terms was likely to be [redacted], formerly [redacted] now retired.

6th October.

Anthony Simkins brought me a telegram from Patterson which indicated that Hoover was extremely annoyed about 'C' having told Bedell-Smith the origins of the case against MACLEAN. Hoover, in his reply to the D.G.'s letter suggesting that Hoover might acquaint Bedell-Smith with the facts, said that this was not really his business but had suggested that an approach should be made to A.F.S.A. This had been carried out by [redacted] in Washington. General Canine, the head of the organisation, was away, but his Deputy, Admiral Wenger, said he saw no harm in Bedell-Smith being told, the more so since he had already been informed about the source in general terms in his capacity as head of U.S.C.I.E. The D.G. had subsequently written to Hoover and told him what had been done. The probability is that in suggesting an approach to A.F.S.A., Hoover had previously arranged with Canine that objections should be raised, but that in Canine's absence Wenger had sold the pass, much to Hoover's annoyance. The allegation now is, that although the action by 'C' was carried out with Wenger's knowledge, it was not done with his approval. We have no record here of what passed between [redacted] and Wenger, but I shall be speaking to 'G' about this.

Gurney has been assassinated in Malaya, which will complicate matters very considerably there, although I believe that he has not been regarded as a particularly successful Governor.

8th October.

I gave a talk to Colonial Police Officers on the usual lines.

I also talked to three Jordanians, sent over by Glubb Pasha. It was clear that they would have considerable difficulty in applying the normal security procedure to their own country. One of their main troubles is that the Police have not got the co-operation of the public, and another thing, of course, is that most of their Ministers are probably corrupt. Only one of them could speak much English, but they seemed to think that they had learned something.

I attended a meeting at Scotland Yard to-day, with the Commissioner of Police in the Chair, to consider possible action with regard to pages 6, 7, and 8 of the "Intelligence Digest" for October, 1951.

Nott-Bower, Howe, Burt and the Legal Adviser were representing the Metropolitan Police, and Baker and Cornish attended on behalf of the Home Office.

I think the meeting was fairly satisfied with the information I gave that is the Chief Constable who wrote the letter to de COURCY criticising M. 75. the Metropolitan Police, and the Home Office. Howe was particularly anxious that some action should be taken, but the general view was that legal action on the basis of the information available would be extremely difficult. A direct approach to at this stage, even if he were prepared to admit he was the writer of the letter, would not be likely to get us very far. It was felt, however, that the Home Secretary could justifiably take de COURCY up where the latter says that the evidence of this former high Police Official is, of course, available to any honest government which wants to investigate. In fact if he were not to do so, it might be taken as an admission of de COURCY's implication that the present Government is dishonest. It was to be expected that de COURCY's reply would probably be a negative one. If so, the matter could be taken up again after the Elections by the new Labour or Conservative Home Secretary, with the ultimate aim and object of dealing with the whole question in the House of Commons.

9th October.

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I lunched with He told me that he had come into contact with H.C. PIECK, who had asked him to be his representative in London in connection with a plan for a travelling exhibition. The purpose of PIECK's organisation is to promote inter-European trade. Van Moyland had taken an instinctive dislike to PIECK and had heard from his own contact

that PIECK had something of a revolutionary past but was now considered to be all right.

I told that we knew about PIECK; that we had seen him with the knowledge of the Dutch Government, and that we had reached more or less the same conclusion as they had. The fact remained, however, that PIECK had, a good many years ago, suborned a British official and that we could not, therefore, wholly trust him. He was 'on the gate' and this might account for his wishing to appoint as his agent in the U.K. is going to turn the proposal down.

Reilly telephoned to say that he had discussed the MACLEAN case with Kit Steel, when the latter was in this country recently, and had told him about the cheques. Steel now wanted to pass this information to Bedell-Smith in order to promote goodwill.

I said that I would consider the matter and let him know.

Reilly also told me that the story about the cheques had reached Roger Makins through Cobbold of the Bank of England, who had received the information from a Director of Morgan Grenfell.

10th October.

I saw Hill about Chapman PINCHER's article disclosing the identity of the atomic physicist PENNEY and the reasons for his visit to the U.S.A. This was a direct infringement of a D. Notice requesting that atomic physicists employed on weapon development should not be referred to. It has transpired that Admiral Thompson, has once more dotted his copybook by agreeing to publication with reference to the Ministry of Supply.

We agreed that it was for the Ministry to deal with the matter.

11th October.

Victor looked in. We discussed the CURZON case. Victor thought that Tess could help quite a lot about PEACH. He thought, too, that there were others who should help in a general way, and he was prepared to press them to do so if the information about their past did not remain on the record to be used by future generations. It was clear that what these people might be willing to say would have to be handled by those actually working on the cases. It was agreed that Victor would give the matter further consideration and help us in any other way he could.

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I also told him about the blowup in the F.B.I. referring to the approach to A.F.S.A. He said that Wenger was quite definite about there

being no objection, and that he himself said nothing to Bedell-Smith except in the most general terms.

Reilly spoke about the Egyptian crisis. From an interview between the Ambassador and the King, it seemed that the latter was extremely embarrassed by the action of Nahas and anxious to help us as much as he could. He thought that the declaration had been made for purely internal political reasons, and there was no doubt that the Government had for the moment been able to cover up their deficiencies on the economic front through rallying public opinion on a national issue. This, however, would not last. The King said that he would do his utmost to restrain any attempts to cut off supplies from the British Forces on the Canal.

The Persian situation did not seem to show any improvement, and there is a definite feeling that the Americans have on the whole behaved extremely badly; they have, moreover, been told so.

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James Robertson came to talk to me about the SHAG case, which seems to be going well. The difficulty is to supply high grade information which will give the necessary build-up for deception. Our own C.E. needs are being kept in mind. So far we have exploited the case fairly successfully on the C.E. front and have gained knowledge about methods of communication and the registration numbers of cars used.

12th October.

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15th October.

Two Italian officers from the Italian espionage and C.E. Service, subordinates of General Broccoli, a recent visitor, have been seeing a number of officers here. I gave them the usual talk about the organisation. They seemed intelligent, although one of them asked Roger how it was possible when the Italians had their records full about PONTECORVO we had not consulted them. The answer, of course, was that at the material time we were at war with Italy and therefore consultation would have been rather difficult!

Shunt

Anthony telephoned about Jackie HEWITT, who has once more threatened to commit suicide. He walked out a day or two ago and has not been heard of since. Anthony wondered whether he ought to do anything. I advised him to do nothing, at any rate for the time being.

 Jack MORTON telegraphed to know whether if necessary he could come back for consultation. I have agreed.

 I left in the afternoon for Rugby in order to lecture to Ryton Police College to-morrow.

16th October.

I gave a lecture at Ryton Police College to some 200 policemen, mostly of the rank of Sergeant, drawn from all branches of the Force.

I discussed first the wider implications of sharing defence secrets not only with the Colonies and Commonwealth but also with the N.A.T.O. Powers, and described how our organisation had been extended for the purpose of achieving closer co-operation and improved standards of security. I then discussed the principles on which our own security work in this country is conducted, with particular reference to the relationship between Intelligence and Investigation on the one hand and Protective Security on the other.

It is difficult to say whether the talk was of interest to the audience, since although a large number of questions were asked in the second half of the meeting, they seemed to have little bearing on the subject of my lecture. I put this point to the Commandant and his staff, but they seemed to think that my lecture was the kind of thing the Police ought to have.

The course, which lasts six months, is by no means confined to police matters.

After my return from Ruyton, Wing Commander Crouchley telephoned to say that some complain had been received by the Treasury from de COURCY about enquiries into his finances in Paris. I told Crouchley that Bridges was already handling this. Hill had previously told me that he had had an interview with Bridges, who was worried about these accusations and was anxious for advice. He said that he had spoken to Donovan of the Treasury who had assured him that no such enquiries had been made. Hill said that if this was really so, he would recommend a letter to de COURCY, stating that as far as could be ascertained no such enquiries had been made by the Treasury, and asking him for chapter and verse.

It appears that both these doctors are Communists, and it was known that they had been contemplating emigration behind the Iron Curtain, probably to Poland. We have been assured by the Medical Research Council that they have had no access to material, and Harwell were warned before the visit was made. One of them, however, has been experimenting with some substance which has a bearing on the hydrogen bomb.

17th October.

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Stallard, Assistant D.I.B. Pakistan, came to see me. I asked him about the general state of security in Pakistan. He thought it was reasonably good, but I did not think his account was particularly reassuring. I told him how we were organised and he subsequently visited various sections. He is an assistant to Kazim Raza.

18th October.

At the J.I.C. (Directors) meeting to-day the War Office representative produced two copies of a report from Tokyo, one of them in full and the other expurgated. This showed fairly clearly that anything relating to China, Formosa and the Phillipines was for American eyes only. On the other hand, we appear to get everything which relates to Korea.

D.N.I. said that the Russian whalers had left the Antarctic; they were numbers 1 - 16, but No.13 did not sail. This may be an indication that superstition cannot be wholly eradicated even by a Marxian State!

Things in Egypt seem to be going reasonably well so far. On the Arab side Ibn Saud appears to be openly with us, some of the others may be but daren't say so. Selfton Delmer has reported from Khartoum that Egypt has done herself a lot of harm in the Sudan.

In Persia it was said that the Tudeh Party were lying low, but that the penetration was considerable, although the Army seemed to be carrying out a purge.

In Iraq, Nuri appears to be friendly. Although a revision of the Treaty is desired, there is no wish to kick out the R.A.F.

On Korea the D.N.I. expressed the view that the delay in Kaesong might be due to a desire to concert action in other parts of the Far East, e.g. Indo-China and Burma, and that we ought to write a paper for the Chiefs of Staff, indicating what the Chinese can do in the next six months. From the weather point of view, the most favourable period would be November to March.

Reilly said, ~~completely off the record~~, that the muddle in the Security Council over Abadan was about as bad as it could be, and that the action of the Government in taking the matter to U.N.O. had been entirely contrary to all official advice.

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2. D.E./A. mentioned that S.I.S. had issued a circular instructing their staff to report if they were ever in touch with aliens and Communists. It was not felt that there was any general need for such a circular to be issued by us, but D.D.G. would give the matter further consideration.

3. It was agreed that from time to time the Board would consider the progress made by A.7 and the principles being adopted by it.

4. D.E./A. undertook to consult S.L.B. and B.1 and 2 regarding the position which has arisen since the abolition of the Press Section.

General Lockhart came to see me. He is taking over from Briggs in Malaya. I told him about our organisation and how it fitted in to the general Intelligence picture. I told him that the real deficiency from our point of view was a lack of Intelligence off the ground, for which the S.Bs and the Police were really responsible. He asked me about Jenkin. I said that I knew Jenkin well and I could not believe that he would have done what he did do unless he had been pretty well at his wits' end. He was only an adviser to S.B. and clearly his advice was not being acted upon.

I discussed the position of Morton, and told him that we were prepared to make the sacrifice if the present structure would make it possible for Morton to do a useful job. I was not, however, wholly satisfied on this point.

19th October.

Kennedy of the R.U.C. rang me up about a trawler which had been bombed near Archangel and is now in Belfast. It had been suggested to him by Immigration that he should interview the crew. He did not wish to do so if this has already been done by the Admiralty. I undertook to ring N.I.D. and to ring him back if he was required to do anything.

I spoke to Hilken, who told me that they already had a report and nothing further was required.

Hollis spoke to me about a rather awkward case of a man called [redacted] who is a legal adviser to I.C.I. and has complained that he is not in the confidence of the Board. He suspects that this is due to adverse reports from M.I.5 and threatens legal action.

The fact is that we did give a warning to I.C.I. and that they are reluctant to take him on the Board, where highly secret matters may be discussed.

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Reed tells me that one of the twelve Poles for deportation is trying to get a visa for Eire through his solicitors. I said that we would not object, but that we ought to tell the Irish. Haldane Porter has arranged to do this through the C.R.O., on the understanding that if any questions are asked the Irish will say that they got their information from the newspapers.

22nd October.

Morton has telegraphed to say that he has turned down the job as head of S.B. Malayan Union, but has offered to do anything he can in the meantime to assist. He thinks it a good thing that the D.G. should go to Malaya, where there are three difficult questions to solve, one of them being the desirability of Gray, the present Commissioner, remaining in office. He seems to doubt whether the S.B. operates efficiently with its present chain of command.

The more I hear of this business the more certain I am that "George" Jenkin must really have been at his wits end when he induced the Deputy Commissioner to issue orders placing the S.B. under his direct command and making him responsible to the

I passed on Morton's views to the D.G. We have also telegraphed to the D.G., giving him a short resume of the position in Washington, where the position has been complicated by Bedell-Smith's appeal to the President. At the moment the issue seems to be a domestic one, but if the decision goes against Hoover, he may try and take it out of Geoffrey Patterson. In that case there might be some point in the D.G. going to Washington on his way back.

I spent the weekend with Victor, where I saw Anthony. I had an opportunity of talking to him privately. I told him that there was still no firm evidence as to the whereabouts of Guy BURGESS and MACLEAN, but that it seemed incredible that as their names and photographs were in the hands of the continental police and press they should be living anywhere this side of the Iron Curtain. I then asked him again what he thought could be Guy's motive in going away: after all, he must have known that he would probably be squeezed dry and put in the waste paper basket. Was there, therefore, anything else on his mind which if disclosed would have involved him in a worse fate. Anthony seems to have changed his attitude to some extent from the first time I discussed BURGESS' departure. I asked him again whether he thought the relationship between BURGESS and MACLEAN was such that BURGESS would have made a sacrifice. Anthony thought this was unlikely, and I had a clear impression that he thought there was something sinister behind BURGESS' action. He then referred to certain sums of money in notes which had been in BURGESS' possession. I asked him whether he was referring to the notes which BURGESS brought back from America. He said no; he recollected that there had been at least one, and possibly two occasions, when BURGESS had been in possession of notes. He thought he had mentioned this, or that we had got it from HEWITT. I asked him to try and recollect the dates. He was unable to do so. I think he must know more than he has told us, but clearly he is torn by a sense of loyalty to an old friend.

I also had a private discussion with Victor and Tess. Tess knows a girl who was formerly a secret member of the Party but has had, she believes, nothing to do with it for ten years. I do not know to whom she

is referring it may be [] wife. Tess would be willing to put us into touch with this person, provided it were possible that the information did not go further than Dick and myself. I said that one of the difficulties we were up against was that we had had to revise our opinion about these sort of people. Formerly we had been inclined to take the view that those who had committed youthful indiscretions and had not shown up in the records for ten years could now be regarded as cleared, but in the light of recent experience we have had to revise our views. I thought, therefore, that before we made any approach to a person of this kind we should have to know all about their present activities. We could not do this without a wider disclosure of the name, for reasons that she would clearly understand. At the moment the position has been left like that, although I propose to return to the charge.

I left with Victor a note about the Polish defector, MARKOWSKI, who wants a job as a zoologist. He said he would do what he could.

23rd October.

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Tommy Harris telephoned to say that he had just got back from Mallorca. He asked me whether I could dine on Saturday, when Anthony would be there. I was unable to do this, so he then asked me to dinner next week, which I accepted.

T.C. shows that Kim and his wife have both dined with Tommy. Kim explained his retirement from S.I.S.: he said that he had been treated very generously and did not seem to have any recriminations to make against his old firm. His position in the matter he fully understood. Tommy, on the other hand, seems to be rather indignant about the whole thing and will doubtless tackle me when I see him. I have, therefore, asked Dick and B.2 to consider precisely what line they wish me to take. We believe that Tommy could help us very considerably, but we have to be sure that any discussion on the question of Kim it would be necessary to have a guarantee that nothing goes back. I am going to try and get Tommy to come up here so that we can go into the whole question of BURGESS and his friends in some considerable detail. This will lead us on in the case of Kim.

I lunched with [] He is going to attend the Conference at S.H.A.P.E., where counter-intelligence matters will be discussed. There will be representatives from both the D.E.C. and the Surete, and from G-2 and C.I.A.

[] said that the worst of the French was that they never planned ahead. The same, to some extent, applied to the Americans, who met round a table without any very clear idea of what they wanted. The British, on the other hand, always had a cut and dried plan and invariably carried the day. He admired the British for this and for their general ability in handling Conferences, although they frequently produced a false impression that they were being too clever and tricky. I agreed with his views and pointed out that the British in general settled a large number of matters on a lower level: they started from the bottom upwards instead of from the top downwards. The result was that many things were settled on a level where the question was really understood and settled in a reasonable way, as we all knew that once these indirect problems reached higher authority, a decision rested on a toss of a coin. He asked me about BURGESS and MACLEAN and

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I gave him the usual answer, that there was no firm evidence as to their whereabouts. It is of course true. He mentioned, too, during a discussion of _____ was generally regarded as being an agent of British Intelligence. I managed to turn the conversation immediately without giving any answer.

24th October.

I attended the concluding meeting of the course arranged by the Port & Travel group for Dominion Security Officers. All the Dominions were represented except New Zealand. They seemed to have enjoyed the course, but said that they would have liked to have heard rather more about our actual experiences during the last war. I think this criticism is probably right, since they get practically nothing from B. Division and had never heard of the London Reception Centre.

I attended the J.I.C. Directors meeting to-day, which was held in the afternoon on account of to-morrow's Elections.

Reilly told us that the action by Middle East Forces in cutting off the oil had caused very considerable consternation and was obviously a very potent weapon. The Egyptians had clearly not envisaged anything of the kind; their immediate stocks were very short and they realised that without oil they would draw upon themselves considerable fire from their own people. The American Ambassador had evidently been somewhat perturbed and had made representations to our Ambassador, as he thought that a continuance of this policy might in the long run make it more difficult to reach a settlement.

'C' told the meeting that _____ had shown a deterioration in the morale and organising ability of the Soviet Forces in that area.

Sir David Kelly, in his final despatch before leaving Moscow, more or less agrees with the views of the J.I.C. about the likelihood or unlikelihood of war, but thinks it important the the West should be careful not to provoke the Russians more than is absolutely necessary.

25th October.

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29th October.

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I talked to Hollis and Cookie about the Agenda for the Immigration Officers' Conference and the question of a possible course here for I.Os. We are to discuss this to-morrow with Ruck.

I talked to Hill about Maxwell-Fyfe, our new Home Secretary, who, according to de COURCY, is one of his friends. If Maxwell-Fyfe believes in de COURCY and reads the Digest, he is likely to take a pretty poor view of this Department! I thought, therefore, that we ought to have some kind of memorandum ready which will make it clear to Maxwell-Fyfe the kind of person with whom he is dealing. Hill is going to get out a note.

A telegram, which has reached us through the C.R.O., shows that the D.G. has abandoned the idea of going to Malaya, on the grounds that Morton has made his decision. He notified the Colonial Office from New Zealand so he would not have had my telegram embodying Morton's views about the local situation and favouring a visit by the D.G. I think the decision, however, is the right one, since Morton made it clear that the D.G. would be involved in a whole host of police matters, not least the retention or dismissal of Gray.

30th October.

Ruck came for a meeting with Hollis, Hinchley-Cooke and myself, to discuss the Agenda for the Immigration Officers' Conference.

It was agreed between us that the item in regard to Special Branch taking over security scrutiny of British subjects should be dealt with off the Agenda. We made it clear that although we realised the limitations imposed upon Immigration Officers at ports where the traffic was particularly heavy, we would not like them to leave the security check entirely to S.B. as we thought that there were certain aspects of these cases over which they helped us in the past and were likely to do so in future. From our point of view the more people who could exercise some sort of supervision the better.

We also arranged with Ruck that Irvine would be present for the discussion on Post Report, and that Hollis and I would attend two of the other meetings. It was agreed that I should put forward a suggestion about a course for Immigration Officers.

31st October.

I saw Newsam [redacted] He suggested introducing me to the Home Secretary, but I declined as I had to go straight on to a meeting of the J.I.C. He seemed pleased about his new boss, who he said understood Home Office problems, having done a good deal of work for them in a legal way.

1st November.

I saw Brigadier Khan, D.M.I. designate for Pakistan, to whom I gave a short talk about the work of the office.

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It was agreed at the suggestion of D.C. not to accept the suggestion which had been made of giving information to the Lord Chancellor's Office regarding the Communist J.P's.

D.B. tabled a revised instruction regarding the carding of Communist sympathisers and this was approved.

 Ronnie Howe came to show me a letter which he had received from de COURCY, intimating that now the new Home Secretary was in power Howe would be free to come and stay a week-end with De COURCY and talk things over. He had shown this letter to the Commissioner and of course had turned the offer down.

I do not quite know why he took the trouble to come over and tell me personally!

2nd November.

I attended the Immigration Officers' Conference. Irvine made a short speech on Post Report which was really excellent. Without any notes he summarised all the facts and was never for one moment at a loss for a word. The Immigration Officers were visibly impressed.

I then made my offer to give a course and thanked the Immigration Officers for all they were doing for us. Nothing was settled about a course, and although I think that most of the officers would like one for themselves or for their juniors, there would be difficulty in people being spared away from their jobs. One officer suggested that possibly we might send someone down to talk to junior ranks.

I lunched with David Williams, who has been back from Abadan for about two weeks. I asked him who he thought was to blame for the present situation. He said he did not think that the Company could be blamed; they had done an enormous amount for the local population but most of the money they had given to the Government had been squandered or taken by corrupt Persian officials. In spite of this they had made at first an offer of 25%, which they had increased to 50% on account of the terms given by the Americans in adjacent territories. This was on the point of going through when Rasmara was assassinated. None of the present Persian Government really had the interests of the population at heart and they were totally incapable of running the oil industry themselves. He thought that Stokes had made a mistake in saying that he had only come out for ten days - he should have said that he was prepared to stay for ten years. The whole business was like buying a carpet. The second mistake had been to leave Persia; there was an opportunity at the beginning of October when Moussadek showed signs of weakening and put forward slightly modified proposals which would have enabled the negotiations to be drawn out - it did not matter what people talked about so long as they went on talking! If the negotiations had been protracted for about six months, the Government would have really begun to feel the pinch and would probably have been prepared to make far greater concessions. Once we left the area it would be extremely difficult to get back again. He said that Morrison's statement, that the 300 employees could not be expected to put up with the conditions which had been forced upon them, was entirely wrong; they would not have minded in the least staying on, even though they had little to do. Once, however, Moussadek's suggestions for further talks had been turned down, it was inevitable that their contracts would be terminated and that they would have to go.

Young and Turney of the D.S.I. came on a visit to the office. I was anxious that they should do this as I have felt for a long time that Young views all our activities with the greatest scepticism. I gave them a talk for about an hour and then passed them to Hollis, who finally passed them on to Dick. I think they got a real bellyfull and I have since had an appreciative letter in which Young says that he was much impressed. He does not say whether the impression was favourable or unfavourable!

3rd November.

I dined with Tommy Harris and his wife last night. We did not get on to any discussion of officer matters until after dinner, when Tommy expressed anxiety about Anthony's indiscretions.

Blunt

Anthony had told Tommy that the American, Bernard MILLER, was returning to this country to study and that he intended to resume touch with him. Tommy had told Anthony that he considered this most unwise. He said that he had never been wholly satisfied with the peculiar story of Bernard MILLER, who had become acquainted with Guy BURGESS on board ship, had visited Geneva, been present when BURGESS was packing his clothes to depart, and had returned to America immediately afterwards. Tommy thought it quite conceivable that MILLER might have played some part on behalf of the Russians, or, alternatively, that he might have been an agent of the F.B.I. Even if he were wrong in both of these assumptions, it was quite possible that MILLER might now be acting for the F.B.I., and that information detrimental to Anthony might go back to them. On all these grounds he had strongly advised Anthony to have nothing to do with Bernard MILLER and had told him that if he, Anthony, had no objection he thought of mentioning the matter to me and asking my advice.

I told Tommy that he could tell Anthony that I entirely agreed with his, Tommy's, view, and I was sure that if Anthony did not pull himself together he might well be jeopardising the whole of his career.

We then talked about Anthony's relations with Jackie HEWITT. Tommy, of course, knew about the latest incident and had strongly advised Anthony to break with HEWITT and not to go on visiting him in St. Mary's Hospital.

This led to a discussion about Guy BURGESS, and of a hunch which Tommy had just after his disappearance that he might have gone behind the Iron Curtain. He recalled that he mentioned this at my first interview with him and Anthony; that I had asked him what made him think so, and that he had been unable to give any concrete reasons. I had then told him and Anthony that BURGESS and MACLEAN had been traced to France. It was clear to me that Tommy now felt rather confirmed in his original belief, although he had always been worried by the idea that, whatever his potentialities, nobody could have seriously employed an individual who was so notoriously unreliable. He felt that if this had been a smoke-screen to cover up more sinister activities, BURGESS was a far cleverer man than he had ever believed him to be.

During the whole evening PEACH was hardly mentioned and no reference was made to his dismissal. Tommy did say at one point of the conversation: "I suppose you have seen PEACH and got all the information you want from him?". It was quite clear to me that the idea that there could be anything wrong with PEACH had never entered the head of either Tommy or Hilda.

As I was going away, Tommy took me out to the car. I told him that we had no positive evidence of the whereabouts of BURGESS or MACLEAN, but that there were a number of points where I thought he might be able to help us. I could not go into them now, as Dick had a good many of the details. Could he spare the time to look in on us one day next week? He readily accepted and we fixed 11 o'clock on Monday.

In the course of this final conversation, Tommy did mention that he had driven Benes about at the request of BURGESS and that this was in 1939 when BURGESS was working for D.

During the whole of our discussion I could detect nothing that would suggest that Tommy was not being wholly frank and genuine.

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5th November.

I told Anthony Simkins about my evening with Tommy Harris. He seemed quite happy about the position.

Tommy Harris came up and he Dick and I had a talk for about two hours. Tommy outlined his own position. He had run away from school at the age of fifteen and gone to the Slade. He did not go to either University but continued to study art and to take an certain amount of interest in his father's business. He first met Anthony he thinks somewhere about 1936, when Anthony on behalf of Victor was buying a picture. In 1938 he had somehow been placed in touch with

It was not until 1939 that he first met BURGESS - he thinks through Anthony. His work consisted in driving people about in his fast car, in particular Benes. He abandoned this job as being more or less a waste of time and went to America to realise dollars on certain pictures which had been deposited in the U.S. After the collapse of France he was approached to join Station 17. There was a meeting between Commander Peters, Burgess and Kim, at which Anthony was also present. This was the first occasion on which he had met Kim. Tommy's job was to get to know all the names of the camp, who were of various nationalities, and some of them highly intelligent people. He had to report on their morale and look after their welfare. His wife did the catering and cooking. The only points of interest that emerged were that Kim and BURGESS were in fact responsible for the memoranda on policy, and in particular one which related to a proposal to assassinate Franco. There were innumerable rows, and finally Gubbins had taken over and militarised the camp. It was at this stage that Tommy joined us and, presumably, when Kim went to M.I.6.

We then discussed Anthony. We told Tommy we thought that there were a number of matters on which he could help us, but that up to now his memory had been extremely hazy; we thought in fact that he could do better. Tommy said that Anthony was probably reluctant to tell us his whole life story, with allusions to his friends, unless the facts were really relevant. He could not, of course, know whether they were or whether they weren't without reference to our files, but his personal loyalties were such that he would be unlikely to disclose information unless he were convinced that there was a really important national interest. Tommy entirely saw our point and thought he could probably put Anthony in the right frame of mind. We said that we would like to think this over.

I discussed with Hill the case of [redacted] We drafted a letter, at the request of the Foreign Office, stating our reasons for not wishing that a prosecution should take place. They are, broadly, that if [redacted] is put in the witness box or subpoenaed and [redacted] tries to defend himself by saying that the payments he made, being of a secret nature, no receipt were kept, [redacted] is bound to be questioned on the nature of his work. If this gets publicity, we shall almost certainly lose our informants and may have our office closed down at a time when its continued existence is vitally important. Moreover, there is likely to be considerable

political scandal involving the Foreign Office. I have been told that if our view is upheld, we may be asked by the Foreign Office to pay £9,000. In discussing this with Con I have suggested that our reply should be that we would be quite prepared to ask the Treasury for this sum as a special grant, but that in doing so we should, of course, have to disclose all the facts; these would include an admission that, in spite of the fact that [redacted] had gone to Cairo with a warning as to his honesty, no proper supervision was maintained over his account

6th November.

We had a special meeting of the J.I.C. to-day to discuss the state of Intelligence and methods for improving it. This was taken in conjunction with the paper on defectors, with which I agreed subject to the proviso that if the Government refused to finance the proposals from the open vote, we could not do more than what we were doing now without turning ourselves into a welfare organisation. I put in a memorandum to this effect for the record. I accepted the security risk of an additional number of defectors being sent to this country. Personally I doubt very much whether the proposals will result in any increase in the number of defectors. A great deal is made of the idea that if one man goes back, the whole policy receives a setback. The fact remains that two or three who have gone back do not appear to have had any effect on the numbers, and in any case the Russians invariably misrepresent the position to their own people. On the other hand, nobody wishes to do anything which may possibly prejudice future defection, since it is one of our few sources of Intelligence about Russia.

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7th November.

At his own request Tommy HARRIS called to see me to-day.

He said he had just heard from a friend of his the story of a party attended by Donald MACLEAN about a week before his disappearance at which, when exceedingly drunk, MACLEAN had made the comment "You know I am the English Alger HIES". Harris was anxious for us to have the story as soon as possible and therefore came round with it immediately. Dick told Harris, but without, we hoped, discouraging him, that we already had this information and that it was reasonably well corroborated.

Tommy made no further mention of PHILBY.

I took the opportunity of telling Tommy that after careful consideration we thought it would serve a useful purpose for him to have the talk with BLUNT which he had suggested.

8th November.

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Reilly reported at the J.I.C. to-day on the complaint from S.H.A.P.E. that the J.I.C. were not supplying them with enough information. They claimed that they were now getting better and quicker information from the Americans.

The real fact of course is that S.H.A.P.E. are trying to operate on a wartime footing, with a staff which is not capable of evaluating detailed Intelligence. They want information about almost everything that is going on, a commitment which can easily be fulfilled by the many officers who are falling over each other in Pentagon Building, but not by the hard-worked staffs of the Intelligence Services here.

In the present state of affairs, it is obviously much better that S.H.A.P.E. should receive properly digested Intelligence, even though it may be a bit old.

I talked to the D.M.I. about a request of his that we should send a C.E. officer to Austria. I said that with our present commitments this was not really possible, but suggested that we might discuss the problem with a suitable officer here in London.

D.M.I. felt it was essential that somebody should go out from here, as otherwise it would be difficult to assess the problem. I was unable to give him any assurance that we should send someone at the moment, since we were being heavily pressed by the Middle East.

'C' and I spoke to Patrick Reilly about [] 'C' agrees with our point of view that any prosecution would be likely to jeopardise our organisations in Egypt. The matter is to be considered by Strang.

Events in Egypt seem to be moving towards a show-down, particularly if the Military get their way in regard to the imposition of full sanctions. The Ambassador is opposed to this, as he feels that the economic consequences would only rally the Egyptian population round the present Egyptian Government, and so make a final settlement more difficult.

In Iraq the situation is not too good. the ultra-nationalist opposition are gaining strength and are openly advocating the abrogation of our existing Treaty. Nuri is at the moment basically on our side, but he might at any moment be assassinated. -----

At the Appointments Board to-day I mentioned that the D.M.I. had given me details of a cable he had received from B.G.S.I., British Troops in Egypt, supporting the demand for anti-terrorist officers in the Middle East. It was agreed to draft a suitable reply for the D.M.I. defining the spheres of responsibilities as between ourselves and the Army authorities on security matters. It was noted that the Army needed help in personnel with anti-terrorist experience as well as we ourselves. We therefore agreed that the D.M.I. should also be requested to send a telegram to General Kirkman, C.C.G., asking him if he would receive with a view to ascertaining if there were any ex-Palestinian Police officers serving with C.C.G. who would be available to assist both the Army and ourselves in Egypt at the present time.

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Brooman-White rang up to say that he was now P.P.S. at the War Office and wished to discuss security. I put him on to Roger.

9th November.

Burt came to see me. He told me he had heard a rumour that the Commissioner would be retiring before long, and wondered whether I had heard anything about it or of his possible successor. He did not wish to retire himself, although he was in a position to take his pension, unless the new Commissioner gave him the same support as the present one. He told me that he was more or less allowed to run his own show and that whenever it was necessary he got the Commissioner's full backing.

I told him that I had heard nothing of Scott's retirement and the second part of the question did not therefore arise.

I attended a meeting of a Committee set up to study the problem of the integration of the Secret Intelligence Services, set up as a result of Norman Brook's report. Winnifrith was in the Chair, with Patrick Reilly representing the Foreign Office, Sinclair representing S.I.S., Martin Watson representing J.I.B.

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The points for discussion were:

- (i) The future of compromised S.I.S. employees.
- (ii) An exchange of personnel within the various Intelligence Services.

As regards (i), I said that while we should always be prepared to consider any case on its merits, we should find considerable difficulty in the normal course of events in employing people in the forties and fifties. This age group was well filled and in a small organisation it was extremely discouraging to young and intelligent members to feel that older men were being brought in over their heads. Equally, to place such people under junior officers inevitably created a difficult problem and their suggested early promotion to Assistant Secretary would probably be out of the question.

Apart from the above considerations, a serious burden would be placed on the employing department if it had to take over pension rights. I had the impression that the Committee accepted my view, that it was unlikely that we should be able to help much in this field.

As regards (ii),:

(a) It seemed to me that the purpose of the Committee was to promote a better understanding among Intelligence officers of each other's work, and a consequent improvement in the quality of Intelligence produced.

It was also felt that if a wider variety of work was open to candidates, a career in Intelligence might be more likely to attract good men.

(b) I said that in so far as our relations with S.I.S. were concerned, I thought that considerable progress had been made towards better understanding through improved relations at home and through the integrated units in the Middle East and Far East. I explained to the Committee how these units in the field worked; how they were now in a position jointly to give directions to S.I.S. stations in adjacent countries, and how as a result both parties were agreed that the quality of Intelligence had been improved. I went on to say that when it was possible for S.I.S. to be housed in the same building at home, further improvements might be effected, and possibly also certain economies.

(c) Patrick Reilly was very insistent that there must be considerable duplication between [redacted] and ourselves, and wondered whether some form of total integration in the new building might not be possible. I said that this would immediately raise the problem of responsibility for such a unit, which had been the rock upon which such a proposal had foundered.

Sinclair said that it had to be recognised that both sides had a slightly different interest in international Communism and foreign Intelligence organisations. We both of us thought that any hasty solution to this problem would be unwise, but that the position might become a good deal clearer when we were both housed in the same building.

(d) Reilly also seemed to think that an occasional interchange of higher grade officers between S.I.S. and M.I.5 might be a good thing. I said that while S.I.S. could get an immediate dividend from one of our officers by posting him to one of their outstations where there was a considerable counter-Intelligence commitment, it would probably be some time before we could train their officer for a post of comparable responsibility. Sinclair took slight exception to this and said that if he had an officer of the calibre of [surely we could make immediate use of him? I said that certainly we could in the case of , and left it at that!

(e) I mentioned that there was a category of officer who might be better suited to M.I.6 work than M.I.5 work, and vice versa. Provision for an interchange of such officers already existed through the Establishment Officers of each department, and to a very limited degree successful transfers had taken place over a period of years.

(f) It was evident that an exchange of personnel between other departments in the Intelligence field had already been discussed, but it did not seem to me that the proposal had met with much enthusiasm. Martin Watson of J.I.B. expressed the view to me after the meeting that such officers as had been transferred to J.I.B., so far from promoting better relations, spent a good deal of time in abusing the department from which they had come!

4. I asked whether it was within the terms of reference of the Committee to discuss the possibility of some civilian nucleus within Service Intelligence departments to give continuity to the work. It was clear that this matter had already been discussed and that the Committee were whole-heartedly in agreement that some such arrangement was desirable. Moreover, the Services seemed to be agreed on this point themselves, provided they could get the necessary establishment.

Lastly, I asked whether the Committee had considered the appointment in regular departments of officers from the Intelligence Services who could improve the relations between producing and using departments. It seemed to me that the users were often unaware of the immense difficulties of the producers, and vice versa. I made it clear that if such an arrangement had any merit it would necessitate an increase in establishment, owing to the narrow margin to which Intelligence Services were working.

Although the Committee seemed to think there might be something in this suggestion, I gained the impression that it was rather outside their terms of reference.

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[] brought [] to see me. [] has taken over from Allan Dulles, who has moved up to No. 2 in C.I.A.

[] was full of appreciation and thanks for the work which our department was doing for C.I.A. He realised from his talks with [] that our assistance was considerable and he was extremely grateful for all that we were doing.

The only interesting point that emerged was a statement by [] to the effect that he hoped and expected that the difficulties between his organisation and others in the U.S. would before very long be finally ironed out. Whether he was referring to Bedell-Smith's recent approach to the President, on the withholding of top secret information by A.F.S.A. and the F.B.I., I do not know. It seems just possible that as a result of a blow-up there, some improvement may result. I doubt, however, whether Hoover will ever see eye to eye with anybody else in his field.

10th November.

Graham has had to argue a case put forward by the Three Advisers, that the purge procedure was being circumvented by departments with our connivance. Some thirteen cases were reviewed and, with the possible exception of one, the Advisers were satisfied that there had been no breach of the rules.

We have to-day sent off an answer to the telegram to the War Office from B.G.S.I. about our Middle East responsibilities, and also one to S.I.M.E., who seem somewhat vague on this point. We are accepting the commitment to provide information about terrorists in the Canal Zone, but we cannot be responsible for actual protective security measures which, in the present situation, must be planned by the Military.

12th November.

Bevir telephoned about the P.M.'s Swiss valet. I gave him the result of our enquiries, which were negative.

13th November.

I gave a lecture of a kind to the police course which started to-day.

Howard of the Aliens Department telephoned to me about the proposal to withdraw control at the Irish ports. We arranged that he should somewhat amplify my remarks, which had not been very fully reported by Ruck in his account of the special meeting of Immigration Officers which I attended. My main contention was that whatever the

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Irish authorities might agree to do now, would be of doubtful value, for two reasons: Firstly, nobody could say what the political situation would be at any moment, and secondly, that, with the best of good will, they were not in a position to carry out their obligations. In this respect it was true to say that our opposite numbers had grave doubts about their reliability and efficiency, and in delicate cases made no request to the ports for action. Apart from this, the Irish were not generally interested in the alien problem.

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David Boyle came here to discuss security of Canadian bags. Geoffrey Patterson had intimated to us that these bags, which are carried by our King's Messengers, were being tampered with. The suggestion was that this was being done by H.M.G. This is entirely untrue and we must therefore assume that either one of the King's Messengers is going wrong, or that the bags have been left lying about. We both of us agreed that the only method of dealing with this was to get the Canadians to write in officially. Geoffrey Patterson is going to try and get his informant to persuade the Canadian authorities to do this.

14th November..

Anthony ^{secret} called on me this afternoon, the visit having obviously been precipitated by an interview between him and Tommy Harris.

Anthony informed me that, in connection with the BURGESS case, he had just remembered being in possession of a further load of BURGESS' personal papers and that these included, he found from a quick glance, an old passport. He therefore wished to know if we wanted to inspect them. This point was put to Dick after he had been summoned by me to join the discussion. Dick made it clear that we should certainly want to inspect every paper relating to BURGESS that we could lay hands on. We therefore subsequently arranged that Simkins should accompany Anthony back to the Courtauld Institute where the papers were lodged in the basement and bring them back to this office for inspection.

The above point having been settled Dick took Anthony once more over the BURGESS story. The following points, not all of which may be new, were made by Anthony:

1. He is absolutely confident that BURGESS must first have become a Communist while at Trinity College, Cambridge, between the dates October 1933 and February 1934. He asserts this because he was himself at Cambridge at the earlier date, at which time BURGESS was certainly not claiming to be a Communist but, when Anthony returned from a Continental visit in February, 1934, BURGESS had certainly become converted to Communism. He therefore places the conversion as having taken place in the winter term 1933 and considers that the particular influence in persuading BURGESS to Communism was probably James KULGMAN, and that John CORNFORD may have had a hand in it. In any case, he remembers KULGMAN and CORNFORD saying that BURGESS was a very erratic Communist and that either their time or that of a competent Marxist was required almost every day to deal with his various deviations.

2. During the period that BURGESS was doing historical research work at Trinity, Anthony remembers that he worked under SIMPSON and that he took as a special subject the Indian mutiny.

3. Anthony has a clear recollection of BURGESS' break with Communism and places it as in the Spring of 1935. The break appeared as a violent revolt against Party discipline and because this seemed to be entirely in line with BURGESS' temperament, Anthony thought nothing of it. It was just another indication of BURGESS' erratic enthusiasms. It also did not surprise him that BURGESS threw up his job at Cambridge - he had never thought BURGESS to have the right sort of personality to be happy as a Don.

4. Anthony believes he can confirm that, on his return to London, BURGESS tried for a job in the Conservative Central Office and wonders whether, during the period he worked for The Times, he was introduced to that Journal either by Micky BURN or by E.H.GARR.

5. Regarding his Continental travels with BURGESS in 1938, Anthony says that although he may have passed through Paris the Spring tour was mainly to Italy.

6. As an indication of BURGESS' political views, that they remained essentially Marxist, Anthony remembers that:

- (a) BURGESS completely accepted the Russian purge trials on the grounds that the French had independent evidence of a conspiracy by the persons purged.
- (b) BURGESS argued that the German-Soviet pact was not Russia's fault but that we had forced her into it by sending a low level delegation to discuss a Treaty with them which was never plenipotentiary.

7. Anthony remembers that BURGESS' valet, George STEPHENSON, once told him that he had discovered a wad of pound notes in BURGESS' property. He could not place the date of this discovery but thought it might have been three years ago though it might have been much earlier. He also remembers that when the time came for BURGESS to settle fairly large personal debts to him he would pay out £20 or £30 at a time in notes rather than pay by cheque.

I think in fairness to Anthony-I should say, as regards BURGESS' papers, he was at some pains, I think genuinely, to explain that he had not deliberately withheld them from us, but had quite honestly forgotten about them. They had been deposited with him as books by Mrs. BASSETT - I imagine shortly after BURGESS left - and it was only when asked for their return that he took a look at them and thought they might be of interest. He realised that in the circumstances of our interview a poor construction might be put upon their sudden production, but hoped that I would believe him when he said that there was no more in it than forgetfulness and a failure in the light of later events to estimate their possible importance at the time of receipt.

15th November.

The D.M.I. telephoned to me about the case of an officer in Germany who had been court-martialled for indecency and sent home. He had previously been reprimanded for getting drunk with a Soviet officer and since his arrest had shown signs of defecting to the Russians. D.M.I. wanted him kept under observation.

Hollis has made it clear that our powers in this respect are extremely limited.

At the J.I.C. to-day it was announced that Eisenhower had written a letter to the C.I.G.S. complaining about the British contribution to Intelligence, to which Reilly is sending a reply.

Kenneth Strong raised the question of the Perimeter Review, which he considered to be one of the most important documents produced by the J.I.C. He felt, however, that there was a tendency to ignore the Middle East in assessing what the Russians might do. Reilly said that he had tried to fill this gap, and that ultimately he hoped that it might be possible to have some kind of separate meeting which would put that part of the world in its proper perspective. On the other hand, he pointed out that the Agenda of the Directors was already very full; that it had to get through its business and that it was not therefore possible to spend very much more time on the Perimeter Review than we were doing already.

'C' mentioned that there had been an extremely bad leak by the Secretary of State for Air in the U.S., Finletter, in which he had disclosed the tactics of the American Strategic Air Force, namely, to bomb the Russian bases before their atomic planes could take off and so destroy their stocks of atom bombs. I asked what was being done about this. I had raised the matter before and it seemed to me that we should at least have cases of this kind listed, and use them in argument when we were accused of lack of security. The meeting were generally agreed that this and thought that the P.M. should be properly briefed when he went to Washington.

Points of interest in the Perimeter Review were a speech by BERIA, which showed a reduction in tractor production and might possibly indicate a corresponding increase in the production of tanks.

Schumann, the French Foreign Minister, is opposed to a high-level approach to the Russians at this moment. He thinks that Germany should be brought into N.A.T.O. now. He said that German economy is going ahead and that it is, therefore, of paramount importance to bring Western Germany into Allied schemes. He thinks that Schumacher's desire for an all-German election is a purely selfish political one, since he believes that the Socialist Party will come into power. Schumann thinks that the Russians will make considerable concessions to avoid German rearmament.

The situation in the Far East did not look very good, particularly on account of the increased air strength of the Russians and the Chinese and their determination in constructing airfields in North Korea in spite of the United Nations bombing.

A similar build up seemed to be taking place with regard to Indo-China. Meanwhile the position in Malaya had deteriorated. We are now faced with a Communist Government in Nepal, but it is not thought that the Gurkha supply will necessarily be cut off.

In Egypt the present policy is to discredit the Egyptian Government but to do nothing that will turn them into martyrs. Self-government for the Sudan is contemplated by the end of 1952.

As regards Persia, there is still no agreement with Washington on policy. The Americans would like us to make concessions to Moussadek as they believe that the only alternative would be a Tudeh Government. We believe that there is an alternative Government and that it would be better to wait. Meanwhile the refinery has been started up in a very small way.

Nuri in Iraq has unfortunately stated that he will not discuss the Middle East Command until the Egyptian question is settled. Other Middle East States are wavering.

I dined with Colonel Stratton, one of our ex-S.C.Os. He told me that he had been invited to visit de COURCY at Alderbourne, on account of a remark that he made about understanding the Communist menace since he had Communists in his factory and had worked in M.I.5 during the war. de COURCY had poured out his grievances at a tete-a-tete lunch which had lasted until four in the afternoon, and had mentioned that M.I.5 agents were examining his banking account in Paris.

Stratton had been subsequently asked to go for the weekend, but refused on the grounds that he was going to Jamaica.

I told Stratton that if he wanted to know what de COURCY thought of M.I.5 he had better read the October issue of his Digest, which I need hardly say was entirely inaccurate and misleading.

16th November.

I wound up the police course and listened to one or two suggestions. On the whole the course seems to have been well received.

17th November.

The D.G. returned to-day. I met him at the airport and told him and told him that no sign had been received from the P.M.'s office, except on the question of the P.M.'s servant, a Swiss named MEYER who seemed to have no adverse record, although of course it was a bad thing for the P.M. to be employing an alien as his valet.

I told him about our difficulties with the Middle East and the suggested appointment of HAMERSLEY, and also about developments in the PEACH case.

19th November.

The D.G. has reversed my decision about [redacted], after sending for Hill. He rang up Reilly, saying that he did not wish to stand in the way of a prosecution. In my letter to Reilly I had expressed the view that if [redacted] were called there was a serious risk that he would be subject to cross-examination and that it would become apparent that he had been paying agents in Egypt considerable sums of money. This might well lead to the closing down of our office and would undoubtedly at a time like this seriously embarrass the Foreign Office and S.I.S.

The D.G. told Hill that as a policeman he had never stood in the way of a criminal prosecution and that he did not intend to do so now.

22nd November.

At the J.I.C. (Directors) meeting to-day the D.N.I., who had just returned from America, said that the Navy Department and C.I.A. were more or less in line with us on Russian intentions and capabilities. The Air and the Army, however, were slightly aggressive. The Navy are worried about our attitude over China.

'C' said that he had seen Dick Casey, who was violent about the state of affairs in Malaya. He thought the situation extremely serious and intended to say so in high quarters here.

Drew stated that he was intending to change the L.C.S. lecture to the I.D.C., which had formerly been on the activities of the organisation during the last war; he was going to outline the general purposes and methods of L.C.S. and then talk about its possibilities. He is circulating a copy of a synopsis of his lecture.

In discussing the Perimeter Review it was stated that the American attitude with regard to Korea was that some troops must remain and that it should be made clear that any breach of the Armistice would bring down drastic retaliation and new bombing north of the Yalu. If there was no truce a new situation would arise, possibly involving an extension of the war. Meanwhile there is a steady build-up of land and air forces by the North Koreans and as many as eight airfields are in operation in any one day in North Korea.

Unemployment in Hong Kong is getting steadily worse and there is a certain depression, due to failure of the Korean Armistice negotiations.

We had a long discussion on defectors. Donaldson, representing the Minister of Defence, said that on instructions from Sir Harold Parker, the P.U.S., he could not accept the defector commitment for the Ministry of Defence. He was subjected to very considerable pressure from the Chairman and other members of the Committee and did not seem to be very well briefed about the whole problem. It was agreed that Reilly and I should go and see Sir Harold Parker next week.

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23rd November.

I talked to Cumming and Winterborn about defectors and told them about the attitude of the Ministry of Defence, since Reilly and I are to try and persuade Sir Harold Parker to appoint an officer to take charge of this whole business if it is put on the open vote, I wanted to be briefed as fully as possible. Parker's present idea is that the whole question should remain on the secret vote and that commitments should be continued to be carried by M.I.5.

24th November.

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26th November.

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I told the D.G. that Hollis and I were attending a meeting at the Home Office to discuss the removal of Immigration Officers from the Western Ports who were handling the Irish traffic. I said that I was intending to oppose this on the grounds that it was opening the back door into this country, and pulling down a piece of security machinery at a time when the world was in an extremely unsettled state.

The D.G. agreed to my taking this line.

Hollis and I attended a meeting at the Home Office with Newsam in the Chair. Howe and Burt were present from S.B., Kelly from Northern Ireland, and Ruck, Hutson and Howard from the Home Office.

Newsam opened by saying that the Home Office had received a cut which involved getting rid of about 120 temporary employees. I said that it seemed a pity that at a time like this the cut should be applied to Security. It was easy to take any component part of security and argue that it had not resulted in the detection of anything but a very small number of people who might be attempting to enter this country for illegal purposes. On that basis you could get rid of security altogether. It had to be considered as a whole, since it was the cumulative effect of all security measures that produced the result, quite often in an entirely negative way. In other words it was a deterrent. It was the old argument that security could not be 100% there was no point in having it at all. If controls were removed, it would be possible for an alien to enter this country and reside here almost permanently without registration, since he could go back to Eire at the end of his two months and come in again. It was quite useless to place any reliance upon the Eire authorities; the degree of co-operation depended firstly on the political situation of the moment, and secondly on personnel in the lower stratas. It was true that both we and the police had useful contacts, but we knew from our opposite numbers that the Immigration and the police were basically disinterested in the alien problem and were in a number of cases unreliable. In fact the Eire Defence Ministry would not think of entrusting any of their more delicate cases to their own Immigration and police. There were many cases where we did not put the man's name on the Suspect Index, but obtained the necessary action through our own Immigration and police, giving it the smallest possible circulation. Clearly we should not be able to do this with the Irish. Both the time factor and their unreliability would make such a course impossible. Any idea, therefore, that we could put a "ring fence" around Ireland and the U.K. was out of the question.

I was supported in this argument by Ronnie Howe, but clearly the Home Office want to abolish controls and I have no doubt that they will get their way.

Newsam said that he would put up a note advancing all the pros and cons and would submit it to us before he passed it to the Home Secretary.

27th November.

I attended a meeting to-day, called by Sir Harold Parker, P.U.S. Ministry of Defence, to discuss the proposal of the J.I.C. that the expense of resettling defectors should be placed on the open vote and that an officer of the Ministry of Defence should be appointed to take responsibility for the work. Those present were Donaldson, Ministry of Defence, Searight of the J.I.C. Secretariat, Patrick Reilly and myself.

Reilly opened the meeting by giving a brief outline of the circumstances which had led up to these proposals. He said that defectors of the right kind provided one of the few sources of information available to the J.I.C. on Russian intentions and capabilities. So far the number of defectors had been disappointingly small. The J.I.C. felt that if more publicity could be given to the conditions under which these people were living and the benefits which they enjoyed, the flow might be increased. The Security Service felt, and he agreed, that while the handling of defectors of high grade intelligence value might be a proper charge on their manpower and resources, they were not justified in acting as a kind of welfare organisation

for low grade defectors and those who were no longer of any Intelligence value. The only object in bringing such people to this country was to avoid prejudicing the whole defector problem through their re-defection to the Russians. Apart from this, the Security Service felt that if the expense were placed upon the open vote they could not as a secret department become involved in the resulting publicity, which would be detrimental to the organisation as a whole.

Sir Harold Parker argued - I think with some justification - from a statement in the J.I.C. draft report on Soviet and Satellite defectors, that as a number of measures for publicity had already been put into force, he could not see what further publicity by interviews with defectors here could really do. How would the information reach other Russian potential defectors? Surely the only publicity that was any good was broadcasting in the Russian language or a distribution of leaflets in the Eastern Zone, which was already being done?

Reilly replied that a considerable increase in the broadcasting programme was contemplated, which would undoubtedly give rise to questions.

Parker thought that if the expense of resettling defectors were placed on the open vote, there would be considerable difficulty in justifying the whole policy. If it were the subject of debate in Parliament, how would we be able to explain why X was getting £5 a week and Y £10? Assuming, however, that Ministers were prepared to agree, Parker did not feel that this was really a matter which should be controlled by an officer of the Ministry of Defence. His department was concerned with the inter-Service co-ordination and carried as little administration as possible. Moreover, the Prime Minister had recently expressed the view that the Ministry was four times bigger than it should be.

Parker sympathised with the Security Service point of view, that it should not spend its money, time and personnel on welfare work, but he did not see why it should be a commitment for the Ministry of Defence.

Reilly countered by saying that the J.I.C. had reached the conclusion that defectors provided one of the best sources of information about Russia, and that their views had been endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff, who worked to the Minister of Defence. It seemed logical, therefore, that the co-ordinating officer should be in the Ministry.

Parker clearly thought that the only solution to the problem was for the Security Service to be given the necessary establishment to carry the increased commitment, but said that if his colleagues on the P.U.S. level were in favour of the J.I.C. proposal, he would not stand in the way.

Reilly undertook to put up a report on the present situation to Sir Harold Parker for discussion by the Committee of P.U.Ss, which meets periodically to discuss Intelligence matters, in accordance with the recommendation in the Brook report. Meanwhile, it has been decided not to proceed with the report to the Chiefs of Staff.

28th November.

Taylor, C.C. Leicestershire, came to see me. He seemed sound and enthusiastic. I gave him a talk on the organisation and the principles on which we worked. He seemed keen to do anything he could to assist and hoped that on a subsequent visit to London he could meet the other Directors.

29th November.

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We had a general discussion about the overseas organisation, for which Alec was present, and, as far as I could see, in agreement. We felt that Nairobi could probably run on one officer, that Rhodesia was a doubtful commitment, that Ceylon was now a waste of money, and that the Caribbean could do with one officer instead of two. Further, that whatever D.O.S.'s recommendations may be, Egypt does not want more than two officers, and that the post at Aden which is to visit Argeisha and the Sudan, would be an unnecessary commitment. If D.O.S. recommends such an appointment in Aden it will have to be filled by an attached officer.

30th November.

COMMUNIST
I saw Tess last night. She told me that when she was at Cambridge Judith FISHER-WILLIAMS, Jennifer Hart's younger sister, then aged about eighteen, was at the time, 1936, very much attached to a young Communist called Ian HENDERSON, aged about twenty. She had been approached and had become a secret - as opposed to an open - member of the Communist Party. Subsequently she had married David HUBBARD, who is now employed in quite an important post in the Treasury.

As far as is known, Judith FISHER-WILLIAMS is no longer active, and her husband is not believed ever to have had any connection with Communism - in fact he is regarded as wholly Tory in his outlook.

Tess would be prepared to approach Jennifer FISHER-WILLIAMS and ask her whether she can give the names of any other secret members with whom she was associated in her Cambridge days. I said that I would look up Jennifer FISHER-WILLIAMS and let her know. Meanwhile, I would say nothing about the case to anyone else.

Howard of the Home Office telephoned about the memorandum on the control of Irish travel which is going forward to the Home Secretary.

I said that we should like to see a copy of it before it was presented, as we might wish to comment. Howard said that Hutson had already mentioned that he thought there was perhaps too much emphasis on the security side. I said that nevertheless we should like to see it. Howard undertook to send me a copy.

1st December.

I discussed with Hollis a memorandum on Irish censorship in time of war. We are drafting a paper, the gist of which is to suggest that if control of cables, mails, air routes or sea routes can be organised via the U.K., we are prepared to drop censorship between the U.K. and Eire and between Eire and Northern Ireland, accepting the risk that information getting into Eire may go out by illicit wireless. Personally I am doubtful whether any Eire Government would commit itself now. If it ultimately refuse the routing of communications through this country, it will either be necessary to enforce such a policy by cutting their cables, sinking their ships and shooting down their aircraft, or else to impose full censorship between the U.K. and Eire and Eire and Northern Ireland.

3rd December.

 I attended a special meeting of the J.I.C. (Deputy Directors) this afternoon to discuss measures to improve our Intelligence. Our views on the subject were accepted. There was, however, a request by the Chairman that a Committee, consisting of M.I.6., J.I.B. and ourselves, might review the existing machinery and any possible improvements for giving effect to a paragraph of the catalogue of recommendations submitted by Departments regarding the cover provided for international gatherings, particularly those behind the Iron Curtain.

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Burt telephoned to say that S.B. were not anxious to release an officer, ATTRFIELD (?), for protection duty to Mr. Eden. He had, however, made some enquiries about DIBDIN, which seemed to indicate that he was a reliable officer and suitable for what we had in mind.


4th December.

I had a talk with Brigadier Major, who has been filling a gap in Ceylon during Wagstaffe's leave. He said that the Singalese Police were clearly slow in their operations: they had not yet put the telephone equipment which we supplied into operation, but said that they intended to do so before long. Their operations are in general rather crude. They are, however, co-operative and frequently ask for our advice. Security in Government departments is not thought to be particularly good, although we have no real opportunity to investigate it. We do, however, know that the Head of the Police is reluctant to send his telegrams through External Affairs, on security grounds. Major says that he gets quite a number of enquiries from the Australians, and also mentioned that the American Naval Attache was in fairly close touch with the police.

Trincomalee was visited. It was found that the Admiral had a number of highly secret documents, which at times were in the custody of a junior Singalese officers. Application is being made to the Admiralty for European personnel. Similar dumps of secret documents exist in other parts of the world for issue on general mobilisation. The general security question arises, which the Admiral is taking up with N.I.D. Major seems to think that the S.L.O's position in Ceylon is justifiable and that to withdraw our representative would be regretted by the local authority.

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5th December.



6th December.

At the J.I.C. Directors meeting we had an interminable discussion about the future in Korea and its effect on other areas.

The more I think about the Armistice discussions, the more I feel that any cessation of hostilities must react to our disadvantage. The only factor at the moment which prevents an attempt by the Forces of the North, which are numerically superior, from driving us

our of Korea, is their lack of air support from bases in Manchuria; the MIG 15s are out of range. They have been endeavouring for many months to construct airfields in North Korea from which they could operate over our lines, and have only been prevented from doing so by the constant bombing of these aerodromes by the American Air Force. If there were a cessation of hostilities the Northern forces would be able to construct these and other aerodromes with impunity and could launch a surprise offensive at the appropriate moment, which, in the absence of very much increased U.N. Forces, would stand quite a chance of being successful. It will take the Chinese some time to build up their Air Force, which is being trained by the Russians, and there is no doubt that they want a breathing space to do this. There is no particular advantage in advancing the U.N. present line beyond a certain point, since it only brings it within closer range of Manchurian air bases.

A further disadvantage in an Armistice would be the release of Chinese forces to make trouble elsewhere; in Indo-China, Burma, Hong Kong and Malaya. If, therefore, we have got to fight the Chinese it is better to go on hitting them in Korea and hope that one day they may feel that aggressive tactics do not really pay.

7th December.

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I was asked by Bevir to go and see the P.M. about MEYER. I asked whether the P.M. wished to see the D.G. or myself, and was told that he wished to see the person who had written the letter. I so informed the D.G., who instructed me to go to Downing Street.

I had to wait a little as the P.M. had not come down after his customary siesta. Eventually I was ushered into the Cabinet Room, where he was sitting alone contemplating the papers. He asked me to sit down and after what seemed to me an age, he said that he was anxious to know a little more about the enquiries that had been made. He made it clear that these enquiries had been made at his request and that the decision as to whether MEYER stayed or went was entirely his responsibility. I told him that as far as we knew MEYER had come here originally in 1947 as a trainee at the Carlton Hotel; that he had gone back to Switzerland in 1948 and returned here in 1949, when he entered the P.M.'s service. We had checked his name against our own records, against the police records in this country, and against the records of the Swiss police, but all with an entirely negative result. We had not done anything in the nature of positive enquiries.

The P.M. immediately asked whether the enquiries in Switzerland would be likely in any way to react in a manner detrimental to MEYER. I replied that I did not think so, but that we would do anything we could to ensure that the Swiss police understood that we knew nothing to MEYER.

detriment and that in the circumstances our enquiry was purely a precautionary one.

The P.M. then told me that he had the utmost confidence in MEYER and in his integrity; he was an extremely valuable servant and managed the household efficiently: the P.M. was therefore extremely reluctant to get rid of him. He thought the Swiss were basically good people, and here he reminded me that during one of his conversations with Joe Stalin, when the latter was urging the P.M. to overrun Switzerland in his D. Day offensive, that "all the Swiss were swine and should be given no consideration"! This was of course quite irrelevant to the point at issue!

The P.M. then disclosed to me that he had four Swiss maids at Chartwell, and that he had in fact, on the basis of our letter, in which we pointed out that an alien would not suffer from the same inhibitions as a British subject in betraying this country, since immediately after the Elections MEYER himself had come forward to say that he would quite understand if his services were no longer required in view of the P.M.'s move to Downing Street.

I said that we had expressed the view about his having an alien servant, since Operation CICERO was very present in our minds. Further, we felt that any alien in his service must be a target. He asked me whether I meant a target for the enemy or for the press. I said I had been thinking of the enemy, but that of course he would be a target for both.

The P.M. said that he was so sure of MEYER's integrity that he was not too worried about the enemy; he was, however, concerned about the political implications, which was a matter to which he would have to give serious thought. In any case it was his responsibility.

He could not have been more charming, and expressed his thanks and expressed his thanks for the trouble we had taken. Just as I was going away he said: "How are you getting on over there?". I said that we were getting on all right but that we were extremely pressed with work and had a really hard nut to crack, due to a large extent to the excellence of Russian security. He referred to the position which gave the Russians access to almost any part of this country, particularly to our factories. He said that a year or two ago he had given information on this subject which he had obtained from some Naval Officer who used to be concerned with Intelligence in Madrid. The information related to the presence of Russian engineers in our factories; he wondered whether we had ever received this.

I could not at first remember the Naval Officer's name. I thought it was either Hildred or Hildreth. The P.M. remarked that this was somewhere near it, and I then remembered that the name was HILGARTH. I said that of course the Russians had been in the factories, but that there was no less occasion for them than when they were busying themselves with taking delivery of the new engines. He said: "Ah yes, the new engines - terrible thing", with which I agreed. I said I thought it was a pity to teach them their A.B.C. in jet propulsion.

The P.M. then said that he was determined that those Russians who had the opportunity should see that this country was "like the back of a hedgehog and not a punch of a rabbit", an expression which he had used in his speech in the recent defence debate! He wanted everyone here concerned with the various auxiliary services to be harnessed in to the defence machine and to take a pride in what he was doing. He again thanked me for coming over and I left.

I had only been back from the P.M. a few minutes and reported to the D.G., when the D.G. himself received a call from Downing Street. When he got there he found Eden and Strang.

Eden was worried about the PHILBY case; he had evidently been extremely badly briefed and had given the P.M. the impression that PHILBY might escape at any moment and that another scandal would ensure similar to that in the case of BURGESS and MACLEAN. The D.G. explained that on the fact of it this was not at all likely. Eden was evidently unaware that PHILBY had already been interrogated three times, although not quite on the line of the proposed interrogation which is to take place on the 19th December, on the basis of a number of subsequent enquiries.

Eden and Strang seemed to think that this interrogation was going to lead to a prosecution. It was explained to them that the chances of prosecution were extremely remote, since all the evidence amounted to was a chain of circumstances which pointed to PHILBY's guilt, and that all these circumstances were well-known to PHILBY himself on account of the appointment that he had formerly held in S.I.S. The odds, therefore, were strongly against any satisfactory conclusion of the case. It should, however, be understood that without a case and without a charge it was not really possible under the laws of this country to detain someone indefinitely upon a suspicion. If, therefore, PHILBY wished to go there would be nothing to stop him short of a withdrawal of his passport, which would not necessarily be effective.

The P.M. then said that he did not see why the interrogation could not take place at once. It was explained to him that all enquiries which seemed possible had only just been completed and that the brief was with the interrogating Counsel, who, owing to previous engagements, could not place his services at our disposal until the 19th December. Meanwhile there was no reason for supposing that PHILBY would attempt to leave, unless he was proceeding to India as a representative of the Telegraph to report on the Indian elections.

The P.M. gave orders that the interrogation was to be held within a week. It was a pity that he had been so badly briefed.

On the D.G.'s return, Dick got into touch with Milmo and has fixed the interrogation for December 12th.

10th December.

I asked Burt to come over in order that Dick and I might discuss with him the PHILBY case. We gave him a brief outline of the evidence and explained to him that we were merely working on a chain of circumstances, which in no sense constituted evidence but the cumulative effect of which seemed to indicate that PHILBY might well have been a Soviet spy for many years. Both the Foreign Office and the Americans were very anxious to get some positive view about PHILBY's guilt, or otherwise, in order to know how they stood from the point of view of operations which PHILBY, by virtue of the position that he had held in S.I.S., might have compromised. We had therefore decided to get Milmo to interrogate PHILBY on a brief which we had prepared and to give an impartial view. We thought that the chances of any admissions by PHILBY were extremely remote, for the reason that he was fully acquainted with almost every card that we had in our hand, and, moreover, was thoroughly experienced in cases of this kind. There was, however, just a remote chance of a break, and should such an eventuality arise we might

want a police officer to come in and take a statement: would Burt, therefore, make the necessary arrangements.

Burt I think at first thought that if the police were coming in, they should come in at the outset and presumably conduct the interrogation, but I think we convinced him that the case was really rather an exceptional one and that the purpose of getting Milmo to conduct what was really a judicial enquiry into a leakage of information, was the more appropriate course. He left us saying that he would think the matter over and communicate with us on the following day.

Dick and I went to see 'C' about the arrangements for PHILBY's interrogation. It was agreed that 'C' would ring up PHILBY on Monday evening and ask him to come up on Wednesday at 10 o'clock. 'C' would then tell him that M.I.5 had come to the conclusion that there had been a leakage of information and that they wished to interrogate him further. 'C' himself had to go over to see the D.G. and would bring PHILBY with him. Hill would do the formal introduction and 'C' would urge PHILBY to submit to interrogation by Milmo. If by any chance at that stage PHILBY felt inclined to say something to 'C', 'C' should listen and urge him to repeat what he had said to the interrogating officer at M.I.5.

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I spoke to Hollis about our memorandum on Irish censorship in time of war. It seemed to me that we ought to insert a paragraph which would make it clear that any arrangement by which the Eire Government assumed responsibility for their external communications, with the U.K. Government supplying a liaison officer to Irish censorship, would be unacceptable on the grounds that we could not possibly supply the Irish with our secret Watch List and could not rely upon their political reliability or efficiency.

I spoke to Winterborn about this and the memorandum is now being finalised.

11th December.

I gave the usual talk to another police course.

I saw Newsam and gave him a brief outline of the PHILBY case and the action that we proposed. I told him that he would be receiving a letter from the Foreign Office, on which we did not wish him to take any action unless and until he received notification from us as a result of the admissions obtained from PHILBY during interrogation.

I gave a talk to two Austrians, Mr. Pammer and Dr. Czedik-Eysenberg. They are concerned with Austrian security under the Ministry of the Interior. They have no executive powers, but are in a sense a part of the police. They can ask for action by the police, in the same way that we do, and only if they met with difficulties would they invoke the assistance of the Ministry of the Interior.

I explained to them the broad principles on which we worked. They said that they had many difficulties to contend with, particularly from the Russians. Their police agents were arrested on false grounds of espionage, when they were merely conducting enquiries into evasions of currency and trade restrictions.

Brigadier Johnstone, D.D.M.I., came to see me about S.I.M.E. Owing to the demand by the G.O.C. for a Director of Intelligence responsible to himself, he wanted to get clear in his mind exactly what the status of S.I.M.E. was.

I explained to him the origins of S.I.M.E., why it was finally made a responsibility of ours, and what its present status was. He entirely agreed with me that it would be wrong to appoint a Director of Intelligence, that the existing collating machinery of the J.I.C. should be adequate, and that the collecting agencies - M.I.6 and ourselves - were already wholly integrated.

I said that I could understand the G.O.C's anxiety: he felt a dearth of information and wanted some organisation which would tell him from hour to hour when an act of sabotage or ambush was likely to take place. Admittedly there was a dearth of information on this subject, due to the disintegration of the police and to the fact that outside the Ikhwan there was no organisation to penetrate. In the present state of affairs, any Egyptian who thought he could get away with it would commit an act of murder, or throw a bomb into a house, in order that he could subsequently engage in looting. I did not, however, think that the appointment of a superstructure was likely to give the answer; it would merely create new channels and cause confusion.

Johnstone entirely agreed and said, off the record, he felt that H.G.S.I. had rather lost his head and that a personal letter to him from the D.M.I. was necessary to readjust the position. The G.O.C., I understand, wants to have someone "whose neck he can wring". The trouble is that just wringing necks does not produce good Intelligence! It is just a question of getting informants and, in the present circumstances, the task would be an extremely difficult one. Once again, Intelligence is

not a tap that can be turned on with a full flow at a moment's notice; there would only be a small trickle which can only be increased by long, arduous and patient work.

D.O.S. has sent in another long telegram about the appointment of an officer at Aden to cover Argeisha in British Somaliland and Khartoum in the Sudan. Horrosks has shown this to the D.G. and a wire has gone back to say that the base at Aden cannot be considered even until we know about budget decisions. In any case, we feel on present information that the base is not really justifiable.

D.O.S. also wishes for a more experienced officer to be posted to assist Ffoulkes in Cairo. The D.G. has apparently agreed to this, although it is not very clear where an officer is coming from, or indeed whether in present circumstances, when a diplomatic rupture is on the tapis, such an appointment would be advisable.

Ronnie Howrang me up to say that in the ordinary way he could not countenance Burt being kept at our disposal during the interrogation of PHILBY, but that as a special favour he would do so in this case. He seemed to be taking the attitude that the interrogation ought to have been done by the police and that in fact we were doing it ourselves and would only call the police in to clean up the mess. I told him quite frankly that he had got the thing wrong; that this was no ordinary case; that there was in fact no evidence on which to work, and that the chances of anything in the nature of a break were extremely remote. We did, however, want to take the precaution of arranging for a police officer to be available should by any chance something unforeseen happen. He then calmed down and said that he quite understood.

12th December.

PHILBY turned up as arranged at 10 o'clock and his interrogation is proceeding. So far, he has admitted nothing. Milmo is bearing down on him pretty heavily.

I was away during the afternoon but returned about 6 o'clock. The interrogation of PHILBY has been completed without any admission, although Milmo is firmly of the opinion that he is or has been a Russian agent, and that he was responsible for the leakage about MACLEAN and BURGESS. Personally I feel less convinced about this last point. PHILBY's attitude throughout was quite extraordinary; he certainly did not behave like an innocent person. He took the view that the interrogation was quite justifiable on the evidence which we had, but that if we thought he was a spy we were wrong. He never made any violent protestation of innocence, nor did he make any attempt to prove his case. As regards being a Communist, he said that he had never been in the Party, and when asked whether he was a Marxist he said that he may have believed in parts of the Marxist creed, but not all. On the question of his wife's journeys abroad, it was put to him that according to his previous statement he had

said that she had dropped her Communism on return to this country and that he and she were living on about £3 a week. He was then shown his wife's passport and asked how her journeys to the Continent had been financed and the reasons for them. In spite of the fact that he had only married her six weeks previously, he could only say that he did not remember; that she might have been going to visit friends and that he did not know where the finance came from. He was asked to surrender his passport and did so willingly. Skardon returned with him to his home again. His attitude throughout was perfectly friendly.

I went to the party at the Yard, where I talked to Burt. He told me he had been in the room when Howe rang up and that he was very worried about the attitude Howe had taken. He was particularly anxious that I should not think that he was criticising our action or that he was not willing to help in every possible way: he could perfectly well have detailed an officer, but in the circumstances he felt he would rather be available himself.

I did not have an opportunity of talking to Ronnie Howe, but I had a word with 'C' and also with Carey Foster on the results of the interrogation.

13th December.

I attended the Directors meeting of the J.I.C. to-day. The question arose of sending to SHAPE that part of the paper on the potentialities of the Communist Party in the event of war which referred to the U.K. It was felt that it was too long for SHAPE, and we were asked to make a short resume of about a page, which I undertook to do.

I had a word with Reilly after the meeting about the PHILBY case. I said I thought it was of the utmost importance that we should hand PHILBY back his passport at the earliest possible moment. To give it up on request might be rather humiliating.

At the Appointments Board meeting to-day O.S. reported on the general position in the Middle East so far as it had been advised. The Board agreed that a reminder telegram should be sent to H/SIME for a full report.

D.E./A. also reported on the position of Attached Service Officers. No further action on our part was called for.

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17th December.

Reilly telephoned to ask me to attend a meeting in Trend's room at the Treasury at 12 o'clock on Wednesday, when our finances would be discussed. He knew that Miss Constant was coming, but he thought that somebody ought to be there to answer questions about our Intelligence activities, if this became desirable, since we are asking for an increase of about £46,000 over and above our last budget. This is due to expansion overseas and to an additional Registry requirement due to increased vetting.

Reilly told me that as things were going he thought we should probably be asked to take on the defectors commitment, since the majority of P.U.Ss did not like the idea of the charge being on the open vote.

I talked to Malcolm Cumming about this. He showed me a note from which he calculated the average cost per defector to be about £500 - in fact it varied from £70 to £1500. If we took on the commitment we should want one more officer at the rank of Principal and another assistant with a knowledge of Russian. At the present rate of defection this would cost about £18,000 a year. If in fact increased propaganda, which cannot go very far if the costs are to remain on the secret vote, were to step up the flow, we might want as much as £50,000, or even more. Personally I doubt very much whether the flow will increase. We still have £20,000 in hand of last year's grant.

I talked to the D.G. about a letter which he had received from Reilly on the case of SPROULE, the technician in electronics who is a Communist. SPROULE's services are being applied for by Russia, or one of the Satellites. He has had no access to classified work for five years but is a good workman.

Reilly states that Eden had seen the papers and wishes the D.G. to talk to the P.M. about this and other similar cases. When he has done so, Eden proposes to say something to the P.M. himself.

Hill is preparing a note for the D.G. and will make an appointment with the P.M. and draw his attention to the Bill prepared by the Labour Party which is now with the Lord Chancellor, which empowers the S. of S. to make an order against an individual who wishes to travel and has information which would be useful to an enemy. The Bill gives right of appeal to the Advisers but the Home Secretary's order is final. The D.G. will say that even if this Bill were passed, it could hardly apply in the case of SPROULE unless the liberty of the subject was to be gravely prejudiced. No Appeal Tribunal could possibly allege that the information in SPROULE's possession, if passed to an enemy would gravely prejudice the security of the State; he is no more than a good technician in electronics.

At the D.G.'s meeting we discussed the further telegram from D.O.S., in which he emphasises that the post at Aden, which is to cover British Somaliland and the Sudan is of the highest importance. He then proceeds to argue that as the post in Cairo has been cut by one, this can only be offset by the appointment in Aden. This seems a very poor argument - either the post at Aden is necessary or it is not, and the same applies to the post in Cairo.

The D.G. said that he wished the Colonial Office to be consulted as to whether they wanted a Security Officer in Aden, and gave orders that someone was to be earmarked for the post if Shaw on his return satisfied us that it was really necessary to fill it. We all expressed the gravest scepticism about this.

Hollis said that he had had a discussion about vetting. Cases arose fairly frequently of a man's relative being a Communist. We felt bound to tell the employing department and to express a view as to whether such facts had any real significance in the case of each candidate. The D.G. was rather reluctant to accept this responsibility, but finally agreed. We were the only people who could express a view, and that provided it was done with due caution and the final responsibility remained with the employing department, we should endeavour to assess the value of this information in accordance with the circumstances in each case.

18th December.

I saw General Dunlop, who is taking over security at the Colonial Office. He is going to start travelling early next year and is anxious to learn as much as he can in the meantime. I gave him a rough outline of the office. He will be seeing Kellar, Hollis and the Registry and possibly Mitchell and Furnival Jones. He told me that he had studied the regulations in the Colonial Office, which he had already found to be deficient in a number of ways. He fully expected that things would be even worse when he got overseas.

Dick has completed his draft for the Americans about PHILBY. A copy will go both to the F.B.I. and C.I.A., with a covering note making it clear that there is no actual evidence, or in fact logic to support the opinion. We are expressing ourselves as being in agreement with Milmo's findings. Meanwhile, 'C' is assessing the damage which in the worst case could have been done to his organisation. We are pointing out why it is arguable that PHILBY's actions in recent years may have amounted to no more than betrayals in cases where he thought they were necessary to safeguard his own position.

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19th December.

I attended a meeting at the Treasury with Miss Constant. This meeting was apparently a sequel to a meeting of the P.U.Ss, recommended by Brook in his report, as a suitable body to review expenditure by Intelligence departments. Presumably they found themselves unable to assess the relative importance of the estimates, and so delegated the task to Trend and Reilly, in his capacity as Chairman of the J.I.C. With the exception of Reilly's presence, this is really a reversion to the old system, except that Trend will have to report back to the meeting of P.U.Ss.

We have an increase of something like £46,000 on our budget, which is in the neighbourhood of £600,000. The increased figures are due to increased payments granted by the Treasury, an increase in overseas commitments, and a necessary balance of about £10,000 to cover those who want to go from untaxed to taxed salary. It also allows for an increase of staff to bring the Registry up from 150 to, roughly, 200 in order to meet our increased vetting commitment brought about by rearmament. We are now vetting something like 5,000 cases a week. There will be no margin to increase the officer strength of more than one or two. Trend asked one or questions on the increased figures and seemed entirely satisfied with our answers.

Reilly mentioned a possible additional commitment with regard to defectors. It was agreed that we would hand back at the end of the financial year whatever sum we had over, and that a sum of £25,000 would be set aside to be given to whatever department it was finally decided to carry the burden of settling defectors in this country or in the Dominions.

I mentioned, on the D.G.'s instructions, that we might have an additional commitment in Aden which would cost roughly £3,000. We had had a telegram from Sir John Shaw about this matter, but the D.G. wished to know the full reasons for this new commitment before making any application for a further grant.

20th December.

21st December.
of the J.I.C.

I attended another meeting to finalise the paper on the "State of our Intelligence and Methods to Improve it". There seemed to be a tendency to think that if the various measures recommended, to drop people by parachute or land them by rubber boat, etc., were adopted in a forward way, we should then be able to adequately inform the Chiefs of Staff about Soviet intentions and capabilities! I suggested some amendments in the wording here, because it seemed to me that a few scruffy individuals crashing into the fringes of Russia and out again were not really going to tell us very much about the Kremlin's intentions!

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I talked to Murrie on the telephone about the memorandum which is being put up to the Home Committee of Ministers on the abolition of control of traffic to and from Eire. It was stated at one point that if it were known that an individual, or individuals, had been allowed to enter Eire and might be coming on to the U.K., special arrangements could be made for a temporary supervision at ports. It was not at all clear how this was going to be done. Murrie told me that he himself had queried this matter; the idea apparently was that an Immigration Officer should be transferred from another port, but this seemed to be very far from being a practical arrangement. In any case it could only be carried out on the basis of a photograph, since passengers would not be carrying any documents of identity.

Murrie said he would look into this.

S.I.S. are counter-attacking on Milmo's findings in the case of PHILBY. We have carried them at every stage of this enquiry, supplying them with all the facts, and they agreed to the course of action which has now been put into effect. It was clear that at no stage did we contend that the case amounted to more than a chain of coincidences, the cumulative effect of which was very considerable. Milmo, after interrogation on all the points, comes down - in my opinion slightly too heavily - on a positive assertion of PHILBY's guilt. The S.I.S. reply is more or less a legalistic one, taking each item and trying to demolish it by Counsel for Defence. They lost sight of the cumulative effect of all these circumstances: it is true, however, that they have demolished one, namely, that affecting the tightening up of Russian signals security. They could, of course, have demolished this at the outset. Meanwhile, PHILBY has registered a complaint at the way he was handled, through He thinks he was tricked into the interrogation and treated too roughly. The answer to this is that if he was treated roughly, it was largely his own fault: he had made certain statements at his earlier friendly interviews which had subsequently been proved to be untrue.

S.I.S. are seeing Milmo and will be able to get direct answers to their queries. Meanwhile, it is proposed that Jim Skardon should have a talk with PHILBY.

22nd December.

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S.I.M.E. seem worried by a telegram from B.D.C.C. Middle East, implying that the Chairman of the J.I.C. M.E. will have executive authority. The matter was discussed by the J.I.C. here, and it was agreed that Reilly should send a suitable reply. The Chairman of the J.I.C. M.E. should have no more executive authority over S.I.M.E. than the Chairman of the J.I.C. London should have over the Security Service. The Chairman can, however, review the state of Intelligence and discuss suggestions for its improvement.

29th December.

I listened to a discussion in B.2 on Skardon's talk with PHILBY. He had gone to the interview with the impression that PHILBY had been deliberately evasive at his interview with Milmo, but was now inclined to

think that this was not so and that PHILBY's attitude was due more to forgetfulness and to a desire to be strictly accurate in such matters as the precise definition of a Communist. Skardon did not find him in any way difficult, and in the end PHILBY came to the conclusion that perhaps he had no real complaint against the way in which he was somewhat roughly handled by Milmo. He saw the force of the case against him and found it extremely difficult to prove his innocence. Skardon's mind remains open, but at the same time he is quite clearly shaken on the question of PHILBY's guilt.

I have read an account of Winston's discussion with Adenauer. Adenauer seemed to have some idea that we might do a deal with Russia behind his back, and was much relieved in getting the P.M.'s assurance that at no stage would we act without full discussion with Germany. The P.M. said that a situation might arise, as the West gets stronger, where Russia might be willing to recede and agree to a united Germany, but in that event it would be for the German Government and the German people, in the first instance, to express a view; and Great Britain would not move except in close consultation with the German Government. He went on to explain that he ardently desired to restore a tolerable relationship with Russia, but he often asked himself why the Russians had deliberately antagonised the West. They might have easily fooled the Western democracies with small concessions and valueless assurances. Why had they not done so? It was, he was convinced, because they feared our friendship more than they feared our enmity. Friendship would bring contacts between Russia and the West; and this, in turn, would lead to the disintegration of the wicked regime which now ruled in the Kremlin

31st December.

At the D.G.'s meeting to-day Hollis was not present so we did not discuss the proposal to post an officer to Aden. This is to come up next Monday.

Shaw gave a brief account of some of the problems of the Canal Zone and of the attitude of the G.O.C., MELF, who is thinking very much in terms of Germany.

Dick gave some account of his meeting with S.I.S. and Milmo on the PHILBY case, as a result of which we shall be sending an agreed viewpoint to the F.B.I. and C.I.A. Basically Milmo's views are unchanged, although he is prepared to make one or two slight modifications in his findings. Arthur Martin has made an extremely good analysis of the present position, which still leaves a heavy burden of guilt on PHILBY, although it is necessary to keep one's mind open. The idea is that Dick should take over the final memorandum on about the 14th of January and explain it in detail both to the F.B.I. and C.I.A.

Ian Carrell has joined B.I.E., having returned from Hong Kong and completed his leave. He seems keen and sensible. He seemed to think that Mackintosh was quite efficient as a policeman, although of course he was not an easy character. Carrell agreed with me that if the Colony was being attacked, not much reliance could be placed upon the Hong Kong Police, or indeed on any of the Chinese element in Hong Kong. Mackintosh, however, was prepared to believe that the Chinese in his force would be loyal to himself.

I cannot see why they should be and experience has shown that they are only too ready to fall in with the winning side, or what they believe to be the winning side.

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ON HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE

Copies of Minutes of D.G's (Tuesday) Meetings.

1951.

Diary

Minutes of the Director-General's Meeting
held on 2.1.51.

1. S.L.B. told the meeting of the result of the Police enquiry into the case of leakage of information from the R.A.E. Farnborough. He said that the papers had now gone to the Director of Public Prosecutions for prosecutions under the Official Secrets Act of WEBB, McDEMETRIA, and GARDINER. He went on to explain that WEBB, Public Relations Officer with the Society of British Aircraft Constructors, had written to McDEMETRIA, employed at the R.A.E. Farnborough, asking him to supply information regarding aircraft development, etc. McDEMETRIA had replied, but at the request of this office the Post Office had intercepted and held the letter. GARDINER had been responsible for inciting WEBB and McDEMETRIA to destroy the evidence.

S.L.B. said that the S.B.A.C. authorities were not in any way involved, and that they had dismissed WEBB at once.

Later in the meeting, B.4 referred to the holding by the Post Office of McDEMETRIA's reply to WEBB. He said that the D.D.G. had seen Sir Frank Newsam on this point, who had said that the ordinary warrant used for the interception of such mail as indecent literature, etc., would cover a case of this kind.

2. S.L.B. reported that there had been a satisfactory arms traffic prosecution just before Christmas against TOWLE, who was fined £2,000 and sentenced to six months imprisonment. He said he did not think TOWLE would appeal, since there was every likelihood that if he did so the sentence would be increased.

S.L.B. said it was interesting to note that Special Branch, armed with the same facts, had failed to bring about a prosecution in this case some months ago, but that the Customs had been successful in so doing. He said that the Customs were particularly good at this type of case.

2054

Minutes of the Director-General's Meeting
held on 9.1.51.

D.D.G. in the Chair.

1. S.L.B. reported that a film about sabotage, entitled "I Spy Strangers" was being made by a subsidiary company of the Rank Organisation. Although this film purported to deal with the work of M.I.5 and Special Branch, this office had not been consulted. The War Office were, however, backing it by lending troops and by financial assistance.

S.L.B. went on to say that the Home Office took a very poor view of this matter, since they felt that there would be questions in Parliament as to why the War Office was putting troops at the disposal of the Rank Organisation. As far as we were concerned, we could not have anything to do with the project, since, apart from any other considerations, it would be inconsistent with our policy towards the Press, namely, that our activities should not be publicised.

The script of the film, S.L.B. said, was at present being scrutinised by Mr. Fenton. It deals with sabotage to Battersea Power Station and apparently hits the nail far too well on the head.

C.2 said that he had been rung up by the Chief Publicity Executive of the Rank Organisation, who had asked whether M.I.5 had any objection to technicians being put into Battersea Power Station. He added that he had been told by the British Electricity Authority that M.I.5 should be consulted, which had apparently somewhat surprised him. C.2 had replied that M.I.5 could give no ruling in a matter of this kind, and that it was purely a decision for the B.E.A. to make for themselves.

C.2 said he had also been asked by the Ministry of Supply whether there would be any objection to a corridor in their building being photographed for the film. He had replied that he could see no objection to this.

The D.D.G. then asked S.L.B. what action was being taken in this matter. He said he thought the War Office should be told exactly what our views were on the subject. S.L.B. said that he fully intended to do this and also to say that, although we must refuse to give our approval in any shape or form and would prefer that the film should not be made at all, we must be allowed to delete certain passages of the script.

2. P.L.S. said that Mr. Richards, Chief of the Railway Police, was lunching with him. He wondered if any officers would like to see him.

3. O.S. spoke about the indoctrination of S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E. integrated units into S.I.S. symbols. He said he thought it was a great advance that 'C' had agreed to this. As this was really a Registry matter, he and R. were to discuss it with Broadway.

O.S. went on to say that S.I.S. had taken the line that reports from S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E. should not be collated on the spot and that they should be sent back to Broadway for this purpose, in triplicate. This, O.S. said, was unsatisfactory, since one of the main reasons for integration was that R.5 of S.I.S. could be decentralised. In S.I.M.E., however, it had been agreed that reports could be sent back as finished products.

It was agreed that Air Commodore Easton should be consulted in this matter.

/B.2.....

B.2 asked O.S. what advantage would be gained by being indoctrinated into S.I.S. symbols. O.S. explained that it would mean that in future we should see a number of papers which we had not been able to see in the past.

Diary

Minutes of the Director-General's Meeting
held on 15.1.51.

D.D.G. in the Chair.

1. The D.D.G. told the meeting that the Foreign Office were now pressing for the abolition of visas for the Argentine, Spain and Cuba. He said he had raised this matter at the J.I.C., when he had expressed the view that, although we could not make out a case for each individual country, we viewed with alarm the gradual break down of what was virtually a first line of defence in security. He said that D.C. was drafting a letter to Mr. Reilly on the subject.

D.C. said that the position had in fact developed a little. He had received from the Foreign Office the papers regarding the Argentine and Cuba. The Foreign Office have apparently rather grudgingly dropped the Argentine case on account of our security objections, namely, that if visas were abolished the Immigration Officer here would be unlikely to have information on which he could refuse an undesirable admission to this country, but if the visa machinery were working, the Passport Control Officer in the Argentine or Cuba would have some power of making local enquiries, etc., and undesirables could therefore be weeded out. As regards Cuba, however, D.C. said he would be drafting a reply to the Foreign Office. He said that 'C' was for some reason very much opposed to the abolition of the visa for Cuba, probably because a good deal of trouble had started in that quarter and it was also a jumping off ground for Communist propaganda. The question of the Spanish visa is still under consideration.

2. C.1 reported that the Ministry of Supply had been ordered to carry out their part of the defence programme. This would entail trebling their staff to about 300,000. A working party is, however, to be set up to discuss the vetting problem.

D.C. said he had spoken to Mr. Jagers on this subject, when he had asked the latter to let us know what the size of the problem was likely to be. We could not, therefore, do anything until the working party had concluded its deliberations. Two points they would have to consider would be: a) the security of production figures, and b) whether low grade vetting could be off-loaded on to local police forces. He said that the Home Office at present discouraged departmental references to the police, but he thought we should have to get the principle recognised, since it would relieve the burden on this office considerably.

C.1 went on to say that at a meeting at the Home Office recently it had been announced that naturalisation figures were going up in respect of Poles, ex German Ps. of W., etc. D.D.G. said he thought Operation Post Report might be helpful in these cases. He said that the Home Office were, however, being more stringent regarding the naturalisation of Germans, and mentioned the case of one WALLRAFF which had been referred to him by the Home Office recently.

3. P.L.S. asked if the usual cocktail party was to be given for the Special Branch course which was going on at present. It was agreed that this should be done.

In this connection, D.O.S. said he felt that if parties of this kind were to be given he thought Colonial police officers should receive the same hospitality. D.D.G. said the matter should be considered.

4. B.1 said that two Dutch officers (Colonel Einthoven's men) had just paid a two day visit to this office, when they
/had been given.....

a fairly extensive tour of the office.

5. D.D.G. said that the J.I.C. had expressed the view recently that the Russian "Peace" Committee was at the moment a failure. He asked B.I. if he agreed with this view. B.I. said that it had certainly not come up to Cominform expectations and that it had, on the whole, been a failure in the West.

In this connection, D.B. said that M. Berthaux had mentioned at the recent S.I.C. meeting that the French Communist Party was now following the line of peace, neutrality, etc.

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Minutes of the Director-General's Meeting
held on 23.1.51.

1. B.1 told the meeting of an interview which the D.G. and Sir Edward Bridges had with the Prime Minister last week.

The Prime Minister was told about the provisional conclusion which had been reached by Sir Edward Bridges and the P.U.Ss in the Service and other Departments, regarding difficulties over the purge procedure arising from the danger to our sources, particularly in London. It had been decided to go slow on purging London Civil Servants, and to do so only when it was not possible to remove them by any other means - i.e. transfer to non-secret posts - and only to take a risk of overt action when security demanded it. The Prime Minister agreed to this.

The second point put to the Prime Minister was that there were cases of Civil Servants, about whom there were doubts but who did not come strictly into the purge category, having access to matters of a highly secret nature. The Prime Minister was asked if he would encourage Ministers to uphold prima facie cases of this kind, in spite of any ruling to the contrary by the purge tribunal. The Prime Minister agreed to this also.

The D.G. asked B.1 to get into touch with Mr. Winnifrith and ask him to send over an account of this interview.

2. B.1 said that the case of one [redacted], a young statistician in the Cabinet Office, had been submitted to the Prime Minister, who had found a prima facie case against him.

3. D.C. said that the Services were thinking of having short training films for use in their units. We had been asked for suggestions as to titles, themes, etc., and D.C. said he would like sections to let him have their views on this matter.

In this connection, the D.G. asked what had transpired regarding the film to be made by the Rank Organisation, "I Spy Strangers". S.L.B. said we had made it quite clear that we disapproved strongly of the whole project and that we would have nothing to do with it. This view was also held by the Home Office. He went on to say that the B.E.A. had apparently given their approval for the use of Battersea Power Station, but had then withdrawn it. The Rank Organisation had then rung up this office, when they had been told that the B.E.A. were the only body who could sanction the project, but that if Rank's were not satisfied with this they should get into touch with Sir Walter Citrine. It is not known, therefore, S.L.B. said, whether the film is to go on or not.

4. The D.G. asked for information in connection with Communists in Key Flats, which had been reported to him by the Manager of the flats.

B.1 said that a successful and interesting operation had been carried out the night before, but he would let the D.G. have a full report as soon as possible.

5. D.O.S. reported that through TABLE sources it had been discovered that the Bandmaster of the P. & O. liner "Corfu" was acting as a courier for the Communists between this country and the Far East. He was not, however, carrying documents.

D.O.S. went on to say that it had been arranged that this man should be kept under strict surveillance at such ports as

/Colombo....

Singapore, etc., but that Bombay had not been on the list. We had, however, informed S.L.O. New Delhi, who had in turn passed the information on to D.I.B. The man's cabin had been searched by the Customs at Bombay, under cover of the routine search for drugs, when his C.P.G.B. membership card had been found and impounded and also some other papers. A full report is therefore awaited from S.L.O. New Delhi. As regards the other ports, it had been decided that no action should be taken, since the man might now be aware that he was the subject of observation.

6. D.O.S. said that a signal had been received from S.L.O. Rangoon, to the effect that the Burma Police saw prospects of establishing S.F. in the Russian Legation there - which was apparently moving to new premises shortly - and desired our assistance in initiating the operation.

As this appeared to be a somewhat hazardous project, and it was doubted whether the Burma Police would be competent to carry out such an operation without jeopardising our technical secrets, D.O.S. had cabled to S.L.O. Rangoon asking for further particulars and telling him to do nothing in the meantime.

It was agreed by the meeting that this operation would be an extremely dangerous one and that the Burma Police were not competent to carry it out. D.O.S. agreed with this view, but said he felt that if it could be achieved without danger of blowing our technical secrets, it would be of immense value.

Minutes of the Director General's Meeting
held on 6.2.51.

D.D.G. in the Chair.

1. D.B. gave the meeting a resume of our criticisms of Douglas Hyde's book 'I believed'. This critique is being prepared for the use of those officers who may have enquiries on the subject from their outside contacts, and we had also been asked by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary to comment on the book. The critique will be in four parts:

- i) The open side of Party activity.
- ii) The underground side of Party activity.
- iii) Espionage.
- iv) General conclusions.

D.B. said that the book is a useful document; where the details come from HYDE's own knowledge they are correct as far as we can check from our own sources, but he is rather apt to take a few facts and enlarge on them to the detriment of accuracy.

B.2. asked if HYDE had given any pointers to other possible renegades from the Party. D.B. said he had not. From other sources, however, B.I. were interested in two possible defectors from the Party, Denis GOODWIN and Claude COCKBURN.

D.C. told the meeting that at the J.I.C. last week, it was asked whether the book could usefully be circulated through the Forces as anti-Communist propaganda. It was generally agreed that it would be very good propaganda.

D.D.G. said that a copy of the book and the critique should go to S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E.

D.B. said that a much more detailed appreciation was being prepared, but this would take some time as HYDE was still being interrogated. However, the short critique should be ready to-day.

2. B.2. had nothing to report.

3. D.D.G. said that he had just seen de Bardeleben who had mentioned an appreciation which B.I. had done for him some months ago on the extent to which the Party were putting a spoke in the wheel of the re-armament drive. De Bardeleben would be grateful if B.I. would check this appreciation and see if there were any points which should be brought up to date.

4. Referring to Mr. Deakin's recent speech, D.D.G. asked if it was possible to represent how damaging were the irresponsible statements about Communist interference in industry etc. which appeared in the Press. The general comment was that most of the people who made such statements were ready to take any political advantage which presented itself.

5. D.C. said that the Americans were turning more and more to us for contacts of a non-security nature which ought to go through the Foreign Office. He had one such case at the moment of an American business-man sponsored by the State Department and U.S. Embassy in London, whose name was BALLENGER.

6. B.4. had nothing to report.

7. S.L.B. said that he had learnt of another development in the progress of the Rank film on sabotage. The War Office had agreed to put up some money for the film/to allow /and troops to be used. S.L.B. had suggested to the D.M.I. that a higher authority should be consulted before anything further happened. The Permanent Secretary, War Office, has now given a ruling that the troops are not to participate and no money is to be put up.

8. P.L.S., C.L., R. and O.S. had nothing to report.


9. D.C. reported on two meetings he had recently attended at the Home Office.

(a) Italian Miners. A scheme has been arranged whereby Italians are being recruited to work in English coal-mines for a period of up to two years. Previous experience of coal-mining does not appear to be necessary. It was originally thought by the Ministry of Labour that 10,000 would come over but it now looks as though the number will be nearer 3,000. There is no possibility of a clause in the agreement excluding communists, but the Italian Government would have no objection to our vetting the miners chosen and excluding any we did not want. [redacted] of P.C.D. stated that they would be able to eliminate all the Communist Party members. He claimed that his own P.C.D. records would serve to eliminate a good many of the members and for the rest, they were on very good terms with Italian security.

D.B. and D.C. agreed that this statement was irresponsible and that the last claim in particular was contrary to all we knew of M.I.6 relations with Italian security.

The Ministry of Labour will send out a team of selectors to pick the miners. This team will work with Passport Control. The miners will come over in parties of about 30 and will either be interviewed by immigration on arrival at the port, or on a "Post Report" basis at their hostels.

(b) Collective Passports. Parties of people coming here from all over Europe for the Festival of Britain are likely to be granted collective passports. The passport contains a nominal roll of from 5 to 50 people, the advantage being that individuals do not have to pay for the price of a passport. The party must arrive here and depart together. Their maximum time over here, without registration with the police, is as usual two months. By agreement, the collective passports have to be approved by the P.C.O. There is therefore a slight advantage from our point of view, as many of the countries from which these people will come are those with which we have a non-visa agreement and the P.C.O. would not normally see the passports.



/10.

10. D.C. said that the Ministry of Supply have raised again the question of vetting of employees in view of the tremendous new intake which will result from the production drive. They have no figures yet but the number is thought to be considerable and they want to know how we are going to tackle the problem. They cannot afford to wait the usual few days or few weeks to clear a man after his initial interview, as candidates will not wait but go after alternative employment. The Ministry of Supply had suggested that they should take on people in advance of their being vetted. It was thought they would be able to fire employees, should the vet prove unsatisfactory, without any trouble, provided that a fortnight's notice was given and that Ministers agreed to uphold decisions taken. The Purge question was raised as this might result in the machinery becoming very overloaded. Mr. Jagers proposed that new employees might be taken on a six months probationary period, so that a man could be fired without the purge being invoked. In discussion this probationary period was said to be too long and one month was suggested instead.

D.B. asked if, with increased staff, we could take on the normal vetting before employment. D.C. said that we would know more when we saw the figures.

D.C. said that the whole problem of vetting Government employees must be faced. We could not say that we would only vet certain secret establishments, as the only result would be that more and more establishments would be declared secret.

D.C. said that it might be possible to offload some of the more immediate new vetting on to the Police. He had therefore asked for geographical areas as well as numbers.

11. D.E/A. and D.O.S. had nothing to report.

Diary

Minutes of the Director-General's Meeting
held on 13.2.51.

1. D.B. spoke about the dock strikes on Merseyside and in London which had occurred since the arrest of the seven dockers' leaders. He said that two of the seven men, DICKENS and COWLEY, were Communists, and that the other five were regarded by the first two as Trotskyists and therefore a dangerous element. DICKENS was in fact a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party.

Although we had not yet seen the charges, D.B. said, we did know that all seven men were moving about between London and Liverpool. It was therefore possible that a charge of conspiracy might be brought against them. We still held the view, however, which we had expressed before the arrests, that in this instance the Communists did not seek to instigate the strike since they *had* felt that the time was inopportune.

D.B. went on to say that the Communists considered that the arrests had made a valuable contribution to their cause, and they were anxious to bring about a further strike on the day of the trial as a protest against what they called "the infamous Act" under which such charges had been made. Apparently eight new "volunteers", all Stalinists or fellow travellers, had been appointed to the strike committees, which, D.B. said, would mean that the Communist influence would be stronger than it was before.

D.D.G. asked if we would have given our recommendations had we been asked to do so. D.B. replied that we could not have done this, since the matter was a purely political one and involved the control of unofficial strikes. S.L.B. agreed, and added that he thought the court would be well advised to give the maximum sentences, *in view of the "blackmail" character of the denunciation which had been planned for the day of the trial.*

2. D.B. told the meeting that Arthur Deakin had called together some sixty pressmen and handed them the terms of a document headed "Agent Provocateur", which he alleged had been brought out by the Communist Party for distribution in merchant ships.

D.B. said that after consultation with the various departments concerned it had been agreed that the document was almost certainly a fake, since the Communist Party would be unlikely to distribute anything of its kind. *out the W.F.T.U.*

P.L.S. said he had had an enquiry from the Cardiff Police about this document, when they had asked for our views. D.B. said he thought the Police should be *circled* on the subject.

3. P.L.S. reported that a further course for senior Police Officers was to be held next week. He wondered whether the usual cocktail party was to be given for them. The D.G. agreed that the party should be given. P.L.S. suggested that it should be held on Tuesday evening. This was also agreed.

4. C.4 reported on progress made with regard to the Port and Travel Control Group. He said he had reported at an earlier meeting that the War Office Establishments branch had approved a higher establishment for the group. On this basis the Territorial Army establishment had been remodelled to facilitate mobilisation, which had resulted in getting a greater number of Territorial officers.

C.4 said he had also obtained 10,000 square feet in London which could be used immediately on mobilisation as a Headquarters for what is now C.4.

The D.G. said these arrangements were very satisfactory.

5. D.C. reported that he had been asked by Mr. de Bardeleben to have a talk with Mr. Ballenger, a representative of American "big business", who had been sent over here with the backing of the American Government to look into the methods used by British firms during the war for dealing with hold-ups caused by bomb damage, etc. He had been touring round interviewing various members of Federated British Industries and had now acquired a good general picture from the industrial side. Mr. de Bardeleben thought that D.C. could give him a brief picture of the official side.

D.C. said he had accordingly seen Mr. Ballenger, when he had told him something of subversive activities and strike action by Communists, and the steps that we should take in that regard and also with regard to counter-sabotage planning.

Mr. Ballenger, who was going on to the Continent to continue his researches, promised to let D.C. have copies of any reports he sent in to his own Government. He in turn had asked D.C. to let him have a number of notes on our legislation with regard to the control of subversive activities, etc. S.L.B. was preparing these notes.

6. The D.G. asked D.C. about the increase of vetting for the Ministry of Supply. D.C. replied that he would be in a better position to speak on this subject at the next meeting.

In this connection, D.B. said that Mr. Philip Jordan, Press Relations Officer at Downing Street, had written to Sir Edward Bridges suggesting that M.I.5 should do more towards vetting members of the Press. Mr. Winnifrith had accordingly sent the papers over to this office for comments, with a covering letter to the effect that, although it might seem to be a strange statement for the Treasury to make, M.I.5 could not object to taking on this commitment on the grounds that they had not the staff to deal with it, since this difficulty could easily be overcome by taking on more staff!

D.B. explained that the question of vetting members of the Press arose out of the case of [redacted], a Communist employed by Reuters and sent to Korea. He felt, however, that some distinction should be made between the vetting of members of the National Press and Reuters, although he was convinced that wholesale vetting of this kind would be neither safe nor desirable.

The D.G. asked D.B. if Mr. Winnifrith was aware that he, the D.G., had already seen the Prime Minister on the subject of positive vetting. D.B. said that Mr. Winnifrith did not know, but that a note was being prepared for him on the subject.

S.L.B. mentioned that he had attended a meeting at the Foreign Office recently, when the question of De COURCY going to Korea was discussed. It was decided that if possible he should be stopped from going, but that great care should be taken as to what information was given to the Americans regarding him, (the Americans being responsible for granting permits for journalists to visit Korea) since it would almost certainly get back to De COURCY himself.

7. The D.D.G. said that Mr. Howe had spoken to him on the telephone recently about an article in one of De COURCY's Digests, which stated that the "Chief of Staff" held the view that there would be war in 1951. Mr. Howe could not believe that such a statement had ever been made by any Chief of Staff and wondered whether anything could be done about it.

S.L.B. said that the last issue of the Digest gave what was purported to be a verbatim account of conversations between

/Mr. Truman.....

Mr. Truman and the Prime Minister, when they appeared to disagree on every point. It had also been announced that the full story of the PONTECORVO case was shortly to be published.

It was agreed that nothing would be gained by pulling De COURCY up again, since this seemed to please him and to boost the sales of his Digest.

8. The D.G. asked S.L.B. about AMOS and his publications. S.L.B. replied that he did not in fact deal with the case, but to the best of his belief it was still going on.

Minutes of the Director-General's Meeting
held on 20.2.51.

D.D.G. in the Chair.

1. D.B. spoke about the alien problem. He said there were about a quarter of a million E.V.Ws and D.Ps in this country who were at present being interrogated by Immigration Officers. All the reports came to this office, where they were being sorted by B.2.c., who had been made largely responsible for this problem pending the setting up of a wartime section on the lines of the old E. Division. All the reports were being kept, and the Immigration Service had been asked to help us in the sorting by stamping them in some recognisable manner.

D.B. went on to say that we were now trying to prepare some overall policy for the treatment of these aliens. When this had been discussed and agreed here, the draft would then be sent over to the Home Office for their agreement and subsequent issue to Chief Constables. We would try to lay down the general principles upon which to decide whether an alien should be put on the internment list or whether he should be made subject to restrictions, i.e. movement, employment, etc. It would then be left to the discretion of the Home Office to decide into which category an individual might fall. Thereafter, D.B. said, the Home Office would certainly expect us to consolidate the list of aliens for internment in the event of war. This we could not escape and it would have to be done from our own records and from reports received from the Police. As regards the restriction list, D.B. said that if the Home Office insisted on our consolidating this also it would throw a heavy burden on this office. It would be preferable if the Police could deal with the Home Office direct, if this could be arranged. D.B. asked D.D.G. if in fact a Chief Constable could make the Orders for internment, or whether they would first have to be issued by the Home Office. D.D.G. replied that under the Prerogative internment could be authorised by a Chief Constable, who should then immediately inform the Home Office. As regards British subjects, however, no internment (under 18B) could be carried out without reference to the Home Secretary.

D.B. said that the Russians were continuing to send good propaganda material to E.V.W. camps, extolling the joys of living in the Soviet Union. It was hoped, however, that when it was found that an E.V.W. was disseminating this literature it might be possible to apply for deportation of the individual concerned.

P.L.S. remarked that questions on this alien problem were continually being asked by members of Police Forces attending the courses here. He said that Mr. Thistlethwaite was to address the course going on at present on the subject.

In this connection, D.D.G. said he had often noticed at Police courses that these questions were asked and that the lecturer had "passed the buck" by saying they would be answered by the appropriate officer. The answer, he thought, had not always been given and he wondered if perhaps some record should be kept so that the appropriate officer could be briefed before his lecture. This, P.L.S. said, was in fact now being done.

2. D.B. told the meeting that New Zealand had recently come to life in a security sense. A telegram from the U.K. Service Liaison Staff in New Zealand to the J.I.C. (London) had been received regarding the case of LISSIENKO, a Soviet citizen

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living in New Zealand who was alleged to have spoken of his recall to the U.S.S.R. for mobilisation, and of his espionage activities in New Zealand.

We had answered, through the J.I.C., that we should like to correspond directly with the New Zealand Police about this case, and asked for the authority of the New Zealand J.I.C. to do so. The New Zealand J.I.C., whose relations with the Police on security matters were believed to be bad, had given us the clearance we wanted and we were writing forthwith to the New Zealand Police Commissioner.

D.B. said this whole matter would, he hoped, enable us to re-enter the New Zealand field, although suspicion apparently lingered there still on account of the activities of one MAWHOOD, who during the war had been wrongly represented as a member of M.I.5.

D.D.G. suggested that perhaps S.L.O. Australia should go to New Zealand to look into this case. D.B. said he felt that it should first be seen what was to be discussed before making this move.

P.A./D.G. mentioned that some time ago J.I.C. New Zealand had complained of the lack of security in New Zealand, and it had been suggested that the British Security Service should be asked to advise them on this subject. Nothing more had been heard of the project however.

3. C.2 mentioned recent reports in the Daily Telegraph and The Times regarding sabotage to a magazine in South Wales, which had been blown up. He said there was no evidence to show that this was in fact sabotage, although the Police held the view that it was not an accident.

4. P.L.S. said he had received a telephone call from Brigadier Lewis, Secretary to the Governor of Jersey, who said he had been approached by the Attorney General, who in turn had been approached by the Postmaster General, regarding a flood of Russian propaganda literature into Jersey. This had arrived in parcels with a Moscow postmark and was addressed to respectable citizens of Jersey. At present there seemed to be no authority to intercept and open these parcels.

D.D.G. said he thought the Governor of Jersey would have powers to deal with a situation of this kind.

P.L.S. went on to say that he had spoken to B.I.B. about this and had suggested that they should get into touch with Brigadier Lewis. Their view was that the literature might have been some form of propaganda against German rearmament.

P.L.S. wondered what route was taken for mail from Russia to the Channel Islands. D.D.G. said this could easily be ascertained through the G.P.O.

5. C.4 said he had had applications from six Immigration Officers from Jersey and Guernsey to join his Port and Travel Control Group.

Minutes of the Director-General's Meeting
held on 27.2.51.

1. The D.G. asked D.B. for information regarding restrictions placed on the movements of Hungarian diplomats, since, he said, the J.I.C. were very anxious to know whether these restrictions had produced any dividends.

D.B. replied that although this matter had been under consideration by the Home Office and the Foreign Office for some time, we had not yet been informed of any decision. He said he would make enquiries and let the D.G. know what the position was.

2. The D.G. asked whether there was any evidence of Communist interference in the railway strike.

Later in the meeting, B.1 replied that there was no evidence to show that the Communist Party took any particular part in the strike.

The D.G. asked B.1 to let him have a note on this subject for the Prime Minister.

3. D.B. spoke about defectors from the Communist Party. He said the case of [redacted] was being studied again, since it was felt that his allegiance to the Party was extremely shaky. It was possible, however, that he may have been brought to order in view of the fact that he was approached by the now notorious "Mr. Richardson".

The woman who was approached by "Mr. Richardson", D.B. said, had not been heard of again and was apparently not disposed to co-operate, possibly because of her husband.

D.B. then mentioned the case of Claude COCKBURN, who was at present in Ireland and therefore temporarily out of our reach. It was thought possible that he was drifting away from the Party and that he might have become a Roman Catholic.

4. D.B. said he was putting up a note, by agreement with the C.R.O., for a statement by the D.G. to J.I.C. Directors on the defection of the Czech Ambassador in India, formerly Czech Ambassador in London. It had been agreed by the Home Office that this man should be given asylum in this country and he was due to arrive shortly. It was believed that he knew a great deal, particularly about contacts between the Czech Titoists and the Yugo-Slavs.

5. D.B. reported that Boris DAVIDSON had been seen by Mr. Skardon, when a certain amount of new information had come to light, which, if it had been available earlier, would have helped considerably in assessing the case. DAVIDSON told Mr. Skardon that before he left Leningrad University in 1937 he had been approached by the N.K.V.D. and had been asked to work for them. He had apparently refused to do this and had used his British nationality to protect himself. Since he left Russia he had had no contact of any kind with them.

D.B. went on to say that he thought DAVIDSON's story was true, but the case was difficult to assess in view of the latter's somewhat silent and inscrutable mien.

The D.G. said he thought the Prime Minister would like to know of this case. D.B. said he would put up a note for the D.G.

6. P.L.S. spoke about the recent meeting of Scottish Police, which had been attended by D.B. and himself. He said that one or two points of interest had arisen.

1) They were interested to hear about liaison among Special Branches in England and Wales, since this did not exist in Scotland at the moment.

This matter was being taken up by the Chief Constable of Glasgow, who considered that the matter should be discussed at Scottish Chief Constables' meetings. He said that in fact Detective Officers in Scotland, particularly those who dealt with our work, only met at the annual meeting in Glasgow.

11) The Chief Constable of Edinburgh had expressed a desire to send his Detective Superintendent here to attend a course, and we had agreed.

7. P.L.S. said there were indications that we should be asked to address Police Officers to a greater degree than we had in the past. The Chief Constable of Hampshire had decided to appoint nine officers in his district to deal with security work, and had suggested that they should all come here for talks.

P.L.S. said he had put this up to the D.D.G., with the suggestion that the problem should be met.

8.

B.4 explained that C.P.R. used this positive vetting angle, even though they would not expect an adverse trace in a case of this kind.

9. D.C. spoke about the possible increase of vetting for the Ministry of Supply. He said there had been discussions in this office on the advantages or otherwise of decentralising local vetting to the Police, when it had been decided that this would not be practicable in view of the fact that too many people would be outside the purely local districts, and that we should not get adequate coverage unless we did a great deal of cross-referring from one police district to another. He said he proposed to inform the Ministry of Supply of this decision, ask them to let us have their lists as soon as they could, and also to try and circumscribe the lists as much as possible.

D.C. said there was a possibility that the Ministry of Supply would take people on before they were vetted, in which case, he said, they could only be got rid of through an adverse vetting trace or by putting them through the purge procedure. He said it was hoped that a probationary period could be arranged, which would, if an individual proved to be unsatisfactory, obviate the necessity of putting him through the purge procedure.

10. In connection with the purge, the D.G. asked what the outcome had been regarding an objection raised by Sir Frederick Leggett, one of the three advisers, that we had been going behind their backs to the Prime Minister.

D.B. said that the D.G.'s reply, that he could give his personal assurance that there was no intention of going behind their backs and that any intervention by the Prime Minister would be post hoc and not ante hoc, must have been accepted since nothing more had been heard of the matter.

11. D.O.S. said that arrangements were going ahead for the Commonwealth Security Conference, which was scheduled to take place in the middle of May and would last for about ten days. He said that the Prime Minister had written to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, including those of the new Dominions, asking them to send Security Officers to take part in the Conference. E.O.S. said that officers from here would also be asked to attend.

D.O.S. went on to say that the agendas were in course of preparation and that the C.R.O. were in charge of all the administrative arrangements. He thought, however, that a party should be given during the Conference. This was agreed.

Minutes of the Director General's Meeting
held on 6.3.51.

Handwritten: D. D. G.

D.D.G. in the Chair.

1. D.B. spoke about the problem of aliens in time of war. There were some 429,000 in this country; 300,000 of whom were "enemy aliens". He said there were a large number of interested departments and it was therefore essential to get aliens' names and particulars sorted out into some form of comprehensive record which would be available to the departments concerned, and which could rapidly produce the information required for the changes of policy which were bound to take place in time of war. He said that in B. Division they had come to the conclusion that the best way of meeting this problem would be to try and persuade the Aliens Department of the Home Office to keep these records on the Hollerith system. This, D.B. said, would constitute a rapid and easy way of breaking down any particular category which at any given moment appeared to be vital, and would also relieve this office of the task of putting into our own records any more than the names of those individuals who presented a security risk. The interested departments would have to be consulted collectively to discover what they might require of a Hollerith index of this kind and to design a suitable card.

After a great deal of discussion on the subject, it was agreed that this proposal was a sound one. D.E./A. then suggested that as the Hollerith system would certainly be used in the forthcoming census, the Registrar General's department might be approached and asked to punch two cards for each alien. The duplicate card could be sent to the Aliens Department, giving them a good start in their task since they would then be provided with cards for all aliens in the country.

D.B. said that Mr. Howard of the Aliens Department was to visit this office shortly, when he would talk to him unofficially about the proposals.

D.D.G. agreed but thought that more consideration should be given to the technical aspects of the project.

2. P.L.S. told the meeting that Air Vice Marshal Graham, head of the Scottish Police College, had visited this office recently when he had seen both the D.G. and the D.D.G. He had expressed a wish for a member of this office to lecture to the refresher courses which he runs at the College for ex-students. These courses would consist on an average of about thirty people. This request was to be made in writing in due course.

D.D.G. said the matter would have to be considered when Air Vice Marshal Graham sent in his formal request.

3. D.E./A. warned the meeting that the Office of Works were putting fire resisting tubes over the emergency lighting apparatus and that this would probably be a somewhat noisy job. He said that anyone who found the noise unbearable should get into touch with A.1.

Minutes of the Director-General's Meeting held
on 10.4.51.

1. The D.G. opened the meeting by asking Mr. Mitchell, C.3., to give an account of his recent tour in South Africa.

2. B.1 reported that the Communist Party had for some considerable time been tightening up their security precautions, as a result of which the products of our regular letter and telephone checks were diminishing rapidly. In answer to the D.G., B.1 agreed that the Party was making much use of couriers.

Although this state of affairs had greatly eased the pressure of work on B.1.A., B.1 said, the position was likely to get worse and it would therefore be necessary to get the information we needed by other means.

D.C. asked B.1 how this would affect current membership records. B.1 said these were coming in at the moment, but that this would not last long and that it would be necessary to improve our agent facilities. In this connection, the D.G. asked what the position was with regard to agents. B.1 replied that the agents were operating effectively, but there were not in fact enough of them.

D.C. said he thought the effect of losing these sources of information would be to render our vetting less watertight than it has been hitherto, while we had claimed that we were very well informed about the membership of the Party and had used this as a basis for our argument in justifying vetting on our records. He said that if in future there were serious shortcomings in the records of Party membership, the whole matter would have to be reviewed.

P.L.S. then asked if better results were being obtained from the provincial Police Forces in this respect. B.1 replied that the results were certainly better and he hoped that the Police would be able to fill the gap in the provinces, and that they would be encouraged to use agents as much as possible.

The whole problem was, B.1 said, being given careful study.

3. B.1 referred to the trial at present taking place of the seven dockers. He said that on the first day of the trial about one-third of the dockers had come out in sympathy with their colleagues, and that they threatened to come out again for one month if the men were convicted and received that length of sentence. They also hoped, apparently, to bring out workers on one of the Festival sites at the same time.

In answer to a query by the D.G., S.L.B. said that the Attorney General had been informed.

4. A.1 said that the Treasury had sent out a fairly stringent note on the question of economy in the use of stationery. He asked that officers should keep this well in mind.

5. A.1 asked that officers who wanted their cars overhauled by the garage should put in their requisitions through him.

6.

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7. C.I. reported that there had been a large increase in vetting as a result of the rearmament programme. He said, in answer to a query by the D.G., that this had not yet become too heavy a burden for his section to carry.

In this connection, D.C. said that a letter had been received from the Ministry of Supply. They were trying to induce us to take up with the Home Office the question of local vetting by the Police of any new intake into Ordnance Factories, etc. They wanted the Police to have first clearance of people who were locally engaged and locally resident. If there was no adverse trace the Police should so inform the factory concerned, but if there was an adverse trace the matter should be referred to this office.

D.C. went on to say that this was not as simple as it sounded, since the Ministry of Supply had made it clear that they did not really propose to limit their vetting to people engaged on secret work, but wanted it to carry

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7. C.1 reported that there had been a large increase in vetting as a result of the rearmament programme. He said, in answer to a query by the D.G., that this had not yet become too heavy a burden for his section to carry.

In this connection, D.C. said that a letter had been received from the Ministry of Supply. They were trying to induce us to take up with the Home Office the question of local vetting by the Police of any new intake into Ordnance Factories, etc. They wanted the Police to have first clearance of people who were locally engaged and locally resident. If there was no adverse trace the Police should so inform the factory concerned, but if there was an adverse trace the matter should be referred to this office.

D.C. went on to say that this was not as simple as it sounded, since the Ministry of Supply had made it clear that they did not really propose to limit their vetting to people engaged on secret work but wanted to carry it further. This was, D.C. thought, probably to guard against industrial unrest. We would, however, challenge them on a number of points, and the Home Office and Police were strongly against the proposal themselves. A Home Office circular had in fact been drafted some months ago on the subject, which had not yet been finalised but which practically forbade any departmental vetting being carried out by Police Forces.

The whole matter was, D.C. said, still under consideration.

8. C.4 told the meeting that two courses had been held for Territorial Officers at the Intelligence Corps Depot, Maresfield, recently. They had been a great success. A further course was to be held in Norfolk in June.

9. P.L.S. said that the last Police course for the winter season was to begin on Monday next. He said that in the last few months the most important Forces had been covered.

During the summer, P.L.S. officers are to speak at various Police conferences in the Police districts.

P.L.S. said that the usual party for Police courses was to be held on Wednesday next. The D.G. agreed to this and said he felt it would be more convenient from every point of view if these parties could be held in the canteen. He asked P.L.S. to arrange this.

10. C.3 gave an interesting account of his recent tour in South Africa, where he had received a most cordial reception. He said that South African security leaves much to be desired, but that he had given a series of lectures and had had innumerable conversations with various people concerned on the subject. He said he was writing a full report and that he would pass it to the D.G. as soon as it was finished.

11. D.O.S. reported that the Commonwealth Security Conference was due to start on May 15th and would probably last for about ten days to a fortnight. He said he hoped to circulate the agenda shortly.

12. D.O.S. said that the C.R.O. had been informed by the U.K. High Commissioner in Karachi that the Prime Minister of Pakistan had now agreed to Security Service representation in Pakistan.

It was hoped, however, that details might be worked out with D.I.B. Pakistan when the latter came over for the Commonwealth Security Conference.

/D.O.S.....

The D.D.G. asked whether there was any question now of a Pakistani representative coming here. D.O.S. replied that this had originally been one of the conditions prescribed by the Pakistanis, but in fact D.I.B. Pakistan had not at the moment anyone he could send. It was agreed that this was just as well, since it might lead to other countries asking for similar facilities and this we did not want.

13. D.O.S. reported the arrival of Mr. Simkins from Central Africa on transfer and ultimate posting to London. Colonel Stephens had also arrived from West Africa on transfer to H/S.I.M.E. vice Mr. Magan, who was being posted to London on health grounds. The latter had informed D.O.S. that he could not get a passage to the U.K. before 9th May.

14. S.L.B. spoke about the leakage in the Daily Telegraph regarding the Egyptian situation. He said this story was thought to be a combined effort of one Ashley and Gordon-Lennox, formerly diplomatic correspondent of the Telegraph who still works for the paper but has no official position, and who in the past had been responsible for leakages of Service information. He is a member of Brook's Club and probably gleans items of information from Service members.

S.L.B. said this was not a Cabinet leakage, but was one of those cases where documents were given a wide circulation and pieces of information were picked up here and there. He said that nothing further had been heard from the Foreign Office in this connection.

15. S.L.B. said he had attended a meeting of the Subcommittee of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers regarding the application of our security law to contracts placed by foreign Governments with British firms. He said this was a difficult situation, since the Foreign Office was inclined to seek a revision of the Official Secrets Acts to include this Atlantic information as secret information covered by our Acts. S.L.B. said that both the Director of Public Prosecutions and himself were loth to see any amendment to the Official Secrets Acts, since their interpretation was wide already. S.L.B. said he hoped we should get through this difficulty without any amendment to the Acts.

16. S.L.B. referred to the case of leakage from R.A.E. Farnborough. He said the three men concerned, WEBB, McDEMETRIA and GARDINER, had all been convicted. One of them had appealed against conviction and the other two had appealed against sentence, but both had been upheld. An appeal had now been lodged against the fines, but the result of this was not yet known.

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17. D.C. reported that Sir Philip Vickery and Major Stone had departed for Washington on the first stage of the security inspection by the Tripartite Working Party of N.A.T.O. Their terms of reference were to inspect the security arrangements of the countries concerned, particularly France, and to draw up proposals for any improvements thereof. They will be carrying out a security inspection in London at the beginning of next month, after which they will be going to Paris.

D.C. said that Sir Philip Vickery would be making a report on American and French security for our own information.

18. D.C. said that the new section, G.3, was now launched under Mr. Mitchell. He said it would be possible to give more details of the work the section would have to carry out when Mr. Mitchell has had time to study some of the problems. It would, however, take over departmental security work on the international side, formerly carried out by G.I.C., and would also cover COSMIC and METRIC security.

Minutes of the Director-General's Meeting
held on 24.4.51.

D.D.G. in the Chair.

Diary

1. D.C. reported that the Tripartite Security Working Group, on which Sir Philip Vickery and Major Stone were representing the U.K., was still in Washington but was due to return at the end of the month in order to start investigations in this country on about the 3rd May. The American delegation would consist of nine people, but the size of the French delegation was not yet known. They would be visiting the Ministry of Defence, J.I.B., the Air Ministry, the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Supply and this office.

As far as this office was concerned, D.C. said, S.L.B. would play the principal part. There would also be a tour of the Registry, but they would not be allowed to see our P.Fs. They would, however, be able to see the security vetting reports of the Departments concerned.

As regards the investigation in Washington, D.C. said that he had been informed by Sir Philip Vickery that everything was being carried out on a somewhat grandiose scale, with security films, etc. D.C. said he did not think we could aspire to this standard here.

2. D.O.S. said that as the agenda for the Commonwealth Security Conference had now, he thought, been seen by those concerned in this office he hoped that they were making the necessary arrangements to carry out their commitments.

3. C.2 spoke about a project of some importance, namely, the storing of crude oil in brine pits. He said that pipe lines were now being laid in Cheshire, where it was hoped to store some 1,000,000 gallons of crude oil. He said that we had been approached by the Ministry of Fuel and Power as regards security measures for this project, and that we were now going into the matter with I.C.I., who own the brine pits, and with Shell, who own the oil.

D.D.G. asked whether this was in fact to be the only storage place. C.2 replied that there might be other places but that this one in Cheshire would certainly be the main one.

4. C.3 said that we had been requested by the B.B.C. to undertake the inspection of certain of their premises, both inside and outside London, from the point of view of departmental security and the risks of sabotage. He said that Mr. Fenton had carried out inspections both in and out of London, and that he, C.3, had had talks with officials of the B.B.C. as regards secrets to be safeguarded and the precautions taken to do so. There only remained Bush House and a building in Oxford Street to be visited, after which a report would be sent to the B.B.C. making recommendations for their consideration.

5. S.L.B. said that there had been a message from the Home Office asking whether we were interested in a site at Ham Common, not Latchmere House. They said they had had a request from the War Office as to whether they wanted to claim the site in question on requisition.

It was agreed that this office was not interested in the proposition.

6. S.L.B. referred to D. Notice procedure in the case of Clayton-Hutton's book. He said that the publishers had stated, quite rightly, that they could not go behind the author's back and ask the Department concerned whether in fact the book had been approved, since this would be liable to involve them in a case of breach of contract. S.L.B. explained that Clayton-Hutton had approached the Air Ministry, who had approved the book after making certain cuts, and an introduction had been written to it by a high-ranking Air Force officer. The publication of the book had, however, subsequently been turned down by the J.I.C.

S.L.B. went on to say that the only possible course would be to ask the Director of Public Prosecutions to prosecute Clayton-Hutton, although this was difficult in view of the fact that the latter was at present in America and it was not known whether he was coming back to this country. In the meantime the F.B.I. were also trying to stop an American firm from publishing the book, but it was not yet known what success or otherwise they had had.

D.D.G. said that cases of this kind should not be dealt with through individuals in Ministries and that they should be centralised through the J.I.C., or some similar body. He asked S.L.B. to take this matter up when the Clayton-Hutton case had been disentangled.

7.

8. D.B. said there was to be a further conference at the Home Office this week in order to try and determine the size of the problem of the control of refugees in time of war, and also to consult with the Foreign Office as to whether there was any possibility of restraining the movement of refugees by agreement with the foreign Governments concerned. He explained that this whole question was not yet detailed enough to concern C.4, but ultimately there would have to be a conference in order to consider what machinery should be set up to control the flow of refugees.

S.L.B. said he hoped foreign Governments would not be discouraged from sending over their technical experts. D.B. said that evacuation plans were at present being studied by the Military Committee of the Brussels Treaty Powers.

