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1952

1st January.

Throughout the past year the spiral of wages and prices has continued to rise. My suit this year has cost £50 instead of £41. The Tory Government evidently intend to economise in every possible way, except, presumably, on rearmament. We start the year with a deficit of over £200,000,000 on the last Budget. We cannot, I think, expect much relief for a considerable time. Any change in the structure built up by the Socialist Government will have to be extremely gradual; a brick here or there pulled away from this shaky edifice might easily bring it crashing to the ground.

Winston has just left for the United States, but the Press comments that he is clearly going to have quite a difficult time. I imagine that he will tackle the Middle Eastern question, the Mediterranean Naval command, Korea and the whole of the Far Eastern question. Another matter which is, I believe, on the Agenda is collaboration in atomic energy projects.

In Europe there are, I think, some signs of improvement politically and militarily, although perhaps not economically. The presence of Eisenhower and the setting up of S.H.A.P.E. has put heart into Western European countries but, although Monty has been extremely active, there is nothing in the nature of a European Army which could stop the Russians if they chose to get on their feet. It is difficult to see in the present state of financial stringency how such an Army can become effective before 1954.

In the Middle East the situation is far from good. We have abandoned Abadan, which was supposed to be a cardinal point in our defence policy for the Middle East, and there seems very little prospect of our going back. David Williams, the Chief Development Engineer, whom I saw after his return, said that Stokes made a bad mistake on arrival by saying that he was only there for ten days; he ought to have said that he was there for ten years, even though the temperature registered 120° in the shade! Negotiations should have been strung out until such time as the Persians began to feel the economic crisis, which is only just beginning to develop. The Americans have been far from helpful; they believe that if economic chaos descends upon Persia, she is likely to go Communist and that with the Tudeh Party in power the whole area will come under Soviet domination. They have, therefore, been pressing us to compromise. We have so far held out, as we do not believe that the only alternative to Mossadeq's Government is the Tudeh Party.

Another major crisis in the last year, which still continues, is in Egypt, where we seem to be moving towards complete military control of the Canal Zone.

There are a good many internal political moves going on in Egypt to try and find some alternative Government to that of Nahas, but it is difficult to see how any Government can now survive unless it makes British evacuation from the Canal and Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan a plank in its platform. The King is certainly worried and anxious for a solution, but he does not feel able to dismiss the Government on what amounts to a national issue, since his own popularity would be bound to suffer.

In the Far East the Armistice negotiations still continue in Korea and, as I have said previously, it is difficult to see how we can in any way profit from the cessation of hostilities. If we allow the Koreans to construct aerodromes in North Korea, we shall lose air superiority, which has enabled us to deal with the preponderance of Chinese and North Korean land forces. The United Nations will, therefore, have an increased commitment to meet in Korea. Apart from this, the cessation of hostilities in Korea is almost certain to lead to Chinese activity elsewhere, particularly in Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, and possibly Hong Kong. If, therefore, we have got to fight the Chinese, we may as well fight them in Korea as anywhere else. The Americans are still toying with the idea of bombing and blockading Manchuria, but whether they seriously intend to do this unless the Chinese re-open hostilities after an Armistice (if we get one), I do not know.

The French are rather shaky in Indo-China. The position in Burma has seriously deteriorated during the last year, and so has the situation in Malaya. The great trouble in Malaya is that there is no organised Police Force, in spite of the efforts that have been made to build up one. As "George" Jenkin has pointed out, a Police Force must contain all elements of the population. It is woefully deficient in Chinese, largely because the Chinese have not got sufficient confidence in British Government's power to bring the country to a state of law and order and resist Chinese aggression. They invariably conform to what they believe to be the stronger party, but if they are uncertain they sit on the fence until the position clarifies itself. This is precisely what they are doing now and it will need a great effort to get their co-operation. The present Force is quite out of touch with the Chinese community, which is really the one that counts.

2nd January.

I saw Stephenson with D.O.S. Stephenson was formerly in the I.C.S. and has been in the Foreign Office for some time. He has just been appointed as the high-powered Chairman required by J.I.C. M.E. I told him about the origins and present position of S.I.M.E. Thereafter, D.O.S. gave him information about developments in the area which were going on when he, D.O.S., was there three weeks ago.

Stephenson said that he had seen General Robertson, who was still thinking in terms of his high-powered co-ordinator who would have executive functions. Short of such a man being appointed, he evidently was looking to Stephenson to fill this role. Stephenson, I think, made it clear that he could not possibly be executive in that sense. I said that, as I saw the role, he had full rights to assess the over-all Intelligence being received, to point out its gaps, and, in conjunction with the producing agencies and other interested parties, endeavour to get them filled. General Robertson had also spoken about his proposal to set up a Police Force in the Canal Zone if we had to establish a military occupation and run all its essential services. For this purpose he had got O'Rourke, who formerly worked with General Robertson in Public Safety in Germany and is now Commissioner of Police in Kenya, to come up to the Canal Zone and to give him the benefit of his advice.

I said to Stephenson that while I realised that something of the kind would be necessary, I thought General Robertson was again making an analogy with Germany, where of course he had the full co-operation of the German Police Force; the British element merely giving direction and guidance. The

The presence of British police officers in the Canal Zone would not produce much in the way of information unless there was a co-operative element of the Egyptian Police working under them. This was precisely the difficulty which was being encountered in Malaya, where there were not sufficient policemen in the Police Force to make contact with the Chinese population.

Stephenson was told about the proposal to send out Giles, who we thought should be an officer of S.I.M.E. - attached possibly to General Erskine's Headquarters and working in close collaboration with D.S.O. Canal Zone. His aim and object would be to obtain sources of information, the most profitable being bribeable remnants of the Egyptian Police.

D.O.S. mentioned that we had had a telegram from Head of S.I.M.E., in which he stated that General Erskine was satisfied with the present position with regard to information. He did not know precisely what this meant: it seemed hardly possible that he was wholly satisfied, but it might be that he merely felt that everything that could be done was being done, and that the flow of information had begun to increase.

I had a long talk with Dick and James Robertson about the PEACH case.

It is difficult to see how it can be done, but it seemed to me that if it were possible to take Tommy fully into our confidence and give him the whole dossier, he might, on looking back on his association with PEACH, be able to supply us with some quite significant information. It would have to be only borne in mind that his association with PEACH only began in 1940. Personally I do not think that we can "open the ball" with Tommy, unless he says something to me. He has certainly seen PEACH since the latter's interrogation, and it would of course be of the greatest importance to know precisely what PEACH had told him. He has probably told him part of the story, but I should doubt whether he told him everything.

3rd January.

I discussed with John Marriott and Morton Evans the note on the potentialities of the Communist Party in time of war, a note on which has been requested by S.H.A.P.E.

B.1 had made the point that as a party the C.P. was concerning itself solely with political matters and running no risk of being involved in espionage or sabotage.

In a later paragraph the Purge was discussed. It seemed to me that the C.O.S. and S.H.A.P.E. could not understand the use of the Purge unless it were made clear to them that any Communist or Fellow Traveller was in his individual capacity a potential spy. The necessary amendment has been made and the memorandum is going forward.

Morton Evans told me that only quite recently several Communists at an aerodrome had volunteered information to the Party and had been sent back with a flea in their ears! They were told not to concern themselves with such matters, but to stick to political work. There is no doubt, however, that what a Communist sees or hears in the course of his duties is a matter for discussion with his Group and probably seeps back to Party H.Q. and to the Russians, if it is considered to be of sufficient importance.

It seems doubtful whether anybody knows precisely what Bob STEWART is up to, since he is really a law unto himself.

Vickery came to tell me that he had now taken up a job as Security Officer at the C.R.O. When he has got the Home Department right, he will probably be visiting High Commissioners' offices in the Dominions. He wants, of course, to work in close co-operation with ourselves. It seems to me rather remarkable that the C.R.O. have never had a Security Officer, in spite of the Bridges Panel. I have no doubt that Vickely will find things in a rather sorry state.

7th January.

I gave a talk to the Colonial Police: three from Malaya and one from Uganda.

Later I saw an ex-Special Branch officer named Davis, who had been serving with the Malayan Police for the last eighteen months in Penang. He seemed an intelligent and rather well educated man. He told me that on his way back he had seen Sir William Jenkin, to whom he had expressed his views fairly frankly. Davis thought the authorities were up against a really serious problem in dealing with the Minyuen, or Masses Movement, which has taken very definite shape during the last two years and is organised throughout the country. It is, of course, proscribed and any member of it or organiser of it is liable to ten years. Nevertheless, it goes on and comprises, either in an active or passive way, a very hig percentage of the Chinese community. It appears to have a protective co of highly secret members, who are organised to deal with traitors or prominent members of the K.M.T. As arms are scarce, they are provided with a revolver which is taken away from them when the job has been completed.

Davis thinks that one of the worst features is the way the schools are being run in Communist interests. Most of them, he says, are breeding grounds for future revolutionaries. The Right Wing dangers are eliminated. I gather that Davis put up a long memorandum on this subject which went to Sir Henry Gurney, and that efforts are being made to prevent Communists from getting hold of the schools. Davis says, however, that the task is a formidable one and that the students form their own cells in schools and are frequently responsible for outrages of one kind or another. The Minyuen has really taken the place of the K.M.T. and is wholly Chinese nationalist and Communist inspired.

Davis was thoroughly aware of the troubles and intrigues within the Police and of the row between Gray and Jenkin. I gather he does not intend to return. In spite of this a certain amount of work has been done and something in the nature of an order of battle for the Minyuen has been plotted out. Apparently the bandit problem is a small one compared with that of the Minyuen and would very soon collapse if the Minyuen could be liquidated. The Chinese are reluctant to co-operate on the S.B. side, but do not mind joining the ordinary C.I.D., which gives them the opportunity for the traditional "squeeze".

8th January.

I talked to two Icelanders, CHRISTIANSSEN and PETERSEN. They are members of the Special Branch of the Reykjavik Police and work under the Minister of Foreign Affairs. They have no direct authority over the provincial police but can get what they want through the Ministry of Justice. The Government are said to be fully aware of the dangers of Communism and prepared to support the Police in dealing with it. Although about 20% of the population voted Communist in the last Election, giving the Party 9 seats out of 42, it was pointed out that the Communist Party is the only opposition to a Conservative and democratic front. It should not, therefore, be assumed that 20% of the electorate are members of the C.P.

There is a Soviet Legation with 12 members, although it appears to have no raison d'etre. There is no trade with Russia, and Iceland has no diplomatic or consular representation in Moscow. It did not seem that the police had succeeded in penetrating the Legation, which is staffed entirely with Russians: it is, however, known that leading Communists in Iceland are constantly visiting the Legation and that certain of them pay visits to Russia. There is a regular courier service to the Legation from Moscow two or three times a month.

It appears that foreign affairs are not debated in the local Parliament, and any questions on the subject by the C.P. are met with the answer that "it is not in the public interest, etc.".

There has been considerable opposition to the presence of American troops and aircraft at Reykjavik, and it seems probable that the activities of the Americans in Iceland provide the main target for Soviet espionage.

The Icelandic Governmand have had a certain amount of trouble with Russian trawlers, which from time to time operate within the three-mile limit. The Captains of these boats are believed to be Soviet naval personne

I gave the two officers a talk on the general principles of security, which I think they appreciated, although neither of them seemed to have a very sound knowledge of English.

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of C.I.A. telephoned about the announcement about more intensive vetting of atomic energy personnel. It has now been agreed that certain categories of people employed on highly secret work, in addition to being interrogated more fully by the employing department as to their antecedents, should be asked to sign a declaration that they are not and never have been members or associates of the Communist Party.

thought he might be asked about this announcement by Washington. I arranged for him to come round and see Hollis.

Burt came to see me to-day. A Jewish informant, whom he has known for a long time but with whom he has had little or no contact for nearly two years, spoke to him on Monday about a visit that he had had from a Jew calling himself JACOB (or JACKOB).

JACOB said that he had come from Haifa, that he was going to Rome and Paris and that he would be back in about a fortnight. His description is as follows:-

Age about 30; height 5ft 9 or 10 ins.; hair brown; complexion sallow; high cheekbones; build medium to thin; weight aboutll stone; wears glasses; speaks with slight foreign accent; dressed in fawn gaberdine raincoat and chocolate coloured trilby hat.

JACOB left with Burt's informant a note on the information which he required. This note may perhaps be interpreted as a request for:

i) The identity of supporters of the Grand Mufti in the U.K.

ii) Arab Intelligence agents and their sources of information;

iii) Agents of Arab Legations and Embassies.

JACOB said that he had plenty of money to pay for the above information if it could be obtained.

Burt's informant did not know why the approach had been made to himself, since he had never seen or heard of JACOB before. Since, however, he had been acquainted some years ago with people connected with Jewish terrorist activities in this country, it might be that his name was obtained from Irgun quarters.

Burt is by no means certain that his informant was not putting forward a veiled suggestion that he, Burt, might like to touch some of the money. The informant has provided good information in the past, but is a fairly unscrupulous type.

Burt would like me to let him know-to-morrow what instructions he should give to his informant.

9th January.

Carless rang up about trouble on the "Vanguard". I spoke to Hollis who arranged for Pelling to go down to Plymouth. I gathered there had been one or two minor fires on board.

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At the J.I.C. to-day Young mentioned that D.S.I. had had a report from the Americans indicating that an atomic experimental explosion some 2,000 miles away had had the effect of destroying large quantities of photographic film at Rochester, presumably the Kodak establishment. He was endeavouring to get further details.

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came over to discuss the business of the S.I.C., particularly the item on the Agenda relating to the War Room.

S.H.A.P.E. have asked us not to mention the discussions we had with the Americans and the French. We feel, however, that these discussions will almost inevitably have come to the notice of other members of the Committee, who may ask us about the outcome. We propose to ask the Secretary to state whether he has had any reply from S.H.A.P.E. to the letter that he wrote them some time ago.

If we are deliberately challenged about the S.H.A.P.E. meeting, we shall say that it was only an exploratory discussion which ended in no concrete proposals.

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10th January.

We had a Directors meeting, when we discussed overseas postings, and in particular D.C.S's suggestion that a station should be opened at Aden to cover Aden, Argeisha and Khartoum. None of the other Directors seemed particularly enthusiastic about the proposal. I asked precisely what the Intelligence problems were and what the officer was going to do, but I did not feel that any very satisfactory answer to justify an expansion at a time of financial stringency was forthcoming.

The D.G. asked what had happened about the letter addressed to the Colonial Office, asking for the opinion of Governors. No reply had apparently been received. The D.G. therefore left his decision in abeyance.

The successor to STEWART in S.I.M.E. was considered. The D.G. asked us to produce a short list. We were also asked to consider appointments for replacements for HUGHES in S.I.F.E., CLAYTON in West Africa, and KITCHIN in India. I do not know where the hell they are coming from!

D.O.S. talked to me after the meeting. He seemed to have a feeling that if he recommended a new appointment overseas that his his recommendation should be accepted without comment. I said that I did not think that was entirely fair on the Staff Board; everybody had to justify new appointments, particularly at a time like this. It seemed to me, therefore, right that we should consider precisely what the officer at Aden was going to do if he were appointed. D.O.S. then said that he would be quite ready to have a review of all posts overseas. I said I thought this would be a good think and that one might equally review the staffs of B. and C. Divisions in order to ensure that we were using our manpower to the best advantage. It was in fact something which had always been done periodically, with the result that changes had been made. I did not think that we ought to regard the establishments as inflexible; we

had to accept that they might at any time be contracting or expanding.

11th January.

I have been getting a brief for the S.I.C. which I am attending next Tuesday in Paris. It is largely a waste of time and the minutes of the previous meeting which I have read are strongly reminiscent to Groucho's Cabinet in "Duck Soup"!

I spoke to the D.D.M.I. (Johnstone), who told me about the strikes in Metropolitan Vickers and E.N.V. The one in Metropolitan Vickers lasted nine days and was due to the dismissal of a Communist Shop Steward. The one in E.N.V. had been going on for about nine weeks and was due to a grievance by the Shop Stewards against the foreman, whom they disliked because he evidently intends to be master in his own shop. The E.N.V. strike is backed by the Unions and negotiations are at a deadlock. The Strike Committee comprises 3 Communists, 1 Trotskyist, 1 doubtful, and 3 "no record". The Party is actively supporting the strike and one of the Committee on KERRIGAN's instructions has visited two of our Ordnance Factories telling them not to accept E.N.V. cuts.

I told Johnnie we would let him have a report or send someone over to explain it in greater detail. It seemed to me, however, that somebody in authority in the War Office ought to ask the Ministry of Labour what they were doing about it.

15th - 16th January.

I attended the meeting of the S.I.C. in Paris on 15.1.52. Mr. Hirsch, the Director General of the Surete, was in the Chair.

I had not attended one of these meetings for more than a year and was agreeably surprised to find an atmosphere of far greater confidence. There are, of course, all the old internal difficulties as between the Police and the Intelligence Services, but in reporting on the state of Communism and espionage in their countries the delegates seemed to be far more forthcoming than they had been in the past.

Reporting on affairs in the United Kingdom, I drew attention to two trends in Communist Party activity:

i) an intensification of the United Front policy, and

ii) a somewhat increased emphasis on Party education.

As regards (i), there were indications that in all branches of Party activity efforts were to be made to collaborate as far as possible with the Labour Party in opposition to the Tory Government. In particular approaches were to be made in all districts where factories played a decisive part, in preparation for the Municipal Elections in the spring. Similar efforts were to be made on the women's front, around the questions of peace, rationing and the social services. Lastly, the Social Services Committee of the Communist Party was to develop the fight against education cuts.

Some consideration had been given by the Communist Party to a renewed application for affiliation with the Labour Party, but it was realised that no progress could be made without an alteration of the Labour Party constitutional rules. No revision of these rules could take place until 1953 and it was important that meanwhile the Party should do nothing to prejudice its chances of affiliation.

As regards (ii), it was noticeable that a good deal of time was being given to Party education and that a considerable number of courses were being held. It was not possible to say whether this trend was in any way related to the intensification of United Front policy, but it was perhaps reasonable to speculate that if Party members were to come more closely into touch with Labour Party activities it was desirable that they should, as far as possible, be immunised against bourgeois contamination.

Meanwhile Party strength had slightly declined; the figures were now about 35,000, plus 3,000 in the Young Communist League. There had likewise been a decline in the circulation of newspapers. The week-end circulation of the "Daily Worker", which some years back had been as high as 120,000, was now 52,000, and there were likewise falls in the circulation of "World News and Views", "Communist Review", "Woman To-day" and "Challenge". This was possibly due to the increased cost. Constant appeals were being made by the Communist Press for financial support, but, in spiteof an apparent deficit, its organs continued to appear. It was difficult to say how far the deficit was made good by certain wealthy supparters of Communist Party activity or from outside sources.

I said there was little to report about the Peace Campaign. Signatures to the Petition were nominally about 800,000. There were 350 local Peace Committees affiliated to the British Peace Committee, and efforts were being made to organise Committees of the various professional classes, in order to stimulate the movement and possibly to give it a greater air of respectability.

This question of "respectability" was obviously very much in the minds of the Communist Party, both on the political and on the espionage front. There had recently been several striking examples of refusal by the Communist Party, as such, to become engaged in espionage activities. A recent defector from the Hungarian Embassy named KOVACS had told us that an approach by his Embassy for assistance in espionage matters had been turned down flat by the Party. There had also been other instances. This did not mean, however, that a general seepage of information did not go on through Communist Party members with access to information of interest to the Party, or that occasionally a Party member, or sympathiser, did not act as an agent for Russia or the Satellites without the knowledge or approval of his Executive Committee.

The danger, therefore, of having Communists or sympathisers in places where they had access to secret information remained a constant one.

From such information as we had, the Russians were more inclined to go to sympathisers or to exploit the human weaknesses of people with no Communist Party affiliations at all. It was a fairly simple matter to ascertain that certain individuals employed by the Russian or Satellite missions were interested in obtaining information, but, owing to rigid security precautions, the identification

of their contacts was a matter of the greatest difficulty. If any members of the Committee had any solution for overcoming these difficulties, I should be very interested to hear what they were. (It was clear that all the delegates thoroughly appreciated the difficulties of surveillance and had found the problem as insoluble as we have).

Luxembourg had, as usual nothing to report.

In the statements made by the Belgian, Dutch and French delegates, it seemed that the pattern of Communist activity was very much the same as our own. In France, Belgium and Holland it centred round the Peace Campaign.

Mr. Hirsch said that although under the cloak of the Peace Committee there was a good deal of agitation against rearmament, the Party had lost influence in social and political affairs and its various demonstrations during the last three mohths had in each case proved a failure. Likewise, the dissolution of Polish organisations and of a Spanish group had crippled their particular activities.

With regard to Iron Curtain countries, the Ministry of the Interior had recently issued an order compelling Hungarians, Roumanians, Czechs and Russians, other than diplomats, to enter and leave the country at a particular frontier post. One frontier post was allotted to each nationality. Anyone who was found to have disobeyed this regulation was, if picked up, immediately expelled. This new procedure considerably facilitated the control of Russian and Satellite nationals in France. It had been established, however, that in every delegation attending the present U.N.O. Conference, and other Conferences on political and cultural affairs, Russian and Satellite States had included Intelligence personnel, and it seemed to the French that there was a tendency by the Russians to make more use of Satellites for obtaining information.

During the last three months there had been some increased activity by South American nationals, most of whom were merely passing through Paris on their way to conferences in Prague and elsewhere.

Lastly, Mr. Hirsch referred to a certain amount of "intoxication" designed toindicate a rapprochement between the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. behind the backs of our Allies. The Belgian delegate, M. Walravens, spoke of similar rumours which had been circulating in Belgium and which had definitely been traced back to Communist sources, (A propos of these remarks, I recollected that from an account of a conversation between the Prime Minister and Adenaeur, when the latter was in this country a few weeks ago, it was clear that Adenaeur had been extremely worried lest we should come to some kind of unilateral agreement with Russia which would be detrimental to German interests. He had been much relieved by an assurance from the P.M. that no such agreement was contemplated and that nothing would be done in that direction without piror consultation with the German Government. I did not, of course, mention this matter at the meeting).

Dr. Fock, the Dutch delegate, drew attention to a recent decree by the Dutch Government which made membership of the Communist Party, or of a Communist Trade Union, incompatible with holding any official position in the Dutch Government. He said that this decree had created a far greater reaction in Dutch Communist circles than any

other measure that had been taken in years. He did not regard this as an indication of serious penetration of the Dutch Administration, but merely as a desire by the Communist Party to exploit what they thought might be a profitable grievance. The efforts in the direction of a United Front were considerable and began about the middle of September.

The Dutch delegation submitted a full report on the Czech espionage case, which will be circulated to delegates.

The report by the Belgian delegation seemed to follow the usual pattern.

The general feeling was that throughout the Western Union countries there had been a slight decline in Communist activity.

There was a long discussion in the afternoon about the Moscow Economic Conference. From the reports made by S.I.C. delegates, it seemed likely that its main purpose was to defeat the restrictions on West/East trade.

There was general agreement that it would be in Allied interests to discourage, by whatever means appropriate to each country, the representatives of firms of importance from taking part in the discussions. On the other hand, it was felt that anything in the nature of prohibition might do more harm than good. The Dutch, who generally see things very much in black and white, were in favour of imposing restrictions on the movements of delegates to and from the Conference, and thought that a warning should be given to those who proposed to go about difficulties they would encounter in other countries in obtaining transit travel facilities. Other delegations thought that such action would be difficult politically and possibly unwise.

Stating the British view, I said that while important firms who asked for advice were being discouraged, we saw no objection to small firms being allowed to go; and in fact that there might be some advantage in getting accurate reports about the proceedings, both official and unofficial, and in acquiring a better appreciation of the real purposes of the Conference. I was certain that H.M.G. would not attempt anything on the lines of prohibition.

At the suggestion of the Dutch it was agreed that a note should go to the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Treaty Powers from the Committee, suggesting that they should inform all Governments which were a party to the Treaty that, in the view of the S.I.C., participation in the Moscow Conference should be discouraged by any means which seemed appropriate.

There was a discussion on the legal position which would arise in the event of a member of an international organisation, such as N.A.T.O. or Western Union, giving integrated information to a foreign Power. It seemed that, as far as the Dutch and ourselves were concerned, the existing laws were sufficient to cover the situation, provided it was accepted that the officer or official concerned was paid by his own Government and that the information he communicated was detrimental to the security of his own country.

I said that, as far as we could see, Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act would operate in such a case, although, of course, the matter had never been put to any legal test.

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The Belgians did not seem to have any really effective legislation to cover a case of the kind, and the French said they would have to make some amendment to their penal code.

Each delegation agreed to submit to the Secretary a statement on the position in his own country.

Finally, under "Any other business", I drew attention to a memorandum that we had supplied to the Secretary about the Black List. We had found that people of the same name with slightly different particulars were being put on the List without prior verification as to identity. I urged that something should be done to improve this situation before the names were included in the List.

The Committee felt that this was a matter which should be carried out by the Secretary.

The Secretary referred to the minutes of the previous meeting, where Mr. White undertook to supply delegates, through the Secretary, with copies of a White Paper on stoppage of work in industry, in particular the dockers' strike in Manchester. He complained that no such papers had been received. It may be that none were issued, but B.1 could give the answer to this.

The next meeting is to be held in Brussels, under the Chairmanship of the Belgians, on Tuesday, April 22nd and the Secretary would be glad to know of any subjects thought to be suitable for discussion.

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At a luncheon given on 16.1.52 by M. Hirsch to the delegates attending the S.I.C. and to certain other individuals, I sat next to a man called Wapler, who controlled the desk in the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres concerned with N.A.T.O. and Western Union affairs.

In the course of conversation, Wapler, who had been responsible for the part played by Leduc in the tripartite security talks, said that he had the impression that we took a slightly exaggerated view of French insecurity. It was, of course, true that, owing to the political situation

in the Chambre des Deputes, there was considerable difficulty in imposing any strong measures for the exclusion of Communists from Government Departments. He thought, however, that we were not perhaps wholly aware of the extent to which "under the counter" methods were employed within Ministries to exclude Communists from places where they might do harm, and ultimately to edge them out altogether. Moreover, there was a strong unofficial Trade Unionism in the more important departments of the French Government. As an example he said that, with very few exceptions, it was almost impossible for a Jew to obtain office in the French Foreign Office. Occasionally a notable exception was made in the case of some well-known Jewish family whose reputation was unimpeachable. This was done deliberately to avoid any accusation of racial distinction. What he had said about the French Foreign Office went, to some extent, for other important Ministries where secret information was obtainable. He could now, however, say the same for other departments. He then told me that in the French Foreign Office they knew of the existence of six Communists, but that none of them was employed in a position where he could normally obtain access to anything of importance.

While there may be a good deal in what Wapler said, I had in mind (although I did not of course mention it) the case of the fairly high Foreign Office official controlling the Satellite desk, against whom the proposed action by the Surete had been supressed on the orders of M. Pleven - the idea being that a French BURGESS and MACLEAN case would have an adverse effect upon the economic aid which the French Government were expecting from the United States. Owen told me that this individual had been identified, that his name was , and that he was being sent to Greece.

Incidentally, I may mention that Wapler was at the French Embassy in Belgrade at the beginning of the war, and that he was instrumental in getting Verneuil and the French Naval Attache out of the country at the time of the German invasion. They apparently spent several weeks in the mountains and eventually succeeded in reaching Budapest. Wapler then returned to Belgrade, where he was severely interrogated by the Gestapo but was finally allowed to leave the country as a diplomat. On his return to France he served on the staff of Darlan. He told me, with some pride, that the only Intelligence operation of any value that he had ever carried out was when he saw a report on Darlan's table about the movements of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau. He stole this report and gave it to the American Naval Attache, who communicated the information to the British Government. The Germans came to hear of his association with American officers and demanded his removal. He was subsequently sent to the French Embassy in Berne. He joined up as a Reserve Officer in the French Forces in 1944.

Verneuil confirmed this account and told me that he had a high opinion of Wapler.

During a lunch with Owen I was told about an incident which occurred a few weeks ago when Constantine (D.A.C.A.S.(I), Johnstone (D.D.M.I.), and Hilken (D.D.N.I.), visited Paris to lecture to the N.A.T.O. Staff College on the Russian and Satellite orders of battle.

These officers had been studying their briefs in the train and, for the purposes of co-ordination, Johnstone and Hilken had given a copy of theirs

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to Constantine, whose notes were mainly in pencil draft. They arrived rather late in the evening and were due to attend a cocktail party. Instead of depositing their despatch cases at the Embassy, they concealed them in various places in their rooms at the hotel. Constantine had apparently put his attache case, for which he had no key, under his bed. When he returned to the hotel at about 2 a.m., he discovered that the briefs of the Army and Navy which had been lent to him were not in his case. He thought it possible that he might have left them in the train. Having consulted the other two officers, it was decided to report the matter to the Security Officer in the Air Attache's office. The latter then communicated with Securite de l'Air, who in turn got on to the Surete. It was not until late in the following day that Owen heard about the matter.

Enquiries at the Gare du Nord were met with the reply that all papers cleared out of their trains were burned. Constantine was seen by the Surete, who complained that he had given no very accurate account of his movements between the time of his arrival and 2 a.m. in the morning! He had therefore been sent back by aeroplane for further interrogation by the Surete. A full report on the whole incident had gone back to the Air Ministry, as a result of which Constantine had lost his promotion.

I told Owen that I had heard nothihg about this and that clearly it was being hushed up. It seemed to me that it should in some form or other be promulgated and, moreover, that Hilken and Johnstone, who had in a sense been lucky, were as much to blame as Constantine.

Only the Army and Navy briefs were taken from Constantine's case, presumably because they were in typewritten or photostat form, while Constantine's was only in pencil draft. These documents haveso far not been traced, although considerable enquiries are being made by the Surete at the hotel at which the officers stayed.

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18th January.

Burt came to see me about the case of He said the man was returning and he was making arrangements to carry out observation. Meanwhile, he had been approached , who had precisely the same story, namely, that Jewish Intelligenc were interested in the activities of the Mufti and any Arab supporters that he might have in England. They were willing to pay considerable sums of money.

Burt had wondered whether it would be possible to give or the other informant a certain amount of "chiken feed". I said I thought that this might be unwise, since if by any chance it became possible for the Arabs to say that the British Government were reporting on their activities to the Jews, the Foreign Office would be seriously embarrassed, particularly at a moment like this when we were trying to bring the Arabs into Western Union defence schemes.

Burt appreciated the point and said that he would refrain from doing anything of the kind.

Burt then told me about a serious case of leakage which S.B. had been looking into. They had received certain documents from Waterlow's. These documents were of a secret nature from the Ministry of Supply to the Prime Minister's office. They had been sent to S.B. by Waterlow's, who had found them in an empty bag which they had received from a pulping firm called Jacob. The matter had been reported to the Ministry of Supply who were investigating.

I told Burt that we were of course always interested in such cases from two points of view. Firstly, we had a general interest in getting departments to improve their security arrangements, and secondly, such papers might provide the answer to a existing case of leakage which we had under investigation.

Burt promised to send me a report on the matter and to let us know about any other cases of the kind which came to his notice.

I lunched with Van Moyland.

21st January.

The D.G. approved our posting arrangements but raised a question about returning Senior Officers. He was anxious to avoid, as far as possible, the position whereby a Senior Officer coming back here from abroad would have to do the work of a section officer. It was explained that considerable difficulty arose from the fact that returning Senior Officers in certain cases had had no previous training in this office. Hollis and I expressed the view that such officers were not fitted to take over a Senior Officer's job until they had been back here for about two years. A notable example was Bill MAGAN, who with his usual honesty had declared that he found the work here extremely complicated and in many respects entirely different to what he had been doing in the Middle East. While of course he could take over almost anything and master it in the course of time, the same did not apply to others, and even in MAGAN's case efficiencly would be bound to suffer.

The D.G. asked us to look into this matter in greater detail at our staff meeting.

22nd January.

The D.M.I. telephoned to say that Gerald Templer was very anxious to see the D.G. about the appointment of someone to co-ordinate Intelligence in Malaya. I said that this seemed to be somewhat similar to the appointment which had been suggested for the Middle East and had been shot down by the J.I.C. and Chiefs of Staff. I rather doubted whether such a post was either necessary or desirable in the Far East, but we would of course be delighted to see Gerald and discuss the matter with him.

I arranged an appointment for 2.30 on Friday.

Later, Gerald rang me up himself from the Colonial Office. He was on the open telephone and could not tell me in any detail what he wanted. He said that as far as he could ascertain, Intelligence was not coming through or being properly disseminated. I said that as far as I knew the machinery was there but that the real crux of the matter was the lack of any Intelligence at all. For a variety of reasons it was not coming off the ground and those primarily concerned were the Police.

I saw Patrick Reilly about the mechanisation of Post Report, which had been discussed at the J.I.C. last Wednesday when I was away in Paris. I felt that we were rather closing the door on the Home Office and that if we could get them to mechanise Post Report there was a possibility of extending the scheme to the whole of the Aliens Register. I felt that this would be valuable, particularly in time of war. Reilly thought that he had better withhold his letter to the Home Office and that the matter should be reconsidered by the J.I.C. He asked me to put in a note.

I told Reilly about my experiences at the S.I.C. meeting in Paris, and particularly the remarks of Wapler of the French Foreign Office on

French security. I also mentioned to him what I had heard about the three Deputy Directors, who instead of depositing their bags at the Embassy had hidden them in their rooms, with rather disastrous consequences. It seemed to me a pity that others should not know of this incident in the general interests of security, although the last thing any of us wanted to do was to get people into trouble or kick them when they were down. Reilly told me that Constantine had been earmarked as a successor to A.C.A.S.(I), who I gather was not considered to be up to his job - nice fellow though he is. This appointment was now in abeyance but Constantine was contuing as Deputy. Reilly felt that if he had been thrown out of Intelligence altogether, it might have been possible to give the incident some publicity in Government circles, but that in the circumstances he did not see that any action could be taken.

Burt rang to say that Charteris had some Czech servants in his employ. I presume that this had come to light owing to the burglary at his house. I said I doubted whether there was a real security issue, since Princess Elizabeth does not, as far as I know, receive secret Government documents.

Dick has telegraphed from Washington about his interview with Hoover, which seems to have gone well. Hoover seems fairly convinced about the case against PEACH, but understands that no action is possible. He did, however, ask how it was that PEACH got a clearance for work in S.I.S. Dick pointed out to him that PEACH came into S.I.S. in the early stages of the war when cases of his kind were not looked at with the same scrutiny as they would be in the present situation.

23rd January.

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John Shaw talked to me about his position, which he felt was in many respects unsatisfactory. He realised that the main purpose of his appointment was the administration of overseas stations, but he found difficulty in carrying out his assignment. He thought really that one person should control the whole of Administration and Establishment and give orders for posting, as I understood him, without much regard for the Intelligence needs of other Divisions.

I said that of course this had been the case in the past, but that I had always felt in this office that there was a tendency for the Administration "tail to wag the Intelligence dog"! Anybody, therefore, who was controlling staff and appointments should be fully acquainted with Intelligence needs; these could only be discovered by close collaboration between all Directors.

D.O.S. then said that in his opinion the Staff and Administration could be carried by one Director, for home and overseas and that the Intelligence side of O.S. could really go back to B. Division.

24th January.

I had a word with Reilly after the J.I.C. meeting about a letter which PEACH has written to Skardon. PEACH says that he may get a job with a firm in Egypt and wants to know if there would be any difficulty about his passport. We propose to tell him that there will be no difficulty. Meanwhile, we are retaining the passport; we should, however, like to have the Foreign Office view as to whether we should send it back now or retain it until occasion for its use arises. Reilly asked me to write him a letter. 'C' has no objection to the return of the passport.

At the Appointments Board meeting to-day I told Horrocks that I wanted to discuss both the staffing of R.S.L.Os and the L.R.C. intime of war. It seemed to me that we ought to have these two pieces of machinery ready to go into action immediately if it ever became necessa

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Breffitt, Chief Constable of Sussex, has written to tell us that he has taken on, with his eyes open, a Communist named BEAL as a member of his Force. Having interviewed BEAL he came to the conclusion that he had the makings of a good policeman. As BEAL has been the leader of his local Communist group and, in 1951, was the Secretary of its Education Committee, we feel rather strongly, I may say, that he is hardly suitable as a candidate for any Police Force.

The Home Office have been informed and have taken the matter up with the Chief Constable.

After discussion with D.C. and Arthur Martin, I spoke to 'C' about Martin giving details of the PEACH case to Jones (of G.C.H.Q.) with a view to his passing on such data to certain of his subordinates who are concerned with London -Moscow traffic. 'C' agreed to this being done.

25th January.

I had a discussion with Potter about the mechanisation of Post Report and the Aliens Register. He has provided me with a list of categories suitable for punching. He thinkg it arguable that the Home Office may be able to supply our needs and those of the Services without

mechanising, but he rather doubts it, and in any case he realises that the operation would be a tedious one, particularly in time of war.

Kenech'hdu came to ascertain from me whether I thought an enlargement of the S.I.C. to cover the other N.A.T.O. powers was a good idea. I told him frankly that I did not think so: there might be something in the Northern Group and the Southern Group having their own S.I.C.; in that case it might be necessary to bring the information together. I should, however, regret to see anything in the nature of amalgamation. From my experience at the last S.I.C. meeting, it seemed to me that Western Union S.I.C. was slowly improving - at any rate a far greater degree of confidence had been established than existed at the outset. If we now introduced other nationalities we might freeze everybody up. He appreicated the point, although I think he was rather disappointed with my answer.

Gerald Templer came in the afternoon and was seen by D.C.S. and the D.G. It was impressed upon him that the existing machinery for collecting Intelligence should be sufficient and that the introduction of a super-Intelligence man was likely to be a fifth wheel in the coach. It was suggested that he should examine the machinery of the L.I.C. and, if he thought it necessary, put in a strong Chairman. He has for the moment accepted this advice.

26th January.

A Czech diplomat, VYHNANEK, has defected and been housed by ourselves. Meanwhile, another, a colleague of his, is doing the same thing. The latter, named ROSAK, was besieged in his house by Czech diplomatic cars. He escaped over the roof with his wife and child.

We have housed ROSAK and the Flying Squad are getting his wife and child to safety.

The Czechs seem to think that VYHNANEK has been a British agent for some time. This suits us quite well and we intend to use it in getting rid of two Czech spies from the Military Attache's office.

There has been a major battle in the Canal Zone and we have been considering what to do with our staff in Cairo if there is a rupture of diplmmatic relations.

28th January.

At the Directors Meeting to-day it was announed that OUGHTON is pleased to accept the appointment of S.O.C. S.I.M.E. and that DROWER,

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although it is slightly inconvenient, is prepared to go to take his place in S.I.F.E.

D.C.S. complained about housing conditions in Kuala Lumpur and Nigeria, where the Office of Works have refused to build. The D.G. felt that we should say to the Colonial Office that if they could not find us the accommodation we should withdraw our posts.

D.O.S. further announced that MORTON had not received with any enthusiasm the proposal that GOODWYN should go out on a visit. He felt that if anyone came it should be a Director who would give them the answers to their various problems both on the Intelligence and administrativ side. GOODWYN's visit has been cancelled.

I mentioned the case of the Ministry of Supply leakage and suggested that cases of this kind might with advantage have a certain kind of publicity in Government circles. It was agreed that the point should be raised with the Inter-Departmental Committee on Security.

I discussed with D.O.S. a letter from Stephens, in which he strongly advocates the appointment of a full-time Security Officer as D.S.O. Canal. This view has already been represented to the J.I.C. and the point was raised by the G.O.C. when he visited S.I.M.E. a short time ago.

While, of course, fully trained Security Offices can always do better in a post of that kind than an attached officer, I doubt whether in the present state of affairs there is much opportunity for running agents. There will, of course, be informants, and probably a good deal can be learned through the interrogation of prisoners, but, apart from all this it is difficult to see who can be sent out without as a result dislocating our business at home. If, of course, there is a rupture of relations with Egypt, FOULKES could very well go down to the Canal Zone and would no doubt be extremely useful.

30.1.52.

Howard of the Home Office telephoned to me to-day and asked whether we had any special observations to make on a draft memorandum, recommending the abolition of controls between Ireland and this country, before he put the matter to Sir Frank Newsam.

I said that is seemed more than ever clear from his memorandum that whatever was done the ill-intentioned alien could fairly easily get into this country and reside here almost indefinitely without detection, but that since the abolition of controls for Irish traffic at the Western Ports had been decided upon in principle, it was difficult to make any suggestions about blocking up holes until we knew what the Irish were prepared to do to assist. There are, however, certain principles involved in the present decision, which in some degree weaken the effect of the Aliens Order. Under Article 1 of the Order, whereby an alien cannot enter the country without permission from an Immigration Officer, it will now be made doubly clear to him that he can do so if he comes via Eire because there will be no Immigration Officer at the port to put the necessary stamp upon his passport, and because for administrative reasons this fact will have to be given as much publicity as possible. Equally, the Home Secretary will not be able to exercise his power to prevent the departure of an alien for the same reason.

I suggested to Howard that he might like to consider whether the powers of an Immigration Officer could be delegated to the Police, either at the port or when the alien registers. He said he would consider this point.

Another point, which I gather is one of some controversy within the Home Office, relates to the visa. Hutson is inclined to argue that as there will be no immigration officer at the port to inspect documents, there is no point in the alien having a visa unless legislation is enacted making it an offence for the nationals of certain countries to be in the U.K. without a valid visa. Others feel that there is some merit in insisting on a visa whether there is anyone to look at it or not.

For the moment I do not think there is anything more that we can do in this matter.

The P.M. asked the J.I.C. to look into a statement made to him by General Vandenberg while the former was in the U.S.A., to the effect that the ratio in the production of aircraft between ourselves and the U.S.S.R. was 11-1 in favour of the Soviet. It turns out that the U.S.A. production at the moment is 142 per month, our own 120, and the Russian about 550: in other words, a ratio of about 2.1- 1. Meanwhile, of course, American production is rapidly increasing.

Alan Moorehead, who was formerly Public Relations Officer at the Ministry of Supply, has, at the suggestion of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Supply, written a book on the cases of RUCHS and others engaged in imparting atomic energy secrets to the Russians.

The late P.M. had asked the D.G. to arrange for some counterblast to the American White Paper, and the D.G. had consulted the appropriate departments. There is now a certain anxiety about the disclosures in the book which will make it quite clear that it is officially inspired and to some extent weakened our position vis a vis the Press.

The D.G. holds the view that, with the exception of certain modifications, the book should stand in its present form and, if necessary, it should be admitted that its contents are partially derived from official sources.

31st January.

There is considerable consternation in the Czech Embassy about the two defections of VYHNANEK and ROSAK. The Foreign Office have agreed to one person in the Military Attache's office being declared persona non grata, and the second one a little later.

The Czechs have removed all ROSAK's furniture, valued at about £500, from his apartment which is rented by the Czech Embassy. They are getting a Solicitor's letter, although the legal position at the moment is not very clear.

1st February.

I went to see General Sinclair about a request by the S.O. branch to get informtation into the Press which related to derogatory remarks made about King Farouk in Cairo. It was not my business to comment on the policy which Sinclair assured me was guided by the Foreign Office-cum-I.R.D. steering committee, but it seemed to me from Foreign Office telegrams that one of the factors which made Farouk reluctant to act in British interests was the likelihood of his becoming unpopular with his own people. I was, however, concerned with the principle that the Security Service should be used for this kind of job.

Sinclair did not seem to think that in principle there was anything against this, any more than there was in the Foreign Office being a party to it. I said I thought it would be extremely damaging to us, but that in any case we were not really equipped with the proper machinery; such contacts as we had with the Press were direct.-in other words each officer who made a contact was known to the Pressmen as a representative of M.I.5.

Sinclair said he quite understood this and clearly we could not use people of that sort for this kind of work.

I do not think that we shall get any more enquiries of this kind.

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I raised the question of principle as to whether or not war-time establishments such as London Reception Centre and Camp 020 should be placed in charge of an existing member of the staff, or someboyd imported for the purpose. It was considered that provisional appointments should be made from existing staff to the head posts in sections such as these. Note was taken that provisional appointments would probably have to be made for L.R.C. and Camp 020, and for sections dealing with Exit Permits and Censorship. Directors were invited to consider nominations for these posts.

D.E./A. reported that he had ascertained that the Civil Defence regional Headquarters were in the same towns as those in which we previously had Regional Security Liaison Officers. It was agreed that D.E./A. should make a bid to the Ministry of Works for the provision of accommodation in the towns where headquarters were to be set up. We should ask normally for accommodation for two officers and about two secretaries.

As regards the staff for Regions, D.E./A. would submit a provisional list of eligible candidates from the Reserve for consideration.

Malcolm Cumming talked to me about the defector ILLYIN, who has produced an outburst. He conceives himself only in the role of a counter-revolutionary and thinks that all his time should be devoted to the over-throw of the Stalin regime. He is not concerned with the question of earnin his own living!

I said it seemed to me that what was really required was something in the nature of a Woburn Abbey, such as existed during the war, where propagandists could settle down to prepare broadcasts or leaflets, and where such people as ILLYIN could feel that they were making a useful contribution. It might further be necessary to organise Russian emigre groups: I had in mind the statement of the Russian who interviewed the remains of VLASOV's Army; it was his view that the Russians would be far more likely to defect to some counter-revolutionary organisation abroad than to the British Government.

I.R.D. appear to disclaim any interest in these people once they have done a couple of broadcasts.

4th February.

I had a talk with two Swedes, one Kriminaloverkonstapel BOGEFELDT of the Police and the other Captain GEIJER of the Army. I gave them a brief outline of the principles on which we worked, our objectives, and the organisation we had to carry out our tasks. They are both returning here for further talks with B.1 and B.2 and C. Division. They had had considerable experience of Soviet espionage in Sweden. B.2 may find it of interest to go into these matters in some detail. It was clear that they found the Russians extremely difficult to deal with owing to the excellence of Russian security. We talked about the observation problem and clearly they have no solution.

The D.G. told us that Jones had been finally appointed as head of G.C.H.Q. The Services had put forward Admiral Daniels, the retiring Commandant of the I.D.C., but Eden had finally come down on the side of 'C''s nominee.

Burt telephoned me. He opened the conversation by saying that the leakage in the Press about the two Czech defectors had not come from the Yard, but he thought from the Czech Embassy. It seemed to me a little curious that he should have volunteered this information - the more so since I heard afterwards that the Sunday Graphic had told an informant of ours that he had got all the information he wanted from the Yard! It would not be surprising, since the Flying Squad were called in.

We then discussed the case of BATESON, who is apparently a youth of 16 collecting data about aircraft. A letter of his had been picked up at the aerodrome and handed to Special Branch. Burt had been anxious to get a search warrant. I told him that there was a considerable amount of information on our files about "Air Registration", an organisation which can give full data about construction programmes of aircraft firms in this country; that this organisation and a publication called "Air Britain" had had correspondence with the Air Ministry and that to some extent they had received encouragement. The Air Ministry are anxious that the youth of this country should become air-minded, as this is good for development and for recruiting. On the other hand they realise the dangers from the security point of view.

I did not wish to discourage Burt from getting a search warrant, but I thought that he or one of his officers ought to see our papers before they decided what they were going to do. It seemed to me that probably a warning to this youth was all that would be required. From the original letter, it was clear that he was endeavouring to obtain details about at least four aircraft which are still on the confidential list, although there was nothing to suggest that he was doing this for a motive prejudicial to the security of the State.

Burt said that he would send over Sgt. Smith to see Bernard Hill.

5th February.

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6th February.

At the J.I.C. to-day I raised again the question of the mechanisation of Post Report and the Central Aliens Register. I obtained the Committee's support for a letter to the Home Office and to the holding of a meeting between the interested parties to establish what categories of information should be recorded and how far the Hollerith was a practical means of carrying out the task.

I told the Committee that as it stood to-day the Aliens Register was purely alphabetical, and that as far as I knew there was no way of ascertaining what Hungarians or other nationalities were in this country, except by sending a circular letter to all Chief Constables. It seemed to me a pity that if the Home Office were considering mechanisation we should not give them every encouragement. Once a start was made we might be able to extend the mechanisation to naturalisation cases. I did not think it was necessary to review again the 20,000 Post Reports which could be mechanised on a purely factual and, as far as possible, invariable basis.

With regard to further interrogations, it might be that members of the Committee would wish to add certain points to the questionnaire on which the Home Office were at present working.

The King's death was announced at about 11.30 by the Secretary. The Chairman asked us to stand in silence and the meeting was then adjourned.

I had lunch with He told me that he had asked for certain enquiries to be made about individuals here who might be in contact with Tunisians at present causing trouble in the Colony.

Alec Kellar had told him that enquiries of this sort would be outside our Charter. I explained to that what Kellar told him was entirely correct; if, for example, we wished to look at someone's correspondence we had to make a case to the Home Secretary and obtain his Warrant. This could only be done on the basis that the man was a menace to our national security. If, however, these individuals were connected with the Communist Party, we should be justified in conducting further enquiries. We had no such evidence, in spite of the coverage we had of the Communist Party in this country. I would, however, look into the matter to see whether there was anything to be done.

I am all for helping the French if we can, since we may well ask them from time to time for enquiries which are possibly to some extent outside their Charter. I think was under the impression that we more or less had carte blanche to do what we liked.

I spoke to 'C' about his letter, in reply to ours, regarding the six people named by PEACH as acquaintances of his during his University days, and particularly the statement "I can see no other risk .....". I pointed out to him that in our view there was a considerable risk of a leakage of information, to the effect that another member of the Foreign Office was under suspicion. Bearing in mind that out of the six people named by PEACH as acquaintances of his during his University days, five had Communist traces, I made it clear that it would not be possible to interrogate these individuals without it being apparent to them that we regarded PEACH with considerable suspicion. If there were a leakage, it seemed to me that the Foreign Office would be seriously embarrassed.

'C' readily accepted this point. He then asked Sinclair to come in, when we continued the discussion about the case. I made it quite clear that there was no reluctance on our part to carry out the

interrogations, provided S.I.S., on their behalf and on behalf of the Foreign Office, were prepared to accept the risk. We did not, however, anticipate that we should be much nearer a positive solution: we had all heard from PEACH thatm short of holding a Party card, he was as near being a Communist as no matter. If, of course, it was felt that in fairness to PEACH the interrogations should be carried out, we would go ahead.

Sinclair throught it was possible that someone might be in a position to say or to deny that PEACH was a close associate of KLUGMAN or of MACLEAN, and that this would be a material point worth getting at. Both 'C' and Sinclair, however, realised the risks involved and suggested that we should select one of the six individuals whom we thought to be the least likely to talk. 'C' hoped that it might be possible to start the interrogation by discussing BURGESS and MACLEAN and leading from them to PEACH.

Recent telegrams from Egypt indicate that Farouk is extremely nervous about the rioting which occurred some days ago. It is clear that if things had got any worse we should have intervened. Farouk evidently knew this and said that he would make it his business to let us know if things got really out of hand, although he would make no specific request for out intervention.

At the moment we are taking up an injured and somewhat reserved attitude. Our Ambassador thinks that it would be unwise to make any serious offer to negotiate until it is quite clear that the Government intends to put a stop to all acts of terrorism both in Egypt and in the Canal Zone. He does not, however, wish to wait too long.

7th February.

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In the February issue of a monthly digest called "Survey" there are derogatory remarks about the Security Service and a statement that the P.M. intends to make changes. The D.G. is mentioned by name.

From records in our possession, it appears that the "Survey", which has offices in London and Paris, is run by Drew; the idea being that it should gain a reputation for accurate information which it will get in advance of official publication , and that having done so it will put out deception material at a suitable moment.

We know that it is officially sponsored as Poston was asked to give one, HOOD, a fair wind with the Bank which holds the funds on which this

'Survey" is run. It is believed, too, that Dick knows that the "Survey" is official. Dick Butler has come into it too, in connection with the formation of a Company.

Whether the venture is a sound one or not, it seems outrageous that "Survey" should join in the general hunt of the Security Service on the lines of the "Daily Express", and without any prior reference to this office. Presumably Drew will argue that if everyone is to be consulted it will never be possible to get the digest out each month, apart from the question of security involved. He will also say that by blackguarding Government departments he will be able to lay off any suggestion that "Survey" is official. But none of this can possibly justify his action.

Whether the venture is worth while is another matter. Personally I should be inclined to doubt it, but if you have a forward planning section I suppost they have got to do something, at considerable expense, in the hope that one day it may be of some use. On the other hand it will recoil like a boomerang if it ever becomes known that it is supported by Government funds. I cannot help feeling that sooner or later this is bound to happen.

Roger will be talking to Dick about it when he returns and will then speak to the D.G. If I were the D.G. I should take the matter up pretty forcibly with Norman Brook.

It was agreed that the establishment of Mr. should be recommended, and this was subsequently approved by the D.G.

D.E./A. submitted a provisional list of suitable officers to be earmarked to take over the Regional Offices in the event of war. This list was agreed subject to one or two modifications, and D.E./A. will write to the individuals concerned asking if they would hold themselves in readiness to take over the posts.

8th February.

D.D.M.I. telephoned to say that Gerald Templer had been receiving threatening letters to the effect that if he took up his appointment in Malaya his children here would be in jeopardy. The letters apparently came from Walton-on-Thames and the matter has been reported to the Police.

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Johnstone wondered if we could help the Police in any way. I said I doubted whether we could, that there were people who made a habit of this kind of think - they were generally mentally unbalanced but as a rule did not really carry out their threat. The Police generally had information about them, although they often had difficulty in getting a conviction. I did not think that a search of our records for Communists in Walton-on-Thames would really make a contribution, since it was extremely doubtful to my mind whether there was any political motive behind a case of this sort.

Allan rang up about two Post Office officials who had been telephoning to each other between London and Manchester and speaking in a derogatory way about the King. The lines had apparently got crossed and their conversation broadcast on Manchester radio diffusion. The Daily Worker, of course, had drawn attention to this incident, although it evidently thought it politic not to state precisely what was said. Allan said they had got hold of the Post Office official in London and were questioning him about the identity of his contact at the other end.

9th February.

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11th February.

Burt telephoned to ask me whether I would see a [redacted] who was an Australian officer working under Colonel Spry. [redacted] wished to have photographs or facsimiles of visas and exit stamps [redacted] from Iron Curtain countries which were normally put on passports. It is apparently Colonel Spry's idea that these should be circulated to his port officers.

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turned up and was seen by Malcolm and myself. In the interim Malcolm had ascertained that somebody had compiled a book of these stamps and that possibly more up-to-date ones could be obtained from the passport office or other sources. They have undertaken to let have these in due course.

has been in Germany and Austria for the last few years screening D.Ps going to Australia. This had brought him into contact with the defector problem. He seemed a pleasant and sensible person and should, I think, be an asset to A.S.I.C. While in Germany and Austria he has had very close contact with the American C.I.C., for whom he has a high regard.

Derby came to see me to ask my permission to show certain intercepts on There is an individual here signing himself "N.N."; who is in communication with and evidently has an interest in running an agent in Leningrad. This seems to link up with a story Dunderdale told me when I last saw him in August.

I have read a resumé by Kit Steel of Forestal's diaries, which are being published in the United States. The work seems worth reading. Kit Steel draws attention to the following points:-

i) the reactions of the Americans to having world responsibilities handed to them by us were initially ones of extreme irritation and of misunderstanding or lack of appreciation of our basic economic weakness.

This was very apparent at the time of our withdrawal from Greece. Gradually, however, Forestal became more and more aware of the part which America would have to play in future. In 1947 he was showing increasing concern at the way the Truman administration was allowing domestic political considerations go come before what he considered as the interests of national security. The Palestine situation was a glaring example. Forestal feared that the United States would lost the friendship, not only of the Arabs but of the whole Moslem world with its 400M people. He said: "I would be derelict in my duty if I did not point out what I thought were the consequences of any particular policy which would endanger the security of this country. I said that I was merely directing my efforts to lift the question out of politics; that is to have the two parties agree they would not compete for votes on this issue. I said I was forced to repeat to Franklin D. Roosevelt Jnr. what I had said to McGrath in response to the latters observation that our failure to go along with the Zionists might lose the States of New York, Pennsylvania and California, but I thought it was about time that somebody should pay some consideration to whether we might not lost the United States".

After two appeals to Marshall, on 12th and 18th February, 1948, to find a non-partisan policy, Forestal abandoned his own efforts to that end, but not before he had become the target for the bitterest criticism of his career. He was fallen upon by journalists and commentators, such as Walter Winchell and Drew Pearson, who probably contributed considerably to the acute persecution complex which led to Forestal's ultimate suicide.

Forestal records that on a visit to General MacArthur on 28th February, 1945, the latter regarded as essential the committments of the Russians to an active and vigorous campaign against the Japanese in Manchukuo, on such

proportions as to pin down a very large part of the Japanese Army, so that the Americans could invade Japan itself. There was, of course, wide agreement on the military importance of getting the Soviet Union into the war against Japan at the time of the signing of the Yalta agreement

Forestal's opinion of MacArthur was that he had a high degree of professional ability mortgaged, however, to his sensitivity and vanity.

An interesting entry on the 13th September, 1948, during the Berlin crisis, reveals President Truman as informing Forestal that he prayed that he would never have to make a decision to use the atomic bomb, but that if it became necessary nobody need have misgivings but that he would do so. At a meeting with a group of newspaper publishers and editors on the following day unanimous agreement is recorded that in the event of war the American people would not only have no question as to the propriety of the use of the bomb, but that in fact expect it to be used.

At a Government meeting on the 16th March, 1945, Roosevelt indicated considerable difficulty with British relations and, in a semi-jocular manner of speaking, stated that the British were perfectly willing for the United States to have a war with Russia in time, and that in his opinion to follow the British programme would be to proceed to that end.

Although Forestal t ought England would inevitably go Socialist in the post-war elections, he did not seem to be unduly alarmed. Apart from apparently showing the distinction between Socialism and Communism, he expressed the view that either Russia or the United States could become Communistic"because both of us have the raw materials, population and production necessary to the creation of a Socialist State", but England did not have these things and that such a nation could only become Communistic if we, the United States, underwrote the transaction.

12th February.

I gave a lecture to the Police course to-day.

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Dick returned to-day after a successful visit to the U.S.A. and Canada. He had long talks with the F.B.I., but seems to have reached the same conclusions as other visitors, namely, that although they have great advantages in manpower, they are not so well organised to produce good results as we are. He gave an example of a request by Hoover for a report on the Edith COPLAN case to be on his desk by 9 a.m. It took no less than 30 operators, working all night, to do the job. Arthur Martin could probably have produced a similar report in a couple of hours! Equally, on B.1 cases the Americans are far less well-informed about activities of the C.P. in the U.S.A. than we are about British Communists. Their records are so diffuse and their organisation so sectionalised, that it is difficult to produce the officers they want.

Winston's visit seems to have been a great success. The Ambassador remarked to Dick that it was astonishing how opposition melted in front of him on matters which he, the Ambassador, had been plugging away at for months

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Roger Hollis has spoken to the D.G. about "Survey" and a letter has been drafted in suitable terms for Bridges, with a copy to General Maclean.

13th February.

Malcolm tells me that in the case of LINKIEWICZ, about which I took so much trouble with Newsam, it has now been discovered that there is no brother in Scotland at the hostel where he is said to reside, nor anywhere else as far as we can ascertain , from which it should follow tha there is no LINKIEWICZ in Poland. It may be, of course, that S.I.S. have got the name wrong. It is slightly irritating that this was not discovered before.

There is a rather interesting revival of the NOULLENS case. The French police found a man gagged and bound in Paris, who said that he had been working for the Russians and that a man who used the name of HAMADAN was travelling to America as a Soviet agent on a certain ship. A description was given indicating that this man had three gold teeth and a slight squint in one eye. He was travelling on a British passport.

The F.B.I. checked up at New York and discovered a man called EDEL who answered to the description, and on looking at his photograph they detected a strong likeness to NOULLENS @ RUEGG, the Soviet agent who in the thirties had run the Far Eastern Bureau for the Comintern in Shanghai. Both RUEGG and his wife had been arrested by the Chinese, but are believed to have been released in 1934, since when nothing further had been heard about them.

Records show that RUEGG's alias at that time was HAMADAN. EDEL has apparently been living here for some time and runs a small business. The whole story sounds too good to be true.

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14th February.

were brought to see me by Hill. I thanked them both for the assistance they had given us in reporting on the large quantities of steel tubing which were going to West Africa about a year or eighteen months ago, and I explained to them the dangers of this traffic. They have recently reported an order, which came to them through a firm in Bristol, for steel tubing for Ireland. Unfortunately they turned the order down, but thinks that he may be able to discover the name of the purchaser.

had known by brother David, who had given him advice on security matters during the war. He wanted to know whether there was anyone here with whom he should make contact. I told him that we were only really concerned with classified contracts, but that if at any time they were given a secret contract, we should be placing someone in touch with him. Incidentally, he fishes the Llanover water!

I went to see Newsam. He gave me particulars of four individuals who were being considered for a Russian professorship at Nottingham University. He was anxious that we should let him know if any of them were undesirable. He did not wish for anything to be put in writing.

The L.U. has shown one of them, to be a Communist. This man was educated at St. Paul's School and Balliol College, Oxford. He has been lecturer in Russian at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in London since 1943. He was also, from 1949 - 1950 Senior Fellow of the Russian Institute at Columbia University.

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15th February.

I had a long talk on the telephone with Howard of the Home Office. He wanted to know whether we were prepared to let the Irish, with whom conversations were to be opened in Dublin next week, have our G. Circulars. I said that I should have to look into this and let him know.

He then gave me a brief outline of the proposals for dealing with aliens coming from Eire. He said that Article I of the Aliens Order would have to be amended and special provision made for the registration of aliens coming to this country from Eire. Persons with valid national passports who did not need a visa, and persons who did need a visa and have one, will be told to register within three months and not to take up employment without reference to the Ministry of Labour. Those who should have a visa but have not got one, and those who are using travel documents are to be told to register with the Police forthwith. In order to deal with aliens who have crossed the border from South to Northern Ireland, an order will have to be given that those whose last abode was in the Republic of Eire should register with the Police forthwith. No provision has so far been made for resident aliens in Northern Ireland.

I asked Howard to keep me informed about any measures proposed to mitigate the effect of taking off Immigration controls at the Western Ports, as we should like to comment on them. Clearly Howard is very dubious about the whole scheme and was never really in favour of it. Personally, I think it extremely doubtful whether in the end we shall not have bad security for the same price that we paid for good security. What seems to be happening is that the Home Office are placing the responsibility upon other people and that an extra burden will fall upon the Police.

Howard then talked to me about the mechanisation of the Central Register of Aliens. He said that the Home Office had given the matter considerable thought and that he thought it might be useful if Weiler attended our meeting. I said I thought it might be better for us to get the Intelligence requirements clear first, but that I should very much like to have a talk with Weiler, and also to have a list of the Home Office requirements in the event of the Index being mechanised. I should then be able to see how far they overlap with Intelligence requirements.

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I asked John Marriott and Robertson about G. Circulars. They did not think that they should be given to the Irish.

I talked to the Police course who seemed to be more than usually enthusiastic about the course and the way in which they had been received here.

18th February.

I saw Jones, Lodge and Weiler from the Home Office Aliens Branch, on the question of the mechanisation of Post Report and the Central Aliens Register. Only two facts of major importance emerged. Firstly, it was clear that any sorting operation, involving 200,000 cards, would be a very considerable one: it would not be possible to sort more than about 15,000 an hour and then, of course, there would be further sorting of a limited category and, above all, the replacement of the cards. It seemed, therefore, desirable, if possible, to limit the number of cards to be sorted; this could either be done by eliminating high age groups and dull-witted agriculturists, and so on, or by arranging the cards in cuts, such as nationality cuts. Secondly, for their own purposes, the Home Office would need something like 65 punches out of 68 for each card. Thier Index would have to be alphabetical and could not be sub-divided in cuts on a nationality basis. It seemed, therefore, that we should have to make our own cards, which should be restrifted to purely Intelligence uses.

The Home Office apparently have a statistical branch which works a Power-Samas machine. This machine gives the answers to many Parliamentary questions on crime and other problems, like road accidents, etc. It could be used for sorting our cards provided our demands were not excessive. If we made our own Index cards there might just be a possibility that the Home Office would be prepared to keep they up to date, but it is doubtful whether they would do so without either funds or personnel. It also seems doubtful whether the Home Office will ultimately be prepared to mechanise their own Aliens Register for their own purposes; the argument will be that they have doen without this for so many years that there is no reason, particularl in times like these, for them to change the system. They are not, however, uninterested in our efforts and the representative of the statistical branch would be quite interested to take on the job.

I told them that we were holding a meeting of interested departments in order to get clear in our minds the items which we wanted to get categorised; we should then consider how this could be done as economicall as possible.

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22nd February.

I saw Roger to-day on my return, having been away for a few days. He had, in my absence, taken the meeting on the mechanisation of Post Report. The meeting had come to the conclusion that the operation should be confined largely to Post Report and, having got some idea of the Intelligence requirements, these were given to the G.C.H.Q. Hollerith expert to work out the most effective and economical way of handling the proposition. He is to submit a report.

I heard from Dick that a decision had been reached to place us under the Home Office. It seems likely that Winston on his return from the U.S., where security matters were obviously touched on, asked to see the Brook Report. He was probably told that these recommendations had been put into effect, except in the case of Ministerial responsibility. He had simply said "This should lie with the Home Secretary - get on with it".

I talked to the D.G. and it was agreed that Serpell should put up a draft after consultation with Dick, Hollis, and myself. This draft should show, very broadly, what the functions and ramifications of the Security Service are. This could then be left with the Home Secretary to study. The D.G. himself, however, would like a short bried indicating special points to which he should draw attention.

25th February.

I had a meeting with Hill and Dick about the case of Dr. Paul WEST, a naturalised-British journalist of German origin, who had been communicating information to a Dr. PLATOW in Germany about the Anglo-German Debts Conference in London.

PLATOW runs a kind of news agency, which has evidently been collecting information in German Government circles by bribing officials. His offices have been raided and the Germans are now wanting us to interrogate Dr. WEST. Hill finds this difficult, since WEST is a journalist and no charge of espionage under Section I could really be preferred against him. An interrogation, therefore, would lead to action under Section 2, which has in the past got us into trouble where journalists are concerned. We cannot use the O.S.A. to interrogate a journalist in order to obtain the sources of his information, unless there is strong presumtive evidence that he is a spy. We do not wish to point out this weakness to the Germans; it has therefore been suggested that we should send an interim reply to Int. Div. and meanwhile get to try and ascertain how the leakage occurred. I am inclined to think that WEST got it from the German Consulate here.

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Newsam said that he had always thought that this was the right idea, but that of course the Home Office would not take any responsibility for our activities.

I said I found it difficult to see how they could avoid doing so, since if the Department was attacked somebody would have to defend it in the House of Commons.

Newsam then went on to complain about the publicity which M.I.5 had. I said that nobody deprecated it more than we did. He thought that we should operate entirely as a Secret Service department and that our affairs should not be allowed to become the subject of discussion in the House of Commons. He then asked me to tell the D.G. that he would be coming over to see us.

I was more than ever convinced that Newsam has little idea of what the work and ramifications of this department are. I think he imagines it as a little research organisation which can provide appreciations for the Home Secretary on subversive movements in this country and can operate in aid of the Police.

27th February.

28th February.

Luke of the Colonial Office telephoned to say that he was proposing to raise the question of a Director of Intelligence for Malaya at the J.I.C. had had a telegram from Gerald Templer regretting that he could not get Dick and turning down Keller and Courtenay Young. Personally, I did not know that either of the two latter had been put forward as possible for the job. I said that I had no objection, and at the J.I.C. meeting I made it clear that in our view all the blue-printing for an Intelligence organisation and for the procurement and collation of the project had been laid down more than once. The trouble was that the working tools, in the shape of a Police organisation containing the requisite elements of the population was not in existence; it was rather like expecting the Siamese Police to take over from the City Police and hoping to get any co-operation out of the public. The cart, therefore, was to some extent before the horse. In my view, a man like Dick White, who is carrying an extremely important job in this country, would be wasting his talents, and we should merely be robbing Peter to pay Paul. Nevertheless, it was clearly necessary to have someone to take advantage of every opening. He would have to combine firmness with tact, since there were obvious differences between the representatives of the Malayan, Palestinian and Indian Police services. The J.I.C. were asked to forward names. Meanwhile, Gerald Templer, according to his telegram, had approached Morton in order to make another bid for his services.

Luke has in mind making an approach to 'C' for the services of I said I did not think that he would be a bad choice.

I spoke to Hilken after the meeting about the rumour that AMOS, an American who runs a news sheet, publishing a story that a member of Mountbatten's staff was a Communist and that Mountbatten himself would have

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a Left Wing influence in Palace circles. Hilken said that he had spoken to Mountbatten. The latter was incensed, although he realised that suggestions about his influence on the Queen were to be expected. He was, however, taking particular care to avoid giving any sort of credence to these suggestions. He ran through the names of people on his staff, of which Hilken unfortunately did not make a note; he regarded them as all above reproach and could think of no basis for AMOS's story.

Hilken had informed the First Sea Lord about the whole incident, and he, the First Sea Lord, would give a warning to Sir Alan Lascelles; there was therefore nothing to be done.

Drew appeared before the J.I.C. on 28.2.52 to give some account of the work of the Forward Planning Section, of which he is Director.

1. Introduction.

He began by explaining that he had been charged with this work about eighteen months ago by the Chiefs of Staff, and co-ordinated his activities very closely with those of the Directors of Plans. He explained how the work of deception, which had been practised with such signal success during the war against the Germans, presented an entirely different problem in a peacetime situation against the Russians.

In considering the nature of the information in which we wanted the Russians to believe, he had at first found himself in some difficulty owing to the indefinite nature of our own plans. But this situation was gradually becoming clearer and it was now the policy when formulating plans either in Europe, the Middle East or Far East to consider at the same time a suitable cover plan. One had been formulated in the Far East, matters were less advanced in the Middle East; and only a beginning had been made in S.H.A.P.E.

2. Channels.

Meanwhile, F.P.S. had been considering suitable channels for the transmission of deception to the enemy.

a) There were, of course, the classical ones, namely, double agents, but the old difficulty remained of being quite sure that these channels were really sound. If they were not, any attempt to use them for deception purposes might produce precisely the reverse effect of what was intended. For these channels he looked largely to M.I.5 and M.I.6, but for obvious reasons they were not and could not be as plentiful or effective as they were in the case of Germany during the war.

b) It had therefore been necessary to consider other methods of making contact with the enemy, and as a first step he had launched various projects with a view to seeing whether they produced any sort of reaction in enemy quarters. In this connection he mentioned, without giving any details, a project in Gibraltar, one in Singapore, information put through M.I.6 agents with C.P. connections, the placing of rumours through industrialists in the Middle East, the starting of a chain of correspondence to Egypt on the assumption that the letters would be opened by the Egyptian authorities, and the sending of letters to the Far East with the object of their falling into Russian hands. At home he had found a

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a Government official who had established some sort of personal relations with a member of the Russian Mission in this country.

c) He had also explored Press channels. Through a newspaper feature agency in Switzerland, which sells articles to newspapers in other countries, he had been able to plant a certain amount of naval information. As a further special project he had started a News Letter, on the basis of knowledge that the Russians were considerably intrigued by information put out in this form. He had considered the Economist News Letter, which he knew to be the subject of interested study by the Soviet Embassy as an organ which they thought represented Government opinion. Unfortunately, however, this paper dealt more with opinions than with facts and was not, therefore, suitable to his purposes even if he could have persuaded the management to allow him to make use of it. He had therefore decided to set up his own News Letter, known as "Survey", and had done this by arrangement with the three Vice-Chiefs of Staff and other Departments, the idea being that it should circulate freely overseas and in the United States. Having gained the confidence of his readers in the accuracy and independent nature of this paper, he thought that it might at the appropriate moment be able to carry major deception policy.

At this point he said that he wished to tender a complete and abject apology to the Director General of the Security Service for what had appeared in the last issue of "Survey". The information was put out in his absenceabroad and he had taken special steps to see that nothing of the kind ever occurred again.

3. Present Plans.

His present plans were:

a) To build up a false order of battle. This would apply almost entirely to the Army, and to some extent to the Air Force. Deception with regard to the Navy was, for obvious reasons, too difficult.

b) To put over a cover plan for our wartime mobilisation plans.

c) To implement the Far Eastern cover plan.

d) To implement the Middle Eastern cover plan when it had been formulated.

e) To formulate, in conjunction with the 3rd U.S. Air Force, a suitable cover plan for submission and approval to the Air Ministry which would be designed to diminish the threat to U.S. Air Force bases.

f) To assist in formulating a cover plan for S.H.A.P.E. and to help, in conjunction with F.P.S. opposite numbers in the United States, in putting it across.

4. Drew then spoke about his liaison with the United States and with the Dominions.

Liaison.

He had close relations with what is known as the Orange Team in the United States, although neither he nor his colleagues felt that that organisation was sufficiently linked with the Planning Staff to be really effective.

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The Australians, whom he had just visited, were anxious to set up a section equivalent to his own and would be prepared to co-operate.

The Canadians, whom he had not yet approached, he thought would also be receptive to the idea.

In general he hoped that if his various projects developed satisfactorily there should be some foundation on which to build if war broke out, and some chance in the meantime of misleading the enemy as regards our intentions and capabilities.

5. Owing to the presence of Colonel Betts throughout this discussion, it was not possible for me to press Drew for additional information. I therefore confined my remarks to three points:

a) On behalf of the D.G. I accepted his apology for the publication in the last issue of "Survey".

b) I said that such channels as might be provided by the Security Service were established primarily for counter-espionage purposes, the object being to ascertain as much as possible about the enemy's technique and contacts in this country, and that we must therefore remain the judges of whether any particular information was suitable for passing through any particular agent. Subject to these considerations, we were doing all we could to assist.

Drew said that he fully accepted this proviso.

c) I thought, too, it was desirable that we should be kept as fully informed as possible of the various projects which Drew had in hand, since failure in this respect might cause us embarrassment or lead us to conduct enquiries which would endanger the security of the work Drew himself was doing.

This point was also accepted by Drew.

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There was a general discussion on existing officer vacancies. The were reported as follows:

C. Division: C.1 - an officer to assist Mr. Gainsford.
C.2.- a replacement for the vacancy caused by Cdr. Johnstone.

B. Division: in addition to the æplacement for Mr. Hackney, two officers to replace Mr. Panton and Mr. Bullard.

O.S.Division: one officer for Iraq, one for S.I.F.E., and the possibility of officers for Malta and Aden.

It was agreed that a further batch of candidates should be seen as soon as possible.

There was a general discussion on the number of Senior Officer posts which each Director considered necessary in his Division, but further particulars of these will be circulated.

I told the D.G. about a further approach to Morton by Gerald Templer for the fofmer's services. I also gave him the gist of Drew's talk and apology at the J.I.C., and the developments in the Mountbatten affair.

29th February.

Dick, Roger and I considered a draft memorandum for the D.G. to leave with the Home Secretary, describing to him the main features of our office. We decided to scrap the other memorandum,with a more detailed description of the duties of each section, and to give the D.G. just a sheet with certain statistics, such as the number of staff employed at home and overseas, location of foreign stations, etc.

I showed the draft to the D.G., who agreed that this was what he wanted.

Luke telephoned to me to say that Gerald Templer had seen MORTON and that the latter had accepted the post of Intelligence adviser. This may in a way be a good thing, since MORTON certainly knows what is wanted. On the other hand, it will be still more difficult to fit him into this office at the end of another two to four years. Moreover, I foresee certain difficulties for Courtenay Young when he takes over S.I.F.E. MORTON will be in a stronger position to bring pressure to bear on S.I.F.E. in various ways and there may in the end be a demand for more of S.I.F.E's personnel to assist the Police in collecting Intelligence.

3rd March.

The D.G. told us at his meeting to-day about his interview with the Home Secretary and the instructions which he, the Home Secretary, had received from the Prime Minister to take responsibility for the Security Service.

Maxwell Fyfe began by saying that he regarded himself as "deputising for the Prime Minister". The D.G. then went on to tell him that while of

course he accepted the present position without demur, he would like to let the Home Secretary know what his previous objections had been when the proposal was first mooted in the Brook report. Firstly, as this department was involved in matters of defence with almost every department of the Government, it would make our work extremely difficult, if not impossible, if we were in any sense departmentalised within the Home Office.

Maxwell Fyfe gave an assurance that the words in the Brook report, namely, that the transfer"would not affect the direct relations maintained between the Security Service and many other departments. Nor would it mean that the Security Service would in any way become a part of the Home Office".were wholly acceptable to himself.

The D.G. then mentioned certain matters which he thought should be for the Prime Minister only, to which the Home Secretary replied that he recognised the need for the D.G. still to have access to the P.M. on delicate issues. Thirdly, he had objected on the ground that theplace the Security Service under the Home Office might give rise to the criticism that it was a Gestapo.

The D.G. then referred to the necessity for us to have access to the P.U.S' of any Government department in whose affairs we found ourselves concerned. The Home Secretary felt that our affairs should not go through P.U.S. at the Home Office except where he was specially concerned. Later in the interview he called in Newsam and informed him that this would be the position and that he himself was merely "deputising for the Prime Minister". The D.G. will therefore have direct access to the Home Secretary at any time he wishes. He made very clear that the Security Service would in no sense become a part of the Home Office.

Newsam raised the question of the Home Secretary's Parliamentary responsibilities. Maxwell Fyfe, rather to Newsam's surprise, said that he would of course take full responsibility if questions were asked about the Security Service as a whole, but on questions of detail he would in general reply that the answer "was not in the public interest". Newsam accepted the decision with a perfectly good grace and was obviously ready to help as and when the occasion arose.

4th March.

I saw Newsam to brief him on Ritter von Lex, who was calling and might possibly wish to discuss security matters.

Newsam evidently did not intend to become involved in this; he would merely talk about home administration.

There seems to be a strong case against John CAIRNCROSS, now in the Treasury and was at one time in Section V.

A piece of paper in his handwriting, giving notes on interview in 1939 with various officials in the Foreign Office and other departments, was found among documents belonging to BURGESS. As CAIRNCROSS is of the same Cambridge vintage as BURGESS and MACLEAN and knew them both, it looks very much as if he was at one time an agent of BURGESS.

He will be interrogated on the notes and asked for an explanation.

The D.D.M.I. telephoned to ask me who MORTON was; presumably the D.M.I. wished to know. I gave him a pen picture and said that I thought Gerald was very lucky to get him.

I talked to Martin about the disposal of B.Js, since I understand that if they are not specially marked they are destroyed at the end of the year. It seemed to me that certain categories, like Czech ISOS, ought to be retained indefinitely whether they concerned this country or not.

Martin explained that it really depended on the carding; it was no use keeping documents which were available in G.C.H.Q. unless they were carded.

5th March.

Thistle told me that, a propos of the Mountbatten incident, T.C. had shown that Mountbatten and his entourage were not only in touch with Peter MURPHY but also with PAVITT, a known Communist. We are looking into these two.

I talked to Walter Bell about his visit to Aden and Somaliland. He seemed to think there was a marginal case for having an officer in Aden, but no more. Generally, he felt that the S.L.O. - he was speaking particularly about Nairobi - had become a part of the local set-up and that his services were of value to the local authorities. If he were moved they would certainly feel the draught.

6th March.

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I lunched with Anthony (BLUNT) to-day. He told me first about the blackmailer, JENKINS, who had rung up the BASSETTs. Anthony wondered whether he had got certain documents from the flat in Bond Street through Jackie HEWITT. It appears that when the flat was searched by Ronnie Reed and someone else, they concentrated solely on BURGESS' papers. A suitcase of letters belonging to HEWITT was not touched. Anthony says that later on HEWITT remarked that there was not only his own correspondence but a considerable amount belonging to BURGESS in the case. HEWITT had disclosed this later but said that he had burned them all. Whether he took them with him and gave the diary to JENKINS is a possibility.

Anthony then told me that, quite fortuitously, a friend of his had obtained the name of the individual who alleged some time ago that he had actually seen BURGESS and MACLEAN in some cafe in the south of France. The individual's name was BARRINGTON-SMITH, who did know BURGESS and MACLEAN but, I gather, not very well. Whether he was merely telling this story for effect is uncertain.

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At the staff meeting to-day we had a long discussion about S.I.F.E. Dick was rather inclined to suggest that we should throw our best S.I.F.E. bodies into the police organisation in Malaya, and so improve the flow of Intelligence. At the moment there is little coming off the ground and very little coming from adjacent foreign territory. It was therefore rather difficult to see why S.I.F.E. were not wasting their time.

I said that this was all very fine, but that having improved the flow of Intelligence there would then be nobody left in S.I.F.E. to receive it and collate it, unless we were prepared to double our staff. However, there may be something in the idea.

Note on D.D.G's interview with Herr Ritter von Lex on 7.3.52.

Herr Ritter von Lex called here at 3 p.m. on March 7th, 1952, and stayed with me until 4.30 p.m.

1. I suggested to him that it might perhaps be useful if at the outset I gave him a brief account of the structure and responsibilities of our office and of the principles on which we worked.

I then explained to him that we were non-departmental, in the sense that we were not an integral part of any Ministry. We served all Ministries and held ourselves responsible to the particular Minister concerned for anything that we did on his behalf. If we were attacked in Parliament in a general way, it would probably be for the Home Secretary to reply, but there might be many occasions where a question would be answered by some other Minister whose department happened to be particularly concerned.

We were not executive in the strict sense of the word. If action under the law was required, it was generally taken through the Police Force in whose area the offence had been committed.

Our role was a purely defensive one. We did not concern ourselves with political matters which did not or were not likely to constitute a breach of the law. Our staff was non-political in the sense that its approach to any problem under our Charter was a professional one and entirely objective in its nature. We had no relations with the Press. We did not pass our information outside Government departments and we had the right to refuse information even to a Minister if a question of sources arose, or if we did not consider the request a valid one.

I explained that such a case would not normally arise, but that if it did there could always be an appeal to the Prime Minister.

Von Lex seemed interested to know that we were not concerned with pure politics, either internally or externally. He here explained to me some of his difficulties in the Laender, where politics were apt to play a considerable part.

2. I went on to explain to him that our objective was a purely defensive one; we were concerned with the defence of the realm from espionage and from any subversive activities of the Left or the Right which threatened the overthrow of the constitution by violent means. In pursuance of this objective we had two important and basic tasks to perform.

(i) To collect, assess and collate all available information within our Charter and to plan counter-measures. In order to get things in their proper perspective in the case of a movement or organisation which had international ramifications, it was necessary to study such movements as the Communist Party and the Russian and Satellite Intelligence Services on an international scale. We, therefore, made use of the machinery of Government whenever it could be of assistance in carrying out this task.

(ii) To advise and assist all Departments on all matters of protective security, or, in other words, on all security

/measures.....

measures designed to make an enemy's task more difficult and to force him into that kind of evasive action which might bring him to notice.

I stressed the importance to any organisation such as ours of having control over both these functions, which were complementary and basic to the maintenance of good security in any country.

3. On the intelligence and investigation side, I explained that we had our own sources which operated solely on British territory and that in addition to the normal methods of enquiry, such as the running of agents, we had certain powers of censorship without which it would not be possible to run an effective Service. These powers were, of course, limited and subject in each case to the Warrant of the Secretary of State, in whose office such powers had been inherent since the days of Cromwell.

Von Lex was particularly interested in this matter and explained to me that only with the authority of the equivalent of the Attorney General and in very special cases could he exercise such powers. There would therefore have to be some alteration in the basic law. I think I convinced him that some measure of censorship was essential if his Government was going to be properly informed on security issues.

Apart from these sources of our own, we obtained information from other departments, and on an exchange basis from our Allies, and finally from the Police.

In discussing the running of agents in this country, I made it clear that only ourselves and the Police were concerned. The latter could not be denied this right since they retained responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. We did, however, maintain close relations with the Police on this subject in order to prevent overlapping.

4. At this point I went into considerable details about our relations with the Police.

We had no authority over the Police, although certain sanctions could be applied in extreme cases. In practice, however, this was neither necessary nor desirable. Our relations existed on the basis of goodwill, and in our view this was the only basis on which satisfactory co-operation could be obtained. The Police had local knowledge which was not available to any other department, and it was essential that they should be sufficiently informed about matters of interest to our department to enable them to give us the kind of information which we required. We had, therefore, taken considerable trouble to build up satisfactory relations with all of the 156 independent Police Forces in this country, of which Scotland Yard was only one.

We had urged the Police to establish in each Force a Special Branch which concerned itself with subversive matters. In some Forces this might consist only of one man. We had then induced the Police to hold area meetings for Special Branch officers, to whom we sent lecturers on various aspects of our work. A representative of our office attended all Chief Constables' meetings, and representatives from the various Forces visited our office and were given a week's course of instruction.

In this manner we had improved both the quality and the quantity of the information we received. We were convinced from our experience that not only was it necessary to get the co-operation of the Police officers actually concerned in

/Special Branch matters....

Special Branch matters, but to make sure that their Chief Constables and Superintendents would give them the necessary support and encouragement.

Normally a policeman was judged on the success of his court cases. In Special Branch work court cases were comparatively few and far between. Unless, therefore, the higher officers were convinced of the importance of Special Branch work, interest was inclined to flag and those who were employed on Special Branch duties might well be ordered by their Superintendents to ignore the Special Branch side of the work in favour of criminal work.

These were psychological factors which I was convinced existed in all Police Forces. I could not, therefore, stress too strongly the importance of retaining the co-operation and goodwill of the whole Police hierarchy. Giving orders to Police chiefs to collaborate might look all right on paper, but it was entirely worthless unless the goodwill of all ranks was obtained. I hoped Von Lex would forgive me for stressing this point, but it seemed to me so basic to the procurement of good intelligence that it could not be emphasised too strongly. He was, I think, impressed by the importance of what I had to say on this subject.

5. I then stressed to Von Lex the importance of our office as a focal point for all information bearing on espionage and subversive movements. It was only by obtaining as wide a picture as possible that we could assess the weak points in our information and set up the necessary machinery to fill the gaps. This meant a highly centralised set of detailed records, against which information received could be assessed and collated.

6. I then discussed protective security, which we believed to be inseparable from the function of acquiring and collating information. While our organisation played a guiding role and gave assistance in a variety of ways, it was important that responsibility for protective security should be largely decentralised upon Ministries. It had therefore been laid down by the Prime Minister that the Minister of any department carried full responsibility for his own domestic security, and that where necessary he should appoint a Security Officer and staff to carry out these duties. Our role was to give assistance to all departments by advice and on the basis of our centralised records.

Protective security was of two kinds:

(i) Measures designed to bring a man up against authority. I here explained that the visa was the first point where a man was brought up against authority; when he made his application he had to give some account of himself and the purpose of his visit. The next point was when he arrived at the port or the frontier and was interrogated by the Immigration authorities. The third point was when he had to register with the Police.

There were also other points where a man was brought up against authority, which were not necessarily designed for security purposes but which could be advantageously made use of. A consideration of the various accounts that a man might give of himself and his business might show discrepancies which would cause us to investigate his activities more closely.

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(ii) The other basic form of protective security consisted of measures designed to keep a man away from places where he might do harm. This was normally achieved by guards, pass systems, etc., and by a process of screening on the basis of records and further enquiries.

The first problem was for each Minister to decide which parts of his department really contained information vital to the security of the State. Unless this were done the problem was likely to become unmanageable. Having decided where these vulnerable points existed, it was necessary, metaphorically speaking, to put a ring round them and to see that no-one who was unreliable could obtain access to them.

The importance of this function could not be over-emphasised, since there were only two fields in which an investigation branch could detect a spy. One was where he procured the information and the other was where he imparted it to some unauthorised person. If, therefore, he once got inside the ring, enquiry in the procurement field was unlikely to produce results. There remained only the field where he imparted his information to some unauthorised person, and this he might do only at extremely infrequent intervals.

This concluded my talk and we then went on to consider the application of our methods and principles to present day conditions in Western Germany.

7. We had already discussed the importance of having responsibilities clearly defined, but had agreed that such Charters were of little value unless full co-operation from all departments could be obtained on the basis of goodwill. Difficult as this might be on account of the varying political situations in the Laender, it was of paramount importance that co-operation on those lines should be achieved. It was essential that the BfV should be the real focal point for all security intelligence for Western Germany, and it should have comprehensive and accurate records on the basis of which information could be checked and reliable appreciations supplied to the Federal Government. It was as important for the BfV to obtain the support and confidence of the Laender as it was for the Laender to establish good relations with the Police. It seemed to me that there were two ways in which the BfV might improve its relations with the Laender.

(i) The BfV might establish in each Land a liaison officer, either in a separate office or in the Land office, not, at any rate at the outset, with the idea of giving directions to the Land, but purely for the purpose of mutual exchange of information. Such an officer would obviously have to be very carefully selected as much would depend upon his personality. It might also be possible to have some reciprocal arrangement by which each Land appointed a liaison officer with the BfV.

(ii) It would be necessary for the Laender to feel that they were deriving benefit from such a liaison. If, therefore, powers of censorship were vested solely in the BfV they would clearly have something to seel which would not normally be available to the Land offices.

As the central records of the BfV improved in quantity and in quality, so the Laender would come to realise the benefits of closer co-operation.

Both these ideas seemed to appeal to Von Lex and it was clearly his intention to give them careful thought.

/8. .....

8. In addition to the Police there were other organisations controlling frontiers, etc., which might with advantage be harnessed in to serve the common purpose which the BfV had in mind, and which would be of particular value in setting up an efficient protective security machine.

Von Lex seemed to think that this could be achieved without very great difficulty.

9. In the matter of running agents, it was agreed that this could not be denied either to the Police or to the Laender for three reasons:

(i) They could not divest themselves of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in their own locality.

(ii) Nothing would prevent the ordinary citizen from reporting breaches of security or subversive activities to the local authorities.

(iii) It would normally be difficult, if not impossible, to exercise control over an agent at long distance.

At the same time, it was of paramount importance that such activities should be guided and controlled by some central authority. As confidence grew and the basic records of the BfV improved, such guidance and control would become more acceptable both as between the BfV and the LfVs and the Laender and the Police. Moreover, the information received at the BfV would be capable of proper assessment.

8th March, 1952.

At the D.G's meeting to-day we discussed the telegrams from Morton, which seemed to conflict somewhat with Gerald Templer's. Morton's telegram showed that he had reserved his decision on whether or not to accept the appointment until he had come home and discussed the matter, whereas Gerald seemed to imply that Morton had agreed to accept the appointment.

The only thing that has been agreed, as far as we can see, is that, pending Morton's absence on leave, Leighton should carry the job of D.I.S. Morton thinks that he should receive additional pay and asks our advice. We feel that Morton should make his terms with the Malayan Government and that Leighton should get 90% in Morton's absence.

The D.G. is going to discuss this matter with Lloyd.

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11th March.

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13th March.

At the J.I.C. to-day there was a long discussion about Russian strategy in the event of war 1952-1955.

The D.N.I. had recast the J.I.S. paper. One of the main points discussed was whether the Russians would be first to use the atomic bomb in Pearl Harbour fashion. D.N.I. and D.M.I. thought that the political disadvantages to the Russians in doing this would be so great that they would wait for the Americans. The Air Ministry, on the other hand thought that if their principal aim and object was to knock out bases from which our atomic attack could be delivered, they would be likely to strike without warning.

Personally I was rather inclined to doubt the D.N.I's contention, since the Russians were quite capable by propaganda of twisting events in such a manner as to persuade their superiors that the first blow had in fact been delivered by the Americans.

In discussion it seemed that the point was not really so material as it had first appeared, since it seemed almost certain that the Americans would use the atomic bomb on the first signs of serious Russian agression, and that of course if they did the Russians would retaliate immediately. Equally, it seemed that, discomcerting as it would be both for us and the Americans to get an atomic bomb without warning, it was unlikely that any such action would have a decisive result. It would merely lead to the Americans hitting back in full measure.

At the Appointments Board meeting to-day it was agreed to diapose of a number of direct telephone lines, as recommended by D.E./A., subject to the retention of the Foreign Office, Scotland Yard, War Office and Colonel Allan, G.P.O. Further investigation would be made into the possibility of giving up one line to the Aliens Registration Office, High Holborn and also the line to Post Office Engineers.

The Board agreed to appoint a Working Party to examine the classification , distribution and control of Secret Documents. D.C. would consider whether Mr. Mitchell could undertake the Chairmanship of the Working Party.

D.E./A. indicated that our Application Forms for staff covered a number of the questions asked on the new Government Security Questionnaire. The Board agreed that it was undesirable to use the Government form and that we should prepare a supplementary one embracing the questions not included in our own. We should require all members of the staff to complete this form, as well as new applicants, but we should not approach attached personnel.

D.B. mentioned that he was anxious to start a special vetting section under Mr. Clayton. This was agreed in principle; details to be discussed between D.B. and D.E./A.

D.E./A reported that Mr. Findlater was no longer available for the special job with C.2 and it was agreed to review the files of recent candidates to see if there were any suitable names amongst them.

Staff Postings.

i) D.O.S. indicated that he was prepared to leave the filling of the vacancies at Baghdad and Malta for the moment.

ii) It was agreed to post Mr. Cuckney to the Canal Zone.

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14th March.

I had a long discussion with Simkins about Tommy HARRIS.

Nicholas Elliott has reported on a conversation that he has had with Eileen PHILBY. She says that while she had been suspicious about Kim, she had come to the conclusion that he was entirely innocent. She had, however, been worried by a question put to her by Tommy HARRIS, after he and Kim had been drinking fairly heavily. Eileen had retired to bed. Tommy came upstairs and said there was a question that he wished to put to her which she need not answer. He wanted to know whether she "had been in this business with Guy". The following morning he more or less apologise for his behaviour and asked her to forget all about it. She then told him that of course she had never been involved in anything of the kind. She knew that Tommy and his wife were at loggerheads, since when visiting them a short time ago they had found them in the middle of a row - Tommy saying that Hilda could go off if she liked and that he was going to pack up the whole place in London and go back to Mallorca. Eileen thought this rather savoured of the BURGESS get-away.

All this seems to me to be utter nonsense. It may well be that Tommy has had a row with Hilda, but this has happened before and I should say would likely to blow over quite easily. In fact they are both fairly jealous of each other. This may well have caused Tommy to start drinking again, which of course is extremely bad for him. The important question to my mind is what prompted Tommy to put the question to Eileen. I find it difficult, if not almost impossible, to see that such a question in any way reflects upon Tommy himself. It is, however, possible that in the course of a long discussion with Kim, ~~that~~ Tommy had become slightly apprehensive about Kim's part in the whole affair. It is even possible that Kim may have in fact said something which in Tommy's view definitely implicated him. Alternatively, Tommy may have been treating the whole business as a case and trying to eliminate one by one all those who could conceivably have betrayed to BURGESS that definite interest was being taken in MACLEAN. The trouble with his wife, coupled with an uncomfortable feeling about his best friend, may well have driven Tommy to a desire to clear out of it and settle down to his painting in the sunny atmosphere of Mallorca.

Another point that Eileen made was that Tommy had said that he had been keeping on his business here for a cause. She inferred that he meant

the Communist cause, but obviously had no possible grounds on which to place her assumption. The cause might well be that what he was doing was in the interests of the export trade, since he has been selling a number of pictures to the United States.

I cannot help thinking that Eileen and S.I.S. are both clutching at a straw which they feel may exonerate Kim. Personally I should like to have the whole thing out of Tommy, but I shall then be upon to the accusation by S.I.S. that they having given us an "important intelligence lead" I go down and have it out with the suspect.

The question was then raised as to why Tommy had not discussed the matter with me. This I can well understand. He may feel uncomfortable about Kim, his best friend, and unable to tell me about it as what he would have to say would not in any sense amount to proof and would merely cast further suspicion on Kim, possibly unjustifiably.

It is really shocking that such an impasse should have arisen and that such havoc could be created in peoples' private lives through the action of a little skunk like BURGESS.

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rang me up about the TAIPHONG network. He seemed to agree entirely with our view that it should be closed down; he was, however, making arrangements to consult the French.

I had a further discussion about Tommy HARRIS with Dick and Anthony Simkins. Dick had been wondering whether he could talk to Kim on the lines that his case was bound to be solved sooner or later, and that while it might be solved now on the basis of a Gentlemens' Agreement, this could not be done if proof were later established of Kim's guilt. He might, therefore, be wise to reconsider his position and talk to us more frankly about his past.

This is, of course a possibility, but I doubt whether it would work. We also discussed whether I could make any approach to Tommy. I said that it would be quite natural for me to ring him up, and in fact unnatural not to do so since I was aware of the fact that he had been in London for the last five weeks. Dick saw no harm in t is but did not think I could discuss Kim unless Tommy opened the ball. There was, in addition, the attitude that S.I.S. have adopted. I am thinking of having a talk with 'C'.

17th March.

At his meeting to-day the D.G. again raised the question of the postings of Senior Officers. He was worried about Senior Officers returning from abroad who had to serve under section officers, and I think particularly he had in mind the case of , who finds that he has not got enough to do and wants to move. We had, of course, wanted to send him out to S.I.M.E., but at that time the D.G. did not feel that he could spare him and I gather that he feels that could be more usefully employed at home.

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I said that we were still reviewing the position but that we had many things to sort out which were by no means easy. I promised him that we would have another look into the whole question.

The Home Secretary, Maxwell-Fyfe, came over for a cocktail party which we gave for him. He was accompanied by Newsam and his Private Secretary. He saw the Registry and the SixthFloor and was apparently much impressed. I had a long conversation with him and I think he enjoyed his visit.

18th March.

I gave my usual lecture to the Police. One of the things that is worrying them more than anything relates to requests which they receive from factories, including Royal Ordnance factories, to vet their personnel.

I explained that such vetting as we did had to be restricted to places where really secret information existed. This did not apply in the case of R.O. factories, but there was, on the other hand, a danger of sabotage. In this matter we could only rely upon the Ordnance factory Inspectors. On the other hand, we were all in favour of any assistance from the Police that they could give within their discretion to R.O. factories or other important factories.

I gathered that there was to be a meeting between the Police and the Home Office, when some sort of policy in these matters may emerge. I urged the Police Officers to raise this matter in more detail with Graham Mitchell.

The D.G. gave a luncheon party at the Connaught Hotel for Mr. GUNDERSEN, the Norwegian Minister of Justice, and Mr. , who is responsible within the Norwegian Police for counter-espionage and counter-subversion. Both GUNDERSEN and had had talks with Dick White and Hollis, and is to see B.2. They both made an extremely favourable impression and there is no doubt that they have had interesting experiences in dealing with the Russians. They seem very conscious of the possibility that in the event of war one of the first acts of the Russians will be to establish submarine bases in Norway.

19th March.

The Mountbatten story has broken in Amos's Digest, although we do not know yet how far the matter has been taken up by other organs of the Press.

20th March.

I lunched with He was very anxious to know about the agitation going on in the Daily Worker, which published a facsimile of a shoulder-strap "U.S.S.R.", alleged to indicate that we were forming an Army of Russians in this country for use in a future war.

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The War Office and the Ministry of Supply had refused to comment.

I said that while it seemed to me there must be something behind the story, the interpretation placed upon it by the Daily Worker could not possibly have any foundation, but I would try and get him the answer since his Ambassador had expressed interest and was rather chiding that with all his contacts he was unable to find out a simple little matter like that!

At the Appointments Board meeting to-day we considered a cable received from H/S.I.M.E., which dealt mainly with his desire to retain the Beirut post. It was considered that no decision on this matter could be reached until D.O.S. was present.

D.E/A reported that C.C. Bucks had offered us the services of It was agreed that we should proceed with his references and ultimately Board him.

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D.B. reported that he had been considering the filling of the vacancy created by the death of Mr. HACKNEY, and he felt that there would be much advantage in appointing an officer with B. Division experience, preferably from B.2., to the post - at any rate for a limited period. This was agreed in principle and D.B. said he would go into the matter with Mr. Storrier.

21st March.

I saw Newsam. He seemed pleased with his visit here and the Home Secretary had also enjoyed it. The latter was apparently impressed by his talks with the Directors and has apparently got the impression that we are a fairly competent lot, which is all to the good!

The purpose of my visit was to take over to Newsam the returns of H.O.Ws for the year. I left the list with him.

I telephoned to and told him the answer to his query about U.S.S.R. shoulder badges. It seems that these were made, with a number of others, in 1942 as an advance preparation for the liberation of the Continent. Presumably it was anticipated that a certain number of Russians might escape and get back to this country, when these badges would be used in the same way that those prepared for the Poles, Czechs and other nationalities were ultimately used after D. Day.

Silverman has got a question down in the House for next Tuesday, which should provide the Government with an opportunity to make capital out of the Daily Worker's propaganda stunt. It might well be said that these badges were prepared with a view to lending assistance to the remnants of any Russian forces which might escape or be rescued by British warships, and that so far from representing any present hostile intentions, it is further proof - if that were needed - of the extent to which we were prepared to go to assist the Russians in the early days of the war when they were on the run and throwing their arms away. We should then go on to enumerate the extent of British and American aid that they gave to the Russians at that time, and for which virtually no thanks have ever been received.

22nd March.

I had a talk with Hill to-day about his investigations into W.E.X., which is engaged in East/West trade. He has had several successful operations; in particular, one where the Turks were selling copper, ostensibly destined for this country but actually to be diverted in the free port of Rotterdam. An approach was made to the Turkish Government and the export has been prohibited.

There are three companies here which are concerned: the W.E.X., working with Hungary, Brenner working with Czechoslovakia, and Dahl working with Poland. The good never touch this country, but a lot of business transactions are centred here in London. We have yet to find what part if any of the proceeds go to finance the Communist Party. Hill has various ideas about this but so far we have nothing concrete.

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24th March.

of the A.S.I.O. called to see me. He is particularly interested in the security of Operation HURRICANE in Australia and is over here for consultations.

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25th March.

Searight and Green of the J.I.C. paid a visit to the office. I gave them a general talk on the principles of the work and a skeleton of the organisation. They were to see the other Directors.

I talked to Macdonald about the mechanisation of Post Report. The examination carried out by a representative of G.C.H.Q. seems to show that we shall have to abandon the project, which would cost initially over £10,000 and subsequently between two and three thousand a year. Nine officers would be required at the outset to carry out the work, and three to keep it up to date. It would, however, be necessary to codify the 200,000 reports and a certain amount of expertese would be required for this work. Had we decided on the mechanisation of Post Report at the outset, the necessary code forms could have been issued to Immigration Officers, but it is

now too late since a large proportion of the work has been already completed. The only possibility of cutting down the task and the expense would be to reduce the numbers of individuals to be codified and to employ the machines of either the Statistical Branch of the Home Office or G.C.H.Q. in actually carrying out searches.

It does not appear possible to reduce the numbers, since we have already excluded higher and lower age groups. The exclusion of others would depend very much upon an assessment of the individual for the particular job that he might be required to do, since we do not know at this stage precisely what that job might be we could not safely reduce the numbers and so reduce the expense. The actual use of the machines of other departments would not materially affect the expenditure, since the cost of hiring such machines is comparatively small.

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Simkins came to talk to me about the telephone warrant which has apparently been running on Tommy HARRIS for some time. I am frankly a little annoyed that I had not been told about this. It arose from the fact that there was a warrant on Kim and that while he was staying with Tommy Harris the warrant was switched to Tommy's house. Tommy had then gone abroad and the warrant had been in abeyance. It had now, however come into operation again and it was felt that it should be covered. Additionally it had been discovered that Tommy had an ex-directory number.

While I cannot believe that Tommy is in any way a guilty party, he is of course a close friend of Kim's and S.I.S. have come forward with a story, through Nicholas Elliott, obtained from Eileen (see pages 53 and 54) which they think suggests that Tommy might be implicated. My own view, and largely the view of Dick, and B.2 is that the story has no significance at all. On the other hand, we do not wish to give the impression to S.I.S. that where an ex-M.I.5 man is concerned we are reluctant to pursue the case. I have said that I do not wish my personal friendships or beliefs to interfere in any way with the enquiries which are

being made and I have therefore initialled the warrant, although I do not think the results will get us much further. I would much prefer to see Tommy and say to him that I presume that Kim must have discussed his troubles, and ask him precisely what Kim had told him, since it would be obviously difficult and improper for me to go outside anything that Kim had actually conveyed to Tommy himself. I would then go on to ask Tommy exactly what he thought of the whole business. I would not, however, be able to tell him what I thought, beyond perhaps saying that the whole question was still unresolved.

There are, however, added complications, since Kim now appears to suspect Eileen and has warned her that she can only make things worse by trying to clear Kim of the charges against him. Eileen seems to think that some approach has been made to Tommy on the basis of the information which she gave and that she is now getting the reaction through Kim, who is treating her pretty coldly. This is, of course, quite untrue, since nothing has been said. The incident does, however, make it much more difficult for me to establish any contact with Tommy. This is regrettable because he must, I think, imagine that I suspect him or at least do not trust him.

27th March.

Kenneth Strong talked about his visit to Washington. He thought that at least 50% of Americans in the know agreed with our policy vis a vis China. On the other hand the Government had taken the line and people like Vandenberg and Fechteler had made plans. The prevailing feeling amongst these people was that since a preventive war was out of the question the Americans would at least like to hit the Chinese wherever they could. They had, however, realised that such a policy might lead to a global war. They have no very clear idea of a sound plan of action and to some extent realise that whatever plans have been proposed might well be ineffective; they are consequently embarrassed. The Americans still refused to comment on our J.I.C. papers, since they felt that this would involve them in expressing views on policy which were in conflict with their own, which they would not wish to disclose. Strong did not think that our comments on C.I.A. papers carried much weight unless they were put in at the drafting stage.

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The diary of General GROW, which was believed to have been stolen by a Communist agent in Frankfurt, has been getting a great deal of publicity It is quite revealing in its nature and I gather involves at least four other powers, including ourselves. Pope, our M.A. in Moscow, was mentioned. General GROW was M.A. in Moscow and it is to his thoughts there that most of the important revelations are directed.

D.C.S. reported generally on the position in S.I.M.E. After discussion it was agreed that D.C.S. should begin negotiations for the withdrawal of the Security Service officer in Beirut.

It was agreed that our relations with S.I.S. in foreign countries where there is a necessity for overt liaison should be reviewed at an early date.

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28th March.

Duncan Sandys paid a visit to the office. He went fairly thoroughly into our relations with the Ministry of Supply and the work we did on their behalf. He seemed quite quick to realise all the difficulties. He was a little shocked to find that we did not control security in other departments, but I think that in the end he was convinced that any advantages from such a system would be outweighed by the disadvantages.

1st April.

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'C' told me that he had had Kim to dine with him at the Travellers Club, apparently in order to ask him whether he wished for any advance of the bonus that was given to him at the time of his resignation. 'C' seemed to to have reached the conclusion that Kim was innocent. I said that I had come to the conclusion that the only thing to do in cases of this kind, where one knew an individual fairly intimately, was to sink one's personal views and allow those concerned to get on with the job, purely on the basis of the ascertainment of facts. Otherwise one was liable to get misled. I gave him my views about Tommy HARRIS and said that I was not in any way impeding enquiries.

Kim does not, apparently, bear any particular resentment against this department. If he had been in our position he would have reacted in the same way, even down to the question of withholding his passport.

3rd April.

Sir Ian Jacob of the B.B.C. attended the J.I.C. to-day, or question of liaison between departments and his Monitoring Secti run by Malcolm Frost. Owing to reduction of staff and to domesti differences, he wishes to dispense with Commander Winn's post as a liaison officer. He will have to move Winn in any case as he has had a row with Frost. The Services deprecated Winn's departure, since it emerged during the discussion that Winn was doing a considerable amount of their work by reviewing reports and bringing special items to their notice. General Jacob pointed out that it was his job to supply the material and to ascertain requirements; it was not, however, his job to indicate passages in the reports which might be of particular

interest to the Services.

It was eventually decided that the head of the department could very well carry the liaison duties if he were persona grata. At this stage members of the Committee began to make it clear that Frost was not persona grata - a view which I personally could well understand, since he served under me during the war and was extremely troublesome. The difficulty is that he is able and, in fact, has organised his department very well.

In view of the advers opinions of the Services, Jacob said that he would see whether in due course it might be possible to transfer Frost to other spheres.

We discussed the Perimiter Review. The Foreign Office were rather worried about the incident to which the Russians seem to have got possibly the majority of the German people as a whole behind them in their proposal for German unity and some measure of rearmament.

Some anxiety was felt about the situation in Indo-China. Although the French do not appear to be pulling out in the immediate future, there are ominous rumblings in Paris, even in General Staff circles. It is really in Paris rather than Indo-China that the danger lies.

The new Constitution in the Sudan, recently promulgated has been very unfavourably reviewed in Egypt. The Americans want us to recognise the Kingship of Farouk over the Sudan and to start evacuation of the Canal Zone at an early stage. If we offered these terms, they think that we should get favourable treatment on the matter of leaving behind maintenance units. I do not think that we are going to be jockeyed into any hasty decision by the Americans.

At the Appointments Board meeting to-day D.O.S. stated that he felt it would be wise to advise overseas stations of the Home Secretary taking over from the Prime Minister the political headship of this Department. It was agreed that D.G's permission to this course would be sought by D.O.S. on Monday.

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It was agreed in principle that recruiting should be restricted to those under the age of 30, except in cases of special qualifications or need.

D.C. reported that there was a possibility that he would receive a request to nominate an officer to go on a NATO inspection to Headquarters in Europe, including Greece and Turkey. It was desirable that the officer should be able to wear uniform. In the event of such a request being received, the Board agreed that [redacted] would be a suitable nomination,

and D.E/A said he believed that the necessary permission to wear uniform could be obtained from the War Office.

I said that I had ascertained that a Working Party had been formed by the Home Office to consider arrangements for screening at ports. This would not however prevent our proceeding with the selection of suitable reserve officers. It was felt that these reserves should be put on a military basis, and the strength of the agreed establishment would be lifted if necessary.

It was agreed to recommend to the D.G. that no suggestion should be made on our part for the revision of the Prime Minister's Directive in consequence of the delegation of supervision to the Home Secretary.

It was agreed to hold a Board to interview candidates on Thursday, 17th April.

CAIRNCROSS has been seen. He was extremely perturbed when confronted with the document in his own handwriting which had been found amongst the papers of BURGESS. His statement is somewhat contradictory; on the one hand he says that he gave BURGESS the information because he thought that he was working for some Government organisation and that it would be in his, CAIRNCROSS',interests to keep in with him. On the other hand, he says that he was extremely nervous when he tried to get his notes back and was told by BURGESS that he had either lost or destroyed them. A further point which is not in his favour relates to an incident reported by the Watchers. He apparently deposited in a wastepaper basket in one of the Parks, a copy of the Communist Review of current date. This would have been understandable in the circumstances if the copy had been an old one, but it is difficult to see how a man who describes himself as having given up his Communist ideas and as having become a Churchillian, would go on wasting his time reading such turgid material as the Communist Review.

4th April.

Perfect came in to say good-bye on leaving the office.

Kennedy of the R.U.C. came to see me. I asked him about the protection of arms at Air Force, Naval and military stations. He said there had been no more pilfering since the incident at Derry and that security generally had been considerably tightened up by the Services. His liaison with the South still went on, but on the whole there was little going on in the I.R.A. world. The principal character in the North is one, STEEL, who appears to have brought the GINGER Group of the old I.R.A. together.He is a tough disciplinarian and quite capable of causing those who do not toe the line to disappear. He has been in prison a longish time, but was released some months ago.

7th April.

I asked Holmes about the Germans employed on secret Government work whom he had interviewed during the last eight months. I was prompted to

do this by a suggestion of Group Captain Paul that something should be done to watch these scientists when they visited their home country.

Holmes said that by and large they had very little in the way of roots in this country; they were rather a community amongst themselves. Some of them had homes in the Eastern Zone and, not unnaturally, corresponded with their relatives. Speaking generally, it seemed that they had no particular motive for staying here, except that they could earn a reasonable living while conditions in Germany were difficult.

There is little reason to think that when the Germans get on their feet these scientists will not offer their services to the Fatherland.

I told all this to Group Captain Paul and also drew his attention to the various discussions which had taken place on the J.I.C., when we had strongly represented the undesirability of employing Germans on secret work for an indefinite period.

Tommy HARRIS rang up and asked me to dine.

8th April.

I had a talk with Simkins and told him that I should be dining with Tommy. He said there had been no developments in regard to PEACH and he personally was inclined to regard Eileen's stories as very wide of the mark.

Eric Jones of G.C.H.Q. looked in at my request. I discussed with him the mechanisation of Post Report, with particular regard to the costs. He said that he saw no reason in principle why they should not do the job, which would cut expenses to at least one-fifth of the present estimate. He would, however, like Dr. Morgan to discuss the matter in detail with Macdonald.

9th April.

At the J.I.C. to-day we considered a memorandum by the D.M.I. in which he stated that British Intelligence, Germany, would have to renew its contracts in May of this year, and that unless some gratuity or other inducement were put forward, the best of the staff would be likely to resign. He said that it would not be possible to get some gratuity scheme going without an Act of Parliament, and that the only solution, therefore, was to establish some 60 of the most reliable members of the staff. If, however, we were forced to withdraw from Germany it would be necessary to provide work for these people. The proposal was that they should be absorbed by the various departments represented on the J.I.C., including ourselves.

I made it very clear that we could not help, although it was just possible that we might have a vacancy for someone in a specialist capacity. In a general way we were recruiting from the bottom and, since we were a

small organisation we did not like bringing in senior officers over the heads of the juniors, or placing senior officers to work under junior officers. It was disclosed in the memorandum that the present staff of B.I.O. (G) was 377 officers. I cannot imagine what they can all be doing!

As regards the question in the memorandum as to whether B.I.O.(G) staff would be of the type which could be absorbed into a Government Intelligence Service, I understand that the question of a Government Intelligence Service does not refer to proposals in the Brook Committee Report, but to a matter under discussion by a Committee of P.U.Ss from the Services under the Chairmanship of Sir Harold Parker. Ministry of Defence. This Committee is considering whether it is possible to provide a civilian nucleus within each of the Service Intelligence Departments, which might act as kind of projection of J.I.B.

10th April.

At the Appointments Board meeting to-day, I mentioned the formation of a Committee to report on the World Wide Intelligence Organisations in War and Peace. It was felt that co-operation with the Committee was desirable and any papers should be entrusted in the first instance to Mr. Magan and Mr. Kellar.

D.B. raised the question of representation on the censorship planning committee which was at present undertaken by B.4. It was agreed that before any change was recommended, this matter should be further explored by D.G., D.B. and B.4.

War strengths for Overseas Stations: - D.E/A reported that the matter was at present before the Establishments Committee at the War Office, after which nomination of reserves could take place. D.O.S. pointed out the special needs for Malta and Gibraltar where more executive powers were exercised by Defence Security Officers.

The proposed syllabus for the lecture course to newly joined officers was approved, with the addition of one by A.1 on administrative procedure. D.B. said that a number of post-war cases would be covered in the course of the B.2 lecture. It was felt that there was no advantage in asking for anybody from S.I.S. to lecture on agents, and that the work of Special Branch could adequately be covered by the lecture given by P.L.S. The Board agreed that no notes should be distributed by lecturers, save where it was necessary on factual or technical information. The Course should be limited to one lecture per day, to commence on about 4th May.

D.E./A asked whether it was yet possible to inform the Lord Chancellor's Department if we wanted to retain the services of Mr. FLETCHER. The Board agreed to defer this matter until nearer November, 1952.

It was agreed not to proceed with the application of

It was agreed not to proceed at present with the printing and distribution of certain forms required by the Port and Travel Control Group in the event of war, but that D.C. would arrange for drafts of the forms and for distribution schedules to be in readiness.

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I arrived at Tommy's house at about 7.30 p.m. He met me at his garden gate, but said nothing about PEACH. Hilda and PEACH met me in the hall and I greeted PEACH in the normal way. I asked him what he was doing and he told me that he was going to Spain, where he would be doing journalistic work and writing a book. He thought that at this moment, when there seemed to be a change of attitude towards Spain by both America and ourselves, the situation would be an interesting one on which to report.

At no time during the evening was PEACH's case discussed. The conve sation ran on a whole number of other topice, including war reminiscences. The only hint that I got as to the extent or otherwise of the Harris' knowledge of the PEACH case was when I was alone for a moment with Hilda. She remarked that she thought it was such a good thing that PEACH was going to Spain as she thought it would do a lot to restore his morale. She added that he was "such a fine fellow". She then mentioned that Mrs. PEACH would not be going with him at the outset, but might possibly join him later if he settled down in Spain.

The relationship between Tommy and Hilda seemed to be absolutely normal. He seemed in very good form, but has recently been so worried about the restrictions on business matters, in particular the export of pictures to the United States, that he has more or less decided to wind up his business and acquire a permanent residence in Lincolns Inn Fields. He, Hilda and PEACH are leaving on April 22nd; PEACH going to Spain and the other two to Mallorca, as far as I can understand. Tommy and Hilda will be returning in September when he is to have another operation, but not, I gather, of a serious kind.

During the evening Tommy was drinking only wine. PEACH was looking reasonably well and only drank in moderation, but I should say in a general way he was drinking quite a lot.

On re-reading the T.C. I am a little inclined to think that the Harris' are not fully informed about the case against PEACH; I doubt otherwise whether Tommy would have been quite so sanguine about throwing me together with PEACH in the way he did. PEACH himself was evidently somewhat worried at the prospect, and although he was a little uneasy at the start, very soon became normal. He made one half-hearted attempt to go home before dinner, but was easily persuaded by the Harris's to stay on.

15th April.

John Marriott talked to me about the case of who the Air Ministry, on somewhat slender grounds, seem to think is a Communist and guilty of obstructing the rearmament programme.

While our file shows that he has had some rather curious friends in the past, particularly when he was at R.A.E. Farnborough; these include MEREDITH and BLACKETT, and that he may hold Bevanite views on the question of rearmament, ther is no evidence to show that he is a member of the Communist Party. The Air Minister now appears to be taking the matter up with the Minister of Supply.

Marriott is informing the D.G. on his return.

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The Treasury have considered the case of CAIRNCROSS and are requesting him to resign. They seem to feel that the case has been extremely well handled by Skardon.

I talked to Hill about the case of KUCHENMEISTER, and subsequently got the D.G's approval to pass a copy of his latest letter, addressed to the D.G. personally with all the old accusations, to the Home Office for information. It was also agreed that we should not reply, since it would clearly be undesirable for us to start a correspondence with KUCHENMEISTER.

16th April.

I talked to Macdonald about Post Report. He has had another talk with Whelan. I have suggested to him that he should get out a coding pro forma for Immigration Officers; that he should get out a new estimate of precise costs, and that he should ascertain whether the Home Office statistical department could do the punching. We should then be in a position to present our report to the Working Party, showing the original estimated cost and the extent to which we have been able to reduce the figures.

Horrocks, to whom I talked, said that he could arrange for a coding of the reports already made by a team in the Registry, provided they could do it in their own time. This seems satisfactory as there is really no particular urgency about the matter.

An excellent report for the information of B. Division has been prepared on the NITWIT case. It is a pity that the Directors of Intelligence cannot know something about this operation, since I am sure there is a tendency in those circles to think that we are apt to sit back here and wait for things to fall into our basket.

There is no doubt that this case was handled with the greatest possible skill and that the product has been of enormous value to the Government. One particular point emerges from the technical side, namely, that a key which will open a safe will not necessarily close it! Therefore, in making facsimile keys it is as well to make several with slight variations.

Speake of the Home Office rang me up yesterday to say that the Public Relations Officer had had a call from Mr. Peter Duncan of the B.B.C., saying that one, PINTO, was proposing to broadcast his M.I.5 experiences and that the B.B.C. were a little worried about what he was proposing to say.

After consultation with Hill, the latter rang up Speake suggesting that he should tell the B.B.C. that PINTO had served in M.I.5., that he was therefore subject to the Official Secrets Act, and that if he said anything disclosing official secrets, both he and the B.B.C. would be liable under the Act. If, on the other hand, what he was proposing to say was purely fiction, doubtless the B.B.C. would not be interested in what he had to say.

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17th April.

Martin and Miss McBarnet have come across an old file on J.D. GREGORY, who in the early twenties was head of the Russian Department in the Foreign Office and was sacked for speculating in francs.

The file, which contains paraphrases of Russian B.Js, indicates that there might have been a leakage of a memorandum on the Russian question compiled by GREGORY.

I told them about the origin and suggested that they should see whether the old B.Js were still in existence. It was my impression that we brought them over here in 1931.

They subsequently ascertained that they were still available, although I believe they are largely uncarded. Miss McBarnet intends to look them through in case they may contain some information which is still of value. Historically, of course, they are of the greatest interest.

As regards the leakage of information, I said that from a personal knowledge of GREGORY I should doubt whether he had been responsible. It seemed to me much more likely that the culprit would have been Mr. E.F. WISE the left-winger in the entourage of Lloyd-George who at that time was his adviser on all Russian affairs and playing an extremely dubious game.

18th April.

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21st April.

Yesterday I received a call from Anthony BLUNT, who wanted if possible to see me. I arranged to have lunch with him, when he told me that he was having trouble from a man called WOODS, who apparently had been employed in the same firm, Head Wrightson, as Jackie HEWITT. Some time ago WOODS, whom Anthony had never seen before, turned up with a sad story about how he had been duped by HEWITT and was involved in malversation of funds belonging to Head Wrightson. If this money could not be repaid the firm would prosecute. BLUNT, knowing the state of mind in which HEWITT was at that time, agreed to pay, borrowing the money for the moment from Tommy HARRIS. He had made one attempt to get repayment but without success and had then come to the conclusion that WOODS was just a crook. He had repaid Tommy HARRIS and written the money off. While he was in Paris, however, WOODS had tried to obtain money from his, Anthony's secretary, and had finally been seen by Tommy, who tthought that he had scared him off.

There has now been a new development. A man purporting to be a reporter from the Daily Mail called LEGARE (?) had rung up asking whether he was a friend of WOODS and saying that he had a story which he proposed to publish. He promised not to do anything without showing Anthony the script. Anthony thought things had gone a little far and was thinking of getting the Police to go and see WOODS, if he could be found and if this could be done without Court proceedings.

I said that I did not think that such a proposal would work, since if the Police took the matter up they would have to go through with it. I would, however, consult with Skardon on Monday.

Hill is worried about the terms of the Geneva Convention, which in spite of all his efforts are likely to cause us some embarrassment in time of war. He thinks it may be necessary to have yet another Camp in order to avoid the attentions of the Protecting Power.

I saw James Robertson, Simkins and Skardon and told them about my interview with BLUNT.

Our only interest in the case is really to ascertain whether there are any documents in the possession of WOODS or HEWITT which might have some further bearing on the case against BURGESS. Skardon agreed, however, to see BLUNT in order to get further details of the story. He thought that we might be unwise to see any representative of the Daily Mail. I rang up BLUNT and told him so.

Meanwhile, as far as we could ascertain, there was no reporter on the Daily Mail with the name of LEGARE(?).It seemed, therefore, not unlikely that LEGARE (?) was merely an associate of WOODS' trying to put the screw on, with possibly Jackie HEWITT in the background. Skardon advises against going to the Police and against seeing any representative of the Press.

I had a word with Colonel Kearn who has joined us from the Ministry of Labour in order to deal with defectors. He knows the problem well as he has been a very great assistance to us in the past. He seemed an extremely sensible person and likely to fit in to the organisation satisfactorily. He is going over to Germany to see those concerned with defectors.

22nd April.

I gave my usual lecture to the Police course. One of the Police Officers asked whether it was true that there was some proposal that M.I.5 should take over all the S.Bs of the Police; he had seen something to this effect in the Press. I told him that this was entirely opposed to all our ideas on this subject; it was not the way we did things in this country and clearly we could not possibly, even if we thought it desirable, take responsibility for the activities of officers who were working and must work under the head of their Force. We did not believe in supreme authorities as we were convinced that satisfactory results could only be achieved on the basis of goodwill, understanding and full co-operation.

23rd April.

I had a long talk with Bill Oughton on his experiences in the Far East. He considered the following to be the main tasks of S.I.F.E.

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1. (a) To obtain as much information as possible about the Communist Party of China and its influence in general on the S.I.F.E. area. The main difficulty is to get the information off the ground. Police sources are weak and It is, therefore, rather like trying to make bricks without straw and much of J.I.D's work and time is wasted in trying to sort out material which cannot as a rule be verified by any basic source. J.I.D. is by no means overworked, but what it can do is not very profitable.

(b) As regards the education of security forces of neighbouring countries, S.I.F.E. has done quite a lot in this field as regards the Siamese and Indonesians, but full advantage is not taken of the training given,

In Indonesia there are two factions both seeking complete power. On the one hand the Inspector General of Police, SOEKARNO (?) and on the other, SOSRO, the head of Intelligence Research. The Americans are supporting the former, while we are supporting the latter. There is some analogy here between the Surete and the D.E.C., since SOEKARNO (?) does not, for political reasons, supply SOSRO with the information to which he is entitled.

In Indo-China the C.E. side is not strong and much of the information received from the French is of doubtful value.

In Burma, where we have an officer of our own, the results are reasonably good.

Hong Kong is also good from the internal security point of view, but there are over sources of information which could be exploited if the Government would agree to something in the nature of an interrogation centre and the money were available to finance it.

(c) Our third commitment is the provision of an order of battle for the I(b) staff, should British troops be involved in hostilities in any of the neighbouring countries. Here again, information is lacking and in the immediate future, of course, military operations, even if hostilities break out, would not be feasible.

2. Oughton thinks that there ought to be some joint centre in Singapore, where the Americans, the French and ourselves could pool and exchange information about the whole area. At present there is a good deal of overlapping and bogus agents are selling their information to all three.

3. There should be more visits from home.

4. Oughton felt that it was perhaps a mistake to remove him from the S.I.F.E area when he was just beginning to get a grip on the subject. He

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thought that officers ought really to remain in the area for at least ten years.

I said that if this were the case it would clearly be necessary to have an entirely separate organisation for overseas, since after ten years in the Far East it was doubtful whether our officers would ever settle down at home. It seemed to me that this observation showed a misconception of our role overseas. We were there to collect information and assess it on the basis of our experience at home, and to give our advice on all security matters. This implied the adaptation of our knowledge acquired here to local conditions. I quite understood his arguemtn if our officers were to become local experts in the procurement field; they woult then obviously have to know their natives well, but this was not in fact our job. If we were to enter that field it would, I thought, be for consideration whether the organisation should remain under the control of London.

Oughton appreciated this argument and thought that perhaps he had got the job somewhat out of perspective. I thought, however, there was a case for having M.I.5 officers in Bangkok, Saigon and Jogjokarta, but if this were agreed it was difficult to see in present circumstances how we could supply the bodies.

Winnifrith telephoned to me about a question put down by Waldron Smithers about the vetting of people employed on secret projects. Winnifrith was proposing to say that they were screened, but some people had taken fright at this suggestion in that a large number were not the subject of positive enquiries as in the case of those employed on a limited category of secret jobs. I agreed with him that his apprehensions were not well-founded and subsequently confirmed with Graham that this was also his view.

Walter Bell came to say good-bye. He is off to India to-morrow.

Dick has returned from the S.I.C. in Brussels. A certain amount of interesting information emerged during the discussions, particularly about the activities of Greek seamen. The Surete seem rather well-informed and mentioned the case of a courier who had visited the U.K. We are to receive all particulars. It seemed to be fairly clear evidence that S.I.S liaison with the Surete was not really satisfactory. It is almost certain that if we had had a representative in Paris he would have got this information long ago.

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24th April.

Young of D.S.I. telephoned to say that in a report from STIB in Germany it had been suggested that M.I.5 would be interested in an outbreak of foot and month disease in Canada due to infection which had spread from Germany. I said that a matter of this sort would only be of interest to us in the improbable event of its being discovered that the outbreak of foot and mouth was due to the machinations of some foreign power.

I talked to him about the case of Clemens DUTT. He told me that on receipt of my letter he had decided to drop the matter.

Hunt of Downing Street rang me up to say that the Prime Minister has received a copy, from a Member of Parliament, of an East German publication entitled "The Democratic German Report" edited by John PEET, Friedrichstrasse 167/3, Berlin W.8. This particular issue is Volume I, No. 7 dated April 11th and the paper is published fortnightly. The annual subscription is 8/- and the distributors are COLLETTs.

The Prime Minister is anxious for any information we can give him about this publication, particularly the extent to which it is being distributed in this country.

At the Appointments Board to-day it was agreed that steps should be taken to obtain the attachment of Detective Sergeant WADE to this department from the Bucks Police, for one year in the first instance.

It was agreed to reject the application of

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I mentioned a telegram which had come in from S.I.F.E. suggesting that an S.I.S. representative should be sent to work in Malaya. It was agreed that the type of work which he should do would most properly fall within the police orbit, but further consideration of the matter should be deferred until the return of MORTON which was expected any day.

It was agreed that the lectures for the newly joined officers should be held at 4 p.m. daily instead of at 2.30. This resulted from representations by C. Division.

25th April.

I spoke to Hunt at No.10 about "Democratic German Report" and promised to send him a short note on John Scott PEET and on what we knew about the circulation of the Report. This does not at the moment amount to very much, but we are asking the Post Office to check the incoming mail.

26th April.

I had a long talk with Jack Morton who has returned today. From what he said it is clear that he had no alternative but to accept the post which was offered to him by Gerald Templer. He is not, however, too sanguine about being able to do a useful job. The only difference between his appointment and that of George Jenkin is that he has the full support of Templer. This means, however, that he can only get his way by wielding the big stick, and each time he does so good will on the part of the various Services which it is his duty to co-ordinate will become progressively less. He is not impressed by Young, the new Commissioner of Police. At his first interview Young asked him what was generally known about the terrorists and the Malayan Communist Party. Morton gave him some account of the present position, indicating that there was a fair amount of information about the enemy's order of battle. Young then said "If you can give me a list of the people, I will have them arrested tomorrow". It then had to be explained to him that this was not quite so simple as it might appear. Had it been possible to arrest these people, the Malayan Government would have done so long ago.

As regards SIFE, there are obvious weaknesses, largely due to paucity of information both from within and from without. The only foreign station in an adjacent country which produces reasonably good intelligence is Rangoon.

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direct to J.I.D. in

Singapore, who waste an enormous amount of time in disproving and discarding valueless reports.

It follows from all this that the Rangoon pattern is the right one, and that if it were possible from the point of view of man-power, SIFE would get a considerable dividend by having a properly trained M.I.5 officer in Siam, Indo-China and Indonesia.

28th April.

Graham tells me that, at a meeting with the Ministry of Supply and the Foreign Office, it has been decided to recommend to Ministers that they should continue to discourage any visit here by Americans to look into our standards of security. He raised the question of the positive vetting which the Government have undertaken to carry out and about which the Ministry of Supply have done absolutely nothing. If the Americans come over, they would find that no enquiries had been made about those passed for Operation Nomination. He strongly recommended that such enquiries should be made forthwith in retrospect. The Ministry of Supply then divulged that Archie Rowlands is taking the line that such enquiries should be made by ourselves, and that he wishes to discuss the matter with D.G. While we might be prepared to get the Ministry of Supply out of their present jam, it seems to me wrong that we should assume any responsibility for the Ministry's positive vetting. In any case we could not do so without reference to the Treasury who have laid down the policy.

The main argument is that we cannot undertake overt vetting of this kind.

29th April.

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30th April.

Burt rang up about the case of [redacted] our [redacted] who was arrested and imprisoned by the Poles for attempting to smuggle a Polish girl out of the country. He subsequently gave away a good deal of information. He has just returned and the question arises as to whether he should be court-martialled. It had been arranged that Skardon should interview him. Meanwhile, however, we wished to know the policy of the Air Ministry in regard to a prosecution. Group Captain Mears had been to the D.P.P., but had produced no evidence except a press cutting. Mears had then gone to Special Branch and asked them to prevent [redacted] from leaving the country, that [redacted] is thinking of returning to Poland. I told Burt to speak to Dick who had more up-to-date information.

Ogilvie-Forbes has discussed with D.G. the case of [redacted] of T.R.E. who is said to be obstructing the rearmament programme. The Air Ministry have produced no evidence, and indeed, two of their officers have expressed their appreciation of the work done by [redacted]. Meanwhile, we have orders to investigate.

B.2 have caught a spy, one William Martin MARSHALL, employed for a year in Moscow by Gambier-Parry's organisation and now working at Hanslope. B.5, in the course of following KUZNETZOV who is always very careful about his movements, saw MARSHALL effect

a meeting and hand over certain papers. This is the first case that I can recollect since the war where, having ascertained that a particular individual in the Soviet Embassy is a runner of agents, it has been possible to detect a contact who has not been planted on them. The watchers apparently lost KUZNETSOV who must then have thought that he was in the clear. Accidentally, however, they picked him up again.

1st May.

At the J.I.C. this morning, Reilly told us that the proposals for increased staff and funds for G.C.H.Q. were going forward to Ministers. In its preliminary stages with P.U.Ss, however, it had been slightly whittled down. Provision for further coverage by the Air Ministry would not be allowed. He gathered, however, that the Air Ministry were prepared to make an attempt to carry out the commitment with their existing sources.

The Committee took a gloomy view of the situation in Korea. There is no doubt that the Chinese have been strongly reinforced and are in a position to take the offensive at any moment. There are one or two disquieting pieces of information which may indicate that such an offensive is imminent. Our reserves are thin and although we have dug a fairly substantial line, well to the South of our present positions, it is by no means certain that the United Nations forces would be able to hold it. The Air Ministry still maintain that the Chinese and North Koreans cannot operate a tactical Air Force in support of their infantry as their bases are too far away.

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Prospects in Egypt seem gloomy. The stumbling block is the Sudan.

We had a staff meeting this afternoon. It was decided to recommend to the D.G. the establishment of Mr.RICH, the establishment and promotion of Mr.VERNON.

The Supplementary Security Questionnaires which revealed answers to questions 2. and 3. were reviewed.

I said goodbye to Mr.HANDOO who seems to be impressed by what he has seen here and is grateful for the assistance given to him.

2nd May.

We had a further meeting on integration - Jack Morton, Magan, Dick White, Kellar and others being present - as a result of which we reached fairly firm conclusions on what our requirements were with regard to outstations of both S.I.M.E and S.I.F.E.

The next thing will be to see whether we can get S.I.S. agreement in principle and, if successful in this, we shall have to try and find the bodies. This is going to be a matter of some difficulty and may take time.

5th May.

Burt came to talk to me about the leakage to the press about the movements of a Pole who had been noted by S.B. for scrutiny at ports.

Burt said he was convinced that these leakages were taking place through the Immigration. I reminded him that there had been one case where we had given a notice to S.B. only, namely, certain people suspected of having had connections with BURGESS and MACLEAN. Burt said he remembered this, but was still convinced that it was through the Immigration that the leaks were occurring.

I said I thought it was of the highest importance to get the matter cleared up, because, as we stood at present, we were more or less debarred from notifying the ports of any suspects if the case was in any sense a delicate one. I told Burt that I was quite prepared, if necessary, to make representations to the Immigration in this sense, or, if expedient, to speak to Sir Frank Newsam. Burt said that he would have a talk with Ruck, and if he wanted any further assistance from me he would let me know.

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I talked to Holmes about Germans employed at the R.A.E. Farnborough, and elsewhere. It was my view that we should send some sort of communication to the Ministry of Supply and the Admiralty, pointing out that in the changed circumstances of German rearmament there was always possibility that the Germans here might wish to return to the Fatherland, in which case they would be carrying up-to-date information from this country. We have, of course, pointed out these dangers in the past, but personally I think the time has come to reiterate them.

Holmes said that of the people he had interviewed very few seemed to have any real roots in this country.

General Maxwell-Craig said that a who was a member of his Air Survey Company, had just returned from Burma where he appears to have seen Harrison and had a certain amount of information to impart. His telephone number was I spoke to Alec Kellar and put him in touch.

Oughton came to say good-bye. He is off to the Middle East. I was glad that he had attended the meetings on integration, and suggested that he might impart our conclusions to "Tin-Eye".

I gave a lecture to the newly-joined officers on the history of the office and the principles on which we worked. I also said something about the methods by which our information was fed into the Government machine.

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I had a talk with Dick. A certain amount has happened during my absence.

Continued observation on KUZNETZOV has shown that he has had another meeting with MARSHALL and that he has also met two Communist journalists, HAPPOLD and TAIT.

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man named , who is another of Gambier-Parry's people in , has been sent home owing to an entanglement with a Russian girl who is a waitress in the Mess. This entanglement led to a proposal, obviously by the M.G.B., that should supply information to the Russians in exchange for which he would be allowed to marry the girl. There is no reason to think that has behaved in any way than properly.

The Daily Express have taken on PINTO to investigate the BURGESS - MACLEAN affair.

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Hollis returned to-day from America, where he has been attending atomic energy security meetings. Archie Rowlands led the delegation and seems to have handled the Americans satisfactorily. Although he started out sceptically about the necessity of carrying out the Ministry of Supply ligation to conduct field enquiries, he seems to have returned with the alisation that his department have really got to get down to things.

The F.B.I. representatives attacked him pretty severely, but he kept his temper and obviously had the support of the other American delegates. It was revealed that of the enormous number of field enquiries conducted by the F.B.I., only four-tenths of one percent had led to the rejection of a candidate. Our objections, through vetting on the basis of our records, amounted to 1.2 percent. It seemed to follow, therefore, that either the Americans as a whole were whiter than we had reason to think, or that the field enquiries were ineffective!

I gather that the only defence that the F.B.I. could put up was that the existence of the field enquiry system was a deterrent to applications by undesirable people. That is as may be!

Another interesting fact revealed was that there has been an alteration in the McMahon Act, which now lays down that, with the exception of certain appointments of a very high grade of secrecy, the Civil Service Commission in the United States is in future to conduct the field of enquiries. If, however, they discover anything suspicious they are to refer the case to the F.B.I. Clearly the F.B.I. are finding the field of enquiry is too burdensome: on the average, each one takes 44 days, and in one case which Hollis saw, no less than 32 people had been interviewed, all with completely negative results.

D.E./A mentioned that certain of the women staff had approached him and wished to have the rank of Junior Woman Officer in place of Administrative Assistant. The Board felt that the title Assistant Officer would be more appropriate and D.E./A. would discuss this further with those concerned.

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Postings:

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I had a word with Macdonald and Cumming about Post Report mechanisation. We now have the reply from G.C.H.Q., which reduces the initial cost to about £450 and the annual cost to about £330. We have now to ascertain whether S.I.S. will ante-up, since they are obviously going to benefit from the scheme more than anybody else.

26th May.

The Daily Express have come out with a part of a letter written by BURGESS, which quite obviously they have obtained through HEWIT and his blackmailing friend, WOODS. The letter is alleged to be one written by BURGESS just before he left for delivery to a friend. A ridiculously sinister construction is placed upon it, but in fact it has no bearing on the case whatever; it relates solely to some emotional disturbance between HEWIT and BLUNT several years ago.

I saw Anthony at my flat and obtained from him the above comments.

At the D.G's meeting to-day the D.G. took note of Hollis's remarks about the favourable views from America and Canada, which were taken of Geoffrey Patterson. The question arose as to whether he should continue for another two years in America after his normal term comes to an end in May of next year.

The D.G. thought that if he wanted to stay he should be allowed to stay. I pointed out that we had on the Appointments Board been endeavouring to not keep officers abroad for more than four years unless the circumstances were exceptional; it seemed to me that if Geoffrey Patterson was going to be in the line for promotion, he must show his capabilities as a desk officer here. The D.G. did not seem to think that this was necessary, and that we should have Senior Officers who would be employed abroad in liaison capacities. I said I thought this would be a limited field which could not include S.I.M.E. or S.I.F.E.

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27th May.

Hunt of Downing Street telephoned to ask whether we had any further information for the Prime Minister about the distribution of "Democratic German Report", a journal published in the Eastern Zone.

After enquiry, Bill Magan told me that the last issue had had a circulation of 400 in the provinces, but the Post Office had failed to pick up London distribution. It was hoped that this might be done when the next issue came out.

I so informed Hunt, who said that he would be grateful for a note when we had the London figures.

Anthony rang me to say that he had spoken to Andy REVAI about the letter in the Daily Express. REVAI had reached exactly the same conclusions as himself and was fairly positive about the date being 1948. It emerged during the discussion that the relationship between BURGESS and Fred WARNER at that time would tend to confirm that the word erased and deciphered by the Daily Express as "Fred" almost certainly referred to Fred WARNER.

Anthony suggested that Norman NASH, who was a close friend of BURGESS in the Press Department of the Foreign Office but was now retired, might, through his Press connections, intimate to the Daily Express that they were barking up the wrong tree. He said that he could probably arrange this if we thought the idea was a good one.

I said that I would consider the point, but provisionally I thought it would be better to leave matters as they were, since the Express would be bound to ask Norman NASH for his interpretation of the letter and his reasons for thinking that it had no significance in connection with BURGESS's departure.

28th May.

After consultation with Dick, I rang Anthony and confirmed the above view.

At the J.I.C. to-day the D.M.I. spoke about his recent travels. He had had discussions in Karachi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, Tokyo and Korea.

Karachi.

The D.M.I thought that Pakistan was in a less aggressive frame of mind on the question of Kashmir. From conversations he had with leading personalities, he felt that while Russia was not regarded as a potential aggressor, the country would be inclined to throw in its lot with the Allies in the event of trouble.

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Singapore and Malaya.

The D.M.I. felt that General Templer's personality and drive were the main hope for the restoration of law and order, but that clearly he was working under a great strain, particularly with regard to cutting his way through the Administration. The D.M.I. described the situation with regard to the Police and the Special Branches, with which we are all familiar.

I intervened to make it clear what our responsibilities were, and to add that we had given General Templer the Head of S.I.F.E. and that we were proposing to second two other officers to assist him. I added that what had clearly hampered the Police more than anything was the fact that they were out of touch with the Chinese population. This, of course, was due to the lack of a Chinese element in the Police. The D.M.I. had come up against this latter point when he visited one of the new settlements and found that it was almost entirely in charge of Malay Police officers, who had no real contact with those inside the perimeter.

The D.M.I. also thought that possibly agents were not being properly exploited. I mentioned here that there had been a proposal to set up some separate agent-running organisation, and that we had strongly advised that it should be constituted within the Police, from whom it would be bound to receive its leads and assistance in actual operations. I gathered that General Templer had a plan to integrate the Police, Special Branches and Military intelligence at all levels.

Hong Kong.

The D.M.I. was extremely worried about the intelligence situation in Hong Kong. Having attended a meeting of the L.I.C. and had long conversations with most of its members, he had come definitely to the conclusion that the Colonial Secretary (in the Chair), the Political Adviser (of whom he did not take a very favourable view), and Mackintosh dominated the Committee and were a dead weight on any proposals to develop intelligence from within the Colony. Their attitude was a purely political one and they were concerned solely with the maintenance of order within the Colony and the avoidance of any activity which might give the Chinese an excuse for saying that Hong Kong was being used as a base for intelligence operations in South China. He had had more than an hour's conversation with Mackintosh, who had told him that the frontier was virtually closed and that no agents would stand a chance of getting through. On proceeding to the frontier, however, where he spoke to an officer named Fraser, he was told that at least 1,200 to 1,400 people crossed the frontier every week.

The question of the Interrogation Centre was discussed, but here again the Colonial Secretary and Mackintosh had put a spoke in the wheel. Such interrogation work as was being done by the China Bureau was inadequate.

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The D.M.I. had put his case very frankly to the Governor, who thanked him for what he had said and expressed his appreciation of what he, the D.M.I., had done to give intelligence a jolt. He did not say, however, what he personally was going to do about it and, unless he caused the Colonial Secretary, the Political Adviser and Mackintosh to change their views, nothing was likely to happen.

Trafford Smith, on behalf of the Colonial Office, here remarked that while it would be a good thing for the D.M.I. to put his case to the Colonial Office, it would be difficult for them to do more than endeavour to persuade the Governor to take a more favourable view of intelligence activities from the Colony into South China. It was difficult for them to act contrary to the Governor's advice, unless they were prepared to replace him. He thought that possibly it would be more profitable for General Airey to make representations through the B.D.C.C. and the Chiefs of Staff.

The D.M.I. thought that the machinery for dealing with defectors had not worked satisfactorily in the recent case of a military defector from South China. Those vitally concerned were still without any information. I pointed out to the D.M.I. that the J.I.C. document on defector procedure should be in the possession of the Hong Kong authorities, and that their attention should be drawn to it.

Tokyo.

British staffs in Tokyo have had no status since the signing of the Treaty. Our Attaches are accredited to the Japanese and not to the United Nations Forces. In the D.M.I's view, they should also be accredited to the United Nations Liaison Section. Air Vice Marshal Boucher has worked his way on to that organisation, but should be withdrawn owing to unsuitability and to the fact that he is no longer in touch with the C-in-C of the United Nations Forces.

Korea.

The D.M.I. was very impressed by the spirit of the Commonwealth Unit, which, to a large degree, he attributed to the personality of General Cassell.

The enemy are not using mines or wire; their tendency is to build a trench round a small hill and to burrow in from the back in order to establish gun and machine-gun emplacements. We, on the other hand, are relying more on belts of wire, of which there are as many as 50 covering our positions in the Kansas Line. The D.M.I. considers this Line to be a formidable obstacle, if we are able to get back to it unscathed in the event of a North Korean attack.

29th May.

At the Appointments Board to-day I raised the question of the change of name of Administrative Assistants to Assistant Officers (Women). I said that if it was to apply to A.As who were doing purely secretarial work, it seemed to me to miss the point which I understood had been put by certain members of the female staff, namely, that they wanted some distinction made between those doing purely secretarial work and those doing quasi-officer work.

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Horrocks pleaded firstly that the representatives of the female staff, to whom he had spoken since our last meeting, were satisfied with the present arrangement. I replied that I did not understand this to be the position. Secondly, Horrocks stated that any such arrangement would reduce flexibility. I said that I did not quite understand the point about flexibility, unless it was contemplated that those now doing officers' work could be put back to secretarial work against their own wishes. Horrocks then quoted the case of Registry supervisors who were carrying quasi-officer functions in overseas stations, There may be a point here, but I am not sure whe is really a valid one.

Hollis then chimed in to say that he was seriously worried at the appointment of to full officer grade, since it seemed that she was really only doing secretarial work. Horrocks replied that the D.G. had thought that this was justifiable in her case since when he, Horrocks, departed she would be the only person who would know anything about the work. Hollis thought that other Divisions ought to have been consulted before such an appointment was made, as they might have had candidates to put forward if vacancies existed. There was no real answer to this, except that Horrocks had asked Dick for any names. Dick had given those of and , which he had in fact put forward more than a year ago.

The fact is that normally the Appointments Board have instructions to keep their fingers out of female staff problems, and that nobody really knows whether they are supposed to put forward names or not. The same thing applies to the putting forward of names for inclusion in the Honours list. There is, I am afraid, no hope of getting these things right until Horrocks leaves, and there is no doubt in my mind that his successor will have a formidable task, involving the breaking of many heads, before things can be straightened out. It was made clear at the meeting that nobody had any personal feelings about or the excellence of her work.

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3rd June.

PINTO seems to have gone out like a damp squib. I understand that Burt has dropped a few bricks about his past to Percy Hoskins. To-day's Daily Express carries a leading article entitled "Slow Sleuths", directed, of course, at ourselves, and makes the brilliant suggestion that in future there should be an amalgamation of M.I.5., the Foreign Office Intelligence Service and Special Branch of Scotland Yard.

A point has arisen in connection with the passing of classified information to the Germans, as participants in the activities of the European Defence Committee. Only members of N.A.T.O. are a party to procedure. If, therefore, we the Germans, we imply that they are members of N.A.T.O. Apart from this, the German Secret Service is by no means on its feet and may not be in a position to vet any of its nationals who might be appointed to receive the classified documents. Lastly, there is a question of a possible change of Government in Germany at some future date, which might even repudiate the Contractual Agreement.

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4th June.

Kennedy and Stone have been asked to supply a representative of the War Office with a ticket to attend de COURCY's rally which begins tomorrow. Why the D.M.I. wants to waste somebody's time in this way, I cannot imagine. The Archduke OTTO intends to speak, but we all know the kind of things that he will say!

I am telling the P.M's office that the distribution of 'Democratic German Report' in this country is roughly 1,000 per fortnightly issue.

5th June.

called on me to-day. He said that had been approached by a high-grade representative of "Time" and "Life" who contemplated writing an article for his paper on certain implications of the BURGESS/MACLEAN affair. He is taking as his text the portion of a letter written by BURGESS which appeared in the Daily Express on Monday, May 26th. He seemed to know that the individual named 'Fred' was a Foreign Office official. He asked whether his proposed action would in any way be embarrassing to the Embassy, although he did not know whether, if he wrote such a story, his paper would necessarily accept it.

I gather, said something about getting his facts right, and had, I think, hinted at the possibility of the representative of "Time" and "Life" getting departmental guidance either from us or from the Foreign Office.

I told that if this journalist had asked whether his proposed action would embarrass the Embassy, it seemed to me that there was a fairly straight answer. Were he to publish an article stressing the security or the homosexual aspect, it could only result in creating a false impression that security in this country is bad and that the Civil Service is riddled with homosexuals, and such an impression would certainly not be conducive to good relations between Britain and America. If the correspondent still wished to write his article, he might be told that he would do well to get his facts correct, and that if he were starting with the letter published in the Express he would notice that it was torn from its context and might, therefore, have no bearing on the case whatever.

I made it clear to that there could be no question of our giving this corresponsent any guidance, since we had no contact with the Press. I doubted, too, whether the Foreign Office would wish to discuss the case.

I passed the gist of this conversation to Patrick Reilly at the J.I.C. on Friday, and also to Carey Foster on the telephone.

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6th June.

At the J.I.C. to-day I spoke to Air Vice Marshal Fressanges about [redacted]. I said that there were two things which seemed to us important:

(i) to keep [redacted] away from the Poles, and

(ii) to obtain full evidence of Polish methods of interrogation and their psychological effect.

We did not stand much chance of doing either unless we could give [redacted] some assurance that he would be given his pension. It was our

Diary

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Speaight, H.M. Ambassador in Rangoon, made a statement to the J.I.C. to-day on the situation in Burma. He took as his text the last report of the J.I.C. on Burma, dated November 1951. He said that the present situation was on the whole slightly better than that forecast by the J.I.C.

The Government had had a victory in the elections and the Prime Minister had remained in power. The new Government, slightly more doctrinaire and slightly less inefficient, had been established. There had been no deal between the Government and the Communists. Some concessions had been made to the Karens, who had not so far co-operated to any great degree with the Communists. The Communist offensive had not materialised and was in fact forestalled by an attack by NE WIN's forces. Both the Communists and the Karens were short of arms and, to some extent, food, and all the initiative seemed to have now passed to the Government. Chinese communism was not making much of an appeal, since there was no very fertile ground for it to work on; there were no rich classes or flaming injustices. In general, the Burmese were a jolly people who did not take kindly to dialectical materialism. Anti-American propaganda did not cut much ice, since the Burmese were conscious of American aid and were anxious for it to continue. At the same time the Burmese, when they thought about these things, were afraid of Chinese power, and if really serious pressure were brought to bear on them their tendency would be towards a policy of appeasement.

There is a very real desire among the Burmese to keep out of war, and this desire is their guiding star in foreign policy - hence they cling to India. Politically they are basically Socialist and anti-Imperialist in outlook. In character they are lazy and always reluctant to commit themselves in advance. They are intensely religious and their beliefs constitute a strong antidote to communism. As long as we give them assistance it is unlikely that they will wish to break with us. They are conscious of their bargaining power in regard to rice, tungsten, etc., which they export at fairly high prices. Their foreign exchange position is good, due largely to inertia in the matter of internal development; they have a balance here of something like 30M sterling. Little teak is coming out of the country, owing to a lack of skilled labour and the fact that the forests are to some extent in the hands of the insurgents. The Irrawaddy if fairly free for navigation, but the Rangoon-Mandalay Railway, although open, is frequently blown up. Road traffic is on the whole more secure, provided protection money is paid to the insurgents. Manufactured goods seem to be fairly widely distributed.

Speaking of NE WIN, one of the most important personalities in Burma, Mr. Speaight said that he was first and foremost out for himself, but was a patriot as far as his own interests would allow. There was a time when he might have got on the Communist band waggon, but he now seems to have realised that those who do so do not necessarily go very far. He is likely, therefore, to stay with the Government.

/The present Government....

The present Government is likely to muddle on, and the Communist menace will probably recede if the Burmese realise in time that the Allied cause is the better bet.

Asked why the Chinese Communists did not give more active support to the B.C.P., Mr. Speaight said that China probably preferred a policy of friendly relations for the moment and would not, therefore, like to be exposed as active supporters of communist activity in Burma. Neither would they like to face an appeal by Burma to the United Nations. Apart from this, they may well think that the B.C.P. is not an organisation which would be really worth supporting, and that arms supplied would merely be used for banditry.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaight said that he has never seen the Prime Minister look worried. When he visited him the latter never had any papers on his desk and he never telephoned - in fact he gave the appearance of having nothing to do! This rather typified the whole situation in Burma.

D.D.G.
6.6.52.

belief that [redacted] was mentally unstable, and this indeed would not be surprising in the light of his experiences in a Polish prison.

Fressanges said that a decision had just been reached to grant [redacted] his pension from the time when he landed back in this country, and on condition that he behaved himself. This decision had been reached on the basis that as [redacted] had made his disclosures under duress there were no legal grounds for withholding the pension.

Fressanges was quite agreeable to our establishing contact with [redacted] and imparting to him, unofficially, the decision of the Air Council. [redacted] will receive an official communication in four or five days time.

I said that we would do our best to rehabilitate [redacted] mentally and persuade him to drop any idea of returning to Poland.

Hunt of Downing Street rang me up to know whether the distribution of 1,000 copies of 'Democratic German Report" included copies sent out gratuitously. I said that to the best of our knowledge it covered everything.

Kennedy tells me that de COURCY is once more on the war path, [redacted] two officers who are alleged to have visited the French Police.

7th June.

Michael Serpell tells me that he has a case of attempted Hungarian [redacted] espionage. A woman named Mrs. SCOTT, who has been twice married and is of [redacted] Hungarian origin, was approached by a Hungarian courier called BENEDICT [redacted] and asked to give information, with a veiled threat that the authorities knew that she had a sister in Hungary. Mrs. SCOTT works in B.E.A. There is to be a meeting between her and BENEDICT on Monday.

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9th June.

I saw Colonel Bajhat, Head of the Iraqi C.I.D., to-day. He is a pleasant little man and obviously very earnest about his job. I gave him a general talk on the principles applied in our work and the organisation which we had set up to give effect to these principles.

Colonel Bajhat then told me of some of his difficulties. He clearly has quite a lot of trouble with the military security branch and is somewhat worried at the prospect of their taking over all intelligence work in time of war. Ray has urged him to get out a detailed war plan covering travel control, censorship, interrogation, Vulnerable Points, etc., as he believes that should a crisis arise the military would probably in the end be only too glad to pass the responsibility to someone who had a plan and knew what he was doing. Colonel Bajhat has already made a start on this, but he is not very optimistic about the attitude of the Army at a time of crisis. He is anxious to get any assistance he can from us about the formulation of his war plans.

The other matter which seems to interest Colonel Bajhat is the recruitment of agents, although he realises that conditions here are very different to those in his own country. In Iraq the Police get no voluntary assistance whatever from the population. The idea of doing something because it is in the national interest never enters their heads. If a murder is committed many people may have witnessed it, but nobody is prepared to come forward or, even when questioned, to identify the culprit. He gave me an example of a murder committed in a cafe, when he and some friend were sitting in an adjoining house. He went round himself immediately and interrogated the proprietor, who pleaded that he had seen nothing. Even two men who had been sitting on the same bench as the murdered man pleaded, the one that he was reading a newspaper at the time, and the other that he was thinking of something else and had only heard the report of the revolver! The only method of coping with a situation of this kind, Colonel Bajhat said, was to take some fifty people who were present in the cafe and put them all in jail. After some hours of confinement, people bagan to admit that they had seen something and eventually fifteen witnesses, corroborating each other's stories, were procured. This story, he said, would indicate how difficult it was to get informants; the only method is by using a personal or family connection and exploiting some situation where money is the primary factor. The average citizen in Iraq does not see any reason why he should court trouble by becoming an agent, and he further takes the view that it is contrary to the tenets of the Koran to act as a spy on his fellow men.

It was clear to me that the relations between Ray and Bajhat were extremely close, and that the latter had a tremendous respect for all the advice and help which Ray had given him.

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Michael Serpell talked to me about [redacted]. He said that [redacted] was still in a very vindictive frame of mind. Serpell wanted me to speak to Fressanges. I said that I would do so on Thursday, by which time I hoped that Skardon would have been able to make contact again.

11th June.

I told the Deputy Directors at the J.I.C. meeting to-day that from enquiries we had made with the Prison Commission, the statement in to-day's Daily Express on FUCHS had no foundation whatever and was inaccurate from start to finish.

[redacted] came to see me. I had been told that he was jibbing about going back to S.I.F.E. after his leave. He is an able officer but a curious type, [redacted] He seemed to be suffering from some feeling of frustration and clearly thinks that he is not being given the scope which his experience would indicate. I do not think that he has got on very well with [redacted] but this, I think, is probably largely his own fault. He had various

ideas about expanding the work of the S.L.O. and it is difficult to see why he has not put them into practice, although he may not have had a great deal of encouragement.

I told him that I could see no reason why he should not go ahead; the only limiting factor being his relations with the local S.B. Provided he could carry them, and it seemed to me that his relations there were entirely satisfactory, there was obviously a great deal that could be done to improve the production of intelligence. Both letter and telephone interception could be developed on communications with adjacent foreign territory. There was also a lot to be done with regard to travel control.

Having got his rather nebulous grievances off his chest, Tolson seemed quite content to go back.

I gather that has been told on the telephone that the matter of his pension is likely to be settled to his satisfaction and that Skardon would like to discuss things with him. He said that he would try and arrange a meeting at the end of this week.

We went to see the F.B.I. film, "Walk East on Beacon", which is a conglomeration of the FUCHS/GOLD/ GREENBERG/ROSENBERG/MARTIN cases all telescoped into an hour of rapid action, with F.B.I. agents everywhere, fast cars, cameras in headlights, television, etc. None of it was very convincing to us, but the apparent speed of the operations and incessant pressing of buttons may hoodwink the public! Mr. Hoover was, of course, in personal control and seemed to have full powers to call out the Fleet and to frustrate Russian attempts to kidnap an eminent Professor on the atomic team!

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12th June.

At the J.I.C. to-day I spoke to Fressanges about I told him that at all costs we did not want to exacerbate feelings. We should be seeing him towards the end of the week and we thought that we could then make it clear to him that he would receive his pension, provided he behaved himself, and that he would be getting an official notification.

Fressanges seemed entirely in agreement with the line we were taking. He thought that although the man was a fool to have got himself into the position that he had, his subsequent conduct under obvious duress was at least understandable.

Young of D.S.I. mentioned at the J.I.C. to-day the case of Dr. Carl STEIMEL, who went to Russia in 1946 - whether voluntarily or not it is not clear - and returned recently to his old job as a Director of Telefunken in Berlin. It seemed that his information was likely to be high-grade: not only had he a considerable knowledge on his own subject, namely, electronics. Radar, etc., but he had also had certain policy discussions.

Personally I am inclined to think that the Russians have reached the point where they consider that they have got all they want from the Germans, and it is better to cut their losses now before they embark on new developments. If this is so, I can only wish that our own research establishments, which are cluttered up with Germans, will do the same.

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I talked to Cumming about . He is going to get into touch with S.I.S. and do anything he can to help. The proposal is to get over here as soon as possible.

We have decided to let Special Branch go ahead in the case of MARSHALL and to effect an arrest at the first opportunity. It is hoped that this may be done at a moment when MARSHALL is handing over documents to KUZNETZOV.

13th June.

Kitchin came to see me. I had a long talk with him about his work in Delhi. While the flow of information was somewhat one-sided, he did think it important to maintain the post, since there was no doubt that the Indians appreciated what we were doing for them. He thought it would considerably help the S.L.O. if the D.I.B. could from time to time be visited by people from home.

Kitchin thought, however, that the time might come when joint S.I.S. operations might be possible. Overtures by C.I.A. in regard to the supply of training facilities and equipment had been unfavourably regarded by Mullik; the approach had obviously been crude.

Kitchin said that Mullik saw Nehru about twice a week, and he thought that Mullik, reinforced by information from ourselves, had, with the support of the Home Minister, succeeded in making Nehru more aware of the dangers of Communism.

The operation planned with Special Branch to pull in MARSHALL took place successfully yesterday evening. They were followed to the rendezvous and S.B. moved in after they had been sitting talking for some time. They were both taken to the police station and a charge was preferred under Section 1 against MARSHALL, in which KUZNEZKOV was mentioned by name. This procedure had rather alarmed the Foreign Office, since it was customary to refer to the representative of the foreign Power. We explained that although this might have come later, it was inevitable that KUZNEZKOV's name would come into the proceedings, since they would rest largely on evidence of pervious meeting of a clandestine kind, and the fact that KUZNEZKOV was an enemy agent. Nothing of importance was found on either suspect, except £25 on KUZNEZKOV and a note of thenumbers of three of our cars. MARSHALL had a paper which related to certain wireless schedules, showing the times at which transmissions were made; there was nothing in this that could not be obtained by any monitoring service. The case, therefore, must rest on the accused being able to show

that these clandestine meetings were not for a purpose prejudicial.....

Burt rang up Dick, and from the conversation it seemed that he was a little bit worried. He indicated that had it been possible for him to conduct the case he might have extracted a statement from MARSHALL, which would have made the outcome of the proceedings more certain. This, however, would have been an extremely delicate matter. We learnt afterwards that Burt was trying to discover whether we thought S.B. had made a mess of things! In point of fact, I think the action has been right, since clearly we could not allow these meetings to go on indefinitely. It is to be hoped that the Attorney General will give his fiat, even if he thinks that the proceedings may fail, since a clear impression must be left in the public mind that these meetings were not purely social and that something in the way of espionage was afoot.

MARSHALL was taken to his home in order that his room might be searched. His father asked what it was all about and Hughes, the S.B. officer, suggested that the son might give the explanation. This, however, the son declined to do, beyond saying that he had been "out with a friend". At the Court proceedings to-day MARSHALL indicated that he did not want bail.

16th June.

Yesterday Dick had to go down to Chartwell to see the P.M. He found him in bed with all the Sunday newspapers laid out in front of him, a cigar in his mouth, and a large box of cigars at his bedside! He was extremely on the spot and wanted to know all about the case. He seemed quite satisfied with the action that had been taken and, having offered Dick one of his cigars which the latter refused, requested him to have a talk with the "Prof" (Lord Cherwell).

Cherwell had a bee in his bonnet about the FUCHS story which had appeared in the Daily Express last week. He thought that the Communists had 'planted' the information on the Daily Express. Dick said that in his view the more likely explanation was that an old lag had seen a way of making £5. According to the story that we have got from someone in touch with the Daily Express office, the paper received a call from a man calling himself 'DAVIS', who said that he was a warder from Stafford Gaol and that he had something to communicate. He said he would meet a reporter at St. Paul's Churchyard. The reporter met him and was shown what was apparently a forged prison order for FUCH's transfer from Stafford Gaol to Pentonville. He then gave the story as it appeared in the Daily Express, but for some reason or another said that his real name was ROSS. The Express had rung up the Governor of Stafford Gaol, from whom they had had a non-commital reply; they had therefore assumed that the story was confirmed.

Cherwell is still not convinced and would evidently be prepared to tell the Americans that it was a Communist plot designed to throw a spanner into the works of Anglo-American co-operation. We frankly think this a bad idea unless there is some supporting evidence.

'C' rang up to-day to say that he understood we were refusing to allow to accompany Penney on his visit to FUCHS. He was distressed about this as he felt very strongly that with his wide knowledge of the intelligence side of atomic energy, would be able to prompt Penney on a number of points which would probably arise during the course of the interrogation. He wondered, therefore, if it would be possible for to go instead of Skardon.

I said that in our letter to Morgan we had said that we wanted Skardon to be present in order that he could maintain touch with FUCHS and use to the best advantage the bond of confidence which undoubtedly existed between them. Apart from this, we had felt that three might be rather a crowd. We had therefore said to Morgan that we hoped it would not be necessary to send more than one representative.

'C' replied that Penney knew FUCHS, and implied that he would not, therefore, need anyone to effect an introduction. I said that this was not really the point, and that in any case Penney, as far as I knew, had not seen FUCHS since his trial. Finally, however, I said that if 'C' really felt strongly about being present, we would certainly reconsider the matter, but Skardon would in any case have to be there. I promised to ring 'C' back.

I spoke to 'C' on the telephone in the evening. I told him that we did not wish to object if he wished to go in addition to Penney and Skardon. It was agreed that 'C' would tell Morgan that this matter had been settled between us.

Jack Morton came in to discuss with Dick, Horrocks and myself a telegram from Leighton to say that he now only wants the services of Carrel for research work within the Malayan Union S.B.

Morton has agreed, subject to review when he gets out there at the end of September. If he then feels the services of Gee are necessary he will let us know. What he is trying to set up within the S.B. is a kind of B.2.b. to carry out research work and indicate cases where profitable action can be taken.

Dick seemed to think the idea was all right, provided the S.B., particularly in their outstations, did submit such cases for examination. We thought we ought to get this matter quite settled with Morton before Gerald Templer descends upon us. The latter arrived back in London to-day - true to his last words to me before leaving: "I shall be back in about six weeks, raising Cain in Whitehall"! I am inclined to think that most of the Cain will be raised in the Colonial Office!

Dick tells me that KERR, who got into trouble with a woman in Moscow a short time ago and was brought home, has come forward to say that he believes that MARSHALL was also visiting the Russian canteen waitress called NINA. This is in fact confirmed by an entry in MARSHALL's diary. It seemd likely, therefore, that where KERR resisted approach by the M.G.B., MARSHALL succumbed.

A former Transport Officer in Moscow has also come forward to say that he believed that MARSHALL was a Communist. The Foreign Office are incensed that the Embassy in Moscow did not dispense with NINA's services earlier or tell them about MARSHALL's association with the girl, about which they seem to have known.

There is no doubt that our security in Moscow is positively lamentable.

17th June.

Dick talked to me about getting prior approval from the D. of P.P. before taking action in espionage cases. He said that this created a certain awkwardness when we called in Special Branch, since the police would normally consider that they wished for freedom of action in going forward with a case such as that of MARSHALL.

I said that as far as I could recollect it had always been the practice to consult with the D. of P.P. before taking action, mainly because there was always the political implication to be considered, even though this might have been previously cleared with the Foreign Office, but perhaps more because it was extremely important not to stultify the Official Secrets Acts in any way. Criminal cases were entirely different. It might, too, be argued that Special Branch - and Burt in particular - would have the right sense and approach in initiating action. This might not apply in the case of many Chief Constables. If irresponsible action were taken, we might end up by getting the O.S.A debated in the House of Commons, with disastrous results. I did not think it was possible to lay down any hard and fast rule. In the present case I did not think there was any need to consult the D. of P.P., but in other cases it might be important to carry him, since it is he who has to advise the Attorney General.

There have been two interesting developments. It now seems that the former Transport Officer in Moscow, BARTHOLOMEW, who came forward to say that he believed MARSHALL to have been a Communist, was either trying to cover up activities of his own or to obtain information. An examination of his banking account, and that of MARSHALL, shows that he has paid MARSHALL several sumes of £20 and also that he paid a girl Communist, who went to Russia years ago and fell on evil circumstances; for some reason or another the Russians allowed her to return here. BARTHOLOMEW's own account had a balance of something like £1,800 at the time that he was making payments to MARSHALL.

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18th June.

At the J.I.C. this morning we discussed a letter from General Kirkman asking for guidance about making contact with the German Secret Service. We agreed that it was difficult to answer General Kirkman's questions until we knew whether the Germans themselves had made up their minds about who was to run the Service. It seemed to lie between Von Gehlen and Heinz. Von Gehlen controls the RUSTY organisation and Heinz is head of what is known as the Heinz Bureau, which also seems to be running agents.

It was clear enough that the Germans would have a Secret Service and that our only course was to establish friendly relations with that organisation.

It was agreed that before making comments, the High Commissioner should approach Dr. Adenaeur and that this should be done, if possible, before General Kirkman's visit to this country on July 30th.

19th June.

At the J.I.C. Directors meeting to-day I mde a short statement about the MARSHALL case, emphasising that it was based very largely on association and was the kind of case which could only be brought by a country having an Official Secrets Act. While we did not think that anything very serious had gone wrong, it was an association which we could not allow to continue. The information being passed related to times, frequencies and call-signs used for Foreign Office communications.

The Foreign Office said they had received a communication from their Ambassador, expressing a certain alarm that KUZNEZKOV had been searched. They thought that reciprocal action might be taken against members of the Embassy staff in Moscow. The Ambassador has issued special instructions that nobody is to carry any documents which might be at all compromising.

I might have asked why such an instruction had not been issued before, since the precaution seemed a fairly obvious one. Apart from this, if the Russians did arrest one of our people in Moscow, they are fully capable of planting documents on them.

When I got back Dick told me that the Soviet Embassy have put their foot right in it. They protested about KUZNETSOV being searched and went on to say that the meeting was a purely casual one; in other words, we are asked to believe that they just happened to sit down on the same bench! This will not go very well in Court, since MARSHALL himself has admitted to meeting KUZNETSOV seven times, and the Watchers will report in some detail about the furtive movements of KUZNETSOV, not only at this meeting but at the two previous meetings. Apart from this, KUZNETSOV had the numbers of three of our cars in his notebook!

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D.E./A reported at the Appointments Board to-day that a letter had been received from the Colonial Office enquiring whether or not any decision had yet been reached regarding the opening of the post in Aden. F.O. was asked to join the meeting at this stage. She was informed that the estimated cost of the opening of the station would be at the rate of £5,000 p.a. or about £2,500 in this financial year. She gave it as her opinion that this money could be found. She then withdrew. It was felt that, owing to the difficulty of obtaining an adequate number of trained officers to fulfil the demands made on the Service, noticeably in Malaya, it would be hard to find a suitable officer for Aden. In addition the Board did not feel wholey convinced of the immediate intelligence need, It was therefore decided to recommend to the D.G. that consideration of this question should be deferred until later in the year - (possibly after a projected visit to the area by O.S.). The Colonial Office should be informed accordingly.

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It was agreed to recommend to the D.G. that Mr. MANN's application to be appointed to the staff of the Security Service on his resignation from the Glasgow Police in September 1952 should be accepted. The D.G. subsequently approved and stated that Mr. MANN should be appointed to the established staff.

D.C. reported that General Templer was searching for a Security Officer for Kuala Lumpur. There was some discussion on this matter and a general feeling that we should do all we could to help to find a suitable officer, but the matter was reserved for further consideration.

20th June.

Billy ROBERTSON looked in. He was formerly in B.1.A. but left us in 1944 to work for U.N.R.R.A. When U.N.R.R.A. folded up he went on to U.N.O. or NATO and is now employed by the Council of Europe.

Apparently Eden's speech, indicating a more active part in the affairs of the Council, has been rather a shock to the Germans, who thought that they were going to have things their own way.

23rd June.

The MARSHALL case came up again on Saturday, when a remand was obtained until next Thursday. There had been a legal meeting before with the Solicitor General, Manningham-Buller, who seemed to be generally rather at sea! At one stage he said to Gambier-Parry, a propos of the significance of the piece of paper found on MARSHALL: "I think I know the meaning of this". Gambier-Parry then said: "I do not think it is the kind of

"significance that you think it is" ! After these cryptic remarks the room was cleared for Gambier-Parry and Manningham-Buller to go into a huddle, at the conclusion of which, Bass, the Treasury Counsel, remarked that so far he had heard nothing about the evidence, which seemed to him important!!

Some time after midnight Dick was rung up from Chartwell by the P.M's secretary. The P.M. had seen the evening papers with the new charges and had got rather excited. After a conversation lasting about half an hour with Oates (the secretary), the P.M. seemed satisfied.

I saw Newsam this morning, when I talked to him about the principle of imposing warrants on a soldier in B.A.O.R. For technical reasons this had to be done by the Army Post Office. The point arose, therefore, as to whether the warrant should be signed by the Secretary of State for War or by the Home Office. Newsam thought that Sir George Turner should call a meeting on this point.

At the D.G's meeting to-day the question of a new post at Aden was considered. It was pointed out that financially the opening of such a post would be possible, as for the remainder of the financial year it would cost about £2,500 , and that this money could be found on our present estimates. The annual cost, however, would in future be £5,000 as far as we could calculate.

On the question of suitable manpower, the opening of such a post would be an embarrassment, since it would be difficult to find a suitable officer without disrupting over more important work. The position had been made more difficult by our agreement to supply two, and possibly three, officers on secondment to General Templer in Malaya, but of most importance, it seemed to us that there was not really an intelligence need. In Aden there were no serious security problems at the moment; the only suggestion of intelligence need advanced was that we should be building an important refinery at Aden in 1953.

As regards British Somaliland it seemed to us that this could be suitable run from Nairobi, while Khartoum could be as easily, if not more easily, visited from the Canal Zone.

The demand for a station in Aden had arisen largely from the mutiny in the Sudan Police rather more than a year ago. Since, however, the possibility was not known even to the Commissioner of Police, it is unlikely that our officer would have been any wiser. The C.-in-C. had, however, felt at the time that he ought to have been forewarned if any additional forces were likely to be committed in the Sudan. For this purpose he had a G.S.O.1 or G.S.O.2 situated in Khartoum.

The D.G. agreed that, on present information at any rate, the opening of a post at Aden could not be justified. He thought, however that the position could be re-examined by Alec Kellar when he attended the African S.L.O's Conference in October. Meanwhile, we should have the advantage of a discussion with the Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner of Police in the Sudan who was attending one of our Colonial Conferences here in July.

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25th June.

One of the Assistant Chief Constables for Lancashire County, Palfrey by name, and Chief Superintendent Lindsay came to see me during a tour of the office.

26th June.

I talked to Miss Small about the case of a refugee of German extraction who is now domiciled in the United States. He is coming here shortly for a visit to an ex-colleague of his in E.M.I., namely, Gerhard There is reason to think that these two individuals may have some connection with the ROBINSON case. ROBINSON was a Russian agent operating in France during the war and was captured by the Germans. At the end of the war we obtained certain records which were in the possession of ROBINSON when the Germans raided his premises. One of the documents was a communication from another Russian head agent here known as "JEAN", forwarding papers which it appeared had been in the possession of It seemed that, possibly unknown to some individual referred to as "The Professor" had had access to documents which covered the field of electronics. We had asked the F.B.I. to interview on the assumption that the latter was an innocent party, and with a view to finding out whether he could suggest anyone in E.M.I. who might have had access to these documents.

gave a number of names, but did not include who now seems to have been a long standing friend of his and is coming on a visit to Europe.

Running parallel to this case, and possibly connected with it, is that of Gunther relative of the man here, who is strongly believed by the French to be a Soviet agent. We are taking all steps to cover during the period of the former's visit to this country.

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27th June.

I had a talk with Graham Mitchell about ERSIG. He is looking into the question of indoctrination and office instructions.

The proceedings at the MARSHALL trial before the Magistrate yesterday went reasonably well, although there were one or two minor slips due to Counsel not knowing enough about his Brief, and to a rather bad witness from H[illegible]slope.

The case has gone for trial at the July sessions at the Old Bailey, and it is unlikely that we shall meet with much difficulty, although the accused's Counsel, APPLEBE, has close Party associations. He is, however, I think, confused about the technical implications of the information which has been passed. It is difficult to see how he can get enlightenment on these points either from MARSHALL or from the Russians, since it would be embarrassing to both of them to tell him the truth.

30th June.

I asked him for our list of Warrants submitted at the beginning of the year, in accordance with a request that the Home Office should be informed about all Warrants which had been imposed for a period of twelve months. This list is normally returned, but Newsam had kept both this year's and last year's. He promised to have a good look among his papers. He opened several drawers revealing memoranda of a Top Secret kind: he then looked a little confused and explained to me that such documents were perfectly safe. I am not at all convinced that they are, seeing that he frequently leaves his room for long periods with the door wide open. I wondered, too, whether his drawers are locked at night!

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1st July.

I attended the . meeting, which was 'C''s last appearance as Chairman. As his "swan song" he implored the Board to have due regard for the security of any future successes with He was convinced that it was only by the most rigid imposition of security that we had won the last war. He had seen the P.M. and asked him to give his support to any proposals which reached him regarding finances which had been adopted by the Board in connection with the improvement of our sources of information. It seemed unlikely that the Board would get more than about half it had asked for.

The P.M. is vitally interested in this source of information and intends to pay a visit to G.C.H.Q. very shortly.

2nd July.

Robertson and Skardon came to see me about The Air Ministry have not yet sent off the letter telling that he will be granted his pension. Skardon rang up yesterday and the latter took the attitude that there was nothing to discuss until he got this letter. Meanwhile is in fairly regular communication with the Polish Embassy.

I undertook to speak to Group Captain Paul at the J.I.C. to-day.

I spoke to Group Captain Paul after the J.I.C. meeting about the case of I outlined to him in some detail the various stages of the case and the point which had now been reached.

It seemed to me that there had been a certain amount of misunderstanding, and perhaps even a feeling of vindictiveness against which might have a serious effect if, as I understood the Air Ministry point of view, the primary objective was to prevent from going back to the Poles and possibly divulging information of even greater importance about which he may up to now have remained silent. We had asked the Air Ministry fo give us the advantage of notifying about the continuance of his pernsion four or five days before he received the official letter. This had been done some weeks ago and we had had a promise from Mears, on the 18th June, that the letter would be sent off forthwith. Our officer had been in touch with only yesterday, when the latter took the line that there was no point in discussing his future, since he could not settle down until he knew about his pension, and that so far he had received no official notification. Meanwhile, we knew from our own sources that he was still in weekly contact with the Poles in an endeavour to obtain a Polish visa. If our officer was to stand any chance of reasoning with who was, we thought, mentally unbalanced and in a difficult state, it was of paramount importance that he should receive the notification forthwith. I understood that had been in touch with his solicitor on the matter, and it might be that this had resulted in the whole case being side-tracked in the Legal Department of the Air Ministery.

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Group Captain Paul said that he would look into the whole question immediately and endeavour to arrange that the letter should be sent off at once. I asked him to let us know as soon as this had been done.

3rd July.

Kirkman, of Intelligence Division Germany, took up most of the morning at the Directors meeting of the J.I.C. to-day. He certainly has some difficult problems to solve, but was rather tedious and pompous about them!

There was the question of his staff, whose contracts come to an end on the 1st October. Are they to be established or kept on on contract, plus bonus? This is really a matter for the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury. If they are established it is very difficult to see how any of the Intelligence branches can give a guarantee of absorbtion which may be in two, three, four or five years time.

There was also the question of relations with the German Intelligence Service. Kirkman thought that the High Commissioner should tackle Adenaeur, as previously suggested. The Committee made it clear that they felt that there was a distinction between the setting up of a Security Intelligence and a Secret Service and some body like the D.M.I's department which would do the collation work. There did not seem to be any difficulty about going ahead with the Secret Service, provided we knew who was going to control it. Anything in the nature of a D.M.I's department raised difficulties, since such a department would be a part of, or a nucleus of, the German General Staff.

4th July.

I have discussed with Dick and Peter de Wesselow the case of Andrew REVAI.

Hugh GAITSKELL and Anthony are supporting him in a renewal of his application for British nationality. Anthony wants to discuss the matter with me .

After very careful consideration of the files, it seems to me that up till the end of 1946 REVAI was about as far left as he could be - if he was not actually a Communist. I should say that he was probably completely in line with BURGESS, with whom he was on very intimate terms.

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In the autumn of 1947 REVAI paid a second visit to Budapest, when he was offered an appointment in the Foreign Office, and subsequently a job as head of the Hungarian Information Bureau in London. He refused the first and temporised on the second. Later he refused the second, but offered his services as an assistant to Miss SZABO, who was placed in charge of the department. This continued until March 1948, when he ceased writing for the Hungarian newspapers and ceased any contact with the Embassy, probably because Miss SZABO was pushed out.

My own impression of the whole case is, that ideologically REVAI was with the Hungarian Government and that he probably is still. He realised, however, on his visit, owing to the liquidation of the Smallholders Party and the subsequent amalgamation some months later of the Social Democrats and Communists, that his services here during the war and his European background would be likely in the long run to make him the victim of a purge. He therefore hesitated to take on a job in Hungary and refused the job in London; the latter because he thought that it might prejudice his chances of being allowed to remain here; he would then have had the worst of both worlds. I cannot, therefore, feel that he is a very suitable person for naturalisation.

7th July.

I gave a talk to Colonial Police Officers this morning.

The question of a possible move of S.I.M.E. during the next year to Cyprus was discussed at the D.G's meeting to-day, although we have heard nothing official about it. The suggestion is that if we do move we should have our own accommodation and not be dependent upon the Army.

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Marriott came to tell me about recent information from [redacted] and some other informant, suggesting that Anthony BLUNT was a far more active Communist in his University days than we previously believed.

While I do not exclude this possibility I should not feel too confident about information from , who now poses as a hot anti-Communist. While I do not doubt conversion, I think it likely that people who have gone through such a change are inclined in self-justification to exaggerate things. For example, it was said that BLUNT was responsible for X or Y's conversion; this may, of course, mean a great deal or very little, but how precisely does the informant know? While I believe that BLUNT dabbled in Communism, I still think it unlikely that he ever became a member. He was, however, on his own admission, deeply interested in the Marxian interpretation of art, and is in fact still so interested. He denies ,however, that he ever believed in the Russian application of Marxian thought. He has nearly all his life been so absorbed in artistic matters that it seems unlikely that he has ever been really interested in politica. I think,however, it likely that, in view of his close association with BURGESS, he may well have been indiscreet in discussing matters going on in this office. He would have excused himself on the grounds that we were fighting with the Russians and .that BURGESS himself was in Government employ. It is also possible - although I am less sure about this - that he did not in far greater detail exactly what BURGESS was up to.

8th July.

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9th July.

I saw Anthony Blunt yesterday at the Travellers Club. He told me that Andrew REVAI had enlisted the support of Mr. Hugh Gaitskell for his naturalisation, and that the latter had written to the Home Secretary.

I told Blunt that I had gone very carefully once more through REVAI's own statement about himself. It seemed to me that ideologically he had been sympathetic to the regime inHungary, but that he had realised, very slowly and very reluctantly, from conversations that he had had in Budapest in 1947, that, owing to his European background and the length of time that he had lived outside Hungary, he would never really be trusted and would in all probability become a victim of the next purge. He had refused to accept office here, either as head of the Hungarian Information Bureau or as Minister, possibly because he thought that in so doing he might compromise his position here vis a vis the British authorities (this view was rather reinforced by a statement by Blunt, to the effect that REVAI had been considerably worried at the possibility that if he were to go abroad he might find himself 'gated' on his return); in other words, he had hoped to get the best of both worlds, but, rather tardily, saw the dangers of getting the worst, ie. being unacceptable both to the Hungarians and to the British. At the conclusion of his memorandum, REVAI had given as one of his reasons for becomin; British that with his present status it was difficult for him to travel in the interests of his work. Lastly, it seemed to me that it was a little curious that he should have obtained a new Hungarian passport in November, 1948.

In the light of the above facts, it seemed to me that the Home Office would have considerable difficulty in persuading themselves that REVAI was a fit and proper subject to be naturalised. I thought, therefore, that REVAI would be wise not to pursue the matter.

Blunt saw the force of my argument and did not dispute my analysis of the position.

I drew Blunt's attention to the fact that towards the end of January and again in February, 1948, BURGESS had denounced REVAI, the inference being that, realising that BURGESS was very close to Hector McNeil, REVAI was trying to pump him for information. BURGESS had therefore more or less severed his relations with REVAI.

Blunt told me that, as far as he could recollect, it was about this time that REVAI and BURGESS had had a row on a purely personal issue. There had been a rift between BURGESS and Peter (? Peter POLLOCK), and REVAI had intervened to try and smooth things out. This had annoyed BURGESS.

I suggested to Blunt that the motive might have been somewhat more sinister; since it was about this time that REVAI seemed to have made up his mind that he would not be acceptable to the Hungarian Government. BURGESS might, therefore, have thought the time opportune to put a spoke in REVAI's wheel. It seemed even possible that REVAI knew more about BURGESS' activities than we might think and that BURGESS, fearing his own betrayal by REVAI, thought it wise to get in first.

Although Blunt thought that the personal motive was the more likely, he did not seem to rule out the other theory and he was evidently very shaken by the fact that BURGESS had denounced REVAI on two occasions (the first occasion on 31st January, 1948, and the second on February 20th, 1948).

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There is to be a meeting at the Home Office to-day to discuss a report which we have put in, showing quasi blackmailing operations by members of the Soviet Consulate, who have been making contact with citizens of Satellite States in an endeavour to get them to return to their own countries. These officials had also been distributing propaganda. Quite a large number of cases had come to our notice, and Lord Vansittart has now put down a Question, in which he wishes to know the policy of H.M.G. We are recommending that at least one of the Soviet officials shall be expelled, and that the Government should say categorically that they do not intend to tolerate such activities in future.

At the J.I.C. to-day I made a statement about the two defectors, RAKHMANOV and RODINOV, a sergeant and a private who defected in Germany in 1951 and were accepted here after a stay of three to four months on the Continent. They had been found employment at eight to ten pounds a week, had been well reported on by their employers, and expressed no dissatisfaction with their treatment. At the end of June, however, they had asked whether they could work in the mines, which they thought would offer them better chances of remuneration, and RODINOV had suggested that he might do better in Germany on economic lines. He had also remarked that he preferred spending his leisure hours with German women! He would, however, be prepared to go into the mines in this country if RAKHMANOV went with him.

At the request of both of them, enquiries were being made about getting them a job in the mines. Meanwhile, they had gone off together to Germany via Ostend. RODINOV had been turned back by the Belgians as his re-entry visa to Germany was out of date. We had seen him on his return here. He was adamant about preferring life in Germany, although he had no grouse against his treatment here. We have told him, therefore, to apply to the German Consulate. We have always taken the view that defectors were perfectly free to come and go where they liked, and there was nothing that we could do to prevent their departure. There was no reason, however, to think that they would go back to the Russians. It seemed to us possible that under the new arrangements, by which defectors would be sent here within six weeks, they might possibly settle down more easily, not having had much of a taste for bourgeois life in Germany.

I felt bound to point out that the press had got wind of the departure of these two Russians, and that some agreed statement between the Home Office and the Foreign Office had to be made. This might lead to questions being asked about the rehabilitation of defectors, the organisation responsible, and the sum of money being expended. This was a point which we had drawn attention to when we urged that rehabilitation should be on the open vote.

On my return from the J.I.C. I told Malcolm Cumming what I had said.

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10th July.

At the J.I.C. to-day it was agreed that Service officers should be reminded that it was their duty to report to Directors of Intelligence, through the appropriate channels, when they received invitations from Russia.

I said that where such invitations appeared to have significance, it would be helpful if the Security Service could be kept informed.

11th July.

Dick has returned from the S.I.C. meeting in Brussels, where Hirsch gave an account of the action of the French Government against the Communists. From information received, the French were satisfied that there was a definite plot to come out in the streets in opposition to Ridgeway's appointment and all that it implied. They felt, therefore, that they had to take the bull by the horns. While the raids had been successful, little information had been obtained that was not already known to the Surete. Whilest, however, it was fair to admit that large quantities of documents had been burned before the Police could get access to them, information of some interest had been obtained in Toulon about the collection through the dockers of reports about the Fleet. This was being followed up. The most important fact, however, was that the French Communist Party had signally failed to react; the fact was that the rank and file of the Trade Unions were sick and tired of strikes for political motives. This was a healthy sign. There was no doubt that the Party had received a severe shock.

At the Appointments Board to-day the D.G's Directive from the Prime Minister was discussed. At the Directors' Meeting on 7th July the D.G. asked the Board to examine the Directive given to him by the Prime Minister on 20.4.46, as in a recent discussion with the Home Secretary the latter had asked him to submit a new draft Directive. This was discussed by the Board and a draft drawn up for discussion with the D.G.

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A.1 raised the question of the use of our internal telegraphic address, Lorimer, as most persons seemed to be unaware of its existence although a circular had been issued on it in March 1950. It was agreed that A.1 should re-examine the situation and if necessary register Snuffbox with the G.P.O. so that internal telegrams could be delivered to Leconfield House.

The MARSHALL case finished yesterday after a two day hearing. MARSHALL rather stupidly insisted in implying that the document found in his possession had been planted on him, and when cross-examined in the box put up a very poor show.

The fourth charge, namely, that of procuring information, was thrown out on the grounds that if he was entitled to have it he could not very well be charged with procuring it, but a conviction was obtained on the other three charges, the sentence being five years.

It is gratifying that this case has been brought to a successful conclusion, in spite of the legal doubts. It must, however, have been abundantly clear to the Jury that the elaborate precautions taken by KUSZNETSOV to avoid detection could only imply that the meeting was for a 'purpose prejudicial', in spite of the fact that evidence was lacking on the fact of the actual transmission of information. The evidence was purely circumstantial.

It was also satisfactory from our point of view, since it is the first case that we have had where the evidence was entirely our own. Through T.C. we came to the conclusion that KUSZNETSOV was a man who was running agents, and the rest of the case was based entirely on successful observation, since it was through watching KUSZNETSOV that we were led to MARSHALL.

15th July.

I had a talk with Kellar before a meeting of the Dixon Committee. I told him that our line should be one of co-operation with O.P.C. on the basis of a fairly full disclosure of what they intended to do. This would be in their interests as much as ours, and that we should also insist on the right of veto by Governors, if they thought any measures proposed were likely to be a source of grave embarrassment.

Hilken telephoned to ask whether he and a party of four could come over to study our Registry. They contemplated a drastic reorganisation of their own and wanted to learn as much as they could about our system.

We discussed the revision of the Charter at the D.G's meeting to-day on the basis of a draft which we had prepared. With some slight amendments, the draft was agreed and the D.G. asked me to write a covering letter to the Home Secretary.

Newsam telephoned to me about an article which appeared in the Empire News last Sunday, in which it was stated that KUZNETSOV's had been tapped with the permission of the Home Secretary. He asked me to look up the article and speak to him again.

Victor looked in about the case of , who was employed by the Agricultural Research Council.

Victor had been introduced to through Briscoe some years ago, when he wished to be instructed in higher mathematics. He knew that was at that time highly Left Wing or Communist; he had subsequently given a job at A.R.C., when had assured him that he no longer had any connection with the Communist Party. Recently, however, A.R.C. had received a visit from Battersby, who had stated that was a member of the Party of eight years standing. The Establishment Officer had reported this to Victor, but did not seem to know what he was required to do.

Victor said the man was not employed on any secret work. I said that this was the normal procedure; the probability was that was a current member, although he might not be particularly active. Having discovered this and that he was employed in A.R.C., a classified undertaking, it would be our duty to report the fact in case he were employed on secret work or in case such employment of him was contemplated in the future. Victor said that he would be glad to know how active was. I promised to let him know.

16th July.

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James Robertson came to talk to me about the case of MAKEEV, No. 2 in the Tass Agency, who has made a somewhat crude approach to an old agent of Vickery's, known as "SPOONER". MAKEEV wanted information about the Imperial Defence Conference and on a number of other matters. The meeting was a clandestine one, and if SPOONER has anything to say he is not to

telephone or write, but merely to send MAKEEV a copy of the Irish Independent; this will be the signal for further rendezvous.

This approach is interesting as showing that in spite of the MARSHALL case, the Russians are continuing to probe in a rather blatant manner.

Sir Alexander Grantham, Governor of Hong Kong, attended the J.I.C. Directors' meeting to-day. He was asked at the outset to give some account of the situation in Hong Kong and his general policy lines.

He said that there were four main sources of irritation in Hong Kong:

a) Unemployment, which was increasing not at an alarming rate. This of course was due to the restrictions placed upon trade with China.

b) Industrial disputes.

c) Deportations, which generally caused fairly strong reactions from Pekin and a good deal of wireless propaganda from Communist China.

d) Fires in squatter settlements. At the outset he thought that the Hong Kong administration had been a little slow off the mark, but they now had adequate machinery and, through the expenditure of considerable funds for relief purposes, coupled with good publicity, the Government had even made a certain amount of capital out of these unfortunate events.

When he left the Colony on July 1st, things were generally fairly quiet. Before his departure he had made a personal tour of the frontier districts in leased territories and had found that security had been considerably tightened up. During the daytime there was a sentry about every hundred yards, and at night these numbers were considerably increased. Crossing over the frontier by unauthorised persons was consequently a much more difficult matter.

The policy of the Government was to be firm but not provocative. Each case as it arose had to be considered on its merits and, provided the point was won, efforts were made to avoid a situation where the Chinese were forced to lose too much face. As examples of this policy, he mentioned the prosecution of three papers for seditious libel: the Government, having won its case on appeal against one paper, dropped the prosecution against the others. Another case of this kind was that of the New China News Agency, which had refused to register. The alternatives were to prosecute and close down the paper, or persuade it to conform to the registration procedure under threat of expulsion. The latter course was successfully adopted. A third example of this policy was the deportation of some twelve Chinese, who were engaged in making propaganda films in Hong Kong for the Chinese Communist Government.

An encouraging sign in support of the Hong Kong Government's policy was the spontaneous formation of Right Wing Trade Unions. The

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The Left Wing Trade Unions, who control, amongst other things, most of the Utilities in Hong Kong, had caused discontent amongst their members by the constant promotion of political strikes, and this had been the cause of the break-away. The Governor thought that the creation of the new Unions could be interpreted as a sign of confidence in the Government, since those who sponsored the movement were an obvious target if at any time the Island fell into Chinese hands.

The D.M.I. was inclined to be critical of the Hong Kong Government's policy. Hong Kong was about the only window into China, providing opportunities for making contact with the Chinese people and extracting information. At the moment there was a singular dearth of such information from other sources, and the Chiefs of Staff were constantly urging the J.I.C. to improve the flow of intelligence.

The Governor said that he entirely disagreed with the theory that the Chinese have a time table and that whatever we do they will, according to schedule, occupy the Colony. It was his business to hold the Colony as long as possible, and the moment when the Chinese might consider that Hong Kong under its present control was no longer of any use to them was an indefinite one, but could easily be provoked by action calculated to cause the Chinese to lose too much face. Each case, therefore, had to be dealt with on its merits in the light of the situation at any particular time. He mentioned that the Colony slaughtered more pigs than any other place in the world, except Chicago, and that at least 50% of the vegetable consumption came from the mainland. If these supplies were in any way cut off, serious disturbances in the Colony would be the result. He was asked why the Chinese had not done this already, to which he replied that they clearly thought that the Colony was of too much value to them from the point of view of trade. This brought the rejoinder that we could, therefore, with advantage to ourselves, adopt a tougher attitude.

The meeting then proceeded to discuss the interrogation of Chinese who were resident in the Colony and visited the mainland, and those who were entering the Colony as defectors or refugees. The Governor said that a pilot scheme for three months had been worked out by the L.I.C. in Hong Kong and has his approval, provided the necessary personnel and funds could be found from sources other than those of the Hong Kong Government. He was criticised for saying that he could not subscribe any funds on the grounds that the information obtained from these interrogations would be of no interest to the Hong Kong Government. It seemed to the D.M.I. and other members of the Committee that it must be a matter of considerable importance to the Governor of Hong Kong to know something about China's intentions. At present there was virtually no information on this subject. The Governor was certainly on weak ground, but took the attitude that the scheme proposed would not, in his view, produce any intelligence of value, and that he would not feel justified, therefore, in giving it financial assistance.

I asked whether if the pilot scheme was found to be successful he would change his view. He said that he would be quite prepared to reconsider the matter in the light of events in three months time.

A.G.A.S.(I) asked about reconnaissance flights for the purposes of direct vertical photography in South China. The Governor thought that such flights would clearly be provocative, but on being pressed, he said that while he would not object to an occasional flight, anything in the nature of regular reconnaissance flights would be extremely dangerous. It was pointed out to him that the Americans had been doing this for some time without any awkward repercussions.

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I gave John Shaw an account of the J.I.C. discussion with Sir Alexander Grahtham to-day.

18th July.

I had a talk with Gee. I told him about Grantham's point of view in Hong Kong and the decision at yesterday's J.I.C. to proceed

with the Interrogation Centre in Hong Kong if the necessary finance and personnel could be found.

I asked Gee about Machell-Cox, the representative of the China Bureau who is doing the interrogations of British and foreigners in Hong Kong. He said he thought Machell-Cox was a rather eccentric person: while he was doing quite a useful job, nothing much had come out of the interrogations of counter-intelligence value.

21st July.

Druce came to see me. He did not make a bad impression. I asked him about the Police. He said that while it was true that if it ever came to a show-down AKEL would be reduced to impotence in a very short time on the arrest of its leaders. He did not think that the Police were particularly well-informed; it was alleged that they had a Secretary who gave them information about the activities of the Executive Committee, but no details were known. Some doubt was cast on this informant, since if she were so placed she should be able to do better. Ashmore was not uncooperative, but rather apathetic and, of course, had always maintained the attitude that the D.S.O's office was superfluous. The Governor was pleasant enough but would not take a strong line with Ashmore.

Druce did not think that the position and work of the D.S.O. in Cyprus would be much affected by S.I.M.E's transfer to the Colony, which in any case would not take place for at least eighteen months.

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Holmes came to talk to me about liaison with O.S.I., the American Air Force security organisation in this country. It had seemed that it would be more profitable for P.L.S. to carry this, seeking assistance from B. or C. Divisions when necessary.

Holmes will give effect to this decision and is well qualified to do so, in view of the frequent approaches by O.S.I. to local Police Forces. In so doing he will give O.S.I. a copy of a memorandum on the situation with regard to the British Communist Party, which was prepared a short time ago for S.H.A.P.E.

We do not mind the Americans communicating with the Police on purely local personnel matters, but for wider questions in matters of policy they should look to us and work in co-operation with the Provost Marshal's department.

Serpell and Skardon came to see me about the case of [redacted] who Skardon has seen in the presence of [redacted] solicitor. Apparently the solicitor was apprehensive lest the interrogation had anything to do with a prosecution. Skardon assured him that this was not the case, and that he merely wished, on security grounds, to ascertain precisely what information had been passed to the Poles and what kind of treatment had had whilst in prison. The solicitor was most co-operative and was quite agreeable that such an interrogation should be carried out, provided

Skardon would confirm his statement in writing.

During the course of the interview, Skardon forced [redacted] to admit that he had been to the Polish Consulate and that he had said nothing about this to his solicitor. The effect on the solicitor was considerable, since he now realises it is clearly a security case.

The D.G. was anxious that before Skardon sent his letter the approval of the Air Ministry should be obtained. It was suggested, therefore, that I should ring up Fressanges and arrange an interview between him and Skardon.

22nd July.

I rang Fressanges, who agreed to see Skardon. The interview was entirely satisfactory; with one minor alteration, Fressanges approved the letter and said that he would have been quite prepared to sign it himself. He is now fully acquainted with the whole position.

I lunched with Cumming, Thistlethwaite and [redacted]. I had previously had correspondence with the latter about certain of his students, and a satisfactory liaison has now been fixed up. Although [redacted] does not of course cover the whole University, he will always be a useful consultant in matters affecting other Colleges. He seems to be thoroughly sensible and discreet.

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23rd July.

I went to see Patrick Reilly about the Political Adviser in Hong Kong, whose term of office, we were informed by the S.L.O., comes to an end towards the end of this year. Aldington, the present Adviser, is a weak character and of little assistance to intelligence on the L.I.C. If, therefore, we could get someone who would give us and the Services supports against the dead weight of Mackintosh, there might be a hope of some change of attitude from the Governor's staff.

Reilly was very grateful for the tip and has promised to do his best to see that a suitable appointment is made.

24th July.

At the J.I.C. to-day Reilly read out several recent telegrams from Cairo, from which it appeared that Ali MAHER had collaborated with Mahommed NEGUIB in the military coup d'etat. Cresswell was apprehensive lest the dictatorship should be the cover for a strong Left Wing Government of the Kerensky type coming into power. The King seems to be extremely worried about his fate.

In Persia it was stated that the recent rioting had, to a large extent, been Tudeh Party inspired. The Shah's position had been much weakened, and the prospect of the country getting back to normal or planning its budget seemed extremely remote. Still more remote was the question of a settlement of the oil dispute. Meanwhile, however, it seemed that the British Minister had been almost embarrassed by the appreciations he had received from Persians and others, of the verdict against his own side by the British Judge at The Hague Court: this incident seems to have restored a modicum of British prestige! The effect is understandable, since we know that the Persians had been endeavouring to lobby all the Judges for some considerable time! It may be that some of them are wondering which member of the Government succeeded in bribing the British Judge, and how much it cost!!

There was a very long discussion about the Chinese attitude to the armistice in Korea. It was shown that the Chinese Forces had been built up to a very considerable degree, and the view was expressed that the armistice discussions had been opened by the Chinese in order to achieve this end. There was no doubt that they had wanted a breather. It was felt that they had got all they wanted within the armistice negotiations, except the return of 14,000 Chinese prisoners, which was a matter of 'face' to which they attached considerable importance. Time was no object, since the present

political situation was mainly in their favour. Strong thought that we should not be confident on the question of the 14,000 prisoners, and I mentioned that the Chinese had already, whatever the outcome, lost 'face' on this issue and were continuing to lose fact as long as the negotiations were protracted. Even if the prisoners were returned, everybody would know that it was against their will. I asked whether it was felt that an armistice would necessitate an increas in the U.N. Forces, due to the fact that the Chinese would then be allowed to construct aerodromes in North Korea. Nobody seemed to know the answer.

Turney of D.S.I. gave some details about the preliminary interviews with Dr. STEIMEL, the German expert in electronics who had recently returned from Russia.

From what he had said so far, it seemed fairly clear that the standard of development in electronics by the Russians was distinctly low. Up to 1948 their development had depended almost entirely upon placing sample orders for equipment, which they endeavoured to copy, and since that date they have been relying on published information and on a certain amount of information obtained covertly. In this connection, American curtailment of official or trade publications on the subject of electronics had held things up considerably.

So far the highest priority in electronics had been given to jamming apparatus, and to copying Western devices. Although a certain amount of work on long-range bombing navigational apparatus had been carried out, little had been done in practice and there was no evidence of any significant developments attributable to purely Russian effort.

STEIMEL seemed to think that the slavish copying of Western devices had somewhat stifled any original thought. There was no doubt in his mind that at the moment the Russians were a long way behind in electronics.

There was an acute shortage of really high-grade materials, and such allocations as there were were going to jet aircraft factories.

STEIMEL had heard of a deception project to fill an aeroplane up with complicated electronic gear and crash it in some area where the Allies would get access to its contents. This idea, which was ultimately abandoned, was presumably intended to give us the impression that the Russians were more advanced in the field of electronics than we imagined; in other words, to cover up their own deficiencies.

German scientists are apparently coming back in considerable numbers, except those employed on atomic energy projects.

A propos of his statement, I asked Turney to ascertain for us two things:-

(a) the nature of any covert information which there might be reason to think was obtained from British sources, and

(b) the reason why the Russians seemed to have made up their minds at this moment to dispense with the services of a number of German technicians.

He undertook to obtain any information he could on (a). With regard to (b), he thought it possible that certain high personalities in the Soviet

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Union had talked fairly freely to STEIMEL on policy matters, and would, therefore, have been unwilling to oppose his departure, since this might have involved them in disclosing their own indiscretions to the M.G.B.

I spoke to Victor on the telephone to-day. I told him that the information on current membership was firm, but was delicate and could not be used. Moreover, it seemed that, at any rate within the last year, had taken an active interest in Party affairs.

Victor fully understands the position and will take special care to see that does not have access to any secret information.

At the Appointments Board to-day, D.O.S. reported that he had had a discussion with who agreed that he could handle the Malta station if he had the assistance of a good girl to deal with certain of the interception work. It was agreed to accept this in principle and that D.E./A. would take the necessary action as regards selecting the individual and arranging training by

D.C. said that had requested overseas service, but it was agreed that it would be necessary for him to have further experience in the office before he could be considered eligible to take over an overseas station.

D.O.S. reported that he had not yet received from S.I.M.E. the report he had requested concerning the return of to Cyprus.

25th July.

I was rung up this morning by Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth, Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Home Office, about the case of who works in the Medical Secretary's office at the South London Hospital for Women. The information regarding , the nature of which is not known to the Home Office, was first given to the Minister of Transport, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, who passed it on to the Minister of Health, who in turn rang up Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth.

I said that we would get into touch with Mr. Lennox-Boyd's Private Secretary, in order to find out the nature of the information and, if necessary, to send someone over to look at any papers there might be on the subject.

Later we rang up Mr. Gingell, Principal P.S. to Lennox-Boyd, who said he knew nothing of the case but would ask Lennox-Boyd. He rang back later to say that Lennox-Boyd had been given the information through one of his private connections, whose name he would not divulge to Gingell as he did not want her to be involved in any way, to the effect that she had visited office at the hospital, where she had seen a number of documents, including a plan of the complete lay-out of the hospital together with some names. These documents seemed to the informant to indicate some sort of Communist organisation within the hospital.

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We were asked to investigate the leakage of information by on the dispute which was going on between Lord Cherwell and Duncan Sandys, about the control of atomic energy.

Hill's information, placed on T.C., has been sent by him in rather obvious form to Wilkinson. This is a legacy of an old practice carried out under Norman Brook's instructions, since it was felt that unless the Ministry of Supply saw the raw material they would not be able to assess what was going on.

Hollis feels, and I agree, that this practice should cease, the more so since security in the Ministry of Supply is lamentable.

28th July.

I spoke to Shaw about the J.I.C. M.E. paper which is to come up for discussion at the Deputies' meeting on Wednesday. It deals with the state of intelligence in the Middle East and surrounding countries, and recommends that we should set up a post in Aden to cover the Sudan and Somaliland.

I pointed out to Shaw that, as far as the Sudan was concerned, a suggestion was made that we were not in touch with the right people and that we should make contact with the Assistant Commissioner in charge of S.B. matters, an active officer named DOEB.

Shaw said that we were in touch with the Police, but it was not very clear whether we had any direct contact with DOEB. Apart from this, Stephenson, Chairman of the J.I.C., on his tour of these territories had suggested that the Sudan liaison might be more properly covered from Fayid.

I felt that at the J.I.C. it would be sensible if I could agree to someone from S.I.M.E. visiting Khartoum for a discussion with DOEB, and that, as suggested, DOEB might come up to S.I.M.E. for a short course. This matter seemed important because DOEB will be the operative person when the Sudan has self-government.

At first Shaw said he did not think this was necessary and that he did not agree that the Sudan could be run better from Fayid than Aden. In the end, however, he agreed to a letter or telegram being sent to Stephens, instructing him to establish closer contact with the Sudan on the lines suggested.

We then discussed the question of Aden. I read him out the Intelligence reasons given by the J.I.C. M.E., which were inspired by Stephens, and said that to me they read like a lot of hypothetical blurb! Even Borneo, Indonesia and Malaya were drawn in as having a possible influence on what might happen in the Hadramuth or the Yemen. I felt that on that basis we might establish posts all over the world like the C.I.A.

Shaw then said that he could not see that our post in Cyprus had any more raison d'etre than the one in Aden. I did not agree about this, but said that if it was so it did not seem to me to be a reason for establishing another post in Aden.

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We finally agreed that I would say that we had been giving the post in Aden consideration, but that in view of general financial stringency we wished to look into the matter more closely. An officer would be going out in the autumn to do this.

As regards the Sudan, I would say that we had always been in touch with the Commissioner of Police, and that our visiting officer had seen Special Branch, but that we would re-establish contact with DOEB and, if necessary, invite him up to S.I.M.E. Shaw seemed satisfied with this proposal.

I said that the whole question raised a rather difficult issue. Stephens had more or less committed us to the policy of a D.S.O. at Aden, by talking to the G.O.C. before referring the matter back here. I thought that in a matter of policy of this kind we should be consulted before any local proposal was made. Shaw then said that he had been out and looked into the whole thing and that he fully endorsed what Stephens had proposed. I said that that might be all right, but we had, nevertheless, been at least half committed in advance without any really satisfactory statement about the intelligence needs in Aden. In fact the only ones previously advanced were that Aden was on the main route to the East, and that they might be building a refinery there in 1953, when foreign labour would have to be employed. The fact was that we never had a D.S.O. in Aden, not even during the war, and since the war it was difficult to see that any new situation had arised there which could constitute a real need.

I went to see about the revised Charter, the D.G. having had a letter from Bridges on the omission of para. 9 of the previous Charter which outlined our relations with S.I.S. Bridges had said that he saw no objection to the omission of the paragraph, provided we were satisfied that the previous para. 9, or something on those lines, represented the state of our relationship.

I had told the D.G. that in my view we could very properly reply that it did so represent our relationship, except that things had developed even further on the lines of the Brook Report, which was endorsed by 'C' and himself at the meeting on the 30th July, 1951, under the Chairmanship of Bridges. If any dispute should arise, those documents were on record. It seemed to me a little inappropriate to define our relations with S.I.S. in such detail in a Charter of this kind, when we did not define them with the Police or any other department with whom we were in touch. There was the added difficulty in that we could not make much use of the Charter with Colonial and Commonwealth Governments, or with the Americans, if it defined our relations with S.I.S. The D.G., however, felt that we should include something about our relations with S.I.S. in the Charter, and, when I pointed out that we should have to clear this with S.I.S., he asked me to do so.

I had no difficulty in getting approval, Sinclair away. in fact, would have added something about the advisa or our filling posts in adjacent territories. He was convinced of the value of integration and of having an M.I.5 officer,

It was nice, however, to hear that he was in favour of this policy, which we think of bringing forward for discussion with S.I.S.

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29th July.

The D.G. saw the Home Secretary and Newsam yesterday. It seems that the D.G's letter addressed to Bridges regarding his retirement had been considered by the P.M., who had recommended that the D.G., Horrocks and myself should stay on until after the Coronation.

The D.G. had drawn attention to the 60 rule, which he thought ought to be adhered to, but the Home Secretary and Newsam felt that it was not worth while going back to the P.M. on this issue. It had therefore been decided that we should stay on if we wished.

I said that I should be very pleased to stay on and asked whether I was now free to write to Bridges about the succession. The D.G. said I could do exactly what I liked in this regard, but that personally he thought I might be wise to defer it until the New Year, since things were rather apt to get lost sight of. I said that I would think the point over. I am, however, inclined to believe that it would be better to clock in now.

The D.G. is, I gather, intending to say on until the end of August if possible in order to complete his pension year.

The D.G. mentioned to the Home Secretary that I proposed to apply for the post of his successor, and that Newsam had remarked that he had not really thought the question over at all. Why Newsam should necessarily be thinking it over, I do not know!

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I rang up Auberon HERBERT with regard to two requests: (i) to be placed in touch with Colonel Perkins, and (ii) to be granted facilities for seeing TOKAYEV. I told him that I had already spoken to Perkins and that the latter would ring him up. As regards TOKAYEV, we were not his keepers and he should apply to the Foreign Office. He expressedhis intention of ringing up Fred Warner. I added, however, that unless he had a fairly strong case, his request might not be viewed with favour, since TOKAYEV was a rather difficult and touchy customer.

Auberon explained that he had been mobilising certain emigre groups here and that some Caucasian major had suggested that he should talk to TOKAYEV. He apparently staged an anti-Communist meeting at Manchester a short time ago.

30th July.

Jonas, the new Deputy A.C.A.S.(I) came to see me to-day.

4th September.

I returned to work to-day. Roger was away but Dick seemed to be having a fairly easy time- in fact it was difficult to find that anything was going on in the office at all. I think the answer is that 50% at least of the time is taken up in answering questions from outside bodies, and that during the holiday season things are put on one side awaiting the officer's return.

The D.G. told me about the decision that he should retire in August after the Coronation, and that the date of retirement for Horrocks and myself was the 13th June. This was now in the open and it was up to me to do what I liked in making an approach to Bridges.

5th September.

I saw Holmes about a note that he has written suggestion some replacement for Boddington. He makes out a fairly good case. It would obviously be difficult to run the section when both Pelling and Holmes are out in the provinces together. Apart from this there is now a much closer relationship between P.L.S. and B.1. The latter realise that there are quite a number of jobs where a man like Holmes can help them considerably in case work. Other work done by P.L.S. has, of course, been the interrogation of Germans and Poles employed on secret work. Personally I think that Holmes has made out a case, and I am going to consider it at the next Appointments Board.

Dick tells me that there has been a considerable flap in the Foreign Office about the article which "Time" and "Life" wished to publish relating to HEWITT, BURGESS, BLUNT and WARNER. WARNER is alleged to be a homosexual and a spy, who associated with MARSHALL. The article is, of course, thoroughly inaccurate and grossly misleading; it can, moreover,

do a great deal of harm in creating a false impression that the Civil Service is riddled with homosexuals and spies!

The Foreign Office are anxious that something should be done to prove or disprove the statements about WARNER. Our view is that WARNER is not a homosexual - although it is almost impossible to express an opinion on a matter of this sort. Neither do we think that WARNER was involved in any of BURGESS' more serious activities. Bedell-Smith, who passed the article which it is proposed to publish in "Time" and "Life", said that if he could get some assurance about the inaccuracy of the document he might get it suppressed. The suggestion was that the Police should interview HEWITT and also SEAMAN of the Daily Express, who is said to have had an interview with HEWITT in which the latter said that he was 'shared' by BURGESS, WARNER and BLUNT. HEWITT, of course, is a notorious liar and has already been paid money by the Express: he might well be prepared to say almost anything if he were paid. For the police to go to him now and to ask him whether this statement is true or not is tantamount to asking HEWITT to incriminate himself. They could hardly do so without going to SEAMAN first. This may be embarrassing to Bedell-Smith, so that point must be cleared first.

Superimposed on all this have been letters written by de COURCY to Eden, and several other influential people, making allegations against WARNER. De COURCY's letters are clearly libellous and it may be for consideration whether WARNER should not bring a libel action against de COURCY and "Time" and "Life", but this would obviously raise a real hornet's nest and a lot of mud would stick to the Foreign Office, since whatever the truth about WARNER, he is certainly rather a disreputable person.

6th September.

Burt rang me up to say that Reilly had been over to see the Commissioner about WARNER, but that he, Burt, was not very happy about the whole thing and would like to come over and discuss it on Monday.

8th September.

Dick and I had a discussion with Burt to-day, as a result of which he expressed the view that unless authority could be got for the Yard to interview SEAMAN before seeing HEWITT, there was nothing which they could really do; he doubted, moreover, whether anything satisfactory would result even if such interviews should take place. He was much more in favour of WARNER bringing an action against both de COURCY and SEAMAN, or "Time" and "Life". He proposed to tell the Commissioner so.

Roger returned from leave to-day.

9th September.

Dick and I went over to see the Commissioner at his request, with the D.G's approval. It was agreed that the Commissioner would see the Foreign Office and explain the difficulties.

C.P. sources indicate that three members of the military Junta in Egypt are Communists and that this may not be known to Neguib. The Communists clearly see that Neguib's policy of breaking up the big estates is a leftward move and something of a slippery slope. We are not entirely satisfied about the authenticity of this information and propose to get the M.E. to check up.

10th September.

I attended the J.I.C. We discussed a paper on Persia and what the effects would be if the Tudeh Party were able to take over power. The general feeling was that the Russians would not wish to turn Persia into a satellite power on the lines of Czecho-Slovakia, but that they would, in fact, to a large extent control the situation and obtain facilities for building aerodromes, etc., which would be of great assistance to them should at any time global war break out.

I drew attention to the conditions which Russia had made in November, 1940, when they were invited by Hitler to join the three-power pact. One of these conditions was that the area south of Batum and Baku, in the general direction of the Persian Gulf, should be recognised as the centre of gravity of the aspirations of the Soviet Union, and that it was important to mention this as it was one of the few occasions on which the Soviet Government had expressed this in writing on a matter of foreigh policy, which was clearly imperialistic in its designs.

We discussed also the case of DAVIDENKO, a Lieutenant in the Soviet Army who had defected. This man had taken up residence in the Western Zone, and subsequently became the head of a gang of thieves. He had been arrested by the Germans and sentenced to 11 years penal servitude. The Russians had asked for his return, on the grounds that he was not a defector but had been retained in Germany against his will. DAVIDENKO expressed his willingness to go back to the Soviet Union. The Foreign Office had the idea that they might use their good offices with the German Government to get DAVIDENKO released in exchange for a British subject named BUNDOCK, who since 1948 had been unable to go outside the British Embassy in view of a sentence of 18 months imprisonment standing against him in a Russian court for having infected a Russian girl with venereal disease - it is believed, in fact, that the girl infected BUNDOCK.

The J.I.C. felt that this kind of horse trading was not really a good idea and that DAVIDENKO's return might have a serious effect on the defector programme. So it looks as if the unfortunate BUNDOCK will have to remain confined in the British Embassy. It appears that diplomatic privilege does not extent to all the lower members of the staff, whereas in this country, as far as I know, all the cooks and the doorkeepers have diplomatic privilege. The Foreign Office are, I believe, proposing to advise BUNDOCK to serve his sentence. The question was raised whether this was wise on security grounds. Although BUNDOCK would not normally have access to any confidential information, he has of course been continuously been associating with people engaged on confidential duties within the Embassy. Apart from this, something of a dangerous precedent is being created, since any of the lower orders in the Embassy could be arrested and blackmailed to giving information.

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I spoke to Reilly after the meeting about WARNER. He said that he had seen the Commissioner and Howe and that the suggestion was now being made to the Foreign Secretary that clearance should be obtained from Bedell-Smith to allow the police to interview SEAMAN. The Foreign Office do not approve of the idea of WARNER starting a libel action; they think that too much mud would stick, however innocent WARNER might be.

11th September.

The D.D.M.I. (Johnstone), came over about the case of an officer called who has been indoctrinated and is employed on M.I. duties.

had asked to resign his Commission in order to take up journalism. The War Office thought that has he had been indoctrinated this would be undesirable, and refused his request. , who has obviously been having a good deal of domestic trouble, has now disappeared. The police have been asked to look out for him at the ports and the security police have been making enquiries at hotels.

I pointed out that even if he turned up at a port, there would be no power to stop him unless a warrant were issued for his arrest under military law, for absence without leave. Meanwhile, it did not seem to me that there was anything useful that could be done. has very little money, as far as can be ascertained, no passport, and did not leave his home with any clothes. It is quite possible, therefore, that for purely domestic reasons he wishes to fade out of the picture for the time being.

I lunched with We discussed the Election prospects of America. He was inclined to think that Stephenson would win, since in many ways he was a more experienced and more intelligent man. At the same time, as a staunch Conservative, he felt that a change of party would be good for the country, since he doubted whether the return of a democratic President would ever bring about the clean-up in the administration that was so vitally necessary. This led him to talk about the vast sums of money which were being expended. While he was all in favour of assistance being given by the United States, he thought it could be done at about half the cost. He referred to the immense number of people who were literally falling over each other in the administration, and not least in the Intelligence world.

I said I wondered whether the many projects which were put on foot were in fact profitable. said that he often heard senior people of his organisation say that Russia was a tough target, but that everything must be tried, from which it followed that the most hair-brained operations were carried out without anybody sitting down and asking whether if successful they were worth while. He agreed with me that to push agents across the various frontiers was by and large a wholly unprofitable operation, which could not really result in telling us what Russian intentions and capabilities were. We might learn that a harvest in certain places had not been good, or that some village had a section of anti-aircraft guns, etc., but such information is really of little or no value. It did, however, enable people to say that they had put so many agents into Russia or a satellite country. It seemed to me that the

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urge generally came from the constantly changing high-ranking Service personnel, who as soon as they were beginning to get some idea of Intelligence work were removed to other spheres. In my view there were roughly three profitable operations. Firstly, it was desirable to get as much overt information, on an exchange basis, which gave a frame into which to put any piece of hot information that might come in, and to assess it against the background of the picture. In our particular line we wanted to get as broad a picture as we could of the enemy's Intelligence organisation, wherever it manifested itself. Secondly, one should have feelers out which would enable one to encourage/possible defector who could give information of real value. Thirdly, one could decide that one wished to obtain a particular type of information, that such information was available in a particular place, and that such and such individuals had access to it. One could then sit down and endeavour to plan a careful operation. I doubted whether there was much else that was really profitable.

D.D.M.I. telephoned in the afternnon to say that wife was getti rather agitated. He wondered whether it would be better to put out an all-station enquiry through the police. I said that the wife, of course, was at liberty to ask for this if she liked, but that my inclination would be to let things ride for the next twenty-four hours.

At the Appointments Board to-day the following points were discussed:

Aliens Reception Centre.

I said that I felt uneasy concerning the present situation, and the machinery which had been set up for the reception of aliens who might evacuate Europe in case of war. I felt it was desirable that, so far as possible, nationalities should be routed to specified ports where they could be interrogated by officers interested in the countries from which they were refugees.

D.B. said that officers of the Dutch Security Service had approached him, and so also had the Foreign Office. It was really a matter for the Home Office, but Newsam was not prepared to initiate any action, considering that the attitude taken was defeatist. The question of setting up an intermediate stage between the port of arrival and the A.R.C. was primarily the responsibility of the Home Office and without their support, nothing could be done. D.B. said he would examine what progress the Home Office had made, and it was also agreed that a study should be made of the lists of officers for one who could carry on the planning, and even perhaps be the officer to set up and control A.R.C. in the event of war.

D.B. pointed out that the question was properly one for A. Division. A.1 replied that this would involve a considerable amount of work and time, to cope with which there was not the staff in A. Division. If it were considered that it was an A. Division responsibility, it would entail an increase in the staff of the Division.

Candidates for A.S.I.O.

A letter from S.L.O. Australia to D.E./A. of 25th August was discussed but it was agreed that in connection with paragraph 6, far more detail must be given concerning conditions of service before the proposal was circularised to members of the staff. A.1 undertook to write to S.L.O. Australia.

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Vacancy for appointment of Commissaire, Surete, Tangier.

The letter from Brigadier Roberts to D.E./A. was discussed and it was agreed that officers should be circularised so that at least they should have the opportunity of putting forward a claim should they so wish.

Police Liaison Section.

The points put forward by Mr. Holmes were discussed and the Board agreed that a replacement for Major Boddington was necessary. Possible candidates were to be examined from among a) present staff and b) applicants from outside, preferably with Police experience.

Aden.

It was accepted that a decision in principle to fill the post of S.L.O. Aden had been agreed. O.S. was going out towards the end of October on a tour of the Middle East and for the Nairobi Conference, and one of his ports of call would be aden where he would discuss the question of accommodation and what was necessary for the setting up of the station. The Board felt it was important to make an early selection of an officer for the post in order that he could be briefed. He would have to be an officer of some calibre so that he could talk with experience and authority to Police and Government officials in Aden and Khartoum. The names put forward were those of Examination is to be made of the lists for further candidates.

(I found on my return from leave that we had been committed to opening an establishment at Aden. The D.G. took the view that as the J.I.C. M.E. and the Colonial Office had supported the appointment, we should go ahead. Administrative details are to be worked out by Alec Kellar when he visits the area in October).

Cairo.

The question of additional staff for Cairo was discussed. It was not quite clear from Mr. Foulkes' demand, whether he wanted an extra intelligence officer or a general purpose administrative officer. The Board felt that it was possible to put in temporary assistance from S.I.M.E. H.Q. and to wait until Mr. Drower had had the opportunity of settling into his new post, and then to see how things progressed. D.O.S. would write to H/S.I.M.E. in this connection.

Visit to Ceylon, New Delhi & Karachi.

D.O.S. informed the Board that Mr. U'ren had been selected to go out to visit these stations, primarily at the request of the officers in charge, so that they could be kept up to date with Head Office activities in connection with their spheres of influence.

Port & Travel Control Course.

It was agreed that a Cocktail Party should be given to representatives attending the Course, to be held on the evening of 26th September at 6 p.m.

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D.C. suggested that the confidential reports on officers, irrespective of their Divisions, should be circulated to all Directors. This was endorsed by other Directors.

One of the Post Office operators has overheard a conversation between a photographer in London called GOTLOP and a woman called "NAIDA" in Birmingham. GOTLOP was trying to persuade the woman to return the sum of £500 to an individual unknown, not to be a traitor, and not to go to Ostend but to report the matter to the police.

We know the woman's address and the firm for which she works in Birmingham. Holmes is going up to-morrow to see the Birmingham police.

12th September.

I had lunch with , from which I gather that the relations between the Surete and the D.E.C. are much the same, but that some compromise has been reached and relations are just ticking over.

13th September.

Holmes has returned from Birmingham. The GOTLOP case, as we expected, turned out to be a mare's nest, although there are a few tag ends still to be cleaned up. Holmes' impression of the woman is that she is a "high-stepper" and a liar! He thinks the whole telephone conversation was part of a love intrigue by her!

15th September.

Bill Drower came to say good-bye. He is off to Cairo to support Foulkes, who seems to be a bit overwrought and to be over-working himself instead of decentralising on others. His main worry is to pick up the disintegrated pieces of the 'Orchestra' and, if possible, to build up a new organisation. Meanwhile, Stephens seems to think that he needs the additional services of an administrative officer.

Our view is that we should await the effect of Drower's appointment

Stephens has also asked for a second administrative officer in Cairo and suggests that Aden should have two officers, the second one being an attached Air Force man. We do not think that either of these appointments are necessary.

16th September.

Jack Morton came to see me. He is leaving shortly to take up his new appointment as Intelligence Adviser and Co-ordinator for Gerald Templer. He fully realises the formidable nature of his task. He is anxious to return here in eighteen months time. Meanwhile, reports received from Leighton seem to indicate that some progress has been made and that Young, rather contrary to his and my expectations, has succeeded in creating a better atmosphere within the police, in spite of the fact that he knows nothing about intelligence matters.

I had a long talk with There seems little doubt that he is slightly resentful at having been uprooted as a matter of urgency to join the integrated unit in S.I.M.E., only to find that he had practically nothing to do, and that in consequence he has been turned over to C. Division duties. He is here now under instruction in C. Division matters.

At the present moment the integrated unit consists of as head, They scarcely have a days work, dur I think largely to the fact that sources of information are few and far between. Greece has now come into the orbit of N.A.T.O. and will therefore cease to be reporting to S.I.M.E. Persia has practically dried up, owing to the withdrawal of the Police Adviser, Briance, who was providing about 90% of the information.

In Iraq the situation is under control and we are well documented on the subject of Communism there, owing to the extensive work done previously by Philip Ray. The flow of information, therefore, is only small.

In the Lebanon and Syria and there is little information coming in. In Egypt most of our sources have been cleaned up, but Foulkes is struggling to rebuild. From the Canal Zone there is a certain amount of information on the IKHWAN and other activities, and Cuckney seems to be doing quite a useful job.

As regards Aden, there seems to have been hardly any communication in the past or any real demand. knew of no particular problems there, unless they were created by the foreign elements which would be introduced when work on the new refinery commenced. In Argeisha, he knew of nothing, except an occasional report about activities of the Somali Youth League. In the Sudan there was no real Communist problem. There was the General Union, one of whose officials had attended a W.F.T.U. conference in Prague some time ago; there had, however, been no significant development since this individual's return. The police organisation there was not well co-ordinated from the point of view of Special Branch information, and it seemed that the chances of effecting any improvement, now that the country was in a state of transition, were pretty remote.

As regards C. Division commitments, had visited the oil area of the Persian Gulf,

There might be some advice to be given to the

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Iraq Petroleum Company, but apart from this there did not seem to be much that we could do. There may be other vulnerable points in the area, but this is being reviewed.

As regards Egypt, the Foreign Office cover B.M.E.O. and the soldiers are responsible for their own security in the camp at Fayid. We should only intervene if we were asked to do so. There remains, therefore, the vetting committment, which at present is a small one. From all the above I feel that some sort of stock-taking of our position in the Middle East is necessary, the more so since integration with S.I.S. in the area seems

17th September.

At the J.I.C. to-day we discussed a paper on the implications of a Tudeh regime in Persia. The main conclusion reached was that the Russians would not attempt to occupy Persia, but would put in missions of one kind or another under cover of which they would build aerodromes, barracks, etc., which would facilitate their passage through the country in the event of war. There had been no mention of the effect of this upon Turkey and Pakistan. Bill Magan was inclined to think that the Turks, feeling themselves outflanked, might lose the will to resist.

I raised this point at the meeting. It was felt that the effect upon Turkey should certainly be considered by the Foreign Office, and, if necessary refer to the Ambassador. At the same time it was pointed out that Turkey was now a member of N.A.T.O. and strongly backed by the Americans. Her armed forces had been considerable improved and it was hoped in a year or two a really efficient fighting force would emerge. This led to further consideration of a possible Russian advance from the Caucasus to the Levant, but it was felt that if the assumption with regard to Turkey was right, the Russians would be reluctant to leave a strong force on their flank.

As regards Pakistan, it seemed doubtful whether she would be prepared to allow herself to be used as a base for operations against Russia, unless and until the Kashmir dispute had been settled. It was thought, therefore, that her present attitude would be a neutral one and that this attitude might be somewhat strengthened by Russian domination of Persia. The effect on Middle Eastern states generally would be to cause them to tighten their restrictions, but to avoid any incident with the Russians. Egypt would probably only use such an event as a bargaining counter in negotiations with ourselves, designed to satisfy her national aspirations.

The position in Egypt at the moment is so fluid that the Committee felt they could not do more than produce a memorandum, pointing out various possibilities which they would use for their own information. Any document prepared for the Chiefs of Staff would be certain to be out of date before it got into print. Reilly explained that there was at the moment a divergence of views between the British and the Americans about support for General Neguib. The Americans wanted to give him whole-hearted support and arms, whereas the British were more cautious in their approach. This is unfortunate, since it gave Neguib an opportunity for playing off one side against the other.

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Mann came to see me about a lecture in November to Scottish Police, on the subject of Post Report. He wondered whether MacDonald or Mars should attend this meeting, since MacDonald would be two months out of date and Mars would hardly have got a grip of the subject. I told him to discuss the matter with them and with Dick White.

Mann also told me about an incident in connection with Operation MAINBRACE. I Naval Commander was apparently sent up to Glasgow to deliver the orders, etc., to the C.-in-C. aboard H.M.S. Vanguard. On getting out of the train he placed his suitcase containing the orders on the platform and went off to get a taxi; when he came back the bag was missing. It subsequently transpired that a German woman travelling in the next compartment, who was visiting the firm of Messrs. Brown & Polson, placed her bag next to the Naval Commander's. She was met by a Mr. McDougal of the firm, who, thinking that both bags belonged to her, picked them up and put them in the back of his car. The German woman, finding the two bags deposited in her room at the hotel, at first thought that the Commander's bag would subsequently be claimed by Mr. McDougal. When she found that nobody turned up, she rang McDougal, who collected the bag and delivered it to the Police. Meanwhile, the Naval Commander had been placed under arrest by the Admiral!

The D.G. told me that he had seen the Home Secretary, who was anxious to come over and discuss with those concernedthe results of the large number of Warrants which are imposed. I told the D.G. that we had

and I reviewed the applications very carefully to see that they were within the four walls of our Charter. This large number of checks was partly accountable to the fact that we had so many cases whether it was desirable to clear up one way or another whether an individual serving in a secret department was a current member.

18th September.

I spoke to D.O.S. on the telephone and gave him my views about the Middle Eastern situation, which I thought ought to be reviewed. His feeling was that this could only be done when Kellar went there next month.

I agree that this method of assessing the situation would be the most satisfactory, but am a little doubtful whether we shall get quite the right answer from Alec.

At the Appointments Board to-day I stated that I had noted many different practices for the custody of the keys of cupboards, etc., and I felt that the matter should be reviewed with a view to achieving uniformity and additional security. D.C. agreed that C.I.B. would consider the question and report.

A.R.C. D.B. stated that he had discussed the matter with the Home Office but they had no fixed policy and the present head of that section concerned is about to retire. The question would have to be

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raised with the new head when appointed.

The Board felt that we should do a certain amount of planning for staff on a basis very similar to that which obtained during the last war. It was also felt that this was a task for A. Division, and D.E./A. stated that it would be necessary for him to have a further officer in A. Division for this purpose and to supplement present staff. This was agreed in principle and D.B. said he would consider whether or not Colonel Glegg could be made available.

D.E./A. stated that he would circulate confidential reports on Officers at monthly intervals.

D.E./A. reported that the Registry strength had now been brought up to over 200 and there was a waiting list of applicants for the Registry. This was largely due to the success of the Schools campaign.

Holmes came to ask me whether he should enquire with the Yorkshire Police about a miner who had written to the General commanding U.S.A. Air Force for facilities to take a party of individuals to the American Zone on a good will visit. The writer gives every assurance that he is not a Communist. I told Holmes to go ahead.

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The Ministry of Health rang up on Wednesday evening after 7 o'clock with an urgent request to the N.D.O. to vet someone named THOMPSON, about whom they had rather inadequate particulars. The vet was done to the best of our ability, after the Ministry of Health had refused to give us any reasons. Further enquiries to-day by Graham have caused the Ministry of Health to refer us to the Ministry of Supply.

Graham thinks that the enquiry may relate to an individual known as "The Luminous Man", a man who has been working in one of our atomic energy establishments and has become radio-active. Apparently he shines in the dark. If this is so, it is difficult to see why there should be so much secrecy - in fact I cannot imagine how the Press have not already got on to this extraordinary case, since it is clearly a matter that cannot be kept inthe dark! It seems possible that THOMPSON may be the doctor who is going to take him under special observation.

19th September.

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I have been studying the file of Dr. Carl STEIMEL, who returned a few months ago from Soviet Russia where he had been employed on electronic projects. The report indicates that the Russians had derived a considerable amount of information from American periodicals, that security measures to prevent these periodicals leaving the country had been taken, resulting in a slight hold-up, but that subsequently information had been obtained from other sources. Information had come from the R.C.A. Laboratories in Princetown up till 1947. When these links were severed they continued to get their information from the Tungsram firm of Budapest, which still had American contacts. The dry-up of American publications took place in 1951, but subsequently the flow had been continued.

Dr. STEIMEL had seen the original set of American M.I.T. handbooks. His general view about Russian progress in electronics is,on the whole, reassuring. He considers that their weakness is due to their present policy of copying; this is causing a lack of initiative but is producing apparatus quickly and is training the middle-class technician. Good class men are so busy organising this "copy" programme that they have no time to demonstrate their originality, even if they had it. Those with new ideas are reluctant to publish them for fear of being committed to realise them without technical equipment or facilities, as a result of which they may themselves be branded as saboteurs. Russian weakness in electronics may not be a yardstick for their weaknesses in other fields of development, since electronics were not included in the first three Five Year Plans. Nevertheless, Russian isolation from the interchange of ideas if a severe handicap. He thinks it very unlikely that the Russians could produce a new weapon in warfare, such as tanks, Radar, V.1s and V.2s, if it needed a large scientific and engineering background. On the deception question he considers the Russians are prone to gullibility and would swallow 50% exaggeration of claims by Western nations.

Graham visited the Ministry of Supply to-day where he saw Dr. Wansbrough Jones, their scientific adviser. Jones then proceeded to explain the reasons for the request by the Ministry of Health for an urgent [illegible] on a man named THOMPSON.

Bacteriological trials have been going on from Stornoway, to ascertain whether or not bubonic plague germs could or could not be used in wartime. The experiment involved the release of a number of these germs - I imagine over some vessel containing a number of unfortunate animals. At the critical moment, when the cloud had passed over, a fishing trawler from Iceland was bearing down on the scene of the experiment. It disregarded the signals to keep away, and it was calculated that it might have been on the outer fringe of the cloud. The question then arose as to what action should be taken. High level conferences went on, when the rather courageous decision was made to limit the precautions to informing the medical officer at Fleetwood, and also the skipper of the ship, that if during the course of the next three weeks any member of the crew, or anybody in Fleetwood developed boils, isolation precautions should be taken immediately. The alternative would have been to innoculate all members of the crew and all rats on board the ship with strepto-myoscin, or some other drug, thus making the nature of the experiments quite clear with all the resulting publicity and criticisms.

The man we were asked to vet was the medical officer at Fleetwood.

Dick and Hollis and I had a long talk about the Middle East. Hollis' assessment of C. Division job for S.I.M.E. is that such an officer would have practically nothing to do, unless it was intended that he should encroach on everybody else's field.

Dick is writing a minute, based on his conversation with [illegible] pointing out the present state of affairs in S.I.M.E. as depicted in t[illegible] notes on my conversation. I have talked over the whole position with Magan, who, at Dick's request, is going to put down his views for the rationalisation of S.I.M.E., which in the circumstances he thinks, without much reflection, might possibly be reduced to 6 officers, without prejudice, of course, to any scheme by which M.I.5 officers would man outstations in foreign countries. He is a little inclined to think that an alternative to J.I.D. might be an M.I.6 officer attached to S.I.M.E., who would obtain for S.I.M.E. some facilities that they would in normal circumstances get under the integration scheme. He thinks this would reduce the weight of S.I.S. control, which they seem to exercise over the J.I.D. in favour of P. Section work. On the other hand he is rather apprehensive as to whether this will be regarded as a retrograde step. I am not quite sure whether this solution is really satisfactory, since I have sensed in the past a feeling in S.I.S. that their contribution to S.I.M.E. and S.I.F.E. goes to the credit of the Security Service rather than to that of their own organisation. It was to satisfy this feeling that we agreed to an S.I.S. individual being at the head of J.I.Ds.

22nd September.

The Americans appear to have solved the curious phenomenon which occurred in their Embassy in Moscow some months ago, namely, the occasion

on which a member of the staff heard a conversation in the Ambassador's room on his wireless set. By the use of detectors it was found that there was a small microphone situated in the tail of a large golden eagle over the Ambassador's desk. This had clearly been done when the Ambassador had his room redecorated by Soviet workmen, presumaly unsupervised. We hope to get details of how this microphone works.

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We had a party for the Colonial offieers attending the Port & Travel Control course. I talked to Doeb from the Sudan. He said that he issued a weekly report on security matters inKhartoum; that he received reports from Commandants inthe provinces which he embodied in a monthly report which was sent regularly to S.I.M.E. He seemed to think that the position in the Sudan was adequately covered, at any rate as regards Communists. He did not think that Communism had any chance of success, since the Government had taken over the land, had divided it up amongst tenant farmers and, in some cases, previous landownrs, arrangements having been made that the tenants should pay a proportion of their profits to the State and to the former landowner, making what they could out of the rest. In this way

everybody seemed reasonably satisfied, even the farm worker, although his wages might be small. There was a Union in the country which had affiliations to the W.F.T.U., which had sent a delegate to a W.F.T.U. conference in Prague. The latter on his return apparently disappeared from the scene, and there do not seem to have been any reactions from his Prague visit.

23rd September.

At his meeting to-day the D.G. said that the Home Secretary was visiting us, and asked me to work out a programme.

25th September.

Hollis wants me to give a talk to the Port & Travel Control Group on the work of the Security Service during the war.

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26th September.

Whittick rang up for information about Charlie CHAPLIN. The Home Secretary was going to see the P.M., who might possibly ask him about Charlie's political views. I said that Charlie was probably not more Left Wing than Sybil Thorndike; that he had come under review during the Hollywood purge; that he was the kind of person who might well give money to the various Front organisations, but that we had no evidence to show that

he was a member of the Communist Party. He had successfully defended himself some years ago in the courts against allegations of abducting women, and he had never become an American citizen. For all of the above reasons, the Americans do not like him very much.

27th September.

I attended a lecture given by Palmer, Cookie's number two, who is an ex-S.C.O., on the work of the Port and Travel Control Group in the war. His talk, I think, was quite good, although possible a little dull. Cookie arrived after the lecture, having risen from his sick bed, and conducted me round the premises, which are spacious and well-equipped. He certainly has a knack of getting what he wants out of the War Office and of inspiring loyalty among his staff.

29th September.

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He had just returned from Germany, where he had been on a conducted tour of the East-West frontier. He was astonished by the progress the Germans had made both in industry and agriculture, but thought the frontier zone extremely grim. The ground had been ploughed up along the frontier in a belt thirty yards wide, and all the houses had been destroyed. There was one case whether one house remained in the Western zone and the remainder of the village minus the houses destroyed in the Eastern zone. On the Russian side there were strong-points manned by the Beiritschaften.

Cimperman came to tell me that a man called de Rochement, who was formerly in 20th Century Fox, had taken up the idea of doing a film of "Animal Farm". The construction of this film was in progress in London and would shortly be completed. He said that when I mentioned the matter to him two years ago he had given a copy of the book to his friend Larry Kent of 20th Century Fox. Kent had sent it with a recommendation to his head office, but nothing had transpired. Subsequently, de Rochemont had had a row with 20th Century Fox. Cimperman thinks that he may have got the idea from Larry Kent, and that he is anxious to wipe the eye of the old firm!

1st October.

I have been studying the papers on integration and I think that before we go any further I should call a meeting of the Directors in order to try and get an agreed policy. The file is covered with conflicting minutes.

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3rd October.

I gave a talk to the Port & Travel Control course on the principles which we employ in our work and on the application of these principles to the work we did during the war. Lastly, I discussed how far the principles and modus operandi would stand in any future war. I discussed in very considerable detail the work of the L.R.C. in the last war.

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fbl James Robertson and Evelyn McBarnet came to see me about a recent
ement by GOUZENKO, that he recollected a message in the latter half
94. which indicated that certain Counter-Intelligence personnel were visiting Canada and that there would be some general tightening up on Soviet activities. The message was in the form of a warning.

It appears that PHILBY had some conversation with T.A.R. before I left for the United States on July 17th, and that my visit might possibly be alluded to in this message.

I said that my diary for the period showed that it was immediately prior to my leaving for the United States that we had for the first time contemplated close co-operation with the Americans on Communist matters. It had been suggested that the F.B.I. should send a representative over here, but this had been turned down by the State Department who felt that such a close liaison on this matter might be politically dangerous if it came to the notice of the Russians. It was, of course, at this time that Roosevelt, and presumably also the State Department, were preening themselves on their own view that they had got Stalin eating out of their hands and would bring Russia back into the comity of nations. In the end it was agreed that I should go over to America. Although one of my objects in doing so was to discuss with Cyril Mills GARBO's notional agent and the WATCHDOG case, I doubt whether I had much discussion on Communism in Canada.

It is possible that some intimation of collaboration by ourselves with the F.B.I. on Communist matters may have reached the Russians through the State Department, but I doubt whether it could have done so through PHILBY. His discussions with T.A.R. were much more likely to have related to the GARBO case, or to WATCHDOG, since T.A.R. had nothing to do with Communism at the time.

Montagu-Brown of 10 Downing Street rang up about certain telegrams, from Communist or other sources, which frequently reached the P.M's office, protesting against the war in Korea or other matters. Downing Street did not wish to keep these telegrams and would prefer to send them on to us. If we did not want them we could destroy them in about three months time. I have arranged that they should go to B.1.

6th October.

I gave a lecture to the Colonial Police on the usual lines.

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7th October.

I went to see some preliminary shots of "Animal Farm", which seem me to be extremely good. The film is to come out in the spring. No final decision has been made about the concluding scenes, which will obviously have to be somewhat altered.

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Hollis was asked that Holmes should go up to interview the "Luminous" or "Radio-active" man, the circumstances of his case being rather peculiar. All employees ap at Risley are tested for radio-activity every day and, if necessary, decontaminated. This particular individual, although he is no longer in contact with plutonium, continues at varying periods to show strong reactions. He had been away on a month's holiday and on return was tested without reaction. The following day, however, showed a strong reaction on the lip and in the groin. The Treasury have been considering whether they ought to get rid of him and pay him a pension, but now there is some suspicion of fraud.

The question arises whether the man has been drinking plutonium water, or whether in fact he has some means of getting hold of plutonium which he is selling to some unauthorised person.

8th October.

The D.N.I. rang me up about Persia. He thought that I was worried about the Intelligence coverage as a result of a conversation that I had had with Courtney.

I said that while I knew there was nothing like the coverage that there was, [redacted] I believed that there was a limited amount of information coming out of Persia, apart from official sources. The point I had made was that the J.I.C. report on Persia, which was forwarded to the Chiefs of Staff, should be accompanied by a covering letter drawing attention to J.I.C's previous report 53, and also to Mid East report, conclusion D., both of which indicated that a coup d'etat was a serious danger. I had infact put this to the J.I.C. Secretariat, but the only result had been to refer to 53 at the beginning of the report. I felt that we might quite easily wake up to find a Tudeh Government established in Persia, but I did not know what anyone was prepared to do about it.

The D.N.I. said he thought of raising the matter at to-morrow's J.I.C.

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I have been reading the J.I.C. paper on Communist intentions in Korea. I find it a little difficult to believe that the forcible repatriation of prisoners is the only obstacle to an armistice in Korea. It seems to me more likely that China and Russia regard the present situation as a running sore in the United States - which in fact it is - and, moreover, that it might be a source of friction between members of the United Nations, on the grounds that America is carrying most of the burden. It is difficult to see otherwise why the Chinese do not accept the obvious advantage they would enjoy from a cessation of hostilities. They would be able to establish air bases in North Korea and the United Nations would, in consequence, lost some of the advantages deriving from their air superiority they might even have to increase their commitment in view of the tactical air support which would then be available to the North Korean forces. The Chinese might, on the other hand, be able to withdraw some of their forces and use them for causing trouble elsewhere.

I would not, however, suggest raising this matter unless one of the Services wishes to do so, since it is quite clear that there is not sufficient evidence on which to base a J.I.C. appreciation. One guess is really as good as another, and it may be that the Foreign Office are right in their assessment of the situation.

The D.G. has attended a Cabinet meeting, where a new law was discussed for preventing suspects like FUCHS or PONTECORVO leaving the country. The draft is, I believe, being thrown back to the Legal Advisers.

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9th October.

Sir Alvary Gascoigne, our Ambassador in Moscow, attended the J.I.C. to-day.

He began by saying that it must be understood that he and his staff were living in almost complete isolation, and that all the usual channels, thgouth which the Ambassador might hope to get an impression of the policy of the Soviet Government and the views of its people and its officials, were completely closed to him. Those whom he saw at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acted like robots and rarely gave an answer to anything in conversation. Any question which was in the least bit awkward had to be referred to higher authority, or to be given further consideration.

From the diplomatic point of view his mission had so far failed completely as regards Austria, Germany, Trieste and Korea. If he went to Vishinsky to-morrow on the question of Korea, he would merely be told that the solution had nothing to do with the Russians and was entirely in our hands.

The Sino-Russo Conference, the Ambassador thought, was more important from the point of view of what it had not revealed, namely the degree and nature of future co-operation between the Chinese and Russians in the Korean war. He thought it likely that the Chinese would get more assistance both in the military and economic sphere and that the presence of the Mongoliand might imply that the Russians could use Mongolia for the transit of troops if the necessity should arise.

He did not believe in any talkof a Palace revolution or a serious split within the Party. Stalin would remain in power until he died and would not be "undressed before he went to bed".

The Ambassador wa convinced that anything in the nature of high-level talks would produce no results and would merely impair the will to resist by the Western Powers.

He did not think that Russia wanted war; in fact he believed she would do everything to avoid it. There was some indication in the Five-Year Plan of an attempt to increase the standard of living of the ordinary citizen, which, of course, according to our standards, was still extremely low. Such

an improvement would be at the expense of the armament programme, but would affect it only in a very small degree. It might, however, stimulate the workers to greater effort.

In Germany he thought that the Russians had given up the idea of a united Germany and would be careful not to push their obstruction in Berlin too far. He thought that they were fully aware that the Allies intended to defend Berlin and that they would not carry their offensive action to the point where there was a real risk of starting a global war.

He did not think that the Russians really believed that the Allies had aggressive intentions, at any rate for the time being.

He did not think that propaganda activities directed against the U.S.S.R. were likely to have any effect as regards radio. He had given up any attempt at listening to the B.B.C. or any other station, since jamming made this irritating if not impossible.

There had been repeated attempts at suborning his own staff, but he thought that this position was now in hand and the Foreign Office had agreed that infuture only those who had both feet well on the ground, whatever position they might be called upon to fill, should be sent out.

He was all in favour of reciprocity for restriction on movement, etc., being imposed on members of the Russian Embassy and Trade Delegation in this country. A point of some interest was that the diplomats of Satellite countries were subjected tothe same restrictions and persecutions as the Allies. In fact, Blagova, the Blugarian Minister, who has a staunch Comintern background, expressed her disapproval of this treatment.

It had been particularly noticeable that the Russians were going out of their way to accommodate the Indian reperesentative, who was invariably asked to many functions to which the representatives of other nations were not invited. MENON, the new Ambassador, is shortly to arrive.

When asked whether any Bourgeois tendencees were developing in Russia, the Ambassador replied that there was, of course,a good deal of class distinction carrying various privileges. Broadly speaking, there were the leading Government officials, the engineers, and the people - with a wide gulf between each class.

I asked the Ambassador whether he had any comments on what appeared to be a development over the last year, namely, attempts by Russians officials, both here and in Canada, to make contact with local officials among the Services. He expressed some interest in this matter, about which he had not previously heard. He thought that although the Russians had a ready-made espionage weapon in the Communist Parties of foreign countries, the tendency was not to trust them and to rely to a large extent on their own personal observation. He thought it possible, at my suggestion, that the Russians might feel that their previous policy of isolation had caused them to be less well-informed than they would like. Equally, he thought there might be a desire to drive a wedge between the Commonwealth and the Americans.

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On the subject of the M.I.5 contribution to S.H.A.P.E., D.B. made it quite clear that the maximum number of officers that we could contribute would be two.

On the question of filling the Senior Officer posts, it was decided that no discussion should be held until the return of D.E./A.

10th October.

Burt rang up to say that he had had two interviews with HEWITT, from whom he had now got a clear statement. He had also had an interview with SEAMAN of the Daily Express. Both denied that they had made any allegations about WARNER at the Foreign Office, and that to the best of their knowledge there was no evidence whatever that he was a homosexual. Burt intended to see CHRISTIANSSEN before taking a statement from SEAMAN. He would then see the representative of "Time" and "Life". He strongly recommended that, with the evidence now in our possession, WARNER should bring a libel action against de COURCY. The latter would then be obliged to disclose his hand, and it was extremely doubtful whether he could possibly afford to allow the case to come into Court.

Con Boddington came in to say good-bye. He is to be number two in the Admiralty Constabulary Branch under Commander Clayton. He seems quite happy at the prospect of a job which should give him considerable scope.

I was very shocked to read a B.J. from the Turks. It seems that we have asked them to use the good offices of their Ambassador in Teheran to make Mossadeq more amenable to the latest British proposals. The Turks, although ready to, and capable of giving considerable assistance, were somewhat shocked to hear that we had made similar requests to the Belgians, the Dutch, the French and the Italians. The idea of a queue waiting outside Mossadeq's office of some five different nationalities, who would be asking him to be nice to the British, would, I should imagine, produce entirely the opposite effect to that intended - in fact, I cannot think of a worse diplomatic blunder.

11th October.

Holmes has been up to interview various people at Risley on the subject of the "Luminous Man", or "Radio-Active Man". He has not seen the man himself, but there is a theory which might possibly fit the facts. Radio-active infection can apparently bring about sterility. It is possible to take some sort of mild solution of plutonium and water. The "Radio-Active Man" is a Catholic, so he may be trying to dodge the Pope!

14th October.

I gave a talk to the Police course at present going on.

James Robertsan and Miss Russell-King came to see me about the case of Fritzvon NIDDA. The Home Office are asking whether the Deportation Order against him should be cancelled.

Von NIDDA was correspondent at one time of the Volkesche Beobachter, the leading Nazi paper, and was believed to have supplied a certain amount of political information from this country, which was not for publication, in his paper. He was on the whole, as far as we know, a somewhat passive Nazi.

Miss Russell-King wanted to know generally what our policy was with regard to Germans. I said that she could expect that the Germans would gradually build up an organisation here; they already had a Security Service and a Secret Service, and they were being brought into European defence. It was true that at the moment they could not manufacture arms, but sooner or later they would begin to do so with or without permission. They will, therefore, be interested in developments here.

As regards Fritz von NIDDA, I thought we could well leave the matter until he applied for a visa to visit this country, since he is at present I believe, in the United States.

15th October.

Rich came to say good-bye. He has got a job in some Ministry in Scotland.

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16th October.

At the J.I.C. (Directors) meeting to-day the War Office made a statement about the movement of troops in East Africa in order to deal with the MAU MAU. The idea is that the troops should get there first and that subsequently arrests should be made of leading members of the Kenya -African Union, including KENYATTA.

Evelyn Baring has told the Government that strong action must be taken.

Things in Persia have reached a climax. The British reply rejects Mossadeq's terms; a rupture of diplomatic relations is expected.

Dick and I lunched with and Culver Ladd, Mickey's brother, who is passing through here on his way to Istanbul.

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Mr. Vernon.

Horrocks told us that the D.G. was considering a project to the Home Secretary about the grades in this office. His present proposal was that when Horrocks and I leave, the three main Directors should be B., C. and D.O.S., that Establishments should be down-graded to Assistant Director, and that three or four Assistant Directors should assist the Directors of B. and C, and presumably O.S.

Horrocks was by no means clear as to what the D.G. wanted us to do. Did he want our views on this proposal, or were we to accept it as final and to decide where the Assistant Directors should go?

Dick, Roger and I felt very strongly that the three fundamental tasks of this office were Establishments & Finance, Intelligence and Protective Security, and that Ove sean should become absorbed in A.B & C, whatever the task in hand. We should in fact have to say so, since any new D.G. might well ask us why we had subscribed to anything else. We could not agree to one thing with the present D.G. and to something quite different with his successor. We are going to try and get some clarification from the D.G. at his next meeting.

I attended a cocktail party for the current police course.

17th October.

I have read a report from Oughton which at last gives us some idea as to what is going on in the Canal Zone. On Stephens' instructions the D.S.O. Canal Zone has assumed responsibility for security in the whole Zone and for presenting the picture to the G.O.C. He has by-passed the G.1(I), directs the Field Security Police, has . agents, and has the new Special Branch under Prendergast under his wing. Apart from this, he seems to have some joint S.O. commitment , involving the destruction of targets if further disturbances break out.

It is quite clear from the above that if anything goes wrong, or there is a dearth of information, the whole responsibility is now on the D.S.O. instead on the Local Intelligence Committee, of which the G.1(I) was formerly the Chairman. It may be that this arrangement is more efficient, but organisationally in foreign hostile territory security must be a matter for the Army.

I have asked Kellar to sound the ground very carefully when he goes out. It is rather characteristic that this fundamental change should have taken place in the Canal Zone without our ever being informed.

20th October.

I attended the Brook Committee meeting to-day, on which Sir Harold Parker, Sir Robert Gould, Baker, Nicholls and Peck were present, Brook being in the Chair.

We were to discuss a remark made by the Chiefs of Staff in their paper on Global Strategy, where they express anxiety that

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sufficient was not being done to deal with Communist agents in this country and in the Colonies, and that Armed Forces were no good if the morale of the country as a whole was undermined. Brook asked who would like to begin, and I suggested that the Committee might like to hear very briefly what we do, what degree of coverage we had, and something about our estimate of Party strength in the most important spheres.

I said that we set out to identify both C.P. members and sympathisers, that having done so we reported to the Ministry concerned with a view to appropriate action being taken where individuals had access to secret information; that we passed to the Police all information about Communists and sympathisers in their areas. We were in close liaison with all the Police Forces in this country and had urged them to pay special attention to Special Branch work. We gave them courses here and periodically meetings of S.B. officers in the provinces were attended by officers from here. In addition, we were passing information about Communists in the T.Us to the Ministry of Labour and also reporting on strike action where Communists were concerned. We were also listing teachers, both at the Universities and at schools, in accordance with a previous decision reached by the Brook Committee. We estimated the Party strength at about 35,000 + 3,000 Y.C.L., and we thought that with our present coverage we had between 80% and 90% of these people on our records. Sympathisers were difficult to estimate, but we thought 150,000 would roughly be the figure, although we had 250,000 on our records, who at one time or another had come to notice with regard to Communist activity. In the Civil Service there were some 2,600 Communists, none of whom had access to secret work. Under the purge we had dealt with 95 cases. Estimating the Civil Service at 750,000, the percentage seemed small. In the Post Office there were about 862 Communists out of 350,000. Those purged were included in the 95. In the Services there were about 610 Communists out of 850,000. All officers detected were purged, and other ranks, if they were in the Regular Army. There were about 3,100 Communists employed in firms which had secret contracts, but they were all excluded from Government work under a special clause in the contract. In the educational field we had detected at the Universities about 126 Communists and about 117 sympathisers, the Party claiming 169. At the schools we had listed about 700 out of 2,000 claimed by the Communists. In the B.B.C. there were about 147 out of a staff of 12,200. There were 250 Communist journalists. We thought the major effort was concentrated on the Unions and on the Front organisations.

The Committee seemed to think that the situation was, on the whole, satisfactory, and that if appropriate action were taken in time of war the organisation would be crippled.

Sir Robert Gould said that he would not like precipitate action taken against the executives in the Trade Unions; he would prefer to wait and see how they reacted. He would not, however, disapprove of any action directed against the Shop Stewards.

Sir Harold Parker mentioned Vulnerable Points. I said that we were taking powers to ensure that such people would be laid off in time of emergency as a precaution against sabotage.

The Committee then went on to consider the Cold War situation. It was generally felt that there was little more that could be done. I.R.D. claimed that they were already in touch with a large number of people, that they did not let opportunities slip, and that wherever there was a chance of counter action by the Press they endeavoured to exercise a guiding hand.

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It was finally agreed that a report on the above lines should go to the Defence Committee, in the hope that not only the Chiefs of Staff but Ministers might be enlightened about the situation in this country.

Sir Robert Gould expressed the view that little headway was being made in the Trade Unions, the Communists having suffered several severe defeats. The Trade Unions seemed to be ready to oppose unreasonable wage claims and the Ministry of Labour, more often than not, had to put stuffing into the employers. I asked the Committee whether they felt that in general the morale of this country was being undermined by Communist activity. The Committee felt that this was not so.

21st October.

Dick returned to-day from his meeting of the N.A.T.O. Security Committee in Paris. It was a full-dress affair with microphones in the the Palais Chaillot and, as far as I can see, he is the sole delegate who seems to have held the floor! The net result of it is that there is to be a meeting twice a year of all the N.A.T.O. powers. Dick, I think, made his point, that to go outside general policy and a broad exchange of information, would be unrealistic and that the normal liaison channels would fill the gap.

The Danes had ideas about setting up a bureau in Paris, but were ridden off. The Americans at first refused to speak until they had heard the remarks of others, and then said they would have to take instructions from Washington! They concluded with the remark that they thought that "what you fellows are doing was on the right lines". Walraven, who was Chairman, replied, somewhat sarcastically, that the Committee were glad to know that what they proposed found satisfaction among the Americans!

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I had a long talk with Bill Magan about the Middle East. He thinks that the arrangement at present in force may quite possibly be the right one, since the situation is not really comparable to one of peace or war. He thought that the other members of the L.I.C. really had no contribution to make and that if we reverted to the L.I.C. with the G.1(I)

in the Chair, it might look better on paper but would have little effect on the collection or collation of information.

23rd October.

At the J.I.C. (Directors) meeting to-day, Hilken gave some account of the deliberations of the Standing Group Intelligence Committee, who are trying to get out an agreed paper on the order of battle in the Soviet bloc. Considerable difficulties have been experienced, as the Americans invariably turned up with a brief from their department from which they could not deviate without going back to the Pentagon or to O.N.I. A case in point was where the Americans claimed that the Russians were capable of building 7 cruisers a year: the French estimate was 3½ and ours 4½. When challenged on the information which had led them to their conclusion, the Americans produced two Lieutenants, who said that their "graph" indicated that 7 was the figure. It finally emerged that their "graph" was based on the slipways; no other factors having been taken into consideration. e.g. the allocation of armoured plating as between warships and armoured vehicles. The same applied to RADAR equipment. All these factors have been carefully weighed by ourselves, and while it was perhaps true to say that there were sufficient slipways to build 7 warships, this was an estimate which, in our opinion, was very wide of the mark. The Navy Department refused to budge, and eventually a bracketed figure of 3½-7 was put into the report. Another factor which clouded the discussions was the belief that Russia might turn the whole of her strategical Air Force on to destroying the U.S. potential with atomic bombs from the outside.

In discussing the Perimeter Review, Reilly said he did not think that, even if the Bonn Government succeeded in obtaining ratification of the contractual agreements in November, there was any chance of getting over the difficulties raised by the French until January or February.

There has been a new development in the Faroes, where the Russian fishing fleet seemed to be engaging in reconaissance. It would, of course, be a very serious matter if in time of war they seized the Faroes. A report is being made to the Danish Government.

The position in Indo-China is regarded as obscure. The French have clearly suffered a loss of prestige.

At his meeting to-day, the D.G. was asked by Horrocks to clarify his previous directive given to Horrocks, that we were to consider the organisation of the office on the basis of three Directors, a downgrading of D.E./A to Deputy Director, and the interposition of an intermediary grade equivalent to that of D.E./A. under Directors B. and C.

The D.G. made no mention of the downgrading of D.E./A, or of the continuance of O.S. Division, but the meeting went on to consider a suggestion that all officers on reaching the top of their grade should pass on to the next grade after a pause of three years, unless their reports were unsatisfactory. We all agreed that there seemed to be much to be said for this arrangement in a small organisation such as ourselves. Horrocks undertook to get out a table with dates showing the present position.

I saw George McClellan and Superintendent Lemieux, who is likely to succeed the former in the not very distant future. Lemieux is an older man, of French extraction. He has a pleasant personality.

Nothing very sensational seems to have happened in Canada, except that they have a line on a Soviet diplomat who may prove to be of some interest. It is also interesting to note that the Japanese have started up again; one of their Consuls got into touch with a former agent of the Japanese, who is now working for the Canadians. The Japanese appear to be interested in all information relating to Communists, but they may of course extend their activities to other spheres.

24th October.

I went to see Ronnie Howe and Burt, after receiving a message from Keith Randell in Germany about a Dr. MEYER of the Ministry of the Interior in Rhine Westphalia, who was visiting the Yard with officials from the other Laender. Randell told me that MEYER was being difficult about security being in the hands of the Laender Bureaux; he thought that the whole matter ought to be handed over to the Police. B.I.O.G. did not want this, as the Police might develop Gestapo tendencies unless they were controlled by some more objective body. Burt undertook to speak to MEYER and explain to him how well the situation worked in this country.

Burt showed me various documents which he had obtained from the Express in relation to HEWITT. It is quite clear that the Daily Express in publishing the letter written by BURGESS and purporting to implicate WARNER of the Foreign Office was in part a forgery. Gurrin, the hand-writing expert, had told the Express that he could not say with any certainty what the missing word was, and it seemed highly probable from the enquiries that Burt had made that the original word was "me" and that "Fred" had probably been written over the top of it by HEWITT and then the whole thing erased. There is no doubt that HEWITT had tried to mislead the Express in order to obtain money. In Burt's opinion there was now a cast-iron case for WARNER to prosecute de COURCY for libel, but it seems extremely doubtful whether the Foreign Office will allow him to do so, even if he is willing himself.

Burt was a little inclined to think that Randolph Churchill may have been responsible for trying to sell the story to "Time" and "Life".

Drew came to talk to me about the reorganisation of his staff in the Far East. He agrees with the B.D.C.C. suggestion, that Koch de Gooreynd, his senior representative can be withdrawn, but he is anxious to maintain Oak-Rhind under cover of the umbrella of S.I.F.E. He said that his proposal would not in any way affect General Templer, since D.P.S. were in no sense responsible for tactical deception in Malaya; they were only concerned with strategical deception in the Far East. There was little that he could do until we had some agreed policy with the United States, but meanwhile he did not wish to lose such contacts as he had been able to make; he wanted Oak-Rhind to maintain these, and when not engaged on this work, to perform any tasks which H/S.I.F.E. might allot to him.

I told Drew that I would refer the matter to the D.G. and would let him know the result on Monday.

25th October.

The Home Secretary has called a meeting to-day to discuss precautions for TITO's visit. We have expressed the view in writing that we do not believe that the Communist Party as such will do more than stage a demonstration but that possibly the Russians might instigate some terrorist organisation, such as the Croat Ustashi, to do the job. We had had one such vague report through the C.I.A., but no details were given. We would undertake to pass to the Police any information that we might receive. We were not summoned to the meeting, but I asked Potter to make a review of our files to ascertain whether there was any information about Croats, Montenegrans, or followers of Michailovitch which we might usefully pass to the Police.

27th October.

Burt telephoned to say that he had seen Dr. MEYER and informed him about the relations between the Security Service and the Police, which worked satisfactorily in this country. He thought MEYER was duly impressed, but he had expressed anxiety about the Police ever supplying information to the Security Bureaux, and it was for this reason that he thought that security would be better placed under the Police.

At the D.G's meeting I raised the question of Oak-Rhind serving under S.I.F.E. The D.G. said that, provided B.D.C.C., the Chiefs of Staff and General Templer, were in agreement, he did not mind. He did not wish, however, to give the impression that he was aiding and abetting Drew to get round the B.D.C.C's recommendations.

After the meeting Shaw and I drafted an amended version of Drew's proposed letter to B.D.C.C., which was based on the D.G's instructions.

28th October.

I saw Dick and Marriott about the data which we are supplying to the Brook Committee to be incorporated in their report to the Defence Committee on Communism in this country. The Chiefs of Staff had suggested that sufficient action was not being taken either against Communists or to ensure that the morale of the population was not being undermined. Our factual statement on this subject is pretty comprehensive. Further enquiries are being made about Communists in the B.B.C.

I gave a lecture to the Registry on the general principles of our work, and subsequently there was a discussion covering a wide range of subjects. There seemed to be considerable interest and keenness among those present.

29th October.

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30th October.

At the J.I.C. Directors meeting to-day, Reilly stated that although agreement seemed to have been reached between certain parties in the Sudan and the Egyptian Government about the Sudan's future, there was a possibility that the terms might be repudiated by a large proportion of the population who were not represented at the talks.

There were no other specially interesting items in the Perimeter Review, and the rest of the meeting was taken up in studying the monumental work produced by the Standing Group Intelligence Committee on the order of battle in the Soviet bloc and Soviet capabilities.

Peter Shortt, who headed our delegation, took the meeting through the report and drew attention to the major differences of opinion. On air strategy there was a strong belief in the U.S.A. that the Russians strategic bomber force, some 300 to 500 aeroplanes, might be wholly concentrated on the U.S.A. on a one-way flight. This may take the form of a kind of Pearl Harbour, with atomic bombs designed to put the American war potential completely out of action.

Fressanges said that he had detected a strong political motive for this point of view, which was bound up with the internecine warfare between the Pentagon and the Navy Department; the latter were even claiming that they were the only people who could effectivly deliver the atomic bomb, and that they should therefore have larger appropriations. There was, however, a very definite realisation in the United States that America was now definitely in the target area and Enemy No. 1 as far as Russia was concerned.

There had also been differences on Russian capacity to build warships, which I have mentioned previously, and also some fundamental differences on logistics. These difficulties had resulted in bracket figures. The D.M.I. thought it better to indicate the differences of opinion if they could not be dispelled in argument. The French had made a valuable contribution, in particular Colonel Petit, since although they had not very much data of their own they were extremely good in making logical deductions from data supplied by the other Powers. The French were very insistent on a paragraph being inserted on the weapon of subversion and diplomacy, which had been used so effectively by the Russians in the past. The D.M.I. noted a lack of interpreters, which had handicapped the operations of the various committees. There was not a single American present with a knowledge of French, and when a discussion took place on radio jamming the Americans had to convey their meaning by some variation of the word "confiture"!

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The D.G. has attended a meeting about DAVIDSON of Atomic Energy, whose parents are still in Russia. The suggestion is that he should be found employment in some University. Cockcroft has wished to promote him to take over the work formerly done by FUCHS. Cherwell talked airily of sending him to Canada, but they would be unlikely to receive him in any case since he is believed to be subject to T.B.

Drew telephoned. I told him that we had accepted his final draft regarding deception in the Far East.

31st October.

I saw Newsam this morning. He talked to me about the meeting of the Brook Committee. He thought that if I.R.D. wanted to do something useful they might well arrange for some of the Germans who have returned to the Western Zone from Russia to come over here and speak at meetings. While in Germany he had been told that they had done much to discount Communism in the Western Zone.

Battersby, on behalf of E.D.C., is going to have a look at German security. I told him about the general set up and he has read my conversation with Ritter von Lex, which took place some months ago. It seemed to me that the only thing he could do would be to ascertain whether the Germans had a plan for the classification of those places where secret information was to be obtained. Secondly, whether they had adequate precautions in these places, and thirdly, how the employees were vetted - whether German security records were consulted and, if so, were they of any depth? Also, were names passed over I.O.G. records, and lastly, whether any positive enquiries were made about people who were to be employed on particularly secret work.

1st November.

A trooper in the Army, DEWICK by name, has written to the Y.C.L. offering to supply them with information about equipment, etc., in his armoured unit. He has applied for weekend leave, but will be stopped as he

leaves the Barracks and searched. Skardon will be there to interview him.

3rd November.

Skardon interviewed the trooper on Saturday and has got a statement in which he admits his guilt. Nothing was found on him, but there were a certain number of Y.C.L. pamphlets in his locker. He is a young fellow of about 18½. The Army are considering whether they should prosecute for "an act preparatory to an act.....". Our view is that it would probably be better to discharge him. He appears to have been thoroughly indoctrinated. This is a little bit disturbing as the Y.C.L. is rather a weak spot in our coverage. We shall have to devise means of making a drive on the organisation. If this young man had not behaved so foolishly we might not have detected him.

Shaw mentioned that he had had a telegram from Kellar about the request of the Governor in Nairobi that he should look into the whole security position in Kenya. Kellar had suggested, in the D.G's instructions, that there might be some parallel with Malaya and that the methods adopted there might be useful. While the Governor did not think that Malaya was any parallel, he seemed extremely anxious that security generally should be examined, and this was endorsed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Kellar is going back to Nairobi after his visit to the Middle East.

Shaw also mentioned the possibility of trouble in Trinidad oil fields, which is to be concerted with Left Wing activities in Jamaica. It is, however, by no means certain that anything will materialise, but there is evidence to show that the W.F.T.U. are taking a much more active interest in Caribbean affairs.

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4th November.

Alderson, C.C. Monmouthshire, came to see me. He said that he had been keeping a close eye on his Police Constable RUFFLE, who some time back had communicated with King Street. He had had no opportunity of getting rid of the man because his work was in every way satisfactory. RUFFLE was under the eye of a very good Sergeant who had detected nothing which might indicate that RUFFLE was in any way politically active. Meanwhile RUFFLE had developed a keen interest in athletics and had competed creditably in the Police walking championships. RUFFLE has no access to M.I.5 material and is not in any position where he might do harm.

I told Alderson that, as far as I knew, we had heard no more of RUFFLE, but that if we had we would let him know.

I then asked Newsam about the Home Office views on proposals made some time ago for dealing with a large influx of Continental refugees in the event of war. There had been one meeting under Murrie, since when no further discussions had taken place.

Newsam said that he had mentioned the matter in the Defence Transition Committee, where the view had been taken that the problem could be dealt with by refusal to admit ships - he referred to the larger cross-channel boats. I said I thought that this was a somewhat unrealistic view, the more so since, according to our information, refugees had already booked passaged on trawlers, tramp steamers, etc., and would doubtless come in every kind of small boat. Apart from this, was it our policy to turn ships back? In the last war we were anxious to get as many ships here as we could. I told Newsam that we had written to Ross about this on the 27th September, but that so far we had had no reply. He promised to look into the matter and let me know.

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5 November

I asked Holmes to come and see me about his visit to the Yard in an endeavour to obtain closer co-operation with Special Branch.

Had I been aware of this visit I should probably have advised against it, since I had discussed the matter very thoroughly with Burt some time ago. I had explained to Burt that we now had very extensive relations with the Special Branches all over the country and that officers up to the rank of Superintendent had been here attending courses - not solely with the idea that they might learn something, but with a view to effecting better relations and to let them know precisely what we were doing. This arrangement had led to far better relations than we had ever had before, and Superintendents had responded in a most remarkable way. I thought it was a pity that Special Branch were outside this scheme, particularly when we had representatives hwere from the Counties surrounding the Metropolitan area. It seemed to me that if he sent one or two of his officers, it might be a good thing for them to have closer contact with people in this office and to become better acquainted with their neighbours. I made it very clear that I did not wish to press this matter in any way if the idea was not likely to be well received. Burt had promised to sound the ground. He came back to me after several days, saying that he had sounded the ground and that the view was unfavourable. He went so far as to say that there was a kind of innate jealousy in the Branch which he was trying to overcome, but that it was not easy to eradicate a feeling of this kind with a stroke of the pen. I said that while this was regrettable from every point of view, the best thing to do was to forget it. I could not frankly understand the attitude, since, although I had been doing this work for nearly 34 years, I had found the lectures of our officers extremely good and interesting. The scene was constantly changing and there was always something to learn. Apart from that, such gatherings did much to improve personal relations.

There the matter had rested until Holmes and Mann had gone down to see Wilkinson and Jones, with the suggestion that perhaps Jones might lecture to one of these courses as he had previously promised to do. Jones had clearly been very much on his guard and had, in fact, agreed to make a date subject to Burt's approval. He and Wilkinson, however, had constantly reiterated the assertion that Special Branch had direct responsibilities to the Home Secretary and could not, therefore, be compared in any way with provincial Police Forces. Wilkinson had been asked to the cocktail party of police officers here, but had, on instructions, turned it down, and Jones had finally rung up to say that, owing to the possibility of Burt being away, he would be unable to lecture in the near future.

Meanwhile I learned that Burt had approached Skardon, evidently rather hurt that the renewal of the suggestion that Jones should lecture had not come to him through Dick White or myself. All this seems to me extremely tiresome and further evidence of the kind of superiority complex of the Yard which gets them into such bad odour with all other Police Forces.

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Cliffe telephoned about the information which Norman Brook requires about Communists in the B.B.C. I told him that ever since the meeting of the Brook Committee we had been looking into this more carefully; that we had had previously had discussions with General Jacob, and that as soon as I got all the facts I was proposing to come over and see Norman Brook.

6th November.

At the J.I.C. to-day we had a long discussion on the criticisms of the J.I.C. by the Working Party set up to enquire into its organisation in peace and war.

There was a general feeling that when a problem such as that undertaken by the Working Party had to be worked out, there was great difficulty in providing staff of the right calibre. Reilly thought that the Ministry of Defence should do more to assist intelligence in organisational matters, and a suggestion was made by Gardiner, on the basis of his eight years experience in the Secretariat, that someone might be appointed to that organisation to take the Chair at Working Parties. He thought, for example, that he could have saved the Working Party on Organisation a great deal of trouble, since he had an intimate knowledge of the workings of all Departments. The appointment of someone on the s. Secretariat had the added advantage that the Ministry of Defence was responsible for its personnel. This, however, was not the whole problem: Service Intelligence Departments were desperately under-staffed, particularly when it came to a real job of work in devilling out facts. The suggestion that a kind of planning J.I.S. should be set up was vetoed, on the grounds that it was necessary for such officers to have the full background of their Directorate, and, in fact, to be a working member of it. One suggestion for consideration is that organisation and security should be sub-divided and that an organisation committee should meet once a fortnight or once in three weeks.

We then passed on to consider the suggestion of a map room. The Services were all in favour of it. Kenneth Strong was indifferent, but on the whole seemed to think it was necessary and possibly misleading. He thought that the Perimeter Review should provide the Committee with all it wanted to know on the question of early warning. 'C' thought that the interest in such a map room would flag after the first six months; he also thought that there was a grave security issue if SIGINT material was to be portrayed in graphic form. D.S.I. said he liked the idea, provided the maps were not shown to Ministers or to people who did not know the strength of the indicators.

I said that I did not have any experience of map rooms from the Service point of view, but that applied to our work they were often misleading. Generally speaking, I was in agreement with 'C''s views.

The upshot was that the Secretariat were asked to go into the costs, etc., and report back.

There was a discussion about writing a paper on Korea. J.I.S. and the Foreign Office were still reluctant to do so owing to a lack of firm information. D.M.I., however, drew attention to the determined nature of the attacks in Korea and thought that if they were gone into they might

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provide some indication of Chinese and Russian intentions. It seemed to me that whatever Chinese and Russian intentions may have been, they are now thrown back into the melting pot by Eisenhower's decision to visit Korea. There will be no offers forthcoming for a settlement until his return.

Richards of A.S.I.O. is returning to Australia to-day. He has been with us for four or five weeks and seems to be pleased with the information and knowledge that he has acquired. He made a very good impression with all the staff here.

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D.E/A was asked to arrange that the Meeting of the I.D.C. should take place at the Ministry of Defence, and that the Meeting of the Tripartite Commission should be in a better room than the present Conference Room.

It was agreed that D.E/A should ascertain if it would be possible in principle for us to nominate an officer to attend the I.D.C. What would be the overall general conditions.

It was agreed that all Directors would give to me their ideas on the future organisation of the Service with a view to a later discussion.

7th November

I had a long talk with Skardon about the attitude of the Yard, in particular Special Branch, towards police liaison. There is no doubt that he thinks the superiority complex is extremely irritiating; he believes, however, that Burt is up against his subordinates in this matter and that the real trouble comes from people like and Skardon thinks it ridiculous that Special Branch do not send a couple of officers to one of our courses, and that we ought to get ttugh. He feels that our whole attitude towards the police in politely suggesting to them that they should do this or that is wrong. This office is undoubtedly the repository of all information on Communism and should have authority to direct the police.

Personally I feel quite satisfied with our relations with the provincial police, with one or two exceptions, but they have never really been satisfactory with the Yard. The basic trouble is their superiority

complex, which gets them in wrong with all provincial forces, both as regards the C.I.D. and S.B.

I expect Burt will raise this matter with me some time, when I intend to tell him frankly what I think. I have, in fact, done so already some time ago.

8th November.

I got D.C.S's plan for the reorganisation of this office. He has three Directors, one for organisation and establishment, another for B. Division, and another for C. Division, with an Assistant Director responsible to both Director B. and Director C. for overseas work.

To my mind this is unsatisfactory. The organisation and administration of overseas stations should be in A. Division; Intelligence and Investigation should be controlled by a reconstituted B.3 and there might perhaps be one officer in A. Division who could act as a kind of post-box in order to see that enquiries from overseas are properly dealt with.

10th November.

At the D.G's meeting to-day I mentioned Norman Brook's request for a break-down of Communists in various departments of the B.B.C. This request had arisen from a statement made by me at the last meeting of the Brook Committee. Brook was considering an approach to General Jacob and, with the D.G's approval, I proposed to see him and give him some background about our previous approaches. There are apparently only 27 full Party members and some 75 sympathisers. There are no Communists on the higher staff of "The Listener".

11th November.

, at one time in Passport Control, came to see me. He has been doing various Government jobs since the war and thinks his present one, with the Foreign Compensation Commission at the Foreign Office, may come to an end in a year's time and he would like to be considered for employment here.

I told him that we were only taking on younger men to the permanent staff, but that occasionally we had requests made to us for the names of people we could recommend for security jobs of one kind or another outside this Department. If he cared to fill in a form we could let him know if any such appointment came along.

made quite a favourable personal impression.

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ohnny Cimperman and came to see me. is over here for ripartite Security Conference.

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I had a talk with Potter about the proposal to Hollerith Post Report. The Home Office have said that they cannot carry the burden of filling in a coding sheet when interviewing aliens under Post Report. This means that the whole burden will be thrown upon ourselves. It seems, moreover, that the job is a more formidable one [redacted] was at first anticipated. The most difficult job is the cutting of areas under the J.I.B. requirement from which an alien comes. In his report he will name the place of his birth, which may probably be spelt in three or four different ways; this then has to be looked up in the Gazeteer to discover whether it comes in Area 1 or Area 60, according to which it would be coded.

I attended the meeting to-day. The estimates were considered: they now total and a further increase is required.

12th November.

I attended a cocktail party for the Tripartite Security delegates in the Ministry of Defence, and subsequently dined with and of the Belgian Surete.

13th November.

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14th November.

The Governor of Kenya has asked the Colonial Office to request the .G. to go out to Nairobi to discuss security problems in regard to the MAU MU, and they have also asked for an officer who can remain there for a period f some months to implement any decisions reached. It is proposed that the G. should take MacDonald to fill this post. Meanwhile, Kellar is being old to return to Nairobi to join in the discussions.

Cliffe came to see the D.G. to have a discussion with D.B. and D.C. the security aspects of turning atomic energy into a private corporation.

It appears that the Cabinet Committee has been set up to settle this tter under the chairmanship of Cruikshank, with Monckton, Macmillan and rman Brook as its other members. The Committee is really the outcome of dispute between Cherwell and Duncan Sandys. From the security point of view think that it would be preferable if atomic energy remained under the nistry of Supply.

I went over to see Norman Brook about the B.B.C. and left with m a note showing where Communists and Party associates were employed. also left him a note of my own, explaining our relations with the B.B.C.

I told Brook that we had already investigated a Foreign Office mplaint in 1947 and 1948; that broadcasts to Eastern Europe were not in cordance with Foreign Office policy. We had discussed certain evidence, ich seemed to indicate duplicity on the part of some of the employees in e Eastern European Section. These were open to a dual interpretation d, after further investigation, we came to the conclusion that General Jacob s probably right in saying that the talks had to be adjusted to some extent order not to offend the susceptibilities of the listeners.

We had again looked into the matter of Communists in the B.B.C. a ort time ago, after representations had been made by Sir Waldron Smithers the Prime Minister. I said that in our view, taking into account the ct that the B.B.C was likely to attract long-haired individuals, there did t seem to us to be an undue proportion of Communists or Left-Wingers. There re roughly 100 in a staff of 12,000, 27 of whom were full Party members.

Brook agreed with this view, but said that owing to complaints that had received from Nutting, the Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Foreign ffice, he was going to have a talk with Jacob. The only specific complaint

that Hutting had made was that the broadcasts on Soviet policy in the Third Programme were harmful, in spite of the constant announcements made during the talk that the views given were the Soviet views and a summary of the Soviet press, and in no sense sponsored by the B.B.C or the Government. Hutting argued that somebody might tune in after the announcement had been made and switch off before it was made again. I said that if that was the measure of the interest of the listener, I did not think the talks could do very much harm.

I said to Brook that while one frequently heard of a general smear over the B.B.C, one never got any specific details of the talks complained of or the w is used. I instanced the case of IRD, who at the meeting of the Brook Committee had suggested that there was something seriously wrong with the "Listener". Our enquiries had shown that there was no trace of any member of the senior staff of "The Listener" on our records.

Brook said he thought that many of the complaints were imaginary and unbalanced. He seemed staisfied that we were doing all we could, particularly on the vetting side, which was really somewhat out of proportion with what we did for other Departments.

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17th November.

D.O.S. tells me that there is an an awkward case relting to the bad times in Palestine. A man named formerly of the Palestine Police, has confessed to the Lincolnshire Police that he and others were concerned in the explosion which took place in Ben Yehuda Street in Jerusalem, when a number of jews were killed and a large amount of property destroyed. At the time the Government denied in good faith any complicity in this and, in spite of accusations by the jews against ourselves, the incident was written off as being promoted by the Arabs.

We have said that this is not a matter for us but for the police, the D. of P.P. and, above all, the Government. Clearly it is most desirable that this incident should not be revived, particularly in this way, but if the confession is ignored there is always the chance that may go to the newspapers. We have suggested to the D. of P.P. that he whould consult Trafford Smith of the Colonial Office and also the Foreign Office.

After consultation with Hill. I have written to Drew in regard to the leakage on Plan FORTITUDE in Chester Wilmot's book "The Struggle for Europe". I have said that although we do not wish to engage in a witch hunt, it is rather important to know how it came about that this information was published without reference to the authorities most concerned, namely, D.F.P. and ourselves. From reading the Appendix and the Preface, it seems likely that we need look no further than the Historical Section of the War Cabinet, and to Bill Williams, Monty's Chief Intelligence Officer, both of whom Chester Wilmot expressed his indebtedness. Brian Melland, who has a copy of Roger Fleetwood-Hesketh's report on Plan FORTITUDE, is now employed in the Historical Section and is mentioned by name.

At the J.I.C. meeting on 12.11.52., Hilken, D.D.N.I., suggested that we might approach , whom he knew well and who lived in his neighbourhood, on the question of getting someone to write a book on the Russian Theory of War. I seemed to recollect that we had some record of

his man and therefore looked up the file, which I subsequently discussed ith Mr. Whyte. We both agreed that and his wife had been more or less leared of any suspicion, although it might be that in his work for the ivil Service Commissioners, was rather inclined to disregard security uestions when recommending scientists for employment on Government work.

I do not propose to say anything to Hilken.

The D.G. told the meeting to-day about his visit to Kenya at the request f the Governor to look into security, with particular reference to MAU MAU. acDonald is to accompany him and may remain there for some time. He does ot wish his visit to interfere in any way with the Home Secretary's visit to his office on Monday, 24th.

18th November.

I attended a special meeting of the Directors of the J.I.C. to consider rawing up a plan of our Intelligence organisation in peace and in war. We pent the morning in dealing with certain criticisms of the J.I.C. structure ade by the Working Party. These related largely to the procurement of nformation and to the list of priorities. I did not intervene as the atter was largely one for the Services. It struck me, however, that there as an absence of reality in the minds of the Ds. of I. as to how Intelligence as obtained, namely, a tendency to think that once you have given a target to .I.S. all they have to do is to recruit a suitable agent, equip him with false beard and secret inks and send him off! They cannot get it into their eads that the obtaining of good intelligence is to a large extent a matter of uck, or of recognising an opportunity when it arises. Nevertheless, there eemed some sense in a suggestion put forward by the Air Ministry, that the orking Party on Measures to Improve Intelligence might usefully go through he priorities and consider whether there was any possible means of acquiring he information.

This rather goes to show what I have always believed, namely, that here are only three major tasks which an Intelligence department can usefull erform, firstly, to acquire information, largely overt, which will form a frame nto which to put any hot information which, by a stroke of good luck, comes our ay - in other words, if you get a good agent or defector you want to have ome background against which to assess his story. The second task is to have he necessary lines out to encourage a defector or to acquire an agent, and, hirdly, to sit down and plan some special operation. If, for example, you ish to get the Soviet ciphers from the Soviet Embassy in Ankara, you would egin by making a study of those who had access to that information and of heir habits, and then try and establish contact. Operations for dropping eople behind the Iron Curtain, or landing them by rubber boat, seem to me to e largely futile. Such mistakes might be avoided if people sat down in advanc nd asked themselves the question; whether if an agent crawling about behind the ron Curtain for several months was likely to be able to say anything of any mportance if and when he got back.

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18th November.

I attended the J.I.C. to-day when we discussed terms of reference for the Committee which is to go over to Germany to examine the B.I.O.G., on the basis of inevitable cuts, which will arise as soon as the Germans regain their full sovereignty. The suggested procedure is that the Committee should first of all ascertain from Departments here how far their priorities are being met. They should then examine in Germany those parts of the I.O.G. which are producing this information and also the other parts which are not producing anything of particular value. On the basis of this examination they will make recommendations. I do not envy them their task.

Although I realise that it may well be possible to get better intelligence from Germany for less money (the present organisation costs about £3,000,000), the Committee will have to bear in mind that for every piece of hot information it is often necessary to comb through about 99% of second grade stuff. If, therefore, you cut away those who are employed on sifting, you may not get your 1%.

Dick and I had lunch with Colonel Einthoven. His main prob to be connected with his B. Division. He has got the equivalent under two separate directors; one part is dealing with the general of the C.P., and the other part is dealing with individuals and also with spies. He cannot get them to collaborate, nor has he established a proper dividing line.

We explained to him that he could not hope to study the individual cases of Communists, except against the background of those who were dealing with general trends. The two should be together, but when it was discovered that an individual - be he an alien or a member of the indigenous C.P.- was engaging in espionage, he should pass it over to the espionage section. His main trouble, I think, is due to the Dutch rigid character.

Einthoven also discussed with Dick before lunch the question of bringing his whole Security Service, with a personnel of about 500 including their wives and children, in the event of a global war. Dick stalled on this one, saying that the Home Office had not yet crystallised their ideas. He said, however, that we should certainly want a percentage of his personnel, with their records, to assist us in the examination of refugees.

20th November.

The Directors of Plans attended the J.I.C. meeting to-day to discuss a criticism by the Chiefs of Staff on the Intelligence paper prepared by the Standing Group on Soviet Capabilities. The Chiefs of Staff apparently take exception to this paper.

D.M.I. said that his brief had been approved by the Chiefs of Staff; that he had got a large number of points accepted, but that in a Tripartite meeting any document produced was bound to be compromised. It seemed apparent, moreover, that if this document were going to be used for planning purposes by the N.A.T.O. Powers, there was not very much that could go wrong during the next few years, since the threat that they had to meet was far beyond their capabilities for counter-action. If we now attempted to alter the Intelligence paper, an impossible situation would be created - in fact it would be of very little use in having a Standing Group Intelligence Committee

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at all. The most that could be done would be to let the N.A.T.O. Powers send in their criticisms which could be embodied in the next report.

There followed a discussion on the likelihood of war, which seemed to be a good succinct and short report which might well have been accepted.

The Service representatives did not like it, because it did not review in detail all the various incidents which might affect a future war, e.g. the ratification or non-ratificiation of E.D.C. were not considered in detail. The Ds. of I. then pleaded that the Chiefs of Staff needed education in these matters, particularly since two of them were new since the previous report was issued. Ultimately some compromise was reached, by which Service Directors would enlarge certain aspects of the report.

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21st November.

Mann told me that Mars's visit to Scottish Police Forces had been a grea success and that they were now much clearer about the operation of Post Repor

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Holmes came to talk to me about Boddington, who wants to visit us whenev we have a Police course. He does not wish to attend the course, but likes the opportunity of talking to Police Officers. He also wants six of his officers to attend a future course.

While I do not think there is any real harm in Boddington meeting Police Officers when they are up in London, I agree with Holmes that if they are to attend a course it should be a different one to that given to Police Officers The suggestion is that we might give one such course, including P.L.A. and other odds and ends.

Mr. Bolam, Editor of the Daily Mirror, rang up to-day. He said that he had noticed in the papers that the D.G. was away, and would like to come up to the office and see his Deputy on a confidential matter. I asked him if he could let me know the subject which he wished to discuss. After some hesitation, and after, as he told me later, requesting someone in his office to withdraw, he said that he was concerned about a decision made by the War Office to refuse permission for a member of his staff, to procee to Korea. He could not understand this, as had carried out accredited journalistic missions on previous occasions, ...ar one to , and there had never been any suggestion that anything was wrong.

I said that I had heard something about the case, but that, as he would readily understand, it would be impossible for me to discuss it in any detail We had a rigid rule on these matters when communicating with anyone except officials of Government Departments, and if we departed from this rule our position would be quite untenable. We were extremely grateful for the help that he had given us on a previous occasion, and I was very sorry to appear s unhelpful to him in being unable to meet his request. The only advice I could give him was to address himself to the Public Relations Department at the War Office. He said that he had already done this and that, in addition, he had spoken to Dugdale. They seemed embarrassed but could give him no explanation. He said the matter was one of great importance. both to his paper and to the future career of the individual concerned. I said that I fully appreciated his difficulty, but I hoped he appreciated mine.

He then said that he would like to ask me one question; he would not expect an answer if I felt that I could not give it. There had been an announcement in the Press that no American journalists were to be allowed to proceed to Korea to cover Eisenhower's visit. The three American journalists already there would do whatever was necessary, but that nothing would be published until after Eisenhower's return. Had the refusal of permission to anything to do with this announcement? I said that we were not the approving authority in this matter, but I could say that to t best of my knowledge there was no connection between refusal to and the case of the American journalists.

I again said how sorry I was that I could not give him any further assistance and he rang off quite amicably.

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I told Dick and Roger about this conversation and suggested that Hollis should ring up Rumbold at the War Office and tell him what had transpired.

Roger has spoken to Rumbold. The Mirror have earmarked another journalist to go on the Korean mission and have asked the War Office to let them have an official letter indicating their refusal to grant permission to This Public Relations have done without stating any reasons.

I do not know whether we have heard the last of this, but I hope so!

22nd November.

Marriott, Loftus Brown, Miss Bagot, and Malcolm Cumming all came to see me in regard to a letter to Barton of the Colonial Office on possibilities of influence, Communist or Indian, at the back of MAU MAU. Apparently Ingrams has started a scare that in view of KENYATTA's former association with Communist activities, the whole MAU MAU movement may be Communist inspired. The letter drafted in reply to him did not seem to be in line with our brief to the D.G. and the necessary adjustments were therefore made. We do not believe in either Communist or Indian influence. At any rate there is no tangible evidence at the moment.

They also showed me a telegram from De Quehen to Nairobi, copy to London, which had reachedus by bag. The telegram suggested a visit by South African police officers to Nairobi. We sent a wire back to De Quehen, copy to Nairobi, pointing out that anything of the kind was entirely contrary to Colonial Office policy, and that therefore the idea should not be encouraged, unless the Governor approved.

I learned later that Duplessis had, in fact, arrived in Nairobi. His visit had been sanctioned by Baring, provided his presence was kept dark.

24th November.

The Home Secretary paid his long-promised visit. He saw me alone and asked me two questions; one about our general coverage in relation to the Communist Party. To this I replied that, as far as we could see, the coverage was reasonably good - we were not complacent about the matter, but we had had the opportunity of checking lists of membership, obtained by secret means, against our records. This had shown that our coverage extended to something between 80% and 90%. It did therefore really mean something when we said that we had "no trace" on our records. It was a good deal more than saying: "This man does not happen to have come to our notice".

He then asked me about NUNN MAY. The Prime Minister had suggested that NUNN MAY should be kept in for his full ten-year period, instead of being released next month in accordance with the normal practice of giving remission for good conduct. I said that we had examined this question. While it was difficult to know exactly what was going on in NUNN MAY's mind, we were reasonably satisfied, from his own statements, that he had no intention of engaging in any further acts of espionage, or of giving assistance to the Russians. He seemed to wish to settle down in some job as soon as he got out of prison and was asking for guidance, since he realised that he was almost

bound to run up against difficulties if he applied for a job at any place where secret work was going on. It was true that he had refused to give us any information about those with whom he was associated in espionage, but this was perhaps understandable and a point of view which one could respect. We thought, therefore, that if we could find him employment and prevent the Press from hounding him, there was a reasonable chance that he would settle down and become a useful citizen. If he were to be kept in, however, for another three years, there was no doubt in our minds that he would be deeply embittered and, in so far as he might be able. would become a serious security risk. On all grounds, therefore, we should be strongly opposed to any suggestion that he should serve his full ten years.

The Home Secretary said that he entirely agreed with everything that I had said, and that he would do everything in his power to oppose the Prime Minister's suggestion, which he told me would be debated in the Cabinet.

After giving the Home Secretary a brief outline of our organisation, Dick White took him over and introduced him to Robertson, Marriott and Cumming. Each of these officers gave a brief account of his work and answered the Home Secretary's questions. After three quarters of an hour he went on to Hollis, where he met Furnival Jones, Mitchell and Hinchley-Cooke. Lastly, he saw D.O.S., Alan Roger and Harrison for quarter of an hour. Before lunch he listened to the record by BURGESS, which had been the subject of questions in the House of Lords, but just as we were going to start lunch he received an urgent call to go to Downing Street. Before leaving he told me that he had been extremely impressed by the officers that he had mad and that he felt entirely satisfied that they were well on top of their jobs. He asked me whether we were still keeping an eye on PHILBY. I said that we were in a general way. We had never been satisfied with his case. Although much of the evidence was open to a dual interpretation, the cumulative effect of it was considerable, and the point that had influenced us against PHILBY, perhaps more than any other, was the fact that he had reacted so mildly to the accusations made - any ordinary person would have been up in arms and made frantic efforts to clear himself.

Potter came to see me about a message that his secretary had had from a Special Branch officer, to the effect that among certain documents held by a man called MORESBY, who had died recently, was a box labelled "M.I.5" I told Potter that MORESBY was a relation of Kell's who for some time had acted as Legal Adviser to this Department. The box probably contained his opinion on cases which had arisen during and subsequent to the first World War. If MORESBY's relatives were prepared to hand over the box to us, we would look it through and destroy or keep any relevant papers.

[redacted] who is due for promotion to Under Secretary. Newsam took the line that there was nothing secret in the Ministry of Housing. I replied that, as far as I knew, a man with the rank of Under Secretary might well be transferred by the Treasury from one Ministry to another. Apart from this, it seemed likely that he would see Cabinet papers on occasions. I thought, too, that it was important that we should endeavour by all means to reach a positive conclusion in a case where a man's future in the Civil Service was at stake. Newsam finally agreed, rather reluctantly, to sink his liberal principles!

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25th November.

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Bolam is seeing the Secretary of State for War in regard to , and the S. of S. is seeking for guidance at the Cabinet meeting to-day. I therefore passed to Whittick details of the case for the information of the Home Secretary. We have told Head that he can say no more than that has been closely association with the Communist Party.

At the Appointments Board we discussed in some detail the Directors' plans for the reorganisation of this office on a Three-Director basis.

I began the discussion by saying that I thought we could most profitably proceed by considering the major difficulties, where three Directors agreed and one stood out. I would then call upon the Director who differed to justify his proposal. There were three such points: D.B., D.C. and D.O.S., who thought that A. Division should be built up, whereas D.E/A had downgraded it to a Deputy Director. The second point was that D.B., D.C and D.E/A all thought that the Overseas Division should be integrated, whereas D.O.S. had placed it under an Assistant Director responsible to both B and C Divisions. It seemed to me that it might equally be responsible to A., and that, therefore, to all intents and purposes it remained a Division, although it ceased to have a Director. The last point related to D.E/A's splitting of B. Division under two Directors - one in charge of Investigation and the other in charge of Intelligence. D.B., D.C and myself, and finally D.O.S and D.E./A, agreed that the future organisation should be based on three Directors: A. in charge of Administration, Organisation and Finance; B. in charge of Intelligence and Investigation, and C.in charge of Protective Security.

While there was some slight difference of opinion about the integration of the Overseas Division between D.B and D.C, - the point being that there might be a "chaser" section to ensure that letter from overseas were properly dealt with - agreement was reached on major issues.

In discussing the D.G's staff, I said that I thought only the Secretariat should remain; S.L.B's functions in regard to leakage of information and arms traffic going to B. Division and his other functions to C. Division. P.L.S. should go to B.1.

A new draft chart is being prepared for further consideration.

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Horrocks came to show me a telegram from Kenya instructing him to send out a competent Registry girl to reorganise the local S.B. Registry. He is trying to find someone and has in mind that possibly Ailsa Russell might go from the Middle East. The job is likely to last a few months.

<u>26th November.</u>

The Foreign Office have suggested that we should send over someone with Miss Constant to the meeting with Trend on our budget for next year, as Intelligence points may come under discussion. Our estimates are up £68,000, £66,000 of which is salaries for new Registry staff, but I will speak to Reilly at the J.I.C. to-morrow.

I discussed with D.O.S. a draft telegram he was proposing to send to Nairobi regarding the telephone check on KOINANGE. On second thoughts I felt that the risks involved in sending records abroad were not really justifiable, unless we thought that information of real value affecting the situation in Kenya was likely to be missed. Examination of the material on KOINANGE shows that noghing of any value has so far been received, and there is little likelihood of the conversations in Kikuyu being of any importance at all. Unless, therefore, contrary views are held in B.1, I think the H.O.W. should be cancelled.

Whittick rang up about a P.Q. to the Prime Minister, asking who in South Africa has invited Sir Percy Sillitoe to proceed to the Union. There seems to have been some rumour in the South African Press, which resulted in a telegram from the High Commissioner to the C.R.O., deprecating the idea.

As far as we know the D.G. had no intention of going to South Africa.

27th November.

We had an off-the-record statement at the J.I.C. to-day on atomic energy from Commander Welsh.

He said that most active members of the American Commission were strongly in favour of a united Anglo-American effort, involving a complete interchange of information, but this seemed impossible as long as the Macmahon Act remained in force. The main purpose of our Operation HURRICANE had been a purely defensive one. It was highly desirable to clear up certain anomalies which existed in relation to the detection of the three explosions which had taken place in Russia. This could only be done by the explosion of a streamlined bomb, all details of the composition of which were known to us. In this connection, Operation HURRICANE had been highly successful and we should in future be in a far better position to detect the precise nature of Russian explosions.

He then told us what he believed to be the ingredients of the recent American explosions at Eniwetok. There was no doubt that one of them was thermo-nuclear and of a violence not hitherto experienced. He would not wish to be quoted, but he would hazard a guess that it would cause complete devastation in an area of 50 square miles, or the equvalent of a radius of 4 miles in the centre of London.

I went with Miss Constant to a meeting in Reilly's room, attended by several of his minions and Trend of the Treasury.

Reilly said that in view of the obvbusly large and increasing commitments which we had,in regard to security, he was surprised at the modest demand for an increase of £68.000. bringing out total budget up

I explained that out of £68,000, £66,000 was due to an increase of Registry staff necessitated by a vetting commitment which had now reached 7,000 a week. The remaining £2,000 was mostly due to increased allowances for officers serving abroad.

Reilly remarked that our expenditure on agents seemed to remain fairly constant at the figure of roughly I said that this might be due to two reasons; firstly, the recruitment of agents was to some extent governed by opportunity; it was not possible just to go out and get agents whenever a particular task presented itself - there was always an element of luck and waiting. if one was going to recruit anybody worth while. The second reason might be that we had succeeded in improving the quantity and quality of information which we received from the Police. I then explained how this had been done through the creation of Special Branches, the bringing of them together, lecturing to them, and the giving of courses, not only to the S.B. officers, but to Superintendents and Inspectors.

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I told the meeting that, on the whole, we felt we had a reasonable coverage of the Communist Party, and that we had on several occasions been able to test this out. We also had a reasonable coverage for sympathisers. The Russian problem was more difficult, but some progress was being made.

The meeting seemed thoroughly satisfied; in fact, I gained the impression that we were rather the "blue-eyed boys" of the Intelligence world!

I attended Cookie's Port & Travel Control Group cocktail party. He had collected the Home Secretary, the D.M.I., ex-D.M.I. Davidson,(Head of the Intelligence Corps), and some prominent female W.R.E.N. or A.T. There was also a prominent representative of P.L.A. As far as I know the party was a success.

28th November.

The D.C. has sent a telegram to say that whatever may be thought in London about Peter KOINANGE, Jomo KENYATTA's mantle fell upon him when the latter was arrested. We are a little inclined to think that there may be some confusion here with KOINANGE's brother or his father, both of whom are under arrest in Kenya. Meanwhile, however, we are continuing the check on Peter KOINANGE and are endeavouring to get a Kikuyu translator who is reliable. So far Peter KOINANGE does not appear to have done anything except attend propaganda meetings. He is,of course, in touch with Fenner BROCKWAY and HALE.

I had lunch with He said that he had the feeling that Ike would make a serious attempt to break the deadlock in Korea. It would not surprise him if Ike were to propose giving the Chinese an ultimatum, that if they did not make peace we should bomb their Manchurian bases.

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James Robertson talked to me about his C.E. problems. While he felt that some progress was being made, he was still of the opinion that we should increase the Watcher staff. He did not, however, see much prospect in getting this done as long as Storrier remained.

1st December.

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The D.G. asked us to send out, rapidly by air, certain equipment for the Interrogation Centre in Kenya. Malcolm produced 9 cases, weighing some 869 pounds and handed them over to A. Branch for despatch.

I now hear that these cannot go by air freight until 27th December; that the Air Force cannot carry them, and that they must go by ship, leaving to-morrow morning and reaching Mombasa on December 22nd. Had we known about this earlier, we might possibly have got the Colonial Office to intervene on a high level to get the cases on to B.O.A.C., who are bunged up with mails for Christmas. I telephoned to Sir Thomas Lloyd and, in his absence, spoke to Mr. Rogers, head of the East African Dept. He felt, as indeed I did, that intervention at a high level might well fail and that we should then have missed the boat. He agreed that the cases should go by boat and accepted full responsibility.

2nd December.

I told Horrocks that I thought that, had we acted a little earlier we might have got the cases for Kenya flown out, but that in the present circumstances we had no alternative but to send them to Mombasa. He said that as the D.G's telegram had intimated that the Interrogation Centre had to be constructed, he felt that our equipment would be in ample time. That is as may be! I said that I was rather worried about the refusal of Kenya to accept an expert to set up the Interrogation Centre, as I had in mind the many mistakes that had been made in Malaya. I subsequently spoke to D.O.S. about this and also to Malcolm, when it was agreed that the latter would write a D.O. letter to Major, giving him certain details about the lay-out of an Interrogation Centre which we have here, and suggesting once more that, if required, we will send out a technical expert.

I attended the meeting. McEwen asked me about the vetting of SIGINT personnel. He wanted to know whether we covered the C.I.D. records. I said that I thought that we did for certain categories, but that I was by no means sure - I would find out and let him know.

3rd December.

At the J.I.C. to-day we had a discussion about defectors. Several people from I.R.D., (McDermott & Hopson), Miss Coates from the Home Office, and Hohler from the Northern Department attended. The I.R.D. paper that we discussed showed a steady decline in the number of defectors, in spite of a good deal of work that had been put in on broadcasting, etc. The Services were asked to say whether they wished our present efforts to be continued. They were unanimously of the opinion that we should go on, since, owing to the scarcity of information from behind the Iron Curtain, even an occasional Private soldier was better than nothing.

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We then considered whether there was any way of increasing the flow. I said that of all the defectors who had passed through our hands, not one had even heard of our propaganda, and that those who had defected had done so for reasons of fear due to some personal issue that they had had with the Soviet authorities. It was represented that there had been a very small percentage - perhaps 1% - of defectors who had come over from ideological motives, but that possibly ideology might just tip the balance in some cases.

At the suggestion of , it was decided that the Working Party should look into the problem again and suggest other courses of action designed to improve the flow of defectors.

Miss Coates suggested that we were inclined to put agricultural workers on to industrial jobs in a city. I said I did not know the precise answer to this, but on making enquiries I found that there was only one man who had asked to go on the land and that his request had been granted. I so informed the Secretary of the J.I.C. later by telephone. I went on to say that a great deal had been done to meet the wishes of defectors, and that in particular an enormous amount of trouble had been taken over the cases of , both of whom had decided that they preferred life in Germany to the U.K.

4th December.

At the J.I.C. to-day there was a long discussion on the J.I.C. paper regarding the likelihood of war, particularly the likelihood of an unintentional war and the likelihood of a preventive war.

The D.N.I. had many fine points to argue, and ultimately expressed a minority view.

We also discussed the paper on Korea, when I managed to get a paragraph introduced about the possible deadlock being due to a desire by the Russians and Chinese to see what came out of General Eisenhower's visit. It seemed to me that it was just as good a case as any other to assume that the war in Korea had been stepped up in order to aggravate its unpopularity in the U.S. during the time of the Election, and in the hope that one party or other would commit itself. This is in fact what happened, with the result either that Eisenhower has to make concessions or lose fact with the electorat Meanwhile, the Russians are opposing the Indian proposals on the United Nations.

At the Appointments Board meeting to-day I reported that I had received from P.L.S. a request that:-

a) Major Boddington should be allowed to come into the office for the purpose of contacting civil Police when we were holding Police Courses.

b) Representatives of the Admiralty Police should be allowed to attend the forthcoming Course for civi Police which we were holding.

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It was felt that we could not deny Major Boddington access to the office at about luncheon time or at the cocktail parties, provided that this

right was reasonably used. It was also agreed that we should accept the recommendation of P.L.S. that a separate course should be held for Admiralty Police, W.D.C. and P.L.A. Police, and for any other kindred organisations.

It was agreed that there was no objection to women police from Lancashire attending the courses, but I said I would consider separately a proposal that Railway Police should attend the ordinary civil Police courses.

Courses to Staff Colleges:

There was some discussion on the advisability and nature of lectures given to Staff Colleges. It was agreed that this question would be investigated by D.C. who would discuss it with the Commandants of Staff Colleges if necessary, with a view to determining the form which the lectures should take.

D.E/A mentioned the necessity for more space in Leconfield House and asked if P.L.S. could move to Hanover Square. I said I would investigate this. A request was also made for the space at present occupied by C.2 Museum, but D.C. felt that the Museum should be maintained in its present form.

D.E./A reported that he had been asked by the Ministry of Works to attend the Munster Tribunal for the purpose of deciding whether we or the Ministry of Health should have possession of Blenheim Palace in the event of war.

The Board agreed that the present Staff List and Telephone Directory should be maintained.

D.C. mentioned that he had recei ed a request from the Home Office that we should house the obsolete Traffic Index which is maintained chiefly for our use. This would involve some 1,000 sq.ft. of space. The Home Office claim that we are the only users of these records and D.B. undertook to ascertain whether or not we still wished to insist on its retention.

D.C. raised the question of whether information which we have on files that contain no direct security interest but are of significance in assessing personal character should be given in response to vetting enquiries. The Board felt that generally this should be done particularly in replies to other Government Departments, but it was agreed that S.L.B. should be consulted.

It was agreed that D.C. should inform C.4 that it is considered that any future Commandant of the Port and Travel Control Group should be a Security Service officer nominated by the Director General.

D.O.S. asked for early consideration of the vacant post for an officer at Aden.

5th December.

D.D.M.I. (Johnstone) spent the whole day here. I asked him to let me know precisely the kind of criticism that was being levelled at us in higher Service circles. He said that while we were generally regarded as an efficient organisation with a good staff, he had heard suggestions that we

were not progressive enough in our policy. Although he did not think Malaya was in any way comparable with the situation here, he did draw attention to the fact that General Templer had instituted some pretty drastic measures and got away with it.

I said that we were always trying to think up new ideas here, but that in a Democracy we had constantly to consider the importance of keeping our machine in being. If, for example, we used the O.S.A., as we legally could, to force a journalist to disclose to us the name of his informant responsible for a leakage of information, we should almost certainly find that the O.S.A. would become the subject for debate in Parliament, with the result that many of our existing powers would be whittled away. At the same time within this framework we took many calculated risks. We had a very considerable coverage of Communist Party activity and we were on the whole fairly well informed. This did not mean that we were in any way complacent; Russian espionage, for example, presented us with an extremely difficult problem. We had made considerable progress, but Russian security was such that the target was an extremely difficult one. On matters affecting the employment of doubtful persons by the Government, or factories where secret work was going on, we had achieved a good deal, although the ultimate responsibility remained with the Department concerned. There were, of course, from time to time, cases where it was considered that the interests of security were overriden, but in spite of this we were in favour of the responsibility remaining with Ministries, otherwise we should eith have to become a Gestapo or Departments would sit back with folded arms and do nothing about their own domestic security problems. It was essential, in our view, that they should be made to feel their responsibilities.

Johnny then went on to see Dick, Marriott, Robertson and Roger Hollis. He seemed to have enjoyed his visit, and on the whole I think he was impressed.

I told Holmes that I had decided to let Boddington come to the Police cocktail parties, as I thought it was important that we should not appear unfriendly or unhelpful in the eyes of the Admiralty.

10th December.

Horrocks told me that he had arranged for someone to go out to Kenya to reorganise the S.B. Registry.

11th December.

I lunched with Colonel Hoare of the Economic League and Anthony Pollen, when we merely talked generalities. Hoare struck me as being intelligent, although somewhat self-opinionated. On the whole I felt that he had a fairly balanced view of Communist activity in this country. He evidently gets about quite alot; he had recently been to Italy - I think under the auspices of I.R.D. - and had seen something of the employers in Milan. He could not walk round the factory as he was told that if he did there would immediately be a shop stewards meeting and demands to know who he was and all about his business. On the whole, however, he thought that the Communist situation in Italy was fairly well

in hand. At home he thinks that under the Labour Government the rank and file of the Trade Unionists had lost faith in their leaders, and that to some extent things are better now that the issue is clear cut.

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D.O.S. stated that the D.G. had asked him if possible to have discussion with Mr. Holland, Prime Minister of New Zealand, and he must warn the Board that if this conversation took place, it was a possibility that Mr. Holland would request the services of an officer from this Service in New Zealand.

There was considerable discussion on the responsibilities of the Security Service in relation to Colonial Special Branches and in pargicular on a letter received from H/S.I.F.E. asking for observations on a proposal that a Security Service officer should work at a Desk inside the Singapore Special Branch. This proposal resulted from discussions between H/S.I.F.E. and the Commissioner of Police, Singapore.

The Board agreed that D.O.S. should communicate with H/S.I.F.E. and ask him to explore further and develop this proposal, also to give an opinion as to the possibility of loaning an officer from S.I.F.E. or of merging such an appointment with S.L.O. Singpaore. D.O.S. would also indicate that in general we do not favour the secondment of an officer but feel that we should retain his administration.

16th December.

I went to see Newsam about the case of one who is coming up for promotion to Assistant Secretary and whose case we wanted to investigate . I told Newsam that I had been a little disturbed by what he had said to me previously in the case of Cases of this sort were extremely important and, indeed, we had instructions to operate the P.M.'s purge to the utmost of our ability. The case of a man in Government employment was always difficult;

I then gave Newsam a rough idea of what we knew about He then changed his tune completely, saying thatall he had wanted to ensure was that we did not use on some individual merely because he read the "Daily Worker". I said that this was not our practice and that we did not put forward such cases unless there were fairly strong grounds for thinking

that something might be going wrong. Apart from this, it was in everyone's interest, possibly including the individual himself, to get such cases cleared up.

Wood of the Home Office telephoned to say that he had instructions to get into touch with the G.P.O. in order to enquire what arrangements were made for vetting staff employed on our special duties. This enquiry had arisen from a request by the P.M.G. to the Home Office to have certain members of their staff who were employed on handling valuable packages vetted by the Police. The Home Secretary, while ready to consider this, felt that in view of the fact that the complaint had recently been made about letters being put into the wrong envelopes, some vetting of the Post Office personnel employed on our duties should be carried out.

I told Wood that we could, of course, let him know what we did for the Post Office, but it was agreed that he had first better make his enquiries and then consult us.

D.B. gave a lecture to the I.D.C., which seems to have been a great success. It is, of course, difficult in an hour to cover all the ground, but I could not help feeling that C. Division had been rather neglected, since it is only on protective security lines that those attending the course can be of any real assistance to us. By contrast I gather that Drew's lecture was a flop. There was a general feeling that he was much too cagey!

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asked me to go to a cocktail party at his house to meet a high operative in C.I.A., who had just been touring the Far East and Middle East. I did not get very much out of him, except that he bought an extremely expensive 'cello at Hills for his wife!

I talked quite a lot to the D.M.I., who was there, and found that his hobby was stamp collecting!

17th December.

Horrocks tells me that he has got a Kikuyu translator, a woman, thought to be reliable. She is being vetted by the Kenya Government.

Strong telephoned to say that he had a personal vetting request from General Bedell-Smith for some man in C.I.A. who has apparently been in this country. He promised to let me have the name.

18th December.

At the J.I.C. to-day we once more discussed the proposal to have a J.I.C. map room. The only strong opponent was Kenneth Strong, with whose

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arguments I felt in substantial agreement. I said, however, that I did not think I was really qualified to express a view, as I had very little experience of map rooms from the Service point of view. I was, nevertheless, convinced that, from our own point of view, maps and documents were often apt to be misleading, at any rate unless they were looked at by someone with a full knowledge of the facts.

It was eventually decided to put up proposals to the Ministry of Defence. I said that we should like to be consulted and to advise on the security angle.

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At the Appointments Board to-day D.O.S. again mentioned the vacancy at Aden and it was agreed that names should be considered at the next meeting.

D.O.S. reported that he had had a conversation with Mr. Holland, Prime Minister of New Zealand, and the latter had admitted inaction on the D.G's report and undertook to look into the matter when he returned.

D.E./A reported that no Kikuyu translator had yet been engaged, but that we had the name of an ex-woman missionary and we were awaiting the result of a vetting enquiry about her which had been addressed to Kenya. No approach had yet been made to her.

Consideration was given to the steps to be taken to ensure the retention of the Traffic Index in the Home Office for ten years. The Board agreed that:

i) D.C. would telephone the Home Office and inform them that we were hoping to arrange that they would retain the Index;

ii) more details should be obtained from B.1 and B.2 about the use to which the Traffic Index is put;

iii) when these details have been obtained, an approach should be made to the Treasury and the Home Office asking for their concurrence in the holding of the Traffic Index by the Home Office for ten years.

D.E/A reported that he had attended the Munster Tribunal for the hearing of the Ministry of Health claims to have Blenheim Palace in event of war; and that the Tribunal had decided in favour of the Ministry of Health against us. It was agreed that if the Ministry of Works were unable to provide suitable alternative accommodation, an approach would probably have to be made to the J.I.C. D.E/A would read the relevant J.I.C. papers on wartime accommodation for intelligence organisations.

19th December.

I telephoned to the D.M.I. about the case of one _____ which he had discussed with me at the J.I.C. yesterday. _____ who has a good record in the Army, is up for a National Service Commission. Our records

show that both his parents have Communist associations.

D.M.I. wants to interview the lad and tell him that he is unfortunately unable to recommend him for a Commission, owing to the political activities of his parents.

I told the D.M.I. that there were two serious snags in this proposed course of action. Firstly, the War Office might well be accused in the House of visiting the sins of the parents on the children; secondly, that while it might be possible to say something on thses lines in this particular case, there would be a serious objection in other cases where the information came from delicate sources. Moreoever, a precedent would be created which if not followed in all cases would arouse criticism. In our recommendat to the War Office we had said that we thought was an acceptable risk and we still adhered to that view.

I was left with the impression that the D.M.I. would either support the Commission or turn it down and say nothing.

20th December.

I showed Hill my note to Reilly on the subject of de COURCY, and he agreed to its terms. The only useful suggestion is that they should try to discover the sources from which the Archduke OTTO receives his information. If we could establish that it came from tainted White Russian sources, we might be some way towards reaching a conclusion that de COURCY and his Digest were unconsciously serving Soviet ends by spreading an exaggerated view about the strength of Russian armaments. If this were so, a suitable Question could be asked in the House.

Cumming brought in for my inspection a brown paper bag containing 100 £1 notes wrapped up in red paper at the bottom and covered with bits of orgnge and apple peelings.

This only goes to show how difficult it is to detect Russian agents, since once the initial arrangements have been made all meetings are cut down to a minimum. If we are going to break new ground, our onl change is to solve the Watching problem. This means more and better staff and better direction, which we will never get as long as remains. The only other hope is to improve technical aids. We have been urging the necessity for research in this field for a long t'ne, but so far Professor has done very little; he has just prepared a memorandum for the Chiefs of Staff asking for more money and scientists to undertake the work, but apart from this no realy progress has been made.

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22nd December.

Reports are beginning to trickle in from Nairobi, which show that the three recommendations made by the D.G. were: the appointment of a co-ordinator in the person of MacDonald, the improvement and enlarging of Special Branch, and the setting up of an Interrogation Centr

The problem is still far from being solved, even though the situation seems to be rather more in hand than it was. There has been no difficulty in getting the necessary funds and authority.

29th December.

. Mitchell tells me that the D.M.I. decided to recommend against the granting of a Commission to [redacted] it had dropped the idea of giving the boy the reasons.

I have had a somewhat belly-aching letter from Walter Bell, who feels somewhat frustrated in Delhi. He says he is unable to give Mullik what he wants, which, as far as I can see, is a preview of Kremlin intentions and capabilities. If Mullik only knew the extent to which we chrystal-gaze at the J.I.C. on this subject, he might not be so insistent in his demands!

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According to the Daily Express to-day, the British Embassy in Moscow have been given three months to find new accommodation. I suggested to Dick that we should go very carefully into the possibilities of breaking the lease at Kensington Palace Gardens, on the grounds that structural alterations have been carried out without permission of the landlords. I referred to the large steel room built in by a special team of Communist builders and engineers. It is difficult to know why Moscow are asking us to leave, presumably they think the Embassy is too near the Kremlin, and since they have thrown a beam at us, we may be throwing one back at them.

I had a long talk with U'ren about his visit to Pakistan, Ceylon and India.

Things went fairly well in Pakistan Kazim Raza was co-operative

There is apparently a feud going on between Ghawas, the D.M.I., and Kazim Raza about an enquiry into revolutionary movements within the Army. Ghawas has just got authority to set up his own organisation, and even to make use of the Police when necessary. U'ren did hit best to sell our method of dealing with this problem, but without much success. There will obviously be a good deal of duplication and confusion.

In Ceylon the general state of security is extremely bad. U'ren has laid down a complete reorganisation of the Special Branch, which Aluwihare, the I.G.P., has expressed his intention of putting into force immediately.

I told U'ren that I was surprised to read a report from Wagstaffe to the effect that he did not know the answers to the questionnaire on protective security which was circulated a short time ago. It seemed to me that as he had been there for 3½ years he might have found out. How did he normally spend his day? U'ren said that he had quite a lot of correspondence with S.I.F.E., and also with Australia, and that it often took three visits before he could get any answer to his letters within the Ceylon Special Branch. He thought that Wagstaffe would have a full-time job in getting U'ren's recommendations put into force. One of the main problems which has occupied the Ceylon Special Branch, and which is not really a security one, has been the illegal immigration from India. There have been so many famines in Southern India that people have tried to get to Ceylon, where conditions are far better and wages are higher; this has created quite a problem.

In Delhi U'ren found Mullik full of complaints. He did not like the course which his officers had attended in Singapore. When asked to be more specific, he said that they had only been given one day on observation. U'ren explained that the technique for observation was one in which India must be fairly well versed, and that having expounded the theory it could be better practiced in India itself, rather than in Singapore where conditions were different. Mullik's reply was that he did not intend to send any more officers to Singapore. He then asked U'ren about the latest information from Moscow about the Economic Conference. When U'ren said that this was outside his sphere, Mullik said: "But you are an officer of M.I.5, shurely you know these things?" Mullik is obviously reluctant to believe that we have not got agents in the Kremlin. His final complaint arose from a request to send one of his officers here for a three-months course on long-term penetration. U'ren said that while we

should be very pleased to give a general course in which this item would be included, he did not see how we could instruct an officer for three months on this one subject. Mullik concluded the argument by saying that he would send no-one unless his whole time were devoted to the study of agent-running.

Something has obviously got into Mullik's hair, but U'ren says that it may well be heat or that he is being harrassed by his superiors. He is obviously getting very mistaken information about our capabilities, whereas most of what we achieve is through hard work and a certain amount of luck.

Hilton telephoned to say that the Foreign Secretary had heard that John Foster Dulles was in close touch with De COURCY. He wanted to have our observations.

I said that as far as I knew there was no very close personal contact. This was, of course, possible, since De COURCY's Digest was widely distributed in the United States where he had an Agency. On the other hand, we knew that De COURCY was in the habit of claiming that he was a personal friend of all sorts of eminent people. He had in fact done so in the case of the Home Secretary, who had only seen him once! The information had apparently reached Eden through the French Ambassador.

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