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territory. He has got hold of a wealthy Czech from whom he requires a sum of £12,000 to carry out the preliminary negotiations with the parties concerned. If he is successful he wants a further sum. The Czech does not mind what he pays as long as he can get his relatives over to this country. I have suggested that he should deposit a credit in a bank which would be payable on production of the goods. C.I.D. are going to try this on and see what happens.

I talked to the D.G. about Neville Bland's request to take the Dutch Foreign Minister over the RPS. D.G. said he would give this matter his consideration. He did not see any objection in principle provided such visits were considered as a privilege rather than a right. He thought that such foreigners should be in cognito in order to avoid any requests from their nationals for assistance which might be embarrassing.

Herbert of the Censorship called about his visit to America. While in Stephenson's office in New York he had been shown a number of ISOS messages which had been picked up locally which contained a certain amount of information about the use of the DOT and secret inks, also a number of names and addresses which he thought should have been in the possession of Bermuda. He accordingly made a list of these names and addresses and with Stephenson's approval wired them to his censorship point.

He was rather annoyed about not having been given this information before. He said it would have made a good deal of difference to his work e.g. had he known that the DOT ~~xxx~~ only ^{was} operating on west-bound mails he would have concentrated all his secret ink testing efforts on the eastbound mail. As regards S. America he had discovered that the DOT was operating in both directions. While I think Herbert's complaint is justifiable up to a point, I do not think he takes enough trouble in analysing the position within his own show. By a simple mathematical calculation it should be quite easy for him to estimate what his chances are of picking up a letter, almost regardless of what we tell him.

October 27th

I had a talk with Grogan about secret inks. He is arranging with Herbert to proceed with the scheme for getting another 40 or 50 testers and several chemists. We also discussed the question of radiotelephony between this country, Lisbon, Switzerland and Sweden. It has now been disclosed that during the last month there has only been one call on the radiotelephone to Lisbon. Post Office are therefore reluctant to go ahead with any further schemes with regard to Switzerland or Sweden until they can get some kind of assurance that the service is really going to be used. Our point of view is that we prefer in

principle not to have these services, but that if any other dept. can put forward a fairly good case and adequate security measures are devised we would not raise any violent objection. In the light of recent disclosures about Lisbon it seems possible that the desirability of continuing the service will now become a matter of serious discussion.

I had a talk with Acworth about his agency. He is so bitten with the bug of secrecy and to some extent with the sense of his own importance that I am rather apprehensive about getting him into line. I told him that while I fully realised that either his departure or that of van der Willik would for a time seriously dislocate the machine I did not regard either of them as indispensable. I have told him to put forward a memo on the agency for discussion.

Orr has written a memo on the position of Room 055 and Harker, Putler and Horrocks have produced another on its back history. Both these memos have gone forward to D.G. who is passing them to Harry Allen for his comments.

The D.N.I. ~~xxxx~~ has got a resolution passed by the ISSB in which the view is expressed that communication between Col. Stanley ~~xxxx~~ and the XX Committee should be via the ISSB.

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October 28th

D.G. meeting. I raised the subject of British subjects in Occupied Territory. A number of these people have been arriving from French occupied territory via Spain and Portugal. Some of them can hardly speak any English. In one case a man left Paris, went to Brittany, and returned to Paris after the occupation.

It was only when he heard that the police were rounding up Englishmen that he tried to make his way out. One rather wonders what degree of loyalty to this country such people have. In some cases they have no papers to prove their identity. Personally I think that these cases want following up fairly closely. It would be an easy matter for the Germans to plant someone on us in the guise of a British subject.

I had a discussion with Victor and B.5 about Worthy Down. It was decided to interrogate Rayner and CARRICK immediately afterwards. CARRICK would then be taken to his home where a search would be made.

R.O.C. are to be warned that they may be called upon to arrange for the raiding of O'CONNOR's house in Dublin. They are not to do anything however till they receive further information from us.

I had a word with Stewart about tomorrow's W. Board meeting. He is in agreement with

us about the line to be adopted, and thinks that we should make it quite clear that the organisation of special agents is under our control.

The D.N.I. is being very troublesome about RUTLAND. Having pinned his faith on him and found that he had made a mistake he is now trying to say that we have made a bungle of the case.

October 29th

I attended the W.Board meeting. The D.M.I. opened the proceedings by saying that as Col. Stanley had no wish to pry into the mechanics of the XX Committee or the W.Board there was no particular object in his becoming a member of the latter. This seemed to be the view of the D.N.I. and Findlater Stewart who I think had been lobbied. Charles Medhurst did not dissent. D.M.I. suggested that Col. Stanley should obtain anything he wanted from the XX Committee via the ISSB on whom the Security Service had their representative. I suggested that that procedure might perhaps be rather cumbersome and that there might be an advantage in Col. Stanley having direct contact with us. None of the Ds of I and I got no support from any other quarter. I then submitted my note which made it quite clear that whatever the decision was about Col. Stanley the control of the special agent system must remain in the hands of ourselves and SIS and that we must be the final judges

as to whether Col. Stanley's or any other depts. requirements could be met. I said that the organisation had been set up by the Security Service as an insurance against German espionage in this country. This was its primary purpose. We were however quite ready to have it made use of in other ways provided its existence was not placed in jeopardy. The D.N.I. at first dissented and finally agreed and my memo was accepted and embodied in the minutes. Findlater Stewart spoke about Plan Guy Fawkes and said that the arrangements made had his full support. The other members of the Board agreed that the plan should go forward. Before the meeting the D.N.I. asked me whether I was in on the RUTLAND case. I said that I had been connected at one time or another with the case for a good many years. He then asked me what I thought about RUTLAND. I said that as RUTLAND had visited both the Air Ministry and N.I.D. and in neither case disclosed what he had been doing for the Japs we regarded him as unreliable. Moreover at the meeting which had subsequently been arranged for his interrogation he had again failed to disclose that he had worked for the Jap Secret Service until certain letters which he had written in 1935 were produced for his inspection. Even then he did not come entirely clean. Finally it was quite clear from the information in our possession that although RUTLAND had directed most of his energies against the Americans he had at one time been willing to work against us had the

Japs thought he could have done so more profitably than themselves. For the above reasons I did not think he was a suitable man for employment as a double agent.

October 30th

Had a discussion with J.C. and T.A.R. about the W.Board meeting. While I think they were a little disappointed with the result we all agreed that the matter would probably solve itself in the end through a clash between the Ds. of I and Col. Stanley. We thought it was important that ~~they~~ ^{we} should not become involved in the dispute.

I saw Medlam for a moment before his departure. I showed him Maunsell's letter to the D.G. about his position in Egypt. As far as possible Maunsell has wriggled out of the military hierarchy which has been nothing but an impediment to him in his work. While he is still nominally a G.S.O.IIb. he in fact has a large measure of independence. In his view however his organisation should be constituted as an outpost of the Security Service. Medlam has almost succeeded in reaching a similar position. In his letter Maunsell had disclosed that he came back here in April 1940 in order to get our support for his semi-independent state. He apparently got no encouragement. We agreed with Medlam that if POGO arrived in Gib. he should be put back across the frontier.

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Lennox has come in with a further change of plans in the Middle East. The S. Plan has been abandoned and the cover plan in the north is to take its place. There is so much deception and counter-deception going on that it will not be surprising if our troops land up in the Arctic dressed in crepe-de-chine. It is difficult to know what is going on by way of deception in the Middle East; while we were given to understand that the impression should be created that we are not in a position to attack, the Times and other papers publish long articles showing our strength and active preparations. D.M.I. has telegraphed to Auchenleck but has got no satisfactory reply.

We are having difficulty about the constitution of the RPS. Dick and I think that Haylor should be head of the whole show and that we should appoint somebody else from our own staff to deal with the intelligence side. This would ensure that intelligence would not become the slave of administration. I gather however that the D.G. and Swinton think otherwise, and that a Commandant is to be appointed who will be responsible to a kind of committee consisting of the H.O., Swinton Executive and ourselves. I cannot feel that this is going to be a very satisfactory arrangement. I gather that the D.G. is writing a long memo about our relations with Section V. Harker, Charles and Horrocks have seen it but I have not. As I shall have to ^{make it} work the agreement I rather feel that I should be shown the agreement.

I'm told that the D.G. has absolute confidence in my judgment and in the work which I am doing. When these sort of things occur I rather begin to wonder.

XX Cttee

The ~~xxBoard~~ seem to think that Montague should go to America in order to instruct the local JIC about vetting traffic.

October 31st

I had a long session with Acworth and very much hope that I have now got him into the right frame of mind. He tries my patience pretty high. I talked with him about the Liberty Restoration League, Hisuncle and Capt. Rogers. He says that it is wrong to say that the League is anti-Jewish or pro-Fascist. He agrees that it has a strong flavour of 19th century Liberalism and says that its fundamental basis is religion. He says that his uncle would do anything if he thought it was for the good of this country and would place its interests before anything else. He did not however feel inclined to speak with such certainty about Capt. Rogers. He admitted that the League was violently anti-Churchill and anti the conduct of the war. I asked him whether he thought that the vilification of the P.M. was really in the national interest, and whether if the P.M. went he had any suitable substitute. He had no answer to either of these questions. I do not think he agreed with the policy of running down the P.M. but he was

to agree inclined with his uncle's view that we should concentrate on building ships and stop bombing on the continent. Acworth said he had known Ramsay and liked him personally. He could not believe that he would do anything deliberately to harm this country. I told him that if he knew the full facts he would quite probably think otherwise. I gather that the Liberty Restoration League has practically no members. It publishes a good many leaflets and is I understand financed by the Duke of Wellington.

I had a talk with Machell about Inside Information. Some form of censorship had been suggested. I have asked Machell to analyse the information in the column over a period in order to establish which of them are true and which are not. If the majority of the information is false or more or less a matter of public knowledge it will not be of much use to the enemy and therefore not worth censoring. Censorship might in fact enhance its importance in the eyes of the Germans if by any chance they were in touch with any employee of the Daily Sketch. It would follow that if a particular item was censored that it was probably true. The same arguments apply if it were thought possible or desirable to use Inside Information indirectly as a means of misleading the enemy.

According to the J.I.C. the Germans had 260 Divisions including those in Roumania Hungary etc. on the eastern front; up to about a month ago there was an estimated wastage of 10%. It is thought that if the front is stabilised, 50 divisions could be turned to the west, and that if the Russians are defeated not more than 100 could be turned. The remainder would have to remain as troops of occupation. Some time in 1942 we hope to have 99 divisions in the field, not including Americans.

Stewart spoke to me about the Pyrene Co. with which I believe W.B. PHILLIPS was at one time connected. It was always thought that Phillips's news service acted in some way as a cover for a mild form of American espionage organisation in this country. Fellner, an American who is representing Donovan over here, let slip that he was visiting one Christie at the Pyrene Co. Stewart thinks it might be worth while looking into this matter. A further point of interest in this connection is that while coming out of Claridges with a representative of S.I.S., Fellner met *who rolled up in a large limousine.* *who was formerly an S.I.S. representative in U.S.A. during the last war and subsequently associated with Phillips,* gave Fellner some form of recognition. Fellner seems to be in charge of a section of Donovan's co-ordination dept. *which receives information from the F.B.I. the Immigration authorities, the F.B.I.*

the Treasury and the 3 Services. They have more or less taken over the functions of the Dies committee and are beavering into the origin and activities of all societies which may be engaged in un-American activities. Fellner, who was formerly an American consul in this country, is quite pleasant but gives the impression of being a little bit shifty. We had heard about him through our agent who is in touch with CALVO, The Spanish agent who is working under Alcazar. It seems that Calvo and Fellner both have the same mistress in the person of a Russian girl called Natasha Anton. Feliner has evidently told Natasha that he is a great spy catcher. She knowing that he is a man who always blows his own trumpet, does not believe him. Perhaps this is just as well.

Cecil has discovered a nun in this country who is writing in secret ink to a priest in Ireland. It seems to be a love affair. The correspondence is merely obscene.

There have been a very large number of arrests of members of the I.R.A. in Ireland.. This is probably due to the previous arrests of Hayes and McCaughey.

November 1st.

Spent the whole morning dictating and then went to spend the weekend with U. 35.

November 3rd

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I saw Major Peirse who is going as our representative to Colombo. I put him in the picture as far as possible. I do not think he will have much to do with Germans but possibly quite a lot with Japs.

I had a talk with Jock Whyte about the JACKSON case. One Gunner JACKSON wrote a letter to the Spanish Embassy which we succeeded in getting out through a friend of Major Rawlinson. JACKSON said that he was fed up with the war and everything else and wanted assistance to get to Germany in order that he could broadcast. After clearing the ground with Rawlinson we decided to write Gunner JACKSON a letter saying that his request had gone through and that we had been advised to make contact with him. He has replied suggesting a meeting.

I talked to M. about Mr. Heron and Lonsdale. I said I thought it would be a good thing to let Burt look through the whole case and advise how to extract the information from Lonsdale. Lonsdale and Heron have a story that a great deal of pilfering of arms is going on, but they give us absolutely nothing to bite on. Heron has written to some secretary in Cabinet Offices, who he has once met professionally, and evidently wants to get himself taken on as a kind of govt. investigator. As he is himself little removed from a crook I think the less we have to do with him and Lonsdale.

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the better. I have suggested to Burt the best course may be to give Lonsdale a thorough grilling.

I went over to see Viv. and found him with who had just flown over from New York at 26,000 ft. in an atmosphere of 60 degrees below zero. He had eaten a large meal and drunk half a bottle of brandy before starting since he could not get any food on account of having to wear an oxygen mask the whole way. The journey took 8½ hours, starting from some desolate spot in Newfoundland.

said that Stephenson was a very hot up about the criticisms that he had received over the Joe K. case. . . thinks that what is really wanted is somebody who has more knowledge of what we are doing over here. He feels that our side of the work has to a considerable extent, neglected, owing to the enormous amount that is being done on security co-ordination lines. He says that Sinclair has been doing very good work and cannot understand why we have not heard more about it. To give him his due Sinclair did write to me suggesting closer co-operation on our lines. The only result was that Stephenson and Section V took violent exception to what he said and insisted on having the letter withdrawn. . . was all in favour of my going out with Cowgill.

I had a word with Stewart, who told me that Catalogue Reference KV/4/188 going on at the Embassy in Ankara since it had been discovered that

a blue print of one of our guns was missing from the M.A.s office. We knew this in fact from ISOS, but it was only after telegrams had been sent out from the W.O. suggesting that something was wrong that the facts became clear. There is obviously somebody purloining documents in the Embassy. The bag to which the Germans had access according to ISOS was one brought from Cairo to Ankara by our assistant Air Attache. In addition to a certain amount of information about C's activities in Istanbul it contained re-cyphering tables. Had the M.A. reported about his blue print it would have been known that probably these tables were compromised at a much earlier date. Luckily they have not yet been put into operation and the necessary action has been taken.

Stewart also talked to me about PLUGGE who has been talking in a very defeatist manner to the Pasha. Eden has got very excited about this and wishes to know what is being done. Stewart has calmed him down. In point of fact there is very little that can be done unless the Govt. are prepared to put Plugge inside, which he rightly deserves. He doesn't care a damn about this country and is merely concerned with filling his pockets.

November 4th

We had a D.G. meeting this morning. The question of the internment of the Roumanian Bulgarians and Hungarians is being consid-

red in view of a possible declaration of war by us on these countries. Personally I cannot see that a declaration of war in any way alters the present situation. All of these people must be regarded as enemy aliens unless they prove themselves well-disposed towards this country.

As we have been forced to treat every German on his merits, we shall be forced to treat these nationals on their merit and general internment is a waste of time. Our only course is to review each case and if necessary submit certain names for internment on a declaration of war.

Swinton rang me up about a company known as W.A.F. The principals in this firm are a man called BERGL and another called WARSCHAUER, both Germans and at one time members of the German Intelligence Service. WARSCHAUER is interned for good and proper reasons. It had been proposed to place a rather confidential wireless contract with this firm. The Chairman is Sir Herbert Williams who is also Chairman of a select committee for investigating expenditure by contracts depts. We advised against the employment of W.A.F. and it had been decided to give the contract to the British Acoustic Co. They could if they so desired call in a representative of W.A.F. for technical advice. They would in any case have made the recording set as W.A.F. are merely a skeleton without a factory. This action had apparently caused a certain amount of trouble politically and we were asked whether the

position would in any way be changed if certain members of W.A.F. were got rid of. Swinton wanted me to see Burton of the Min. of Supply.

S.I.S. have information that the Eire Govt. have discovered codes and cyphers and a wireless set at Brittas Bay.

At Bennett's request I spoke to A.D.N.I. about the RUTLAND case. Apparently the D.N.I. legal advisers after scrutinising the case had come to the following conclusion

(a) that the interrogation failed to show that the arrest of RUTLAND was desirable or necessary.

(b) that there was no guidance to the Admiralty as to whether RUTLAND should be used as A XX agent

(c) that the interrogation disclosed the secret workings of the Security Service.

A.D.N.I. who is clearly on our side wanted to know the answer.. I told him that the interrogation was not held for the express purpose of deciding whether RUTLAND should be arrested or not. We wished to obtain from him any information that we could about the Jap Intelligence Service and to arrive at some conclusion as to his reliability or otherwise. We were quite convinced that R. was not suitable as a XX agent, firstly because he was clearly thoroughly unreliable and secondly because, having refused to go to Mexico and having returned to this country, it was extremely unlikely that he had the confidence of the Japs.

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As regards the workings of the Security Service I said that nothing of the slightest importance had been disclosed.. Everybody knew that correspondence was intercepted and the letters which had been shown to " dated back to 1935. In any case we played our cards when we thought they were going to be most effective. Otherwise it was no good having them.

I had a long talk with T.A.R. and B-W about the CALVO case. B-" is very anxious to arrest CALVO and possibly a number of other Spaniards who have been working here for some time. T.A.R.'s contention is that if CALVO is arrested there will be a serious reaction on G.W. and that in view of the slightly dicky position at the moment of the B.L.A organisation it would be undesirable to throw a spanner into the works.

J.C. had made a special appeal on behalf of G.W.

November 5th

Saw Maxwell today about SEMMELBAUER and MAASS. I explained to him our difficulty about moving them as long as the repatriation of internees was in the air. It was essential that they should go to some Camp from which there would be no repatriation. Both Maxwell and Hutchinson appreciated the difficulty. They seemed doubtful about giving any guarantee against release but felt that possibly a guarantee might be obtained against their return. That what we wanted to

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guard against was pressure at some future date by the F.O. to release a man on the exchange basis and that for this reason we hoped it would be possible to reach some degree of finality. I suggested that we should comb through the Nazi camp X and divide the internees into Party organisers, Party members and people with technical knowledge. Hutchinson seemed to doubt whether mere membership of the Party would constitute grounds for repatriation, if a suitable exchange could be effected. In the meantime I am afraid SEMMELBAUER and MASS will have to remain where they are.

I had a hasty talk with V.V. about the possibility of my going to America, and about our difficulties with Felix. It seemed fairly clear to me that Felix did not wish me to go to America since as I understood he had already made his arrangements. If that was the atmosphere I would infinitely prefer not to go at all or to go by myself rather later.. I said that in the old days visits abroad had been welcomed by S.I.S. representatives since anybody coming from our dept. had something to give and therefore it improved the relations of the P.C.O. with the local authorities. I therefore felt I could have been some use. I did not however intend to travel round with Felix with the feeling that all the time I was not wanted. V.V. said a little unconvincingly I think that that was not the case but that owing to a letter that he had received from C., Stephenson was

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extremely nettled at the criticisms which had been levelled at his organisation for not keeping us informed about the Doe K. case. Stephenson had sent a rather hot reply concluding with a statement to the effect that he would be glad to know who this paragon was who was coming out to show him how to run his business. It seemed therefore to V.V. that anything in the nature of a mission would be likely to put Stephenson's back up still further. I told V.V. that our relations with Felix were anything but satisfactory and that I earnestly wished to have a long talk with him about the whole position. He said he would arrange for me to spend the night with him.

We had a meeting to discuss Acworth's agency. Dick, M., Dixon, Acworth and van der Willik were present. I had previously seen Acworth and told him that he had to make up his mind whether he was going to work in this office or not, and if he was that he would carry out the work in the way that we thought best. He said that he wished to stay and was prepared to act under our instruction. I then called the general meeting and we went through Acworth's memo point by point. In the end he accepted all my criticisms and it was left to M. to work out the details.

T.A.R. is worried about the execution of RICHTER, as he thinks it may place Tate in difficulties. He is putting up a note.

I went to a cocktail party which was a farewell to Herschel Johnson. He is going to Sweden as Minister and his departure is regretted by all. We are I fear losing a very good friend.

I had a talk with Borum and asked him to raise with Herschel two questions: firstly did the Embassy get any interesting reports on the situation on Ireland and if so, would it be possible to pass the information in the strictest confidence to ourselves? Secondly, would it be possible for the Embassy to give us a fair wind with some of the more important American journalists who visit the continent and come back to this country. Borum said he would take up both these points and let me know the answers.

The Advisory Cttee. have recommended the release of Gerald HAMILTON. Their report is really rather a staggering one. They take the view that there is no very strong evidence that HAMILTON wished to go to Eire by clandestine means and that if he had gone with the intention of starting peace negotiations through the Vatican and the German Legation there is no evidence to show that he would necessarily have been advocating a peace in Germany's favour. They took no account of HAMILTON's past record. It was quite clear that HAMILTON had intended to go to Eire by clandestine means and he admitted that he wished to get in touch with the Vatican to discuss

peace proposals and that he might have visited the German Legation. Our evidence showed that he thought the Vatican would be favourable to the Nazi cause and that he would be acceptable to the German Legation in view of his previous record and association with CASEMENT. It seems therefore that he committed an act preparatory to ciontravenen D.R. 14

November 6th

Craufurd and I saw Burton of the Min. of Supply about W.A.F. Major-Gen. Butler was also present. I think we persuaded Burton that W.A.F. was of no consequence whatever as a company, that its directors were undesirable, and its chairman was trying to grind his own axe, and its financier SVARVAS was a shady alien financier with a bad reputation in the city. Burton who seemed to accept our view said that he thought the present arrangement should stand and that the W.A.F. should not be given the contract.

V.V. attended the XX Committee in the absence of Felix who has been showing Swinton round Section V. There was one rather controversial issue. G.W. might possibly be compromised if CALVO were arrested. Montagu took the view that the D.N.I. would be extremely annoyed if he was not previously consulted. The view taken was that as CALVO and G.W. had been used as a means of transmitting false

information to the enemy ~~the~~ services were naturally concerned if the enemy was now to discover the truth. V.V. took a very useful hand in the argument. He thought that the services had a case for requesting consultation but that their point of view might be carried too far. In putting information through these channels they had to realise that they took a certain risk since any agent was liable to be compromised at any moment through no fault of his or anybody else's. They could not therefore claim priority rights over the handling of an agent merely because he had been used as a channel for transmitting their information. On the other hand the Security Service and S.I.S. should do everything in their power to meet the wishes of the services.

I spent the night with V.V. in the country. and had a very long talk which really centred round Felix. I said that I could not see why we should not get together and thrash out our difficulties. The complaint of all my people was that they could not reason with Felix, that he merely dug his toes in and withheld information. When they asked for things they were given the impression that they were interfering in matters which were not their concern. If one person had come and told me this, I might have been disinclined to believe it but since everybody told me the same thing and I had to some extent experienced it myself it was impossible for me to ignore the matter.

I said that I particularly resented the view that had been going about that I was being pushed by a number of hotheads. I said that nothing could be further removed from the facts since I was wholeheartedly associated with their views. I asked V.V. about the D.G. smemo and told him that although Harker, Butler and Horrocks had seen it I had not. He seemed to think that this was a great pity. The memo had been sent to him in order that he might say whether he thought it was acceptable as a basis for discussion. He said that it was on very broad lines but that whatever was decided between the D.G. and C.S.S., the really important thing was that the liaison between Section V. and ourselves should be as complete as possible. He did not intend that the twenty years of intimate cooperation between ourselves should not continue in the frankest possible way. The idea that Felix should hold back anything from Dick or other senior members of this dept. seemed to him quite ridiculous. He told me in the morning that he had been thinking a lot about what I had said during the night. I am afraid therefore that what I said must have worried him considerably. I am sure that he will do his utmost to put things right. V.V. said that C.S.S. had suggested that I should not go to America at the moment owing to the general atmosphere that prevailed in New York. I told V.V. that there were moments when I wondered how Felix would be received, and that although it was not my business I did

feel that if I went alone I could probably carry both Stephenson and the F.B.I. It is obviously difficult for V.V. to agree to anything of the kind whatever he thinks, and it is obvious~~ly~~ that Felix would be mortally offended.

November 7th

We had a meeting with Collins and Sir Robert Robinson whose advice was asked regarding suitable chemists for work on secret ink. It was suggested that where we had special problems to solve we might farm these out to suitable laboratories. In addition we might procure the services of an expert in dye stuffs and of several juniors who were suitable for training and possibly for sending abroad to Censorship points throughout the Empire.

At the R.S.S. meeting we raised the question of the inception of German radio in the western hemisphere, Herbert having ^{been} shown a number of messages in New York which never reached us. It seems that the present procedure is a little cumbersome. Messages come over by mail and are then passed through the machinery of G.C. & C.S. They emerge finally in the form of ISOS. I gather that GPOR went into the whole question when he was in America and that some improvement may be expected.

Swinton came over to discuss the case of RICHTER. He read my minute in which I had pointed out once more the undesirability

of the present procedure. I had suggested that in future the matter should be dealt with by a statement in the House to the effect that it was not the intention of the Govt. to publish details regarding the apprehension and execution of spies, and that the House should not assume that because no details were published spies were not being caught and executed.

This would leave our hands free.

Swinton said that he would have to consider this matter rather carefully.

As regards the particular case of RICHTER he thought that it would be unwise to press for a reprieve since the information would undoubtedly leak out with results which would be detrimental to B.L.A.'s organisation. There were two alternatives, either to proceed as usual, or to suppress the notice of the execution and make a special appeal to editors. My fear was that the bare mention of RICHTER's name in the press might cause the Germans to make a thorough enquiry into our traffic, possibly with disastrous results, since RICHTER was linked with Tate, and Tate with Tricycle and Rainbow, and Tricycle with Balloon and Gelatine. There was in addition the legal difficulty since RICHTER had made an appeal in which he stated that he knew that Tate was under Govt. control. Cookie has got RICHTER to withdraw this statement which is in no way relevant to the normal legal appeal. He has told him that he can put this in with his appeal to the Home Secretary if his appeal fails.

T.A.R. and I had a consultation about the case afterwards and decided that it was best to let it take its normal course.

After the meeting I told Swinton about my visit to Burton on the previous day. He seemed satisfied. He then talked to me about his visit to Section V. He thought it was a jolly good show, and expressed great pleasure in having asked Felix a number of questions which he could not answer. He said that this was just what he had hoped for as it showed that Felix had started to decentralise. I think Swinton was angling to know what I thought, but I said nothing.

I attended a meeting of the J.I.C. at which it was decided that in the event of war with Japan there should be an all for all exchange of internees with the exception of EGUCHI who is already interned. It was pointed out however that if negotiations regarding this matter were started now it would be tantamount to giving the Japs a free run in putting spies into British territory.. This should be a matter for consideration at the highest level.

Dragonfly has received a message instructing him to write a letter to Father which was to be signed in the name of a Belgian who has passed through the Patriotic Schools and been absorbed in the Belgian Army. The letter asks for a meeting. It is not clear however whether the Belgian or Dragonfly is to meet Father. This is probably a reply

to Father's urgent request that somebody should establish contact with him.. The matter is interesting as an indication that if the Germans wish to conduct urgent business they have to do it through one of the family.

V.V. rang me up about Victor's sabotage requirements which Section V. find somewhat onerous. I told V.V. that we rarely got adequate reports on sabotage matters from the U.S. If we felt that these matters were really being looked after we should not ask for reports on incidents of which we read in the papers. Our confidence had been considerably shaken, by the fact that we have heard nothing from America about quite an important case of incendiarism in the mails between New York and Glasgow. Eventually we had succeeded in getting particulars of quite a thorough investigation which had been carried out by the F.B.I. This had reached us through Warnock who had written direct to Hoover.

November 8th

CARRICK, the man at Worthy Down, has been arrested and has confessed that he was the writer of the letter to O'CONNOR in Dublin. He said that he had heard of O'CONNOR through a case in Liverpool which was reported in the press. He thought O'CONNOR had got off very lightly and had conceived the idea of planting the letter on him.

This idea did not sound very plausible since a plan of another secret aerodrome was found amongst CARRICK's belongings. He also had the name and address of another Irishman who had been prosecuted in Liverpool. He was trying to destroy this when the police prevented him.

I lunched with the D.G., Theo and Fellner.

November 9th

Plan Guy Fawkes went off at 4 a.m. this morning. The bombs were successfully placed but while the Superintendent was keeping watch a War Reserve Policeman appeared on a bicycle. He saw Harmer waiting in the car and asked him what he was doing. Harmer said he was waiting for somebody. The constable then became inquisitive and Harmer was obliged to refer him to the Superintendent. The constable was threatened with every possible penalty if he said anything about what he had seen. Unfortunately however he was not told to leave the site. As soon as the fire started he raised the alarm and one bomb was extinguished before it had really taken hold. A portion of it and also of the suitcase have been discovered and enquiries are being made. The two night watchmen were obviously fast asleep. One of them said that he could not imagine how the fire could have started since he had visited the site only 10 minutes previously. In actual fact he had never moved from his hut. Press and Censorship Bureau have been

asked to issue the necessary D. Notice.

November 10th

Discussed with the D.G. cases of RUTLAND and HAMILTON. It was decided that a letter should be written to RUTLAND saying that in all the circumstances we had no use for his services. It was felt that no useful purpose would be served by interning him as he would in all probability be released. If however war breaks out between this country and Japan the matter could be reconsidered on the grounds that he was of hostile association. RUTLAND has been thoroughly scared and I do not think he is likely to do anything. The D.G. has decided to write to Maxwell about the case of HAMILTON expressing his disapproval of the findings of the Advisory Committee.

Dan Bryan turned up today. He has given us some interesting details about GOERTZ. It appears that hue and cry after GOERTZ has nothing to do with the cases of HAYES and McCAUGHEY, the two members of the I.R.A. recently arrested. Bryan says that the police got on to some woman called Helena MALONE and that through her they were led to a Mrs. McCAUGHEY who had a boarding house at Dunleary where GOERTZ has apparently been a lodger for some months. GOERTZ had been brought to this boarding house by some people called FARRELL. Just before the house was raided GOERTZ seems to have escaped to the FARRELL's house and then got away to some

bungalow at Brittas Bay. The people with whom he was staying had a rubber boat which had been bought in Dublin. There would seem therefore to be some possibility that GOERTZ has been picked up either by a ship plying between Eire and the Iberian Peninsula or by a seaplane. Bryan says however that as far as the Eire authorities know there has been no seaplane in the vicinity of Brittas Bay, neither have there been any submarines in the Irish Channel. It is possible that GOERTZ may have boarded some vessel making for Lisbon but this could have only been done by means of a prearranged plan. The hunt for GOERTZ is still going on. While at Dunloghaire GOERTZ had an H.M.V. radio receiving set. This set was one of two purchased by a man named REDMOND in Dublin. GOERTZ took the set with him and it is possible therefore that it may have been converted into a transmitter. It is not quite clear to me how the Germans knew of the existence of GOERTZ but I daresay we shall find this out in due course.

Victor has seen Wood of S.O.E. in connection with Plan Guy Fawkes. Inspector Greeno of C.I.D. has discovered a part of the bomb. The C.I.D. made enquiries some time ago at the request of S.O.2. about the loss of a similar part and therefore recognised it. Wood appears to have fenced quite quite well and suggested to Greeno that he should consult Victor.

November 11th

We have an extremely interesting case which centres round Stella LONSDALE, the wife of John LONSDALE the Mayfair Boy. Stella who was in France appears to have been caught by the Germans. She was at liberty for some time but was eventually arrested when in possession of a diagram showing the location of a petrol dump. According to her own account it had been her intention to pass this information on to the British through the American Consul at Nantes. She was imprisoned and threatened with the death penalty, but according to her account she was reprieved owing to the intervention of one Rene whose identity she refused to disclose. Rene she says is working for the British although in the employ of the Abwehrh Stelle at Anger. The head of the German organisation at Anger was MEISSNER who subsequently went to Paris. Rene had sent Stella into French unoccupied territory, and she had apparently become acquainted with certain facts relating to the British Secret Service activities in France. She knew the history of a man called GESSLER who had in fact been sent over to France with a transmitter. Stella said that he had offered his services to the Germans but had eventually been imprisoned. She gave a number of other details which according to S.I.S. are substantially correct. It will I think be necessary for us to obtain the fullest possible facts from S.I.S. before we shall be able to establish how

far Stella can be regarded as genuine. On present form we are inclined to the view that Rene, if he exists at all, has been running Stella and that he is in fact a German agent. His technique in posing as one who is pro-British would be quite sound. He might expect that Stella would work more rapidly for him and would communicate more facts to him about the British organisation than she would otherwise do. It is quite possible of course that Stella's story has been entirely invented and that she is in fact collaborating with Rene, and there are many points in her story which struck us as extremely weak. On the other hand her information about S.I.S. agents is substantially true, though most if not all of it was known to S.I.S. already. Stella herself wants to go back to France where she says she has contact with the 2eme Bureau. We propose to discuss this proposition with her solely in the hope that she will in this manner ultimately disclose her hand.

Burt is taking over the case of Worthy Down at the request of the D.P.P.

At the D.G.s meeting today Toby raised the case of HICKSON and Ben GREENE. HICKSON is to give evidence before the Advisory Committee and also M's agent. HICKSON wants a transcript of the notes and Maxwell agreed to his having these. We feel that this may create an awkward precedent and that the official notes of the Advisory Committee should not be allowed to pass

into the hands of a private individual. This seemed to us to be particularly important in the light of the coming debate on l8B. The D.G. asked Toby to consult Maxwell.

T.A.R. has seen the Commissioner about Plan Guy Fawkes. The Commissioner knows that the C.I.D. are working on the case but he has not told Kendal about the plan.

I forgot to mention that Dudley Clarke was released about 3 weeks ago. The circumstances of his release were to say the least of it peculiar. At the time he was dressed as a woman complete with brassiere etc. Why he wore this disguise nobody quite knows. He seems however to have played his cards fairly well, since his speedy release can only be explained by the Germans having intervened on his behalf. It will be remembered that he made contact with a man he believed to be a German agent in Lisbon. This man was in Spain at the time and believing Dudley-Clarke to be an important agent who was ready to assist the Germans, intervened with the Spanish police. Dudley-Clarke is now on his way home. Nobody can understand why it was necessary for him to go to Spain. Before he is allowed to go back to the Middle East he will have to give a satisfactory account of himself. It may be that he is just the type who imagines himself as the super secret service agent.

November 12th

Cecil and I lunched with Dan Bryan. His visit has I think been very successful. He is to let us know when the wireless experts are to go over with a view to locating the station which is in communication with Nauen.

I had a word with Toby and Hart about a suggestion that those wishing to visit protected areas should carry a special pass. This is a re-hash of the old scheme which broke down since nobody would take the opportunity of imposing sanctions. The present proposal cannot be very effective in keeping a spy out of the area but it will fulfil its primary purpose, namely that of keeping the enemy in a state of suspense in regard to the documents of identity in protected areas. It will also give the Registrar General an opportunity for checking up on registration cards and putting his index to some use.

We had another abortive conference with Adam about the running of agents on ships. T.A.R. is reconsidering the position.

Victor has seen Inspector Greeno of the C.I.D. who has asked him some searching questions about Plan Guy Fawkes. Victor is trying to shepherd as much of the enquiry as possible into his own hands.

November 13th

I had a fairly long discussion with Arnold about the security of RDF. I said that as I saw the position at the moment he was obtaining information from the AirMinistry about the security of certain aspects of R.D.F. particularly in Service establishment Victor on the other hand was trying to survey the whole field of R.D.F. and Archer was concerned with the security in factories where RDF material was being made. At the moment nobody seemed to be making a very thorough job of it. It is quite clear that we shall have to have a meeting. The danger of Arnold's show is that Blackford regards it as a kind of Air Ministry Gestapo within the Security Service. There ought really to be a proper R.A.F. section under Archer which would correspond to the Air Ministry section in S.I.S. The Section would be under the D.G. but seconded from its Ministry. Its enquiries would all take place under the D.G.s direction.

I had a word with Curry about the case of LENIHAN. He seemed to think the case was an extremely difficult one and was on the whole sympathetic. The difficulty is to know how LENIHAN can profitably be used.

November 14th

I saw Bingham and Younger about the

STAPLETON case, and gave them instructions about their meeting this evening. I do not wish them to press the matter too far until we have been able to extract as much information as possible about STAPLETON's connections if any. The D.G. approves of our line of action.

The Stella LONSDALE case has been handed over to T.A.R. He is rather keen to use her as a XX but before doing so wishes to know much more about her character. It is also essential that we should have the fullest possible particulars from S.I.S.

Gen. Gifford, G.O.C. West Africa, called to see the D.G. They seem to have suffered considerably from the activities of the Franck Mission of which he had a very low opinion. There is a fight going on at the moment. It seems that Wyngate was taken over from Franck and wishes to control S.I.S. Gifford did not know Haigh-Wood but from what he had heard wondered a little whether he would carry sufficient weight.

I had a long talk with _____ at the Travellers. He told me all about the Rutland case. It seems that his organisation sent several telegrams and letters from New York and found it extremely difficult to get any answer. The full facts of the case were known to them 4 or 5 weeks before Rutland left the U.S.A. He could not understand why the first intimation to us was the projected arrival within 48 hours

of Rutland's arrival at Foynes. It seems that Rutland was definitely implicated in the case of the Japanese language officer at Los Angeles who was arrested some months ago. Rutland, realising the delicacy of his position, had offered his services to the American authorities, saying that he had extremely good commercial connections with the Japanese and that he would be very pleased to work them. His suggestion was turned down and he next appeared in Washington where he visited our Air Attache du Boulay. John Maude got hold of him and thought that it would be a grand idea to use him as a XX. John never consulted anybody and it was only by accident that [redacted] heard about the case. Knowing Rutland's record he warned John to lay off. Rutland had in the meantime gone back to Los Angeles. Finally Foxworth of the FBI told [redacted] that the Americans proposed to arrest Rutland. They did not however wish to have the scandal of bringing to trial an ex-member of the British Air Force. They thought therefore it would be better if we made arrangements to send Rutland back to England forthwith. He was summoned to Washington where John Maude suggested to him that it would be a good thing if he went back to England to discuss his project. Rutland seems to have jumped at this. Several days after Rutland had arrived here Stephenson got a telegram from S.I.S. asking who he was and all about him. As he had already sent 3 telegrams and one if not two reports he rather wondered what was going on. The Americans have evidently

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been watching Rutland for several years. They always wondered why we had never put our cards on the table. They thought perhaps that he was one of our agents and they had been waiting for us to tell them. I anticipated some sort of situation like this arising when when some years ago I suggested that we should give full details of Rutland's case to the Americans. The objection at the time was that Rutland was tied up with an S.I.S. agent and it was thought that there might be awkward disclosures if the Americans started to make enquiries. The services of the agent were eventually dispensed with more or less at our request. "C" agreed with us that any form of espionage in the U.S.A. was a mistake and likely to jeopardise good relations. There was nothing that this agent was finding out that could not be found out by asking.

seemed very anxious that I should go out to the U.S.

November 15th.

T. A. R. and I had lunch with He told T. A. R. quite a lot about Tricycle. Tricycle has now made contact with the enemy. He was rather resentful at first about his treatment but he now seems to have hit it off with the F.B.I. and also with the S.I.S. representative. He has been given introductions which have given him the Catalogue Reference **KV/4/188** He was very anxious to know about the fate of Balloon and

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Gela time since if anything had happened to them he thought his position might not be very secure. These are the kind of matters on which Section V. evidently do not consider it necessary to keep us informed.

I had a talk with Burt who had come back from Worthy Down. He has obtained evidence to the effect that CARRICK has been talking in a very pro-Nazi and anti-British way. This should drive a nasty hole in CARRICK's case. He is trying to contend that he sent the aerodrome plans to the individuals whose names he got from the Press in order that they should receive heavier sentences. Both of them had received rather mild sentences for I.R.A. activities. CARRICK's story seems a bad one to me.

November 17th

I had a long discussion over the week with Hart about our functions vis a vis Section V. and S.I.S. Both Dick and I have prepared notes which we discussed today with the D.G. The D.G. I think accepts the view that we should be kept informed about the activities of the German S.S. all over the world. and I think we have convinced him that from the point of view of secrecy we are not so irresponsible as Felix Cowgill would have him believe. Felix has really been putting some singularly childish stuff about in his own organisation and ours. His outlook is so

narrow that unless somebody pulls him up it is going to be very difficult to cooperate. Quite briefly our point of view is that we have to take the executive action against the German S.S. whenever it attempts to penetrate British territory. We must be in possession of ^{all its workings} and agents from ~~from~~ whatever part of the world they may be active. We realise that S.I.S. obtained information affecting British territory and that we ^{also} obtained information affecting foreign territory. In fact if ISOS is excluded we are obtaining very nearly 75%. ^{of the information on the ground} This illustrates the futility of trying to make any hard and fast dividing line. All that is necessary is close and unrestricted collaboration between the officers of all branches of Section V. with their opposite numbers in the Security Service.

Jock Whyte is moaning about the case of Gunner JACKSON. I have put it up to Cookie in order to get Judge Advocate's decision. Jock however had the files sent to the country before anything could be done, hence no decision. I have seen Cookie who thinks that there should be a meeting. This has been arranged for next Saturday.

Frost tells me that the B.B.C. are asking for his return. He proposes that he should put in a certain amount of time at Barnet in order to put Slater in the picture. He imagines this may take some months. He also proposes that he should still be responsible for security matters in the B.B.C. and that in the event of invasion

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his services should again be made available to this department. D.G. takes the view that he should hand over his duties as soon as possible but is quite prepared to accept his offer of service in time of invasion. In the meantime Frost is anxious to get our position vis a vis R.S.S. quite clear. He thinks that the terms of reference of the R.S.S. Committee should be extended to enable us to enquire about measures taken from time to time by R.S.S. to intercept illicit communications from this country. The present understanding is that we place ourselves unreservedly in the hands of Messrs. Gambia-Parry and Maltby. This should be perfectly all right but there is some reason ^{I think this} for the emphasis is too much on the side of the group traffic and that the original purpose for which R.S.S. was set up is to some extent being lost sight of.

A suggestion has been made that we should employ LENIHAN as an agent on a boat between this country and S. America. I have looked through his file. I do not believe his story about his escape from the Channel Islands. I think he was anxious to get away and conceived the idea of offering his services to the Germans partly as a means to this end and partly in a spirit of adventure. If we are going to make any use of him it seems to me that we shall have to wipe out his past completely and give him a fresh identity. He could give away a certain amount of information about Ham etc. but it would be difficult for him to talk to

the Germans without disclosing his identity, but if he did he would have to explain how he came into the hands of the British authorities.

I had lunch with Fulford. He is rather concerned about the Duke of Bedford. There is a movement to have him arrested because it is thought that his propaganda will do a lot of harm in the U.S.A. Fulford I think rather wisely considers that his arrest would do more harm than good since it would give the Duke an enhanced importance. At the moment it is like a voice crying in the wilderness. Swinton's view and I understand Morrison's is that if the Duke is not dealt with there will be a cry of one law for the rich and another for the poor.

November 18th

We had a director's meeting and I raised the question of Irma STAPLETON. From the transcript notes taken by Mike of her last interview with Bingham posing as a representative of the German S.S. there seemed no doubt that she was prepared to go to any lengths and that she could quite easily bring out a whole shell from the factory where she works. She has swallowed our bait hook, line and sinker. If we went on with the case there seemed little doubt that we could get her 7 years at the Old Bailey. We were to some extent forced to adopt these methods because if we interned people under 18B because we felt they were

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a potential danger they were almost invariably released. I rather wondered how far it would be worth the expense and trouble of trying to get a woman of this type sentenced to 7 years, particularly since the case could not be held in an open court. D.G. said he would give this matter his consideration. ^{There are} Various other arguments, namely that it has in the past been said about people that we intern under 10B that if our facts were as stated we should have prosecuted. It is also for consideration whether some use could not be made of this case in the coming debate in the House on 10B. The public and M.P.s are generally rather reluctant to believe that such people as Irma STAPLETON exist.

We had the famous meeting with S.I.S. Stewart, V.V., Harker, Dick and myself, with the D.G. in the chair. D.G. made a few introductory remarks and the rest of the meeting, which lasted 1½ hours, was taken up with a discussion between V.V., Dick and myself. D.G. asked me for my views and I tabled them in the form of a short memo which was read by all present. I said briefly that it was the responsibility of the Security Service to combat the activities of the German Intelligence Service wherever it was directed against this country or British possessions, including Egypt and Palestine. It was for this purpose that it was essential that we should make a comprehensive study of the form, workings and agents of the German Intelligence Service. The collection of such information

from foreign territory was the responsibility of S.I.S. and from British territory including Egypt and Palestine of ourselves. In each of these territories the Services must of necessity overlap. I felt that in the best of worlds we should both be housed in the same office but that since for a variety of reasons this had not been considered possible, we had to strive for the next best thing, namely complete and frank interchange of information on all questions affecting the German Intelligence Service.

I did not think it would be sufficient to confine this to anything in the nature of an exchange of periodical memoranda. We could only do it by the closest collaboration even on matters of detail. I had never wished to suggest that everything that S.I.S. obtained should be thrown to us to digest and assimilate. We had always regarded it as their function to pass on in a palatable form information after it had been co-related with any other facts already in their possession, but we did feel that as the executive responsibility was in our hands we should receive all relevant material in order that our picture might be as complete as possible. V.V. did not dissent from these views in general but said that he did not quite see how to define the limits of our interests. He thought that if we had everything relating to the German Intelligence Service from all parts of the world we should be duplicating the functions of S.I.S. I said that I did not see that this was necessary. We had however had any difficulty about it in the

past when he himself had been in control of Section V. and that provided Felix would allow his subordinates to collaborate in a perfectly free and friendly manner I did not see why there should be any difficulty. V.V. then passed on to our standards of secrecy. Felix was apparently horrified because so many people knew about ISOS. Dick replied that at least 50 people knew about it in Section V. and I asked how many people knew about it on the G. side. Stewart said only 4 or 5. I found this difficult to believe. I should be surprised if it were not known to a great many more on the G. side. I then asked why it should be considered that our officers were in any way less reliable than those employed by S.I.S. There did not seem to be any answer to this question. V.V. then questioned the carding of ISOS. We said that we had to card it because we were working on it every single day, that we carded it in a limited way, i.e. we covered those areas to which we attached the most importance. V.V. suggested that this was duplication of the work being done by Section V. I said that if he carried his argument to its logical conclusion there would be no point in our having ISOS at all. V.V. then produced the RUTLAND case which he said had come as a great shock to Felix. A comparative table had been prepared showing the information given to the D.N.I. by S.I.S. and by ourselves. Felix held that the RUTLAND case had nothing to do with the D.N.I. and that therefore information should be refused to him. We

had on the contrary sent him a very full statement of the case including references to certain information obtained from B.J.s. I said that while I quite agreed that the D.N.I. was interfering in a matter which was not his concern, I could see no harm in the action we had taken since the B.J.s were already in the D.N.I.s possession and the remainder of the information was old and was in fact made use of by us in breaking RUTLAND down. We had lost nothing in the process since the letters which were shown to him were dated 1935, and the methods for intercepting correspondence were known to all. We had to work with the D.N.I. and if by peaceful means we could satisfy him that he had made a fool of himself we were quite prepared to do so. I then referred to another aspect of the RUTLAND case, namely that although the full facts of this case had been known in America for 5 weeks we were only given 48 hours notice of his arrival at Foyhes, and heard nothing of any consequence until arrival. This was just the kind of thing we wanted to have the full facts about. Before the meeting broke up I referred to the Stella LONSDALE case. It was essential that in a case of this sort we should be given the fullest possible information. It was only by the most detailed collaboration that we could really get at the facts. Stewart said he would be only too pleased to let us have any information about this case that we required. The D.G. took a strong view about Felix. He thought that he ought to

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be sent away for a long period. He had grossly overworked himself and had in consequence taken up a very narrow bigoted attitude. I think all present agreed that the real difficulty was Felix's personality.

I went to a meeting at the War Cabinet presided over by Gen. Dewing. The job the meeting was to place itself in the position of the Germans General Staff and with the knowledge at its disposal consider the best methods of setting about an invasion of this country. I was asked to give some sort of picture of the potentialities of the 5th column in this country. I began by explaining what the pre-war set up had been in this country and how the main effort had been concentrated (a) on propaganda through various organisations and societies to keep us out of the war and (b) on estimating our industrial mobilisation capacity through the machine tool industry and other similar means. Since all these activities had been perfectly legal it had not been necessary for the Germans to establish any very deep-seated underground organisation. It seems probable that they did not seriously contemplate invasion until they reached the Low Countries, and it was then that they began to take stock of the position here. They probably found themselves rather badly equipped and there followed a number of hastily improvised and crude performances in the shape of parachutists
Catalogue Reference: KW/4/188 by rubber boat. While

we thought it possible that we had missed some of these people we did not think that we had missed very many. Simultaneously with these efforts attempts were made to penetrate this country by people who posed as escapees. Some of these had been caught but they were much more difficult proposition since without previous knowledge it was not easy to get at the truth of their story. We knew that seamen were being employed as agents and communicating in secret ink. Some of these had been caught but there might well be others. Unfriendly neutral embassies and consulates were a constant source of danger since their representatives had complete freedom of movement, particularly within the dock areas and had all the facilities for transmitting the information by bag or cypher telegram. We knew for a fact that activities of this kind were going on. Lastly there was the 5th column field. We did not think that the Germans had any real grip on the B.U.F. although there was no doubt that certain connections existed. It was for this reason that the most prominent members and particularly those who were active after the invasion of the Low Countries, were interned. A good many of these had since been released. From time to time we came across isolated cases or small groups of 5th columnists who were undoubtedly prepared to assist the enemy but never seemed to have any real plan or means of doing so. We felt fairly confident that there was no organised body of the kind which was receiving direction from the Germans.

I made it quite clear that I did not wish to be complacent about the position but as far as we could see, if the German General Staff decided to invade this country they would not have many organised starting points. The question of propaganda was next considered. It was generally agreed that the German Freedom Station, the N.B.B.S., Workers Challenge, Caledonian Station etc. had failed, although it was true to say that the N.B.B.S. had caused a lot of trouble in May 1940. Mr. Warburton Minister of Home Security thought that we should not under-rate the potentialities of the German propaganda machine and that there should be some very definite counter-plan. Mr. Wells said that he thought the Ministry of Information and the B.B.C. had machinery both for jamming and for counter-propaganda. Mr. Warburton said that the Ministry of Home Security had made a rather careful analysis of the effect of German bombing raids last year. In the light of their experience they thought that the most effective action that the Germans could take would be to select a certain important town like Tyneside, Merseyside, Southampton, Bristol etc. and bomb it continuously for a fortnight or more. He would drop 3000 tons of bombs each night for 3 nights and continue for a week or 10 days with 5 tons a night and then step up again for another two days at 300 tons a night. He would also drop occasional bombs during the day if this were possible. He thought that if this were done propaganda of the type of

the NBBS would become more effective. Air Commodore Slessor doubted very much whether the German Air Force could possibly carry out such a task. Firstly the number of machines required would be too big and the losses perhaps too heavy and secondly they would be dependent upon weather conditions. What Mr. Warburton was suggesting was exactly what Bomber Command were trying to do now in Germany. They were finding it extremely difficult mainly on account of weather conditions. They realised that if they let up for 2 or 3 nights the effect of the previous bombing was considerably diminished. Mr. Warburton agreed with this point. He thought it would be extremely difficult to destroy morale here unless the aerial bombardment could be sustained nightly and daily for a considerable period.

Mr. Warburton criticised the policy of "stay put" which was now being changed to "stand firm". He did not think it would be much use telling people to stand firm unless they had something to stand firm with. He thought that the women should be better organised and that if they had a definite job to do they would go to their posts and do it. If they were left as at present they would probably get on the roads and hamper the movements of troops. Col. Hill-Dillon did not agree. He thought that the Germans would either shoot up any unarmed civilians who resisted or drive them in front of the German forces as they had done in Holland and Belgium. Provision had been made by .

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Home Forces for such a contingency and the police had instructions to shepherd these people on to roads which would not be used by the military. Mr. Warburton evidently thought that the military and the Home Guard and the women would be better organised on a defence area basis. He thought that as things were at present the task of the civilian population was not sufficiently co-ordinated with that of the military. It was generally agreed that the most effective action that the Germans could take would be to drop large numbers of parachutists who would cut communications wherever this was possible. There was no doubt that this would present a very serious problem since we were still very much dependent upon telephone communication. Gen. Dewing said that he might at a later date want some further particulars from the Security Service particularly with regard to sabotage, and that he would let me know when his committee had proceeded further with their deliberations.

November 19th

V.V. rang me up. He was rather apologetic about the attitude he had taken up at yesterday's meeting. He said that he had felt bound to fight Felix's case and he hoped that some of the things he had said would not be resented. He rather wondered what the next move was. I said that I thought he had felt somewhat embarrassed in the past by my suggestion that he should

have personal contact with a good many of our officers here whom he had never met. He had doubtless felt that this would be rather going behind Felix's back. I thought therefore that when Felix went to America and he took over it would go a long way to solving our difficulties if we could get together on these lines. He entirely agreed with this.

D.G. considered my minute on the Irma STAPLETON case. He agreed that before the meeting which had been arranged for this evening it would be as well for somebody to see the D.P.P. and get his views. Harker took the case over and the D.P.P. decided that if STAPLETON brought out a shell or other information of a confidential nature she would be apprehended. He thought that at the conclusion of the trial the press should be let ~~him~~ and the case should be given a certain amount of publicity. I explained the position to Bingham and he is making the necessary arrangement with S.B.

I had a talk with Ward of F.O. and ~~the~~ ^{Mr} Turner about the position of allied nationals and their governments. I said that although it was not my direct responsibility I had felt concern about our duties. As the position stood at present we relied upon the 2ieme bureaux of the allied governments to keep their house in order and to seek our assistance in any enquiries which they wished to make. If however at some future date it was discover

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that a serious leakage of information had been going on for some considerable time through a member of one of these governments. Would the Security Service be held responsible? If it was held that we should be doing something the authorities would have to take the responsibility of their being a slip-up and this would be almost inevitable sooner or later if we tried to run agents, which was the only possible method to obtain positive information. From time to time we obtained rather vague statements about the unreliability of certain people. Such information was of little use unless we could probe it thoroughly. I thought that it was necessary that we should either have official backing for such activity or that it should be properly understood by all concerned that these matters were being left to themselves. Ward took the view that it was far better to risk something going wrong than jeopardise our relations with allied governments, who as a token force represented our sole *raison d'être* for fighting on the continent. If we had not got these allied governments here there would be many people who would argue that if the Germans came to terms with the Dutch, Belgians, Danes etc. it was not our business to interfere. Theo had previously discussed with Ward various points which had arisen in connection with the arrival of diplomats or semi-diplomats from abroad. There had been a complaint by the allied governments of these people that they were out to unnecessary inconvenience by their interrogation at the RPS.

We feel that these people should have proper credentials if they were to be exempted from examination.

Frost came to tell me that Gambier-Parry and Maltby strongly deprecated his departure to the B.B.C. They did not see how Slater could take over his work, at any rate for some considerable time. Frost said that there were certain jobs which the B.B.C. wanted him to do, one of which was considered urgent. He did not know what his decision should be but preferred to leave it in the hands of the D.G.

November 20th

Irma STAPLETON was arrested last night. She had brought an empty shell out of the factory, and a note in her own handwriting giving the position of Wade's garages. She also gave Bingham full production figures for Wade's garage. His reaction was immediately to denounce Bingham as a Gestapoagent who she was intending to hand over to the police at the earliest opportunity. She insisted on making a statement which is said to be a tissue of lies. Bingham was arrested at the same time and carried away struggling and handcuffed. She was remanded at Bow St. for 14 days this morning.

D.G. asked me to come down and see William Dwight WHITNEY, who is Bill Donovan's representative over here and will have a small staff working under him. He is to

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have an office somewhere in Bush House which will be for press and propaganda.

This will act as a cover. His main purpose is to collect as much vital information as he can which has any bearing on the part being played by the U.S.A. and the possibility of her entering the war. This information will go direct to Bill Donovan in special cypher for the President. Lastly he is to try and lay the foundations of some organisation for penetrating the continent both on S.I.S. and S.O.E. lines. It seems to me that this is going to complicate life considerably for S.I.S. It is bad enough having an English S.O.E. but if there is to be an American one as well I fear there may be a major disaster.

The news from Libya is quite good. The offensive started on the 18th. We apparently made a feint frontal attack and sent our main forces round the desert. The Germans it is thought were also contemplating offensive action since they had brought up a whole tank division which was operating in the coastal area. A large number of these tanks have been bogged owing to very heavy rain and we have been dive-bombing them for the last 24 hours. The convoy interception has apparently failed in its job of bringing out the Italians. It was duly reported through the Straits but was also reported going back. It is said that some of our light tank units have been within about 20 miles of Benghazi to the south, but this

is unconfirmed. We seem to have air superiority, probably due to the fact that the large convoys which were sunk a few weeks ago contained Me.109Fs and technical personnel. I am told that prior to this operation some of our patrols penetrated without opposition to within 40 miles of Tripoli.

November 21st

I saw Marriott's brother and Shankland from the B.B.C. They came to discuss the various German broadcasts which they have been monitoring since about May 1940. These broadcasts were originally taken by M.I.8 and I gather at the request of the W.O. they were taken over by the B.B.C. Marriott said that they were costing about £10,000 a year and that he was rather anxious to know how we regarded them. It seems that they have been monitored almost exclusively for our purposes but that nobody here has taken any very great interest in them or given any directions to the B.B.C. I told Marriott that I had only learned that we were receiving these broadcasts about 10 days ago that I had then discussed them with those concerned. From what I had been told about them it seemed that the obscure references which had the appearance of code could not be dealt with by any code section except in the light of other information available. In the case of Anna WOLKOFF it had been very valuable to us to produce in court the code messages from Haw Haw implying

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the receipt of Anna WOLKOFF's message. It was possible at some time or another that we might arrest a man and find in his possession certain notes from these broadcasts but that this was a fairly remote possibility. I doubted therefore whether we could justify the expenditure of £10,000 a year unless some other dept. was interested in the broadcasts from another point of view. Before making a final decision I said that I would be very grateful to see any specially significant passages about he might know. He promised to send me these.

We had a meeting with D.G., D.D.G. Dick and myself about the B.L.a(1) seamen's organisation. D.G. was rather horrified by the possible number of agents which we hope to employ. He thought it would be much better to start with a very few high-grade people. I explained that our object was three-fold: (1) to collect data about conditions and individuals in foreign ports (2) to detect any possible enemy agents on board ship, and (3) to recruit a few suitable XX agents for ourselves. In order to arrive at (3) it was necessary to put agents through a test of reliability and a period of observation. We felt that many of the 40 or 50 we had selected so far would fall by the wayside. If we selected only half a dozen we should probably not hear of them again for 3 months and if none of them were suitable we should still be no further than we are now. D.G. then asked about the organisation and said

that he would like to see Wilkie, Lovell and Jones who he thought would be able to give him first-hand information about the kind of people they were handling.

I am told on good authority that the German reserves on the Russian front are getting extremely low.

November 22nd

I had a talk with Burt and Cecil on the "Worthy Down" case. It had been suggested that Burt should go to N. Ireland with Stephenson and then on to Dublin, where he would collaborate with the Garda. Burt had previously been to Dublin and made certain contacts there in connection with another case. I feel that while it was a good thing for Burt to go to N. Ireland it might be dangerous for him to go to Dublin in view of the fact that his connection with our office had been published in the press. If it became known to Dan Bryan that we were establishing a direct contact with the Garda there might be a great deal of trouble. There was also a possibility that the R.U.C. might not approve. It was agreed therefore that Burt and Stephenson should go to Belfast and that if possible the R.U.C. should be persuaded to collect the necessary evidence about O'CONNOR. A Paling of the D.P.P.'s office thinks that if we do not show in court that we have made some attempt to clear up the Dublin end it will be assumed that we are covering the whole case to be insignificant.

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November 23rd

The Dorothy case has opened up a new line. Contact has been made with Dorothy's friend Mrs. Roy JOHNS whose husband is interned. There seems quite a possibility that he is in reality a German. He has talked rather mysteriously to a number of people about his activities prior to his internment. His wife now says that he was in touch with an oldish man who was his paymaster and died some time ago of food poisoning. The paymasters place was taken by a younger man. Mrs. JOHNS is also in touch with certain Italian circles.

On the evening of her arrest Mrs. STAPLETON produced 22 mm. Oerlikon shell, unloaded but apparently passed by inspectors, a tw-pound anti-aircraft shell igniter and a 22 mm. shell base plug. She also gave in her own handwriting the address of the R.O.F. at Stone, Staffs. and the production figures of Wade's Chain Garages which are stated to be accurate, as well as the addresses of the other units of Wade's factory organisation. N.I.D. say that the production figures are confidential although they do not regard the

shell as such. Mrs. STAPLETON is provisionally charged under DR. 2A in that she obtained certain articles of ammunition and information concerning the same and endeavoured to dispose of them to the enemy.

I have read through the evidence given by HIRSCH who with Oscar GILINSKY was arrested at Trinidad en route to South America. HIRSCH, a banker was arrested by the French and given a sentence of 10 years because of a scandal about the Figaro and his connection with Baroness von EINEM. The Germans released him almost immediately after they reached Paris and he was taken on by them as an agent of the Sonderkommando. The Sonderkommando protects the interests of the state and party in France, Spain and Portugal, and furthers the interests of collaboration with France, without however any mandate to interfere in French politics or indeed to do anything other than report on the situation. The executive of this organisation is the Sicherheitsdienst. Later HIRSCH got taken on by the Paris Abwehrstelle, the executive of which is the Geheime Feldpolizei. He eventually succeeded in getting sent to South America with Oscar GILINSKY on some mission for the German S.S. the nature of which is not yet disclosed. He has given a good deal of information about French collaborationists. We have just discovered that one of GILINSKI's trunks had a false bottom

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containing \$41,500 and roughly 5,000 escudo
Oscar GILINSKI has told us very little so
far. He is of course identical with a
man of this name who was at one time acting
for the Soviet Govt. in the purchase of
arms for Spanish republicans. There is no
doubt that both HIRSCH and GILINSKY had
a mission from the German S.S. but its not
clear how far they intended to carry it
out. They are both to a large extent
crooks and it may be that they were mainly
guided by self-interest, but were glad to
get out of the country on any pretext with
as much money as they could take with them.
£12,000 has already been found on HIRSCH.

Interesting information has come from
Medlam about MUNOZ DOMINGUEZ. He has
produced a specimen of the floating mine
and has clearly been in touch with the
German S.S. in Madrid. It is not yet clear
how far he is genuine. It seems likely
that we shall have to send somebody to
Gib.

Machell told me about 4 cases of leakage
which have occurred in connection with
the movements of H.M. ships. It seems that
information reaching Gib. becomes known to
the Italians within a matter of about 40
hours. The Admiralty do not think that
their cyphers are being broken since 3 of
the incidents were in different cyphers
and one of them was a tear-off and would
be almost impossible to crack. One is
driven to the conclusion that somebody in
the C. in C's office must have gone wrong.

We have suggested sending over some bogus messages in order that we can watch the reaction.

November 24th

Jock Whyte tells me that Gunner JACKSON never turned up at the meeting. It subsequently transpired that his battery had been on the move and another rendezvous will be arranged.

I had a long talk with Arnold and Mothschild. Arnold performs two functions on the intelligence side. He keeps Lennox informed of any special air operations and Lennox takes certain security measures in order to ascertain whether there are any suspicious persons in the vicinity of these operations or trials. For this purpose Lennox works in close touch with the RSLO, local police and censorship. Secondly Arnold keeps us informed about suspicious tracks of enemy aircraft and obtains for us certain information that we may require from time to time from the Air Ministry. Arnold has come into conflict with B.L.C. on account of the case of Sir Denniston Burney. Arnold was asked to look into the security of an invention known as the Toroplane. In so doing he discovered that the invention had been to a large extent compromised by the action of Sir Denniston Burney in passing particulars about it to the Americans. The fact that Sir Denniston Burney had done this was of interest to Arnold as it rendered any other enquiries

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or precautions more or less useless. Sir Denniston Burney has for some time been the subject of attention by B.l.c who regard him as a phoney inventor and a crook. Without reference to B.l.c Grimston of Air Ops. had made enquiries about Burney and came to the conclusion that he had infringed the Defence Regulations, and put his case up to Pilcher for a legal opinion. In all this he appears to have been acting under the instructions of Blackford who regards Air Ops. as an Air Ministry organisation situated for convenience in the middle of the Security Service and under Blackford's orders. This seems to be an unsatisfactory state of affairs. It is I think part of a general scheme of Blackford's to get control of all Air Ministry Security work. My own view is that if it is accepted that security is complementary to counter-espionage work it should be under the control of the Security Service. At present there is not much continuity or cohesion in the handling of these matters. It is the business of M.A.P. to look after security in Service Establishments, D.3. the security of the same article in the factory and the Air Ministry when it is being used on the aerodrome for experimental purposes. Archer is known as A.I.I.d. in the Air Ministry and is at the same time a member of the Security Service working under D.C & D. In any case he feels that his responsibility is to the D.G. Arnold feels that his position should be the same. Blackford evidently thinks that both

Archer's and Arnolds sections are part of
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the security organisation which he can direct from the Air Ministry. He has now taken to giving Archer's section instructions to put on a telephone check and Arnold's section instructions to look into matters which in some instances should be carried out by the Provost Marshal's department. In neither case did Blackford consider that he should put his wishes through the D.G. in the form of a request.

I visited Tangye's office. He seems to be doing quite a useful job of work. I went through his files. He gets a number of enquiries from a variety of sections and seems to put up quite useful replies. He is very keen that all requests about journalists should pass through his hands since in a recent case where enquiries were made by a section through S.B. the reaction was rather bad. I am trying to get this put right.

November 25th

I gave a lecture to the RSLOs in answer to a request from Baxter that they should be given a general picture of the B. Division angle. I divided the talk into four parts: (1) An account of the German activities prior to the war and up to the time of the invasion of the Low Countries. I took the view that as their main effort had been concentrated on propaganda and capacity to make war, it seemed that they had not found it necessary for this purpose to establish

any deep seated organisation. They probably had not contemplated invasion till they reached the Low Countries. It was for this reason that their early attempts to put in agents by parachute and rubber boat had been of a rather crude nature.

(2). I dealt with the illegal landings by rubber boat and parachute. The first arrivals had one-way sets and instructions to fall back at the time of invasion with the British Forces giving particulars by wireless of movements of troops and morale. Later arrivals had two-way sets and were given very wide instructions to report on almost every aspect of life in this country. The scene of their operations was the east coast of Scotland and an area covered by a triangle London-Oxford-Birmingham-The Wash-Cambridge-London. From August to December 1940 the question they had been asked were mainly of a general nature, i.e. military and civilian. From then onwards they were mainly military until May 1941 when they again became general, with an emphasis on food prices, morale, etc. The emphasis on military activities up to May 1941 may have been due either to possibility of invasion or to a desire to know our military strength and the chances of putting an army on the Continent. if The Germans decided to start a war on the Eastern Front.

I then dealt with legal landings, both by escapees and by seamen. I said that the more recent escapee cases had shown attempts to penetrate our Services. The idea was that certain Norwegians should get themselves taken on by the British Service and return to Norway with a wireless set, where they

would work under German control. There was a possibility that one of them might have been sent over to start 5th Column activities in the Norwegian forces. As regards seamen I quoted the cases of LAUREYSSSENS and TIMMERMAN. The latter was interesting as he had evidently received very careful instructions from the Army, Navy and Air Force over a period of about 6 months. He had questionnaires from all three Services and had been told how to identify various forms of armament. He had also received instructions in the uses of secret ink. He had been detected through an examination of his kit. I then gave a short talk about illegal landings in Ireland, with particular reference to the case of GOERTZ and Plan Kathleen. Other subjects I dealt with were Neutral Embassies and Legations, 5th Column and sabotage. The principal Neutral Embassies and Legations were the Japanese and Spanish, in a lesser degree the Brazilian Chilean and Swedish, all of which needed watching. We knew that throughout the world Japanese Consuls had been reporting on shipping. We also knew that the Spaniards had been reporting both on shipping, air raid damage and morale through their Consuls and had in addition a small network of journalists working under the direction of Alcazar de VELASCO, a prominent member of the Falange, who was here for a short time as Press Attache. In the 5th Column people the general indication was that while there were a number of isolated

individuals, Germans, people of German extraction and members of the B.U.F. who were ready to assist the enemy in any way they could, there was no widespread organisation working under direct German control. Those ^{who} had been apprehended had collected information but did not know how to transmit it to the enemy. I mentioned the cases of HISCOX, DOROTHY STAPLETON, and Gunner JACKSON. As regards sabotage I said there was no evidence that the enemy had any widespread organisation, although he had attempted to send saboteurs to this country. Most of the cases investigated, and there were hundreds of them, showed that the damage was due to carelessness, ignorance or bloody-mindedness. On the other hand there had been attempts to place bombs in ships coming to this country from the Peninsula. It was perhaps reassuring that there had been no serious outbreaks of sabotage during August and September of last year, but we must expect that the enemy had improved his organisation and that members of the I.R.A. may have had instructions to lie dormant until an invasion period.

In part (3) of the lecture I tried to give some idea of how far we had been successful in countering enemy activities against this country. I said that we had in all apprehended 47 individuals who were undoubtedly German agents operating against this country and 3 others who had been taken off the high seas and were intending to operate in other spheres. In wire & spies had been apprehended and another was believed to be at large. In the field of special agents we had found that whenever the enemy was hard-pressed to get funds to

this country or to communicate instructions rapidly he seemed to be forced to seek our assistance. We could not say positively that there were ^{no} any illegal transmissions here, but the situation in that respect ~~was~~ improving. We still had the difficulty of possible ground-to-air transmissions by VHF. Perhaps our greatest anxiety were the people who came to join the allied forces since without prior knowledge they were difficult to pick up. Seamen presented similar difficulties. In Ireland we thought the authorities were extremely vigilant and that it was difficult for aliens to move about undetected. On the other hand if there was ~~an~~ an influx of renegade Irishmen the situation presented great difficulties. With regard to Embassies and Consulates we were fairly well informed about the Japs and Spaniards but we could not escape the conclusion that a considerable amount of information passed through these channels although it might not be of a very high quality. In the 5th column field, while we did not think there was any widespread organisation we did think that there might be a considerable number of people both British and alien who in time of invasions would be seriously considering where their personal interests lay. In part (4) of my talk I tried to explain the action we were taking in all the various fields which had been reviewed. B.L.A. were trying (1) to satisfy the enemy that the Germans had an adequate organisation here both for the purpose of espionage and sabotage. (2) we were attempting to learn as much as possible

about the enemy's organisation, methods and agents, in close collaboration with Section V. (3) that we were endeavouring to induce the enemy to send further agents to this country whose identity would be known to us. (4) we were operating through R.S.S. ^{in the matter of} the detection of possible transmissions from this country. For illegal landings we relied largely on the vigilance of the Home Guard, Police and Military. We also made a study of the tracks of enemy aircraft. In the matter of legal landings we were trying to penetrate the enemy's espionage system in the hope of getting prior knowledge of arrivals, but we had to rely to a large extent on the vigilance of the S.C.Os and the cross-examination at the RPS. We hoped to improve matters by recruiting agents on ships for a 3-fold purpose, firstly to collect data about individuals cafes rendezvous and foreign ports in enemy control, secondly to detect members of crews who behaved in a suspicious manner and thirdly to make approaches to the enemy in foreign ports on XX lines. In Ireland we had to rely very largely on our liaison with ~~xxxx~~ the R.U.C. and Eire authorities. In the field of Embassies and Consulates we had made great efforts at penetration and had achieved a considerable measure of success. We had done our best to restrict as far as possible the movements of foreign attaches, and in the case of the Japs had persuaded the authorities to close down their consulates in India. We should have liked to have taken similar action here and in Rangoon, Singapore and Cape Town but in

view of the possibility of reciprocal action in Shanghai and elsewhere this had not been thought desirable. In the 5th column field we hope to give assistance to the R.S.L.O.s by sending round suitable B.2. officers who would give suggestions about the introduction of agents and then report to headquarters. B.4a were also going through old files ostensibly to see whether there were any roots which had not so far been pulled up. I read to the meeting the D.G.s minutes about so-called "agent provocateur" methods. I explained that while he was not averse to such methods being employed he thought that each case should be considered very carefully and that action should be very closely directed from headquarters. Lastly I gave the meeting some account of the way we were trying to handle the analysis of censorship material and increase our chance of picking up correspondence in secret ink. I also told them about the DOT and the microscope in case these might be of use to them in carrying out searches.

D.B. came to see me about George KNUFFER who is associated with a young White Russian organisation known as MLADOROSS. KNUFFER is bringing an action against the Daily Express who said that his organisation was working for the Nazis. Bracken wants to support the D.E. if they are on a good wicket, and has asked C. for his assistance. C. has told him that he thinks MLADOROSS is suspect and Bracken now wants to place the D.E. solicitors in touch with

In view of the representations of G-P and Maltby, the D.G. has decided to retain the services of Frost.

I had lunch with Borum. In answer to Tangye's request about American journalists he said that if we liked to notify him at any time of the arrival of any American he would do his best either to extract the information we required or to put us into direct touch through the American Press officer. With regard to Eire he said that all information from Mr. Grey, the American Minister, went direct to Washington. The Embassy in London was in no way responsible for Grey's activities. Any attempt to get information from him would probably lead to difficulties since his wife was related to the President and Grey was therefore inclined to regard himself as being in a specially privileged position. Borum thought this matter could be tackled better in Washington.

The Bank of Spain, are sending £2,000 in £100 Australian notes to Spain. It looks as if this was a request from the Germans or Japs who are probably trying to place an agent in Australia or Singapore. Ned is making enquiries about the supply of notes by the Bank of England and the Big Five to the Bank of Spain, on similar lines to the enquiries he is making in regard to the Yokohama Specie Bank.

November 26th

As I rather anticipated a question has been put down on the order paper about KURTZ. It is to the effect that since the information he gave to the Advisory Cttee in the case of Ben Green has been admitted by the Chairman to be false, will the C. of C. say what action ~~he~~ proposes to take. As far as we know the Chairman expressed no such view, and we strongly object to KURTZ's name being placed on the order paper. Toby is going to see Maxwell and say tht if the question has to be allowed KURTZ's name should be omitted. He should merely be referred to as "the material witness". The D.G. considers that this incident amply justifies his contention that informants and agents should on no account be forced to appear before the committee.

Curry has had a word with the D.G. who wished to talk to him about his work. D.G. wants him to write up the early history of German activities here, particularly in regard to the penetration of industry. This is not quite what he had in mind. He has in the past been occupying himself with the postwar work of B.I and the co-ordination of the work of the various sections which are trying to build up a picture of the German espionage organisation. It is to be hoped that he will be allowed to continue this work which is of great value to us.

November 27th

There is a suggestion that we should establish 4 secret transmitting stations in Lire which would be able to give timely warning to BTNI in the event of an invasion. I gather that there is already one transmitter in operation. From our point of view we should deprecate any action of this kind since if anything comes out our relations with the Min. of Defence are likely to be jeopardised. We are therefore advising against this action. If however the authorities insist on having these sets installed without prior consultation we think that they should not carry out any tests at least until an invasion is considered imminent.

I forgot to mention that HARRISON, who attempted to sell plans to the Swedish attache was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. He admitted subsequently that he had also tried to sell plans to the Spanish Embassy.

November 28th

Craufurd came to see me about Denys BOYD-CARPENTER, who had informed us that he was receiving correspondence from a German officer named Karl BRUCKNER, who was employed on intelligence matters in France. These letters were said to reach B-C via Spain B-C had said that he last met Bruckner in France in 1937 but we were inclined to disbelieve this since his passport which was
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had not been renewed. Craufurd went to see him with an 80a order and asked him to produce the letter. He found B-C in bed and with a certain amount of difficulty got from him a letter authorising Craufurd to obtain the correspondence from Brucker from Vernon Bartlett to whom it had been sent. Our files showed that Vernon Bartlett had been interested and that Isobel Cripps, Stafford Cripps's wife, had also had copies which she had sent to some high-up in a hush-hush dept. We have now had a letter from B-C's solicitors a propos of Craufurd's visit. The solicitors explained that their client periodically went into a trance, when interesting facts were revealed to him. He attached great importance to the information he received but knowing that the authorities would not be likely to pay any attention to psychic transmissions he had felt bound to invent the story about receiving the information by correspondence from enemy occupied territory. The solicitors had realised that their client had committed a breach of the regulations and hoped that we would take a lenient view of his conduct. We have now got to concern ourselves with finding out what circulation has been given to B-C's letters and to warning those concerned that they are wasting their time.

I had a talk today with Kellar about George KNUFFER and the Young Russia organisation known as Mladoross. There do not appear to be any grounds of a substantial kind for saying that this organisation is pro-Nazi. In fact most of our evidence is

in the contrary sense. I saw D.B. later and gave him the facts. He is going to draft a letter for C's signature to Brendon Bracken telling him that the Daily Express seem to be on rather a bad wicket.

Burt and Joe Stephenson have just returned from N. Ireland. Gilfillan did not think that the R.U.C. could obtain the necessary evidence from Dublin and they did not think it advisable that Burt should make the approach. Perhaps more correctly I should say that the information might be obtained but the R.U.C. would be unable to give evidence about information which they had received by courtesy of the Dublin police. Burt was rather horrified both by Gilfillan and Roger Moore. He also learned during conversations with some of the inspectors that they had doubts about the R.U.C.'s contact in the Garda. I ^{wonder} ~~am~~ whether these doubts are altogether justifiable since I think that the R.U.C. have reaped considerable benefits from their liaison. The worst of Ulster is that they can only think in terms of Orange and Green. Other matters do not really interest them and they have little or no understanding of European politics. Cecil has just had a message from Dan passed through Joe Walsh and Dulan-ty to the effect that the gentleman who was the subject of discussion between on the occasion of Dan's visit is now in Dan's house. This must I think refer to the arrest of GOERTZ. It is a good sign that the information has been transmitted to us in this way.

S.I.S. have heard through Holt's Bank that one Man Mohan Singh, Sikh, who is attached to the Air Force, has paid into the bank since August about £5,600 in notes. Prior to August his account was only a small one.

S.O.2 have got a couple of tame Russians who are to be dropped in Germany. I presume this means that they are collaborating with the 4th dept. I am going to try and find out since there may possibly be an opening for obtaining Russian information about the German intelligence organisation.

November 29th

I had a meeting with Dick, T.A.R. and Victor about sending someone out to Gib. to handle the DOMINGUEZ case which has reached an interesting stage. It was agreed to recommend that Marriott and Harris should go. They may I think find it necessary to have someone permanently in Gib. In any case it will be useful to have two people in the office with an intimate knowledge of local conditions.

I lunched with Eddie Grant and discussed with him his various difficulties. He has the feeling that his attempts to penetrate the Spanish colony in his area have not so far been very effective. He does not think that ARTAZA is doing anything very serious. He is however going to explore the possibilities of a mike.

MODE OF ARRIVAL OF GERMAN AGENTS

(Saboteurs underlined in red).

A. ILLEGAL ARRIVALS i.e. by other than recognised and approved channels.

1. Surreptitious Arrivals

(a) By rowing boat ex trawler towed across Channel by minesweeper:

1. MEIER	}	3.9.40	Nr. Dymchurch, Kent
2. KIEBOOM			
3. WALDBERG			
4. PONS	}	3.9.40	Lydd-on-Sea, Kent

(b) Parachute

1. SUMMER	6.9.40	Denton, Northants.
2. TATE	19.9.40	Willingham, Cambs.
3. GANDER	3.10.40	Wellingborough, Northants.
4. TER BRAAK	1/2.10.40	Haversham, Bucks.
5. JACOBS	31.1.40	Ramsey, Hunts.
6. RICHTER	12.5.41.	London Colney, Herts.

(c) Rubber boat ex seaplane

1. WALTI	}	30.9.40	South of Moray Firth.
2. DE DEKKER			
3. V. ERICKSEN			
4. LUND	}	25.10.40	South of Moray Firth
5. JOOST			
6. EDWARDSSEN			
7. MUTT	}	7.4.41	South of Moray Firth
8. JEFF			

2. Refugee parties from Norway

(a) M.V. "VOLGA"	(HANSSON	6.3.41	Shetland
	(OIEN		
	(4 innocent passengers		

(b) M.V. "TAANEVIK" (B. HANSEN 27.4.41 Wick
(TORGERSEN
(STRANDMOEN
(H. HANSEN

Penitentiary
35
(c) M.V. "HERNIE" (WALLEM 8.7.41 Shetland
(2 innocent Norwegians

(d) M.V. "HORNFJELL" (SAETRANG 13.9.41 Iceland (C)
(7 others

3. Other illegal arrivals

(a) "LA PART BIEN" (JONASSEN 23.9.40 Put into Plymouth
(DE LEE when proceeding
(LIBOT from Brest to Le
Touquet

(b) "JOSEPHINE" (ROBLES)
(HECHEVERIA) saboteurs
(FAZOS)
(EVERTSEN) 12.11.40
(KRAG)
(VANDAM) crew
(MARTINEZ)
(JEZEQUEL)

Intended to land
saboteurs in
Bristol Channel -
put into Fishguard
as one of saboteurs
was ill.

B. LEGAL ARRIVALS

1. By air from Lisbon

1.	GIRAFFE	28.9.40
2.	DOOLITTLE	11.10.40
3.	TRICYCLE	10.12.40
4.	GERTH VAN WIJK	5.4.41

2. By ship from Lisbon

1.	FATHER	20.6.41
2.	CARELESS	15.7.41
3.	WIK	27.4.41

3. Seamen

1. DE JAEGAR	4.10.40
2. LAUREYSSENS	6.12.40
3. TIMMERMAN	1.9.41

Newport ex Lisbon
Workington ex Lisbon
Glasgow ex Seville.

C. AGENTS SENT TO IRELAND

The following agents all landed or descended surreptitiously:

(a) By rowing boat ex trawler:

1. <u>OBE</u>	July 1940
2. <u>TRIBUTH</u>	July 1940
3. <u>GARTNER</u>	July 1940

(b) Parachute

1. GOERTZ	May 1940 (uncertain)
2. MARSCHNER @ SCHUTZ	March 1941
3. LENIHAN	July 1941

(c) Rubber boat ex submarine

1. FREETZ	June 1940
2. ANDERSON @ SIMON	June 1940

CAPTURED ON HIGH SEAS

(a) "VESLE KARI" (HOEL captured 18.8.40
(GIAEVER
(HANNESTAD
(COLL

in Kong Oscar's Fjord
where they were about
to set up a
Meteorological Station

(b) "FREESE" (FINCKENSTEIN
(HANSEN
(5 others

captured off Jan
Mayen Island where
they were about to
set up a Meteorolog-
ical Station.