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them with them. Duff said that it was only his first impressions but that he meant to study the papers very closely before giving a final opinion. I told him about my visit to S.I.S. when I saw C. and Viv. about our direct communication to America. He said: "Oh, I understood that all that had been settled, and you can take it from me that it has been." I said that I was quite certain that this was not C's view. While he agreed that we should communicate direct with Stephenson on matters affecting the Caribbean, he did not agree that we should communicate direct on matters affecting us in N.America. Duff implied that he intended to fight this point and more or less intimate that we should carry on on the assumption that we were authorised to communicate direct. This won't do of course. We shall have to get it settled.

Duff also talked about the Black Market. He seemed to think that it was wrong for the Security Service to take part in investigations of this kind, and evidently thought that we were dealing solely with the grocer who gave overweight to his customers. When we explained to him however that our only interest was that some other departments did not abuse our machinery and so jeopardise our C.E. enquiries and that we only imposed checks in cases of big deals involving sums such as £500 and bigger, he took a different view. He evidently did not know that the Black Market was operating on such a large scale. I agree in principle that

it might get us into difficulties if we were associated with Black Market enquiries but I think that the limited action which we are taking is fully justifiable. Victor is going to try and arrange a meeting between Duff and Charles Teggert. I think Duff was feeling rather bad about this question since Diana is threatened with a prosecution for having accepted free gratis a sack of stale bread from the baker which she was intending to give to her pigs.

Duff talked a good deal about his political career and particularly about the Munich crisis. He held the view that we should have fought at that time, because we should have had the support of the Czechs who had perhaps one of the best equipped armies in Europe and that at that time we might also have had the support of the Russians. As regards ourselves he said that although our armaments were poor they were by comparison with the Germans far poorer at the outbreak of war, since the Germans during 1938 and 1939 were producing at least 4 times as much as ourselves. He thought too that the French were in much better fettle at the time of Munich. They had mobilised and were ready to fight whereas after demobilisation and another year of corruption and indecision they became thoroughly demoralised. There is I think a good deal in what he says.

Duff has a tremendous feeling about the superiority of the British race and about our system of Government. He is entirely die-hard on questions such as education for

the poorer classes and the old school tie. He thinks the old school tie is one of the finest institutions that we have got and that widespread education is a mistake. His argument is that people in this country have far more freedom and better conditions than in any other country in the world and that therefore there is much to be said for the existing regime. Duff also referred to the decision of the Cabinet to go to the assistance of Greece. He said that he had weighed this matter up ~~very~~ carefully and that he had voted in favour of the action taken. His reason was that we should have lost a great deal in the eyes of the Americans if we had refused to go to the assistance of a nation which had fought so gallantly. He maintained that whatever we had done we should not have been able to go on to Tripoli, owing to lack of equipment and transport difficulties. He did think however that had we not assisted Greece we might have prevented the Germans from landing south of Benghazi.

After the collapse of France, the P.M. said to Duff "The end is very near, but there will be no surrender. We shall go down fighting". At this moment we were of course at our lowest ebb, without any Home Guard and with 330,000 troops returned from Dunkirk totally unarmed.

September 23rd

Harker, M., Fulford, Tangye and I considered the case of Claud COCKBURN, who had approached Tangye and wanted him, Hyde, and Wilfred Roberts MP. to form a small committee to assist C. in running The Week. The policy of the Week was to get inside information about Government scandals. Tangye, Hyde and Roberts were to follow up certain clues that he would give them, and also supply him with as much information as possible. Roberts was not very sanguine about the part he could play. He said that he did not think it would be possible to get much out of the Civil Servants, and indeed many of them might not know what was going on. We decided that in approaching Tangye COCKBURN must have a fair idea that he might well be connected with the Security Service. On the other hand he probably felt that he was a person discontented with the general conduct of the war and therefore probably ready to assist in exposing the deficiencies of Govt. departments. It was decided that as far as possible Tangye should use Hyde as a screen. It would be difficult for him to go very far since we could not possibly supply information about the scandals in Govt. circles, without the knowledge of the departments concerned. There was a danger that if Tangye was ultimately found out or retired from the party COCKBURN might try and expose him in the Daily Worker. This would be extremely damaging to ourselves. On the other hand we thought that the party should

go on for the moment as it was valuable to
 usto know exactly what COCKBURN was up to.
 We formed the impression that under cover
 of pep movements he was really seeking
 inside information and having compromised
 Tangye he would probably try to blackmail
 him.

I took the weekly meeting. We are expecting
 another agent here, who goes by the name
 of Georgie. It is just possible that he
 may be FRITZCHEN. He is a saboteur. There
 is also a possibility of a Belgian named
 HUYSMANNS coming here, his destination at
 the moment being uncertain. There is
 another agent on the Shetland and it seems
 likely that PRYNNE is acting under instruc-
 tions of S.O.E. in Lisbon.

Eggs had got in alongside SIMOEZ. The
 latter's room has been searched but without
 result. Eggs' view is that SIMOEZ is not
 a very high-class agent. We are still
 unable to get up MANEZES ink and we now
 consider the question of extracting the
 next letter and subjecting it to major te-
 tests.

Coit came to see me. He had just come over
 on a fast convoy and was horrified that both
 the customs officer and the I.O. at Belfast
 were tight when they came on board and
 tighter when they finally landed. He
 thought that some order should be issued
 that I.O.s and Customs Officers should not
 take drinks on board. The fact is that they
 have a drink with the captain of every ship

in the convoy. I said I thought this should be a matter for Duff Cooper to take up with the Treasury and the Home Office. I would mention it to him next time I saw him. Coit I gather has come back to this country for good.

I lunched with Machell who seemed to think that he had not got enough work to do. I suggested to him that he should try and get some general assessment of leakage in this country. Strong, D.M.I. Home Forces, had recently stated that the enemy were very well informed about the disposition of our troops. It would be a good thing to find out exactly what information they have, when they got it, and what the time lag was. He might do the same with regard to the sinking of H.M. ships. He might also consider making an index of all information which was known to have reached the enemy.

This would enable us to take stock of the position from time to time, and give an answer to various departments who were inclined to question the security measures at ports, e.g. Capt. Altham who is worried about the control of ports to Air.

I saw Reilly in the afternoon about the Zionist intercepts. I said that I thought that the military should have been consulted. but that as it had now been decided to close down the station this might not be necessary. I thought that we should have a complete set of these messages which could be studied by Kellar who is responsible for Palestine. I also said that I could not

see that there would be any harm in either Rothschild or Hart seeing the messages if Kellar thought fit. They had been of considerable assistance to him on Zionist matters. Rothschild was violently anti-Zionist and as far as I knew Hart is too. There was also the question of informing Maunsell. There has been a great deal of fuss about these telegrams, which Robinson of the D.O. and I gather also the S. of S. did not wish to be shown to us. They have consequently been piling up. We should never have known the true situation unless the matter had been raised on the R.S.S. Committee. Page pointed out that A.S.S. and G.C. & C.S. were dealing with this material and the Committee were asked to give them priority although they had no information about their contents. I have now got to tell the Committee that the C.O. was interested in these telegrams but have now decided that the station should be closed down, if it can be located by the R.S.S. unit in Egypt. In the meantime the decoding of these telegrams is to go on. The interception would if possible be transferred to some Y. unit.

The D.G. had written a letter to Sir John Anderson about A.C.E. It contains a number of inaccuracies which Dick and I are trying to get straightened out.

Stopford had made a careful analysis of the Ostro messages as a result of which he has come to the conclusion that they are

being carried probably by B.O.A.C. pilots on the West Coast routes. We have decided therefore to search all B.O.A.C. planes at Bathurst for a period of 2 to 3 weeks. We propose to inform the head of the Civil Aviation Dept. of the Air Ministry, D.M.I., A.C.A.S.I., the Governor of Bambia via the C.O., and Haigh-Wood. I think that we should also inform Maunsell whose enquiries hestates have reached a delicate stage. It may be that our action will jeopardise these enquiries and before moving we should have his approval.

I talked to the D.G. about Frost and his proposal to take over the mobile units. I find great idfficulty in convincing him that this was necessary. He kept on saying that as there was no evidence of any illicit transmissions from this country did not think there was any need to worry. I tried to point out that we relied upon the M.Us for the final round-up of any wireless spy. We were at this moment expecting FRITZCHEN and the prospects of locating him through wireless interception were not particularly bright. If he transmitted three times a week for about 10 minutes or quarter of an hour at a time we might reasonably expect to pick him up in due course. We should then have ~~to have~~ an area of some 60 miles in which to operate the M.U.s. These units were not however particularly 'satisfactory since unless we happened to be fairly near at the time of transmission and searching on the direct frequency we should not pick up

the transmission. If the man only came up occasionally on the call sign and changed his frequency and time it was on the whole improbable that we should pick him up at all. The technical tool was not therefore a particularly efficient one. If we were called upon to operate on the Second Front we should find ourselves singularly ill-equipped. The D.G.'s only suggestion was to get hold of Morton-Evans and somebody from the Post Office, exactly why the Post Office I do not know, and have a conference. I told him that it would be difficult to consult M-E without bringing in Maltby since the proposal was to take over certain units which were at present under Maltby's command. The D.G. did not seem to think that this mattered. Nothing can be done till he returns from leave, when I shall hope to get the whole question straightened out in his mind.

I told him of my difficulties with Frost. I should never be able to trust him and I could not say whether if he did take over the mobile units they would be any better run than they are now. Not being a technician myself, he would always be able to pull the wool over my eyes with a lot of mumbojumbo about megacycles. // I told the D.G. that I had seen Viv. about Rothschild going to America but a further letter was coming from C. proposing that another telegram should be sent to New York. Our original proposal to S.I.S. was dated 11th August. Six weeks had elapsed and a good deal of acrimonious correspondence had taken place.

The D.G. remarked that the final sentence of C/s letter was rather out of place. C. had pointed out that this was a clear instance of how any sort of dual communication with Stephenson led to misunderstanding. D.G.s view with which I entirely agree is that had we been in direct touch with Stephenson we should have merely telegraphed to him saying that we proposed to send out Rothschild to discuss the sabotage case. and unless he registered a protest within 48 hours, Rothschild would have gone, and would have been back by now.

September 24th

I attended a meeting of the W.Board at which all members were present and in addition Col. Bevan and T.A.R. C. read out various notes which I imagine must have been prepared by Felix. They were designed to show that we were not solely responsible for the D.A. organisation, which is working to the Twenty Committee and the W.Board. The argument was not very clear to me nor to anybody else. I said that the present network really started with Snow and was developed through the arrival of parachutists and others, some recruited here and some abroad. We originally conceived the purpose of this organisation to be insurance against penetration; deception was a subsidiary advantage to be gained as well as general intelligence about the enemy's intentions and organisation. I felt however that I ought to say that if we ~~xxx~~ at any time were directed by the W.Board to put information

through our channels which would jeopardise this network, the D.G. would reserve to himself the right to refuse. In the same manner he felt that in the case of the CALVO arrest he was the final arbiter. This did not mean of course that he would not give every possible consideration to the views of any department concerned. C. said that he also would put his foot down if certain action by the Twenty Committee did not meet with his approval. It was not clear however what would happen if C's interests and our own were in conflict. It was pointed out that the Twenty Committee had no charter but was agreed by all that as things had worked smoothly and everyone's interests had been reconciled without friction it was better to leave well alone. C. had based his intervention in this matter on some phrases in the D.M.I.s circular letter to members of the W.Board turning down the D.N.I.s proposal that Bevan should become chairman of the Twenty Committee. The meeting then considered certain suggestions by Montagu that there was not sufficient intelligence deception as distinct from strategical deception. He instanced the case of a query about some factory. In proceeding to this factory the agent was forced to pass certain aerodromes etc. The Air Ministry had refused to allow him to report on these aerodromes because they were new fighter aerodromes. Montagu thought that this was foolish since the aerodromes had probably already been located by the enemy and that if it was desired not to emphasise the fact that they were fighter

aerodromes, some form of implied deception could be put over to mislead the enemy. The same applied to Army and Naval matters. It was generally agreed that this should be done in future. T.A.R. asked that those who approve the traffic should have periodical meetings. He thought this would give greater unity to the methods employed. This was also agreed.

After the meeting Stewart showed me a copy of a B.J. from Madrid to Tokio disclosing a long report by PEPPERMINT to his masters. This report embodies a good deal of the information which we gave to P. but it also deals with other matters. There is no reason to suspect any disloyalty on P's part. In fact he seems to have done pretty well. The other facts mentioned may be in answer to certain questions which were put to him by his masters or may have been invented by ALCAZAR.

I had a discussion with the D.G. about our obligations on the Second Front. He said that he would take this matter up on his return. He told me that during his absence he wished me to talk to Duff-Cooper about (a) Ostro and (b) direct representation in America. He thought I should tell D-C what Viv. had told me about Stephenson, namely that S.I.S. thought that if we had direct representation Stephenson would try and play one party off against the other. I told the D.G. that in my view S.I.S. would be considerably strengthened in their dealings with Stephenson if we had direct

representation since he, the D.G., would be much more likely to drop heavily upon Stephenson than S.I.S., who seem to be afraid of him. I told the D.G. that they had considered his replacement by Denham, but had ultimately come to the conclusion that he was so well dug-in with Donovan and the President that there would be a major upheaval if he were removed.

Gibbs, Dick and I saw the D.G. on Gibbs' W. African visit. Gibbs had prepared a brief for himself which dealt with our own security and C E. organisation within the colonies, our relations with S.I.S. and S.O.E. and with the Americans.

September 25th

I had a long conversation with Gibbs this morning. I gave him as much information as I could about our obligations qua security in W. Africa. I also discussed with him at length our future relations with New York. He pointed out that S.I.S. in their correspondence with Luff-Gooper had clearly attempted to limit our activities in the Caribbean area to purely security matters. He drew special attention to the phrase in C's letter of the 18th September in which it is stated that Stephenson as our representative would deal direct with us in those matters which fall within our field of responsibility, viz. security in colonial possessions and security liaison in dominion territories. Gibbs thinks that the word security means that we have no locus standi

in matters of counter-espionage. In other words that in places like Bermuda and Trinidad we should not deal direct with Stephenson on C.E. matters. This position will clearly have to be qualified but on the analogy that we are the Security Service I should have thought the word security should be held to embody C.E. Gibbs thinks that we should send copies of all our communications to our stations in the Caribbean area to Stephenson and that he should do likewise. This might promote a fairly healthy exchange and avoid any sort of contrary instructions. // Gibbs then went on to tell me about recent disclosures in regard to "Pacific Cottage". Bird integrates all censorship material and passes on the correspondence with with references and comments to S.I.S. These comments just remain in Christie's files. A recent letter from New York indicates that D.S.C. who of course receive these intercepts direct have not integrated them although they have the same facilities for doing this as ourselves. Christie receives their letters and in spite of the fact that he has the integrated censorship material never refers back to them drawing their attention to the points that we have raised. The net result is that the work is not done properly either in New York or at Glenalmond and that we who have none of the facilities for checking up that S.I.S. have really know more than they do. It is no wonder that nobody is in any position to give a comprehensive account of Abwehr activities in the U.S.A.

I went over this afternoon to see C. and Bridges about PEPPERMINT. Bridges was mainly worried about MacCarthy who is quoted as one of P's informants. MacCarthy is employed in the War Cabinet Offices. He resides in the same house as P. P. knows him and I think regards him as being mildly indiscreet. I explained that the statement attributed to MacCarthy had not necessarily emanated from him. P. might have been using him as a peg to hang the information. Bridges however wished to get rid of MacCarthy in any case, as he was inefficient. I asked him to postpone any action that he could for 2 or 3 weeks which he agreed to do. // Bridges then left, and C. and I had a long talk. He was generally optimistic. He thought that the Germans had committed a frightful blunder in knocking their heads against Stalingrad. He thought they might later on go to Astrakhan but that time was against them. His best informant who had always reported that the Russian venture was a ghastly mistake on the part of the Germans was still convinced that Moscow would not be taken, and that the attack on Leningrad would probably fail. A B.J. showing a conversation between Ribbentrop and Oshima in Berlin indicates the importance of getting oil. C's informant who had always thought that possibly the Germans might get Maikop and Grozny, does not think that they will get Baku. In any case they won't derive much benefit for a considerable time.

C. talked to me about an ISOS message

indicating that GIRAUD was to be approached by a V-man. He said that he was dropping a man over tonight to warn Giraud. He also told me that Giraud was thoroughly on our side and that 75% of the army at least were with us. He had recently dropped an anti-tank gun in order that the French could adapt their armoured vehicles to take these guns as soon as the second front opened. The man who took the gun over said that the landing-place was floodlit to a degree that was almost unbelievable. C. had subsequently had a message to say that the gun had been received intact, and that the operation had been entirely successful. It is to be hoped that he is not being double-crossed. Slessor late of the 2eme Bureau is in command of a battalion and was ready a short time ago to take Nantes. We were prepared to meet him. The French are getting to a stage where it may be rather difficult to hold them. As regards N. Africa, the Americans have been making all sorts of approaches but it is not known yet for certain what opposition there is likely to be. On the whole it is considered unlikely that the French Navy will put up much of a show since they well realise that it can only lead to the bombing of Moulon. C. is rather worried about certain members of the 2ieme Bureau who have recently been sacked. They were formerly working with us. Rivet is no longer head of the bureau which is working very much behind the scenes.

September 26th

I had a long conversation with Curry and Hart about the keeping up to date of Curry's work on the Abwehr. Hart's view is that with the large increase in the ISOS product and with the increasing flow of information reaching Section V from other sources, it is really impossible for us to write up either the Iberian Peninsula or the Middle East if we have not got their full co-operation. This they are not at the moment in a position to give. He thinks we should confine ourselves to writing on special subjects such as the Sicherheitsdienst, Wehrwirtschaft etc. concerning which we can come into possession of all the available data. In the meantime Gwyer mainly for the purposes of the R.P.S. is collecting information on an area basis which will enable us to extract information from S.I.S. more easily. When he has got this work on its feet we may then reopen the question with Section V. who are generally speaking rather inclined to regard comprehensive reports as an academic luxury. I am sure that they are entirely wrong. It is undoubtedly a good thing for all workers to stand back periodically and take stock of their position. Apart from this it is essential that some comprehensive view of the Abwehr should be published for the education of those who are not so intimately acquainted with the subject.

Montagu came to talk to me about PRYNNE. It seems that he has to some extent been employed by S.O.E. and Kinnaird House.

I had a talk with Burt who has just returned from N.Ireland. He seems to have smoothed out the I.G. He is quite certain that the only man who is really well informed on I.R.A. matters is Moffatt head of the S.B. in Belfast. As regards the Guinness case, Col.G. is regarded as entirely reliable by the G.O.C. The problem therefore is to ascertain who wrote the anonymous letter accusing him of being in touch with the German Legation. Skardon is doing another scrutiny of Army forms in order to compare handwritings.


R.S.S. have once more blotted their copy-book. They were co-operating with ourselves in a special exercise run by G.O.C. Northern Command. The problem was to detect an illicit transmitter of our own which was being run by Swann and also another which was to have been provided by Signals. At the last moment Signals failed to produce a transmitter or to inform Elmes or Sclater. Elmes had strict instructions not to make an arrest without prior reference to one of our officers. Our own transmitter had been located by intelligence means and not by the mobile units. Elmes started to work on what he believed was the transmitter provided by Signals. Unfortunately however he got on to the transmitter being used by the Umpire controlling the operation.

This transmitter was located at Jesmond and

Elmes who I believe got some indication from Hope that the second transmitter would be in this area, put two and two together. Elmes then observed an Army Wireless Vehicle bearing Umpire marks, in which were two operators wearing single white arm-bands instead of two white arm-bands, the official marking. He leaped to the conclusion that this must be the agent's transmitter. He then effected the arrest of the operators in collaboration with the police. The operators protesting violently that they were official umpires, were taken to police headquarters where they were detained. It subsequently transpired that they were those working under the direction of the Chief Umpire controlling the exercise and that owing to the breakdown in the umpire's communications which resulted, the exercise came to an abrupt and early conclusion. The G.O.C., Gen. Brooman-White and his staff, were not unnaturally extremely annoyed. They were loudly demanding blood, but were stalled by being referred to the D.M.I. It is to be hoped that in future R.S.S. will be able to catch the spy and not the umpire.

Lennox came to see me about the prosecution of DAUBENY for revealing information about Torch. The Chief of Staff now wants to postpone the prosecution till after the operation as they feel that it will give away our order of battle to a number of unauthorised persons even though the proceedings are held in camera. There has been

a further incident in connection with Torch. A case of maps which had been sent to Swindon en route for the port of departure has been opened and resealed. The officer in charge of the party is suspected. It is suggested that Cookie and Burt after getting the full facts should investigate. The difficulty in these matters is to avoid spreading the leakage through emphasising its importance.



September 28th

I had a meeting with Dick, Topford, Hart, about action in connection with Ostro. We sent off a more explicit telegram to Maunsell explaining to him our reasons for thinking that we are more likely to be successful in Bathurst than in the Sudan. We decided that action in the Sudan would take place 10 days

after the first search at Bathurst. In order to set the wheels in motion I sent to see Medhurst to get his help with Civil Aviation. He told me that he had seen the Vice Chief of the Air Staff who approved of our action, and he, Medhurst, would have a talk with Hildred of Civil Aviation, and tell him that he had to be prepared for a good many protests owing to the searching of aircraft and possible delays. Medhurst suggested that it might be possible to make some arrangements for other planes to take on the passengers after they had been searched.

Gibbs went over to see the Colonial Office in order to get them to send appropriate instructions to the Governor of Gambia.

Gibbs is leaving today for W.Africa.

I have just read Curry's memo. Its concluding paragraphs draw attention to the possibility that if all the material regarding the Abwehr was carefully integrated from week to week with operational material from C. sources it should provide an important piece of evidence as to the enemy's intentions. He tentatively suggests that for example the fact that Vienna is controlling stations of the Abwehr in the Balkans and on the south Russian front indicates the Germans intentions of making a pincer movement on the Middle East. There is I think a good deal in what he says. It would be no argument to my mind to say that there were other and more positive indications of the enemy's intentions to be obtained from other sources.

If ISOS only produces only a fiftieth part it should be included in the calculations of the General Staff.

Maiski is still propaganding here about a SecondFront. There is a certain irony in the present situation. Russia with the utmost cynicism signed the Russo-German pact and thereby precipitated a world war, doubtless on the assumption that the British Empire and Germany would fight themselves to a standstill when Russia would come down like a vulture and pick up the pieces. It is now Russia and Germany that are fighting themselves into a state of exhaustion while we are to a certain degree enjoying a welcome respite. This situation must be a source of considerable irritation to old Joe, although in advocating a second front he fails to recognise that we are already fighting a war in the Middle East, in the Atlantic and by aerial bombardment of Germany, not to speak of supplying war materials to Russia and other theatres of war.

I dined with Barty Bouverie. I asked him a good deal about Security Co-Ordination. He confirmed all my stories about agents employed in the Embassies in Washington which had caused so much trouble between D.S.C. and the F.B.I. I asked him how far Stephenson's removal would have caused an upheaval. He said that Donovan would probably have protested but he did not think it would have gone much further than that. He does not think ~~xxxxxx~~ Donovan's influence in the White House was particularly strong.

508
Donovan was becoming more and more under the close control of the Chiefs of Staff. He instanced a case where Donovan's people had wished to employ somebody on the staff of the U.S. Embassy at Vichy. They found a suitable person but the State Dept. insisted on telling the French that this man was a member of O.S.S. Donovan was powerless to prevent this. In other words he could not use his influence with the President to control the State Dept.

Barty has seen a good deal of S.O.E. while over here and was impressed by the work that they are doing. They had sent over no less than 90 canisters with arms etc. to France during the month of August. He thought that they were making real progress. I asked him about V.H.F. He told me that S.O.E. were already using it for communication with their agents. It is not completely satisfactory but improvements were constantly being made. He talked about detection in America with particular reference to the recent statements in the press about Mr. Kaiser's achievements in shipbuilding. He said that there was a good deal of ballyhoo about all this. In actual fact wages in America are so high that a good many people do not feel it worth while putting their backs into the work. The consequence was that in terms of man hours American production was very far below our own. Americans could turn out a ship in 10 days firstly because they put 1500 men on to the job as against 250 in this country and

secondly because they are able to work at night, which is not possible in this country. The Americans were now faced with a considerable shortage of labour, simply because their workmen were slacking.

September 29th

I attended the D.D.G's meeting, but nothing of any interest was discussed. Pilcher gave an account of the BEZIER case. BEZIER was suspected of being a German or Vichy agent for several reasons, one of which was that he was the recipient of £100 note which had formerly been in the possession of the Abwehr or Gestapo. There was not sufficient evidence for us to hold him. Subsequently the French induced him to join their forces. They then placed him under arrest and subjected him to a certain amount of 3rd degree. BEZIER succeeded in getting a message out to his mistress as a result of which a writ of habeas corpus has been filed. The French are rather inclined to ignore this writ and Toby has had considerable difficulty in getting them to take the matter seriously.

Later I attended a meeting with D.D.G., Lennox and Bevan. I am not quite sure as to the purpose of this meeting, except perhaps for Bevan to make his number and explain his work. He had one special question on which he desired to consult us. Dudley Clarke is returning here shortly on a visit. He is anxious to have ways and means of putting

over deception in E. Africa, and was suggesting setting up his organisation for this purpose in such places as Louranco Marques. Did this meet with our approval? We said that being foreign territory it was not strictly our concern but that on general grounds we thought it highly undesirable. S. I. S. and S. O. E. were already in the field and it would obviously be a mistake to set up another organisation. If Audley Clarke did not think that the existing machinery was satisfactory he should have complained in the appropriate quarter and steps should be taken to see that his demands were met, as far as possible.

Orr came to see me with a general complaint about S. I. S. He seemed to think that there must be something wrong with their organisation. His main complaint was that he sends in reports about interviews at Room 055 but nobody pays any attention to them till several weeks later when they ring up and ask him for information about the individuals concerned. When he tells them that a report has already been sent in the answer is invariably that they have not seen it or that it cannot be traced. Similarly in the case of S. I. S. agents who come his way with stories of one kind or another, it takes weeks before he can find out who is responsible for them.

Frost, Hughes, Dick and I had a meeting about the detection of illicit wireless and the part played by R. S. S. The first complaint was that R. S. S. had produced no suitable technical devices other than the vans. We had designed a special machine for recording

frequencies within a distance of 100 yards or so of an enemy transmitter

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IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. *Oct 2000*

As R.S.S., our technical tool, had not helped, were we justified in going direct to the Post Office? The second point we considered was the question of the Mobile Units. Frost said that they had no means of inter-communication and that the personnel were bad. Thirdly Frost complained that there was no policing of our own services. This was essentially a security matter. Lastly we considered the question of V.D.F. Frost said that the vans which handled it had to turn out on an average of once a week only and could very well be employed on experimental work of this kind. We decided in the end to state our various complaints and to ask G.P. and Maltby if they would come and discuss them.

I had a long talk with Barker in the evening when I told him that there were many things in the department with which I personally was far from satisfied. This had followed criticisms of S.I.S. These were (1) re-grouping of sections dealing with 5th column work (2) O.C. (3) E. Division in relation to the R.P.S. and (4) the registry. I gave him my reasons for each case which I have already

September 30th

I had a slight dust-up with Harker on the question of N.D.O.s. I said I thought there ought to be some uniform procedure throughout the office. I was quite ready to withdraw the privileges from certain officers in B. provided people like Abbe did night-duty. Harker evidently does not wish to deal with this.

I took the weekly meeting. Hart said that there had been a large number of inaccurate reports from the Fidrmuc source reaching the Germans this week, dealing with the alleged arrival of British troops in India, the "launching" of the Hood and Anson, both of which have been in commission for some time, etc.

The agent on the "Shetland" has not yet been identified, although it seems certain now that his name is the same as that of his mother i.e. JANNSEN.

We learn that PRYNNE had no mission from S.O.E. to pass information to the Germans or indeed to contact them at all.

ISOS indicates that sabotage of the "Baron Forbes" is planned. There have been a spate of Second Front reports, mainly regarding British attempts against Norway and intentions in Africa.

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/190

The Germans are showing interest in Aden,

and seem to think they can get information from Jibouti. Harry Allen who was present on my invitation mentioned that Webster had sent in a report to this office, which has never been seen by anyone in B.Division, mentioning his fears of leakage through the uncontrolled air routes from Aden, and also through dhow traffic. Harry has promised to try and locate this report, which must have gone out through O.C. to whatever sections they think are interested. B.Division does not seem to be included in the number.

We have heard that FRITZCHEN is to leave on some date prior to October 9th.

The cases of Pierre MOREL and Karl TRUNINGEN, now at Camp 020, and others of the same kind, point to the existence of a Swiss seaman courier service on Swiss boats running between Genoa and U.S.A. ISOS mentioned such a service some time ago and also said that Turkish Seamen on boats going to U.S.A. are to be approached.

Nevile Bland came to see me about a case of leakage through a Dutch friend of his. He is going to make further enquiries.

I had a long discussion in the afternoon with Jock Whyte about arrangements for dealing with escaped P/Ws and evaders. We have come to an arrangement with M.I.9 by which we will, on receiving the names and numbers of these people in advance, get descriptions of them from their W.O. papers. These will be sent to the port who will notify us

(a) whether the description fits the man when he arrives and (b) in the case of escapers, the number of the P/W camp from which he comes. B.4 will then have a look up on the individual and also on the camp, which may be one in which there are certain disloyal individuals whose activities have come to the notice of censorship. We can then ask the escaper what he knows about these people. If we are interested either in the individual or the camp B.4 will send an officer to the transit camp to interview either the escaper or evader. Any records so obtained should be closely related to those of British subjects returning from occupied territory or internment camps in unoccupied territory, also with the records of the R.P.S.

Bamford of I.P.I. came to see me about Peter Fleming, who is returning to this country from India. He is responsible to Wavell for deception work. It seems however that his channels to the enemy are slow and complex. I should say that what he required was a good XX agents in touch with Kabul where all the Axis countries are represented. D.I.B. should be able to provide such an agent. Bamford is going to see Fleming and Bevan on this matter.

I saw Bowlby who has just returned from the Middle East. I had hoped that he might be able to tell us something about Ostro and the investigations being carried out on this subject in Egypt. Unfortunately he seemed to know very little. He is of course concerne

with the offensive side of espionage. I gather that he leaves most of the defensive work entirely to Rodney Dennis. Equally Bowlby seemed to be somewhat ignorant about Max and Moritz.

Spent the evening with Curry at Woldingham. He is still very worried about his position which is obviously unsatisfactory in many ways. What he really wants to do is to get back to some active job with definite responsibilities. I am seriously considering trying in conjunction with him to organise a complete reorganisation of the office for presentation to the D.G.

October 1st

I discussed with J.C. a really pathological letter which I have received from Viv. about the case of MULLET. J.C. said that in certain eventualities the case would have to be passed back to us as it would have to be handled by the Twenty Committee. Viv. takes this to mean that we run and control the Twenty Committee, and cites it as an instance of friction between B.I.A and Section V. He goes on to express the hope that it may some day be possible for me to control my subordinates. The whole thing is nonsense since MULLET was dug out by us, and directed by us as being an agent resident in this country. The whole thing was done with the full co-operation of all parties concerned. If therefore P.W.E. or the F.O. or C. do not wish to control him he will have to come back to us, who will have to be respon-

sible for the instructions issued to him after they have been deliberated in the Twenty Committee.

Lennox came to see me about the Catalina which crashed off the Spanish coast. All the occupants were killed, including a representative of S.O.E. and some officer who was carrying a letter to Mason "ac about the Second Front. This letter actually gave the date. The body of the man who carried it was washed up on the Spanish shore and handed over by a Spanish Naval Officer to a British R.A.F. officer. The letter was sealed and did not appear to have been tampered with. I.S.S.B. are how in a great flap as to whether Torch has been compromised.

Machell came to see me about a letter written by Diana Cooper to a certain woman called Dr. KOMMER in the United States. In this letter she mentioned Randolph's wife's affair with Averill Harriman. She tells Dr. KOMMER to keep it to herself as she doesn't want to spread gossip, which is of course exactly what she is doing. She also alludes to Duff having to pay income tax on £5,000 a year while he is receiving only £2,000 as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. She adds that he gets no money for his secret service work as this would be improper for an M.P. Personally I do not think that there is any very great harm in either of these remarks but a nice point has been reached when the letters of

the wife of the head of a department are submitted to his subordinates for censorship. If we advise that the offending passages should be erased and it subsequently transpires that this has been done on our instructions Duff would be annoyed. On the other hand if we give him the letter he may tell us that we are being stupid in taking exception to certain remarks which are more or less common knowledge.

Machell also told me about two people called COLLIE and ANTON or ASTON who have recently come back from Occupied Territory and are in touch with Kenneth de COURCY, to whom they have given a good deal of information. They have written a book, the MS of which is now in the hands of Jonathan Cape. The book discloses a certain amount of information about escape organisations. There is a good deal of conversation of a derogatory kind about S.I.S. I gather also that de COURCY has been talking about the Second Front and that he is in close contact with Kennedy of the Planning Dept.

Viv. talked to me about our plans during the Second Front. He seemed to think that S.I.S. should have been represented at the W.O. meeting which I attended some days ago with Harry Allen. I said that the meeting was a purely informal one of an exploratory nature, and explained to him how it had arisen. I said that we did not want any new commitments but we were anxious to know in advance whether we were going to

be called upon to produce people with specialised knowledge. It seemed to me fairly clear from the meeting that the responsibilities were very ill-defined and I envisage the possibility that we might at the last moment be asked to produce 10 bodies for wireless, sabotage, R.S.L.O. or B.I.A functions. I suggested to Viv. that he should get a copy of the minutes from Harry Allen and that some representative of S.I.S. should be present at the next meeting. In the meantime I have written to G.P. about Mobile Units and the Second Front. Frost has had a conversation with Maltby who seems to be more or less prepared to consider all the points which were raised at the meeting between Frost, Dick, Hughes and myself the other day.

I saw Duff-Cooper on 3 matters: Ostro, AMERI)-can representation and Peppermint.

I explained the origin of Ostro and the measures we were proposing to take. He quite agreed with our course of action.

I showed him the B.J. giving Peppermint's report to Madrid. He read it all carefully and seemed much interested and amused that the deception had gone through. I explained to him once more the position about representation in America, namely that S.I.S. were in agreement about direct representation in matters affecting the Caribbean but that they had tried to whittle this down by defining our position as security in the colonies and

security liaison with the dominions. I was inclined to think that they were trying to make a distinction between security and C.E. work. He said he thought that that was quite possible but recommended that we should accept the wider interpretation. I then made it clear that S.I.S. did not regard the agreement as giving us the right to communicate direct with Stephenson on matters affecting our liaison with the F.B.I. and North America generally. He said "Oh well, once you have established direct contact with Stephenson there is nothing to stop you from communicating with him on these matters." I said that I did not think it was as simple as that, as I had already in an interview with C. and Viv. and they had made their position quite clear and this had been followed by the turning down of a proposal of mine that we should keep them in the picture by sending them copies of our telegrams and letters and ringing them up before sending a telegram, in case they had already communicated with New York on the same subject. I thought there would have to be something in writing, which would make it quite clear that we could not go on bottlenecking our stuff through Glenalmond.

Duff then started talking about A.C.E. He said he thought arguments put forward by Section V. for not coming up to town were very forcible. I told him once more that I thought it was essential that they should not only come up to London but should be in the same building as ourselves. I said

820

that the arguments about communications did not strike me as being valid. There was always the point that if they were housed in the same building as ourselves we should no longer require our lines to Glenalmond which would be available for them for communication with their registry and other sections of their office. As regards the files, they would on the whole be losing nothing and possibly even gaining a certain amount. He then suggested that possibly certain of their most important sections such as the Spanish, Middle East and American might come up. I said that we should be very pleased to see them but that I did not think that such an arrangement would be acceptable to Section V. who would say that they could not have their show split into two parts. It would be far preferable to my mind to have them all up here.

October 2nd

There is a tremendous flap going on about de COURCY. Apparently show that something about the Second Front is coming out in the next number of his News-Letter. Jim Hale has been sent off to see Dents who were supposed to be the publishers. On arrival he found that it was some other firm. This could have easily been ascertained by looking at one of the back numbers. Meanwhile Toby and Harker went over to M.O.I. to see Cyril Radcliffe who explained that he could do nothing

Catalogue Reference: V4/1900 rang up the publishers who said that a number of copies had

already gone out and the rest were due to go today. I do not know what the sequel has been but clearly de COURCY will now know that the W.O. are interested in his bulletin and that therefore its contents are probably correct.

Stopford and Hart dined with Diplock last night. There has evidently been a good deal of lobbying at Kinnaird House on the subject of A.C.E. and the undesirability of Section V. coming to London. Diplock had been persuaded that their arguments were good, but after several hours with Hart and Stopford he now thinks they are bad. He has I think been persuaded that there is no valid objection to their coming up and that it would be impossible for us to go down. He does not think that anything in the way of amalgamation is possible for the moment, but he thinks Section V. coming to London is a step to something of the kind. He has asked Hart and Stopford to produce a note giving concrete examples of how impossible it would be for us to function in the country owing to our relations with Govt. Depts. in London. They have also suggested that he should see Philby. His invitation to Hart and Stopford came entirely out of the blue. They told Diplock that before accepting the invitation they would have to refer the matter to me. I naturally agreed, since it is to everybody's advantage that Kinnaird House should know as much about the facts as possible.

We had a meeting to discuss the arrangements for FRITZCHEN's arrival. Stanford is going to be at Fighter Command H.Q. to watch the tracks for any suspicious plans coming in. The Regional Officers have been given full particulars and will mobilise the C.C.S. and a few selected S.B. officers under the direction of Burt and his sub-ordinates. Camp 020 are in the picture and will be given a brief for the interrogation. I saw Maxwell this afternoon about the case. It was decided that FRITZCHEN should go to Camp 020 and that he should be detained in the first instance under the arrival from Enemy Territory Act. It seemed unlikely that circumstances would arise which would necessitate his being brought before an Advisory Committee but if we were faced with such an eventuality the H.O. will do everything in their power to safeguard our interests. We propose to turn FRITZCHEN round immediately if his case has not caused too much publicity. We know a good deal about him already. He is probably an Englishman called CHAPMAN. He has an Identity Card and a card permitting him as an Irishman to work in this country. He has had a large sum of money spent on his teeth. He is 6' tall, and has been carefully trained in Wireless, Secret Ink, Sabotage and Parachute jumping. He will be wearing a special kind of kit, details of which are known, and will be dropped somewhere in the vicinity of London between now and Octo. 9th.

I have sent off a letter to Viv. about the MULLET case, in which I have told him that the misunderstandings between us appear to me to be almost pathological and suggesting that we should tear up the whole correspondence, but that if he does not agree that I must pass his letter to J.C. for a reasoned reply and since he has already consulted C., submit the whole thing to the D.G.

I have just heard that Herschel Johnson, as American Ambassador in Sweden, has just arrived back from Stockholm and wants to see me.

Helmut CLISSMAN has arrived in Madrid and has been accompanied by, we believe, Frank RYAN. There is nothing at present to indicate exactly what his in the wind. CLISSMAN was of course formerly active in Eire

Harry has asked me whether in the light of our experiences during the last 3 years we think he would be justified in allowing aliens to take up work which might conceivably give them access to information of interest to the enemy. I have said that there are 2 problems to be considered: (1) the entry of Axis agents and (2) the static 5th column elements who might become dangerous in time of crisis. As regards the former, we were more or less satisfied that we were on top of the situation although there were one or two unknown quantities. As regards the latter there is no evidence to show the existence

of a widespread organisation either controlled or uncontrolled by the Germans but that in time of crisis there might be more people than we know about who would be prepared to give assistance to the enemy. Our information on this part of the problem seems to be more negative than positive. His action I thought should be based more on our knowledge or lack of knowledge of German agents, and that his problem is to decide whether to go for 100% safety or to make a reasonable bet. If the latter he should consider carefully how far the employment of the aliens are really in the national interest. We had had rather a striking example in the case of technicians. There had been a drive for alien technicians. Only 33 had been found - two of them were spies and the remainder useless from the technical point of view.

ISOS indicates that on the 26th Berlin knew something about the Catalina which came down in the sea near Cadiz on the 24th. Since the Abwehr in Spain seem to be ignorant about the matter, there is at least a possibility that Berlin got this information through the interception of our messages on the subject. I am asking Viv. for his views and suggesting that some enquiry should be made.

October 3rd

Gilfillan begins his report for the month of August by saying that the peace of northern Ireland was well maintained during the month of August 1942. 152 indictable offences were

reported compared with 148 in the previous month.

Stopford showed me a memo that he had received from his agent who has just returned from A. Africa and was apparently responsible for the arrest of SERAFAMIDES. This had not been apparent from the report from S.I.S. which indicated that their representative was responsible. Doubtless however Muggeridge did a good job in protecting the agent. The latter is clearly full of resource and has succeeded in obtaining quite a lot of valuable information.

Hart has given me a memo reviewing the activities of the German Intelligence Service ever since the last 3 years. He said that out of a total number of 66 enemy agents apprehended or identified in the U.K. during this time, only 2 or 3 were resident here before the war and had engaged themselves before the war to work for the enemy. He seems to have omitted a few names who might have been included in this category. Secondly, he stated that since the outbreak of war only two German agents out of a total of 66 have had instructions to contact other agents who were both residents and working for the Germans here before the outbreak of war. Thirdly evidence shows that the Germans have no sources resident in this country before the war through whom they could pay their agents here. Fourthly ISOS has never referred to an agent in England in terms to suggest that he was resident and acting under instruc-

tions before the war. On the other hand they do make reference to sources known or partially known to us to have become resident here since the war. Fifthly with the exception of SCOTT-FORD, the German and British agents have been persons of Aryan German origin who have acquired by marriage, naturalisation or accident of birth, British nationality. With the exception of WARSCHAUER they have not been drawn from the refugee classes. Lastly none of the agents who have been apprehended or identified since the war had any instructions to make contact with any subversive political movement in this country, not even with the B.U.F. This is not entirely correct if we accept the mission of HORSEFALL-ERTZ who was an official of the B.U.F. instructed to get into touch with Mrs. WHINFIELD who controlled the Party funds and whose son had gone into Germany through Switzerland under the direction of one KRUGER, a German agent. Further, Snow had certain instructions regarding HORSEFALL-ERTZ. On the other hand Hart goes on to say that the Germans have made an attempt to establish contact with the Welsh Nationalists and also with the I.R.A. He thinks therefore that the Germans have not in general concentrated on political movements but on movements which are racial or nationalist in character. From all this he deduces that there was no Kriegsnetz in this country because the Germans relied on the N.S.D.A.P. etc. to keep us out of the war; because they themselves were too pre-occupied in 1933-37 with internal problems and problems affecting European states; because as long as France was in the war information about

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/190

England could be got out of their organisation in France, and lastly because of their trust in Snow and his notional group of 12 sub-agents. There is I think one other factor which Hart has left out of the account, namely the knowledge the Germans had through the machine tool industry of our incapacity to make war. This information had been obtained so easily and they were so confident that we should not make way that they did not take the trouble to establish a really efficient Kriegsnetz. While Hart thinks that we are rightly impressed by the Abwehr and the Sicherheitsdienst, he does not think that we should be dazed or hypnotised by them into believing they can operate in all times and places with the thunder-bolt energy and precision sometimes attributed to them in their work of espionage and disruption of morale. He argues that the position on the continent at the outbreak of war bears no analogy to the position here today. I entirely agree with this but I do not think that Curry in his memo ever implied anything of the kind. Hart draws the following lessons for the future. He suggests that we should lay less attention to aliens or people of enemy origin resident here before the war and concentrate more on those who have arrived since the war. In the latter category he includes seamen, persons arriving from German-occupied territory, neutral diplomats or official persons, persons wishing to join the allied forces, particularly the air forces, S.I.S. and S.O.E. agents and persons coming to this country and taking employment as technicians etc. We should devote more time

to examination at the RPS, lines of communication whether wireless, secret ink, diplomatic bags, courier or otherwise, and that we should devote some of the personnel to the work who are now employed on combing through the pre-war alien population. I agree with a great deal of what he says, if we are purely concerned with catching spies. I am as convinced as he is, and have been since the early days of the war, that there was no long-term German espionage organisation left behind in this country. I always felt there might be one or two still operating although our evidence on this point was negative. If however we are to consider the potential 5th column here in a time of real crisis we cannot altogether abandon our enquiries into the pre-war population which in my view has never really been sifted.

There is an interesting report by G.H.W. Home Forces on a German manual called "Das Britische Kriegsheer" dated April 1942, recently captured in Libya. This book which is marked "Secret, only to be issued down to Divisions" shows that information about our army organisation in the post-war period is, on the admission of the authors, somewhat scanty. They have no detailed information about new formations in this country since Jan. 1942. Little is known about the Intelligence Corps, airborne troops, R.A.F. regiment, Commandos or the Royal Artillery. G.N.Q. is described as being probably at Leicester. Signs of formations are confined to those units which have had contact with the enemy either in

France, Norway or the Middle East. None of the armoured formations at present in this country appear to have been identified. There is very little about the forces situated in this country and even as regards our forces elsewhere there is less than is available about the German Army to our own staffs. This is encouraging from our point of view.

October 4th

PEPPERMINT has returned and has been seen by Brooman-White. He was welcomed with open arms by ALCAZAR, who explained to him that although his military information had been of great value he was now more concerned with political information. The motive behind this is that SUNER is particularly anxious to re-establish his position as a mediator between the Allies and the Germans if an appropriate moment arrives. SUNER thought of paying a visit to the U.S.A on such a mission if it was likely to have any success. The Spaniards are anxious that the war should come to an end as they feel that it is reducing their country to a state of abject poverty. PEPPERMINT then explained that ALCAZAR had offered to give him money in Swiss francs and American dollars, a Minox camera on which would be films containing a questionnaire, the camera to be used for photographing documents, secret ink which had to be developed in 3 processes, and cover addresses if the bag could not be used. PEPPERMINT explained the difficulties of using the bag owing to its being

830
censored by the Ambassador. ASCAZAR suggested that a use of the Greek bag might be made since the Greek minister in Madrid was in his pay. When PEPPER-MINT went to collect his bag at the F.O. in Madrid he expected to find a small inner bag with all the things which had been promised him by ALCAZAR. Instead of that he was handed a letter from ALCAZAR by a representative of the F.O. who is in ALCAZAR's pay. He did not open this but rather foolishly had it placed in the bag. When he arrived the bag was handed in and the letter opened by the Ambassador, who wishes to see PEPPERMINT on Monday. The letter contained \$2,000 9,000 Swiss francs, and the film with the questionnair. PEPPERMINT is going to say that he had no knowledge of the questionnair which must have been inserted by ALCAZAR who for a long time has been trying to blackmail him, but that the money was to pay the debts of the Press Bureau and finance it for future operation. It is hoped that he may get away with this. It seems from conversations between PEPPERMINT and ALCAZAR that VILLAVERDE has for a long time been cognisant of ALCAZAR's activities. He disliked them but felt it politic to play with him. Now that SUNER has gone he will probably change his tune. He is a real time-server.

B.W. also told en about certain negotiation with Sir George Young who is in touch with NEGRIN. NEGRIN says that he is running agents into Spain and he has been

asked to disclose to us his information and informants. He has replied by saying that we should talk to Gen. Rotas on this matter, and that the latter should be allowed to come here for this purpose from the Argentine. This seemed to be a ruse to get Rotas to this country. Sir George Young returned to the charge and suggested that he must at least have somebody here who knew something about the organisation. NEGRIN then said that he could not disclose anything of the kind without the knowledge and approval of the British F.O. He was obviously playing a political game and was looking ahead to the time when he hopes he may get some support from the British Govt. in setting up a new regime in Spain. Obviously the F.O. cannot be a party to this. On the other hand it seems a pity that we or rather S.I.S., should not be able to take advantage of NEGRIN's organisation, which is probably being run in conjunction with the Russians. NEGRIN spent much time with MAISKY and in the meantime there is a wrangle between Eden and Morrison on the question of for NEGRIN. Morrison does not like the idea. We say that it is undesirable that we should know about any organisation operating on British territory and have the support of the F.O. I do not quite know what the next move should be.

I had a long talk with Sneath who is

2832
rather wondering what he is going to do when he has finished his enquiries into the alien population. I told him that our minds were working on some sort of re-shuffle. There should be useful work for him to do. I read to him Hart's memo and told him that I was very anxious to know exactly what had been done by the various sections concerned who were reviewing the cases of enemy aliens in this country, my impression being that we were singularly ignorant about most of them.

October 5th

Two Dutch brothers named ERASMUS have arrived here as escapees. They have broken down at the RPS and are being sent to Ham. They were apparently trained in Brussels.

Dick is now writing a memo on the work of the whole office for the last 3 years. I think this may be a suitable peg on which to hang some sort of reorganisation scheme.

Viv. rang me up about the security of the factory that is making "the bomb". 40 people are employed on the work and it is now suggested that they should be asked to sign the Official Secrets Act. I said that I wondered whether one might not be doing more harm than good by introducing special security measures at this late stage. Might it not perhaps

emphasise the secrecy of the work? I suggested that possibly Joe Archer might go down and have a look at the place.

Viv. rang up afterwards to say that he had referred this point to Nigel de Grey who seemed very agitated and reluctant that anyone should look into the security question.

October 6th

I attended the D.G.s meeting today. Toby explained the position with regard to the SERAFAMIDES case. The latter is a Greek seaman who has been working for CAMPINI, the Italian Consul and S.S. agent in Lourenco Marques. Through the ingenuity of a B.I.L agent and the S.I.S. representative in Lourenco Marques he was lured on to a ship and subsequently handed over to the S.African authorities in Durban. We wish to get him back here in order to interrogate him and if possible produce a case for representations by the F.O. to the Portuguese Govt. for the removal of CAMPINI. To obtain the extradition of SERAFAMIDES is a somewhat complex matter. We have powers in the case of colonies under 10B(a) but not in the case of dominions. In the case of a colony the Army Council would have to empower a competent military authority on the spot. It would be difficult for them to empower a British officer to issue an order in a dominion and it would equally be impossible for them to empower a S.African authority

over whom they have no jurisdiction. It is therefore suggested that the Dominion Government should deport SERAFAMIDES and that on his arrival here we should refuse him leave to land and detain him under 12(5)a. It seems to me that this action could be challenged if SERAFAMIDES was brought to trial but since there is no other machinery we shall have to take the risk.

Viv. has replied to my letter about the MULLET case. He takes the line that it would have been simpler if I had quietly ascertained what J.C. had in his mind. He then goes on to say that there has been considerable advantage in the past in ~~he~~ and myself speaking our minds freely and acting as a safety valve. He seems to think that my remarks were rather strong and apt to be offensive, to which I might reply suggesting that he should have a look at his own letter. He has however agreed to tear the correspondence up and talk when he sees me next.

Senter brought round Lord Allerton who is taking over the security of S.O.E. outstations. I discussed the question of the Wireless Panel. Senter is quite emphatic that Archie Boyle will not tolerate any interference by Frost in this matter. This of course raises an awkward situation.

I showed Senter C's letter about leakage through the Fighting French. C. does not

wish to stage any "plant" in conjunction with S.O.E. as he thinks such action might jeopardise his relations and because he has already proved that things do leak through that channel. I have written back asking him for evidence on this point and details since it is a matter of some concern to us.

I had a meeting with Toby, Adam, Dick, Abbott, Albert and Orr, on the subject of a Reception Centre for British subjects arriving from abroad. I said that the reason for setting up such a centre was that British subjects of a somewhat undesirable type were arriving in increasing numbers and I felt that they should be examined with greater thoroughness. Quite a number come from unoccupied France. I believed to that we may have a number of Americans of a similar type, who cannot go to the RPS and must therefore be examined elsewhere. There was a good deal of irrelevant discussion, at the end of which it was decided to put forward a memo to the Executive. Adam, on the basis of any advance information that we obtain from the establishment of an examiner in Lisbon and through other sources, will sort out arrivals at the port and cast his net somewhat wider than heretofore. These people will later be asked to call at the Reception Centre, which it was felt could not be at Wandsworth but should be somewhere in the vicinity of Whitehall. We shall need at least two examiners.

Albert will go to the RPS where he will control the records and do all the spade work. Orr was the only dissentient voice. He seemed to think that this new arrangement would involve us in a good deal of unnecessary expense in view of the fact that the ground ~~is~~ already covered. He wishes to record his views on paper to the D.G., which I have told him to do.

The real trouble is that he feels that the new arrangement is a reflection on himself, which in fact it is not. We only want to do the job much more comprehensively than it has been possible to do it in the past.

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ACT 1958. Oct 2000

October 7th

I took the weekly meeting. The Germans appear to contemplate an attack by us on Dakar from Gambia, landings by air and sea in Sicily and Eastern Italy and an attack on the French coast in the area of the Gironde Estuary. There has been another Ostro message giving details about the 8th Army supplies in the Middle East. The Sicherheitsdienst in Norway has been trying to penetrate escape parties by sending agents to England in the guise of bona fide escapees. Their recent attempt was unsuccessful since owing to premature arrests the boat left without the S.D agents.

Rainbow has received a new type of Duff which consists of white letters on black background.

From the 14th May to the 25th September Garbo has received \$4,000.

P/W reports show a general decline in morale as compared with any period prior to 1942. There was some anxiety about the progress of the war, more dissatisfaction with service conditions, and more political criticism. Within the period under review German successes in Russia appear temporarily to have brought about some slight rise in morale and the will to resist was also strengthened by fear of the consequences of defeat.

I had a talk with Trevor-Roper who is trying to gain his independence from Section V. He wants to work directly under C. with free access to all depts. to whom he supplies his material.

Grogan came to talk to me about the censorship of P/W mails. A letter has been received in code from one of our P/Ws in which he indicates that the correspondence of P/Ws is very carefully gone into and that curiously certain people for completely unexplained reasons receive their correspondence much quicker than others. He suggests that the Germans may be making improper use of the P/W mail in some way which he cannot explain. We went into this subject in connection with the EVERSDEN case, and I was told that P/W mail takes anything up to three months to reach its destination. I asked that further enquiries should be made as to how long P/W mail takes to reach German territory or possibly Swiss territory. I was told that judging by the date of posting and the date of arrival on British territory of incoming mail the average time was about 10 days to a fortnight. It may therefore be assumed that much the same applies in the reverse direction. If therefore letters for one of our P/Ws were picked out at the frontier a spy letter could be held back and the remainder of the mail would be sent on, in rather special circumstances, direct to the camp con-

cerned. This might account for some people getting their letters quicker than others. Censorship are going to test P/W mail more extensively in future. Probably the bath system will be applied. There are roughly 200,000 letters going out per week.

Grogan told me that he had heard from Dent of Bermuda who has recently returned to this country, that the general censorship for Duff had ceased since March or April of this year. Dent explained that he had been informed by an American officer of signals of the text of an ISO message indicating that Duff was to be discontinued. Dent had been rather indignant that he had never received any confirmation of this from England, but had nevertheless decided to order the cessation of a general search. A particular search, namely of suspicious letters, is still going on. These are tested both for Duff and S/W. The message to which Americans Signals had referred has been traced here, but it does not give any clear indication that Duff is to be stopped on other routes. It would seem only to refer to letters from Brazil. There seems to be some danger in Bermuda taking action in these matters without prior reference to London.

I saw Herschel Johnson who is over here for a few days from Stockholm. He told me that the atmosphere in Sweden was on the whole extremely favourable to the allies,

although the Govt. were maintaining a very strictly neutral attitude. They were quite prepared to deal with intelligence agents of either side very firmly. Herschel Johnson was anxious to know a little about the German intelligence service. I could not tell him much about Stockholm but I gave him a general picture. He apparently institutes fairly effective security precautions at the Legation.

I dined with Roger Hollis who has returned after a long illness. We talked about the de COURCY case, details of which were not really known to me. He seemed to think that the whole business had been lamentably handled. Harker's final interview with Hanau was miked and on record. Hollis felt that it was far too friendly and that an excellent opportunity had been missed for taking action against de C.

We then discussed the 5th Column. Hollis is rather sceptical and had the impression that Curry's memo was trying to draw an analogy between the situation here and that which had existed on the continent at the beginning of the war. I said that I did not think that this was Curry's intention. He had merely desired to collect all information that there was on the subject of the 5th Column and to make it clear that what was commonly known as the 5th column was really part of the functions of the Abwehr under the direction of the OKW.

Hollis then referred to Curry's suggested remedy of adding to the Invasion Lists in an arbitrary manner and referring the whole matter to the Home Secretary.

I said that I entirely agreed with this criticism. I thought it was purely a question of putting our own house in order, and that if any names were added to the Invasion List they would have to come up to the required standards. Where I thought we were deficient was in knowledge of the alien and dual national population.

Hollis then talked about the D.G.'s and Fulford's views on the Comintern, which he thought were unsound. There was some idea that the Comintern had ceased to function. Admittedly it is probably not functioning in exactly the same way but its activities are going on just the same. Neither Hollis nor I think that there is any evidence to show that the policy of the Soviet Govt. and the Comintern has changed one iota. Clearly the whole second front campaign is dictated from Moscow. Whether the instructions come by courier or through the Embassy makes no difference. There is no doubt that the Russians are taking every possible advantage of the present situation to dig themselves in and that they will cause us a great deal of trouble when the war is over.

October 8th

The D.G. returned from leave today. I informed him about the various major incidents that had occurred during his absence.

At the R.S.S. meeting this morning I explained the position about the Palestine intercepts. Maltby said that steps were being taken to have the service monitored by some other Y. Unit. An Italian S.I. S. network has been discovered under cover of some Italian Naval Cypner and a move is on foot to set up a section in R.S.S. to deal with Italian ISOS. A good deal of Group 8 material has been accumulating but G.C. & C.S. seem to have been rather lax in solving it.

D.G. called me down to a talk with Bevan and Lennox. Bevan was very concerned about leakage of information regarding Torch which is being discussed freely in Fleet St. It was decided that possibly we might try and find some channels through which we could put Fleet St. off the track. This however was likely to be extremely difficult. You can't fox people like KUH, POLIAKOV and LITAUER, at any rate for long.

Toby Pilcher has been made a Judge.

Philip JORDAN of the News Chronicle has told Casa Maury of C.C.O. that there is much talk going on in Fleet St. about the second front and that he had been told by A.J. Cummings of the News Chronicle who knew that JORDAN was one of the second front war correspondents, that according to Maisky N.W. Africa was the objective. It is JORDAN's impression that Maisky imparted this information with the deliberate object of suggesting that a campaign in N.W. Africa would not be considered by the Soviets as sufficient to meet their request for the opening of a second front. The purpose of Maisky's statement was propaganda and he intended that Cummings should use it as such. On hearing this news JORDAN had gone round to see his contact at the Public Relations Dept. 1 at the W.O. This contact assured him that he would be looked after wherever he was sent and that it was possible that he would not be going with the first flight. He also said, a little to JORDAN's surprise, that two motorcards had already been sent off for JORDAN's use. No actual objective or date was mentioned, but from these remarks JORDAN very naturally ruled out the possibility of N. France or Norway. He therefore came to the conclusion that Maisky's information was probably correct.

Viv. came round to tell Dick and myself that an order had now been issued appoint-

ing Dansey as V.C.S.S. and himself as one of the many deputies in charge of security. He had replied to C. saying that although this order was only giving effect to a situation which had existed for some considerable time owing to the whittling away of his various functions, he nevertheless found it pretty mortifying. He wished to be informed as to whether he was in any way intended to be responsible to V.C.S.S. since if this were so he would refuse to consult him. So far he has had no reply. Viv. emphasised that this new arrangement did not auger particularly well for counter-espionage and that he more than ever regretted that we had found it impossible to accept the A.C.E. plan. I said that I could not see how A.C.E. would give C.E. a better chance than it would have if it were all brought under this office. In the former case it would only have half the D.G.s backing and in the latter case it would have his whole backing. C's backing, in Viv's opinion, was not likely to be of much use. Viv. said that he would sooner bring the whole organisation in here than work under Dansey but he did not think the plan was a good one nor did he think it would be possible now to get C. to accept it. I am frightfully sorry for Viv. who is one of the few really honest people in S.I.S. I do feel however that his attitude towards our original proposal was intransigent and misguided.

I saw Kenneth Younger and Milmo about SZUMLICH. SZUMLICH is a Pole who at one time was in the hands of the Germans. The Poles want to try him on the grounds that he was never demobilised from the Polish Forces and is therefore their prisoner. In fact they wish to make the Act under which they have jurisdiction retrospective. SZUMLICH has never been a prisoner and is at present under interrogation by ourselves. Certain information that we want from the Poles to complete our interrogation has been refused for some unknown reason. There is obviously a good deal of politics at the back of the whole case. We are telling the Poles that they must apply for the custody of SZUMLICH to the H.O. and that meanwhile they will greatly assist us by answering our questions.

October 9th

Hart and I went to N.I.D. to discuss the Kameradshcaftsdienst. In addition to Leary from the coding section of censorship, Hinsley of G.C. & C.S. was also present. The latter is by way of being particularly brilliant. He has examined Leary's work and has come to the conclusion that there is definitely some sort of code in the K.D. and other similar broadcasts. He feels however that until the whole field of such broadcasts has been surveyed it would be wrong to attempt relate these messages to any particular action by the German Armed

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ACT 1958. Oct 2000

Forces or Intelligence Service. There is apparently definite evidence from Italian that code is broadcast in certain messages which immediately following the playing of a certain tune. Leary is also examining the broadcasting of certain tunes and has found that they come up at certain specified times although from different stations.

Jim talked to me about an enquiry that he is making into certain S.O.E. agents who went to Denmark and about the whom the Germans appear to know a great deal. He is rather at a dead end and in my view cannot get any further unless he goes thoroughly into the life history of all concerned.

D-C has drafted a letter for Stephenson about his new mandate for the Caribbean pointing out that there are certain matters which will still have to be dealt with through London and the C.O.

I told the D.G. about the Mutt and Jeff plan which involves an explosion in Hants. The objective is a food store on army property and the Germans will be informed that the store must have contained ammunition as well since the explosion was a very big one. C.C. Hants, R.S.O. and Burt are in the know.

October 10th

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/190

Viv. spoke to me today about a lunch

that he had had with the D.G. The D.G. had suggested meetings 3 times a week of about 3 or 4 people from each dept. Viv. like ourselves could see no very useful purpose in such meetings but had not liked to say so to the D.G. as he felt that he might be regarded as uncooperative. I said that I did not see what these meetings could do and they would certainly involve us all in a good deal of waste of time. We could of course resume our Planning Committee, but experience in the past had shown that it was mainly devoted to smoothing out questions of friction than to any concrete planning.

I had a meeting with D.G., Lennox, Machell and Harris about plans for misleading Fleet St. about Torch. The Chiefs of Staff have been in consultation with the M.O.I. and appear to think that the leakages in Fleet St. can best be dealt with either by talking to certain selected journalists and asking them to take a definite cover story line or by taking the Press fully into our confidence. Personally I think that either line would be a mistake. As regards getting at leading journalists here I suggested that this could better be done through Embassies such as the Spanish and Turkish. The information would then leak back to journalists such as POLIAKOV, LITAUER and KUH. It was proposed that we should make a concerted attack on Alba and also on Orbay the Turkish Minister. I

948

think the line would be to start with two minor indiscretions by people who might be slightly in the know, and follow this up with a major indiscretion by somebody obviously in the know. Alba would be bound to report this to Madrid and the information would go direct to the Japs and Germans. I thought it necessary however that whatever story went over it should be different to any of the previous cover stories.

I am going down tonight with Victor to see the fireworks.

October 11th

We met two officers of the police at the given rendezvous, and then drove about quarter of a mile to the objective. This was about 12.15 am. We drew the two cars up inside a field along the hedge. Meanwhile guards were put out on the road to give us warning of any cars or cyclists. The S.O.E. experts put in the explosives which consisted of 9 lbs of aminol, incendiary material and thunder rockets. The fuse was laid through the hedge on to the road. When this work had been completed and we were satisfied that no cars either way could reach the site within a period of two minutes, the car which was carrying the S.O.E. representatives pulled out into the road opposite the end of the fuse, and remained with engines running. We then came out and headed straight for an observation post

about quarter of a mile away. As we passed the first car the fuse was lit. The S.O.E. representatives and Victor immediately jumped in and streaked up the road behind us. The explosion took place in about two minutes 10 seconds and was a formidable one. The incendiaries worked well and a blaze of light went up which could be seen for miles round. There was an aeroplane somewhere in the vicinity which dropped a flare. We presumed therefore that the matter would be reported back to some R.A.F. headquarters. Not wishing to be in the vicinity of the conflagration we made off after watching the fire for about 5 minutes. We reached Michael Ryde's house at Newbury at about 3 a.m. We heard later that the fire had been seen by a number of the Air Observer Corps and had been reported to the Andover Police who had sent out two sergeants immediately. They had remained on the site during the night. They had already ascertained that somebody had been seen in the vicinity of the hut several days previously. This was probably one of the S.O.E. men who was putting in the material. There was also a shepherd who might have given information, since he was questioned discreetly by Michael Ryde in order to find out whether any of his sheep were left out at night. We had originally intended to use 13 lbs of aminol but felt that this might be dangerous if the whole hut was lifted into the middle of the road. We anticipate that the police will

make enquiries with the military about the hut, when they will be told that it was taken over by G.H.Q. Home Forces. Mountain Home Forces has been informed and will say that the hut was taken over for special purposes and stored with certain Commando equipment. If the debris is carefully examined it is possible that a piece of a German Pickford fuse will be found and a Norwegian compass or the remains of it. Burt who is in the know will be sent down as a special investigator. I am told that the explosion has disintegrated the whole hut and that a few loose thunder rockets have been found. Steps have been taken to get some notice of the incident into the local press.

October 12th

Dixon came in this morning. He is doing a course here before going out as C.S.O. to N. Africa.

Park of S.O.E. came to see me about a rather peculiar message which VALLIN, a dubious member of the Fighting French wished to put over on the B.B.C. The message alludes to lines of communication "through Douglas or through Switzerland". I asked Park if he could find out what these lines were and let us know. There has been a good deal of trouble about the F.F. communicating code messages in broadcast. C. is rather inclined to think that we should have been looking

after the security of this matter. We have in fact been writing to his organisation ever since November 1941 without getting any reply until fairly recently, when Kirkpatrick took the matter up with Dansey. Dansey then agreed to Kirkpatrick writing at the end of May to the Free French suggesting that such broadcasts should go through Passy and S.I.S. but no reply or final decision was reached until 29th June when Dansey wrote to Kirkpatrick saying that it had now been arranged that all messages for broadcasting from the F.F. should go through Passy who was in touch with the S.I. officer who dealt with such messages on the one hand and with S.O.E. on the other. Kirkpatrick was asked by Dansey to issue instructions to his representative in the B.B.C. that such messages must arrive in future either from Passy, M.I. 6 or S.O.E. This arrangement was apparently satisfactory to Dansey at the time, but the latter, having seen a number of messages going through, is now telling his Chief that the Security Service are not doing their job. // I had a long talk with Frost this morning about RSS and today's meeting on the Second Front. It is not worth recording the conversation as most of the points were raised at the subsequent meeting in the afternoon called by Harry Allen, at which representatives of S.I.S., Home Forces and ourselves were present. S.I.S. took the view that they would be responsible for

supplying I.B. Units with intelligence both in the forward zone and in the static zone. The Chief Civil Affairs Officer was appointed and they were anxious for their men to come under his direction. They also felt that Passport Control should be established on a civilian basis since it would have to be largely responsible to the Home Office and the F.O. S.I.S. were clearly anxious to establish their rights on foreign territory but admitted that they might on occasion want some expert assistance from the Security Service. They thought this would be of an ad hoc nature. Brig. Strong seemed to think otherwise. First of all he was very insistent that whatever units of M.I.5 or M.I.6 operated abroad should come under the Force Commander and be part of the I.B. staff. Secondly he thought that the experience of the Security Service should be made use of. He was rather in favour of our having a representative at G.I.Q. Hill-Dillon on the other hand who had been largely responsible for the training of I.B. units clearly felt that their functions were going to be usurped by ourselves and S.I.S. He seemed to think that if they were not capable of carrying out their duties there was not much point in their existence. The real facts are of course that S.I.S. are not equipped for dealing with security in a static area and that if the I.B. staffs are asked to perform any of our functions and to run XX agents they will make a howling mess of it.

G-P tried to pull a fast one on the meeting by saying that he was solely concerned with Abwehr material while I.B. units would be concerned with military traffic. He did not propose to function on the continent until the situation became stabilised. He argued that it would be impossible for mobile units to do their work in an area where a battle was going on. If Abwehr agents were dropped during that period he would merely take a bearing on them and inform the I.B. Staff. If operational agents were dropped it would be up to the I.B. units to deal with them. Frost pointed out that the I.B. Signal Units would not be able to do any work of this kind as they would be far too occupied with other matters. Brig. Strong agreed. He did not appear to know that the ~~rounding up~~ of illicit wireless sets would be one of their responsibilities. G.P. only proposed to send over M.U.s to deal with static agents after the battle had moved on. He said that such agents could be actually D.F.ed from this country which is of course quite untrue. The final hunt with the M.U.s generally involve an area of some 50 miles square. Any D.F. bearings therefore given to I.B. units during the early stages will be more or less useless, since there will be no means of locating the agents until the M.U.s operate.

254
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ACT 1958. *Oct 2000*

October 13th

I talked to Kellar about the Pasha. We are still no nearer to discovering how he communicates with his Govt. Such B.J.s as there are are unimportant and few in number.

have not produced the answer. In the country they are difficult to operate since a 24-hour watch is necessary. It is proposed that we should try and get a line on the matter through introducing in the case of some of the Pasha's more dubious associates, LOTFALLAH etc. We are also considering introducing a wireless operator in the guise of a chauffeur. There are difficulties here since he would have to take his apparatus down as part of his own baggage every time he went to Luppitt. We also propose to review all telegrams to and from Egypt if this is at all possible.

Field-Robinson came to see me about a German deserter called ^{this} man who was a lorry driver deserted from France and according to his story got across the border into Spain. He was eventually brought back here via Gib. and has been interned as a R/W. Although his story is not very convincing on paper, Field-Robinson feels on the whole that he is genuine. He is a young fellow of about 33 and says to be a Social Democrat, notly opposed to the Nazi

regime. Field-Robinson wants to have him interviewed and give him our independent opinion. He also wishes us to take him over as a civilian prisoner. The man is apparently quite ready to be dropped back into Germany.


Censorship have put up a paper on internal censorship of mails, telegrams and telephones. They say that the increasing demands of the Services and the Security Service are taxing their resources very severely. They do not think that they can continue as at present without reducing to some extent the work that they are doing on external censorship. I said that as far as catching spies was concerned I did not think that we could justify internal censorship. We were quite pleased to see it go on as it to some extent acted as a check upon our work, but the results from our point of view were purely negative. As far as one can see the main purpose of internal censorship was to enable the military authorities to check leakage of important information to unauthorised persons. I raised the point that there was not much object in policing internal mails and telephones if we did not police our own wireless which was open to the whole world to listen to. As far as I knew practically nothing was being done. A propos of this, Frost tells me that information has just come in that one of

456
our own army signals operators has been found to be communicating, probably quite innocently, with the Germans.

I saw Capt. Stone, one of the F.S.O.s from Freetown. He seems to be an excellent fellow. He knows the set-up in Freetown very well. He was inclined to doubt the necessity of having a D.S.O. but he was not fully aware of our problem, which was to give effect to information from secret sources obtained in this country and elsewhere. He did not understand that in order to do so we either had to pass through Haigh-Wood, The Governor and the Police, or through the W.O., G.O.C. West Africa, and the F.S.P. at the port. What we really want is a direct liaison with someone on the spot who has knowledge of our problems. He thought it possible that the F.S.O. could carry this work if we could be allowed to communicate with him direct. On the other hand he said that Brodie of the police had often told him that he was so cluttered up with other work that he could not really attend to security matters. On the whole therefore it seems desirable that we should have a D.S.O. It will be interesting to see what Gibbs has to say on this matter.

At a meeting with G-P, Maltby, Dick and Frost the subject of R.S.S. was discussed. As regards our commitments on the wireless front abroad it was generally recognised that we should probably have to provide a man for the F.B. staff who would be

capable of performing similar functions to B.3B in this country.



It was agreed that our representatives in the Regions should be responsible for directing wireless hunts. The question of times was discussed. G.P took the line that we might have informed him earlier about our misgivings. There was I think a certain amount of justification for his complaint. R.S.S. have undertaken to supply specialised reliable personnel for the purpose of our enquiry.

Major DAUBENY, who leaked about the second front to Audrey Richmond-Brown, has been cashiered and given 12 months imprisonment. This is an extremely severe sentence which is to be widely promulgated. I gather from Egerton-Johnson whom he consulted in his official capacity that DAUBENY is still quite unaware of the seriousness of his offence. Egerton-Johnson suggests that officers should be lectured on the dangers of careless talk and have it explained to them how a casual remark can develop into a serious leakage.

An ISOS message discloses that the Kameradschaftsdienst is definitely being used

for Abwehr purposes, whether solely to communicate the receipt of a message or to convey instructions is not yet quite clear. It seems doubtful whether a service of this kind works on any uniform basis. Probably each agent has a special code. If this is so, it is questionable how far it is worth while to pursue the question; without knowing something of the context it would be impossible for anybody to crack these codes.

I saw Sinclair who is on a visit from New York, and took him down to the D.G. He gave an account of the Belize case. In his view there was no question of refuelling of submarines. GOUGH is undoubtedly guilty of a number of breaches of the regulations and could be prosecuted if necessary. There are still a certain number of points which have not been entirely satisfactorily cleared up. A certain amount of good has however come out of the case, since security in British Honduras has been tightened.

October 14th

I attended a meeting at Kinnaird House. Leakage of information was the first item on the agenda. Their attention was drawn to the recent cases of two officers who had been courtmartialled. It was thought that the best method of stopping leakage was to impose severe sentences both on military personnel and

if possible on civilians, if magistrates could be induced to do so owing to pressure of public opinion.. It was thought that possibly the most effective action would be to get the P.M. to make some statement in the house in answer to a question.

The meeting then discussed internal censorship. Herbert said that he had reached the limit of his capacity. The Services on the other hand pressed very hard for a continuance of internal censorship which was put on to tighten up security. Our view was that while we were interested indirectly in security measures which narrow the field of investigation we could not say that internal censorship had led or was likely to lead to the catching of spies.

A telegram has been received from the M.A. at Berne to the effect that a man called HEWSON, a P/W captured at Crete, had turned up. After a rough time as a P/W he had been approached owing to his Irish parentage with a suggestion that he should work for the Germans. He had been taken to Brussels where he had been given a good deal of training. He was to use a special kind of match for his secret writing. This is interesting since similar matches were in possession of the ERASMUS brothers. He was trained by a man called Ulrich WERNER. He was to correspond through the P/W mail. This is the first positive

260
evidence we have had of an agent using this method of communication although we suspected something of the kind for some time HEWSON is to follow the escape route from Switzerland about which the Germans are anxious to have details. He has instructions to send them a postcard from each stopping place. On arrival in U.K. he is to collect military information.

The D.G. has written to Duff about our representation in America. He has drawn attention to the unsatisfactory nature of the situation created by S.I.S. in restricting our correspondence with Stephenson to purely security matters in the Caribbean. He recommends that Duff should make a further approach to C.

I had a long talk with Denniston on the subject of enquiry into enemy aliens. He agreed with me that practically nothing had been done about Cat.B enemy aliens and that there had been many very bad releases prior to about April or May 1941. It was only by accident that any of these cases were coming to light.

I had a talk with Bevan, T.A.R., L.Hale, Lennox, Dick, Brooman-White and Harris and Marriott on the subject of co-ordinating misinformation. It was decided that Brooman-White would be responsible for the production of misinformation with a small committee formed to decide on the channels through which it should go; that

B-W should ask C. to give him copies of any rumours that he was putting out and that T.A.R. should make a similar request to N.I.D. All this information will now be carded with the B 1A traffic.

October 15th

I saw Loxley and handed him Lennox's memo on his interview with Philip JORDAN. Loxley said that Eden had already been informed of the indiscretions of Maisky on the Second Front, that he was extremely annoyed and had been pressing to send a full-dress protest to Moscow. He had however been ill in bed for the last two days. The F.O. view is that Maisky is doing this on his own and not under instructions.

I lunched with Montagu and Sainsbury. The latter is looking for a job. He made a good impression and I am suggesting that he might be employed as a No.2 to Haylor at the R.F.S.

Dick attended a meeting at S.I.S. with Crockett, Viv. and Dansey to decide about HEWSON. It was agreed that he should be allowed to come through the escape route. He will be accompanied and will have definite instructions about the postcards he is to send off. These will be of a misleading kind. M.I.9 realises that they are running a considerable risk but they think it is worth while.

862
I went with the D.G. to see Col. Ralston, Canadian Minister of Defence. He had been asked to call on Duff to discuss port security work in Canada. We had received a letter from Robb from which it appeared that after training a few N.C.Os and officers he was unable to get any further. The Commissioner was proposing to recruit civilians who would be paid so much a day and be under no obligation to remain in the service. Robb thought that it was dangerous to make information available to people over whom the authorities had no real hold. Col. Ralston said that the matter was largely a domestic one and that there was a battle going on between the Dept. of Justice and the Ministry of Defence. He had certain very definite commitments and could not afford to give more than 50 men for port security work. We informed him that so far these 50 men did not seem to be forthcoming. We also told him that the powers of port security officers were totally inadequate to meet the situation. He undertook to look into the whole question on his return. He thinks that ~~xx~~ Commissioner Wood has not really got his heart in it.

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ACT 1958. Oct 2000

October 16th

I attended the RSLOs conference in the country. In addition to the RSLOs a number of people from other sections were also present. After giving a short account of the work of the various organisations in America, and Canada, I summarised the position as I saw it today on the Home Front. I felt that the somewhat tentative conclusions reached when I spoke to the RSLOs about a year ago had been largely confirmed. It was our view then that the Germans, being confident that their propaganda would keep us out of the war and that the poor state of our armaments would make it impossible for us to fight even if we so desired, had not taken the trouble to establish in this country prior to the war any very deep-seated espionage organisation. We had up to the present caught 66 enemy agents in this country and

264

who had arrived here, 12 were Norwegians, 8 Dutch, 8 Belgian, 5 Spanish, 5 German, 6 British, 4 Portuguese, 3 French, 3 Cuban, 2 Swedish, 2 Russian, 2 Yugoslav, 2 Polish, one Greek, one Czech, one Swiss and one Danish. Only a handful of these were resident here before the war. Only two of them had been instructed to get in touch with a pre-war resident. In one case with an agent of ours and in the other with the moribund Duchesse de Chateau-Thierry. The Germans had great difficulty in paying their agents in the U.K. Reliable information received from special sources did not indicate that they were getting any information from agents resident in the U.K. before the war. On the other hand there were indications that two or three possibly notional agents were supplying information to the Germans which was of such poor quality that they could not last a minute if the data acquired by the German intelligence system about matters in this country was of any quality at all. The German document captured in April 1942 on the British Army showed that they had very little information about our formations since the outbreak of war and practically nothing since Jan. 1941. It followed from the above that as far as we could see there was no extensive spy organisation here about which we did not know, and no organisation here of a pre-war resident kind that had probably not been sterilised. There might be a few more WARSCHAUERS but the probability was that if they did exist

they were inactive. Did this justify our diverting our attention from the pre-war resident population to the post-war arrivals. I felt that it would if we were only concerned with catching spies, and that it might if we were convinced that

we were never again going to be faced with an invasion crisis. This led me to consider the 5th column position. The potential 5th column elements were: enemy aliens, parties of the Right, dual nationals, allied nationals and the I.R.A. How far should we feel satisfied that the whole of this ground had been properly covered if we were faced with the worst possible invasion crisis - Russia out of the war and 150 German divisions on the western front, a jitter broadcast campaign by all the wireless masts on the continent and the dropping of Abt. II sabotage agents, resulting in the creation of a real spy psychosis. Would not certain people at this stage perhaps come out of their holes and did we know exactly who they would be? I then reviewed the situation as regards enemy aliens, which is the only 5th column body with which I am strictly concerned. At the beginning of the war we had a list of 750 suspects of whom only about 250 were finally arrested. The remainder had been allowed to trickle out. Some of those originally interned had been released without much interrogation. There followed the setting up of tribunals whose business had been conducted by individuals who had no knowledge of the subject, no standards and no

background. Moreover they had kept no records. Their examination was therefore completely valueless. Next we had the general internment order and that back-peddled half-way through. Regional tribunals were set up to clear up the matter. Their records were sketchy and they had not had much knowledge of the subject with which they had dealt. They had categorised enemy aliens under A.B. and C. Those under A. had been stool-pigeoned and examined to a considerable degree in camps. Some of them however had been released ostensibly on grounds of ill-health and there was no record of who these people were. Those in Cat. B and C. had never been interrogated, nor had their cases been sifted except in a haphazard manner. We had a case running now which indicated that certain people whose cases had never been investigated were of a highly dangerous kind. The

information about them had been obtained by agents and not by the ordinary routine methods of H.O.W.s etc. Ought we perhaps to change our method of investigation. We knew the man who waved a swastika flag in the street, the man who waved it in his back garden and was seen by his neighbours, but did we know one who waved it inside his own house? I then asked RSLs to let me have their views. Evidently they wanted to think the problem over before making any definite reply, Baxter however did say that 3 cases had come to his notice of members of the NSDAP

who had got through all tribunals. He had only got on to them by accident. One had since been interned and the other two had been placed on the invasion list.

I had a talk with people in B.4 in the afternoon, in particular with Ernie Allnutt whose correspondence I examined in some detail. He seems to be doing quite a lot of work but without much guidance. There are things that he is handling that ought to be known to B.1B. If we ever succeed in getting a point for D.S.O. control under Gibbs, I think that Allnutt's section should form part of it.

I saw Stewart at the club in the evening. He told me that the Germans were waiting for the ice to form in order to make an attack on Leningrad. The Germans were now organising a direct attack on Stalin-grad which had become a matter of Hitler's personal prestige. He had sacked von Bock, Halder and other generals and put in younger officers who were more likely to be of his way of thinking. The result has been chaotic conditions in the rear of his lines. News from Germany showed that morale and conditions were extremely bad. In France the demands for petrol had only been met to the amount of one-third. There was indications that the Germans were contemplating bombing this country from very high altitudes with a new type of explosive. It was thought too that they may make attempts with long-distance aircraft to bomb our Atlantic

964
shipping. The situation with regard to ISOS was becoming increasingly complicated. The Chiefs of Staff in America had decided that only the Navy Dept. were to receive illicit wireless communications. Matters were constantly cropping up where it was necessary to inform Donovan that he was being penetrated but under the present ruling this could not be done. A further wire had been sent to New York, in an endeavour to clarify the position. Meanwhile it has been discovered that the French have been intercepting certain groups in Tangier which we do not know about. The Russians have been given a number of groups, some of which it is believed they are already decyphering. Stewart thinks that it is a little short of a miracle that ISOS continues, and his main preoccupation now is to safeguard the ISK. We are now getting certain German diplomatic material some of which is consular and relating to Africa. I do not know whether this is high-grade, but doubt it. Messages are in some cases between Abwehr points.

For some completely unexplained reason a British aeroplane has dropped an American agent in the middle of Dakar. This may be the work of Hutchison the O.S.S. man. American Intelligence seems to be generally haywire.

Last night 40 maps of French Morocco fell out of the back of an American lorry. Only

33 of them have so far been recovered. To make matters worse the police have asked de Gaulle's headquarters whether they have lost any maps of French possessions.

October 17th

The HARZBURG case has just been brought to my notice again. It occurred more than a year ago and may have a bearing on the use of P/W mails by the Germans for intelligence purposes.

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It seems that Duff is determined that we shall send a party of 6 people to Glenalmond, the senior officer to have equal rank with Felix Cowgill. There is to be a meeting on Wednesday between Duff C. and the D.G.

Blackford has been sacked and will be succeeded by Chappell. Charles Medhurst is to be temporary Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, and later Director of Plans on the Catalogue Reference: *KV/4/190*. is to go and also

The D.M.I.

Ned Reid told me about the de BARY notes. The tracings are extremely interesting. In a number of cases the notes came into the hands of known German agents. Whether we can infer that the others who got them are also German agents is another matter. There is however quite an interesting case of a Dutchman, ZANSTRA, who is at present employed in some factory here. In his case the notes were traced to 3 hotels. The Dutchman was the only common factor.

October 18th

Curry came to see me at my flat. He is extremely distressed about his position. He virtually has nothing to do since Gwyer is covering a good deal of research work and the major problem can only be tackled in conjunction with S.I.S. who have neither the staff nor the time. Curry would like to come back into E. Division in his old capacity as Dy.B but he does not wish in any way to interfere with Dick. He is most insistent on this point. He thinks however that the activities of Abt. II should be controlled under one head. This would include B.1C and other 5th column sections. I said that I would have to discuss this with Dick and also two other suggestions which Curry put up as to work he might usefully do.

Spent the day till 4 p.m, at the Law Courts.

I had a word with A.D.N.I. on my return. He was very worried about the Kameradschaft-dienst. Apparently Robertson-Macdonald is not on speaking terms with Frost and when Frost turned up at the meeting this afternoon R-M refused to speak in front of him. Hart took the situation in hand, told A.D.N.I. that this was nonsense and a rather sticky meeting ensued. It seems quite clear that the broadcasts are decypherable and the question for decision is who should control the work. Clearly the application of a great deal of intelligence information is essential. Section V. are really the body who should contribute this information but I doubt whether they will ever do it. It is a whole time job for one man.

October 20th

I attended the D.G.s meeting. Nothing of any real interest was discussed. There is a paper coming before the Executive which defines its functions. The duties of the Security Service, and its position, are very badly explained.

Dick tells me that the Met. reports have been going on for the last 3 months and that it is now definitely established that some one in the Croydon area comes up every morning and every evening and rather intermittently on Sundays. This may be

an indication that the operator is a man who has a job which takes him out during the day and gives him Sundays off. It does not seem that very much has been done about this case which somehow must be solved. If it is a true bill it very much upsets our calculations. The other stations which were formerly operating in other parts of the country have not come up again.

I had a meeting with D.G. and Frost. D.G. does not approve of Frost's appointing Regional Officers, with the mobile unit sections at Darlington and in the Reading area. He thinks the work should be done by the Asst.R.S.L.O. Frost pointed out that it was necessary for these people to have some technical knowledge if they were to keep their end up. I am inclined to agree, but I do not see why we should not appoint someone to the RSLO staff who could do ordinary duty as well as wireless hunts which are few and far between. If we are building up for the Second Front we may as well try and find one or two people with a knowledge of wireless. I have told Frost to try and get Maltby to move his units to Newcastle and Reading so that they will be close to our regional offices. I have also asked him to consult with MacIver who is looking for regional officers and may be able to find two with wireless knowledge.

Dick has seen Diplock, It seems that Duff is absolutely set on our sending a party

to Glenalmond. The head of it is to have dual responsibility with Cowgill and will report to Dick and myself. I do not imagine that this arrangement will please S.I.S. and frankly I cannot see that it will do anyone much good.

Gibbs has arrived in W. Africa.

I dined with J.C., Marriott and Cavendish-Bentinck. The latter told me that he knew of 3 cases where people had paid sums as large as £3,500 in £1 notes to art galleries and jewellers. In one case the purchase was made at Tooth's gallery and the other at Mappin & Webbs. A Mr. Todd of Mappin & Webb knows about the latter deal. Cavendish-Bentinck suggested that it would be more difficult for black marketers to conceal their ill-gotten gains if a D.R. was passed making it illegal to tender more than £25 in £1 for the purchase of goods. Prima Facie the idea seems a good one, but there may possibly be snags.

October 21st

Brooman-White and Courtney Young came to consult me about Chinchilla Kobbe, the new Spanish Consul who is going to Vancouver. B.J.s disclose that he was flung out of the political bureau of the Falange on account of his anglo-American sympathies. The Japs were consequently very disturbed to find that he has now been sent to Vancouver. It had previously been

arranged through Alcazar and the German Organ that someone should be sent who would work as an Axis spy, in this very important post. In the course of his business Cobbe would be representing the Japs and he has therefore made contact with the Jap Embassy at Madrid. He was filled up with a good deal of propaganda as to how Spain's interests were wrapped up with those of the Axis, and finally it seems that rather reluctantly he has agreed to work for the Germans and Japs. B.-W thinks that he would be easily turned round. He is going to New Orleans, Washington, New York and Montreal en route for Vancouver. The difficulty is that there is nobody very suitable to run him either in Security Co-Ordination or in Vancouver. I am asking Victor to take the matter up in New York and Canada and if necessary B-W might go out to Montreal to do the job, which he would undoubtedly handle it extremely well. Having placed the man in touch with the police in Vancouver he could then retire.

I took the Wednesday meeting. An important German agent, a Portuguese journalist named Manoel Mesquita dos SANTOS, left Lisbon at the end of April on a mission to Lourenco Marques. The ship in which he was recently returning to Lisbon put in at Freetown and he was arrested. He is being sent home for interrogation. An important German agent, Andres Pigrau BLAY a Uruguayan has recently been detained at Trinidad on his way to S. America. He is

an agent of the Marine Section of the Abwehr.

The Germans are getting into the Portuguese cyphers which give them good information from Brazil.

Milmo spoke about the case of Pierre MOREL. His interrogation at 020 discloses that he received considerable sums of money from the Germans for services rendered, over a fairly long period. According to his own story he originally got into touch with the Germans through one CONSTANTINI who was recruiting an air force after the French collapse which would be used against this country. He said that his purpose in joining this unit was to escape to England with his plane. Through CONSTANTINI he was approached by one SCHMIDT of the German Embassy in Paris who ultimately sent him to England in order that he might join the Free French and fly one of our planes back to France. He also had other alternative assignments. He is one of those difficult cases where a man tells the truth but not the whole truth. We regard him with the gravest suspicion.

Joe Stephenson talked about DONOHUE who was closely associated with PREETZ. Quite unknown to us he succeeded in reaching this country some months ago. Lately he has been employed in Mooney's Bar, and has now been arrested and interrogated. He has told us a good deal about PREETZ

and his story though interesting in many respects is not a very convincing one in so far as the part he played is concerned. There is little doubt that he knew what PREETZ was doing. The Irish held him for a short time but he was released, probably owing to some dispute between the Garda and the Ministry of Defence. At that time he was a prisoner of the Garda. I am told that now all such prisoners come under the Ministry of Defence. The most interesting fact that emerged was that PREETZ came here in the name of MITCHELL on the 28th September 1939. He arrived at Holyhead and aroused suspicion owing to the German visas on his passport. He was thoroughly searched but nothing incriminating was found on him. Clearly he lost his nerve since he returned to Dublin by the next boat.

I raised the question of HARZBERG. Ramsbotham said that after enquiry the F.B.I. came to the conclusion that he was a genuine philatelist. I am not altogether inclined to accept this since tradition-ally philately has been a cover for espionage.

There are some interesting ISBA messages showing that Tricycle and Balloon are both still regarded as somewhat doubtful in Berlin, but have got away with it in so far as their master in Lisbon was concerned. Tricycle has been given \$25,000 and a new ink known as "H". He is due to arrive today or tomorrow.

Osbert Peake came to see me about a German called LOSER. It is alleged that this man was naturalised at our request. I told Peake that I could not remember anything about it but I thought it had more probably been at the request of S.I.S. or S.O.E. I would find out and let him know. It seems that LOSER has told someone else that it cost Baron HATVANI £2,000 to obtain his release from internment.

Peake also said a word about the DAUBENY case. I told him that we regarded it as a very serious one, that the extent of leakage was appalling and that it was worse in high than in low quarters. He said that he hoped that did not include the H.O. I told him of the suggestion by the Executive that the P.M. should answer a question on the subject of leakage in the House.

I suggested to the D.G. that he might like to see Smuts as I felt that this might be of assistance of Webster. He is going to see what can be done.

Lewis came to see me about the Kameradschaftsdienst. We told him that we thought it was a matter for Section V. and the G.C. & C.S. Lewis agrees that it was not really an Admiralty matter and that although great credit is due to Robertson-Macdonald for the energy he has displayed in pursuing the case, his continued employment on the work could not really be

justified since he personally was not an expert in codes. I said that I would take up the whole question at the R.S.S. meeting tomorrow.

I had a talk with Jock Whyte about pre-war spies. He mentioned one or two whom I had totally forgotten. I suggested to him that he might go over the original list in order to consider whether a thorough interrogation, possibly by the Czechs, would not yield some result.

I attended the dinner given to Toby by the office. The D.G. made an excellent speech and was followed by Toby, who gave an account of some of his experiences in the Security Service. He recalled the early days of the war at the Scrubs when Tin-Eye used to walk about with a large hiatus between his sweater and the top of his trousers, putting up minutes about "loathly Germans" and "scrofulous Bosches". His best remark was connected with the case of a German who said he wished to remain interned. Tin-Eye wrote the following minute "Since when has it been the privilege of a scrofulous Bosche to arrogate to himself the right to determine his own destiny?" After Toby, Theo rose to protest against the unwarranted attack on "Tin-Eye's No-Man's-Land". He made an extremely amusing speech. Everybody seemed to enjoy the evening.

We have now got some further details about Operation Brock. The Nissen hut

was completely disintegrated. Pieces were discovered as far as 70 yards away. Within half-an-hour two policeman, a Home Guard officer, a Home Guard private and a shepherd were on the scene. Since then the police have been busily investigating the case. Interest appeared to be flagging when the Home Guard officer advanced the theory that the top of one of the sticky bombs had corroded through and set alight to all the rest. However an expert from the W.O. has now been down. Parts of a fuse have been found. At least 5 policemen have been engaged for the last 24 hours digging among the ruins and suspicion now falls on a private in the R.E.s who asked for a lift that night at about midnight and who has made a statement which has been proved to be incorrect. The Intelligence Officer of the 25th Division has also been called in and is showing a lively interest. An announcement will go into the press on Friday and the Det. Supt. of the Hants Constabulary is also going to arrange for the local press to run the case hereafter. Photographs are available. Burt came to see me as he felt that the discovery of the German Bickford fuse and the Norwegian compass was working the local police into quite a fever. They now feel that they have a serious saboteur in their midst. I told Burt to soothe them down bit.

2880
It is possible that the Yugoslav who recruited the Snark in Madrid may be going to America on a forged Brazilian passport. In that event the Snark and the head of the Yugoslav intelligence have got a plan for having him eaten alive by rats in order to make him talk. The matter is under investigation.

Mosley has written a petition to the P.M. on behalf of the interned members of the B.U.F. We have been asked to render a report. If we release any of these people it would seem to be a fundamental mistake since it would obviously raise misgivings in the minds of the Russians and the parties of the Left. It would also be undesirable from a purely security point of view.

October 22nd

I took the R.S.S. meeting. Groups X10 and 11 have now been handed over to one of the "Y" units. Some progress has been made with the Italian ISOS. Group 8 is to be gingered up and other material which has been under cover of some naval procedure looks like coming out. R.S.S. have had a record week in intercepting 7,700 messages, 2,500 of which have been decyphered. I raised the question of giving Group 7/23 to the Russians. It is by far the most important Russian groups and unless it is one huge XX should be vital to the Soviet at this moment. We have given them a number of other groups which

are no good and some of which are defunct, but not the ones that are really vital to them. There appears to be no cryptographic or intelligence reason why they should not have it. The argument is merely that they are being extremely cagey with us and that therefore this group is being held up in the meantime. The Committee passed a resolution recommending that it should go to the Russians as a matter of urgency.

We also discussed the Kameradschaftsdienst. Frost announced that he had had a meeting with Felix Cowgill at which it had been recommended that Gilbert Kyle of T-R's section should take over the whole thing. T-R was rather piqued that this should have been done without prior consultation with himself. The idea however seems to me a good one since if Kyle is in charge the work will be well done.

The D.G. has been to see D.C. to discuss with him and C. the future of ACE. Duff said that in normal times he would have no hesitation in saying that Section V. and ourselves should be amalgamated under one head. He thought however that circumstances being what they are, we should send 6 people down to Glenalmond and that the head of this section should have equal status with Felix. He would report to me and be responsible for collecting from Section V. any information that we require. The D.G. had previously

made up his mind that it was no good our sending 6 officers to bury themselves in the country. It would mean getting others to take over their duties in London and a consequent dislocation of our work. He felt that the only thing to do in the circumstances was to have two or three meetings a week alternately in London and Glenalmond and he would like a free hand to deal with Viv. on all these questions. He then went on to say that he felt that C.E. had been very much neglected in the past. Felix Cowgill had been left in the country to plough his own furrow and had had little support. He did not consider him a big enough man to be in control of such an important branch of S.T.S. work. Apart from the interest which he personally had in C.E. abroad he thought that the offensive side of S.I.S. did not realise how important C.E. was to their operations for if they did they might not have lost so heavily in the field. He said this without bitterness. His one idea was to get on with the war as quickly as possible and to retire when it was over to his fireside and carpet slippers. I gather that C. did not demur at any of the D.G.s criticisms and agreed that we should have a free hand to settle matters with Viv. Personally I am rather appalled at the idea of the meetings, particularly if we are going to hold them twice a week. The D.G. has some idea that the various sections will bring along their

important cases and that they will be discussed across the table. I have told him that I cannot see this working out in practice since cases are already discussed constantly on the lower level. I did however see a need for Joint Planning. If however we are going to meet 2 or 3 times a week it will be a serious strain for me to go to Glenalmond which means at the least the loss of half a day.

October 23rd

Viv. came in. He told me that he had obtained approval from C. for a new charter for Section V. giving them a fixed establishment. He was very pleased about this.

T-R's section had also been under discussion. He thought it would be given independence under the direction of Morton Evans and would have Ryle as a liaison with section V. I gather that Dansey is likely to retire before very long and that probably Moses Beddington will take his place. I do not know how much this will be a change for the better. As S.I.S. is at present constituted there is no seat on the Production Board for C.E. Viv. has put this forward but it has been turned down. The argument given was that if Section V. were represented M.E.S. would also want a representative, and that in 1971 the Production Board never really met. It sounds almost

incredible that C.E. should not be given more say in the affairs of an organisation like S.I.S. It is tantamount to saying that Bentevegni of Abt. III should not be at Canaris's headquarters.

Viv had been given the correspondence on security measures in connection with broadcasting of messages to agents. I explained to him what had already been done. In future all such messages would be approved either by S.I.S. or S.O.E. and Kirkpatrick of the B.B.C. would be given the names of the approving officers. I made it clear that we were not in a position to advise on the content of the messages since only S.I.S. and S.O.E. had any knowledge of what the Allied Govts. were doing.

Viv. talked to me about the case of HUMPHREYS which I. had brought to his notice. HUMPHREYS who had been employed in G.C. & C.S., knew all about M.S.S. and was now at Gib. in connection with Torch. He had I gather caused a certain amount of trouble with G.C & C.S. Viv. was horrified about our information which showed him as a former associate of Arthur Albert TESTER and Charles ADDIS the solicitor. He had not previously seen the correspondence which had been handled by I said that if there was any prospect of HUMPHREYS being blackmailed by ADDIS he was probably better placed at Gib. than in this country.

October 24th

The D.G. has sent off a letter to Mason Mac on security at Gib. He draws attention to recent incidents and asks rather tentatively whether Mason Mac is altogether satisfied that everything has been done to prevent a repetition of such incidents. We feel very strongly that Medlam is not really up to the job. He takes little interest in security and is somewhat gullible on the C.E. side. Probably Kirby Green would do his work much more effectively. Medlam is heartily disliked by most people on the Rock and has been making difficulties for Bristow the Section V. man.

I had a talk with Curry on Research. I rather hope that with their new establishment S.I.S. might be able to make a better contribution. I thought it possible that if Italian ISOS came out Curry could combine a study of that product with his research work.

I had lunch with Jimmy Rothschild who is worried about the behaviour of his French cousin in Canada. The latter has taken on a mistress who is reported by the Canadian Police for defeatist talk.

Victor left last night on the first stage of his journey to America.

October 25th

I had a talk with Mills about the U.S.A. and explained to him the position. I am still anxious that he should go there. This suggestion, which I made when I got back from New York, has been side-tracked pending some settlement between ourselves and S.I.S. on future liaison with the F.B.I. It is possible that we might send Tricycle to Canada, in which case it would be essential for someone there to handle him properly.

Viv. telephoned about a report on Ireland which is being sent to the Foreign Minister for transmission to the F.M. The latter had become alarmed by one of the telegrams by the Italian representative in Dublin which appeared to him to indicate leakage of information. In actual fact the information that has been obtained by Berardis in Ireland is of little consequence. Much of it has been inaccurate.

I told Viv. that I thought the report which had been put up by Jane gave away too much about our relations with Dan and S.I.S. agents. I thought this could better be said verbally to the Foreign Secretary.

I asked Ramsbotham to come and see me about the case of the German LUNING who had been arrested at Havana. It seemed to me there was a lot of information which might usefully be distributed to interested parties. I thought that for this purpose he should keep in close touch with Milmo. He really ought to be in B.I.B.

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887

Lewis rang up about the Kameradschafts-
dienst. I told him that the whole ques-
tion was in the hands of S.I.S. but that
I thought that Ayle was going to take it
over. I undertook to speak to Viv.

S.I.S. have a report containing a copy
of a letter from REICHERT of D.N.B. Rome
to JORDA of D.N.B. Ankara dated 13.3.42 sa-
ying that there was a plan to build up
a Near Eastern Directorate of the D.N.B.
under REICHERT in Cairo with agencies at
Jerusalem, Damascus, Bagdad, Teheran and
Kabul and in Arabia. Teheran is thought
to be the first of these places likely
to be occupied. JORDA's final destination
is to be Bagdad, which has been earmarked
as the capital of the "Celebrated Unified
Arab State of Iraq, Syria and Palestine".
In the light of forthcoming events this
all seems to be a little premature.

J.C., Marriott and Harmer came to see me
about a woman called

This woman had been
recruited here some time ago and sent out
to Unoccupied France by S.I.S. Within a
very short time she got into touch with
a friend who was a collaborationist
called CHAUDEL. This man introduced her
to a German agent known as Bibi at Cannes.
Bibi is probably an S.D. agent. The
woman's mission was partly political, part-
ly intelligence. J.C. did
not consider her reliable or profitable

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688
as a ~~XX~~ and was inclined to tell U.I.S. that we did not want her. I said that as she had certain cover addresses I thought it might be as well to test them out particularly as she had been promised money from Switzerland. I thought that even if she was not reliable her traffic might assist us in coming to a more definite conclusion. Whatever we do we should have to look after her from the security point of view.

Marriott came to see me about the Brazilian. It had apparently been agreed that Mathews should put over some deception in connection with Forch. He had in fact asked - to oblige him by sending a telegram to his Government saying that all the information circulating in Fleet St. and diplomatic circles about Dakar as an objective had been put out intentionally by the British Govt. in order to divert attention of the the Germans from the real target which was France. - had been somewhat worried about this and had gone round to see L.D.M.I.(O). The latter was embarrassed and promised to look into it. He now wanted to know what reply he should give. He could not say that the information was true and if he said that the whole thing was unauthorised he might damage Mathews' relations. Personally I think the approach, which was known to the M.A. should not be asked to send a

telegram to his government the contents of which he knows to be untrue. Apart from anything else the inference is somewhat insulting. It is tantamount to saying that anything that goes to the Brazilian Govt. is bound to leak to the Germans, or that we know that the Brazilian cyphers are insecure. The information might have been passed in the form of a personal view by Matthews based on something confidential that he had heard.

October 26th

Viv. telephoned to say that the Catalina investigation was satisfactory from the cypher point of view in so far as the Air Ministry and M.I.D. were concerned. He had however since discovered that C.G.C. had telegraphed on the subject, and this angle was being investigated. It seems that he has got documents from the Spanish Police in Madrid which disclose S.A.B. and S.O.E. agents in Africa. These documents were being carried by a Frenchman called CLAMORGAN who was washed up on the Spanish shore. ISSS shows that these documents are in the hands of the Germans.

A flap is developing about the incident. D.M.I. is apparently rather rattled. I have asked Bevan to come round and talk it over.

390
The D.G. has sent a letter to Stephenson explaining to him his charter in the Caribbean.

Lennox tells me that our attack in Egypt which is developing is against fortified lines of the 1914 pattern. The enemy defences are in depth and they are surrounded by anti-tank mines. It will probably take a week or two before we can hope to reach the stage of open warfare.

Father is now in London being coached up in misraffic in case he comes down in enemy territory and has to give himself up. If he can put over a good story the Germans may allow him to escape back to this country.

The D.G. called a meeting with Barker, myself and Tangye. He explained to Tangye that the work of the Press Section had been reviewed and that he had decided that it was a necessary part of the office machinery. He thought however that Tangye should take stock of the position and make up his mind which of his agents was most valuable. He thought that there was a limit beyond which the organisation could not expand. Tangye said that he thought the expenses would not be so high in future since he had now reached the stage where he was being entertained himself by the various contacts he had made. It was agreed that he should be given closer direction.

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ACT 1958. *Oct 2000*

841

October 27th

I attended the D.G.'s meeting. The question of an organisation to deal with British subjects returning from abroad was again discussed. The D.G. agreed to the establishment of the Reception Centre and to Albert being employed at the R.P.S. as a link with Taylor and the Information Index. He will in fact come under Taylor. He will be responsible for preparing as far as possible cases for interrogation at Devonshire House where the new office is to be.

The D.M.I. is still very worried about

He says that the matter must somehow be liquidated as far as the H.O. is concerned. He thinks that if

could be induced to come up and say that the whole thing had been a mistake and that he did not wish it pursued further, that would be a satisfactory conclusion. I spoke to Brig. Vale and told him that I would arrange this.

The D.G. talked to me about Stephenson's charter on behalf of the Security Service in U.S.A. He is quite definite that we must correspond with him in our own cyphers on all matters in which we are interested. I have explained to him that this is very far from being Viv's idea. He maintains however that it is covered by his letter to C. and C's reply which acquiesces in it more or less by default.

A rubber boat has been found on the Sussex coast. I gather that it can be accounted for. It is from a German plane which came down in the channel, and has evidently been in the water for a considerable time.

Curry's report on the German S.S. is now printed and its distribution is being considered.

Gen. CRUWELL, a P/W who commanded a Panzer Division in Libya, takes a poor view of Canaris. He says that he was in the habit of receiving Abwehr reports but that he never paid any attention to them. At the same time he has conveyed in one of his letters to a friend in Germany that he would be grateful for Canaris's assistance in effecting his release. He seems to have a pathetic belief that Canaris must have many men working for him over here who could quite easily do the job.

Roger Hollis came to talk to me about the Communists. We appear at the moment to be extremely well informed about their activities. There is no doubt that they are trying to make hay while the sun shines, and serious efforts are being made to penetrate the armed forces.

October 25th

I took the Wednesday meeting. An Einz 1 Tech. Luft. agent, Oscar Sanchez GARCIA, has been taken off at Trinidad on his way to S. America. It has been decided to knock off SIMOEZ who appears to be inactive. M.-.9 are asking us to let them have an officer at the London Transit Camp to deal with the security aspect of cases of escapees and evaders. I am proposing that Caroe should take this on as a part-time job.

An Irishman named HUMPHRIES who sold his passport in Unoccupied France, has arrived at Milford Haven en route for Eire. D.O. say that they cannot apply the D.A.S. even though the body is within the 3 mile limit. This seems to me rather weak since we are constantly pulling bodies in at Bermuda and Trinidad. Jim Hale is trying to get the question sorted out.

Berlin have been calling Dublin all day. Some reply may be expected in the evening. I have suggested that the D.O. should instruct Maffey to inform Joe Walshe, so that if possible they can go in and close the set down. If this is done officially they will not be able to say that they never heard it operating. The matter is important in view of the impending Torch operation.

Joe Archer talked to me about the new

243

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ACT 1958. *od 2000*

rocket plane which seems to be developing fairly satisfactorily although the teething troubles are considerable. A matter of 5 thousandths of an inch here or there is sufficient to shake the whole place to pieces. The speed is colossal, and its great point is that it gets over the use of a propeller which cannot put up with more than a certain amount of wind resistance. It is thought that the speed limit for propellers has almost been reached.

October 29th

I had a meeting with Field Robinson and Caroe about the case of The latter escaped from Occupied France and is prepared to go back to Germany. Doubts have arisen about using him since he appears to have been in contact with a number of other escaped prisoners at Sib. and knows a good deal about the escape routes. The position is to be further explored.

The D.G. discussed with Viv., Dick and myself the set up in W. Africa. Viv. said that S.I.S. were really awaiting Gibbs report. It was agreed that the first joint meeting should take place next week. The D.G. wants B-W and Kamsbotham to attend. This will make it difficult to discuss controversial subject of policy, unless it is anticipated that the should come down in sailor suits and play with Philby and in the

nursery while we have tea in the drawing-room.

I spent the whole morning trying to get something going about W. Africa. Stone and Rogers, late of Freetown, want to come up and see me.

A new XX agent known as LIPSTICK is arriving. We contemplated the arrest of the wireless operator from the Gilleardis. Having got the crew list from Newfoundland it was discovered that the wireless operator was a well-known ISO character. The F.O. were ready to let us deal with me if the ship was still in port but were against his being removed on the high seas. The Admiralty are taking a different view.

Lennox tells me that a special enquiry is being made into the Catalina incident with particular reference to the documents found on CLAMORAN. Although S.O.E. sponsored C's departure they do not appear to have censored his documents. Our view is that we cannot take responsibility for saying where documents of this kind should or should not be taken out of the country, unless we are fully acquainted with the activities of the agents of allied Governments. A repetition of the Catalina incident could probably be prevented if everyone carrying documents were made to empty their pockets before departure. Documents could be sealed in

895

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ACT 1958. Oct 2000

an envelope and placed in a leaded canister which could be jettisoned if the plane got into difficulties.

The F.O. are making a fuss about the interrogation of 5 suspects at Freetown. One of them is the barber from whom correspondence was taken at Cape Town. Tests carried out after the departure of the ship from Cape Town showed that the letters he was carrying contained secret ink messages about the movements of our convoys. It is proposed to interrogate him and several others who were associated with him and to detain anyone who is suspect. The F.O. seem worried about the detention of so many Portuguese subjects. I spoke to Woxley and agreed that we would interrogate the 5 suspects and report further before detaining them.

I had a talk with B.W and Antony about tomorrow's meeting with D.M.I. on the subject of ^{the subject} they are rather afraid that the D.M.I. may try and restrict our use of diplomatic personnel. Personally I do not think so. In any case I shall resist it strongly. I put forward a suggestion that we might consider planting a bogus cypher to be used between some S. American attache and his Govt. We would plant this cypher on the Germans and then use it for deception purposes. The difficulty is that we should have to take into our confidence not only someone

here but someone in the foreign affairs dept. of the Govt. concerned. If this got back to the Germans our deception would merely be an indication of what we did not intend to do. On the other hand if we use some cypher between ourselves and the Americans for the same purpose the probability is that the contents of the messages would not be believed. The deception would in any case be difficult to maintain for long.

October 30th

Harker held a meeting about the facts that have to be published after the execution of SCOTT-FORD. With the concurrence of S.I.S. details have been given about the part played by WELTZIEN's show. It seemed a question whether this should be included or not. Later in the day I saw C. I pointed out that our only interest lay in the possibility of so much mud being thrown back about the attempt to penetrate WELTZIEN's office that the value of our story about SCOTT-FORD might be diminished. It was of course for C. to say how far he thought the publication of this information was going to react on his own organisation. It was eventually decided that we should omit the passage about WELTZIEN but pass the facts to our Minister at Lisbon for communication to SALAXAR, after the execution had taken place. Representations had already been made to the

Portuguese Govt. about WELTZIEN's activities but they had so far not seen fit to take any action.

ISBA discloses that the Germans are wrangling a good deal about Tricycle's expenses and future salary.

Tangye came to see me. By an oversight the confidential B.M. giving Harker's report on his investigation of the Press Section had been sent down to him. He had naturally read it all from cover to cover, ~~and~~ was extremely incensed, and wanted to know what he should do. I said that as he had seen the report, which had been addressed to him, there was no use pretending that he had not. The best thing that he could do was to answer it in a minute to me which I would put forward to the D.G. Tangye seemed to think that most of the criticisms were unjustifiable and that his work was not appreciated.

C. told me this afternoon that the P.M. was hopping mad about Alba who had communicated a report to his Govt. on our forthcoming operations. Personally I think it is difficult to blame Alba. People will not realise that however benevolent and pro-British a neutral Ambassador may appear it is his duty to report to his Govt. what he hears, sees and thinks. The fault lies with those who confide in him. He has an immense circle of friends in all walks of life, and probably a good deal of

information goes west over the second glass of port.

We had a meeting this afternoon in the D.M.I.'s room to which Vale, D.D.M.I(O) Carlyle, M.I.1.(L), Bevan, the Controller, T.A.R. and I were present. The purpose was to discuss. We admitted quite frankly that although it had been agreed with the Controller that the information should be passed to as a conscious agent, the technique was bad since it obviously placed the W.O. in a false position. It was suggested that in future such information might be passed either as gossip or as a calculated indiscretion. In some instances M.I.1(L) might be a better channel. As Carlyle knew nothing about the impending operations it was decided that he should in the future be in the know. I then raised the question of leakage of information through high places, persons in the Services and in civilian Departments. I thought that for the purposes of deception, it would be well worth while acquiring a list of the principal contacts of the Spanish Ambassador and M.A., and possibly also those of the Turkish and Swedish Embassies. We could then select those who would have knowledge of operations. They could be approached on a personal basis and asked to notify the controller whenever they were likely to see one of the Ambassadors or M.A.s selected. The controller would

give them the necessary guidance both on a defensive and offensive basis. e.g. they would know how to parry awkward questions and how to lead the conversation on to suitable lines of deception. This suggestion seemed to find favour.

Kellar came to see me about the Pasha. We are still unable to solve the matter of his communications. We are getting still further which may help. This means that an Arabic translator will have to be found.

October 31st

I saw Rogers and asked him to consider the job of Asst.D.S.O. in Gambia. He was reluctant to leave this country but seemed to think that if he accepted the job it might help him in his future career.

A Dr. WILSON has been arrested in Dublin for assisting British P/W to escape. Walshe has complained to Maffey about the whole of the M.I.9 set up, details of which appear to be known to the Eire Govt. Maffey is much concerned, and seems to be making rather heavy weather of the whole affair. He has suggested that tnt S. of S. should go and see Dulanty. Cecil and I agreed that it would be far better to say quite frankly to the Irish that as long as they remain neutral and detain our P/Ws we shall of

course try and get them out of internment. They should further be told that this is a rudeness which they must expect. I gather that several others have been arrested as well. Mafley is doing his best to get the proceedings damped down.

It has been agreed with C. that all Axis wires emanating from Dublin shall be held up until after Torch has started. The attempts of Berlin to get into touch with Dublin were eventually successful and an en clair reply was sent: "Baldigst auf anderem Wege". This obviously means the diplomatic route. Probably the Germans have got wind of Torch and are anxious to know about the movements of convoys from N.Ireland.

Loxley rang up to say that the action with regard to the SCOTT-FORD case was approved by the F.O.

C. has written me a letter commenting on the minutes of the R.S.S. meeting in connection with Group 7/23. He notes that the R.S.S. Committee deprecate his policy and suggests that this is not really a matter for their concern. He enquires whether the Committee was unanimous. I gather that the minutes were taken to him by Cowg 11 who described them as rank mutiny on the part of 5 of his officers. Maltby is shaking in his shoes and is saying that he is going to repudiate the whole thing. I am replying to

901

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ACT 1958. *Oct 2000*

the effect that the matter came up in the ordinary course of the committee's business and that the fact that certain of the groups already handed over were dead did not appear to be known to and possibly not to C. himself. It seemed therefore necessary to bring the matter to his attention. I had suggested doing it personally but had decided otherwise rather in deference to Ferguson's wishes. I said however that the committee was highly qualified to give advice about ISUS and ISA since on it were represented all the producers and users. The fact is of course that the only advice C. ever gets is from Felix who is not always aware of the full facts and is in any case biassed against giving anybody anything.

Gillfillan's monthly report has the usual characteristic opening: "Despite the commission of a number of serious outrages the peace of Northern Ireland has been well maintained during the month of September 1942. 167 indictable offences were reported compared with 152 for the previous month."

Geoffrey Wethered came to see me about the possibility of a job in W. Africa. I said that the whole thing was in the melting pot but that possibly someone might be required to cover the joint interests of S.I.S. and ourselves in Lagos. He seemed quite ready to take on some job of the kind.

November 1st

I read an extremely interesting report by two representatives of S.I.S. who had managed to get away from Japan. One of them had been interrogated every day from 9 in the morning till lunch time and from 2 o'clock in the afternoon until sometimes 11 at night. After being held for 8 months he was finally released. His accusers seemed so confident that he would get 10 years imprisonment that they were more than usually forthcoming about their methods. They showed him a series of documents which they had intercepted and disclosed to him in some detail the activities of Dr. SORGE, a Soviet spy whom they had arrested in 1941. It is possible that they thought that C's man had been associated with SORGE since he had resided in the same block of flats. C's man did in fact know SORGE but had always regarded him as a hot Nazi. SORGE had been operating in Japan for 10 years and had a fairly widespread organisation and a W/T transmitter. He was assisted by a Yugoslav called VUKOLEVICH. The organisation had been given away by the latter's wife. She was disgruntled because her husband had deserted her for a Japanese woman. V. had been arrested and under great mental strain had given the whole party away. Dr. SORGE was also arrested but would not have been broken down had it not been for the facts disclosed by V. SORGE is apparently a

German who was either born or had lived in Russia for many years. So much was he regarded as a hot Nazi by everyone that he had succeeded in penetrating the German Embassy where he was persona grata and shown confidential documents. A man with whom he had relations there was summarily executed by the Germans in the grounds of the Legation. Only once did SORGE give himself away, - when he was tight he said that he could not stand the Nazis. His position was so strong however that nobody paid any attention to the remark. SORGE's performance is all the more incredible when considered in the light of Japanese supervision of the alien population. Every alien has a dossier and is under constant supervision. The Japs disclosed that SORGE had acquired a considerable amount of information regarding Singapore and Hong Kong which had proved very useful to them in their attack on those places. There is no doubt that the Russians are far better in the matter of espionage than any other country in the world. I am perfectly certain that they are well bedded down here and that we should be making more active investigations. They will be a great source of trouble to us when the war is over.

November 2nd

I had a long talk with Stone who is quite ready to go out to Freetown. He explained to me the workings of the I.B. staff in Sierra Leone.

Viv. rang up to say that C. was horrified about HUMPHREYS. C. had decided however to leave him at Gib. at any rate for the time being. I agreed that he would probably be better there than in this country.

The wireless operator on the Gilleardis has been taken off. It was just as well as the ship was about to run into the Torch convoy, which before turning south had sailed three-quarters of the way to Newfoundland in the teeth of an appalling gale.

The Libyan battle is beginning to move and ~~xxx~~ number of Germans and Italians have been cut off near the coast. The Germans counterattacked. Twenty tanks got through but the gap was closed again. It seems that the Germans may be getting short of armoured units and petrol. We have over 300 tanks knocked out but have recovered at least 270.

The American Navy in the Pacific is seriously out-numbered in battleships, cruisers and aircraft carriers, but slightly stronger in destroyers and sub-

marines. The airfield at Guardalcanar has been recovered. Our shipping losses are extremely heavy.

I am told that Winston in discussing lorch with the President by cable, replied to the suggestion that the Americans should land first in N. Africa and be followed by the British in order not to wound the susceptibilities of the French, concluding his telegram by saying that though his experience in these matters was limited he had never before associated seduction with rape.

I had lunch with Isham and Buist of M.I.9 about escaped P/Ws and evaders. I told them that I was proposing to send Caroe down to the Transit Camp as soon as he returned. I impressed upon them that we should have to rely very largely upon their experience of escape routes. There was no Security Service Magic in cases of this sort. We would so far as it was possible identify P/WS but we should have to rely on their knowledge and experience to say whether his story was plausible. I impressed upon them that the question was one of vital importance to us and that we would only be too ready to assist in any way we possible could.

I had a meeting with T.A.R. and the Controller when we worked out a scheme on the lines that I had suggested to the D.M.I. Antony is going to get the list

of contacts and we may later consider getting the F.M.'s support in approaching the various highly placed individuals concerned.

I have sent a wire off to Gibbs asking him to give us an estimate of the personnel required for W.Africa.

November 3rd

At the D.G.s meeting today the question of allowing aliens to join the army was considered. It was felt that on the whole provided aliens were properly vetted there might be some relaxation of the existing procedure.

Emerson, Minister of Justice from Newfoundland called to see the D.G. He seemed satisfied with our Security officers. He mentioned that he had a certain amount of difficulty with the Americans who regarded the whole of the Western Hemisphere as their province. They were rather inclined to make enquiries on their own, without saying anything to the local authorities.

Tangye has handed his memo to the D.G.

We had our first meeting with Section V at Glenalmond. Viv. made an opening speech. I am bound to say it made me feel quite uncomfortable. He announced the new establishment for Section V. by saying that Major Cowgill, whom he hoped

shortly to be able to call Lt. Col. Cowgill, but who would always be known to us as Felix, had succeeded in getting this matter through. The D.G. made an appeasement speech and referred to the various matters which he thought we could profitably discuss in detail. He said that in his experience in India, it was impossible to deal with subversive movements on a provincial basis. In the same way C.E. must be treated as a whole. It was therefore necessary that we should get much closer together. He and Duff Cooper would have wished our organisations to be unified but in the present circumstances this appeared to be impossible.

Curry's report was discussed and it was agreed that I should see Cavendish Bentinck and draw his attention to the points raised by Curry regarding the operational significance of integrated C.E. material.

An Irish P/W named JOYCE has arrived from Madrid. He was interned for some time (19 months) in what is normally a transit camp somewhere near Frankfurt. He says that he succeeded in escaping and apparently got into touch with one of our escape organisations. He has created a bad impression. The matter is further complicated by his wish to take a holiday at his home in Co. Mayo. He is being kept on some pretext or other in order that his story can be thoroughly examined. Cases of this sort are going

to present very serious difficulties, since under military law there are no powers for holding a man who is regarded with suspicion.

Lennox tells me that the 10th Armoured Corps broke right through the Germans lines last night. Preponderance of armour vehicles is about 2-1 in our favour. We have some 800 tanks.

November 4th

I took the Wednesday meeting. On 30th Oct. the German I.S. in Lisbon reported under date 22.10.42 from Egypt that our present offensive was undertaken for political reasons and had a limited aim of winning back Mersa Matruh and the surrounding area. The report concludes with a description of the present strength in armaments of the 8th Army. On the 22nd October Lisbon reported the possibility of an attack on Dakar by American and English units now stationed along the African coast. It was thought that the specially strong garrison at Gib. was intended for an operation against Tangier in the immediate future. The report was sent on to Berlin with reserve although the source was stated to be a good one. Klaus LANGHORST, an official of the Abwehr at Le Havre who has been responsible for organising several small boat expeditions, is at present paying a visit to Casablanca. Canaris is inspecting the Abwehr stations in Norway, accom-

909
panied by the head of Abteilungen I and III.

The D.G. has had a telegram from Stephenson suggesting that Sir William Wiseman should supervise the work of the Security Service on Stephenson's behalf. Wiseman is a director of Kuhn-Loeb, and was over here a short time ago. This looks rather like another big business stunt by Stephenson.

The D.G. has wired back to say that he sees no useful purpose in interposing Wiseman. He thinks the work of the Security Service can quite easily be carried by him. He has offered to send out an M.I.5 representative if he is over-burdened, which in fact he is. I am pressing again that Mills should go out.

STEPHENSON, the P.W. who was recruited by the Germans and reported to our M.A. in Berne has not yet arrived. Apparently M.I.9 do not wish him to follow the escape route. It seems doubtful therefore whether we shall be able to use him as a XA.

The barber on the ship "Colonial" has been taken off at Freetown. Evidence seems fairly conclusive that he is the culprit. He is on his way back home.

Ede came to see me. When he has finished his work he is going to try and get the
Catalogue Reference: KV 4/190

hang of things. The D.G. has some idea of putting him in as the co-ordinator of a intelligence received from D.S.O.s. Personally I cant see what he can do that cant be done as well or better by Gibbs, unless he takes over Jelf's side of the work. There would be every advantage in getting rid of Jelf and Flowman, who are completely dead-weight.

M.S.S. shows that the Germans are in serio difficulties.

I dined with Vickery. He told me the full story of Subhas Bose. He was under a kind of preventive detention at Calcutta and got two Indian Sikh Communists to smuggle him out of his house and across the frontier to Kabul. In order to distract the attention of his guards he announced that he was going into retreat for meditation and fasting. He had himself screened off and grew a beard. The guards not wishing to disturb his meditations did not penetrate his inner chamber. One night the two Communists smuggled him out of the house. He had told the Communists that he wished to go and see Stalin but when he reached Kabul he decided, after being approached by the Germans that he would prefer to see Hitler. The two Communists were rather bewildered by this but succumbed to the large sums of money which were forthcoming. When Germany attacked Russia they felt that things were going too far and reported themselves to Stalin. The G.P.U. took them in hand

and told them to remain in the pay of the Germans. They were relieved of a good deal of the money which they had already received. These intrigues were known to the Indian Govt. who eventually persuaded the Afghans to expel them. One of them was arrested on crossing the frontier but the other one disappeared. It was at this stage that the Russians approached Hill of S.O.E. in Moscow and suggested that we and the Russians might run the agents together. In proof of their bona fides they supplied Hill with a great deal of interesting information about the German intentions at Kabul and their relations with Subhas Bose. In return the Russians have persistently asked for information about subversive movements on their Chinese eastern frontier. They seem to have a pathetic belief in the British Intelligence Service which in fact has no such information. This the Russians find it hard to believe. D.I.B. are now sending a representative to Moscow to collaborate with the G.P.U. Vickery was wondering whether to send a high official or a man who really knew his stuff. I said that it might be better to send both. The Russians seemed to be rather bewildered and cannot quite understand why the Indian policeman is going to Moscow.

November 5th

There is very good news from Egypt. It seems that we have really broken through and got the Germans and Italians on the run.

At the R.S.S. meeting we discussed the Italian groups which seem to be coming along, particularly those which are being run under some kind of naval procedure. Ryle is getting down to the Kameradschafts dienst. He is taking Leary from the Coding Section of the Censorship.

Horderm and his naval brother came to see me. The latter is rather horrified about careless talk at Weymouth. I showed him the minutes of the Security Executive on the subject, and explained that only a prosecution with a heavy sentence or a statement from the P.M. was likely to do much good at this stage.

Lennox tells me that the Germans now have only about 100 tanks as against 670 of ours. The escarpment to the south of Fouka has been taken.

Walker tells me that some pigeons have been seen on the South Downs. He is going to get some hawks down there. The ones in the Scilly Isles caught several pigeons but they were found to be our own.

D.F.P. rang me up about the case of BOSWORTH, an M.A.P. official who seems to have embezzled about £10,000 which he made on contracts. He has paid large sums into his account in £1 notes. We took out an SOA order at the request of M.A.P. on the understanding that it was only for the purpose of information. They now want to confront BOSWORTH with details of his account and ask for an explanation. I explained to the D.F.P. that we could not feature as a Gestapo on the Civil Service and that it was equally important that SOA should not receive any publicity. I suggested as a way round that the man should be questioned and told that the authorities were doubtful about some of his transactions. They could then say that they were anxious to clear the matter up and that possibly he would have no objection to showing them his passbook. D.F.P. thought this was possible but felt that if he were confronted with a statement of his account he would be more likely to break down.

I had a talk with Viv. about America and Stephenson. I said that unless he refrained from running agents into Hoover's area we could never hope to get any information out of the F.B.I. Viv. seemed from doubtful about Stephenson. He thought now that he was the representative of HDSE, S.O.E. and ourselves, S.I.S. would no longer have any control over him, and that they might be

well advised to drop him altogether and start a separate show. I said that if he was going to propose this I hoped he would let us know as we were not particularly keen on being landed with Stephenson.

Curry and I had a meeting with Cavendish Bentinck when we discussed the presentation of Curry's report to the J.I.C. Later after a talk with Dick and Hart I decided to see Melland before putting forward a paper about the operational value of integrated C.E. information.

November 6th

Noble came to see me about the case of ETSCHT and Mrs. FRIEDMANN. The case has very curious features and it is quite on the cards that Mrs. FRIEDMANN came here as an S.D. agent. The case however is so old that I doubt whether there is much to be learned from it.

Melland came over and Curry, Dick, Hart and I had a talk with him. He was a little worried by certain passages in Curry's report which seemed to imply that the operational significance of ISOS was not being presented to the Chiefs of Staff. He realised however that Curry was really trying to get official backing for Melland in his efforts to paint a rather wider canvas. MELLAND felt that there ought to be regular meetings

between all the users of ISOS, R.S.S., and Palmer of G.C & C.S. He is quite certain that we should all benefit from such discussions. His great difficulty is in putting the full interpretation upon ISOS which necessitates his ringing up ~~of~~ various people. He gets much more from Hart and T-R than anyone else. He gets a certain amount from Palmer, but mighty little from Section V. of whom he appears to have a poor opinion. It was agreed that we would discuss this at our next meeting with S.I.S. and in the meantime we would call off the presentation of Curry's report to the J.I.C. I rang up Canvedish Bentinck and explained to him that there were certain matters which we wished to iron out on a lower lever before the report went forward.

Mills came to see me about the Lipstick case. Lipstick is an extremely interesting character. He is a Republican who managed to fade into obscurity after the Civil War with the assistance of a friend who was in the Civil Guard. He was closely associated with the Catalan Movement and in particular with Cordunella. It was thought desirable that he should try and establish contact with Roca of the Catalan Movement in this country. It occurred to Lipstick that he might be able to obtain his exit permit more easily if he offered his services to the Germans. He made tentative approaches to a German who was a

member of the Barcelona Tennis Club, and through him eventually obtained an introduction to members of the German S.S. It was many months before he could get his exit permit and British visa. During this time he succeeded through the indiscretions of one PASHKIS in learning a good deal about the German I.S. He has now arrived here with an interesting questionnaire, Secret Ink, etc.

November 7th

John Senter came to talk to me about a Norwegian named BLIXBERG who is working for the Russians. He went from Stockholm to Norway and was accompanied by a Russian to the frontier. He reported his activities to S.O.E. in Stockholm. This fact appears to have come to the knowledge of Trygvelie who has asked S.O.E. to lay off owing to delicate negotiations that he is having with Maiski. This all sounds rather mysterious. I have asked Senter to clear up a number of points.

November 8th

Torch began.

November 9th

I had a talk with Inspector White of MAP and Joe Archer about the BOSWORTH case. I explained our point of view to White and suggested that possibly the best

way round was for the S. ofS. for Air to sign an 80a warrant. He said he would report accordingly to Sir Archibald Rowlands the permanent Under Secretary.

Janson and Wood of N.I.D., Dick, Arnold Foster of S.I.S. and myself had a meeting to discuss the paper put out by the Security Executive on anti-sabotage measures. We came to the conclusion that the existing machinery for taking action in specific cases was working satisfactorily and that all that was really required was proper co-ordination of the instructions circulated by this office and by the Security Executive. It seemed to us that the latter should send their instructions here for vetting and should confine themselves solely prophylactic measures.

Lennox tells me that the Torch operation in N. Africa seems to be going well. In addition to the landings on Casablanca, Oran and Algiers, there has been a landing at Philippeville. French M.T.Bs at Alexandria feeling that they ought to be doing something, started roaring round the harbour and loosed one torpedoe into the Mole, killing 11 people. A French battleship had been carefully induced to go into dry dock. Three French destroyers were sunk off Casablanca and the "Jean Bart" has been torpedoed in the harbour.

November 10th

At the D.G.s meeting today the new regulations put out by the War Cabinet Security Panel were discussed. There was no provision for searching officers before they left this country and placing their documents in a leaded box. I said that I felt therefore that the precautions were inadequate, and would not prevent a repetition of the incident they were designed to prevent.

Peter Hope came to see me. He had heard something of jobs for RSLOs abroad. He and Forrest were worried by their lack of knowledge of the work which they felt they might be called upon to do. I explained to him that we were starting a series of lectures on the work of the office.

Joe Archer brought in Chappell to see me. He has taken Blackford's place and seems a great improvement.

Lan Wilson came to talk to me about his visit to USA. He or rather Wren had apparently a certain amount of trouble with the FBI who were not particularly helpful in the preparation of Tricycle. MacSwain in New York did his best and a man called Lanman was sent up from Washington for two days. During this time notional informants to cover the information which Tricycle had given were discussed and agreed upon. It was naturally

assumed that MacSwain and Lanman had the authority to go ahead on behalf of their department. When the whole scheme was submitted to the F.B.I. a rude letter came back from Hoover complaining that the F.B.I. found Tricycle's instructions "for the most part extremely objectionable". A reply has been sent to Hoover pointing out that the whole matter was arranged with members of his department. In order not to exacerbate the feelings of the F.B.I. no mention was made of their very indifferent handling of the case which was really responsible for the present difficulties. I ^{have} am Wilson did an extremely painstaking job and I am quite sure that had he not gone to the U.S.A. Tricycle would never have got away with it in Lisbon. He seems to have satisfied von Kasthoff and Berlin are now less sceptical than they were. He has received a highly interesting questionnaire and 25,000 dollars.

Viv. has rung up to say that Felix will not be present at our A.C.E. meeting tomorrow as he is "in the middle of the battle". Viv. doubts whether he will have the requisite knowledge to discuss certain matters that we have on the agenda. I am rather afraid that Section V. will always be in the middle of a battle, struggling to keep their heads above water. The consequence is that they never have time to do anything but to take ad hoc measures on isolated bits of information. If they could sit back occasion-

nally and take stock of what they are doing they might get better results.

Viv. has sent me a letter saying that C. has asked him to deal with the question on the minutes of the R.S.S. Committee on the Russian group 7/23. He says that a discussion of the kind does not come within the terms of reference of the R.S.S. Committee and is a matter of high policy; he hopes we shall not trespass on such ground in future. He ignores the fact, which was made quite clear to me by Ferguson, that C. had never been informed that the Russian groups already handed over were dead. I am also certain that C. had very little idea as to the extent of group 7/23 since I know that he is only shown isolated messages from time to time. Viv. ends by saying that if I consider that there is any intelligence matter outside the scope of the Committee which should be brought to C's notice, it would be better if I spoke personally to C. or himself. I had thought of sending a reply to this letter but probably it is better to say nothing.

November 11th

Tricycle's questionnaire deals mainly with naval and military matters. Unfortunately one of the Duff was folded over on itself and only a few words of it can be read. It contains all the cover addresses. We hope to get over this by

corresponding to one of the old addresses.

Garbo has recently proposed sending one of his agents to N.Africa, so as to provide us there with a non-existent XX whom we could use if necessary for deception purposes. The set-up would be that this agent would communicate back to Garbo in his secret ink for which he has no developer, and that the original reports should be forwarded to the Germans via this country.

I took the Wednesday meeting. On the days preceeding Torch, the observation stations at Algeciras, on the Straits and on the Atlantic coast of N.Africa, were kept very busy reporting the arrival and movements of British Naval units. It seems clear that up to the last moment the German I.S. had no definite information as to the purpose of the concentration of Naval units at Gib. and thought it was for another operation to convoy war material to Malta. When the landings had actually taken place the Intelligence stations in Spanish Morocco received instructions from Madrid to put all their forces to bear to investigate the situation and report back. In order to carry out this suggestion Tetuan head station of German I.S. in Spanish Morocco instructed Mellila to bring into force immediately all its intelligence and reporting services with Algeria. Direct communication with the German station at

Casablanca ceased during the afternoon of 8th November and after that the Germans had to depend as far as we know on the information received from Vichy and through the Spaniards for its situation reports.

On 6th November the German Intelligence H.Q. at Berlin informed Madrid that they were to discover the address of a firm of oriental carpet dealers E. PEREZ & Co. The proprietor of this firm was said to be living in England, and Madrid was asked to find out. He is likely to be at his business address, so that an agent could get into touch with him. It is probable from the form of the request that the proprietor is approached and sounded. He has not necessarily been in touch with the Abwehr in the past. It would also appear that the contact is to be established in this country. We already have a certain amount of information about PEREZ but enquiries are proceeding.

One of the earliest intimations that we know of as having been received by the German I.S. that landings were to be made at Casablanca was obtained through an agent from the Marine Section in Paris through a former member of the Zeme bureau on the 4th November. According to this source an American landing was anticipated in Casablanca within a short time and serious French resistance was only to

be expected if Weygand took command, which it was thought that he was prepared to do.

Milmo gave an interesting account of the case of PRY, a Belgian who fought at the beginning of the war in the Belgian forces. After the Armistice he went back to his insurance company Constantin and later he went for his company to Hamburg, where he met a Dr. FRANKE, a friend of Dr. Ley. According to his own account he deliberately worked up a friendship with Franke. After 3 months in Hamburg he returned to his business in Brussels but as it was not functioning well he offered his services to the Germans as a means of escape. He was given a mission to the Belgian Congo to report on the presence of American troops, especially Air Force personnel and air fields. He was then to be in touch with a Mrs. DINGS, the mistress of a Belgian known to the Belgian authorities here as one who had been trying to penetrate escape routes on behalf of the Germans. He was introduced by DINGS to a man called GILSON, as a representative of the British S.S. going to Lisbon. GILSON was induced to hand him a number of incriminating documents. He was then told by DINGS to get the names and addresses of people on the escape route. He looks bad, because (a) he was in Hamburg for 3 months where his career as an S.S. agent probably began (b) he consented to be an agent and never warned GILSON.

(c) he had a book with markings which suggested that the book was the basis of some code. (d) the plain language code he was to use in the Belgian Congo was singularly inadequate for the purpose of reporting on the lines laid down by the German I.S. Cases of this sort present us with considerable difficulties. A somewhat similar one is that of Pierre MOREL who has been sent here to enlist in the British S.S. by joining the R.A.F. and fly a plane back. He says that he worked in the German S.S. for 6 months but seems quite unable to give us any information of real value. His salary was raised from 1700 francs per month to 2,00 and then to 3,000. One imagines therefore that the Germans must have been satisfied with his work. He was told to make a tour of aerodromes in order that he could see which one would be the most suitable on which to land the British plane. He only visited one. If he had really been out to help the allies he might have taken the opportunity of making a detailed inspection of a large number. There are also other unsatisfactory points in this case. The difficulty is that MOREL could be a German agent and yet not be forced to depart from the truth in any of the detailed information he gives under interrogation.

I raised the question of the censorship of P/W mail, and urged Grogan to get things moving.

At the A.C.E. meeting today we discussed first of all W. Africa and decided that we should have to wait for Gibbs' return before the S.I.S. aspect of the problem could be settled. We then came to the question of Research. It was agreed that the next report should be written up to November 30th and that the contributions should reach Curry on Jan. 1st.

I reported that I had seen Cavendish Bentineck and also Melland who was very anxious to have some regular meeting of ISOS users which would include a representative of R.S.S., S.I.S. and G.C. & C.S. Viv. poured cold water on this and said he saw no use in having another committee and when I told him how anxious Melland was to get something of the kind going he replied that it was for Melland to put forward his reasons. The D.G. hurried over this aspect of the question and we then proceeded to vet the list of those who were to receive Curry's report. I am glad to say that two copies are going to the F.B.I. Lastly we discussed America. The D.G. said that he proposed to communicate with Stephenson direct on all matters in which his department was interested. Viv. I think took this to mean that he would only be communicating on matters affecting the Caribbean. I therefore asked him point blank whether he was in agreement with the proposal that we should in future correspond direct

with Stephenson on German espionage cases in the U.S.A. sending a copy of our letters and telegrams to him and in certain cases consulting with them on the telephone before the despatch of the telegram. Viv. said that this was not what he had understood and that it was contrary to C's wish. D.H. then went over him like a 1000 ton tank and Viv. remained protesting to the end. As I went out of the room with him he said "This is sheer piracy". I said that I did not think it was as bad as that and that frankly I could not see that Glenalmond was performing any useful function as regards our liaison with the F.B.I.

I saw a man called Jones who is a candidate for the post of interrogator at the Reception Centre in London for British subjects. He has been repatriated from Shanghai recently, where he was secretary to the Municipal Council. He is obviously a man of considerable knowledge and experience and should I think do the job quite well.

The Germans have entered Unoccupied France

November 12th

I discussed yesterday's A.C.E. meeting with Curry and decided before proceeding further with the suggested Committee of ISOS users, to consult Melland.

I had a meeting with Viv., A.D.N.I., Wood and Arnold Foster on the Security Executive anti-sabotage paper. All were agreed on opposing this paper on the lines previously discussed. I undertook to speak to Loxley and obtain his support.

The D.G. is extremely annoyed about yesterday's A.C.E. meeting. He is particularly annoyed about Viv's reluctance to accept his generous offer of 6 individuals who could take part under anybody's colours in a future Second Front. Viv.

said that S.I.S. had planned not only to send people out to operate with the I.B. staff in the initial stages but others who would take up jobs in the back areas when the situation became stabilised. I asked him who these people were going to be. He said that they had not yet been found but when they did get them they would be trained and go out "thoroughly soaked" in C.E. How exactly this is going to be achieved in the time I do not know. It is extremely difficult to get people and more difficult to soak them in C.E. in a matter of a few weeks or months. All our RSLOs and their subordinates are very good ground work and would be much more suitable material. The four people who have been sent out to N.Africa are not of very high quality and certainly of little experience. The leader was a manager of a provincial bank in 1941. Probably an excellent fellow but not one of any very great experience.

The D.G. has now drafted a telegram to Stephenson informing him that in future we are going to correspond with him direct on all matters in which we are interested in the western hemisphere. In this he includes cases of enemy espionage, sabotage, subversive movements, alien control etc. etc. He does not intend to submit this telegram to Viv. before it is despatched but will send him a copy. He says that he cannot go on arguing any more.

We have just had a wire to say that 10 saboteurs have landed in Canada, and Victor is going to have a look at them.

I have just seen a report from India on the infiltration of Jap agents. 45 genuine agents have been caught, 24 were from the Indian National Army and 10 were landed in two parties by submarine. The remainder are civilians of various categories probably introduced into the stream of refugees from Burma. A number of others have become agents in order to escape and give themselves up on arrival. There is no evidence of Japanese connection with the Congress Party. The Burmese frontier is now to be closely controlled.

Herbert of Censorship rang me up to say that Duff had now started again in Bermuda. A letter had been intercepted going from Mexico with 40 duff.

Alba has addressed a note to the F.O. on behalf of his Govt. with a tentative and veiled offer of mediation. He has received a pretty stiff reply from Eden making it clear that we intend to fight this war to the finish.

Father is in the process of applying for a transfer to high altitude flying. Balloon has received an interesting questionnaire. In this the Germans have at last replied to his proposal that he should visit Lisbon. They say that they will require at least 4 weeks notice of any such message and ask him to explain his plan more fully. Since he has already given full details making it clear that the next move is with the Germans and since it has taken them 7 weeks to think out this extremely unsatisfactory reply it looks as if Berlin has instructed Lisbon to stall Balloon off at any rate for the time being.

November 13th

A wire has been sent to Gibbs urging him to press the Resident Minister to reconsider his decision about our having an Asst.D.S.O. at Freetown.

The D.G.s wire to Stephenson has gone.

I spent the afternoon at the R.F.S. and was extremely impressed by what had been done since my last visit more than a year ago.

The place seems to be well organised and the conditions for the guests are much improved. Miss Wadeson's index should be extremely valuable. I suggested that possibly more use might be made of it by members of this office, O20, S.I.S. and S.O.E. There was a lot of valuable information about controls abroad which should be extremely useful to an agent visiting the continent. There is also information which could act as a check against the statements of the prisoners at O20. I addressed the interrogators and gave them a brief survey rather on the lines of the one I gave the RSLOs recently.

November 14th

A message has come through to say that a VHF set of German make has been found in a tree by the R.A.F. at Westcliff.

I had a talk with Bingham of M.S. on the MANEZES case. He has been in personal touch with MANEZES for some time. He doubts whether he is doing very much. Women appear to be his main preoccupation. He is extremely cautious and suspicious.

Teresa Clay tells me that Marita had challenged "Jack" about his name. She asked him if he was called Roberts. "Jack" merely went on eating and said "Yes". He is inclined to think that Marita does

not really believe that this is his name. We do not know at present what lead Marita to ask this question. I have asked for a short note on the Marita case which I may want at any future discussion on 5th column.

Fulford talked to me about the de Courcy case. He says that there have been further indiscretions and that there is evidence that de Courcy has recorded a great deal in his confidential diary. Fulford thinks that his premises should be searched and the diary confiscated. De Courcy has a long story about HESS

which he has obtained from Loftus M.F. who obtained it from his son who was one of the guards at HESS's place of internment. The trouble is that all this information is handled in the first instance by D.D.G. and not A.D.F.

The circulation of the Daily Worker is now 75%. The Caledonian Press is being purchased for the sum of £45,000. There have been private donations of £8,000, £4,500 and £3,000. The present policy is a campaign against certain members of the Cabinet but not against the P.M. There is also a campaign against the Labour Movement.

November 15th

Grassby rang up about the alleged VHF set. He said that there were now two, and that they were definitely met. instruments. They bear the stamp of a firm in Berlin and one of them had the remnants of a balloon attached. Five of these instruments have already been found at varying times and have been sent to the Court. or New Observatory. The probability is that they broke loose from somewhere on the French coast.

I had a talk with T. H. K. about man-power. He can spare Cyril Mills and could possibly spare one other, but personally I think he should have some free lances in reserve. He should be getting Luke back before long. He has a high opinion of Marriott, Harmer, Mills and far Wilson. Cyril Harvey is not an unqualified success

According to an announcement made two days ago we have sent to Russia during the past 12 months, 3,000 planes, 4,000 tanks, 30,000 motorised vehicles and 851,000 tons of other equipment. We have also sent 40,000 tons of petrol and 60,000 tons of diesel oil. These deliveries do not include those sent by the southern route or the American deliveries.

Victor has wired to say that relations between Security Co-Ordination and the and difficult. he says action has been taken against one

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ACT 1958. - Oct 2000

member by the F.B.I. and is contemplated against the head of Section V New York, presumably . He recommends delaying the question of representation until he returns. He says that Thurston of the F.B.I. is bringing a confidential letter from Victor to me. He himself is going to Montreal to look into the case of van JANOWSKY, the minz marine agent who recently arrived. I do not know whether this is a new agent or whether he is included among the 10 saboteurs previously reported. Victor wants us to treat Thurston on the same lines as Kimball. Meanwhile Tren has telegraphed urging us to send a wire from Duff Cooper to MacDonald pressing that no publicity should be given to the case of JANOWSKY as he may prove to be a useful AX. We have wired to Victor c/o A.C.M.F. authorising him to approach MacDonald in Duff's name.

November 16th

Col. Edgeworth Johnson of D.M.R. rang me about HILLSON, who has considerable appeasement background and wrote a book on Germany in 1937, and wants to go out to W. Africa as a newspaper correspondent for the Daily Sketch. At a time when he was particularly hard up in March 1937 he received a payment of 500 marks from the German Embassy, according to U.35. He seemed to us to be not altogether suitable for journalistic work in W. Africa

where he would be endeavouring to collect information from the armed forces. I do not think that he is a spy, but his heart was not in the right place in 1937. At the moment he was on the Inland Revenue Stop List. Edgworth-Johnson said he would report this to his chief who was going to interview the editor of the paper

I had a talk with Max Knight about Tangye and his future relations with M.S. Knight agreed with me about Tangye and his organisation and said that he would be very pleased to co-operate with him. I have put forward a recommendation to the D.G. in this sense and suggested that the D.G. should have a talk with Tangye in order to liquidate the unfortunate incident of the erroneous passing to him of the personal B.M.

Lt. Col. Acland of Canadian M.I. came in to see me. I saw him in Col. Murray's office in Ottawa. He wanted to know about a number of Security matters so I have put him on to Harry Allan. He seemed confused about the organisation of this office. He is not the only one.

MacIver came to see me about John Mair and Geoffrey Wethered who would do exactly as they were told but had a feeling that their qualifications for jobs abroad were more suited to Europe than Africa.

Curry and I went over to see Melland. He was immersed in ISOS, ISK, MSS and other kindred services. Amongst other things he is compiling a list based on the Gestapo Services of members of that organisation who were committing atrocities all over Europe. He hopes that somebody will have the pleasure of dealing with them in due course. In one camp alone 6 or 7,000 women have died of typhus. In other camps sterilisation is going on by means of Rontgen rays. We discussed at some length the proposal that regular meetings should take place between the users of ISOS, R.SS and G.C. & C.S. It was decided that we should in forwarding Curry's report to Melland, write him a letter making some suggestion of the kind and stating the reasons. Melland would then pass this on with a hot minute to his colonel. Melland told me that Gen. von Thoma in talking to Montgomery had suggested that now would be the moment to make a frontal attack on France since all the Germans had probably been drawn off to the south. He said emphatically that he was no Nazi. This is interesting as coming from the Commander of the Panzer Corps in Africa.

Last week D.G., T.A.R., Jim Hale and B.W. had dinner with Peppermint ending at about 1.30 a.m. The idea was to give Peppermint confidence and to make him feel that he was doing a good job of work. The evening seems to have been an unquali-

fied success.

November 17th

At the D.G.s meeting today Harry announced that we had been asked to send an officer to Madagascar. The D.G. said that he felt this was an M.I.6 commitment. Col. Vivian had made it very clear that we did not function on foreign territory. Harry pointed out that this was perhaps a little inconsistent on our part seeing that we had volunteered to produce six officers for a Second Front which would be prepared to operate under anybody's colours and that the the experience required in Madagascar was clearly that of a Security Service officer. The D.G. said that he would speak to Col. Vivian.

Mills talked to me about a plan he had on foot for getting money for Garbo. Apparently some fruit merchant here who is known to MUNOZ, the Spanish Asst. M.A. wishes to transfer money from this country to Spain. It is suggested therefore that this money should be handed over to Garbo and that the German S.S. should credit the fruit merchant with pesetas. Quite a large sum of money is likely to be involved. This is known as Plan Dream.

SIMOEZ has been knocked off. According to plan a search was made in his rooms and revealed certain chemicals for the development of secret ink and an innocent

letter on which he was probably preparing to write in secret writing. He was imprisoned with our informant Eggs in order that the latter might attempt to get him into the proper frame of mind for making a confession. SIMOEZ seemed to be singularly indifferent as regards his fate. When Eggs endeavoured to bring home to him the seriousness of his position, he merely said "Something the police and something the military", turned over and went to sleep. In the morning he said that he was hungry and wanted a good breakfast. He then proceeded to make a complete confession.

Victor has telegraphed about von JANOWSKI, the German spy who has arrived in Canada. This man had been told to carry out reconnaissance in Canada with a view to assisting 6 saboteurs who were to land in 1943. He has a 40 watt set and is scheduled to come up on the air about December 1st. He landed in civilian clothes at 2 a.m. on November 9th, near New Carlisle, Quebec. He is an Einz Marine agent, although he is in fact a Lieutenant in the German army. He has 3 cover addresses. On landing he buried his naval lieutenant's uniform, which he later stated he was to wear when sending messages. He was formerly in the Afrika Corps with Rommel and then in Brussels recruiting agents for Abteilungen 1 and 2.

He carried identity documents taken from Canadian prisoners at Dieppe, altered to the name under which he was to live in Canada. He had previously lived in Canada from 1930-1933 and married a Canadian woman who is still living in Toronto. He carried \$1,000 in U.S. gold pieces and \$5,000 in Canadian notes. He had a code within his code which would indicate to the Germans if he was under control. He was to introduce three U's into the 5th Group. He is now beginning to talk.

I lunched with Robertson MacDonald and thanked him for all the work he had done on the Kameradschaftsdienst. He told me that he had had cards on the table with Frost whom he had always regarded as an obstructionist.

I had a talk with Viv. about America. He is much disturbed about the D.G.s cable. I said that I thought that some change was inevitable in view of the projected visit of Thurston of the F.B.I.

In the afternoon I saw Duff-Cooper in order to explain to him that I had taken his name in vain on Sunday night by getting Rothschild to convey a message from him to Malcolm MacDonald about the publicity in the JANOWSKI case. He was quite satisfied that this was the right course.

I attended the anti-sabotage meeting at

Kinnaird House. Diplock's memo was gradually pulled to pieces brick by brick. I rather doubt whether he ever intended to do more than get the position clarified. In future any agreements that are reached at the Executive meeting involving action through consuls or naval authorities will be drafted by the Executive but sent out through and in the name of the department concerned. Diplock explained that in the past the signature of Security Executive had only been intended to imply the combined views of all the departments concerned. Confusion had occurred through the Security Executive being thereby regarded as an executive body which in fact it was not. The Chairman deplored this name but said that it was not of his choice. The other points were that there was no intention to interfere in any way with the existing machinery in dealing with ad hoc cases, and that the Security Executive will not send out anti-sabotage circulars without prior reference to ourselves. The Security Executive memo is to be amended accordingly.

Dick and Hart have returned from Glenalmond where they have been studying the activities of the Middle East Sections. Their view is that Section V. act mainly as a conduit pipe about ISOS and that Maunsell clearly has nobody to give him a general appreciation of this information in the way that Hart provides it for us. This probably

accounts for Maunsell's rather indifferent action in the Ostro case. We shall have to consider seriously the question of giving him reinforcements, and a visit by Dick to the Middle East seems essential.

WALENTI, the Polish spy who was rounded up by the Germans has been allowed by them to escape and to return to this country. We are not yet at all convinced as to his bona fides. He says, and this is confirmed from other sources, that the Germans have been making overtures to the Poles and that his escape was connived at as a gesture to the Polish authorities in this country. This seems rather hard to believe.

November 18th

I took the Wednesday meeting and had a discussion about searching at the RPS. in the light of the SIMOEZ case. It is clear that owing to the use of Duff and of secret ink in the form of small pieces of cotton wool dipped in some solution, nothing but a very thorough and complete search can be of the slightest use. Duff is now concealed on passports, ties, bits of paper, finger nails, cigarette cases etc. etc. and bits of cotton wool are sewn into the clothing or stuck into the ear. In another case they were carried in a shoe-tree. It would be possible to neutralise duff by the process of disinfecting everyone's clothes but it would not be possible to take away the

clothes of every man entering the RPS and put him into something which would immediately be dubbed as prison dress. Equally it would not be possible to select certain individuals for treatment of this kind without incurring endless complaints from allied governments. The problem is a very difficult one and will need further discussion.

Grogan announced that I/W mail was now being dealt with fairly extensively.

Dick, Curry and I went to Glenalmond. We discussed the Gough case. It was decided to accept Sinclair's report, but ask the Americans for all the evidence in their possession about the British subjects and about the case generally, to call a meeting with Lincoln of the C.O. and to tell him that from the purely security point of view we recommend the release of the British prisoners at Jamaica. We do not feel that it is for us to say whether there has been any infringement of the local regulations in British Honduras.

We then discussed the KOBBE case. Viv. thought that the action we suggested might prejudice the security of the B.J. but he had a more cogent reason in the fact that KOBBE had confided in an agent of O.S.S. and SIS who was travelling on the boat with him to America. This fact had never been made known to us. It trans-

pired also that the F.B.I. had been given a paraphrase version of the B.J. by G.2. It was therefore necessary to find out what action the F.B.I. were taking. We in the meantime agreed to find out how much the Canadian Police knew. It seems fairly clear now that we shall have to let KOBBE go through to Vancouver and then try and make some approach there through the Canadians.

Telix said that a number of the members of the Armistice Commission had been captured in N. Africa. Three Germans of some importance were on their way to this country. Two from the Abwehr and one from Gestapo.

It appears from ISOS sources that someone in the Portuguese F.O. is selling what purport to be decodes of Portuguese official telegrams. These bear little or no relation to the actual telegrams from the countries concerned. The whole thing is clearly a racket.

The German Ambassador in Berlin is of the opinion that peace between the Germans and Russians can be excluded from practical politics unless the Russians agree to cede the Ukraine, and the Caucasus, and to a limitation of armaments. This is regarded as most unlikely. Germany intends to concentrate on the war with England and the U.S.A. and has no intention of making peace with England. This is presumably the official view expressed on by the German F.O.

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ACT 1958. *Oct 2000*

942
Japan is being warned to guard against attempts to drive a wedge between Japan, Italy and Germany. The King of Bulgaria apparently has information that he has given to the Germans about a plot among Italian officers to make peace with Britain and the U.S.A. in the spring of 1943.

November 19th

I was unable to attend the R.S.S. meeting today. I understand that the proceedings were somewhat lively owing to a suggestion by Page and Twin that the Committee should review its terms of reference. There was a suggestion that the Services should be called in for this purpose. This was objected to by on the grounds that only Felix could co-opt the Services. A document was produced however under Felix's signature clearly showing that this was not the case.

I went over with the D.G. to see C. and Viv. on the question of America. Viv. and C. are making a last bid to get us to rout our correspondence to Stephenson through Glenalmond. Logic is of course to some extent on their side. The trouble is that the present system does not work. I said that I thought the discussion might be somewhat academic since Arthur Thurston of the F.B.I. was now on his way and was to establish himself here as Legal Counsellor at the American Embassy. We either

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had to carry on a liaison with him or show him the door. Since we could not do the latter it seemed that the logical sequence would be for us to send someone to Washington. This would automatically cut out Security Co-ordination. Viv. was rather inclined to insinuate that I had been in some way responsible for this manoeuvre. I told him that I had discouraged as far as it was possible to do so and that I had done so solely in C's interests. It seemed clear now however that Security Co-ordination would never be able to clear itself of the stigma of working under Donovan in Hoover's areas. I wondered therefore whether both our interests and S.I.S.

interests would not be better served by out setting up a separate office in Washington, leaving the F.B.I. liaison to us. The D.G. was quite determined for the time being in any case to communicate on all matters of interest to the Security Service direct to Stephenson and on this note he parzened his way through the meeting.

November 20th

I had a talk with Mills about the U.S.A. since it had been agreed at yesterday's meeting that on any account his presence there would be of value. There was also the question of his going over to run the JANOWSKI case in Canada, but I thought we could not come to any final conclusion about his charter until we had seen Thurston and

Rothschild.

I lunched with the Belgian Prime Minister Pierlot, Minister of Justice Delfosse and Lapage of the Belgian Surete. The lunch was being given by Delfosse who wished to meet the D.G. Brook Booth was also present. Our relations with the Belgians are excellent. Brook Booth says he can get any co-operation from Lapage that he requires. Delfosse has only been here three months. He was formerly in Liege where he says that conditions are pretty bad. The German troops are either very young or very old. There appears to be a good deal of sabotage going on. Delfosse mentioned the case of Henri LEVI, a Jew who had been imprisoned in the fortress and ill-treated. When the facts were broadcast he was immediately released. Delfosse succeeded in getting him out of the country. He is now employed at the B.B.C. on Belgian broadcasting. Some people appear to be suspicious of him but Delfosse was convinced that he was all right.

Dan has arrived from Ireland.

There is a saying going round that Swinton is returning shortly suffering from "backwater fever," owing to the operations in N. Africa which may leave him high and dry.

A careful analysis has been made of the

945
met reports and after a meeting with Dr. MacVitie, the met expert at G.C. & C.S. a definite conclusion is that the information in Zodiac's can be attributed to Tate and Dragonfly. The salient point is that reports from their areas have never appeared at a date when they did not transmit. The other discrepancies can be accounted for by cryptographic errors and computations and mistakes in converting readings from one scale to another. It now remains to analyse the 1941 reports which appear to be coming from other areas in the north of England.

I had a look at the HOUSE case. House has a curious background. He was at one time secretary to the Deutsche Verein in Southampton which must have brought him into touch with SCHARPFF. He visited Germany some years ago and also had a tour in the Middle East. This all seems rather extraordinary since he is the son of a carpenter. He has since married a rich wife. He has come to notice recently owing to the purchase of certain wireless equipment which according to Frost can only be used for purposes of transmitting. When in Germany he appears to have been the guest of Col. Lehr. He was also known to the Baroness van der OSTEN. The case does not seem to be making much progress and I am inclined to think that our best course will be to interview HOUSE and ask him the purpose for which he required the wireless equipment.

Loxley sent over a Cabinet paper about Rudolf HESS. When he saw the Duke of Hamilton on 11th May 1941 he said he was on a mission of humanity and that the Fuhrer did not want to destroy England, he only wanted to stop fighting. He suggested that his presence showed his sincerity and the German willingness for peace. His main theme was that the Fuhrer was convinced that Germany would win sooner or later, that he (Hess) wanted to stop unnecessary slaughter. He asked Hamilton to get together the leading members of his party to take over things with a view to making peace proposals. He then stated that he could tell him what the Fuhrer's peace proposals would be. Kirkpatrick saw Hess on the 13th, 14th and 15th of May. Hess said that he had come without the knowledge of the Fuhrer to convince responsible persons that since England could not win the wisest course was to make peace at once. He gave his word of honour that the Fuhrer had never entertained any designs against the British Empire, nor had he ever aspired to world domination. The Fuhrer would sincerely regret the collapse of the British Empire. The solution which Hess put forward was: (1) that Germany should be given a free hand in Europe; (2) that England should have a free hand in the British Empire, except that the ex-German colonies should be returned to Germany; (3) that Russia should be included in Asia, but that Germany had certain demands to make on Russia which would have to be satisfied either by negotiation or as the result of

war. There was however no truth in the rumours that the Fuhrer contemplated an early attack on Russia. (4) that Germany could not leave the Iraqis in the lurch. They had fought for Germany and Iraq would therefore have to be evacuated. (5) the peace agreement would have to contain a provision for the reciprocal indemnification of British and German nationals whose property had been expropriated as the result of war, and (6) that the proposal could only be considered on the understanding that it was negotiated by Germany with a British Government other than the present British Government. Mr. Churchill, who had planned war since 1936, and his colleagues who had lent themselves to his war policy, were not persons with whom the Fuhrer would negotiate. Hess concluded by emphasising that the Fuhrer really wanted a permanent understanding with Gt. Britain on a basis which preserved the British Empire intact. His own flight was intended to give Gt. Britain a chance of opening conversations without loss of prestige. If this chance were to be rejected it would be the Fuhrer's duty to destroy Gt. Britain utterly and to keep the country after the war in a state of permanent subjugation. The conclusions drawn by others interviewing Hess were (a) that he was under the impression that he was engaged on a mission that had a considerable prospect of success (b) that he came on his own initiative, (c) that he believed there was a strong opposition party in

this country which wanted to end the war and that he could get into contact with it (d) that Hess's plan was an attempt to reproduce Hitler's frame of mind as expressed in many conversations and (e) that Hess had contemplated carrying out his mission ever since the fall of France. A medical report on Hess is that he is a man of good intelligence but of poor character and personality. He had certainly been over-anxious and neurotic earlier in life. Whilst under observation here he had shown definite delusions and for more than half his time had been unable to control them and had in fact been suffering from a paranoid psychosis. This unsoundness of mind might very well be hidden if he had to take the lead in a party once more but his personal relationships and his judgment would however be destroyed by it. The fluctuations in the severity of his symptoms would recur and there was a perpetual risk of another suicidal attempt without much warning. For that reason he must be under constant psychiatric and nursing supervision. Hess has gone through periods of deep depression and has already made one attempt at suicide. He has at times refused to go out of doors. He has been suspicious about his guards and about poisoning in his food.

Balloon has received a payment of £725 through the overseas branch of the Midland Bank. This payment is said to be by order of Mr. Arthur CANVALHO. If this should be

be Arthur CARVALHO it appears to be the same channel of payment as has been used for Careless, which indicates a link between the Abwehrstellen in Madrid and Lisbon.

I spoke to the D.G. about W. Africa. He agrees to wait about Stone until Gibbs returns. Luke is to go as Dixon's No. 2. He will be replaced by Michael Royde

November 21st

I spent the day at the S.C.O.s conference. I gave them a short time (a) on the German Intelligence Service, (b) pre-war situation (c) post-war situation and (d) the assistance we might be able to give them. As regards the latter I said that beyond directions about specific individuals, classes of individuals and a few things to look for, there was very little that we could do. The fact was that C.E. work was now highly centralised and that methods of communication had been much improved. This affected the carrying of secret ink, instructions etc. and meant that short of putting a man under a microscope and taking his clothes to pieces, there was very little to be done. It was necessary to act largely on intuition. Was the man's story a plausible one and if so, did it fit in with any documents that he might be carrying?

I had a talk with Jock Whyte and arranged with him that Vesey should go to the RPS

at the end of next week. He talked to me about the Newitt case. It appears that Mrs. NEWITT is suing for the return of her property and also for the good will of her business. Jim Hale has the matter in hand, but I gather that it does not present any very great difficulty.

A.D.N.I., Byron of the Air Ministry, Abbott of G.2 American Forces and Acland of G.2 Canadian Forces attended the S.C.O.s meeting.

November 30th

Returned from leave.

Mills is to go to Canada.

I saw Arthur Thurston the F.B.I. representative. He was formerly working for Foxworth of the New York Office on South American affairs. He is to retain his entity as a representative of the F.B.I. but will be camouflaged at the Embassy as a Legal Attache. His purpose in coming here is to liaise with this department. He said however that he would be pleased to visit S.I.S. if they wanted to see him. If they did not that would be just too bad. He was quite frank in his views about D.S.C. Hoover took the view that liaison through that body was unsatisfactory for several reasons. Firstly there was no proper flow of information. He had the

impression that reports reaching New York were not passed on. I said that I did not think he could blame Stephenson for this. The fact was that Stephenson had never been very well briefed. The second and principal reason was that Stephenson continued to run agents in Hoover's territory. I told Thurston that so far as this office was concerned it was the D.G.'s wish that he should have all the information at our disposal. I explained to him however that our work was very closely related to that of the foreign service, since we were interested in manifestations of the German S.S. all over the world, although our charter only ran to the 3 mile limit and to British possessions. It followed therefore that there was certain information in our possession which we could not transmit to him without authority of another department. I wished him to understand this thoroughly since I felt that it might ~~be~~ possibly lead him to suppose that we were trying to hold things back. He said that he perfectly understood the position. He himself was similarly placed since information reached the F.B.I. from all departments of State and could not be transmitted without prior reference to the department concerned.

I asked Thurston tentatively whether the F.B.I. would welcome the appointment of an officer from this department in Washing-

ton. He said that in his view Mr. Hoover would be very pleased to receive one of our officers and to give him a room in the Bureau. I then explained to Hurston the difficulty of our office vis a vis D.S.C. and asked whether if our representative had a room in the office of D.S.C. either in New York or Washington that would in any way prejudice his position. He replied "I wouldn't go so far as to say that it would", but I took this to be a polite way of saying that Mills would do much better if he had an office of his own.

Viv. called to see the D.C. firstly about America and secondly about the R.S.S. Committee. I was not present at the meeting although I believe Viv. suggested I should be. As regards America Viv. thought that in view of recent developments S.I.S. might be well advised to hand over the liaison in N. America to ourselves. This would mean the sending of Mills to Washington either under his own colours or under D.S.C. in his capacity of M.I. representative.

Viv. then apparently talked about the R.S.S. Committee and suggested that it should go into liquidation, its deliberations being transferred to the weekly meeting with such members co-opted as were necessary. Viv. expressed the view that the ordinary business of the committee on priorities could be conducted on the telephone, that

the committee had little business to discuss and therefore gossiped about other people's business. This was obviously a reference to the Russian Group incident.

I dined with Victor who has just returned from the U.S.A., after a somewhat adventurous passage on the Queen Elizabeth. They had 12,000 troops on board and the accommodation was in consequence somewhat meagre. The sea was rough and infested with submarines.

End of vol. 6