



(c) crown copyright

A.

Abwehr - S.D.	297
Africa, North	19, 24, 26, 28, 30, 31, 34, 37, 45, 53, 60, 71, 74, 81, 84, 85, 185.
South	64, 69, 75, 91, 114, 118, 139, 141, 148, 149, 152, 157, 248, 299, 303.
West	25, 30, 32, 36, 40, 42, 45.
Allied Pilots	38
" Radio Communi- cations	315, 316
Amalgamation	206
American Visits	7
" Liaison	62, 68, 71, 81, 83, 93, 100, 125, 127, 142, 158, 176, 179, 185, 187, 188, 196, 201, 206, 210, 212, 217, 231, 241, 248, 252, 255, 256, 281, 286, 317, 334.
<i>See also FBI</i>	
Anti-Communist Army	152
Arms Thefts	64, 66
ARTAZA	305, 329
Australia	279
ASCARATE	154

B.

BATICON, J.	67
BEITH, Capt.	157, 187, 192, 194
Belgium, Invasion of	78
BIRKIGT	56. 92, 98, 203
Black market	216
CLUNT	43 53
B.O.A.C. plane	247
BONNEFOUSSE	113
BORISSON	82
BOYD	4, 9, 21, 51, 52, 53, 64, 140
BRISCOE	40
British Subjects (arrivals)	79, 98, 101, 131
BRUCE, Col.	see O.S.S.
BRUNING	291
BRUTUS	see WALENTI
BUCCLEUCH, Duke of	24
BUNSEN	38. 46. 51, 56.
N. 1K	214
B. 5	157, 219

C.

CANSLEY	116
CARELESS	65.72
Casablanca Conference	99
CASEY, D.	41
CATTO, Miss	265
C. C. A. O.	308
Censorship	15, 30, 55, 68, 82, 83, 84, 89, 99, 124, 151, 173, 266, 277, 311, 312, 326
Communism	132, 169, 218, 227, 235, 239, 241, 243
CORCORAN, P.	47
Courier Service	128, 137
Cover addresses	312
COWGILL (talk with Finney)	251
CRADOC-OWEN	216
De COURCY	97
CRAVEN	204, 209
CURRY	68, 69, 90, 145, 159, 184, 239.
- his book	26, 31, 91, 177.
Czech Bank	69
Russo relations	113, 117

D.

DUCK	27, 37, 144, 151, 242.
DAHL	301
DARLAN	83
D.B.'s organisation	217
Deception	74, 75
Devonshire House	37. 43. 55. 65.
DITCHFIELD	118, 241
DO-GERAT	302, 323
DONALD	198, 226
DRAGONFLY	73, 197, 240, 258, 279
D.S.C. New York (see also American Liaison)	2, 8, 9, 19, 24, 25, 33, 37, 38, 39, 45, 92,
Duke Street	53, 168

E.

"Edenvale" 103, 117, 139, 152, 176, 199.

Eire, Anti-Communist
Army in- 152

Enemy Aliens, visas 114
" " " Situation 114, 145, 147, 203, 268

ENDER, R. 235, 332

Escapers' Information 247

Exchange of Spies 277

F.

F.B.I. 2, 5, 8, 9, 19, 37, 44, 45, 54,
281 (see also American
Liaison).

FEYGUIN 333

Fifth Column Memo 25

FIRTH 169

Fortnightly Intelli-
gence Summary 306

French Intelligence
Centre 58, 168

FREYTAS, de 22

FRITZCHEN	21, 29, 33, 35, 37, 52, 55, 56, 73, 86, 87, 94, 95, 96, 146, 161-164, 173, 174, 175, 177, 182, 193, 198, 229, 230, 233, 314
-----------	---

FROST	46, 53, 266, 273, 274, 311
-------	----------------------------

G.

GARBO	255, 307, 309, 315, 316
-------	-------------------------

GAULLE, De	120
------------	-----

GERHARDT	59
----------	----

German B.J.s	83, 114, 226
--------------	--------------

" Navy	86
--------	----

" Police	207
----------	-----

Gibraltar Security	24, 102, 119, 310, 318
--------------------	------------------------

"Gil Eannis"	22
--------------	----

GRAAF, de	67, 106, 124, 164, 176, 180
-----------	--------------------------------

GREENE, B.	208
------------	-----

GREEN, O.	18
-----------	----

GRIMM, H.	66
-----------	----

H.

HAGEN, Dr.	35
HAGER	90, 121
HAMILTON-GAY	97
HARLEQUIN, see WURMANN	
HAYWORTH-DUNNE	26
H.O.L liaison Officer	103, 127, 132, 159, 174, 230
HOHENLOHE, Prince	84
{ HOYSE	108, 122, 125, 180, 207, 220
{ HOYES	
{ HOUSE, R.	158, 159, 178
HUYSMANN, J.	241

I

I.B. Information	224
INDIA	52, 55, 170, 253, 285, 327
Inter-Allied Commission	62
Intercept Integration	18
Internees, release of -	312 "
Internment figures	72
Intermediary Camp	146, 147, 206, 213, 229,
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/191	245, 253

ISOS Central Index 160
ISOS Operational Value 26.31
ITS 303

J

JACOBSEN 154
JANOWSKI see WATCHDOG
Jap agent 241
Jap M. A. s 99
JENSEN 305
JOSEPHINE 139, 275

K.

KAMERADSCHAFTS-
DIENST 48 68, 99
KINDERMANN, M. 33, 121
K. L. M. 278
KOBBE 68, 79, 80, 255, 326
KOENIG, K. 257, 260
KREFT, Col. 88

KUHLENTHAL, agent 304, 312

L.

LALART	223
LASKI, H	67
Leaflet Messages	264
LEHMITZ, E.	333
LEIBRANDT, R.	52, 140, 141
LENIHAN	101
LIEHR, O	269
LIPKAU, F.B.	21
Lisbon Leakage	23, 38, 43, 45, 46, 49, 51, 66, 90, 93, 117, 123, 125, 138, 148, 150, 154, 160, 195, 270, 284
LORENZ, W.	127, 201
L. R. C.	180, 205, 206, 219, 228, 232, 245, 259, 265, 272, 312
LYNKE	80

M.

Madeira Leakage	45, 51
MAIR, J.	69, 298, 299, 304, 320, 327
MALIK	114, 117, 121, 127, 146
Malta	107
MANLEY, Mrs.	39, 59
MANUEL	58
MAWHOOD, Major	279
Max-Moritz Service	68, 81, 104, 117, 167
MENEZES	26, 43, 70, 90, 109, 110, 114, 117, 119, 126, 139, 204, 208, 219, 221, 243, 258, 262, 270
METEOR	234
Middle East	20, 25, 42, 48, 55, 74, 75, 82, 83, 85, 89, 94, 121, 122, 126, 130, 179, 192, 221, 257, 290, 298, 302, 322, 327, 336
MORGAN	216
MORIARTY	107
MORRIS, C.	173
M. S. S.	105, 111, 119

MULLET 43, 52, 146, 191, 199,
204, 319

MUTT & JEFF 110, 171, 233, 240, 243,
281

N.

NEGRIN 170

Newcastle Police 135

Newfoundland 94, 104

"News Review" Leakage 171, 181

Nigerian Police 181

O.

O'BRIEN, J. 181

O.C. 210, 320

O'NEILL 15, 36

O.N.I. 177, 190, 192, 197, 199
218

"Orcades" 41

Organisation Report 90, 101, 145, 147

O.S.S. 136, 152, 190, 197, 199
218, 222, 336

P.

"P", Gerard	241
PAASCHE	91, 150, 153, 155, 160
Parachute Spies	171, 172, 257, 318
Pasha, the	6
PASTOR, A.	270, 287
Patents Development Co.	216
Peace Proposals	24
Penetration Cases	167, 198
PFEIFERT	119
Pin-37	293, 294,
PIERLOT	109
Pigeon Section	80
Plan Dream	87, 103, 234, 240, 275
Plan Mincemeat	95, 230, 238, 242, 301
Police Force(Met.)	300
Portugal, German Esp- ionage i -	293
Postwar Plans	259, 269, 281
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/191	

PRETORIUS

88

Prime Minister's report 138, 151, 194, 197, 244,
280

PRY 50

PUPPET 228, 278

P/Ws 2, 6, 8, 125, 215, 246, 247
276, 277, 329

R.

RAPOSO, C. 66

"Ravenspoint" 51

R. C. M. P. - D. S. C. 142, 156, 189, 239, 252

"Reidar" 67, 79, 80

R. D. F. 94

Red Cross Ship's Captain 304

Regulated Areas 328

ROT, M 107, 117, 120, 167

RSLO talk 132

RSS in N. Africa 24, 34

RSS Committees 1, 4, 5, 8, 14, 17, 19, 27, 34
35, 39, 45, 52, 58, 74, 89,
104, 108, 109, 111, 118
122, 123, 143

Russian Plans 109

R. T. D. 262

S.

Sabotage 39, 66, 93, 240, 241, 243, 288
297, 305, 313, 320

SANTOS, V. dos 56

Seamen (Internee) 22, 30
" (American) 218

SCO reports 135
" Conference 211

Second Front Courses 32, 47, 65, 81, 111, 123, 131,
139, 164, 199, 207, 220, 289,
332

" " Policy 46, 57, 58, 62, 74, 81, 92,
106, 166, 178, 182, 186, 192,
207, 220, 244, 249, 266, 275,
287, 288, 294, 295, 298, 299
304, 313, 328

Secret Writing 17

Security Service,
future of- 86, 120, 224, 231, 259, 269
(see also Postwar Plans)

S. I. (b) unit 185, 227 (see Second Front
Policy)

Signals Security 76, 77, 128, 141, 142, 178,
190, 220, 225, 230, 244, 266,
273, 280, 311, 314

S.I.S. in Sweden	22
SITTIG	148, 250, 198
SMITH, F/Lt. N.	41
SOE in E. & S. Africa	52, 55, 57, 70, 86
" and the Dutch	113
SORGE, Dr.	61
Soviet Espionage	151
Spanish Consuls	110
SPRINGBOK	88, 140, 197, 240
SPRINGHALL	292
STALIN	96
S.S. Co-Ordinating Cttee	206, 212
STOCKMAN	216
STEINER	209, 223
Students' Visits	101
Swedish Airline	32
" W/T	105, 118
SYRIE	68

T.

TATE	324
TOMA, von	10
TORCH	16
TREFUSIS, Mrs.	234
TRICYCLE	72, 146, 278, 320, 325
TUESTA, F.P.y	102, 170
Two Four Bomb	283, 325
Turkish Embassy	53

U.

Unaccredited agents	45, 52
---------------------	--------

V.

Vault	275, 276, 282, 283, 286, 289, 294, 295, 321, 324, 328
VLASOV, Gen	336

W.

WACE	154, 166, 172, 176
WALENTI,	29, 49, 54, 57, 72, 228, 233, 319

WATCHDOG	60, 63, 71, 73, 79, 197, 258
WILDER, J. and B.	223
"Willowdale"	15, 23
WILSON	64
WINTER	192
WITT, O.	108, 122, 126, 129, 144, 147, 156, 183, 193, 195, 196, 271, 321
WURMANN	61, 68, 70, 72, 73, 76, 77, 93, 103, 107, 116, 117, 197, 230, 241

X

X-Ray 108, 111

XXX (Spanish, Portuguese
and Swedish) 54

Z

ZIGZAG see FRITZCHEN

1

December 1st

Dick and I saw the D.G. about the N.S.S. Committee. The D.G. showed me a letter that he had received from Viv. in which it was stated that the general opinion was that the committee no longer served any useful purpose and that C.S.S. had instructed his representatives to vote for its dissolution. He hoped the D.G. would also instruct his officers. He thought that we might possibly agree on a policy at the weekly meeting tomorrow. I told the D.G. that I thought this whole thing was a bloody ramp, that it was an attempt to get rid of the committee because it was thought that in the Russian group business it had talked out of turn. There was also the question of T-R and the obvious desire to see him eliminated. I did not think that the weekly meeting was a fit and proper place to discuss this matter. We had our terms of reference down for discussion at the next meeting of the N.S.S. Committee and I proposed that we should ask all members to record frankly and freely their views about the proposed dissolution of the committee. These views could then be submitted to the D.G. and Gt for their decision. I personally thought the committee served a very useful purpose in that it brought the users and producers of ISOS together and helped everyone to understand the material better. The D.G. told me that Viv. had made it clear that Catalogue Reference KW/4/191 was a rather dangerous

2

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. Doc 2000

and ill-disciplined body. The D.G. agreed to reply to this letter saying that he thought the matter should be discussed by the A.S.S. Committee.

I attended the D.G.'s meeting. The D.G. raised the question of interrogation of returned L/Ws. I told him that the matter was proceeding and that we had a candidate for the job.

I dined with Victor and Walter. There was a very frank and free discussion about Security Co-Ordination. I thought that the position as regards D.S.C. was quite irretrievable and that the only thing for us to do was to have our own direct link with the F.B.I. Hoover had made this very plain to him before he left. He said moreover that if Stephenson did not discontinue his undesirable activities in Washington he would be run out of town.

December 2nd

Walter came to see me. He asked me for advice about talking to C. He did not wish to say things behind Stephenson's back. On the other hand he thought the issues were so important that C. ought to know. I told him that he should tell everything to C. and that it was definitely his duty to do so.

I took the Wednesday meeting. There have been as usual numerous reports by the Advent on movements of British shipping.

The majority of them are inaccurate. The Abwehr is anxious to purchase as quickly as possible current timetables for railways on the south and south east coast of England. This purchase is to be made on behalf of the Air Section of the Abwehr. These timetables are obviously for the purpose of tip and run raids. Arrangements have been made to place timetables on the stop list of publications.

The Abwehr has under weigh preparations for inserting units of the Brandenburg regiments behind the British lines in N.W. Africa to harrass British supply lines and sabotage work. These are to be dropped by parachute and will receive extensive air support.

The Abwehr receives operational information on the situation in the Tunis area from Spanish Morocco and from Zuara. The latter place is becoming of great importance as a collecting centre for information. The Abwehr is interested in the work of a German "/T amateur named Felix CREMERS. This man is employed by Siemens at present working at their Paris branch. During the working of Plan Amateur B. 1A several times got in touch with CREMERS and it is of interest to note that the suspicions they then formed that these German amateurs were also in touch with the Abwehr and doing work on their behalf has been confirmed.

4
Father has been given a questionnaire on gas. This is of interest in the light of a report from a reliable S.I.S. source that if really up against it the Germans intend to use gas and bacteria.

Dick, Curry and I went to Glenalmond for the weekly meeting. Viv. raised the question of the abolition of the R.S.S. committee saying that he thought perhaps we might reach an agreement before the meeting called for tomorrow. I said that the D.G. had replied to his letter saying that he thought the matter should be discussed in the R.S.S. meeting. I told Viv. how I proposed to conduct the meeting. He had fetched in Maltby and various arguments were given for the committee's dissolution. Dick and I reserved our defence. Other matters discussed included America. I told Viv. and Felix quite frankly what I thought was the trouble. They both seemed to agree that we should carry the representation in N.America. Felix was a little inclined to wash his hands of the F.B.I. altogether.

A S.African seaman called BOYD seems to have got through the net of the S.C.O. in spite of an extremely phoney story. He is now residing somewhere in Scotland. He is definitely an ISOS character.

What is believed to be a German parachute has been found near Stevenage. It is in a tree but I am told that it has not been there more than 24-48 hours. Tracks at

Fighter Command do not indicate any hostile aircraft over that area during the last two days.

December 3rd

We held the famous R.O.S. meeting today. I opened by saying that we had originally intended to discuss our terms of reference but in the meantime the D.G. had received a letter from Col. Vivian suggesting that the committee should vote for its own dissolution. I proposed therefore that all members of the committee should state frankly and freely their views and that they should be carefully recorded by the Secretary. The minutes would be submitted to all concerned before being issued. I then proposed that they should go to D.G. and C.S.S. for decision. The upshot was that everybody voted for continuance of the committee except Felix and Maitby. The gem of the meeting was that Felix asked to go on record to the effect that he did not think that Dart's views were relevant as he was not a full member of the committee. We then went on to discuss the extended terms of reference which give scope for wider discussion on intelligence matters. Much to my surprise there was a unanimous vote although Felix made the reservation that his vote was subject to the committee remaining in existence.

Thurston saw the D.G. today and presented him with a letter from Winant. The D.G. was impressed by Thurston and considers

6
the letter a clear invitation for us to have direct representation in Washington. He proposes therefore to notify Stephenson accordingly. He is writing to Duff and sending a copy of his letter to C.

I had a talk with Caroe and Dick about the transit camp for P/Is. We all agreed that the best procedure would be to put Windy Triant as interrogating officer in sole charge. It seemed essential that he should have his records in London. Incidentally Jock Whyte is persona non grata with M.I.9 owing to his method of interrogation. In the course of JOYCE's interrogation he put all his cards on the table and gave away gratuitously a good deal of information.

Jock has put in a somewhat impertinent note to me on the whole question. He is apparently annoyed by a report of Caroe's which has wounded his vanity. Caroe had to look into the whole question in order to see whether he could carry the work alone or whether it would have to be a whole time job for someone else.

Kellar came to see me about the Rasha. He is now beginning to doubt the whole story of the illicit wireless.

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. Dec 2000

Mills left tonight for the U.S.A.

A report from the J.I.C. of today's date sets out at considerable length the present position of the Axis powers. The total losses of the German Army to date are estimated at 4 million killed and totally disabled. A good deal is said about the oil situation. The ultimate conclusions are that the final outcome of the war may be dependent on the vigour of allied action during the winter. The following is the forecast of German strategy. (a) The Russian front will remain Hitler's chief pre-occupation. He will continue his attempt to gain control of caucasia until he is compelled to abandon it by Russian action, by the demands of the Mediterranean or western fronts, or both. (b) In the Med. and Western theatre of war Hitler's strategy will be fundamentally defensive. The employment of the forces he can make available will be dictated throughout by the action taken by the Allies.

(c) Hitler will do his best to retain a foothold in N. Africa and to keep Italy in the war. If nevertheless Italy collapses he will concentrate on the defence of the Balkans and leave Italy to her fate.

(d) Intense air and submarine attack on our shipping will in any event be carried out.

The above conclusions though probably correct strike me as being somewhat platitudinous. The information and the arguments on which

they are based are of considerable interest but I should have thought that the same conclusions might have been reached from an intelligent reading of the Times.

December 4th.

The new D.N.L., Commodore Rushbrook and I had a short talk today, during which I tried to explain to him the work of B. Division. He is clearly in rather a haze. His ideas about C.E. work seem somewhat elementary. He presumed that most of the waitresses in the restaurants were in our pay.

The D.G. has approved the appointment of Windham-Wright to the M.I.9 transit camp.

Dick and I had a discussion with Frost about the R.S.S. committee. We agreed that it might be well to have an intelligence and priority committee and another committee on a higher level which would discuss the allocation of R.S.S. forces. Frost is to draft a letter to C. for the D.G.'s signature.

The D.G. has written to C. and Duff Copper about representation in the U.S.A.

The D.G. took Thurston to the trial of the Belgian seaman WINTER who was convicted. Thurston was immensely impressed with the proceedings and much honoured by being allowed into a trial in camera. He was ever

more delighted when the U.S. told him that he could not submit any report on the proceedings to Mr. Hoover until the sentence was made public. This has of course emphasised his feeling that we have taken him completely into our confiden

told me that he had had a discussion at Glenalmond about the future of D.S.C. Felix had written a long note in which amongst other things he advocated a complete severance of relations between S.I.S. and Hoover. pointed out that this would be the greatest mistake both on a short term and a long term view. On a short term view they had to collaborate with the F.B.I. in S. America and on the long term view O.S.S. would disappear while the F.B.I. would always remain. Felix thinks that the undermining of position began with my visit to the U.S.A. and told him that on the contrary it had done more to build up Wren's position than anything else.

Milmo and Burt have just returned with BOYD who has been sent to O20. They have together handled the case extremely well, having extracted a confession shortly after crossing the border. BOYD is a peculiar type who would not respond to hard treatment. His immediate reaction would be to make himself a martyr. Milmo and Blunt have already done much to show him that the Germans have let him down.

BOYD who is an engineer when in 1939 to the U.S.A. On his way back he was captured by an armed raider and deposited on the French coast. He was interned subsequently at St. Denis, near Paris. He became very disgusted with the British inmates. The head of the camp committee posted up a notice urging collaboration and moreover threatened those who wished to escape with denouncement to the authorities. This had disgusted BOYD to such an extent that he was ready to fall in with the plans of the Abwehr when they suggested he should work for them. He declined to accept any money. He was to be employed in S. Africa but as an escaped internee he was sent to this country. He has since been trying to get a passage. He had two duffs on his wrist watch which related to the wireless set that he was to construct. He carried two duplicates on a slide-rule which had been taken from him by the Spanish authorities. There seems a reasonable chance of turning him round.

December 7th

Von Toma has been talking in an extremely interesting manner to his fellow Panzer General Kreubel. From his experience on the Russian front he is inclined to think that the Russians are as tough as they were last year. They have still got tank superiority. He regards the North African battle as lost. He thinks that the

Germans should take up the next line of Cyprus, Sicily, Corsica and of course the Balearic Isles. The Germans are clearly experiencing a shortage of officers; a large number of their higher regular officers have been sacked by the Fuhrer. In Russia they have reached a stage where N.C.O.s were commanders in the regiments. The strong point of the German Army had been its excellent type of older officer. Owing to losses this type is now practically extinct. He was of the opinion that as long as the General Staff had planned a campaign everything had gone without a hitch. Things were now different since the Staff was forced to take orders from the Party. A whole campaign in Africa had been nothing but a political sacrifice and was hopeless from the start. Most Germans realised that the Party and its actions had brought Germany into extreme disfavour with the rest of the world. As the result of this however every German even if he disagrees with Nazism, will fight to the bitter end in order to save his own skin. This attitude is spurred on by mistaken British propaganda to the effect that all Germans up to the age of 16 should be sterilised.

Von Toma has been impressed by the quality of the ordinary British soldier, the quantity and quality of the food supplied to British troops and civilians, which is infinitely superior to that in Germany, and by the wonderful way he has been treated

as a German and an enemy. Von Toma criticises Rommel for his tactics at El Alamein. He thinks that he should have either cleared up the situation at once or else withdrawn right at the beginning. His determination to stay where he was was the result of a direct order from the Fuhrer. "Those damned orders of the Fuhrer were the cause of much misfortune for us in Russia" he said. Rommel was loud in his complaints of the Air Arm under Kesselring. They wasted petrol owing to the fact that there was no proper co-operation between the G.A.F. and the Army. Both von Toma and Kreubel agreed that Rommel's best quality is his experience as an infantry man. They think him a bad C. in C. He understands nothing about artillery. They both object that they could not get definite orders from Rommel although the latter meddled in everything. The fact that the Fuhrer made himself C. in C. of the Army is regarded as unsound policy. It was humiliating for the army, for they no longer had any representation. Now finally the order had come through that all Generals were to be examined specially to make sure that their ideas were firmly based on National-Socialist doctrine. That was to be the decisive factor. It seems that Mussolini never wanted to advance beyond the Libyan frontier but Rommel would not listen to him.

Von Toma has a poor opinion of the Abwehr. He is prejudiced by certain pessimistic remarks at the beginning of war attributed to Canaris. These remarks were reported through the dentist of Frau Canaris. It seems that Canaris sends his reports to what is known as the Foreign Armies Dept. of the General Staff. They are here integrated with other intelligence.

In discussing their experiences von Toma and Kreubel remarked that in November Rommel promised that he would not start an offensive again until he had sufficient supplies to go to Cairo. It seems that Mussolini had made elaborate preparations for a triumphal entry and the bribery of the Egyptians. There is no doubt that the General Staff regarded the attack on Russia as a gross blunder. Von Toma says that the first time Guderian heard about the attack on Russia he said "What, another colossal blunder?" He thereupon issued an order of the day telling his troops that they were going into the bloodiest battle, the longest road, the German soldier had ever had to face.

Mrs. Rainbow's brother is in a I/W camp in Germany, and in the course of the past fortnight he has written no less than 4 times to his sister requesting the despatch of food and clothing. This seems rather unusual.

Dragonfly is still discussing with the Germans how they should pay him. There are indications that he may be going to

14
receive his money through Tate. Tricycle's cover addresses have been received. He will therefore resume transmitting information.

I had a talk with Melland today. His suggestion about a committee to discuss the intelligence content of ISOS has gone forward to the D.M.I.

There has been a certain amount of light hearted discussion among B.Branch officers as to the usefulness of Secret Service. It is argued that since the majority of agents are unreliable or at least the value of their information is difficult to assess, the reports they submit more or less cancel each other out. In any case few people have the courage to act on them. If they do they are just as likely to be wrong as right. Therefore no value in espionage and hence no point in counter-espionage. If we allowed all the German spies here to do their worst their reports might be so conflicting as to totally mislead the German General Staff. Many of their reports are in fact mere invention. The fact is that the only tolerably certain basis for action is the intercept and even that may at times be misleading. Outside these sources I do not think we get a great deal that is of value and most of the work of Section V. is concerned with tying up the tag ends of ISOS. All the above sounds rather attractive as an argument but I do not

think it holds water, if carefully examined. To some extent of course it is impossible to avoid having a Secret Service. It is not the cloak and dagger organisation that some people think it is. Much of its work consists of approaches from the other side, at points which are known to the enemy. It is impossible to prevent people trying to sell you information. If you discard it and it happens to be correct the Govt. and the public would be indignant.

A bomb of the Imber type has been discovered on the s.s. Willowdale at Gib. It was taken off on 4.12.42. The ship sailed from Seville. It is thought that there are other bombs on board in a wine cask and also possibly in the cargo of wolfram. It is suggested that the ship should be unloaded.

Grogan tells me that censorship are proposing to send a girl down to Glenalmond whose business will be to extract any information from Section V. relating to Censorship matters.

Cecil has a censorship intercept from the I.O.W. to Dublin passing certain information of a military kind. It looks like a hoax.

The O'NEILL case is proving interesting. O'NEILL was captured by a raider and interned. He eventually landed up in a camp for Irishmen where conditions were particularly bad. He was approached and questioned

who before the war was active in Ireland. HOVEN used the name of REINHARDT. In order to make his escape O'NEILL agreed to work for the Germans. After instructing him in various means of communication they gave him work in a firm in Germany which had a sub-contract in France. While in France he was allowed to escape. This was to be his cover story. He was to go to Donegal and to transmit from there weather reports, and reports about the armed forces in N. Ireland. He was to construct his own transmitter. Before departure he was to be given £1,000 and crystals for his wireless set. Unfortunately however he elected to cross the Franco-Spanish frontier before he had received either the money or the crystals. His excuse was that the man failed to keep the rendezvous. He notified the Germans of what he had done before leaving. In Spain he got into a certain amount of trouble and was eventually repatriated. We have considered the possibility of suing him but in all the circumstances we are inclined to turn down the proposition.

J.C. has written a note on Torch. He thinks that the absence of leakage about this operation was due to our ensuring through security and control of the position through XX agents, that dangerous information did not pass to the enemy. Passing of misinformation he feels is less effective. Another lesson is that deception messages as near to the real thing as possible should be sent, e.g.

it is little use talking about attacks on Norway when you are going to attack North Africa.

Certain discoveries have recently been made on the secret ink front. If writing is done with a solution of an inorganic material in alcohol there is no disturbance to the paper, no need for washing and no real need for rubbing. If the stick is dipped in water first so that a certain residual moisture remains on it, very much better writing is obtained. Briscoe summarised the present position by saying that it is now known that there are two distinct ways in which writing can defeat the iodine and damping test (a) by drying on a glass plate and (b) by using an alcoholic solution to write with. It was now possible to immerse paper in solution sufficiently long to invalidate the iodine test and yet to give no positive reaction to the damping test.

December 7th

Dick, Frost and I discussed a letter which it was proposed the D.G. should send to C. on the subject of the R.S.S. Committee. We propose that the existing committee should have its terms of reference extended to cover the discussion of intelligence matters and that a higher committee should be formed to deal with the allocation of R.S.S. resources.

The position in Tunisia is not too good.

There is a lack of fighter support and aerodromes are waterlogged. The ~~First~~ Guards Battalion have been badly mauled. We lost 40 tanks and the Germans 30. The Russians are asking for a European Second Front in the spring.

I have read an interesting memo on the case of Oliver GREEN, the 4th Department agent. He states that certain of his subordinates have been communicating with Moscow in high speed morse. He has refused to give their names or the location of their stations.

I had a long talk with Lewes at the club on the subject of the integration of intercept material. I told him I knew that each Service got their own stuff. I wondered however whether there was any point at which all the intercept services were brought together. He said that this was a point which had always been of great concern to N.I.D. They had however got over it to some extent by demanding to see almost all the intercepts. The result was that on occasion they had been able to give tips to the Air Ministry.

They had also warned C. in C. Mediterranean a week before Rommel's advance to El Alamein. The W.O. on the other hand had only given the G.O.C. 24 hours notice. This however had apparently been due to the rather slow-moving machinery of the W.O. who were always waiting for other confirmation.

Action in N.I.D. on intercept material was taken very rapidly by the officers who

were actually reading the material each day. e.g. Montagu drafts the action telegrams and after a word with A.D.N.I. gets them approved and despatched by the Admiral concerned.

December 8th

Nothing of interest to B. Division was discussed at the D.G.s meeting. We had a talk on America at Kinnaird House under the chairmanship of Duff. The D.G., C. V.V. and I were present. In the light of Thurston's remarks about D.C. New York being persona non grata it was decided that a strongly worded telegram should be despatched to Stephenson, outlining the causes of the trouble and asking him for an explanation. In the meantime Duff was anxious to maintain the status quo and leave Stephenson as our representative in the Western Hemisphere. G. took the view that it was impossible for S.I.S. to discontinue relations with the F.B.I. He thought therefore that their only course was to try and clear matters up.

Frost came to talk to me about N. Africa. Eisenhower wants an R.S.S. but on what grounds we do not know. This seems to be a matter which should normally be referred to the R.S.S. Committee but G-P has characteristically taken it into his own hands to carry on an ex parte exchange of wires with Eisenhower and Mockler Ferryman. What is not clear at the moment is the reason for Eisenhower's anxiety.

20
Does he want radio equipment or does he want somebody to advise him on wireless cases. If the latter, we should provide him with an officer.

Herbert has written a report on the visit he paid to the Middle East Section at Glenalmond. He begins by saying that the breaking of ISOS in Egypt has contributed to a considerable degree towards a better understanding of Abwehr problems. He goes on to say that combined pressure of events and logic aided by pressure from the M.E. and this office have succeeded in loosening Major Cowgill's mortmain grip on the ISK which is now flowing more generously to Cairo. Herbert and Dick felt strongly that ISOS and ISK are not being properly presented to Maunsell in Egypt and that he does not really appreciate their importance. To improve this situation it is necessary to give Maunsell assistance in Egypt, and to put one or two people into the M.E. section at Glenalmond.

December 9th

I took the Wednesday meeting. Information received by the Abwehr in Lisbon regarding shipping etc. seems to be fairly accurate. The Germans say they are getting it from the British Consulate. Measures are under discussion as to the best way of closing up this serious leakage.

The Abwehr have issued instructions to Lisbon on the measures they are to adopt to prepare the ground if it should be necessary for them to leave the Peninsula. As many people as possible are to be recruited to carry on the work in such an eventuality. They must of necessity be natives of the country so that there will be no difficulty in their remaining in Portugal. This anxiety is the result of rumours about British action as a sequel to the N.African campaign.

The case of BOYD has been developing. He is now quite ready to work for us. We are asking S. Africa if they would be prepared to accept him. BOYD is the first agent captured who appears to have undertaken his mission solely from ideological conviction.

Fernando Ballesta LIPKAU, an agent of Einzheer, has recently been arrested at Trinidad on his way to Mexico. It was intended that he should make his way to America to take up employment in some concern such as the Ford or Chrysler works.

After an interval of several weeks mention has again been made of FRITZCHEN. He is to be made familiar with conditions in the Welsh mountains and with communications from that area to London.

A Portuguese in the Marconi Co. in Maderia is passing on information re movements of ships in American waters to a German agent

who in turn sends them on in code or by courier to Lisbon. S.I.S. have managed to get in on this racket. Steps are being taken to obtain the co-operation of the F.B.I. at the New York end.

De FREYTAS, the wireless operator on board the "Gil Eannias", after being somewhat stubborn, has now confessed. He was employed for some time by the Portuguese Marconi Co. in Lisbon. Having got into trouble with the company he decided to go to sea as a radio operator. Before he sailed he was approached by one Fernando RODRIGUEZ, who invited him to see a German named SCHMIDT who offered him 1500 escudos a month in return for an undertaking that he would send wireless messages relating to his observations when at sea. He was subsequently instructed in a code. He admitted having sent two messages on his second voyage, one of which related to ships in the harbour of St. Johns. This information tallies with what we knew from ISOS.

Jock Whyte has made arrangements to cover returning internee seamen on lines similar to those employed in dealing with P/W at the M.I.9 transit camp.

At the S.I.S. meeting today it was announced that Section V. would be sending a representative to Sweden. We were asked if this move had our support, We

said that Sweden was of considerable importance to us since ISOS from that quarter was not being obtained in any quantity and since K.O. Sweden was not reflected in any way on the Abwehr traffic

Hart described steps taken to deal with the alleged leakage from the Lisbon Consulate. It seemed that there was no valid reason for the information reflected on ISOS relating to convoys being sent to Lisbon. We had to conclude therefore that it went by clandestine means, and that the leakage was probably taking place in this country or possibly at Gib.

Victor came into the discussion about a complaint from Mason-Mac and Medlam that they were not given sufficient data on which to base their decision about unloading of the "Willowdale". It was believed that the Willowdale had a bomb concealed among casks of sherry and also among the wolfram cargo. With S.I.S.'s approval we propose to send a fairly extensive telegram pointing out that the transmission of the communications we receive in their naked form would not be particularly enlightening since they contain an inner code. We pointed out that we could not always give such complete explanations and that it must therefore be taken that though not always very explicit our telegrams were carefully worded.

Eisenhower has sent a message from North Africa asking for assistance from A.S.S. It is not clear whether he wants technical assistance or advice on wireless cases. This is a matter which should come before the R.S.S. Committee but which G-P is apparently handling himself.

Viv. has sent a stinging telegram to Stephenson asking for guarantees that enquiries in Hoover's area will cease forthwith.

Guy McCaw came in to say that the Duke of Buccleuch was involved with Lonsdale Bryans in some tentative approach from the Germans with peace proposals.

Reduced depth charges exploded in Gib. Harbour and brought to the surface an Italian one-man torpedo. This may be due to the shake-up which the D.G. gave Medlam about security at Gib.

December 10th

We have had indications from various sources that security in N. Africa leaves much to be desired. The British Consul Algiers has suggested that Medlam should go over to look into the whole question. The difficulty is that we have no locus standi in N. Africa. We can only send an officer if requested to do so by Eisenhower. I spoke to the D.G. about this. Harry Allan and I are to go over and see the D.D.M.I.

Certain passages in Viv.'s telegram to Stephenson indicating that we were going to appoint a separate representative to carry out liaison with the F.B.I. in Washington have caused a protest from Duff. It had been agreed that this question of our representation should remain in abeyance until an explanation was received from Stephenson. Viv. has accordingly cancelled these paras.

Harker called a meeting with Curry, Dick and myself to discuss Curry's 5th column memo. Harker said the D.G. had asked him to look into the whole question. The D.G. had apparently made up his mind that the present invasion list could not be arbitrarily increased. He did not seem to think it necessary or desirable to employ agents for the purpose of improving our knowledge about the enemy alien population in this country. He thought that the 5th column aspect was rather out of date. Both Curry and I were in disagreement with this view. Obviously nothing is going to be done.

It has been decided to send Dick to the Mid East. He is to take stock of the position and to see what assistance Maunsell requires.

A long report has come in from Gibbs. He is held up at Fishlake, Monrovia, and is suffering from sandfever.

December 11th

I went with Harry Allan to see Brig. Vale D.D.M.I. (O) about N. Africa. Vale said that so far he had received no security reports from N. Africa. I impressed upon him that in so far as R.S.S. matters were concerned the committee of which I was chairman had a very definite interest. I also said that from the security point of view we could supply experience on a number of subjects if required. He seemed to think that if Mockler-Ferryman wanted any assistance he would ask for it, and that without a definite request there was nothing to be done. I am told that Brig. Vale has been living in Cheltenham for the last 15 years, and joined the W.O. a couple of months ago. No further comment is required.

I had a talk with B-W and Dick about the MANAZES case. It is proposed to liquidate it by enlisting the co-operation of the Portuguese Ambassador. Duck has got an opportunity of getting the Spanish B.J. material over the weekend. A suitable cover story has been worked out in case anything untoward happens.

I saw Cavendish Bentinck and gave him the document for circulation to the J.I.C. on the operational aspects of Curry's report.

I had a word with Loxley about Heyworth-
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/191

Dunne who is to do Arabic translations of special material. I was anxious to get F.O. approval since Heyworth Dunne had incurred their displeasure in Egypt. Loxley readily agreed to his doing this work.

I told Loxley about the Duck proposal and that we were in consequence arranging that no telegrams should be delivered to the Embassy over the weekend. He said he was glad to know about this since he would see that the F.O. kept quiet. There was always a possibility that somebody unacquainted with what was going on might summon the Ambassador to London. This would mean a return of the staff and possibly the despatch of telegrams.

I had a talk with C. about the R.S.S. Committee. I explained to him how the incident of 7/23 had arisen and that the committee had no intention of criticising his policy. All they wanted to do was to bring to his notice certain facts of which he appeared to be unaware. He entirely accepted this explanation and told me that as a result of our deliberations a whole number of facts had been brought to his notice for which he was very grateful. I then outlined to him proposals for the formation of two committees, one to deal with priorities and the intelligence content of ISOS, and the other, perhaps on a higher level, to deal with the allocation of R.S.S. resources. He seemed to think that this

would be satisfactory. After seeing him I had a talk with Viv. He was I think a little ashamed of the way in which the whole business of this committee had been handled, and anxious to make amends. He asked me whether it was possible to get another secretary for the committee. I told him that if his idea was to get rid of T-R he was making a great mistake. I thoroughly realise that in some ways T-R was a a trouble person. At the same time I liked him and had a high opinion of his ability. I thought that he had been badly mis-handled. Had his views, many of which were obviously right, been given more sympathetic consideration, many difficulties might have been avoided. Viv. had two alternatives, one to get rid of him altogether, and the other to retain his services and give him freedom of action. To kick him off the committee was no way out of the difficulty and would be highly detrimental to our discussions to which he contributed almost more than anyone.

December 12th

I had a discussion with Viv. about North Africa. There have been four ships sunk in Algiers Harbour and he feels that something ought to be done to give expert advice. The ships were apparently sunk by Italian small torpedo craft and divers attaching bombs to the hulls of the ships. I have suggested that a wire should be

sent to Mockler-Ferryman drawing his attention to various complaints about security in N. Africa and stating that we could give expert advice or assistance if required.

Dick, T.A.R., Marriott, Harmer and I discussed the WALENTI case. WALENTI has instructions from the Germans to try and start something in the nature of a Fifth Column among the population. His whole story has been carefully examined. In the main we believe it to be true although we think that he is trying to cover up certain of his disclosures to the Germans which he probably made under duress. He also appears to have been a little over-sanguine about the Germans trust in him after he was released. This led him to make contact with various Poles connected with their escape organisation and it may well be that they have been compromised. It was decided to let WALENTI operate a transmitter under close supervision.

We have had information that FRITZCHEN has gone to Paris. There is some indication that he is going to land in the Cambrian Hills. We are getting out the bloodhounds which we purchased at considerable expense at the beginning of the war and have never used.

December 14th

Gibbs has completed his report on his visit to W. Africa. He recommends that we have two people with R.S.L.O. experience at Accra, that we abandon Freetown (Stone to change places with Land who is not an unqualified success at Lagos. -and is a good worker but rather too familiar to the leading personalities in the colony).

Harry suggests that we should approach the ISSB about the security in North Africa. I doubt whether this is any good. What we really want to do is to let Mockle-Ferryman know that we have people with various types of experience in security matters who are available to do a job of work if required.

I had a discussion with Cheney and Foster about returning internee seamen. They made various points in connection with Jock Whyte's scheme for interrogating these people on arrival. We want to deal with them more or less on the same lines as we are dealing with the returned P/Ws.

Francis of Censorship came to see me in the absence of Herbert who has just left for N. Africa. He told me that in accordance with Herbert's scheme for getting Censorship informed about our work it had been decided to appoint a Miss Evans to Glen-

almond. It will be her business to extract from Section V. any information which might be of value to censorship.

December 15th

I attended a meeting of the J.I.C. which was held for the purpose of discussing Curry's book on the German S.S. The meeting were asked to say whether they considered the book to have operational significance, whether it should be brought up to date, whether its present form was satisfactory, whether it should appear more frequently. The meeting agreed that the book should be brought up to date and that ad hoc papers should be prepared on any matters which appeared to be of operational significance. D.M.I. said that the preparation of these papers would be of considerable value if there could be some kind of meeting between the users and producers of the basic intercept material in order that closely related services such as M.S.S., Ingots etc. should also be discussed where they impinged upon ISOS and ISK. I said there was already in being a committee of users and producers which discussed priorities and that if the Services were co-opted as I thought they should be, such a committee might well discuss the business which D.M.I. had in mind. "C" agreed to the course suggested.

Charles took the D.G.s meeting. There was a discussion about N. Africa and also

about the proposed course of instruction which we were holding for prospective second front officers.

Gibbs has given me a long account of his visit to W. Africa. He seems to have handled the whole business extremely well, and to have surmounted many difficulties, not least those of transport. He languished over two weeks at Fishermans Lake, Monrovia, where he contracted sand-fly fever. Incidentally he discovered that the mails from Brazil which formerly came by the Lahti Service d are now carried by Pan-Air and are arriving in Monrovia uncensored. G.2 had discovered this, took the bags off, and had them sent back to Costa Rica. This has probably been going on for some considerable time, and provided a direct route via neutral territory to Berlin. Swinton I gather is leading an extremely active life. He rises early, takes a siesta after lunch, plays 3 or 4 sets of tennis after tea and goes to bed at 10. He appears to be more interested in paying the Resident Minister and economic matters than in Security, although as regards the latter he is setting up all the familiar inter-locking panels.

I had a conference with Kimbal Johnson and Stopford about the Swedish Air Line. I do not think K.J has been doing very much about CARLBERG and the London office of AeroTransport. I have suggested that he should get a telephone check going,

in order that we might get to know the various personalities and the general business of the office.

December 16th

FRITZCHEN arrived at 1 a.m. His plane started at Le Bourget, went up the coast of Holland, across the North Sea, to Lincolnshire and after making two circles came down to a height of about 3,000 ft. Stanford who was with Fighter Command~~er~~ pin-pointed the descent at Ely. The N.D.O got through to the R.S.L.O., but before the latter could get to the police, they had received a call from FRITZCHEN, who had dashed into the nearest farm house, saying he was a British airman and wanted to phone. He told the police that he had some highly interesting information to give

I went to Glenalmond for the weekly meeting of S.I.S. They showed us Stephenson's reply which to my mind was not a very convincing document. In fact I think it contained a number of serious misstatements. It strongly deprecated the appointment of Mills.

December 17th

I have just heard about the case of Max KINDERMANN, British subject of German origin. The police got into his flat the other day and discovered some white powder and ribs in a sock. They have now summoned him for interrogation at the

police station. If there is anything in this case it seems a pity that they should have acted without prior reference to us. No thorough search of the flat has been undertaken by anyone who knows what he is looking for. If KINDERMANN still has anything incriminating there he is certain to have destroyed it.

G-P turned up unheralded at the A.S.S. meeting today, presumably because I had tabled a request for information about Eisenhower's telegram relating to radio security in N.Africa. G-P did not agree that this was a matter in which the R.S.S. Committee should have been consulted. He said that a y allocation of units to N.Africa which might be contemplated would have no effect on the work of radio security at home. He was obviously trying to divide R.S.S. up into a home and foreign service and to say that in so far as anything on the continent was concerned the matter was no concern of ours. Frost said very emphatically that it was. G-P then said that the whole matter of the terms of reference of the present committee was under discussion and doubtless a decision on the point would be reached. He should of course have consulted the committee before communicating with Eisenhower and this is admitted by Viv.

I told the meeting about the resolution of the J.I.C. Felix said he reserved his opinion, but the others present seemed to think that there was everything to be gained from having the Services represented. De Goureynd and Riley attended the meeting at "C"'s special request and seemed to be impressed with the desirability of holding such meetings without which many interesting points would never come to light.

Riley came to see me about a so-called Dr. HAGEN, whose position he wishes to get regularised. This man came in on the recommendation of the Lord President. I gather that he is connected with experimental work on the Uranian bomb.

I went to see Maxwell about the case of FRITZCHEN whose identity has been established as CHAPMAN @ EDWARDS. Enquiry shows that he has a long criminal record. He is an experienced safe-breaker and blackmailer. There were three amusing coincidences in this case. Firstly a police officer who brought him to London recognised him as a fellow soldier in the Coldstream Guards who was discharged in 1933, secondly Edwards of B.5 had twice been concerned in CHAPMAN's prosecution. It was for this reason that CHAPMAN took the alias of Edwards! Thirdly CHAPMAN was intending to reside within 100 yards of one of our other agents. He has brought with him sabotage material, £500

and a wireless set. His documents are not good. We are proposing to turn him round. In the meantime we want the authority if necessary to hold him. It was agreed that I should sign an arrival from enemy territory order and that in the meantime we should try and persuade him that it was in his own interests to reside quietly at some place which we would provide. He is at present being questioned at Ham. Later on I went and gave the story to Duff Cooper who was much interested.

I had a discussion with Cecil, Harvey, Dick and T A R. about O'NEIL. The latter has given us an interesting account of his internment. He was captured by an armed raider in the early days of the war and put into an Irish camp. His treatment there, contrary to expectation was definitely bad. He was eventually visited by our old friend JUPP HOVEN and in order to escape agreed to work for the Germans. We are making no attempt to hold him and are allowing him to return to Eire.

According to CROLLA the Italian representative at Bangkok, the Japs have given up military operations against India for the time being.

December 18th ,

I dictated at the flat all morning. In the afternoon I saw Dixon who is still trying to get away to Accra. There is

a certain amount of difficulty about his rank. Swinton wants him to be a full Colonel. G.O.C. want him to be a Lt. Col.

December 19th

Duck has been successful in getting the Spanish tape. A very good piece of work which should keep G.C & C S going for about 6 months.

December 20th

CHAPMAN has got through to the Germans, who are convinced that he personally is operating the key.

December 22nd

We are informed that the ISK machine has been taken in N. Africa, but at the moment the information is somewhat vague.

At the D.G.s meeting today the L.R.C. for British subjects was discussed. I think at last that things are beginning to move.

The D.G. saw Thurston and myself. Thurston has made it very clear that the F.B.I. will not resume relations with Stephenson and in fact that liaison with anybody in New York is likely to be entirely meaningless.

December 23rd

36
December 23rd

We had another meeting at Kinnaird House about America. No real decision was reached except that we were for the time being to continue to regard Stephenson as our representative in New York. C. did not think he could take any action until he had a report from Mr. Winant or had the opportunity of a personal interview with Stephenson.

At the Wednesday meeting I raised the question of allied pilots coming through the L.R.C. I was anxious to know whether all these pilots were accounted for in a reasonable way. Younger said he would make enquiries in order to find out whether any of them had subsequently been reported missing in circumstances which were thought peculiar.

The Lisbon leakage was discussed. It involved information about our convoys which is said to be coming from the British Consulate and Embassy. The number of ships and the approximate date of sailing are accurate but the escort and route are nearly always wrong.

Hart mentioned a rather important Swiss case centred round a man called BUNSEN. There seems to be a small group with a commercial background operating between W. Africa, America and Switzerland, and Lisbon. These people are on a higher plane than those to whom we are accustomed

At our joint meeting with S.I.S. we discussed Service representation on the R.S.S. Committee. It seems that S.I.S. are now prepared to accept this position. The constitution of the Committee and also of a higher level committee at which the allocation of R.S.S. resources can be discussed, still have to be worked out.

Sabotage in Switzerland and Spain was mentioned. It was pointed out that as action had invariably to be taken on ISOS material if a ship was in jeopardy it would be valuable to have agents in such places as Seville and Huelva who would give the necessary cover to ISOS and ISK sources. S.I.S. undertook to see what they could do.

I had a talk with Viv about Section V and America. He is quite clear that their work must go on but that in some way it should be detached from D.S.C. Meanwhile he is getting together with Thurston on a frank basis.

I went to see Maxwell about the BOYD case. He is giving an order under 18B which can be cancelled if the S.Africans want to make use of BOYD.

December 24th,

Medhurst talked to me about Mrs. MANLEY, a curious character who gives large parties which are attended by some of the Air Ministry girls employed on confiden-

tial work. Our records show that she is a doubtful adventuress.

I had a talk with Dixon about Stone going first to Freetown and then to Lagos. I thought that as we had got Swinton to agree it was desirable that Stone should stay a short time at Freetown on his way to Lagos.

The D.G. has written a somewhat stinging reply to Mason-Macfarlane.

Viv. is raising tremendous trouble about ISOS being shown to Briscoe. Quite obviously Briscoe must see it if he is to carry out his duties. The present arrangement is that a special file on secret writing is kept in the B.I. registry. Briscoe can draw this file when he wants it but cannot keep it in his room over-night. He can pass blanketed versions of the material to his subordinate chemists working on a particular problem. I am getting rather tired of being held up as a model of indiscretion.

Canaris and La Hausen, head of Abt. II, are shortly to visit Madrid. The S.D. is active in Spanish Morocco in the preparation of sabotage enterprises. It appears to be working in close touch with the Luftwaffe by providing suitable bombing targets.

December 25th

Ned talked to me about a F/Lt. Norman SMITH at Montrose. This man has got two notes from a suspect series taken out by THALHEIM at the beginning of the war. POGO brought some of these notes back and others have turned up all over the world. SMITH has another account with large sums paid in in cash.

December 27th

A.D.NI. rang me up about the Orcades which had been sunk off the coast of South Africa under circumstances which were thought to be peculiar. The Admiralty proposed to hold a special enquiry. I said that if there was anything that Col. Webster could do we should be very pleased to let him know.

There is still a good deal of talk in Portuguese and Spanish circles about the possibility of an attack by us on Spanish Morocco. It seems to have become known that the possibility of such an operation being necessary was at least envisaged.

I lunched with Dick Casey. He is going to Washington and will be back in Cairo on the 15th Jan. He seemed pretty tired. He told me that he had had a difficult time during the first 3 months, but that things were now settling down. He did

42
not say so, but I gather that he did not find Lampson a very easy customer. He seemed pleased with the Intelligence set-up under Maunsell, although he seemed to have a somewhat erroneous impression of the activities of enemy agents in his area. I did not entirely disillusion him as I did not wish to let Maunsell down. This goes to show however how necessary it is for Dick to go out to the M.E. Casey was obviously puzzled about the D.G.'s remark that Maunsell was responsible to the military. Casey says that as the head of S.I.M.E. he is responsible to M.E.I.C. who is responsible to the Defence Committee at the head of which is himself. I explained to him Maunsell's position vis-a-vis the military and his responsibilities to the D.M.I., M.E. In my view the whole situation is unsatisfactory. Quite clearly Maunsell is anxious to be based on the Security Service. I told Casey that Dick was going out and he promised to see him and give him all the assistance he required. Casey has regular meetings with Maunsell, S.I.S. and S.O.E. and seemed to be very satisfied with their work.

December 26th

I had a discussion with Gibbs and Dix on West Africa. It was decided to draft a wire to Swinton explaining to him that Stone was going to Freetown at any rate for a period and that Mark Johnstone would be No. 2 to Dixon.

In the absence of Dick I took the 12 o'clock meeting. We discussed the Lisbon leakage. Hart is to speak to the ADNI about an enquiry into the general convoy set-up, and Blunt is to find out about the possibility of testing our own bags, which may just conceivably be carrying information in secret ink.

I had a talk with Haylor, Abbott and Albert on the LRC for British subjects. This matter has been dragging on interminably but does seem at last to be getting on its feet.

Foley came to see me about the MULLET case. He is very anxious to get over a man called FANTO, who is an associate of KOESSLER. FANTO will be fed as a XX agent. The idea is to build up KOESSLER as far as possible with MASTERS. Foley feels confident about the reliability of FANTO. If he comes here we shall have to give him a considerable measure of liberty, but this is perhaps a risk worth taking.

December 29th

I attended a meeting with Cadogan and others about the MENEZES case. The possibility of enlisting the assistance of Montero, the Portuguese Ambassador, in the liquidation of MENEZES was discussed. The present position is that MENEZES writes to his sister with an enclosure to a man named MENDEZ. The enclosure

44 contains secret writing. The letter goes through the bag. We have succeeded in bringing up the writing which under a combination of ammonia fumes and violet ray is visible, but then fades out. While subjected to this treatment it can be photographed. We do not yet know the nature of the ink. The interest of the case lies in the fact that MENEZES is an S.D. agent operating on British territory. This is contrary to normal procedure. Although his information is of low grade, he is undoubtedly in a position to do us considerable harm. If we warn the Ambassador he may well decide to send MENEZES home. On the other hand if he could be induced to remove his diplomatic privilege we could probably try him under the Treachery Act, but to do this it would be necessary to produce a copy of the letter which may cast suspicion on our activities. If we can get a really good piece of information the F.O. will consider making the approach to the Ambassador.

I had a discussion with Kenneth and Ramsbotham about America. Ramsbotham is I think a little hurt about the introduction of Gibbs, who the D.G. wishes to keep a record of what information is received from Thurston and the information going to him. The main idea is to see communications from the F.B.I. properly followed up. Gibbs feels that Ramsbotham should continue to act as adviser to other sections and the appropriate Ameri-

can Security Dept. here capable of carrying out their enquiries, since he is in touch with G.2, O.S.S., Coe of the Embassy etc. on matters of routine.

I attended a meeting with the D.G. and Thurston. Thurston had expressed himself as very satisfied with the information he was getting from us and he is evidently anxious that we should have our own representative on the Bureau in Washington.

I went with the D.G. to the W.O. where we saw Gen. Gifford, E.O.C. W. Africa. He was introduced to Dixon. He apparently objects to Dixon being made a full colonel as he feels that this would upset the balance of the military hierarchy. Otherwise he was extremely amiable and co-operative.

December 30th

D.G. has seen MacMillan who is leaving for N. Africa to take up post as Resident Minister. It has been explained to MacMillan that we can if necessary provide officers with knowledge of security matters.

I attended the weekly S.I.S. meeting at Glenalmond. Matters discussed were (1) America - the situation here was still obscure and it was clear that no solution could be found till Stephenson returned; (2) Lisbon and Madeira leakages. After the meeting I explained to Viv. our point of view about the examination of unaccredited agents at the RPS and also about the position of the new

46
R.S.S. Committee.

December 31st

After the R.S.S Committee meeting Morton-Evans and Ryle talked to me about Frost. They regard him with the greatest suspicion. They think that he sells us to Maltby and Maltby to us.

January 1st 1943.

I took Dick's meeting. We decided to get a definite opinion from A.D.N.I. as to whether he considers the Lisbon messages constitute a leakage.

The BUNSSSEN case is still something of a mystery. BUNSSSEN appears to be here but his identity is uncertain.

T.A.R. reported a letter addressed to Lipstick in Lisbon was missed in Censorship. It was a new ink which dissolves when submitted to the iodine test. The ink is an iodine solution.

Brig. Swinton-Lee, who is in charge of the C.C.A.O. Second Front office came to see the D.G. He was mainly interested in obtaining the services of our officers for duties connected with his office. It was explained to him that our officers were trained in security matters and that if they went on a second front job we should like them to make use of their former experiences.

Catalogue Reference: KW4/191

reached as to the part to be played by this office in Second Front operations.

January 4th

Our first course for Second Front officers opened at Blenheim. I said a few words on the security aspect and also on the jobs that might be open to those attending the course. Dick lectured extremely well. He covered the whole evolution of the office since the beginning of the war and then explained in some detail the basic sources on which we work. After the lecture the meeting was thrown open to questions and general discussion.

Cecil established touch with a man called Peter Corcoran, who was formerly employed by the Garda. This man is now employed in a Govt. office over here. He had had passing through his hands certain reports about our military dispositions in N. Ireland. This he had obtained in the Ministry of Defence. While we do not mind Dan having this information apart from the general impropriety of the action, we are rather worried about its passing through a number of different offices in Eire. There is very little to be done about it. If at a later date we have any trouble with the Ministry of Defence we can give them a hint that we know what has been going on in N. Ireland.

48
January 5th

A.D.N.I. came to see me about the Kameradschaftsdienst. He said that Robertson-MacDonald had been given authority to visit Barnet in order that he might acquaint himself with the progress being made. In his opinion very little was being done and O'LEARY was getting practically no assistance. I said that this rather astonished me since Ryle, who was in charge of affairs, was energetic and extremely intelligent. I thought therefore that A.D.N.I. before taking the matter further would be wise to have a talk with Ryle.

I had a meeting with Charles and Dick about Maunsell's position in the Middle East. At the moment he is responsible for his staff and finances to the D.M.I. Middle East, though he serves two other commands as well. On the other hand, as the head of SIME he is responsible to MEIC who are responsible to the Defence Committee, at the head of which is the Resident Minister. Maunsell feels the lack of any authority at home to whom he can look for support and finance. He would much prefer to regard himself as an outpost of M.I.5. locally responsible to the Defence Committee for the work he performs. His position would insansense be analagous to that of Medlam or the D.S.O. Malta. We afterwards saw the D.G. who authoris'd Dick to look into the matter while he was in Cairo,

T.A.N. and J.C. came to see me about the WALENTI case. They think that before proceeding the W.Board should be consulted as to whether we could co-operate with the Poles on a case of this kind.

Loxley rang me up about 5 Polish agents who have been condemned to death. He wanted to know whether we had anybody we could possibly exchange. I said that apart from the principle involved which would be a matter of serious discussion, I did not think we had anybody who would not be able to give away a good deal of information if he were sent back to Germany.

January 6th

I took the Wednesday meeting. There have been further reports about the movements of our convoys which are said to be due to a leakage from the British Embassy or Legation in Lisbon.

Canaris has had conversations with Wigon and Jordana. Wigon has made it clear that it is not possible for Spain to enter the war on either side. He did not believe that the allies intended to attack Spain or Spanish Morocco. He pointed out however that an attack on Spanish territory would be rendered less likely if the Army which was already mobilised, was equipped with modern arms and weapons. It would be in Germany's interest to provide such weapons. He said

that in order to give the allies no pretext for making any attacks on Spanish territory acts of sabotage carried out from Spain or Spanish must cease. A resumption of sabotage activities against Gib. was agreed to with certain reservations, and the continued use of posts on Spanish territory for the observation of shipping in the Straits was also agreed to provided that the greater part of the personnel employed at these posts were Spanish nationals. Wigon told Canaris that Jordana's discussions with Salazar had resulted in a mutual talk on the defence of neutrality and in political and economic support.

Canaris had discussions with Jordana who took an identical line to that of Wigon. One of the results of this exchange of views was that Canaris made urgent representations to Berlin that the sabotage which is being undertaken from Spanish Morocco should cease, as it is placing difficulties in the way of Spanish acquiescence in German activities.

The German agent PRY has now confessed that he had a dual mission. In addition to carrying out espionage in the Congo it was also intended that he should enable the Germans to intercept secret correspondence passing between loyal Belgians in Belgium and Belgian Govt. officials both in London and in the Congo. Thus it was not only intended that he should deliver the letters entrusted to him by GILSON to the persons to whom they

were addressed, including the Belgian Colonial Minister in London but that he should use his best endeavours to see that he was entrusted with the replies and go with them to Lisbon where he was to hand them over to his German masters.

The A.D.N.I. expressed the view that the Lisbon leakages are serious. The dates and numbers of ships are accurate, but the route and escort inaccurate.

We have just heard that the "Ravenpoint" has got a small bomb in the stern which exploded in Gib.

I had a talk with J.C., Burt and Milmo about BOYD whose uncle is causing a certain amount of trouble by writing letters to officials about his nephew. It is proposed to tell the uncle that he is doing more harm than good.

There is a good deal of talk about the inefficiency of American troops in N. Africa. The fact is that they had very little time for training. The current joke is that there is a new film just come out called "How Green is Our Ally".

At the meeting with S.I.S. today Viv. announced that an agreement had been reached with Thurston about his being able to see ISOS. It was agreed to discuss the Madeira leakage case with Thurston and also the BUNSEEN case as they had important

J.C. has had a talk with Krefft of Affica House about ~~BOYD~~ and also about the LEIBRANDT case. Krefft is all in favour of the BOYD enterprise.

January 7th

Dick and I had a discussion with Viv. about the R.S.S. Committee. Viv. said he thought the whole thing would be rather a bitter pill for Felix. He did however intimate that although he had a great admiration for Felix some of his conceptions were extremely narrow. We also discussed the interrogation of unaccredited agents at the RFS.

I had a talk with T.A.R., Vickery and Bamford about our sending somebody to India to give instruction in XX work. We were of opinion that John Marriott would be the most suitable person. The appointment will be a temporary one but Marriott might possibly be replaced later by Finney.

Viv. tells me that S.O.E. are starting up in Portuguese Africa and intend to deal with illicit wireless. They are also going to deal with counter-sabotage matters in S.Africa.

Plans are going on for the notional sabotaging of de Havilland's by Zigzag. Camouflage is to be used.

Fanto of the MULLET case has put up a plan to give him the necessary cover for visiting

this country and we have indicated that we are prepared to accept him.

Dragonfly is still having trouble about his money.

January 8th

The D.G. told me that after a conversation with Tin-Eye he thought BOYD was unsuitable for sending to S. Africa. I said this case was one on which I should not be prepared to accept Tin-Eye's advice. BOYD was a type whom he would never really understand. I still thought that there were considerable advantages in sending BOYD to S. Africa. I thought that before making up his mind the D.G. should see Masterman, Burt and Milmo.

I also spoke to the D.G. about Frost and explained to him my difficulties. Frost was neither persona grata with anyone in this office or with anyone in R.S.S. Things had reached something of an impasse. I thought it would be far better if he went back to the BBC. The D.G. said he would see what could be done.

2 BRUNT

I spoke to Antony about the Maurice Embassy. I thought it was extremely important that we should do our best to get an agent in, owing to 2 or 3 important cases of leakage.

The D.G. told Lennox, myself and Charles that the P.M. was going to S. Africa and that he and his party would be leaving from Poole, probably tomorrow night.

Catalogue Reference: KV/4/191

54
January 9th

I had a talk with Walter Bell about a memo which Ian Wilson had prepared on the TRICYCLE case. It was fairly critical of the FBI. While I was all in favour of its being shown to Hurston I thought it undesirable that it should go in writing to the F.B.I. It would be better to leave it to Hurston to put it over in his own way. The real trouble is that the F.B.I. objectives in running KX agents are somewhat different from our own. The only use they appear to see in a KX agent is that he leads them to another whose arrest can be effected.

I asked J.C. to ascertain how far B.I. traffic was reflected on the ISO network. I want this for the purpose of a memo which I am preparing on various aspects of B.I. work which we are unable to cover.

I had a talk with the DMI about the WALENTI case. He thinks it ought to form the subject of discussion by the W.Board.

January 11th

Horrocks came to see me when I expressed to him my views about the future of L. Division.

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958

Catalogue Reference: KV 7/19 Jan 2001

55
I had a meeting with Cecil, Grogan, Cheney and Bird on the proposed reduction of Censorship services. We agreed that reduction on USA mails was possible but not on outward mails for Eire. The above reductions only reply to examination for leakage. It is always open to us to have a secret writing test if we so desire.

I had a talk with Duff about the ZigZag case and also about S. F. E.'s suggested activities in S. Africa. I said that I could not quite see what function they had to perform.

I had a talk with Marriott about going to India. He seemed a little doubtful about whether there was a job to be done. I said that it would not involve his staying there more than a few months since once he had sold them our experience the rest will be done by the Indian Police or the military.

January 12th

At the D.G.s meeting we discussed the reduction in Censorship. The D.G. agreed with our policy.

The centre for interrogation of British subjects was finally agreed upon, and is to commence work.

Dick started today for Mid East but came back from the station.

Lomax of M.E.W. came to see me about the BIRKIGT case. He thinks BIRKIGT is all right, but he is rather shaken by a letter attributed to him which indicates that he has been into Occupied France. He would like if possible to know whether this information is authentic.

Hughes rang me up about a complaint he had received from one of the C.C.s that he had not been put into the picture about ZigZag. The question was whether Hughes should speak to S.B. officers who must have heard about the case from their colleagues. The purpose would be to make an appeal to them to keep their mouths shut. The trouble is that if Hughes speaks to the S.B. officers they would report to the C.C. who complains that he has not been told. It is of course always open to him to go to the meeting of S.B. officers but C.C.s do not generally make a practice of this.

January 13th

The weekly meeting was attended by RSLOs doing the course. Hart said that one of the BUNSEN group has been identified as a Frenchman named Georges Bardec d'ARNOUX. He will shortly be leaving Lisbon to take a position as secretary to the Swiss Mercantile Marine Office New York. An agent recruited by the Germans in Lisbon to report on allied shipping movements in the Mozambique area from a base in Lourenco Marques has been identified as a certain Viana dos SANTOS who was arrested at Cape Town when his ship called

there. He has confessed that he was recruited by the Germans and arrangements are being made to have him sent to this country.

Hawkins of S.O.E. came to see me about South Africa. He was worried about a report that we had received from Viv. that S.O.E. were going to open up on counter-sabotage matters in the Union. He said that they had no such intention. The history of S.O.E. in S.Africa is that they were originally sent out to do a job of work in "adagascar. After the operation was over a small posse was sent to the Union where they have established contact with Col. Lenton, but have not been in action except for one small job they did in conjunction with Lenton and on the authority of Smuts.

At the W.Board meeting today it was decided that we should run VALENTI who should in future be known as BRUTUS. It was agreed however that for the moment he could not be used for purposes of deception.

I had a word with the D.M.I. about the Second Front and impressed upon him that officers with Security Service experience could be made available and that in our view had a definite function to perform. He seemed sympathetic and said that he had instructed Brig. Vale to look into the question.

January 14th

We had our first R.S.S. meeting with Service officers present.

Loxley spoke to me about the MANUEL case. MANUEL, whose case had aroused a certain amount of suspicion in the R.S., had been sent on to the French for enlistment with a warning. They apparently gave him some very rough treatment at their establishment in Duke St. and then told us that he had hanged himself. Spilsbury, who has examined the body was rather inclined to think that he may have been throttled. The Free French have got an idea that the methods we employ are no good. Certainly if the purpose is to extract the truth their methods are no better, since a confession obtained under duress is in 9 cases out 10 perfectly useless. Personally I think it is time that Duke street was closed down. There is certainly something fishy about the MANUEL case and there is no doubt that the French 2eme Bureau are extremely worried, as well they might be. MANUEL was supposed to have hanged himself with his shirt and when Brooke-Booth visited Duke St. he was shown a pipe from which he was supposed to have hanged himself. He asked where the shirt was and was told that it was on the man's body and that he could not therefore see it. When the police went to the cell the shirt, or part of it, was hanging from the pipe.

I had a talk with Rupert Speir about the Catalogue Reference:KV/4/191

Second Front and urged on him the importance of getting us on the map. What we really required was some letter from the DMI to the DG in which we were given a definite commitment.

Hughes talked to me about the C.C.s in his area being informed about ZIGMAG. Unfortunately they had been talking among themselves. Those who had not been told were up in arms. I said that I could see no reason for telling any C.C. except those immediately concerned.

The P.M. and Roosevelt arrived in N. Africa today.

January 15th

Sneath has brought to my notice the case of one GERHARDT, an Aryan German whose activities had never been properly investigated.

Spooner is looking into the case of Mrs. MANLEY, which was referred to me by Charles Medhurst. He will dig into her antecedents.

The D.G. dined with me at the Club. We had a very pleasant evening.

January 16th

Gibbs is to go to B.I.C as No. 2 to Victor. This solves two problems as far as I am

concerned. Gibbs was crying out for work and Victor was shouting that he was overworked.

S.I.S. have asked us whether we can provide them with x suitable passport control officers for N. Africa. They are rather inclined I think to regard us as a recruiting ground. They have heavy commitments but rarely seem able to fulfil them.

January 17th

I have had an interesting report from Mills about the JANOWSKI case otherwise known as WATCHDOG. He has evidently been through considerable difficulties in getting the case on its feet. The R.C.M.P. appear to be totally unfitted to deal with a matter of this kind. Had Mills not been there the case would have been blown three or four times over. He seems to be using the utmost tact and I feel sure will make good.

The D.G. has written to Cook, Inspector General of Constabulary in the Cambridge area about the arrival of enemy agents. He has told him virtually that he does not think that C.C.s have any right to be informed about matters of this kind unless they are specifically concerned.

Jap B.J.s show that at the conference between Germany, Italy and France about 24.12.42 Italy wanted to withdraw from Greece and Croatia and transfer their troops to France.

Germany declined to permit this owing to the position in the Balkans. Laval tried to get (a) the organisation of a new French Army, (b) a falangist division for the recovery of N. Africa, (c) the removal of the boundary between occupied and unoccupied France, (d) the release of P/W and their employment in German, and (e) the use of ciphers. (a) was granted on a small scale, (b)(c) and (d) were refused and (e) was granted. The cost maintaining the army of occupation in France is to be increased from 300 to 500 million francs.

According to a Jap B.J. Dr. SORGE's spy ring consisted of 246 members, 9 of whom are Soviet citizens.

Representatives of the Abwehr captured in N. Africa report that the S.D. is taking over the functions of Abts. II and III. In Paris III is already in the hands of the S.D. Canaris appears to favour this and is said to be interested only in Abt. I. This is interesting in view of S.D. activities in Spanish Morocco of an Abt. II character and the presence of S.D. agents abroad. Canaris's character is given as follows: friendly, ice-cold brain, knows his subordinates intimately and addresses them as "du". Domesticated and entertains in Berlin but not Party officials. Intimate friends are von Keitel and von Brauchitsch, and particularly von Liss. In the Abwehr itself he seems to be on very

intimate terms with PIEKENBROCK, head of Abt. I. He is on bad terms with Himmler and Ribbentrop and on no terms with Goering. With Hitler he is diplomatic. Hitler trusts him with diplomatic missions specially to Spain where his connections are excellent. Canaris has no known vices and shows no preference Naval Officers in matters of promotion. He despises the Party. This same representative of the Abwehr states that there is a W/T station in Zurich run by de COERDA, at, he believes, Neuhauser str. 43.

January 18th

The Consul General at Algiers has asked for an MI5 officer to work on an Inter-Allied Commission which is to sort out several thousands of internees. He is to be responsible on the one hand to the Consul General and on the other to G.2 of the Allied Forces.

I had a meeting with Gibbs, Kenneth, Brooke-Booth and Ramsbotham about American liaison. Gibbs thinks that while he could keep a record of the incoming and outgoing correspondence which concerns the FBI, Ramsbotham must continue to be the pointer for sections of this office for the placing of enquiries with the various American offices G.2, OSS, ONI, the Embassy and the FBI.

I had a talk with Harry about the Second Front and the importance of getting a commitment from the D.M.I.

Adam came to me with a grouse about Stopford.

I told him that I thought Stopford was doing quite a good job of work. He then complained that he never heard anything about Stopford's work. I said the fact was that he had never given Stopford any encouragement to talk to him and I was not surprised to hear that Stopford had not gone out of his way to volunteer information. I was quite sure however that he would be ready to do so. The fact is that Adam has always regarded Stopford's work as interference with the functions of the SCOs. In point of fact SCOs are not supposed to run agents and have not got the time to do so.

JANOWSKI has given quite an interesting story about the proposed invasion of this country in 1940. He himself was at the time with the Brandenburg Regiment waiting to come over. It was intended that the Brandenburg Regt. followed by other troops should land at night on the flat beaches west of Folkestone. They had been issued with British uniforms captured at Dunkirk. JANOWSKI's section was to proceed on motor-bicycles to Dover and capture the docks. Nazi flags were to be hoisted on the docks at Dover as a sign to the German Air Force to stop bombing. The invasion plans were definitely cancelled at the end of October 1940. According to JANOWSKI, Rantzau's stock is very low. Canaris has been blamed for Germany being misinformed about Russia.

January 19th

At the D.G.s meeting we discussed the paper on the pilfering of arms which was to come before the HDSE. It was agreed that the matter was quite serious and that we should press for something to be done, particularly in the case of revolvers which were getting into unauthorised hands. Most of the delinquents however were small boys.

Jim Hale talked about the WILSON case. WILSON was formerly a member of Grand's organisation. He was interned because he went bad and committed indiscretions relating to the SOE set up in Roumania. He had brought an action for wrongful imprisonment. Judgment was given against him and the Judge refused to listen to details about SOE, MI5 etc. Justice Humphries commented quite severely on the action of the H.O. in holding up WILSON's petition to the Lord Chief Justice and accepted the H.O.'s apology. He said that any citizen in this country, whether he be alien, enemy alien or British, had the right to communicate with the Court. It is feared that this remark may lead to a certain amount of trouble.

Smuts has refused to have BOYD, whom we wished to send to him as a D.A.

Michael Hyde is anxious to take a letter with him to S. Africa which will have the effect of giving him a certain measure of

independence. The D.G. was reluctant to do anything about this at first, but eventually agreed to my drafting such a letter.

Harris and J.C. came to see me about Garbo. Garbo was asked to send some of his ink to Careless. The latter ~~xxx~~ is an extremely indiscreet and truculent fellow, who is in detention and has refused to write to the Germans unless he is released. The mistake has been to allow Garbo to make contact. If Careless does not write the Germans may well think that Garbo has given him away. I have spoken to TinEye and asked him to have another go at Careless. He tells me that he has tried every sort of interrogation but that Careless is adamant.

Orr has sent in a particularly offensive minute to the D.G. about the new interrogation centre for British subjects at Devonshire House. He imagines that the establishment of this institution is a reflection on his work at 055.

I attended a meeting at Kinnaird House with the D.G. to hear Connop Guthrie's views about America. He was on the whole pretty guarded but admitted that the situation was extremely unsatisfactory. He also criticised the lack of liaison between the uptown and downtown offices.

We had a final meeting of the first course today, when Dick and I were answering questions

66
The course seems to have been a great success and everyone is enthusiastic about it.

January 20th

I attended the HDSE meeting when the pilfering of arms was discussed. It was agreed that something should be done to place dumps of arms in more suitable places and that the services should issue warnings to officers about the seriousness of losing their revolvers.

As a result of representations which have been made to the Portuguese authorities in Lisbon, a ring of German Portuguese agents who have been responsible for organising maritime sabotage in Lisbon have been arrested. One of these is a German named Hans GRIMM who was responsible for obtaining information concerning allied shipping movements from the crews of British ships arriving in Lisbon through an organisation of sub-agents. Another, a Portuguese named Candido RAPOSO, was the head of an organisation obtaining similar information through a source with access to the Marconi Station at Madeira. RAPOSO has made a full confession.

Leakages of information about convoys which reached the Abwehr through Lisbon continue but ~~an~~ a very large proportion of the information is inaccurate.

The Spanish vessel Cabo de Buena Esperanza has just left Bilbao for S. America carrying two German agents. One is a member of the
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/191

crew, a Spaniard named Joachim BATICON, who has already acted on several occasions as courier for the Germans, and wrote a letter which was found on the agent Andres BLAY, introducing him to a contact in S. America. The other, Mans LASKI, was travelling on a Spanish temporary passport in the guise of a German-Jewish refugee. Arrangements have been made to have both of these men arrested at Trinidad.

Milmo reported at the Wednesday meeting that there had been a large influx at Camp O20. The main increase is in spies going to S. America. He mentioned the case of de GRAAF a Belgian who had come down an escape route and had been temporarily employed at the British Embassy in Madrid. De GRAAF admitted that he had been in contact with the Abwehr but said that he had done so in order to escape. He was carrying pyramidon and tooth picks. He was caught through a clever link-up on the information index at the RPS which showed that he had been put on the escape route by someone known already to be working for the Abwehr. He is now beginning to come clean. He was highly trained both in espionage and sabotage and appears to have corresponded with German occupied territory after his arrival in Madrid.

Another interesting case is that of the s.s. Reidar. SOE appear to have got in touch with 3 members of the crew at Lerwick on the false grounds that they were SOE agents.

It now seems fairly clear that one or all of them are German agents.

Dick is firmly convinced that Max, alleged to be a German agent operating in South Russia, is in reality a Russian D.A. The Sofia-Meldekopf appears to work for the Bulgarian police as well as for the Abwehr. The name of SAMOILOFF, who appears on the traffic as a Russian traitor, was given to the Russians, who do not appear to take much interest. There are no inward messages to Sofia picked up by RSS and the material covers a wide area from Leningrad to the Caucasus. Everything seems to point to Max being an imaginary agent controlled by the Russians.

We had a joint meeting with SIS today in London. The case of one WURMANN, an Abwehr agent captured in N. Africa was discussed. It was agreed that we should house him, look after him and give him a certain measure of liberty. He would be regarded as a useful reference book on Abwehr matters. Authorised persons would be allowed to have direct access to him. Other matters discussed were the KOBBE case, Herbert's suggestion for the improvement of our relations with Censorship, the Kameradschaftsdienst and the situation in America.

Harker talked to me about Curry. I told him that I thought that Curry needed an executive job and that he should not be held responsible for what had happened at Blenheim in the

early days of the war. Barker said that he did not think Curry was fit for an executive job.

Ned came to see me about the discovery of notes in the Czech Bank. There is no doubt that the Czechs have been importing notes from the Lisbon market. It is suggested that official representation should be made.

Broman-Thite told me about an Argentine official named Syrie and his friend, who are going to Spain and Portugal. He thought that they might perhaps be tackled by the SCO and asked to keep their eyes open. They might also let us know if they receive any approaches from the Germans. I said that provided Loxley was in agreement I had no objection.

January 21st

The D.G. has agreed to the letter about Michael Ryde's position being sent to Webster but he will not agree to Ryde being made a Lt. Col. The D.G. has also agreed to Quir being posted to E.I.A.

I had a discussion with Charles about Curry and the possibility of his taking over E. Division. Charles does not think that he is capable of doing the job but says that he will wipe out of his mind anything that he may have had up against Curry from what happened at Blenheim in 1940.

I had a discussion with Dick, Milmo and Marriot about TURMANN. He is to be housed in London in a flat near U.35. Caroe is to do his interrogation and be generally in charge of him.

D.B. came to see me about MENEZES. He is opposed to the scheme by which it was suggested that we should produce a particularly hot letter by MENEZES for the inspection of the Ambassador.

Sloane has told U.35 about a new Russian offensive which has been extremely successful. The ultimate objective was said to be Gomel. The Russians have been keeping very quiet about it and do not propose to make any announcement till about the 30th January.

January 22nd

Dick and Brooman-White have seen Loxley and D.B. about the MENEZES case. It has been agreed to give it another month's run.

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. Jan 2001

Senter came to see me about S. Africa. He told me that Col. Taylor of SOE was doing a general tour of SOE stations and would probably be seeing Smuts.

Thurston came to see the D.G. He seemed very appreciative about what was being done for him here. I asked him whether, if Security Co-Ordination were cleaned up, the position of any representative that we might have with the FBI in Washington would be prejudiced by his attachment to the new organisation. Thurston clearly felt that it would be better if he had direct contact with ourselves, without his communications passing through New York. I also asked Thurston about cases which were sub judice. I explained that we were giving him cases which were sub judice on a highly confidential basis, and that we would like if possible for the FBI to do the same. He fully appreciated this point and said that he would take it up with Washington both in writing and on his return.

I am rather worried about Kenneth's appointment to North Africa. Viv. has asked Felix to see the Consul General in Algiers. Personally I think we ought to tell the F.O. to inform the Consul in reply to his telegram that the MI5 representative would be Major Younger, and that we ought to make a similar notification to the American HQ. I cannot see what Kenneth's job has to do with SIS, or why we should negotiate through them.

JANOWSKI has got through to the Germans from Canada.

I had a meeting with Dick, Stephens, T.A.R. and Harris about Careless and Garbo. Careless is still adamant about writing to the Germans. We decided therefore to send him to Huntercombe, and to offer no excuse to the Germans for the cessation of correspondence. Garbo is very worried but personall I think we shall get away with it.

Caroe has had a long talk with Wurmann. He thinks he may be very useful to us. Wurmann is however in a rather unsettled state of mind. It is necessary as far as possible to treat him as a collaborator rather than an informant.

January 23rd

At present there are 6076 Germans, Austrians and Italians interned. This figure includes 3786 Germans and Austrians and 2051 Italians. Originally there were 22,308 internees, 19,636 of whom were Germans and Austrians and 2,672 Italians. This was the position after the General Internment Order. The total of the released is therefore roughly 16,232.

The report from the Polish Military Mission about BRUTUS is favourable. Meanwhile contact has been established in a new place and the wireless side of the case is working satisfactorily.

TRICYCLE is getting a little restless and has put up various possible plans for his
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/191

getting abroad to recover direct personal contact with the German S.S.

DRAGONFLY has not yet been paid and is therefore still silent. It seems however that the Germans are trying to make the necessary arrangements.

Mills telegraphed that contact had been made by Watchdog. He has been given interesting details about the BRANDENBURG Regiment. Details that he has given about the Abwehr in Belgium are far from convincing, however.

S.I S. have agreed that ZIGZAG shall be allowed to return to France via Portugal.

I saw Maxwell and explained to him our plan about WURMANN. The latter was particularly anxious to get some assurance about British nationality. He naturally thought that this could be done at the stroke of a pen. We have explained to him that this was quite impossible but that we hoped we could get some letter from the H.O. which would give him grounds for thinking that if he behaved himself his naturalisation would be considered in due course. Maxwell has promised to let me have a letter stating that if WURMANN keeps to his bargain his naturalisation will be considered after the fulfilment of the statutory conditions and that the period of 5 years should be taken to start from his arrival in this country. In addition he will say that it is not the custom of the British Govt. to

deport aliens if by so doing they will be liable to persecution by their own authorities. WURMANN has not changed his identity and is being fixed up with papers in the name of Count STENBOCK. He will take the identity of a Baltic baron.

Felix is going on from N. Africa to Cairo. It seems likely that he will get there before Dick.

I spoke to Harry Allan again about getting us on to the Second Front map. He is going to have another talk with the W.O.

T.A.R. is a little worried about the attitude of the Controller of Deception, who seems anxious to give directions in detail about the channels through which his information is to be passed. I said that I thought it was up to the Controller to state the nature of the information and the time when he wishes it to reach the enemy. He is entitled to know the grade of the agent who was to pass this information in order that he could assess the extent to which the information was likely to be believed. The rest of the business seemed to be a matter for us.

January 25th

I received Viv's letter about the R.S.S. Committee. There are to be what are known as a high level and a low level committee. The high level will have Duff in the chair

and will consist of C., the D.G., G-P, Vivian and myself. Neither Frost nor Felix are included. Dick is suggested as chairman of the low level committee. On the high level it is open to either party to co-opt people who have special problems and the chairman of the low level committee can attend, when his committee have a problem to present. I don't think Frost will be particularly pleased with the arrangement.

From Lourenco Marques B.J. s it would seem that the Germans are operating a transmitter in the Union which is acknowledged by broadcasts from Berlin through the playing of the tune "Opsaal Boere". These messages are picked up in Lorenzo Marques and relayed to Berlin as direct reception there does not appear to be satisfactory.

Findlater Stewart came to see the D.G. He will support us in any attempt by the Controller to dictate the nature of the traffic to be put over our network. I do not think however that this situation will arise.

Dick has had notice to leave for the M.E. at 10.30 tomorrow.

According to a Turkish B.J. dated 25.1.45, ANTONESCU who has just returned to Berlin paints a gloomy picture. It seems that everyone, from Hitler and Ribbentrop downwards, is obsessed with the idea of protecting Europe from Bolshevism. They are quite prepared to evacuate Europe provided they

26
can keep some of the Russian territory. Hitler said: "The revolution accomplished by Stalin in 20 years is greater than anything I have done. I look upon it with admiration and dread. It is not the Anglo-Saxons I am afraid of. It is the Russians. The countries which believe the Russian danger only exists for Germany are blinded by their immediate interests."

In the opinion of Antonescu, Hitler has given up the idea of ruling over Europe and is beginning to be afraid of Russia. He will be satisfied with a peace of agreement, and Antonescu imagines that the Turkish Govt. realises that if Germany is crushed Russia will be free to carry out her designs of invasion the next day. Whatever the military preparations of the Anglo-Saxons they will not be able to block Russia's path. The only counter-poise to Russia is Germany.

Doubtless all the above was carefully staged in order to keep Turkey on the path of neutrality, and incidentally to impress upon Antonescu that his only hope still lay in sticking to the Axis. The statements attributed to Hitler may have been sincere, but were quite obviously said with a purpose.

According to WURMANN, England is badly covered by the Abwehr. The best information comes from the "Funk Überwachung". WURMANN saw the periodical results of this W/T traffic, and says he was terribly upset.

to realise how useless the Abwehr work was when compared with the splendid W/T intercept service. WURMANN says that, as a result of this service, everything is known about the distribution of the different divisions in England, their numbers etc. He saw similar results in Athens resulting from the W/T service in Egypt. The Athens information came from Rommel, who sent it also to Berlin.

This information ties up with the following statement by one of the Panzer Generals now in our hands: "I am always worried in case they should crack our code. All our communications with Japan are by W/T. All the things we hear when the English are using their W/T are startling when they are worked out. They don't worry about it all ... of course they may be doing it purposely it was quite amazing up to the time I was taken prisoner. At that time our successes were partly due to that, otherwise it would not have been possible at all. BAYERLEIN and I actually gave our orders accordingly. Not exclusively, but at any rate it was very important information for us".

These two statements make valuable ammunition in my battle for Signals Security.

January 26th

WURMANN is giving us some interesting sidelights on past events. The following refers to the incident some years ago when

two German staff officers travelling by plane fell into the hands of the Belgians and were found to be carrying important documents giving the German invasion plans against Belgium. He says: "In January 1940 a Major of the G.A.F. arrived at Cologne route for Munster, carrying with him the exact details of the part to be played by the G.A.F. and paratroops in the invasion of Belgium. Before proceeding to Munster by train, he called on an old friend, a G.A.F. Major commanding the Cologne aerodrome. The two old friends cracked a bottle of wine together. The first bottle had, of course, to be rounded off by a second, and the excellence of the Rhenish wine, combined with the convivial atmosphere, sufficed to lead to an agreement that instead of going on to Munster by train that night, the messenger should wait over until the next morning, and be flown there by his old friend. The two majors duly took off the next morning, and for causes not yet ascertained, but probably not unconnected with the quality of the wine they had drunk the preceding evening, they mistook the Maas for the Rhine, and made a perfect landing on an aerodrome near Brussels. Their first thought on realising their mistake was to burn their precious plans, but these two highly-placed representatives of the most efficient nation in the world did not possess a single match between them, and the plans duly fell into the hands of the Belgian authorities.

doubts as to whether the Belgians would really believe in the authenticity of these plans and the stupidity of the officer who allowed them to fall into Belgian hands, and finally concluded that the risk was too great to be taken. They thus postponed the offensive, which was planned for January 1940, until May 1940. Had the offensive taken place on the date originally fixed, the terrific frosts which set in at the end of January 1940 would have caught the German panzer divisions in the middle of the Ardennes, and the whole of the 1940 campaign might have ended very differently. Was this luck, or was it Hitler's intuition?

At the D.G.s meeting the arrival of 40 British subjects from Germany and 150 from Italy was discussed. We only heard of this arrival two days ago. Necessary arrangements are being made for their reception but we intend to lodge a protest with the H.D.S.E. A large number of these people can hardly speak English.

I took Lick's daily meeting. The case of the REIDAR was mentioned. This boat contained escapees from Norway. ISOS showed that she was intending to pick up fisherman "O" whose identity is not clear. The Admiralty and S.O.E. are being consulted.

The Canadians appear to be keeping a close watch on KOBBE.

It has now been discovered that there was a previous reference to WATCHDOG on ISOS.

80
Leslie Burgin is fussing about LYNKE. The latter has already made certain demands which are quite sufficient in our view to keep him inside.

I had a talk with John Senter, Hart, T. A. R. and Milmo about the REIDAR case. Senter will arrange with Hart and Milmo for them to see Wilson of S.O.E. who may be able to give them a line on the matter.

Walker came to see me. He had heard that Frost had some idea of transferring him to the pigeon section of the W.O. and Air Ministry. He hoped that before considering this I would give due consideration to his views. I said that I knew nothing about any such suggestion but that I would certainly consult him before doing anything.

January 27th

We had the weekly meeting with S.I.S. at Glenalmond when we discussed the case of KOBEE and ALADREN. S.I.S. have told Security Co-Ordination and have suggested to them that they should handle the case or pass it to OSS if the FBI did not know about it. This struck me as being a somewhat curious suggestion since the basis of Vivian's complaint against Stephenson is that he has been co-operating with OSS in running agents in Hoover's area. Viv. I think realised that this message contained evidence of the cloven hoof and was clearly rather worried. It seems that the FBI in spite of the stipulation of G.2 and ONI

are in fact getting B.J.s from G.2 by a boot-legging process on the lower level.

We then discussed N. Africa when Vivian made it clear that Kenneth in his new job would be working under Crawford. This of course is a ridiculous position since Crawford will know nothing about Kenneth's work. This is merely designed to keep us off foreign territory unless we go there on an S.I.S. ticket.

The Americans made their first attack on Germany. The target was Wilhelmshaven.

January 23th

The D.G. held a meeting with Harry, Barker and myself at which it was decided that we should see the D.M.I. with a view to getting some definite Second Front commitment for our officers who had received special training.

At the R.S.S. meeting today we had a useful discussion on the Luft-Meldekopf and on the Max service, which we think is XX. We also discussed the advisability of the bombing of Stahnsdorf. Morton-Evans thought that anything we could do to create a shortage of wireless equipment would be to the good.

I had a meeting of the officers doing the course and answered questions.

Lt. Saxe of G.2 came to see me. He said
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/191

that G.2 were seriously lacking in training. They had a school in Chicago where they had been given lectures which he thought were not of any very great practical value. In this country they had no one from whom they could get instruction. Could we do anything? I said that I should be very pleased to arrange for him to have a talk with all the sections of this office who might be of assistance to him. I thought however that it would not do much good if he retailed this information to others or wrote a memo for the school in Chicago. It would be far better if he assembled his officers and allowed us to give them a course of instruction. He said that at the moment the G.2 officers in this country were either doing I.b courses or were attached to units. He hoped however that before long it would be possible to recall them and take advantage of my offer.

Milmo tells me that a Danish subject called BORISSON, who is interned at Dartmoor, has written to the King's Bench, having read about the Wilson case in the papers. Camp 020 took the precaution of withdrawing all papers dealing with this subject otherwise we might have had a flood of applications to the King's Bench for habeas corpus.

Maunsell has asked us to stop all diplomatic telegrams from Cairo. Presumably this is due to the P.M.'s visit. The F.O. are rather worried about this arrangement as they think it may lead to protests from

allied govts.

As from Tuesday last we have been getting German B.J.s from Dublin. These are likely to prove highly interesting and will fill in an important gap in our information.

January 29th

I saw the officers concerned and worked out a course for Lt. Saxe.

We heard from Dick today. He is still at Plymouth owing to bad weather.

Herbert has seen the D.G. He has just returned from N. Africa. He thinks it possible that the assassination of Darlan may have been planned by the de Gaullists in London. Enquiries made after Darlan's death showed that the assassin, who was a Monarchist, had obtained facilities in the matter of papers etc. from a certain d'ASTIER, an official of the N. African Govt. While Herbert was at Gib. waiting for his plane, he met d'ASTIER's brother, a member of de Gaulle's staff who was very secretive about his journey. He said he was going to Syria, but actually proceeded to N. Africa. It was a few days later that Darlan was murdered. Herbert had an appointment with him which was to have taken place about 4 hours after the assassination. When he arrived he found officials carrying the body away.

A basic political difficulty in N. Africa at the moment is that before landing the Americans, through Murphy and his connections, had been running a 5th column against the French Govt. officials in power. They had not however considered how they were going to run the country when these officials had been deposed. They therefore found it necessary to leave them in power after the landing. These officials then demanded the internment of those who had been intriguing against them before the landing, and the Americans were forced in this way to arrest their former supporters. This had naturally led to a great deal of ill feeling and to a highly complicated political situation.

Herbert found that the French Censorship were very ready to co-operate, although they might contain certain doubtful elements. It was impossible for us to take over the organisation on account of personnel and also for political reasons. The only thing we could do therefore was to co-operate as far as possible by putting our people in alongside the French. Later on, if things were unsatisfactory we should have learned the machinery and should be in a better position to take over if this were necessary.

WURMANN tells us that since JOHENLOHE was a highly placed agent of Canaris and used by him for important political objects. In the early days of the war he had visited Sam Hears in Madrid. It would seem that

Hoare, anticipating the possible German invasion of Spain, had asked HOJENLOHE to keep in touch with him. The motive of this arrangement was not clear.

GULBRANDSEN, a Norwegian escapee and agent of S.O.E., when confronted with information obtained from another escapee named JACOBSEN, had broken down and confessed that he was allowed by the Germans to escape and was given a mission to penetrate S.O.E. He did not intend to carry out this mission. He had not given the information previously because he was ashamed that under duress and serious ill-treatment he had given away quite a lot of information to the Germans. There does not appear to be any reason to doubt GULBRANDSEN's bona fides and his account of the circumstances is perhaps excusable.

January 30th

Kenneth has got off to N. Africa by plane. Dick is now at Embroke Dock. He went out last night but had to return owing to bad weather.

A study of MSSOS and MSS material shows that the enemy's defensive preparations in the Near and Mid East are weak. They are putting over deception which is intended to show that they're fortifying Crete, the Aegean Islands and Salonica.

The PM is still in Cairo and is to have conversations with the Turkish President.

4

Taylor of SOE has seen Smuts and a suggestion has come through that a mission should be formed consisting of Webster, Lenton, Smith of SOE and Ransome, the S.O.I. officer, to consider all information coming from Portuguese East and West. On the basis of this information it is proposed that SOE should take certain action to combat the activities of submarines, particularly in the Mozambique channel. What exactly SOE can do goodness only knows, particularly since there is evidence to show that submarines do not refuel from shore bases but from special submarine refuelling ships

ZIGZAG has notified his employers that he has done his job in sabotaging the Mosquito factory at Hatfield and that he is returning.

January 31st

I had a quiet working day. Dined with J.C. and discussed with him the future of the office. I asked him to put down his views.

February 1st.

The Panzer Generals, in discussing the German Navy. say they have the following ships: heavy cruisers, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau. Light cruisers, Prince Eugen, Hipper, Lutzow and Scheer. There is also the Leipzig and the Nuremberg which do not appear to be in action yet, and the Koln and Emden. There are besides roughly 15 destroyers, 10 torpedo boats, 30 mine

sweepers, and then come the two ships of the line Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesian. U-boats are believed to number between 50-60. Goering appears to have said in August last that the oil situation would be the deciding factor. Nothing has been got from Meikopf which it is thought would have yielded as much as all the oil from Roumania. It is said that the regiment Hermann Goering is called the Regiment Maier because Goering once said: If ever an English flyer comes over Germany my name is Meier".

The ZIGZAG operation was carried out on the night of the 29/30 Jan. Conky Turner's experts arrived at de Havillands at dusk and made up a complete representation of two large explosions by the morning. ZIGZAG has told the Germans that he was blowing up the two sub-stations and on his return will say that these supply motive power for all the machinery at de Havillands.

MUNOZ, the Spanish M.A., is returning to Spain on Monday, and for the purpose of Plan Dream we have arranged for him to take with him a letter of introduction. GARBO is to send a letter giving a new address at which MUNOZ can be contacted and the money is to be deposited with Charles Russell & Co. MUNOZ will then send a telegram to his contact in London to say that he has received the pesetas and that the sterling may now be released. ~~to say that~~ ~~he has~~ ~~received~~ ~~the~~ ~~pesetas~~ ~~and~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~sterling~~ ~~may~~ ~~now~~ ~~be~~ ~~released~~,
 to HRC Notional ~~Mr.~~ Wills, in other words Mills,

On the back of MUNOZ's letter there will be a message in secret ink about which he will know nothing. The Germans will be notified about the existence of this message

Consideration is being given to plans submitted from Canada for attempting to re-establish SPRINGBOK.

I had lunch with Col. Kreft of S. Africa House. He seems friendly and ready to help in any way he can. He told me an interesting story about an old man called PRETORIUS who during the last war had often gone through the enemy's lines. In this war he was in charge of the Press Correspondents. He was not very popular with these people as he was always taking them up to the forward area to enable them to get hot news. Most of them prefer to get their news at a safer distance. PRETORIUS therefore got rather bored with his job. When the Italians capitulated he commandeered the Duke of Aosta's white car which was beautifully fitted up for safari trips. He careered about the country in this car, and finally got it shipped down to Pretoria. Although this performance was not regarded with favour in some quarters, it was generally felt that Pretorius was Pretorius and that he was entitled to do what he liked, in view of his magnificent services to the Union in the last war. He was formerly by profession a hunter.

Frost and I saw the D.G. about the R.S.S. Committee. The D.G. says that Duff should decide on the composition of his own committee, and proposes to reply to Viv. accordingly.

Kenneth has had a frightful 36 hours at sea in a destroyer and has eventually had to put back owing to bad weather. Two of the ships in his flotilla were badly damaged.

Dick is once more leaving tonight.

February 2nd

Grogan informed me today for the first time about the censorship of the mails of allied forces. It appears that these mails are carried in bulk to Lisbon and are posted from there. Postbox addresses in Lisbon are given to which replies are sent. These in turn are collected and brought back in bulk to this country. There is apparently a field censorship examination which of course only covers leakage. There has been no secret ink test. I have arranged with Grogan that this should be done in future. There would seem to be a grave danger of people getting through the LRC and joining the allied forces being able to correspond with occupied territory in secret writing. I cannot understand how matters of this sort are not brought to our notice. I mentioned this at the directors' meeting.

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. Jan 2001

One Mirko ROT @ Michael RATH, a Yugoslav, has offered his services in Lisbon. He comes from Sofia where he was employed by the Medekopf. He mentioned that a British agent in Egypt has been submitting reports and also that one HAGER, the son of an Egyptian Police Chief, who was captured in Paris, has also been sent here for the same purpose. The suggestion is that we should get ROT over here and run him as a XX.

I have sent my memo about lacunae in our organisation and E. Division to the D.G. with a note about Curry, recommending that he should take over E. Division with Aiken-Sneath and Brooke-Booth under him.

has produced a letter in S/W signed by MENEZES. It contains information about our A.A. defences and certain other information specially planted by one of our agents.

February 3rd

Information obtained by the Germans from Lisbon about our military dispositions and convoys seem to be more than usually inaccurate. There is considerable annoyance in Abwehr circles about their having been no previous warning concerning the meeting of the P.M. and Roosevelt at Casablanca. There has been a raspberry to the S.D. and the Abwehr.

At the joint meeting between ourselves and S.I.S. S.Africa was discussed in the light of the Lourenco Marques B.J.s. It was agreed that on no account should PAASCHE be followed. It was felt that an operation of this kind would be far too dangerous and unlikely to succeed, and that D.F.ing would be much the most profitable line to adopt, when it was decided to close in on the transmitter. It was also agreed that Michael Ryde should be put fully in the picture. S.I.S. were opposed to having a committee in S.Africa with powers to handle their information. We also discussed the request of Home Forces that they should be allowed to circulate some memo on the Abwehr down to Divisions. Such a memo would be based on Curry's book. Viv. appeared to be opposed to giving such information to the I.B. staff. I said that I thought this was a difficult attitude to adopt. Surely the principle function of the I.B. staff was to counter activities of the German I.S. in the field. Could one therefore say that they should not be informed about the German I.S? Viv. seemed to think that the presence of the so-called C.E.experts from Glenalmond would be all that they would require. I said I thought myself that it was desirable to give the main units of the I.B. staff a note for the Abwehr, otherwise the documents and Abwehr personnel captured would never reach headquarters.

The D.G., Harry and I had a meeting with D.M.I. and Vale, D.D.M.I(O) on the question of the Second Front. The D.G. explained to the D.M.I. that we now had a pool of trained officers whose services would be available if required. Many of them had language qualifications in addition to their knowledge of security work as a whole. At one point in the discussion the D.M.I. suggested that these officers should be handed over to S.I.S., to form the basis of their S.I.(b) units. Harry explained that they had a somewhat different function to perform, which was more akin to I.B. work. He thought therefore that they should strengthen the I.B. staff rather than the S.I.(b) unit. It was understood by all that any officers going out on a Second Front job would lose their identity as members of the Security Service and become members of the I.B. Staff.

February 4th

Walter Bell came to see me. He told me that Ellis had returned. Ellis says that Stephenson is fed up and likely to resign. Bell also told me about the possible move of Section V. to London.

Major Thompson of M.A.P. came to see me about the case of BIRKIGT. I showed him our papers. I said that we were really indifferent about his being reinstated in his company provided this did not result in a leakage of information, which seemed unlikely.

I had lunch with Col. Sheen, Major Gillette and Lt. Saxe of G.2. I explained to them that we should be very pleased to give a course of lectures to G.2 officers on the German I.S. and on Security work. I thought this would be preferable to giving an intensive course to 2 or 3 with a view to their instructing others, or circulating a memo to the Chicago School. They all seemed to be in agreement. Meanwhile it appears that there are only very few G.2 officers available in England. Most of those who are here are either attached to I.B. units or trying to gain some practical experience in N. Africa.

I saw Jarvis of Lisbon in the D.G.s room, when we discussed the leakage case. The D.G. impressed on Jarvis the desirability of finding a solution if possible.

Medlam's agent COCK has staged a couple of big explosions in Gib., one involving the sinking of an old trawler. The incident has been duly reflected on the ISOS, and those concerned have been congratulated.

Caroe came to see me about WURMANN. The latter has supplied a good deal of information and a large number of names of the people connected with the Abwehr. He is at the moment rather depressed. Caroe thinks it very important that he should have plenty of work.

February 5th

Dick arrived in Cairo yesterday.

Guild from Newfoundland came to see me. He rather wants to extend his liaison to Greenland and Canada. There seems no objection to this provided it is only for local purposes and is carried out tactfully.

Milmo has been to see Duff who has been enquiring about certain cases at O20 which are recommended for release. Tin Eye or his minions appear to have spoken to Duff when he was at O20 the other day. The result was that Duff sent for the D G. who, not knowing the details, sent over Milmo. This is bad. If Tin Eye has got any complain about releases he should make them to me and not to Duff Cooper. Milmo was placed in a rather awkward position. He had to tell Duff quite frankly that there were certain cases handled by Goodacre which we thought were unsatisfactory. We did not in fact trust Goodacre's judgment. Duff's natural retort was "Ought you not to get rid of Goodacre?". The two particularly controversial cases were those of La GALLE and SZUMLICZ.

I had a talk with Alan Hodgkin about ZIGZAG's statement on the invulnerability of certain German night-fighters from the effects of RDF. Zigzag had been told by his masters that no night-fighter could get within a mile of him, and this happened

Alan said that it would be technically possible to send back a stronger pulse than the reflected pulse which might mislead a pilot who was not aware that he should look for the weaker reflection. He said that the German night-fighters were fairly good but of course had the great advantage of being able to operate immediately we crossed the channel. They could attack our aircraft for hours where we could only attack theirs for minutes.

I dined with J.C. and Barrington Ward of the Times.

ZIGZAG is awaiting his passage in Liverpool.

BALLOON has received two more questionnaires in duff but still no money.

February 6th

I asked Alan Hodgkin today about certain enemy planes reported as coming in at a very low altitude and dropping no bombs. He said it was just possible that they might be coming in to spy on our wireless procedure.

Plan MINCEMEAT is in the making. It involves the dropping of anybody off the Spanish coast, ostensibly that of a British officer, who will be carrying despatches of a highly confidential nature. These will give our future plans and cover plans in the Mediterranean. In fact the plans will be the cover plans. The idea was conceived by Charles Cholmondeley and is being developed

by him and Euan Montagu.

ZIGZAG has suggested to the Germans that they might get him back to Lisbon by submarine. When he gets back he will try and get another sabotage job, possibly in the USA. He will have a method of communication with us through talking in ham chat when transmitting broadcast messages. He thinks he could probably get his old station to let him do this. We will endeavour to communicate with him in a simple advertisement code. GRAUMANN receives the Times regularly.

Victor has had a talk with Clark Kerr, our Ambassador in Moscow, who gives an extraordinary account of Stalin. It took him many weeks to get an interview. Once inside the Kremlin he seemed to march through endless corridors before reaching Stalin's room. This was extremely long and sparsely furnished. A long carpet led from the door to Stalin's desk. Stalin was wearing a pink satin shirt. He apparently thinks aloud, addressing remarks to himself without looking at his visitor. This is rather awkward as the remarks are not always complimentary to the visitor. Just as the conversation started the sirens went. Stalin asked Clark Kerr whether he would like to go down to the shelter. Clark Kerr said he was quite accustomed to being bombed and had no desire to move. Stalin however had made up his mind to retire to the cellar, where there was an almost exact replica of his room above ground. Stalin began by asking him

how it was that a man like de COURCY who was opposed to the opening of a Second Front remained at large. Surely this meant that his views were supported by the P.M. Clark Kerr tried to explain that English people were at liberty to hold what views they liked provided they did not seriously impede the war effort. Stalin seemed unable to grasp that de COURCY's views were of little significance and that the majority of people in this country had not even any knowledge of his existence. After about 3 hours in the shelter and an exchange of one or two dirty stories, the friendship warmed up considerably. They parted apparently on very good terms.

The P.M. has got stuck at Algiers on his way back owing to engine trouble. We have been asked to start a cover story about his present whereabouts. One suggestion is that he is visiting Swinton in W. Africa, another is that he is going to see Salazar, and a third is that he has arrived back here. Personally I think it would be better to say nothing, the first is extremely unlikely and the second highly dangerous. I understand that at the meeting at Adana the P.M. promised the Turks arms but made no request for intervention.

Hamilton-Gay came to see me about a job in the M.I. 9 Transit Camp. He seemed quite a suitable candidate but unfortunately had no languages.

98
February 7th

I spent the weekend with Victor and D-C. I took the opportunity of talking to the latter about the cases at 020 which Tin Eye had told him he thought suitable for release. I think I persuaded him that we at head office must really be the judges in things of this sort.

The P.M. has arrived back.

February 8th

The D.G. saw myself and Stopford on the subject of B.L.L. He went carefully through the memo which Stopford had prepared on the work that he was doing and seemed quite satisfied.

Thompson of M.A.P. came to see me again about BIRKIGT. I showed him the letter alleged to have been written by BIRKIGT. He thinks it was certainly written by Prince PONIATOWSKY, BIRKIGT's son-in-law. This removes a good deal of the suspicion against BIRKIGT as the letter implied that the writer had been in Occupied France.

I had lunch with Orr who poured out his woes about Albert's new section which is dealing with the British subjects returning from abroad.

Milmo has seen Tin Eye, and told him fairly frankly what he thinks of Goodacre and 5 case concerning which a complaint was made to
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/191

Duff Cooper. He thinks Lin Eye is rather subdued but that it would be a good thing for me to see him.

McDermott tells me that at the Casablanca Conference it was decided (1) that convoys should have more escort since as a rule only ships outside the convoy got caught; (2) that bombing of U-boat bases, factories, oil installations, aircraft factories and Berlin should take priority; (3) details about Plan HUSKEY.

A Jap B.J. deals with a recent Conference held by Jap M.A.s in Berlin. Outside their own Intelligence officers they can only rely on Spanish co-operation. They realise that they are miles behind. They have no wireless gear for setting up secret transmitters, but they intend to have receivers in Berlin, Madrid, Sofia, which are to take down British and American messages. They wish to penetrate N. Africa from Paris via Tangier, where they will have a consulate.

February 9th

At the D.G.s meeting we discussed Herbert's proposal to move Censorship unit at Bermuda to Dakar. The D.G. agreed that the proposal seemed a sound one.

Frost has had a very sticky meeting at Broadway about the Kameradschaftsdienst. The meeting was called by C. at the request of D.N.I.. On the Admiralty side were present DNI, DDNI, ADNI, and Commander

Robertson-MacDonald. For S.I.S. were C., Gilbert Ryle and Ferguson. A venomous attack was made on Frost by the Admiralty representatives. Frost and Ryle maintained that there never had been a case for any very intensive work on secret transmissions by broadcast. It was extremely doubtful whether such broadcasts could be solved on any uniform basis. The probability was that each agent had his own particular code and that without the intelligence knowledge and background it was a pure waste of time to try and work it out. In any case such messages would be of secondary importance compared with ISOS since they were almost certainly one-way and therefore limited. This did not of course mean that the matter should not be probed as far as possible. It could however only have been done in the light of intelligence from other sources. It was only in recent months that such intelligence had been obtained. The Admiralty put up a lot of accusations about early negligence on the part of Frost which in some instances they said had amounted almost to sabotage. The fact is I am afraid that they are talking rather nonsense. I tried to warn Lewes that he was putting his foot in it but he seems to have accepted unreservedly everything that has been told him by Robertson-MacDonald and Leary, who are so bitten with this bug that they think nothing else matters at all.

Viv. rang me up about the telegram which Thurston had received from the F.B.I. saying

that they were quite ready to accept Mills as our representative in Washington and that this had been arranged in conjunction with the State Dept. Viv. seemed very perturbed about this as he thought it was cutting right across the tracks of SIS and jeopardising their position. He evidently thought that the FBI had taken this action on our suggestion. I told him that it was quite spontaneous, that nothing had been said to the FBI about Mills representing us in Washington that had not been said in his presence. It had merely been discussed in a general way as a possibility.

The D.G. went over the reorganisation of B.Divn. with myself and Horrocks. Nothing very definite was decided and the major issues, namely the liquidation of Jock Whyte's section and of Frost, were temporarily shelved.

We have decided to allow LENIHAN to go to Ireland on a visit. We are warning Dan. The Govt. of N.Ireland think we are crazy. I cannot see that there is any harm to be done.

February 10th

I attended a meeting at Kinnaird House which dealt with visits from students sponsored by the British Council and the arrival of British internees from Germany and Italy. On the first subject it was emphasised on our behalf that the visits of students were not to be encouraged from the Security point of view. The danger lay not necessar-

ily in the students being anti-British or being recruited by the enemy as agents, but in the fact that they would normally be under the protection of their Embassies, would see members of the Embassy staff, who would in the ordinary course of their duties report back anything that the students might have to say about what they had seen. I think this view was generally accepted. On the second subject the Security Service had a definite complaint that British internees from Germany and Italy had arrived at Lisbon before we were told anything about them. The F.O. appeared to have been negotiating since last November but to have told nobody. The Ministry of Health complained that they had had no time to make the necessary arrangements for the welfare of those who might be destitute. It was agreed that in future as much advance notice should be given as possible.

I took the Wednesday meeting. The Abwehr station at Madrid was recently asked by Algiers to provide the names and addresses of persons who could be used as letter-boxes to receive reports from Gib. Algiers have supplied the name and address of a woman for this purpose which we have obtained. The necessary action is being taken at Gib.

A Cuban, Francesco Pacheco y TUESTA, who was recruited by the Germans in Brussels, has been arrested in Trinidad, together with his wife. He has admitted that he was recruited by the Germans and that his wife

was aware of his mission. He is to be sent back to this country.

Cecil has told me about the case of the s.s. "EDENVALE". A Portuguese named Granja Tomas who is a kind of hanger-on at the docks at Lisbon, was given a letter in code by the ships cook of the "Edenvale", Christopher EASTWOOD. EASTWOOD had asked GRANJA whether he knew the whereabouts of the German Legation. When he said he did he asked him to deliver the letter. GRANJA having a friend in the Press Division of the British Consulate, took the letter to him. It was opened and photographed, and found to contain code. It was sealed up again and delivered by GRANJA to the German Legation. EASTWOOD had collected the letter from Donal O'SHEA, a broker of Dublin. The letter was addressed to the OKW.

We have received £2,500 on the conclusion of Plan DREAM.

I saw Maxwell about getting a letter from the H.O. about HARLEQUIN's naturalisation. He has agreed to give us such a letter which will in fact promise nothing but will indicate that if he wishes to become naturalised the statutory period will count from the date of his arrival in this country.

I also discussed with Maxwell the project of establishing someone in the H.O. who would make a special study of all our problems. Maxwell is very sympathetic to the project

and agreed in principle not only to the appointment of the individual but the establishment of a secret registry. He would however like to have time to think it over.

T.A.R. has had a request through GARBO to supply the Germans with information about our train service. This means that they probably contemplate shooting up our trains in the same way that we are shooting up theirs in occupied territory. I think the answer is that there are so many trains and since they do not always run at the time that is scheduled little harm can be done by giving the Germans the timetable. The German tactics are apparently to shoot up the engine and then the passengers if they are foolish enough to get out of the train.

February 11th

Guild, who is returning to Newfoundland, seems very pleased with his visit. He is going to try and link up his organisation more closely with the Canadian ports, and may be able to do this tactfully through the Canadian Naval authorities. I impressed upon him that it was extremely important that on no account should he give any offence to Commissioner Wood.

I took the RSS meeting today. Melland supplied information about Moritz. He said that only 20% of it was accurate. He thought the XX was possible. The Germans appear to reply on it and to use some of the information operationally. Group 8 is getting on but is

not yet out. I raised the question of the Swedish material which I thought was important in view of the absence of any W/T communication between Stockholm and Berlin. Was it possible to get at the land communication? Something of the kind has been going on by a process of induction which had enabled certain Swedish authorities to tap in on the land line from Oslo to Berlin. It was arranged that this situation should be explored.

Melland and Montagu came to see me. Montagu has had a raspberry from S.I.S. for mentioning MSS at a meeting of the RSS Committee. I have suggested to him that he should postpone sending his reply pending a conversation which I propose to have with C., who I am sure will be entirely reasonable. Melland has just produced a singularly important document based on a combination of ISOS, Spiel material and MSS. Spiel material shows what the enemy wish us to believe with regard to their defences in the Mediterranean, and the MSS shows the actual position. Thereby we get an extremely good picture of the enemy's weak spots. I asked Melland who saw reports of this kind, since it seemed to me that they were of first-rate importance and should be on the tables of the Chiefs of Staff with the least possible delay. He said that he had to put them up through the usual hierarchy but that generally they were seen by the DMI and sometimes by the VCIGS, and then returned to him. He did not know what action was taken on them or whether

they were considered by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. I said that this seemed to be a matter of such great importance that if he saw no objection I would have a word with C. He agreed to my doing this.

I had a session with Mountain and T.A.R. on the Second Front. Mountain is very anxious for our co-operation.

According to a Jap B.J. from Berlin a propos of the differences between the Fuhrer and the military command, it appears that the military want able and talented men as commanders in chief and a major of intelligence for the Army Supreme Command. There are rumours of the possible removal of Keitel.

De GRAAF, who is half Belgian and half British, but technically British, has confessed in 'U20 that he was trained by the Germans in espionage and sabotage. It seems likely that he may have imparted to the enemy a considerable amount of information about our escape routes. He was given some temporary employment at the British Embassy in Madrid where he has been associating with other escapees, whose stories he doubtless obtained. De GRAAF was broken through the mention by him of his connection with someone who, according to the LRC Index, was believed to be working for the Germans. Had it not been for this successful look-up de GRAAF might well have got through the LRC.

February 12th

Col. Harrison from Malta came in to see me. He does not appear to have any problems. He told me that the Maltese enthusiasm over Tripoli was tremendous. Harrison is very anxious to have a link in Tripoli. He thinks Maunsell will have a DSO there.

Isaw Maxwell again about WURMANN. He has arranged that the H.O. letter should be addressed to the DMI, W.O. A copy of this letter will be shown to WURMANN and then placed in a safe deposit in his bank. He will be told that any attempt to make improper use of it will render it null and void. He should present it in due course to the Under Secretary of State for Home Affairs. Meanwhile if he attempts to remove it from the bank we shall be informed.

February 13th-17th

Away ill.

February 18th

Back after flu.

Merko ROT has arrived in this country.

MORIARTY, an Irish seaman has arrived at Liverpool from USA. He was in possession of details of convoy routes, and was reported to be anti-British.

I had a meeting with the various parties
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/191

concerned, including Briscoe, about the examination of property by means of X-ray at the RPS. Victor is rather worried about this question which seems to have been hanging fire, mainly owing to the lack of personnel. It seems desirable that there should be a more extensive examination of articles which contain sabotage material.

I spoke to the D.G. about the WITT case. He does not think there is anything in it but does not mind about our pursuing enquiries with the assistance of Major Scotland.

The D.G. has written a letter to Duff about the RSS Committee.

February 19th

Burt came to see me about the HOYSE case. He has had a talk with Sir Archibald Rowlands. It seems that HOYSE, through his confederate in MAP, ARMSTRONG, has received a warning that proceedings may be pending. Sir Stafford Cripps in a moment of indiscretion allowed Sir Frank Spriggs, chairman of Hawkers, to become aware of the fact that ARMSTRONG was at the moment under suspicion. Spriggs then warned ARMSTRONG, called a meeting of the Board, voted ARMSTRONG £6,000 in recognition of his services to the company before he went to MAP, and arranged that this money should be paid into ARMSTRONG's account after banking hours. The following morning ARMSTRONG had paid back the £5,000 to HOYSE at his flat.

Cadogan is to talk to the Portuguese Ambassador today on the subject of MENEZES. He will be shown details and impressions of SIMOEZ, Dos SANTOS, de FREITAS etc. and will then be told that the rot has even spread to his own Embassy. He will then be shown the letter and an offer will be made to develop it completely in front of him.

I have today replied to Viv. on the question of the RSS committee.

I lunched with Pierlot, the Belgian P.M. Delfosse, his Minister of Justice, and Lapage at the Belgian 2eme Bureau. They spoke of the recent arrival of the Communist Deputy MARTEAU.

Maisky has had a somewhat peculiar conversation with the Egyptian Ambassador. He suggested to the Ambassador that his Govt. would be well-advised to have a representative at Moscow, since the important powers at the conclusion of this war would not be England and America but Soviet Russia and China. There is little doubt to my mind that the Russians intend to lose no opportunity of enhancing their prestige in the Mid East. They are already showing signs of intending to stay in the parts of Persia which they have already occupied. I do not think that they are anxious to bind themselves very closely either with ourselves or with the Americans. When Germany is beaten Russia will advance to the Curzon Line. She will leave us and the Americans to deal with the Japs and meanwhile will make as much trouble for

us as she can in the Mid East. When Japan is beaten to her knees Russia may walk into certain ports in the far East which she would like to acquire.

February 20th

MUTT & JEFF have received a wireless set and £200 which were dropped by parachute just west of Loch Strathbeg in Aberdeenshire. This operation had been arranged with the Germans and a party went up to receive the set. The plane was heard and a light was flashed. After circling twice and coming down to about 50 ft. a parachute was dropped. The set was carefully packed in a canister which had a bag of sand as a buffer to take the shock at the point where it would strike the ground. It seems to have worked quite successfully.

February 22nd

Montero has informed his Govt. about the MENEZES case, and asked him to let him have an immediate decision as to whether MENEZES should be handed over to the British authorities. He seems to be taking a very satisfactory attitude.

Brooman-White tells me that through a new informant he has obtained a number of documents from the Spanish Consulate in Newcastle dating back to 1940. There is one document in particular signed by Alba in which he requests the consul on the orders of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to supply

him regularly with reports of air raid damage, and particularly damage to military objectives. We are keeping these documents with a number of others of a somewhat similar kind as I think there may be a time when they will make a useful stick with which to beat the Spanish Govt.

I had a meeting with Briscoe and Victor about the ^{very} examination of property at the LRC. It was decided that Briscoe should go down and see what equipment is required and how it could best be operated. It was thought that a small portable set might also be required for use at O20 or at the laboratory.

I had a meeting with Harker, Allan, McIver and Pearson about a future Second Front course. It was decided to have another course early in March with a few SCOs, representatives of the LRC, O20 and others within the office who might usefully be invited. Harry will arrange for our officers to attend an Ib course and certain C.C.A.O. lectures.

I saw C. in the afternoon and discussed with him the S.S. and S.I.S. Conference or Low Level committee. I said that I thought it was extremely important that Melland and Montagu should be allowed to refer to MSS when it had a bearing on ISOS. He entirely agreed and said that he would like to have a talk with Melland. I then told him about Melland's reports and my fears that they might not be getting to the right quarters. He said that

curiously enough he had been thinking of this himself. He had wanted to have a talk with Melland but did not quite see how he could do it without telling the DMI. The question of discussing MSS³ at the Low Level Committee would however give him the opportunity he wanted. He would take an early opportunity of getting hold of Melland.

C. is a little worried about the very close relations between the Czechs and Russians and asked me to let him have any information which had a bearing on this subject.

He told me that BONNEFUSSE and PAILLOL were to set up a 2eme Bureau here on behalf of Giraud. Rivet is in N.Africa and so is Slessor, who wants to fight. Slessor had all his records which he asked the Fleet to take to N.Africa but he thinks they must have fallen into German hands. C. brought Passy and Rivet together. Rivet takes the line that he is the official 2eme Bureau and that Passy is merely an amateur. He is quite ready to work with Passy if the latter cares to come in under him. There is no solution of this problem at the moment.

C. is worried about the arrangements between the Dutch and SOE for the reception of agents. He thinks that things are going badly wrong. He told me that Laval's bodyguard was armed almost entirely with SOE tommy-guns.

The Americans apparently put up a terrible show in N.Africa. They did not seem able to stand up to dive-bombing.

The Americans have been partially responsible for dealing with German BJs. C. is still anxious to refrain from giving ISK to the Americans as it has so much important operational content.

February 23rd

Nothing of real significance was dealt with at the DGs meeting. Adam raised the question of visas for enemy aliens to Eire. Should refusal remain a matter of principle or should cases be treated on their own merits. Jim Hale was asked to look into the matter with Adam.

A Czech named MALIK who is a bitter opponent of Benes, has published a scurrilous brochure in which he mentions Bartik, Sloane etc. We have arranged that copies of this brochure should not get out of the country and a prosecution under the official secrets act is under consideration.

Michael Ryde left for S.Africa.

MENEZES is to be prosecuted under the Treachery Act. It is felt that if a conviction can be obtained this will act as a marked deterrent on the members of other Legations who might be prepared to act in a similar manner. MENEZES' only excuse so far is that

he was blackmailed into working for the Germans on account of certain relatives he had in Germany.

I spoke to Tin Eye today about the complaint that had been made to Duff that head office had not accepted 20 recommendations for release. I said that we must be the final judges in these matters and that in any case that had been brought to my notice I was quite satisfied that the individuals in question should not be released. Tin Eye said that his main anxiety had been that these questions did not reach my level. I said that this might be so but that in this particular instance I had seen the papers. I saw papers before a release was granted and I also saw papers before a prosecution was embarked upon. I said that the cases to which exception had been taken had invariably been those conducted by Goodacre. While I thought that he was a very careful, painstaking officer, I did think he had certain blind spots. Tin Eye was inclined to agree. On the other hand he did not wish to get rid of Goodacre unless another job could be found for him and also a suitable substitute. He was very emphatic that nothing should stand in the way of the efficiency of O20 and if I was dissatisfied with Goodacre, he would have to go. I said that we would try and see if it was possible to make any other suitable arrangement, but that I thought it would be good for all concerned if Goodacre were transferred to other spheres. Tin Eye said that he was in great difficulty when official

visits were paid to O20. Duff who saw O20 reports always wished to talk to the officers personally and sometimes in Stephen's absence. He naturally asked them their views which they felt bound to express. These might not always coincide with our opinion. He thought the only way out of the difficulty was to make his officers record in writing any such interviews and to send these up to me personally. I should then at least know what was going on.

I then raised the question of extra copies of O20 reports. If he required assistance I would see that he got it. I thought however it was essential that we should have at least 3 copies at head office. Three were required for B.1B, one for the FBI, one for Security Co-Ordination, and in certain cases one for B.1C and one for B.1A or any other section of B.Divn. There was also the problem of E.Divn whose only chance of getting to know how a spy operated was by studying O20 reports. Tin Eye promised to arrange for these copies to be sent up.

Burt told me that the CANSLEY case had been extremely badly handled owing to the negligence of the inspector in charge of Scotland Yard. Burt is actively pursuing the HOYSE case.

I went to see the DMI about the letter addressed to him by the H.O. in the case of WURMANN. I wanted him to sign a covering letter to this which would give added weight. He got cold feet and refused.

According to one of the Panzer generals, the Navy had been very luke warm in 1940 about the invasion of this country. The necessary enthusiasm had been lacking from the start. Rundstedt was protesting and the final outcome was reported to Hitler. About a week later the order came that the Seelowe operation would be cancelled for the moment and all work on it was to cease.

February 24th

It now transpires that MENEZES was concerned with Italian as well as German espionage. His means of communication were through the bag to Mendes, now identified as MARCELLO, and thence to an Italian called UMERTE.

Convoy leakages from the USA as disclosed by ISOS in Lisbon have been fairly accurate.

The "EDENVALE" has gone back with EASTWOOD to Lisbon.

I saw the D.G. and Harry Allan about the letter for WURMANN. The D.G. said that Harry had better sign it. Harry thought it would be better signed by Col. Barry.

I saw Robson Scott about the Czechs, and about MALIK. He seemed to think that action should be taken.

Herbert told me about Mirko ROT, who has given details about Max and Moritz. He said that a White Russian in the Soviet Embassy in Sofia who was working for the Germans had

had gone back to Russia some time ago where he had got into touch with relations on the General Staff. On his return he had established a wireless set which his Russian friends had been using to communicate information. This came through a station just outside Sofia. Moritz has a collecting centre in Syria. This is all more or less accurate except that the whole set-up looks more than ever like XX.

Montague told me that NID had a very valuable connection in Sweden who was giving them information about German messages between Oslo and Berlin. A certain amount of the information related to operations.

Jock is very anxious about the case of a man called DITCHFIELD in Preston who is trying to get into touch with the German Legation in Eire. He has offered information and proposes to transmit his message inside a cigarette.

February 25th

At the request of the D.G. I went down with him to Barnet. Frost more or less described the work of his office. He complained to the D.G. that he did not have very satisfactory liaison with the B.Sections.

I took the RSS Committee meeting and announced the new constitution. We discussed the situation in S.Africa qua the RSS in the light of the new information about the existence of a transmitter. It was agreed

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/191

that no action was required at the moment. I told the meeting of my discussions with C. W. who had given his authority for mention to be made of MSS when it impinged on ISOS. Fergie and the other members of SIS said that they had no ruling from their chief on this question but that they would make enquiries. Meanwhile their lips were sealed. A really farcical situation, since everybody sitting round the table had a knowledge of MSS.

Mason Mac called on the DG. He appears to be quite satisfied with Medlam and with Kirby-Green.

MENEZES has made a full confession. MARCELLO @ MENDEZ introduced him to Miranda in the Portuguese Air Force and it was through the latter that he got into touch with the Italian UMERTE. There appears to be a cipher clerk called RAMOS in the Portuguese F.O. who is also in German pay.

According to ISBA, others implicated are a man and wife named PFEIFERT, and the head of the English Dept. of the Portuguese F.O. There is some doubt however whether these people may not be double-crossing.

February 26th

I dictated all the morning.

Cookie has become very het up about the numerous statements which MENEZES has signed. He fears that he might be called upon to

produce these statements by defending counsel. He was told by Cussen and Milmo that this was a risk we had always accepted. It did not seem likely however that defending counsel would risk sending in these statements.

A message has been received from Downing St. about the possibility of de Gaulle trying to get out of the country. It seems unlikely that an attempt will be made but if it is made, he will be stopped.

I had a talk with JC, TAR and Loxley about the future establishment of the office. They were all in agreement with my proposal that there should be a wider field of promotion which should include some permanent intelligence staff ^{from} each Service, Ministry, and S.I.S. ~~Loxley~~ Loxley would be quite pleased to see the scheme extended to certain posts in the F.O.

February 27th

Herbert Hart spoke to me about ROT. He has evidence that ROT is lying about his association with the Abwehr and that his wife knows it. They have between them some £20,000 brought here before the war, some of it in the form of jewellery. We have decided to send the husband to O20 and the wife to Nightingale Lane after cancellation of her landing condition. We hope in this way to get the exact truth. Probably ROT is reluctant to admit that he was actually working for some considerable time on behalf of the Abwehr. His information so far has

Catalogue Reference:KV74/191

been quite important. Hager, a son of the Egyptian Police Chief denounced by ROT, has been arrested in Egypt and has incriminating documents.

After discussion with Jim it was decided to apply for an l8A order against KINDERMANN.

I discussed the case of MALIK with Cussen as I found that no action had been taken either by Blunt or by Robson-Scott. The case has fallen between two stools. Cussen thinks that a statement should be taken from Sloane and that MALIK should then be charged under DR3. All copies of the brochure should be recalled.

Dick is reported to be air-borne since yesterday on his return from the Mid East.

Brooman-White told me about his new informant in Newcastle. She has a Scottish mother and a Swiss father, who was naturalised Hungarian. She seems to have lived a good deal of her life in Tangier.

February 28th

ROT has been taken to 020 and his wife to Nightingale Lane.

A B.J. shows that the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin in conversation with Ribbentrop has discussed the P.M.s recent visit to Adana. Ribbentrop is nervous about Turkey's continued neutrality. It seems that the Turkish Ambassador, Ari Khan, when recently

in Ankara told von Papen, and on his return Weizsaecker, that the existence of a strong Germany in Central Europe was vital to Turkey. He said moreover that this was Turkey's official view. Hari Kan did not discuss the PMs conversations as a communique had been published and sufficient explanation given to von Papen by the Turkish foreign secretary.

Dick arrived this evening.

March 1st

At the D.G.'s request I went with Frost to see Duff Cooper. The D.G. wished Duff to be in the picture about the history of our relations with RSS before the meeting was held to discuss the constitution of the High and Low Level Committees.

Burt told me about the HOYSE case. He said that Kendall appears to be a little put out. There has evidently been some sort of trouble raised by S.B. who think that B.5 are stealing their thunder.

March 2nd

The D.G. spoke to me about the WITT case. He thinks we are wasting our time by further interreggation. I have persuaded him to let us go on for a bit. I am not at all satisfied about the case.

The D.G. has agreed at a meeting today to another course being started for RSLOs and SCO

Cayzer is to look further into the Admiralty and Min. of War Transport aspect of the Lisbon convoy leakages. He has already established that a large number of people, down to the rank of ^{Marine} Superintendent of Shipping Companies are bound to know approximately the date of sailing, nature of cargo and destination of a convoy nearly a month before it sails. The possibility of leakage from the Americans is to be further considered.

A meeting was held at Kinnaird House today to discuss the constitution and personnel of the High and Low Level RSS committees. It was agreed that the High Level committee should be called the Radio Security Committee and that members of either party could be co-opted as necessary, including the chairman of the Low Level committee, which will be known as the Radio Security Intelligence Conference. The question of signals security was raised. G-P deprecated precipitate action. He said he would be seeing Brig. Fladgate of Army Signals on the 16th March and would get his views. I said that I did not think we could withhold information in our possession and that we should put forward a paper to the JIC in order that they could if necessary bring the matter to the notice of the Chiefs of Staff. This was finally agreed, subject to the memo being submitted to G-P for any remarks that he might have to make.

March 3rd

I attended a meeting at Kinnaird House at which were discussed (1) the proposed establishment of a transit censorship base at Dakar, (2) the Censorship Policy in relation to Manpower and (3) the proposed discontinuance of the D.4 Daily Report. With regard to (1), it was decided that a transit base should be established at Dakar at the earliest possible moment. As regards (2) this was not thought to be a matter which the Executive could usefully pursue. It was pointed out that while it was desirable that unnecessary workers in Censorship should be drafted into the Services or industry, there were numbers of people employed in Censorship who would not be suitable for other work. The M/L had not been able to find other employment for members of the staff whom the Censorship were willing to release. With regard to item (3) it was thought that the information previously distributed to departments in the D.4 report was now reaching them through other channels. It was agreed to discontinue the report and to invite the Seamen and Overseas Shipping Committee to consider the best means of ensuring the continuance of the services hitherto provided through the medium of the daily report for the Ministry of War Transport and the Security Executive.

I attended the Wednesday meeting. Milmo spoke about the case of de GRAAF and said that we knew of losses sustained on the escape routes which were probably due to him.

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/191

I said I thought the matter of his employment without being vetted by the Madrid Embassy, and all similar cases of employment, of which we had heard of several, should be taken up in high quarters.

Later I had a discussion with Viv. and the D.G. about America and also about the Lisbon leakage case. As regards America, I asked Viv. point blank whether he had any objection to Mills taking up a position in the FBI at Washington. He said that his objection was only a technical one, by which I think he meant that we were outside the 3-mile limit.

March 4th

Burt is actively pursuing the HOYSE case. He had what must have been an extremely entertaining interview with HOYSE. HOYSE at first wanted to call his solicitor, to which Burt replied "Certainly - a very wise precaution Mr. Hoyse". HOYSE later thought better of it, rang up Burt and said he was prepared to make a statement. HOYSE is not yet aware of the extent to which his banking transactions are known and is likely to put his foot in it pretty badly.

The D.G. told me today that he had seen Rawli who had every confidence in Jock Whyte and would be delighted to see him as the officer representing the Security Service at the M.I.9 Transit Camp. The D.G. has clearly made

up his mind, and there is no use my saying that past interrogations had not been very satisfactory since Jock had the habit of putting all his cards on the table face up.

Wiesner who is interrogating WITT, has put in a stool-pigeon. WITT has told the latter that he had been in wireless communication with Germany from Sweden, that he was at one time in touch with the Abwehr in Hamburg, that he was a member of the NSDAP and had known Heydrick, that wireless transmission from a flat was impossible but it was as well that we should suspect him as others were doing the work. He went on to say that he was directed while in Denmark by a Gestapo announcement that he was a wanted man. He was afraid about the interrogation of his wife and of torture. Equally he feared interrogation himself at the hands of the Czechs. He wanted to know if the 14 spies executed had confessed, particularly "der grosse Hollander". Even if broken down, he would not give away his accomplices.

A B.J. indicates that the Portuguese suspect that their bag has been opened but do not wish to raise the matter.

Kellar came to see me about a possible job in the Mid East. I told him that I thought there might be an opening for him here since if Maunsell's office developed on the lines we hoped it would, the general flow of information to this country from Cairo and vice versa would be considerably increased.

J.C. had devised a plan whereby a blown agent can indicate that he is under control. The simple device is that he should begin each of his messages with a pronoun if he is under control and with a verb if he is not.

A telegram has been sent to Mills at Duff Cooper's request asking him whether he has discussed any matter with the FBI which might have caused them to notify us of the State Dept. agreement.

I had a talk with Carew-Robinson and Coles about somebody in the H.O. to represent our interests. We all agreed that he must be an H.O. official, that it would be preferable if he could be an existing H.O. employee but failing that, we would see what we could do to provide someone.

The H.O. are considering the case of MALIK who may be prosecuted.

March 6th

I saw Maxwell about the case of Willi LORENZ who has written to the Lord Chief Justice. He wants to make application for his release, on the basis of Justice Humphreys' article. We cannot prevent him although there is no chance of his succeeding.

I told Maxwell about our meeting with Carew Robinson and Coles. He said he thought it would be difficult for the H.O. to supply anyone at the moment. He would be glad to

know if we could think of a suitable candidate

The JIC are to discuss the question of a courier service between this country and Switzerland in exchange for the Germans being allowed free access to Afghanistan, Portuguese E.Africa, Argentine and Eire. I cannot imagine how anybody in their right mind could have put up such a cock-eyed suggestion.

Machell has been given notice by the D.G. He is very upset. These things are done in a very peculiar way. I had no idea that the axe was going to fall.

Frost has prepared his memo on Signals Security for the J.I.C.

March 8th

I had a meeting with WIESNER, Dick, Milmo and Sneath about Otto WITT. Wiesner was very confident that if he could employ his own methods he could break WITT down within 3 days. He suggested that WITT should be interrogated at frequent intervals both during the night and day or alternatively that he should be given to the Czechs for 3 days, at the end of which Wiesner gave a guarantee to hand him back without a bruise on his body and wrapped in cotton wool and silver paper. Our general conclusion was that WITT though arrogant was a physical coward. He had probably built himself up to a considerable extent in the eyes of the S.D. or the Gestapo, more probably the latter, and had volunteered to get information about the activities of Strasser's organisation in this country. We were rather disinclined to believe his story that he had told to the stool-pigeon HAAS about his having a Vorsatz-Gerät which could be used for the conversion of a receiver into a transmitter. Sneath on the other hand had seen WITT leaving his flat with something heavy. There is a suggestion in conversations with HAAS that this apparatus had been left with one of WITT's accomplices. The most likely would be the FEDERNS who he saw before his internment. The father is apparently all right but the son is extremely doubtful. WITT has boasted quite openly to HAAS about his connections

with the S.S. and also about a link with the Abwehr at Hamburg. He took HAAS into his confidence because the latter was the son of a general and because he knew that he had a brother in the S.S. WITT is terrified of being handed over to the Czechs since he thinks they would probably torture him. He is quite certain that the British will not. When confronted with HAAS he denied everything that he had told him. It was finally decided that WITT should be told by some suitable officer that as he was clearly lying and would not come clean, we had no alternative but to hand him over to the Czechs or the Russians, but before doing so we wanted to give him a final chance to come clean. He would probably find British justice better than Czech or Russian. If this bluff fails we shall fall back on telling him he will be handed over to the International Tribunal as soon as the war is over, and that he will thereby lose the protection of the British Govt.

Dick and I saw Harker and Horrocks with the D.G. about Egypt. I suggested to the D.G. that it might be preferable if Haylor and Forrest both went out together. When Haylor had set the local LRC on its feet he could return and leave Forrest in charge. This would ensure that the Egyptian LRC would get on its feet in the shortest possible time. It was agreed that Stephenson should go out to do what Hart is doing here and that Baxter should be approa

approached about running the LRC during Haylor's absence.

I had a meeting with McIver, Dick, Allan, and Glover about the next course. They have got the syllabus sketched out and McIver is going to arrange about collecting the bodies.

March 9th

I saw Barratt from Lisbon PCO with Mars, Adam and Albert, about the examination of British subjects in Lisbon. Barrett who is a member of the Repatriation Committee there is going to take over this work. I said that I thought he should make it his business to extract as much information as he possibly can and make a special note of all contacts, addresses etc. He should encourage all applicants for visas to talk as much as possible since it was only in this way that we could get the necessary data for the purpose of checking up their stories. He should not confine himself solely to those in Cat. B, namely those whom for one reason or another he regarded as suspect. It has been arranged that he will allocate the priorities. This will enable him to get rid of those whom he thinks are of no security value and ensure that full reports about the suspects will reach us before they arrive in the U.K. I have arranged for Barratt to visit the LRC.

132
The D.G.s meeting lasted 1 minute. I arrived 1½ minutes late and consequently missed the proceedings. Adam arrived 2 minutes later amidst roars of laughter.

I had a word with Hollis who has been asked by Section V. whether he could supply somebody versed in communism to assist Mills. I wondered a little what return we were likely to get from sending another officer to Section V. It seemed to me that we could get all we wanted in the western hemisphere direct from Thurston and that in so far as other PCO points were concerned they were much too occupied in obtaining information about Germans to bother with communism. I discussed with Hollis the suggestion that we should have a Peter Loxley at the H.O. He seemed to think the idea was a good one and undertook to think about a suitable candidate.

I gave a talk to the RSLOs. There were only 7 as the remainder have all been on the Second Front course. I thought it desirable at this stage to give them a more intimate picture of our work, particularly our basic sources and to explain to them how B.IA sources were cross-checked by Hart's, and how therefore we were able to speak with a certain amount of confidence about the measure of success or failure achieved by the Germans I.S. in their operations against this country. We could not discard B.IA sources unless we were prepared to discard ISOS and this

for many reasons was quite impossible. The Torch operation had largely borne out our conclusions since it seemed to be due to the control that we exercised over the enemy's organisation in this country that the details about the operation had not reached the Germans. I did not wish to be complacent since there were certain obvious gaps in our organisation. 19 out of 43 agents captured in this country since the outbreak of war had not been reflected in Hart's sources. A certain number of unsatisfactory cases had to be passed through the LRC. WURMANN's evidence showed that signal security was bad and that the enemy were well informed about the disposition of our units. Use was possibly being made of P/W and internee mails and the mails of allied forces for clandestine correspondence. We had the example of the evasion of censorship of Belgian refugees in this country who were communicating with their relatives in occupied territory by means of a courier and postbox via Eire. Lastly there had been a number of doubtful British subjects returning to this country from the Continent and N.Africa. To meet this situation we were contemplating some intermediary place of detention between the LRC and Camp 020 where LRC cases could be better examined. We were placing an officer with the M.I.9 Transit Camp to deal with returning P/Ws and we had opened a new office at Devonshire House to deal with doubtful returning British subjects.

I then talked about the enemy alien and alien problem, referred to the bad cases thrown up by Sneath and said that even if we thought the spy content among enemy aliens was small and possibly dormant, there was the long term view to be considered. It was still desirable to know as much as possible about these people since at the end of the war their repatriation would probably be considered on the merits of each case.

I outlined the latest developments in the organisation of censorship and the types of material which were at the moment being submitted to secret ink test. These were (a) outward air and surface mails to towns in Portugal Switzerland and Sweden in which it was known that the enemy has or had cover addresses; (b) the testing and duffing of inward air and surface mails from these places and addressed to persons with foreign names and persons who could otherwise be identified as of alien nationality in Gt. Britain, N. Ireland and Eire; (c) transit mails from N. Ireland and Eire to all European countries, and (d) secret test leaving no detectable trace of mail sent by allied forces to European countries. Lastly I said a few words about our DSO points in Mid East, North West and South Africa, India, the Caribbean and the USA and then gave a short account of our probable commitments in the event of the opening of a Second Front.

I had a long and tedious meeting with Adam, Cheney, Foster, Blake Budden, Horrocks and Stopford, on Adams's suggestion that his S.C.O.s should no longer supply us with the alterations in crew lists of coastal vessels or examine members of the crew of such vessels. The examination is important since it appears that anyone can travel as a passenger from one port to another on a coastal vessel. Adams hopes that by cutting some of his staff down he may get a higher percentage of officers. He thinks he should concentrate on vessels sailing to Eire or foreign ports rather than on coastal traffic. We all agreed that Eire was important but we were inclined to doubt whether intensive examination of the passengers and crews proceeding to the Western Hemisphere were of any great value from the espionage point of view. I emphasised the fact that we had already agreed to cut down examination of the correspondence to 10%. It was agreed that the existing personnel should continue to examine the crews of coastal vessels as far as they were able and that Cheney and Foster would indicate to Adam where economy could be effected in sending in reports of a detailed kind about seamen who had ultimately been cleared.

Forrest talked to me for some time today about the Newcastle Police. He had found it an extremely uphill job to get them educated on our lines. They seemed to be solely interested in getting convictions

and were rarely able to see anything on a long-term basis. They resented our running any informants in their area and agreed to allow Forrest to do this but had spent a lot of their time in trying to find out who his informants were and if successful in torpedoing them. They have been extremely sceptical about TANGERINE who has recently been taken on by B-W. She has in fact produced very remarkable documentary information and looks like being a first-class informant.

Cecil and I dined with Walter Bell and Col. Bruce, head of OSS in this country. Bruce is a very charming, cultured American. I had heard from Thurston that he intended to operate in Ireland and in fact had already had two agents there. By way of throwing a fly over him I turned to conversation to Eire generally, but he did not rise. I told him that although there were of course many opportunities for leakage of information, we had no evidence that the Germans had a collecting centre for reports that they might receive from labourers and others returning to Eire once every 6 months on leave. I pointed out that if there was any organisation of this kind it would have to be on a very wide scale if there was to be any continuity to the information received. It would therefore be difficult to organise anything of the kind without its existence becoming

not propose to raise any objection provided any action is controlled by the C. in C or C.S.S.

The JIC had before them today a paper suggesting that in exchange for a courier service between this country and Switzerland we might allow the Germans facilities to communicate with Portuguese colonies, the Argentine, Afghanistan and Eire. I have not yet heard the result of the discussion but it is difficult to see how such a hare-brained suggestion could receive any support. One of the advantages which we are supposed to gain is the facilities for sending propaganda to Switzerland, though what effect any propaganda disseminated in Switzerland at this stage in the war could possibly have it is difficult to comprehend. Our view is that we get nothing from Switzerland in any case and have not done so since the outbreak of war, even though it is a traditional centre of German espionage. On the other hand the Germans would be only too pleased to have bag communication to Lourenco Marques, whence their activities are directed against the Union, to Afghanistan, centre of their intrigues against India, to the Argentine their base for attacking U.S.A., and to Eire, whence they can attack this country. Quite apart from this there is the G.C & C S angle. We stand to gain every time by driving the Germans on to the air.

March 10th

The D.G. has had a letter from Duff, who after consultation with the P.M. has suggested that we should furnish the P.M. with a monthly report. It should not be too long and should only include items of major importance. I suggested there should be contributions from Hart, Milmo, T.A.R., LRC, Hollis and occasionally items of interest received from DSO points abroad. Dick is going to get out a rough draft which we will then discuss. There are obvious advantages in selling ourselves to the P.M. who at the moment knows nothing about the activities of the Department. On the other hand he may, on seeing some particular item, go off the deep end and want to take action, which will be disastrous to the work in hand.

At the Wednesday meeting Hart gave examples of further cases of leakage from Lisbon. There was one about a convoy due to sail in mid-March which was more or less accurate. Again the information is said to come from the consulate, the agent having said that he actually saw a document in the consulate. While it seems doubtful whether the agent did in fact see any such document which would not normally go to Lisbon at all, it does seem probable that he has in fact got something to do with the Consulate. I have suggested that Hart should draft a further letter to Viv. on these lines.

Milmo talked about the MENEZES case. The Portuguese have now arrested Miranda as well as Marcello. Something in the nature of a general clean-up seems to be going on. In the meantime we have ^{given} a report on the case to the F.O. for transmission to the Portuguese Ambassador.

EASTWOOD of the "Edenvale" has received another encoded message for delivery to GOERTZ. A copy of this has been obtained in Lisbon

I had a longish talk with Perfect, who is anxious if possible to attend the next course. He thinks it would be of great value to RSLOs to have as full a background as possible. He was a little hurt that he had not been told about the agent JOSEPHINE who is being run by Stopford at Dyce. I told him to discuss the matter with Stopford and he would put him in the picture. His point is that if by any chance anything went wrong he would be able to take the necessary action with the police.

I had a long talk with Luke who has just come back from S. Africa. He has put in a very good report. Attempts to set up some central security organisation in S. Africa have unfortunately failed. Gen. Smuts has placed C.E. work in the hands of the police, namely, de Villiers, the head of the police but he also has other commitments connected with coastal command,

rather low calibre. Under him is Lt. Col. Coetzee who is clearly somewhat nationalist in outlook and consequently I gather uncooperative. He is mistrusted by most of the Cabinet Ministers and by Smuts himself. We have never yet been told the full story of Robey LEIBRANDT. The police are very heavy-footed and are incapable carrying out any delicate C.E. operation. It would be pure waste of time to give them a XX agent. Meanwhile the D.D.N.I. Maj Powell, is working on C.E. matters on his own. He is quite cooperative and could quite easily handle the C.E. cases. Brig. Denton is also cooperative but has now been relegated to his official function of Chief Postal Censor. He still controls what is known as I.R.B. (Information and Records Bureau) which he had hoped would form the basis of some united intelligence organisation. The Springbok case went astray largely because at that time there was no suitable organisation to run the agent. The BOYD case went wrong because Webster unfortunately put the proposition to Gen Smuts who did not really understand its value. Had it been offered quietly to the D.D.M.I. it would probably by now have been a going concern. It would be far better if Gen. Smuts knew nothing about it. The other people who have really got any footing in S. Africa are the Navy. We could probably under cover of them have obtained far more control over port security. Col. Webster's scheme is in force. The S. African personnel

employed are of a very poor quality. The S.African authorities were informed about Robey LEIBRANDT through a nocturnal visit they received from Gerling, Van Renzberg's principal assistant and reputed ring-leader, of the unruly section of the Ossewa Brandweg, to the Minister of the Interior. It was as a result of this visit that the spy was eventually caught.

I dined with Peter Reid who has just come back to take up a position in Admiralty Signals. I told him about our problem of Signal Security, but emphasised that I did not think that the Admiralty were the guilty party. We were much more concerned with the W.O. and Air Ministry. He will however look into this aspect of his work and let me know what he thinks. He seemed to think that the American Navy, in spite of a number of disasters, were getting on their feet. They have some useful torpedo aircraft, which is really the weapon of the day. It is impossible for the Fleet to operate in reasonable safety unless they have a proper air umbrella. This was of course what was lacking so seriously at the time of Singapore and led to the disasters of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse.

March 11th

I spoke to Viv. and told him about Luke's return. I thought that there might be considerable advantage in Luke making a careful study of the recent Most Secret

S.African material since he was soaked in S.African politics and might be able to make a useful contribution. Viv.agreed.

The D.G. spoke to me about our memo for the J.I.C. on Signal Security. He wants to pass a copy of it to G-P for his comments I explained to him that in fact G-P had refused to accept responsibility for Signal Security and that we now had our links with the various signals branches of the Services. Moreover it was said that G-P was not particularly persona grata with the Military Signals, though I really could not say whether this was true or not. The D.G. said he wished to send a copy to G-P as he had undertaken to do so when he saw him at lunch yesterday.

Duff Cooper has asked us to refrain from sending Mills to Washington until the position of Security Co-ordination is cleared up. For this we shall have to await the return of Stephenson. The delay in this matter is really intolerable. I have just had a long personal and confidential letter from Commissioner Wood with a series of complaints against D.S.C. It seems that Gooch was sent up from New York more than a year ago to enquire into Jap activities at Vancouver. For this purpose he recruited an agent named Allan ROESCH. ROESCH provided a lot of information which the R.C.M.P. say was wholly unreliable and subsequently allegations were made in the press against the integrity of the

R.C.M.P. These it appeared were prompted by ROESCH and possibly also by D.S.C. A full enquiry was held by Judge Cameron who found that ROESCH's information was based on hearsay, and completely whitewashed the R.C.M.P. A great deal of money and time had been wasted, and the R.C.M.P. feel quite definitely that they have been double-crossed. Then came the incident of Port Security with an onslaught on Wood backed by the Service Dept.s This again caused grave irritation. Finally Stephenson had sent Bavin to Ottawa as a Liaison Officer with the Canadian Police. Bavin was an ex-R.C.M.P. man who had been found unsatisfactory. Wood therefore refused to accept him. He had been sent to Ottawa with no previous warning by Stephenson. In forwarding me this information Wood said that "I prefer to write to you personally in this matter in the hope that some rectification can be made without an open clash which would mean action through official channels." I also got a long letter from Mills describing the lamentable state of affairs in the offices of D.S.C. New York.

Dick has taken over the chairmanship of what is now known as the Radio Security Intelligence Conference, formerly the S.S. & S.I.S. Committee. I have become a member of what is known as the Radio Security Committee, which I should imagine would be a singularly ineffective and uninteresting body.

144
Caroe went to see WITT today to give him a last chance to speak the truth before he is handed over to the Czechs. He broke down and said that he had been lying, and would now tell us the whole truth. Unfortunately before Caroe left he told him that he personally did not believe that WITT was a spy. We feel that it is now desirable to bring in some new military person to do the interrogation and have obtained the services of Major Scotland. We want if possible to carry out the interrogation at the London District P/W camp, but this will have to be subject of H.O. approval. I saw Maxwell and asked him whether he had any objection. He said that as the man was a German detained under the Royal Prerogative, we could hold him where we liked. He was interested in the WITT case and would like to know in due course what we got out of it.

March 12th

The Czechs are a little crestfallen about the WITT case being taken over by Scotland, but everything has been smoothed over to their satisfaction. Scotland will commence operations on Monday. When we have got a statement the Czechs will be brought in to cross-examine.

We have decided to carry out if possible another Duck operation. The Ambassador is away this weekend. I had previously talked the matter over with Loxlwy, who thought that the risk was worth taking.

since it should give us the B.J.s for another three or four months.

I lunched with Curry. He is still very worried about his position. He has put up a memo to the D.G. about a co-ordinated research section between ourselves and S.I.S. but he is not very sanguine about the proposal. He has also sketched out a plan for writing up a history of the office since the beginning of the war. In putting this forward he has pointed out to the D.G. that it is rather like a man of 40 trying to write his biography. He thinks it would be better for sections to write up their own subjects and to postpone the amalgamation until the war is over when we shall be able to present a more complete picture. He also points out that the publication of such a report at this moment might raise controversial issues and implied criticisms.

The D.G. wants to discuss my reports on the enemy alien and alien situation. He admits that the cases that Sneath has thrown up have been badly investigated but is inclined to say that the trouble started in B.Division where it was impossible to deal with them owing to pressure of work. This may be true but for the last 18 months or two years the cases have been handled by a variety of sections in E.Division and if we want to go back further we should find that Jock Whyte was the trouble. On the allied alien side we have I gather been successful

146
in persuading the Home Office to let us have an intermediary camp between the LRC and O20. This will probably be at Emmanuel Schools, within a few hundred yards of the LRC.

The Czechs are very worried about no action having been taken in the MALIK case. The trouble is that just at the moment when we were making representations to the H.O. Slavic the Czech Minister of the Interior weighed in with a whole chapter of grievances against the opponents of the present Czech Govt. This has resulted in consultation with the F.O. and the usual delays.

Efforts are being made to send Tricycle to Cairo but the construction of a suitable cover is still not solved. Dragonfly is still unpaid, but ISOS discloses that the Germans are still trying to devise ways and means. Zigzag left on 5.3.43. Garbo has established W/T communication with Madrid. The Mullet case is hanging fire owing to KOESSLER having got into trouble with the local police for currency smuggling. It remains to be seen whether KOESSLER can wriggle out of this difficulty and whether the Germans will in any event take advantage of this opportunity to send FANTO to England.

March 13th

The D.G. spoke to me and Dick about my memo
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/191

on enemy aliens and aliens. I could see that he had already made up his mind about the enemy aliens position and that it was not the slightest use arguing. He had got it into his head that only 3 cases had come to light, that although they had been badly handled they were in no way symptomatic and that in any case enemy aliens in this country were not spies and therefore of no significance, not even on a long term basis. He seemed to think it would be quite sufficient if he had a word with Denniston who of course has no idea of investigation. D.G. does not intend to bring E. Division in more active touch with B. by giving them somebody who knows something about B. work and methods of investigation. As regards the aliens, he has succeeded in getting the H.O. to agree to the establishment of intermediary camp between the LRC and O20. This will probably be at Emmanuel Schools, which are next door to the LRC. The Oratory School has been mentioned as an alternative. If we can get this going it will of course help matters considerably since it is to be hoped that there will be fewer doubtful cases handed over to the allied forces, who have little means for investigating suspects. Later in the afternoon D.G. saw Sneath to whom he spoke in a similar manner. Sneath likewise saw no use in arguing.

March 15th

Sneath came to talk to me about WITT. Scotland has started his interrogation and

has announced that WITT is an agent of some sort. He cannot however get him to come clean. The only previous falsehood on which WITT now recants is that he was ever attempting to get into touch with Embassy circles. This makes his visit here even more peculiar, the trouble is that this case has been so messed about that he is now convinced that we have nothing on him and cannot bring him to justice. Scotland thinks that Wiesner should now return to the charge.

There is to be a meeting tomorrow on Chiefs of Staff level to discuss the Lisbon leakage. Everybody seems to have got suddenly excited about them as they were relayed on M.S.S. A.D.N.I. has unfortunately got it into his head that a man called WELLINGS of the Elder Dempster Line, who may have been responsible for certain indiscretions in Liverpool some time ago, is a spy and provides the key to the whole matter. It is extremely improbable that he has any connection with it at all, since the leakages in question concerned operation convoys with which WELLINGS is in no way connected. I am sure that we stand no chance of getting to the bottom of this affair until we send someone to Lisbon to make enquiries about the hangers-on at our consular and shipping offices.

Luke has spent to me about his examination of the S.African B.J.s. He thinks that SITTIG, a German, is probably the head of the Felix organisation. Leo he thinks is

WERTZ, the German Consul at Lourenco Marques whose christian name is Leopold.

Dick and I saw the D.G. about S.Africa. We pointed out to him the absurdity of S.I.S sending - who has spent a good many years in Brazil, and knows nothing about S.Africa, he is receiving the usual course at Genalmond and is presumably to go out briefed on the Felix case. I have reason to think that this has all been arranged with the F.O. and D.O. and that he will handle his business through the High Commissioner. There seems to be no real excuse for his going at all, unless he is going purely as a courier, and he will certainly make Webster and Hyde look extremely foolish. S.I.S. are extremely touchy about our setting foot on foreign territory but they walk into British territory merely on the excuse that they are the custodians of some secret source. Webster knows everybody in S.Africa and is probably much better qualified to handle a matter of this sort than anyone else. Moreover whoever goes out will have to take his instructions from London. We also pointed out to the D.G. that there were 3 people now running the Felix case, Section V, Section Vw and ourselves. The matter is further complicated by the fact that Section V do not pass us relevant information that they are receiving from Lourenco Marques. Luke has furnished an extremely good report on all the

150
material relating to the Felix case which is in our possession. He does not agree with T-R that Felix is identical with Pirow. He thinks he is more likely to be SITTING, a German who was interned in S. Africa, escaped to Lourenco Marques, was sent back to the Union and re-interned, but again escaped and is now believed to be at large. Meanwhile he has ascertained that Muggeridge has paid a visit to Brig. Baston of the S. African Police in connection with the visit of von FAASCHE of the German Consulate to the Union. Muggeridge was told to watch FAASCHE's movements, and learning through an informant that he was likely to go to the Union, has, presumably on his own, put the S. African police on the track. This is most unfortunate and quite possibly there may be disaster.

At a meeting with Section V. we had called agreed that it would be much better not to attempt to follow FAASCHE to the Union and to leave the ultimate liquidation of Felix to a D.F.ing process. The D.G. has decided to write a letter to C. about the handling of this whole case and to discuss the matter with Vivian and Cowgill at the Wednesday meeting.

Janssen of A.I.D., Hart and I had a talk about the Lisbon leakage which I gather is to be discussed by the Chiefs of Staff tomorrow. Janssen agreed that it might be a good thing if Hart went to Lisbon to see what he could find out about something about the personnel of the Shipping Office.

March 16th

At the D.G. meeting we considered the memo presented by the Chiefs of Staff to the ManPower Committee on Censorship and agreed to stand by our former recommendations. We do not object to the reduction of the examination of material to and from America but we think that 100% censorship should remain on our going Irish mail.

I had a talk with Dick, TAR and Hollis about the monthly report for the P.M. They were all a little apprehensive about Hollis's contribution. The P.M. might speak to the Home Secretary about it and if the latter was not also informed we should find ourselves in trouble. We eventually decided to draft something and see what it looked like. Dick will be editor of the B. Division material.

I had a talk with Hollis about doing something more about Soviet espionage. There is no doubt to my mind that it is going on and that sooner or later we shall be expected to know all about it. On the other hand if we take action and get found out there will be an appalling stink. Hollis and I are going to discuss the matter with Loxley on Monday.

Duck's operation was successfully performed last Saturday and G C & C S will now be

able to carry on for some months.

One of the code messages carried by EASTWOOD of the "Edenvale" for delivery to the Germans at Lisbon has appeared on ISOS. It indicates that consideration is being given to the formation of an anti-Communist army in Eire under O'Duffy. It is not clear whether the intention is to get this army out to the Russian front or whether the scheme is likely to act as a cover for a revolutionary body in Eire itself.

I rang up Viv to suggest that we should have a meeting tomorrow about S. Africa. He said that unfortunately he could not manage it as he had to see Bruce of OSS about the projected activities of OSS in Eire. I suggested some other time but he replied that he could not fit it in. He asked what aspects of the S. African problem we wished to discuss. I said that it was rather difficult to go into it all on the telephone but that firstly we were rather in the dark about the S.-I.-S. representative who I had heard was going out to the Union, and secondly that the Felix organisation seemed to be falling between 3 stools, namely Sections V and VW and ourselves. I pointed out that we were unaware of what was passing between Section V and Lourenco Marques but that it seemed to me from what I had heard that Muggeridge, in his ignorance of the material on which we were working had already got into touch with the S. African

police who were in pursuit of PAASCHE. I was under the impression that we had agreed that this was not the right course to adopt and that when it had been decided to liquidate Felix this should be done by some D.F.ing process. Viv. said that as regards their representative he had already indicated the possibility of sending someone out and this had now been arranged between S.I.S., the F.O. and the D.O. This did not however imply that he would not be co-operating closely with Webster. I said that while we had no objection to their having a man in the Union, there was a danger that such representation might make Webster's position rather ridiculous. Moreover I could not see any real necessity for such an appointment. The man they were sending out had never been in S. Africa before and could only act as a kind of conduit-pipe for the B.J.s, the existence of which was already known to Hyde. I asked him whether this action implied a vote of no confidence in Webster. Viv. demurred somewhat and then said that he thought that in matters of such importance and delicacy it was necessary for S.I.S. to have their own representative on the spot.

A telegram from our High Commissioner in S. Africa to the D.O. rather indicates that Smuts has designs on Lourenço Marques. Harlech does not however think any such action is imminent, and if the submarine scare dies down nothing will happen. There is no doubt however that quite a number of

politicians in the Union have imperialist ideas about Portuguese E. Africa.

Loxley rang up about AZCARATE, the ex-Spanish Republican diplomat being billed in "Russia Today" to speak at a meeting the title of which was given as "The Free Peoples of the World salute the Soviet Union". The R.O. take a rather grave view of this since they think it might embroil them in difficulties with Franco Spain. They contemplate having a friendly talk with AZCARATE. I suggested to Loxley that it might be a good thing for him to speak to Maxwell, and I warned him that AZCARATE might go to Maiski and also to certain M.P.s, who might be disposed to ask questions in the House.

March 17th

At the B. meeting today Hart stated that the German I.S. in Madrid were making arrangements to send an agent to the U.K. called JACOBSEN. This man would be working for the Military Section and would be provided with a cover address in Lisbon.

The leakages attributed to the British Consulate in Lisbon are still going on, but much of the information is incorrect.

Jim Hale and Shelford came to see me about the case of WACE. WACE was at one time in the B.U.F. and later closely associated with William JOYCE's National Socialist League.

For 10 years prior to the war he had been visiting Germany fairly frequently at the invitation of HOFFMANN. The outbreak of war found him doing translation work for the Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin. In 1940 he was interned but was released some time in 1941 and had remained at large until his repatriation a few weeks ago.

WACE states that he continued to do translation work until the end of November as he had been promised that if he did so he would be sent back to England. In so doing he has of course committed high treason but there is now evidence beyond his own. WACE is at present in Brixton. We decided however that for the purposes of further interrogation by Stamp it would be advisable to get him to the Oratory Schools.

Dick, Courtney and Luke went to Glenalmond to discuss the S. African case. As I rather anticipated, the balloon has gone up. FAASCHE, who was carrying the addresses of van der MERVE, a famous gynaecologist, an Afrikaan with close associations with the O.B., and also that of Lothar SITTIG, a German who had twice escaped from an internment camp of which van der MERVE was the doctor, was followed to a farm near the frontier. This farm was known to the police since two people suspected of the murder of Lotte, the Crown witness in the HENNIG case, had disappeared in the vicinity some time ago. The police there therefore decided to raid the farm on the 14th.

The results of this raid have not yet been obtained.

Felix takes the view that it is a good thing that the case has been liquidated, as he thinks that by the time another transmitter has been landed by submarine at Durban, the Mediterranean will have been cleared, and the importance of S. Africa minimised. This struck everyone as being a somewhat specious argument.

The D.C. has seen Duff about Commissioner Wood's and Mills's letters from Canada on the relations between the A.C.M.P. and D.S.C. He has asked Duff to do his best to effect a settlement at the earliest possible moment. There appears to have been some feeling that we, or rather Mills, had been responsible for Wood's letter. Duff was therefore shown Mills's personal letters to me which make the position quite clear.

March 13th

We have decided to liquidate the "ITT" case by sending him to Dartmoor. There is no doubt that he is a confirmed liar, but it seems quite impossible to extract from him the real reason for his visit to this country. I am inclined to think that he is a man who has at one time or another worked for the Gestapo, that they had not got a very high regard for his ability, but that he, in his conceit, succeeded in persuading them to let him go and try his

hand in England by investigating in political refugee circles.

I have just heard that the search of the farm in the vicinity of which FANSCHE was seen had drawn a blank.

March 19th

I saw Burt this morning. Kendal has suggested to him that perhaps the work of his section was coming to an end and that he might return to the Yard. Burt explained to him that very much the contrary was the case, in fact his people were fully employed. He also explained that there were many types of case which he could handle from here which could not be handled from the Yard. It appears that Kendal has been subject to some pressure from S.B. who resent the fact that Burt and his men have been handling political cases such as that of Lord BARNLEY and MENEZES.

The D.C. has written a letter to the Dominions Office and also one to Vivian, expressing his views about the setting up of an S.I.S. representative in the Union. He has no objection on territorial grounds. He merely thinks that the appointment is an unnecessary one.

I have seen an N.C.O. from Trinidad. The suggestion is that he might be usefully employed in O20. Stephens is glad to have him but does not wish to exchange him for Goodacre unless the latter again proves

54

unsatisfactory after a month's holiday. Trinidad obviously need help and I do not think that we can retain unless we give them someone in exchange. Possibly Mathews could fill this job.

I saw Duff-Cooper and explained to him the case of Rex HOWES at the D.G.s request. I said that as Stafford Cripps was now taking a hand he might possibly hear something of the case.

He raised with me the question of D.S.C. He told me that he had seen C. and explained to him that the whole position was extremely unsatisfactory, the more so on account of recent communications from the RCMP about trouble between that organisation and D.S.G. It did not seem that we were getting on. We had had 3 or 4 meetings and each time had been told that no final settlement could be reached until Stephenson returned. C. said that Stephenson was probably staying on on account of Eden's visit though neither he nor Duff could see what that had to do with him. We had also been told that Winant was going to explore the position and would be giving us his views. He likewise had not returned. Duff urged C. to press Stephenson to return forthwith. Meanwhile C. said that according to information that he had received from New York things were now going much better and that was an unqualified success with the FBI. He had also heard from Dick that Stephenson did not intend to resign. Duff

said he thought it would create an impossible situation if he did not and that we should then be forced to place our own representative in Washington quite independently.

Garbo's agent No. 3 has now been relayed on special sources. His late agent No. 2 is also relayed and given a number. Garbo's number is now officially quoted. His V/T communication has temporarily broken down owing to the incompetence of the Germans in sending over their instructions.

March 20th

Curry talked to me about his plan for a Research Section which he has been asked to put up to the D.G. He merely amounts to his maintaining contact with certain sections in this office, with Palmer and T-R and with Section V. He would however like occasionally to call a meeting of some of those concerned. He is not very sanguine about the arrangement since we both felt that there was a general lack of enthusiasm in S.I.S. who seem to regard research as an unnecessary luxury. I said that I thought we should discuss the matter with Dick and Hart and then probably with Vivian.

Frost has gone off with one of the B.5 officers to try and clear up the HOUSE case.

Butler talked to me about the Home Office appointment. The D.G. has suggested Sir Charles Stead, who is a retired Regional

160
Commissioner formerly of the Punjab. This rather fills me with despair. He is 60 and I feel sure that a younger man is essential. If this job starts off on the wrong foot the whole arrangement will do us far more harm than good. Hart thinks that the H.O. should appoint their own representative, with which I heartily agree. The difficulty is that they have no one available and if we press them they may give us a dud.

I learn from Felix that Sir John Dashwood is going out to Lisbon to look into the leakage-ages. He suggests that this will meet our requirements. I am not sure that it will, since anyone going out there should have a full knowledge of what has transpired to date. Hart is going to find out on Monday whether Dashwood is to be fully briefed and whether he is to cover the Shipping Office and if so when he is likely to leave.

Dick as Chairman of the R.S.I.C. has put up a memo compiled by the Service representatives suggesting a united ISO index based on that of Section V. provided the latter is brought to London. Such a move would be highly desirable, seeing that there are now 7 separate organisations carding ISOs.

Felix has sent a teleprinter message saying that the result of the raid in S. Africa are disappointing but that he thinks this may be due to Webster giving the information to Coetzee, whereas Muggeridge gave it to Baston. It asks us to warn Webster not to give any

further information to Coetzee. I have pointed out that to give information to Basto and withhold it from Coetzee is the equivalent of asking Sir N. Kendal to carry out an S.B. job without informing Canning. I have however sent a telegram to Webster warning him that he must not make any use of B.J. information communicated to him by Ryde until authority is given, as I thought it possible that he might think that as the balloon had gone up he would be justified in doing so.

March 21st

Montague has informed J.C. about a Lisbon-Berlin message in which it is suggested that an agent should put explosive or incendiary coal on board a ship on which he is serving as steward. The agent is clearly ZigZag since the message implies that he is identical with the individual who did the Mosquito job and that he cannot go back to England. He is to slip away as soon as the job is done and go on to Paris. This all fits in with ZigZag's set-up. The difficulty is to know what appropriate action should be taken. I am trying to ascertain when the "City of Lancaster" is likely to leave Lisbon, since if there is sufficient time we might send an officer out. I have also asked Fergie to put a rush on the Berlin-Lisbon service in order that we might get a reply at the earliest possible moment. The message to Berlin was dated the 19th. Later I heard from Fergie that he was proposing to send a

wire to Jarvis informing him that Abt. II were proposing that Zigzag should sabotage his ship, and asking him whether Zigzag had informed the ship's captain. If not, without indicating the slightest knowledge of the enterprise it was suggested that the captain should be told to ask Zigzag (1) if and when he was going to desert (2) whether he had contacted the Germans yet and if so with what result, and (3) had he any messages for the captain to take back to England. At that moment I was discussing the whole problem with Montague Ronnie Reed J.C. and Wilson. At first we thought that a telegram might be sent to Jarvis explaining to him the position and suggesting that he should arrange discreetly for the master to meet him at a suitable rendezvous for a purpose of arranging a still more discreet meeting between Jarvis and Zigzag, bearing in mind that the latter was probably being followed. Jarvis should show Zigzag the signal from Foley and say that he came with other instructions from Reed to ascertain whether Zigzag had successfully contacted the Germans and if so, what instructions he had had at Lisbon. On no account was Zigzag to be asked questions about sabotage. If he failed to come clean about the plan to sabotage his ship, he would be placed in irons by the captain and brought back here. On further reflection we thought that it would be better to send Reed who had the advantage of knowing the whole case and of knowing Zigzag personally. This would avoid the difficulty of Jarvis or

up 3

any of his people, who must be known to the Germans, making contact with Zigzag and would have the additional advantage of giving Zigzag no way out. If he were approached by anyone else he might not feel under any obligation to tell them a story which he thought he had already dealt with in his own way. On the other hand however if he failed to disclose what had happened to Reed we should have to assume that he was definitely wrong. In any case we felt that Reed's presence in Lisbon could not be otherwise than a help to Jarvis.

Fergie in consultation with Foley seemed to have some doubts about the necessity or indeed the advisability of Reed going out but promised to let me have their decision in the morning. Meanwhile the German reply dated 17.35 on 20.3.43 had come in saying that the plan devised by the Abwehr in Lisbon had been approved by headquarters. We also learned from the Min. of War Transport that the ship is not likely to be unloaded before the 27th.

I spoke to Fergie again at about 7 p.m. suggesting that he should send off a wire to confirm the time of departure of the ship and ensure that as soon as Zigzag deserted the matter should be reported. I had in mind that if he deserted in the immediate future we should have to take a more sinister view of his part in the suggested enterprise.

164
March 22nd

I rang up Cecil of the F.O. and arranged about Reed's Portuguese visa. He can if necessary carry a dummy bag. I also spoke to Fergie who said the matter was now in the hands of Felix who was in conference. Later I rang again and was told that Felix had left for London where he would be in consultation with Vivian. I rang both Viv. and Felix and found they were both out. I left a message asking them to ring up before they went to lunch which they failed to do.

The second officers course began today. My remarks were confined to explaining the purpose of the course and the necessity for secrecy about our basic sources. I emphasised that by no means everybody knew about these sources in this office and still less in offices outside. It was therefore essential that before discussing them with anyone else or outside, they should enquire whether the person was authorised to know about such sources.

I was not able to get hold of Felix at all till 3 o'clock. He was at first rather reluctant to agree to Reed going to Lisbon and thought the telegram would do just as well. I pointed out to him that unless Zigzag was confronted with Reed we should never be quite certain whether he was right or wrong. If he saw Reed he could have no possible excuse for not telling him about

the suggested sabotage incident. I said I thought that no harm could possibly be done by sending Reed who knew the case and the man intimately. He and Jarvis could work out the best method of approach after his arrival. Cowgill eventually agreed. I then rang Herbert and succeeded in getting a place for Reed on tomorrow morning's plane.

The D.C. called a conference of myself, Milmo and Cookie to discuss the de GRAAF case. Cookie complained that he should have been called in the moment de GRAAF said that he had been working for the German S.S. and maintained that when he did speak to de GRAAF he found him very easy. Milmo explained that de GRAAF's story had only been extracted from him with considerable difficulty and bit by bit. Had he been interrogated in the first instance he would probably have given the story that he related at the LRC, namely that he had worked for the Germans in order to provide himself with means of escape, and that he had the pyramidon and the tooth picks for purely normal reasons. The D.P.F. turned the case down because the formal statement given to Cookie at a later stage had been preceded by a number of other interrogations. This might lay the prosecution open to attack on the grounds that the story had been extracted by third degree methods. Personally I feel inclined to agree with Milmo that a weak statement in the first instance followed by interrogations by M.I. and then another official statement would have laid the prosecution open to the

criticism that the original story was the true one and that the subsequent story had been extracted under duress. My own view is that if the case had been pressed with the D.F.P. a successful prosecution might have ensued. It was agreed that whenever there was any doubt in the cases of this sort in future there would be a consultation.

Stamp and Milmo talked to me about the case of WACE. It now transpires that WACE was one of a party and when he left Berlin he was given a note to a man called MERCKEL who was to meet the party at Metz. WACE and his companions got out at Metz but could not find MERCKEL. The train went on and ultimately an official was found who said that MERCKEL had actually got on the train and gone on to Paris. The party proceeded by the next train to Paris where they met MERCKEL who conducted them to Lisbon. Statements are being taken from other members of the party.

St. Johnson, the late C.C. Oxfordshire who is in charge of police matters in the office of the C.C.A.O. came to see me about the part which we were going to play in the second front operations. I explained to him the kind of duties that this office could perform. He seemed to welcome the idea of having a Security Officer at C.C.A.O.s head office. He is being assisted by Inspector Suttling late of S.B.

The F.M. made a very fine speech on the war and reconstruction last night. There was

also an extract from the German broadcast of Hitler's speech on the occasion of Heroes Day. His voice was on a very low, monotonous tone. While most people seem to think it was his voice, he certainly did not seem to be up to his usual form. We have got the transcript of the broadcast, which gives his conversation with wounded soldiers. They never amounted to more than an announcement of the man's name, his wounds and the place where he was wounded. Hitler's replies in each case consisted merely of a repetition of the name of the place where the man was wounded. He seemed to show no emotion and asked no question.

The Tunisian offensive started on Friday night and seems to be going well.

The D.G. has approved the appointment of Wethered to look into S.O.E. and S.I.S. penetration cases.

March 23rd

Dick is extremely incensed with Felix for torpedoing the suggestion put forward by the R.S.I.C. The committee, after due consideration of all the facts said that they thought that Merko ROT's statement about the Sofia Meldakopf and the Max and Moritz services should be handed to the Russians on the grounds that if the Max and Moritz services were a true bill the Russians should be informed about the man in the

Soviet Embassy in Sofia who was acting as a traitor, or that if Max and Moritz were double cross, they could warn the Russians as to the true facts. This minute of the committee was sent to C. for his decision. C. referred it to Felix who said that he was satisfied that the Moritz traffic was obtained from interception of our signals and Russian signals and that the W.O. were in full agreement with this view. In fact this matter has been thrashed out months ago and the bulk of the evidence seems to be in the contrary sense. Moreover Melland says that the W.O. are by no means satisfied that Moritz is not a double-cross. Section V. have a representative on the committee who agreed to the resolution put forward and Hudson Williams of Section V who was most concerned entirely disagrees with Felix's view. In any case an impossible situation has been reached if the committee's views are to be torpedoed by Felix who really does not know what he is talking about.

At the D.G.s meeting today Jim Hale told us about his meeting with the H.O. about the French interrogation centre at Luke St. where somewhat irregular methods are employed. It was decided that Newsam would advise the Home Secretary not to register any protest in view of possible adjustments which will be made if there is an amalgamation of the forces of de Gaulle and Giraud. Newsam was a little offensive in suggesting that we might possibly have instigated the French to use improper methods. He also referred to

a case where one of our officers had been dismissed for using third degree. There is no foundation whatsoever for either allegation, and in fact no necessity to make such a suggestion, particularly in front of Desmond Morton.

Onnox gave the D.G., darker, Dick and myself a talk about future plans which are still somewhat fluid and dependent to some extent on the outcome of the operation in Tunisia, but more particularly on the supply of the requisite number of invasion barges. These are required for the Mediterranean front, the Burma front and the Western European front. The supply does not meet the demand. The importance of the Burma front lies in opening up the China road. The African front is important on account of clearing the Mediterranean, while the European front is at the moment perhaps of greater political than military significance.

I had a meeting with Dick, Brooman-White, Scoford, Hollis and Shillito about a man named _____ who is travelling as a ferry pilot between this country, Gib., N. Africa, Malta and Cairo. At Gib. he makes contact with a communist airman who is known to have received money from Spanish Communists destined for Moreno, the Spanish Republican here who is working for Negrin. There seem to be two aspects to this problem (1) might be giving information to Republican Spaniards about things that he has seen, shipping, convoys, etc. which could ultimately

reach the Germans. We know that to a limited extent they have made use of Spanish Republicans agents. (2) the possibility of using this incident to persuade the Home Secretary to allow us to go more fully into the activities of Negrin. The F.O. were anxious that something should be done some months ago but Morrison had opposed action on the grounds that Negrin had the right of asylum and should not be persecuted in any way on account of his political views. Our main interest in Negrin is that he runs a small network of agents into Spain. We do not know how far his organisation is penetrated by the Germans. In any case we ought to know about any organisation of this kind which is being run from this country. If we can say from examination of Moreno's banking account that he has been in receipt of considerable sums of money, we might approach the Home Secretary. Enquiries on these lines are going to be made. Brooman-White talked to me afterwards about TUESTA, the Councillor of the Spanish Embassy who has now been appointed as consul general to Hamburg. B-W suggested that we should approach him and try and recruit him as an agent, although he felt he would almost certainly go to the Germans on arrival in Hamburg. Personally I cannot see any very sound objective in this. We all ultimately agreed that it would be far better to try by some means or other to discredit TUESTA in the eyes of the Germans.

Catalogue Reference: KV/4/191
 Lord Curzon arrived in India on the 13th.

Leonard Ingrams rang me up about a passage in News Review which referred to certain documents which had recently been got out by M.E.W. relating to conditions in Western Europe, and in particular to collaboration-ists. I discussed the case with Cussen. We agreed that there would be no point in trying to get the paper suppressed since clearly the information could not really be held to be detrimental to the war effort. On the other hand there was a definite leakage and it would be interesting to know who had disclosed the matter to the Press. Cussen suggested that M.O.I. should be asked to send for the editor.

I dined with C.C. Lanks and put him more or less in the picture.

March 24th

A piece of the parachute by means of which Mutt and Jeff's wireless set was dropped some weeks ago has been picked up by a farmer near Loch Strathbeg. It only reached us quite fortuitously through an officer in A.I.L.G. having given it to Room 055. The general instructions are that objects of this kind should be handed over to the Air Force by the Police. I am going into this matter with R.C. The officer's suspicions had been aroused because of a report he had read of an interrogation of a German airman who claimed to have landed an agent here in Nov. 1939 in a Dornier 18 off the Yorkshire coast not far from Scarborough. This agent was

equipped with a short-wave W/T set. At the end of April 1940 he picked up the same man from a bay just to the North of Flamborough Head. This spy was said to have given the Germans immensely valuable information at the beginning of the Norwegian campaign and also about a raid carried out in April 1940, on which advance information was given. There was a raid on April 18th from which 5 Hampdens and 2 Wellingtons failed to return from a flight to southern Norway.

The signal for picking up a spy was to be the dropping of a bomb, and as a bomb had been dropped in connection with the Mutt and Jeff enterpriset the Air Force officer who brought in the bit of parachute thought it might have some significance from an M.I.5 point of view. The P/W also spoke of another agent that he had landed at the beginning of the French campaign. This man wore civilian clothes and was provided with a Sq. Leader uniform and a small transmitter. Landings from aircraft and also descents by parachutes had later gone out of fashion as they were thought to be too dangerous.

There has been a further development in the WACE case through the identification of MERCKEL on the ISOS and through certain discrepancies in WACE's story when compared with that of one of his fellow-travellers. The ISO shows that MERCKEL went from Cologne to Lisbon at the same time that WACE was making this journey. MERCKEL is a man who has been formerly associated with other agents such as Thisbe

At the Wednesday meeting Grogan mentioned that four plain code letters compiled by S.O.E. had been inserted in the mails. Examiners had failed to detect them. They were then submitted to the Code Section as if the examiners had found them. The Code Section said they could detect nothing. They have since been shown to Foyer. He has tried his hand at one but seems to be on the wrong tack. It is not thought that he would be able to make much of the others under about 6 months. From this it would seem that these codes, which are quite simple to memorise, would be far safer than secret ink. We have no evidence that the Germans are making extensive use of such codes. I sincerely hope they will stick to secret ink and duff.

An ISOS message shows that Zigzag will be leaving for Paris via Madrid on the night of the 26th. It is to be hoped that Reed will have been able to make contact with him.

Hollis came to talk to me about a man called Chandler MORRIS of the American Embassy who seems to have a friend called Carlo employed in what is known as the Prevention Division of the O.S.S. On introduction from Carlo MORRIS paid a visit to the C.P. There are obvious difficulties in passing this information to the Americans without disclosing the source. We finally came to the conclusion that the best method would be for the State Dept. to have MORRIS up and ask him what he was doing when he visited the C.P. in London.

He may then say that he went on the introduction of a man called Carlo. If so, this will enable the authorities to make further enquiries about Carlo. If on the other hand there is no disclosure about Carlo we could at a later date consider passing information about him to O.S.S.

I discussed with Victor action regarding the ZigZag affair if Reed is unable to make contact. We came to the conclusion that the only thing to do would be to pick over each piece of coal before it is put into the furnace.

The D.G. sent for me about the suggestion to put a liaison officer in the H.O. He showed me a reference in Who's Who to Sir Campbell Ker, formerly an Indian Civil Servant, who he thought would be suitable for the appointment; My heart sank when I saw that he was born in 1878. I told the D.G. that as a result of conversations I had had with Jennifer Hart and Toby Mathew I was strongly of opinion that if we could induce the H.O. to appoint their own representative from their own staff such an arrangement would be far more beneficial to this office. They felt that anybody appointed by us might be regarded as suspect. The D.G. said that Sir Campbell Ker knew our work from A to Z. but as far as I can see his sole qualification was that he had had something to do in the past with communism in the Punjab. I said that I thought whoever did this job would have to make up his

to a good deal of intensive work in this office before he was qualified to carry out his job. In spite of what I said the D.G. replied that he would be seeing Maxwell tomorrow and that there would be no harm in his mentioning the name. I spoke to Toby Mathew on the phone and asked him whether he had found any suitable person to fill the position. He said that so far he had not but that he would speak to Maxwell and urge upon him the importance of giving us an H.O. official. He did not think that anybody from the Indian police was likely to be particularly acceptable to the H.O. since they had had somewhat unfortunate experiences with some of the Regional Inspectors.

March 25th

There has been another ISOS message indicating that ZigZag went to Madrid on the 23rd, leaves for Hendaye on the 26th and will be in Paris on the morning of the 28th. I am afraid that this means that Reed must have missed him. We have drafted a telegram to the NCSO telling him that Reed will be getting into touch with him regarding proposed anti-sabotage action. We also drafted a telegram which I read over to Ferguson suggesting that it should be sent to Jarvis for Reed. After giving ZigZag's movements, enquiries are made as to whether ZigZag said anything to the captain, and what the present position is. If ZigZag has made no disclosure Reed is to suggest the following action to the NCSO: examination of the coal between the bunker and boiler

176
immediately the ship leaves. The coal is explosive but will not detonate unless thrown into the furnace or violently handled.

I am considering the re-opening of the de GRAAF case on the grounds that it is highly important for general security reasons to stage a sabotage trial. Otherwise it is difficult to keep factories and vulnerable points up to the mark.

Stamp has had a long conversation with WACE as the result of which he does not think that MERCKEL is identical with the ISOS character. The descriptions do not tally. The case against WACE therefore seems to collapse.

Commander Wynn came to see me. He is going out to take Hasting's place in Washington. I explained to him about our difficulties in showing B.J.s to Thurston and suggested to him that he should see Vivian.

Dan has just telegraphed to say that the Stephen Carrol HELD cypher has been broken and it may be identical with the one being used by GOERTZ. Messages that we have obtained in Lisbon have been examined and appear to be in the handwriting of ANDREWS. ANDREWS met EASTWOOD on arrival and there was an exchange of notes. A cypher has been found in GOERTZ's cell, probably through the assistance of his servant who is in Dan's employ. Dan has asked us to send over an expert to look at the cypher. Page and Cecil will probably be going over on Saturday.

Dick, Curry and I talked about the future of Research. We all agreed that the most profitable line would be for the continuation of Curry's book to comprise certain definite trends that should be treated on a special basis e.g. the extent to which the S.D. is penetrating the Abwehr. In order to get a line on these various trends Curry should see representatives of the various departments concerned and perhaps call a meeting periodically. It was suggested that he should discuss this with Vivian.

The D.G. asked me about certain visitors from O.N.I. It seems that O.N.I. are spreading their tentacles rather wide and want to come into the field of C.E. I suggested that we should as far as possible confine them to the functions that would normally be performed by an S.O.I. If they come where they should visit Adam, Cheney, the ports and possibly the L.R.C.

March 26th

Two telegrams have at last arrived from Reed. He has seen the captain who stated that he had been approached by ZigZag, but that in view of his instructions he would not have said anything to anyone except Reed. The sabotage project was suggested to the Germans by ZigZag. He had obtained a bomb which the Captain had in his safe. Reed would bring it back by air. He suggests that we should stage some sabotage incident when the boat gets back to Liverpool. Victor, in conjunction with S.O.E. is trying to devise some

means of doing this without causing damage to the ship.

Frost came to see me firstly about the HOUSE case which has been liquidated, with the help of Skardon. HOUSE explained the wireless apparatus by saying that he wanted to get extremely good reception. This is a plausible excuse. The house in which he resides with his father is very large. He only uses about two rooms which are in an extremely dirty condition, and has no servants. There is no doubt that HOUSE is a crook. He father does not know quite what action to take to recover his money. HOUSE lied on a few rather immaterial points. The case is not considered either by Frost or Skardon to be of any security interest.

As regards signals security, Frost heartily disapproves of G-R's delaying tactics. He thinks that we should be wrong if we did not bring the present situation to the notice of the Chiefs of Staff since operations may be endangered. There appears to be a good deal of factual evidence obtained during the recent exercises. I have asked Frost to put up a note about this, when I propose to take the matter up again with the D.G., making the suggestion that the subject should be discussed at the Radio Security Committee.

Harry talked to me about the Second Front. He said that Mountain and Vale were going down to Glenalmond next week. Harry proposes to go with them. Their idea is to discover

exactly what Section V. can offer. I said that they could only offer 3 things. (1) to act as a conduit-pipe for ISO S; (2) to produce before the I.b. staff a certain number of names of suspects of the area, which to some extent would be collected from the RPS; and (3) to start running agents, but for this they would have very little experience. There was in fact nothing that they proposed to do that we could not do with a great deal more experience. On the other hand there were many things which we did which they had never touched at all. They have not yet begun to train their officers and they did not propose to give them more than 8 weeks training before sending them out. For the services of these officers they will indent upon the Army. The whole business seems to me quite farcical.

The D.C. has turned down the idea of bringing Maunsell under this office, although Dick has succeeded in persuading him that there is nothing which cuts across our present charter and that he should not therefore say anything that might bind his successor after the war.

I saw Cavendish-Bentinck to discuss with him the difficulty of G.2's objection to our showing B.J.s to Thurston. Cavendish-Bentinck thought the only way to handle this matter would be for the D.M.I. to write a personal letter to Strong explaining to him the difficulties.

140
March 27th

I had a long talk with Burt about the HOYSE case. He thinks the case is fairly complete. He was disappointed that Sir Frank Sprigg who will not give a categorical statement that he warned the Air Ministry, merely says that he told ARMSTRONG there was some sort of enquiry going on about the particular contract. The case has gone to the D.P.P and it will be for the jury to decide whether or not there was corrupt practice.

I discussed the de GRAAF case with Burt. He agrees with my view that interrogation at the early stages would have been a mistake. He says that even in criminal cases he never takes a statement until he is pretty certain what the man is going to say.

Burt also told me about the Vine St. inspector who is taking over the position of Commandant at the LRC. Apparently this is a matter of some comment in Yard circles, and has caused remarks to be made to the detriment of this department. I think the inference is that the place has been somewhat mismanaged, and that it needs a Yard man to put things right. Evidently Moyland and Kendal have been hobnobbing together. Burt I think has distinct reservations about Inspector Robinson but exactly what they are I have not yet discovered.

I spoke to Skardon about the O'BRIEN case. Last November a letter was seen in Censorship going to one John O'BRIEN at an address in Dublin, and signed "your fond brother Syd", from an address in Cowes. Scrutiny showed that a second sheet of paper had been gummed to the covering letter, and contained in bad German certain information about the military and civil situation on the I.O.W. Although the letter was written in good English, certain points about it, such as the date written as "Novembre" and the figures and word "Nieuport" in the enclosure made it uncertain whether "Syd" was not perhaps an alien. Enquiries have been made both in I.O.W. and Dublin with no effect. Skardon said that his main difficulty had been in dealing at third hand through the RSLO and the local police. I said that I was reluctant to leave the case as it was and have asked him to take it up personally on the spot. I thought that possibly the most practical line of enquiry would be to discover something about the Belgian Naval personnel in the I.O.W.

I talked with Cussen about the M.E.W.-New Review leakage case. Farrer, who has written to me, evidently thinks there has been leakage in high quarters. In asking Ratcliffe of the M.O.I. to help us with the editor, I think we should impress upon him that although the items were passed by censorship and in themselves are not a real menace to national security

it might be inferred that as the information about the publication of these Second Front books had leaked out, something might have been said about the order in which they had been done. If information has leaked, and priority was given to any particular country it would be a serious matter.

Reed has rung up to say that he is in Bristol. He says that the Captain of the ship had been interrogated 4 times by the shipping office and had denied that he knew anything about the ZigZag affair. He affected to be extremely annoyed that an agent had been put on his boat without his knowledge. He was in fact acting on strict instructions that he was not to divulge the fact of ZigZag's connection with the British Intelligence. He was much relieved to see Reed. The piece of coal has been sent round via Gib. as Jarvis was nervous about its being taken on the aircraft in case it had some delay mechanism.

March 29th

I saw Dick, Victor, T.A.R. and Reed about the ZigZag case. It seems that the Captain has played his part well. He even instructed ZigZag to cause trouble on the ship. ZigZag threatened to attack one of the other stewards with a knife, and the incident ended in a brawl, and the steward was laid out. We discussed whether a fake explosion should take place at Gib. or

Liverpool. There is an advantage in doing it at Gib. since the information could easily leak back to the Germans. On the other hand this is a disadvantage in that since certain people, members of the crew and possibly others, might have to be in the know, the fact that the explosion was a fake might get back too easily to the Germans. We eventually decided to take no action in Gib. and work out some scheme which can be put into operation as soon as the ship reaches Liverpool. The piece of coal was notionally placed on some spot where it would not be thrown into the boilers until the ship was well out to sea. ZigZag has explained this to the Germans. Our methods of communication with him now are by code advertisements in the Times and through practice messages which he hopes to be able to send from Paris to Nantes.

Milmo came to see me about the WITT case. He had a letter from Duff Cooper asking about the guarantees to WITT's wife. He is replying that WITT has confessed that everything he said about his proposed mission to this country was a lie. We did not consider therefore that SOE had any further obligation to the wife.

Cooper of the Nigerian Police came to see me. He told me about the exploits of Supt. Ward, who for the last 3 years has been in constant contact with MANETTE, the Chief of Police in Dahomey. He had

always had good personal relations with MANETTE, and on a strictly personal basis these had continued even after the French collapse. Ward had in this way collected a good deal of information. He had been working under the direction of SOE. This is a typical example of how S.O.E. cash in on the work of another organisation for purely intelligence purposes. They did so presumably because there was no other organisation in the field, and the result has been quite profitable to all concerned. Cooper is being taken round by Gibbs and will be given such information as he requires about secret inks. At one of the camps in Nigeria there are quite a number of neutrals and Syrians, who have been working to Dahomey, it is thought in the interest of the Germans. None of these people however has been interrogated in the proper sense of the word. It seems a pity that we cannot get some of them back here.

Senter came to see me about Cyril Harvey. He was anxious to obtain his services for the C.E. section which S.O.E. are setting up. I agree to the suggestion. I gather that Harvey is anxious to take on the job. I also talked to Senter about Curry. I explained to him Curry's disabilities and also told him about his virtues. I thought it a frightful pity that one who had so much knowledge and also ability was being allowed to go to seed. He promised to consider him as soon as

Marshal-Cornwall, who I think will ultimately take Dansey's place, as got well into the saddle in S.I.S. Marshal-Cornwall is a very co-operative person and I think anxious to break down the various barriers which have been set up in the past.

Vivian rang up to tell me that Stephenson had arrived. He had heard that Stratton was also in this country and was anxious that Stratton should be allowed to talk to "C". I gather that Stratton has already talked with Howard. I said that I had not seen Stratton. I understood that he had been ill since he had arrived back, but that he was expected in here today. I would mention the matter to the D.G. who I was sure would be only too glad that Stratton should call on "C". I warned Viv. however that I should not be prepared to accept all Stratton's views about D.S.C. I thought he was a good fellow, but I did not think his judgment was always as sound as it might be. Moreover he was very thick with Connop Guthrie.

Mocklet-Ferryman, late D.M.I. N.Africa, came to tell us about security matters in that area. What interested us most was to ascertain the exact functions of the S.I.(b) unit. He spoke in fairly glowing terms of the work they had done, his information being based on a report by Hill-Dillon. When we questioned him, he said that the S.I.(b) unit was the purveyor of most secret information and also supplied information

about suspects, some accurate and some inaccurate. I (b) staff had in fact relied upon the French authorities who were well disposed towards the allies. If there was a case to be investigated it was the duty of the S.I.(b) officer to ask for such executive assistance as he required from the FSP. It was clear that neither Mockler-Ferryman nor Hill-Dillon really knew what expert C.E. advice was. There was nobody to advice on counter-sabotage or to give full significance to information from Mos Secret sources where acts of sabotage were contemplated. There was no one with experience of interrogation or investigation. It seems that there was a certain amount of trouble at Casablanca where Park, one of the S.I.(b) officers, was accused by the Americans of being a British spy. He was refused permission to communicate either with Force Headquarters or with London and was eventually removed. Trevor-Wilson is remaining as officer in charge of the S.I.(b) unit, while the other three have been put into civilian clothes and camouflaged in the consulate. This is for the purpose of getting over the suspicions of the Americans.

Dick feels, and I agree, that in future S.I.(b) units ought to be the joint concern of M.I.5/6. In this connection we have received a letter from the D.M.I., dictated for him by Harry at my instigation, in which he says that he is pleased to take advantage of the D.G.s offer, that of the

appointments for which these officers are likely to be considered, two at least will require experience in general Civil Security matters for duty with G.D.Q. I.B. staffs of a future expeditionary force and that one of these officers should if possible be of a suitable type for the attachment to the C.C.A.O.s staff in and when such were thrown off by the Force headquarters.

In addition he would be grateful for specialist officers on certain security subjects. In the mean time he would like to have a list of names and particulars of those officers whom we propose to make available. This seems more or less to put us on the map, but only after endless prodding.

Stephenson looked in for a moment and is to discuss D.S.C. with the D.G., Dick and myself tomorrow. He is still fighting for a united front in America and seems to be inclined to stress the growing importance of organisations other than the R.B.I.

Dick, Milmo and I had a talk with Stratton about _____ of Trinidad whom we wish to retain here at J20. Stratton thinks this will be a last straw to Henderson who is already somewhat browned-off by the apparent indifference of O.C. to his many complaints. These include his rank, his pay, and his personnel. Stratton ~~thoughts that~~ a wire should be sent to Henderson asking him for his views.

188
and pointing out the advantage of an exchange of personnel between Trinidad and Head Office. We have still got to get Stephens to fall in with the arrangement and, what is more important, the D.G.s approval for the whole scheme.

March 30th

Lennox gave us the outline of future plans at the D.G.s meeting. Eisenhower thinks that N. Africa may be cleared up by the 15th April but gives no guarantee until the end of the month. Things seem to be going well but Rommel has clearly made another extremely able strategical retreat. It seems doubtful whether the next move will come much before the middle or end of June.

The D.G. Dick and I had a long set-to with Stephenson. The D.G. made it clear that we wanted to have our own representative in the L.B.I. and that only in that way can we hope to get their full co-operation. We also made it clear that if information was to pass through D.S.C. it would be useless for us to make the appointment. Stephenson seemed very anxious to make it clear that the present situation was not entirely of his making. For a long time he had urged on the home authorities the necessity for full co-operation with the F.B.I. but for 2 years he had been starved of information. I said that we had entirely agreed but that this could not be laid at our door since we had not been

responsible for the liaison. The position
now was however that the F.B.I. were getting
everything they wanted, in fact everything
we had. We on the other hand were not
getting full co-operation from them, and
Thurston would be the first person to say
so. We felt that there was only one thing
holding us up, that we had not got a man on
the spot to ferret round in the same way the
Thurston does in this office. Stephenson
was clearly very reluctant to accept any
position by which he would be by-passed.
He said he now had some 13 people who were
dealing with the F.B.I. on C.E. matters,
though what they all do God knows. I said
I thought the situation would be met if
we had our own representative at Washington,
who would work alongside . . . It would
not do however if he were regarded as part
of D.S.C. The D.G. mentioned the complaint
we had had from Commissioner Wood. Step-
henson was not very forthcoming on the Jap
incident which had evidently got well under
Wood's skin. He said however that Gooch
had been sent up to Vancouver at Wood's
request. My own belief is that the Press
campaign was instigated in New York.
Stephenson said that Wood had always been
most cooperative and he seemed somewhat
surprised to hear that D.S.C. were persona
non grata in Ottawa as well as in Washington.
This meeting would be described in F.O.
parlance as "a tour d'horizon". We
certainly have not got very far at the
moment. I like Bill personally and am
rather sorry for him because I think he

190
has had a difficult time. On the other hand he has certainly made some bad blunders and we shall get nothing out of the FBI as long as he is responsible for the liaison. He feels I think that his own head office are really to blame for the situation, although he must be conscious of his own mistakes. He is rather inclined to emphasise the importance of ONI, OSS, and G2 but admitted that the centre of gravity for the purpose of liaising with these bodies was inclined to be here rather than in New York. I emphasised very strongly that the FBI would be bound to regard with suspicion, in the light of what had passed, any organisation which had an offensive charter. They did not suspect us because we had an analogous problem to themselves and were solely interested in an exchange of information. We are to have a further discussion in a few days. In the meantime Bill wants me to have a word with Duff Cooper.

Dick, Frost and I had a talk on Signals Security. It was decided to draft a letter in reply to G-P for the D.G.'s signature pointing out that we did not think that we could justifiably withhold such evidence as we had from the JIC or Chiefs of Staff, and that we proposed therefore to raise the matter for further discussion at a meeting of the R.S.C. We proposed to make it clear that we are extremely concerned with the security of this country and that we have definite locus standi in this matter if our secrets are being blown

off into the air by the Services. There is already plenty of evidence, apart from what we had learned from WURMANN and the Panzer Generalism that wireless discipline is extremely lax. In our view it is necessary to set up some committee between the Services and ourselves to deal with the problem. G-P has clearly once more sold us a vacuum cleaner but we are going to return it to store if possible.

March 31st

I had a discussion with T.A.R., J.C., Foley and Robertson about the MULLET case. ISOS indicates that FANTO is to be recalled and is on no account to be allowed to approach this country. It looks rather as if the Germans have rumbled something and are intending to arrest FANTO. The latter has a seat on a plane from Lisbon and a British visa. He was intending to come here on XX lines in the near future. This aspect of the problem has now broken down. The value of getting him here at this stage lies in the information that he might possibly provide about Abwehr personalities in Belgium and also about Falkenhausen and his entourage. It is thought that Foley should go to Lisbon to make the necessary arrangements. I am not very sanguine about the value of this operation since nobody seems to be very clear as to exactly how much FANTO knows. I think however that we are justified in taking a chance.

192

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
8.14 OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. Jan 2001

Kellar is to join B.1 and form a Middle East section. This will be all the more necessary when Joe Stephenson gets going in Cairo.

I had a talk with Stratton and Ede whom we wish to get for O20 in exchange for Goodacre. We have drafted a suitable wire to Henderson which Stratton approves and this has been given to the D.G. who will discuss the case tomorrow.

Commander Burch of ONI has asked us for information about the WINTER case. He has a request from the CE department of ONI yet another department in the USA dealing with these matters. I think ONI's duties qua CE are more or less analagous with those of D.4. Before replying I propose to discuss the matter with Thurston.

Dick and I saw Harry Allan about his visit to Glenalmond. Both he and Mountain are satisfied that S.I.S. could not contribute more than ISOS and the Purple Primer and that their officers could not be regarded as experts in C.E. and counter-sabotage. I gather that Vale was rather inclined to sit on the fence at first, but when he was called upon to provide officers from the Army he was bound to admit that he did not know where he could find them unless he came to us. This is in fact what he intends to do. Vivian was quite emphatic about the S.I.(b) unit being an M.I.6 commitment and it was made quite clear that he had no wish to co-operate with ourselves.

128

I think this whole meeting has been something of a shock to Harry. We propose to draft an answer to the D.M.I.'s letter giving him lists of our officers and their qualifications.

April 1st

I went over the S.O.E. establishment in Herts. having stayed the night with Col. Wood. Victor and I were explaining our requirements in connection with the Zigzag case. A bomb is to be manufactured, if necessary like a bit of coal, which will give an appreciable bang and emit a good puff of smoke.

I was shown quite a number of S.O.E. gadgets, including some booby traps. A wire which is practically invisible under almost any conditions is being used with good effect. Immediately you walk into the wire adetonator goes off and explodes the charge. They had great fun getting Victor and myself to walk into the booby traps.

Major Thornley of S.O.E. came to see me about the "ITT case. He is very emphatic that S.O.E. are under no obligation to the wife since it was primarily on WIT's own suggestion that he came here. They think moreover that it would be extremely embarrassing to continue these payments, since such action would be tantamount to an admission that there was no case for

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. Jan 2001

WITT failed to get a return visa from the Swedish Legation. Evidently the Swedes did not like him, but we are not likely to ascertain their reasons.

Frost tells me the Post Office have bumped into a 75 watt transmitter in the house of a Norwegian and Dutchman in Bloomsbury. I expect it has something to do with S.O.E.'s activities but we shall find out in due course.

April 2nd

I had a talk with Tin-Eye and Lick about Tin-Eye has now made up his mind that Goodacre should be transferred to other scenes. He does not mind having Beith as an assistant but he does not want to put him in Goodacre's position. It was arranged that we should wire to Henderson but that we should say that we proposed to take on Beith for a trial period of 3 months and that we are sending him Goodacre in order that he should have someone with the knowledge and background of OZO. Meanwhile Goodacre was to be recalled and told that his services are urgently required in Trinidad.

I saw Duff and took him the report for the P.M. He seemed quite satisfied with its form and contents. I impressed upon him the degree of secrecy which should be attached to it and the necessity therefore of ensuring that it was seen by the P.M.

only. At first he had thought of sending it to Desmond Morton. I said I thought it would be far preferable if he handed it to the P.M. himself. He would then be able to answer any supplementary questions and ascertain the P.M.'s reactions. From what he said I don't think that he intends to leave the report with the P.M. In any case he will ask for its return. I told him that if it went to Desmond Morton it was highly probable that he would take a copy and send it to "C". While there was no real objection to this it might possibly cause a certain amount of trouble.

I also left with Duff a copy of Hart's report on the Lisbon leakage case. We then talked about WITT. I explained that the idea that he should come to this country had first been mooted by WITT himself after a conversation with Tennant the Press Attache to whom he had already supplied certain articles of an anti-Nazi character for publication in this country. After a good deal of discussion here we had fallen in with the view of S.O.E. that in any case WITT, who was considered a doubtful character, would be better in this country than in Stockholm where he was trying to penetrate our organisations and social-democrat refugee circles. Further points were that WITT's wife was now employed in Stockholm in a secretarial capacity, and that he himself before his arrest had been refused a visa by the Swedish Authorities to return to Stockholm.

Lastly we had found WITT wholly unsatisfactory, and had at last extracted a confession from him that the reasons he gave for coming to this country were entirely false. I think that as a result of this conversation Duff somewhat modified his views about the whole case. He will probably say a word to Selborne when he sees him.

Duff showed me a commentary on a huge volume which he described as "Stephenson's apologia". The commentary had been made by Diplock who seems to have reached more or less the same conclusions as ourselves. These are that Stephenson was badly supported by his own organisation and was for two years at least kept very much in the dark. He consequently lost credit with the F.B.I. Secondly he made a gross blunder in not handing over all his agents to Hoover when the Americans came into the war, and lastly his office is badly organised and over-staffed. We are now awaiting C's decision as to Stephenson's ultimate fate. I told Duff that I thought Stephenson had done a good deal of extremely useful work in the early days of the war but that in the present situation I did not see how he could continue as our representative, moreover anybody who represented S.I.S. in the present atmosphere would be regarded with some suspicion, firstly because he would be a member of an organisation known to carry out offensive operations on foreign territory, and secondly