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conversations about a week ago indicated that there was some contact between Badoglio and the British Govt., and I presume therefore that discussions have been going on for some time. A further straw in the wind is the arrival here of Gen. Carton de Wiert, until now a P/W in Italy. He came to Lisbon with an Italian officer named Castellano.

When the latter's suggestions were not fully accepted, Carton de Wiert in his chivalrous way suggested that he should go bac, to Italy. Castellano said however that he had better stay where he was and proceed to England. He has been spirited away to the country as he is a somewhat conspicuous figure, being without one arm and one eye. Fleet St. are of opinion that we are going to attack Naples tomorrow, though it is not clear precisely on what they base their assumption. They are somehow influenced by the fact that Winston has postponed his speech and that the Pope is speaking on Wednesday.

Gen. Martel, our M.A. in Moscow, has telegraphed to say that there is not a single German division at the front that has a complement of more than 60%. Some divisions are down to a mixed lot of 100,

We have received information that the first escort group was attacked by 13 Do. aircraft at 12.52 p.m. on 27th August when about 30 miles west of Vigo. "Egret" blew up and "Athabaskan" was damaged but managed to steam at 15 knots. The C.O., 4 officers and

30 ratings from "Egret" were rescued by "Athabaskan" which herself had 17 casualties, two of whom were fatal. The projectile used for the attack is believed to be a rocket-propelled glider bomb which is discharged 3-5 miles from the target at a moderate height the flight being controlled by radio from the aircraft. Some mention of this bomb has been made by P/Ws. They say it can be fired at a distance of 15 kms from the target. The aircraft has to be turned in the direction of the target at the moment of release. The observer keeps the bomb in his electrical apparatus and steers it on its target. The experimental flights were carried out at Peenemunde on the Baltic which was bombed the other day. Jamming is thought to be difficult as each bomb is steered on a different wave length. I believe that we ourselves have been experimenting with some similar type of glider bomb. R.D.F. reflection is obtained both from the bomb and from the target. All that the pilot has to do is to keep the two super-imposed on his screen. Alan seems to think that jamming should be possible. He has also suggested the firing of rockets festooned with wire. These of course are already being used by A.A. defences and might well be applied to this problem.

The question of giving the Max material to the Russians is still under discussion. Felix's contribution has been that since the Russians are only in part our allies, not having declared war on Japan, we are not under any obligation to give them anything. It is difficult to imagine a narrower or more

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stupid point of view. I do not think that his views are likely to cut much ice since in principle they are diametrically opposed to those of H.M. Govt.

Joe Archer told me about the Mohne Dam incident. The bomb used is spherical and contains about 4 tons of H.E. It is revved up by a special motor within the aircraft before release. When it touches the water it plays ducks and drakes until it hits the side of the target. It rebounds it is still spinning as it begins to sink and is gradually drawn in to the side of the dam. When it reaches a certain depth it explodes. The effect of the explosion is curious. The chunk knocked out of the dam is on the opposite side to the explosion. Wallace, Chief Designer of Vickers who invented this bomb, was confident that it would be successful and that this would be the effect. He said so as early as 1940 and his designs were in fact given to the Americans. Nobody believed in him. He based his opinion on a curious phenomenon which occurred at the time of the building of Waterloo Bridge. Long concrete pylons were being driven into the bed of the river with a steam hammer and showed a tendency to break off near the top. The reason for this was that the force of the hammer-blow recoiled up the pylon, the break taking place at the point where there was least resistance, i.e. above the water and between the top of the pylon and the steam hammer. The same effect is produced in a lateral sense with the dam, the concrete falls away on the far side as

there is only air resistance. Four bombs were dropped in all before the dam gave way. The area covered by the explosion was 90ft deep by 230 ft.wide. The possibilities of this bomb in dealing with battleships surrounded by torpedo nets is being considered

August 31st

At the Directors Meeting today we had a discussion about travel control. It was generally agreed after a good deal of trouble from Abbott that we could not at this stage anticipate the conditions which would prevail on the continent at the end of hostilities and that it would therefore be wrong to commit ourselves concerning our future requirements to meet hypothetical situations. It was therefore agreed that any decisions on 18(1) would have to be dependent on the maintenance of full travel control between this country and Ireland, which would affect both aliens and British subjects. It was for example quite useless to try and operate the Arrival from Enemy Territory Order if its provisions could be circumvented by uncontrolled entry from Ireland. Lastly it was felt that the present restrictions would have to remain in force until Stage B. when we should be prepared to give it further consideration. It was agreed that I should put forward a short paper stating our views.

Dykes came to see me about the possibilities of his being used for a Second Front job. I said that there might be an opening for him provided R.C. could spare him.

Frost brought me a paper on W/T security which he thought should be the subject of discussion by COSSAC. It contained his views as to what was required on the Second Front, and he suggested himself as a candidate for the job. I asked him what he was doing about the offer that he had received from the Radio Board. He said that he still had it in mind but that he would prefer to do a job with the forces if there was one going. I reminded him that it had taken us a very long time to get Dixon and Younger into position and that there might well be further delays before this particular matter had been settled. I did not for example know what part RSS were going to play and how far signals would regard themselves as being responsible, and put in their own nominee. In any case I did not think the job would be higher than a GS03. I then repeated to him what I had said before, namely that I did not particularly want to carry the war with RSS on to the IB staff. I think he went away somewhat discouraged about his prospects in an army job. He then asked me whether the D.G. would be prepared to lend him to the Radio Board. The significance of this is that he would hope in this way to retain his military rank in what is in fact a civilian job. His present position is that he has been lent by the BBC to the Army. If however he reverts to a civilian status on the Radio Board, the BBC at the end of the war might say that as he had taken a civilian job they did not propose to take him back. He cannot go back to the BBC at present as being only 34 he would come within the category of those re-192-up. I suggested

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to him that he should discuss the question of his being lent to the Radio Board with the D.G.

Welles rang me up about the meeting of the RSC. He suggested that possibly the Reid Committee might take over the thorny question of the communications of allied govts. and that they might also deal with the non-service communications. I said that I thought this would be perfectly satisfactory provided we had a representative on the Reid Committee. In many ways I thought it would be preferable to the handling of these matters by the RSC since the chairman of the Reid Committee was a highly qualified technician and was in a position to call anyone's bluff on technical matters. I also made it clear to him that I did not think that G.P. had any locus standi on the Reid Committee. He was merely a technical tool and should take his orders either from ourselves or from SIS.

I saw Istead who is their Force Security Officer for Alachity. He is a not unpleasant but rather feeble creature. I found it very difficult to get any sort of spark out of him. He is not at all clear as to what he is required to do. I have arranged for Stopford to see Benady who will be in charge of I.B. matters, with a view to getting the position clarified.

N. Africa have asked for the permanent retention of John Mair. I told Harry that we had sent him out on the understanding that he was going to plan counter-sabotage and establish
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would be returning to us within a period of 2 months. Had it been the intention of N. Africa to use him in Italy he could certainly have done a good job. They had however turned this suggestion down. I did not think therefore that we should entirely give up our claim on his services which might be more usefully employed on the continent. I suggested that we should agree to his remaining in N. Africa until such time as we might require him for other duties.

Marcus Heywood tells me that the landing on Calabria has been postponed until tomorrow. Meanwhile there appears from the Press to have been a Commando Raid.

We have been told that segregating facilities at the Oratory Schools are now ready.

Burt tells me that there is further trouble in the HOYSE case, which may ultimately be turned to advantage. £200 which was given to Bloss by MAP was said to be a loan on the security of certain shares, valued at that sum. In fact the value of the shares was only half that amount. Cunliffe Owen has now induced Arthur J. Rank to purchase these shares at their full value. Both Cunliffe-Owen and Rank will have some difficulty in explaining this rather peculiar transaction.

TAR tells me that Johnnie Jebson and Tricycle have come to an understanding. Presumably Jebson is playing straight as ISO shows that he is backing Tricycle. Jebson's idea is to go out to Lisbon and work there as an
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Abwehr official in touch with Tricycle and his gang.

September 1st

Nobody had anything of interest to say at the Wednesday meeting. Hart's material shows a steady flow of bogus information alleged to be coming from this country. There is not one word of truth in any of it.

I had a discussion with Dick, Brook-Booth, Milmo Byrd and Gibbs about the sending of duplicates of all our correspondence with America to SIS. We have apparently been doing this religiously. O20 reports go to SIS and it is up to them to copy them and send them on to BSC if they think fit. We have come to the conclusion that we had better leave things as they are for the time being except in the case of enquiries on O20 reports which the FBI sometimes put through BSC New York. We are going to suggest to Thurston that if they have any enquiries to make they should pass them through him since it is here that discussion on O20 reports should take place rather than in New York. The only communications to the FBI which SIS do not see are the letters which Thurston sends as a result of his conversations with the various sections of this office.

I went to a meeting called by Dingle Foot at MEW at which, Farrer, Geoffrey Gibbs, Roberts of the FO and Lord Drogheda were present. The meeting had been called on account of a German

B.J. which showed that Hans SULZER the Swiss industrialist had talked a good deal to the Germans about his previous visit to this country. His attitude now is definitely pro-German and of course pro-Sulzer. Having interests all over the world he very naturally does not wish to see the annihilation of Germany. He also feels that from a cultural point of view he is closely tied with Germany rather than with any other country. I said that from a security point of view we were against having him here since owing to his many contacts he was bound to collect a good deal of information. It did not make much difference whether he was pro-German or pro-British. It could in fact be argued that if he was pro-British he would be likely to get more information than if he were pro-German. If however it was considered that there were over-riding considerations and that the information he would get here would do more good than harm we did not wish to stand in the way of his proposed visit. It appeared however that Sulzer's firm has come perilously near the Black List since it is stepping up production for the Axis. On these grounds therefore objection may be taken by MEW. If this is so he would hardly be acceptable as head of the Swiss Trade Delegation and the F.O. are prepared to say so. Lord Drogheda point out that the visit of the Swiss delegation would be a matter for the HDSE where the Service Depts, would have an opportunity of expressing their views. There seemed no doubt whatever that some delegation would have to come to this country from Switzerland as the matters to be discussed are of considerable importance.

Marcus Heywood tells me that the landing on the mainland has now been postponed till the 3rd. The Russians are doing extremely well. The Commando laid on Calabira appears to have been quite a success. A number of prisoners were brought back and there was practically no opposition. The bathing was warm.

September 2nd

I went over to see C. about the case of LECUBE, a Spaniard who was recruited by the Abwehr somewhere in 1941. He is an ex-international Soccer player, an ex-Treasury official and an ex-owner of a greyhound racing track. Whether there was any connection between his appointment in the Spanish Treasury and his greyhound racing activities is a matter for some speculation. In 1942 he obtained a mission from the Abwehr to report on the military forces in the Panama Zone. He was picked off at Trinidad and brought to this country. While he has told us a certain amount about his connections and activities, he vehemently denies that he is a German spy and has written several appeals to the Home Secretary. He writes in typical Spanish style: "From my microscopic insignificance I fling myself against the pedestal of your greatness" or words to that effect, with professions of his innocence. The documents found on him contained a number of addresses which undoubtedly connect him with the Abwehr, but do not perhaps to the uninitiated provide an entirely conclusive case. Unfortunately for LECUBE
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however there were some 90 messages on ISOS some of which tally completely with his own statements of his movements and associates. In order to convince the Home Secretary it is necessary that he should be acquainted with the nature of the evidence. I explained this to C. who agreed.

I then told C. about the ZECH-NENTWICH case and our views. He seemed to think it was quite possible in the light of other information that the man was genuine.

He then referred to the agent in Switzerland who had been handing out German B.J.s relating to GOERTZ and also reporting on certain messages emanating from Josephine. It seems that this agent, who in the first instance made contact with an OSS representative, may be something in the nature of a XX, but it is not really clear at the moment. C. was evidently not aware of the fact that we had no official knowledge about the Josephine messages. I said that we should be very interested to know precisely what these messages were. He said that of course we should be informed. Vivian was present and I think slightly embarrassed. The fact is that everything is being done by Cowgill to keep this information away from us. However we now have an opportunity of taking the question up.

The Marita case seems to to be developing in a rather interesting way, Marita having visited the I.O.M. Bernard PERRIGOE is giving quite a lot of information about the
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internees. One of his recruits appears to be our old friend HORSFALL-ERTZ. There may be an opportunity of finding out more about him and possibly also Mrs. KRAFT.

HAFFNER the deserter from Spain who knows about Bodden is still in Madrid. Meanwhile certain ISOS messages indicate that the Germans have been making frantic efforts to get him arrested by the Spaniards. At the moment it looks as if the Spaniards have got hold of somebody whom they believe to be HAFFNER and who is alleged to have committed suicide. The probability is that they have got hold of the wrong man, since the latest SIS reports indicate that HAFFNER is still in hiding in charge of our people.

I saw the Home Secretary this afternoon. The D.G. and Jim Hale had seen him previously on the question of RUTLAND. They had suggested that RUTLAND could do very little harm if he were released. After half an hour's discussion the Home Secretary decided to keep him inside.

Herbert and I discussed with him the case of LECUBE and he readily agreed that the evidence was conclusive. He thought it quite clear that the man mentioned in ISOS as Espina and Gomez was identical with LECUBE.

I had a discussion with the D.G. and Abbott in the morning about travel control. Abbott seems to have impressed the D.G. that travel control to Ireland could be relaxed at Stage

A. I made it very clear that I thought this would be a mistake and got somewhat irritated. The D.G. decided to have a further meeting in the afternoon, at which Harker, Milmo and Hale were present. We were all in agreement, except the D.G. and Abbott, that travel control should remain as at present until Stage B. although it might be possible to relax to some extent within the framework of the regulations. It was finally agreed that Milmo and I should put forward a note giving our reasons. In due course this would be the subject of discussion with the H.O.

A Jap B.J. indicates that prior to the meeting of the Grand Council, Mussolini and his friends had the intention of strengthening the Party by establishing it on a somewhat broader basis by gathering round Mussolini more men both from within the Party and outside. Having formed a new National Government they would concentrate the strength of the whole country under the King and follow the only course open to Italy, namely to continue the war. This was the intention underlying their request for a meeting of the Grand Council, and the so-called Grandi proposals.

A report from Wheeler Bennett in Washington on the German refugee population indicates that there exists and always has existed a hatred of the Prussians among the South Germans. There is also a strong indication of a desire to exculpate South Germany at the expense of Prussia for the sins of Germany

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over the last 100 years. As Bennett points out, a picture of the peace-loving South Germans, tyrannised and dominated by a brutal and oppressive Prussia, is not entirely in accordance with the facts of history. While it is true that Prussian influence was the directing force of Pan-German aggression prior to 1918, the centre of reaction was shifted to South Germany on the collapse of the Second Reich. Moreover South Germans predominate in the higher circles of the Party. Hitler, Hess, Goering, Frick, Esser, von Epp, and many others. Munich is the spiritual home of the Nazi Party and of Geopolitik. The founding fathers of Pan-German ideology, Arndt, Fichte, Hegel, etc. were none of them Prussians and the great centres of Pan-Germanism were not ~~only~~ in the North but in Mainz, Leipzig and Munich. Equally the proportion of South Germans in the High Command is extremely high, including some of the leading figures, Rommel, Halder, von Leeb, List, Jodl, von Thoma and the two Keitel. Wheeler Bennett says in conclusion that there is a good case of saying that Prussianism originated not in Prussia but in other parts of Germany. Although Prussia may have provided a more receptive field for the propagation of this bacillic culture, no part of Germany is wholly free from infection. If therefore Prussia was to be separated from South Germany it should be done with the confidence that all the sick in Germany has been isolated in one area. This like talking about Nazis and Germans, but Prussianism is Germanism. Bennett thinks therefore that South Germans

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should not be allowed to escape their share of that measure of punishment which is the just desert of all Germans.

A P/W has stated that he was posted in the Intelligence Central Office at Cologne for the invasion against England in 1940. He was acquainted with the preparations of Admiral Fleicher, Naval Cin-C. Channel Coast, on the 16th September. On the 22nd September the whole operation was cancelled.

Tricycle is expected back between the 5th and 10th September. He has obtained some further details of the agent PBK who seems to be connected with Ostro. The fact that Jebson is prepared to give us information through Tricycle offers enormous possibilities

A further delivery of a wireless and sabotage material has been promised to Mutt and Jeff at the end of September. The possibilities of shooting down the plane on this occasion will probably be explored.

The cover address received by Brutus was one of the addresses given to the German agent Joe K. The name however is different, and other addresses of this agent have been given at one time to agents such as the Worm but taken away later. The giving of these addresses therefore appears to be consistent with the interpretation derived from ISOS that the Germans regarded Brutus as being a free agent up to the time of his arrest but are somewhat nervous about his having fallen

into our hands as a result of his arrest.

The Germans are now transmitting on Father's old and new frequencies. It has been ascertained that the operator working to Father on his Indian frequencies is the same as the one working to the important XX Silver. Father has now been posted to a night-fighter squadron.

Shadow has arrived in Lisbon. We have not yet heard whether he has made contact with Wilma SCHULTZ.

A further operation of Plan Dream by which we expect to receive £2,631 has almost been completed.

Phipps came to see me. If there was anything he could do on the Second Front he would like a job. Unfortunately he has no language qualifications.

I have read report on ZECH-NENTWICH, which is extremely well presented. The key to the man's whole make up is that he is obsessed by his status as an officer. This point is particularly emphasised by his extreme reluctance to disclose that while he was in prison he had his face slapped by a representative of the Gestapo. What he does not understand of course is that we are fighting German militarism just as much as Nazism. When this dawns on him a somewhat bitter disillusionment is bound to set in. His whole story reads like a film

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scenario. The circumstances in which he gradually drifted into contact with the Polish resistance movement appear to be quite circumstantial and authentic. At the moment SOE are having a look at him.

September 3rd

We entered Italy this morning at 4.30 but at the moment there is no further news.

I had a meeting with MacIver, Eddie Grant and Stopford. There is a certain amount of friction between Eddie and Stopford over the question of the running of agents in the PAIR FISHING Co. The information supplied by Stopford's agents is diametrically opposed to the information supplied by Eddie through the police. The real trouble was however that Eddie had the impression that agents were being run in his area without his knowledge. In fact when we got down to particulars, it was fairly clear that Eddie had been given both the files about the agents and all their letters coming from Milford Haven when he did the course here some months ago. Whether he had forgotten about this or whether he never read the files I do not know. He has since received memoranda based on information supplied by these agents. Clearly it would be quite useless to send him all their reports as they came in and in fact he had no wish that this should be done. Stopford had concluded his reports by saying that he thought certain of the Spanish factions were at loggerheads with the heads of the fishing companies who held different

political views. The police have made enquiries into an allegation by Stopford's agent that Spanish seamen were being fleeced by the local inhabitants. They had gone to

heads of the companies who had denied that anything of the kind was going on. Stopford says that it is no good going to the heads of the companies who give the police regular presents of fish. The heads of the companies who hold contrary political views to the complainants are in his view not likely to give their subordinates any assistance.

They would naturally pay no attention to their complaints. While I am quite ready to believe that the heads of the companies are scoundrels and that the police know very little about political matters of this kind, it seems a little far-fetched to say that the heads of companies would not support a genuine complaint. On the other hand Stopford says that his own agent has been paying 45/- a week for half a bed and no food. What I think upset Eddie more than anything was that some suggestion that the HDSE Seamen's Welfare section should intervene was put to the HDSE without prior consultation with himself, or without a further check-up by the police. In this I think he is right. I have suggested that before we go any further Eddie should ascertain from the police the exact number of Spaniards involved - I do not think that this will amount to more than a dozen - and then find out what they are in fact paying for their lodgings. If we press the Executive to take action and find that there are only 3 people involved we shall all look rather foolish.

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SOE have revived the scare about diamond smuggling from south and west Africa to Germany and wish to have further discussions with ourselves and SIS. Everybody is a bit sceptical about this business since certain people in SOE have a lively commercial interest. SIS have begun by asking for the evidence. If we get it we shall then have a better idea of where we are. I do not think we can do very much except to give assistance through our local representative.

called PIASECKI
Park of SOE rang up about a Pole/who is arriving from Stockholm. He is said to have been working as a courier between Warsaw and Berlin. He is regarded as somewhat fishy. He will be sent to the LRC for examination.

Frost came to talk to me about his job on the Radio Board. He is getting it kept open until the end of next week. His decision will apparently depend to some extent on the result of the conference of the RSC on the 14th.

September 4th

The D.G. sent for me and Harry about Harmer's suggested appointment to the I.B.(1) unit for France. He said that this was the first he had heard of it and I tried to explain that I had told him of it at any rate in general terms when we had had a meeting some months ago with Cowgill and Arnold-Foster, at which we agreed to do what we could for the S.I.(b) unit, bearing in mind that we now had a catalogue reference key 4/192 from the I.B. Staff. We

had provisionally arranged to let Cowgill have Day immediately. That appointment had gone through the official channels and a month before operations Harmer would be employed on D.A. work. Cowgill had made an attempt to get him earlier but we had sat on it. I quite understood that these appts. could not be made without his sanction or through official channels but there had to be some sort of discussion in a preliminary way on a lower level before official application was made. I had the greatest difficulty in getting this out in bits and pieces as the D.G. would not allow me to give him any connected story. I eventually said that all we were trying to do was to assist SIS where possible and to present the best team that we could for C.E. work on the Second Front. The D.G. seemed rather annoyed at giving Cowgill anyone the more so since he had just received an application from the Services for two MI5 officers for Ceylon and for one for India. He then discussed the question of Mair. I said that I was anxious if possible not to lose sight of him. I knew the tendency in the Army to hang on to a good man regardless of his special qualifications. We had thought that Mair owing to his knowledge of Italian was eminently suited to the Italian I.B. unit. Owing however to the fact that Hill-Dillon had been thoroughly impregnated by Vivian with the anti-MI5 complex about the Second Front Mair seemed to be stuck in North Africa. They had asked for him for a specific job for two months. I was not suggesting that we should ask for his recall. What I wanted was to enter a caveat so that if his special

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qualifications were required for Second Front operations he might be brought back at any moment. The D.G. finally decided that Mair should be allowed to take up the GSO3 job offered, Harry having assured him that the W.O. would get him back if his services were required.

I had a talk with TAR about Japanese espionage when Stage B. was reached. I thought that we should consider very carefully how far it would be possible to sell out network to the Japs in order to prevent them from building something up themselves. I had in mind the Jebson-Tricycle set-up. I found that TAR and Tommy Harris had been considering the possibilities of selling Garbo to the Russians at some convenient date. This I think might well be worth considering.

I have read Marriott's report on India, which is extremely good. We have also had a very appreciative letter from Pilditch, head of D.I.B. asking us for another officer of similar calibre in addition to Finney. There is no doubt that Marriott was an unqualified success.

September 6th

Air Commodore Chappel came to see me and say goodbye. He is going as Air Attache to Brazil. I gather that his duties are to be taken over by A/C. Buss, who at the beginning of the war was Director of Air Intelligence.

TAR tells me that Starkey is being taken rather seriously by the Germans. They have blocked Calais harbour with concrete ships and have laid extensive minefields outside Boulogne. They have also brought down 4-6 destroyers, two of which are said to be in Dunkirk harbour. There are a large number of fighter aircraft in France but so far it has been extremely difficult to get them up.

According to the Press, Stalin has received the Bishops of the Orthodox Church. The significance of this move may well be a desire on his part to take the wind out of the sails of the Catholic Church, whose adherents are extremely worried about the possibility of a Bolshevik invasion in Europe.

At the Press meeting today Tangye stated that Barker Benfield had held a press meeting at which he had explained the whole significance of Starkey. TAR knew that the press were being informed that Starkey was an exercise. He did not know however that they were going to be told that its main purpose was to draw the Luftwaffe. Tangye also knew about the negotiations with Badoglio and Carton de Wiert. The story in Fleet St is that we are going to attack Naples on Wednesday and that the Italians will sue for peace shortly afterwards.

The D G. held a further meeting on travel control at which the paper prepared by Milmo

was accepted for discussion with the H.O. We are opposed to the abolition of sections 18(1)-(5) until Stage B. We are however prepared to consider certain relaxations within the frame-work of the D.R.

Joe points out that the fact that the Germans have gone over to fighters as a first priority gives them a certain advantage in production figures. Normally it takes 8,000 man hours to make a fighter against 50,000 man hours to make a bomber.

I visited the American Gen Strong, head of G.2. who is over here for a short time. He is a man of, I should say, about 65, no fool but filled with a tremendous sense of his own importance and very slow of speech. I should say that if his stenographer could do 3 words a minute she would suit him admirably. I explained to him very briefly the organisation of the Security Service and this caused him to give me an account of the all-embracing functions and efficiency of G.2. It was G.2. who had been responsible for catching the 8 saboteurs in the USA. One of his officers had recognised a German whom he thought he had seen in Berlin many years ago. He informed the FBI and it turned out his hunch was right. This is the first time that I have heard this story. It may or may not be true, but it is certainly not the FBI's version. I then talked about Civil Security duties in the British Army. I explained that we had been carrying these duties here for the Army

and that for the Second Front we had now been asked to supply a certain number of officers, although we were primarily a civilian department. He said that he had always thought this rather a curious arrangement. In the USA G.2 were thoroughly equipped to deal with all civil security matters. The transition to field work therefore presented no difficulty. The fact is of course that they have no training in civil security duties and are a constant source of irritation to Mr. Hoover. This prompted me to ask him what the position of OSS was in the field. He made it quite clear that OSS could not operate in the field without the full concurrence of G.2. from whom all their directives would come. He thought that the corresponding unit to I.B.(1) would probably receive its secret intelligence from G.2. in London.

Gen. Strong then told me that he had seen the American Chief Civil Affairs Officer and found that he was relying on G.2. to supply him with a large number of officers to perform police duties. Gen. Strong had no intention of doing anything of the kind and said so, neither does he intend to co-operate with any de Gaullist organisations in the zones of the armies. I explained to him that we were expecting to put a GSO 1 with C.C.A.O. and also to supply other officers who would control districts under the CCAO's organisation. I pointed out however that all these officers would be under the I.B. staff of the Force Commander. Security matters as distinct from police matters were considered the business of the army. We then

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passed to questions of deception. I explained to Gen.Strong that we had a network of XX agents here, that we used them primarily for an insurance against penetration, and secondarily as a means of deception. We ran a committee which met weekly and consisted of officers of the 3 Services, Civil Defence and MI5/6. The traffic, which was based on information obtained on the spot either by the agent himself or by one of our officers, was approved by all concerned. Gen.Strong told me that deception needed very special qualifications - dramatic instinct and imaginative intuition - it was very rare that such qualifications could be found in one man. I knew of course what was coming and was not in the least surprised when it was made clear to me that the combination of these qualifications was to be found in the person of Gen.Strong alone, although he did say that he also consulted the naval authorities.

The meeting was very friendly throughout and ended by Gen.Strong saying that if his organisation could at any time be of assistance to us it was entirely at our disposal. I said that possibly we might have an officer either resident in or visiting the USA and that I hoped it would be possible for him to make contact with the General in Washington.

September 7th

At the directors' meeting today the DG. said that Furnival-Jones had returned from the CCAO course and he thought that it might be a good idea if he gave a talk to our second front officers.

Lennox gave us the Quebec decisions, which are roughly, to knock Italy out of the war, after which the second front takes priority. There is still however a possibility, if the Italian situation is satisfactory, that we may try and enter the Balkans through Durazzo. Seven divisions are to return in November in preparation for second front operations. Provisions are also being made for a possible but improbable early collapse of the Germans when it would be necessary to rush a force through to Berlin. Second priority comprises the opening of the Burma Rd. and attacks on Akiab and Rumree early next year, followed by attacks, on Rangoon, Sumatra and Singapore. Bombing of Germany is to remain first priority.

The Communists are preparing a second front demonstration for Winston's return. Steps are being taken to meet this situation.

Plans for an armistice with Italy have been approved by the Russians and a conference is to be held by American, British and Russian Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs in London in October.

Walter Bell came to see me. He tells me that Dick Ellis is on his way back. He does not think however that his views will be very helpful as he seems to be unable to look at the whole problem in an objective light. He is rather inclined to say that it has now been conclusively proved that Hoover never had any case against Security CoOrdination. Vivian seems to be rather on the upgrade and is producing a certain amount of order in American affairs. His whole policy however is governed by a rooted prejudice against any encroachment by the Security Service on American soil.

I attended a meeting at the H.O. with Sir John Moylan in the chair to discuss the section 18(1)-(5) on Travel Control. The H.O. appear anxious to get rid of some of these regulations at Stage A whereas we feel that they should be maintained at any rate until Stage B. I pointed out that it was difficult to consider these regulations independently since if travel control ceased to operate between this country and Eire we should merely be closing the front door and opening the back. We had good reason to think that the Japs were attempting to build up their espionage organisation and that they would probably make use of the remnants of any German organisation apart from the connections that they already had with Spanish organisations. There would moreover still be a Jap Legation in Eire.

As regards the entry of British subjects it
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was pointed out by Jim Hale that the Govt. would be made to look extremely silly in the eyes of the House if they had to say that all sorts of renegade British subjects returning from Germany and occupied territory arrived in this country without any sort of examination. This view I think had a considerable effect as indeed do all views which suggest criticism in the House of Commons.

As regards Eire there was a strenuous attempt to abolish 2(a)b which prohibits entry of a British subject from Eire. It was pointed out that this restriction could be avoided if people liked to come in via the continent when they would only be subjected to the restrictions under the Arrival From Enemy territory order. These restrictions did not amount to total prohibition but merely gave facilities for a detention of up to one month.

Milmo ably defended this para by pointing out that it would be impossible to deal with the large flow of traffic between this country and Eire unless there was a permit system. If there were no permit system there would be no suitable opportunity of ascertaining where a British subject had been prior to his arrival in Eire. This would mean that extensive interrogation would have to be carried out at ports with all the consequent delays. The position would very soon become untenable. Apart from this there were certain British subjects and of course Eire nationals

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of a highly undesirable kind who had been residing in Eire since the beginning of the war. It was essential to have powers to deal with them.

On the question of exit it was pointed out that conditions in Europe and elsewhere might be extremely disturbed between Stages A and B. and even after B. It would be a considerable embarrassment to us if British subjects could travel to allied territory and make trouble. They might also wish to travel to Palestine and there might be cases of disaffected persons wishing to proceed to neutral territory in order to agitate for an early peace with Japan. There might be many other cases of a similar kind where powers would be needed to prevent exit.

As regards para. (5) Milmo pointed out that some amendment would be necessary since we could not even now deal under the Arrival from Enemy Territory order with British subjects coming from Sicily. It was therefore necessary to make it clear that para 18 (3) of DR should apply to any territory which has been occupied by the enemy since the beginning of the war.

As regards exits, the argument was advanced by Hill of the H.O. that territories concerned should be held responsible for dealing with our nationals and that we should throw the onus of refusing entry on the foreign or colonial governments. It was pointed out that this depended very largely on the extent

to which they could control their frontiers. Access to Palestine was for example an easy matter. Equally zones occupied by the armies might not be very rigidly controlled.

On the whole our arguments appeared with some reluctance to be accepted though they may not all be embodied in the H.O. recommendations. We have however an opportunity of fighting them again in the last stage before their presentation to the Home Secretary.

Roger tells me that there was a note in SPRINGHALL's diary on a certain date which said "See Ann Gresson and Ray Milne." A look-up resulted in our seeing that we had vetted Ray Milne for SIS. There was nothing against her except I think some vague reference to the fact that at some ~~former~~ date she had been connected with Peace Pledge Union activities. She was the daughter of a Post Office official. She was interviewed by Roger and Felix Cowgill. She admitted that her friend Ann Gresson, who is of course a Party member, had introduced her to SPRINGHALL on one occasion. The latter had asked her what she was doing and she said that she was employed on highly confidential work in connection with the war. SPRINGHALL then said that if she saw anything that she thought would be of interest to the Party would she kindly let him know. She said that she would but with no intention of doing anything about it. In fact she had

been rather shocked by the proposal. She was still more shocked when she learned about SPRINGHALL's prosecution, but she did not say anything because she assumed that he was working for the Russians who were our allies. Had she thought that SPRINGHALL was working for the Germans or for anyone opposed to the interests of this country she would have mentioned the matter.

She admitted that she was a member of the Party herself and that she had a dual loyalty to this country and to Soviet Russia. I gather that she works in Section V and is right in the middle of ISOS and everything else. She is regarded as an extremely efficient and hardworking girl. The dilemma is to know whether to retain her services or whether to kick her out, when she may do serious harm.

Victor tells me that in the raid on Stuttgart only 33 out of the 350 Fortresses reached their target. 48 of them were brought down and 175 members of the crews were picked up in the drink. Fortress crews are extremely brave but their navigation is undoubtedly bad.

The Dö-Gerät scare has been intensified owing to references to it on ZIIS. It seems that the Germans intend to clear an area in the Baltic for experimental purposes and that when the rocket guns are established on the coast they will be surrounded by a smoke-screen to prevent them from being seen, and bombed.

Italy has surrendered unconditionally, the armistice having been signed as early as Sept. 3rd. The delay in announcing the armistice was agreed between ourselves and the Italians in order to give us an opportunity of getting a firm footing on the Italian mainland before the Germans had the chance to occupy the whole country. Badoglio has stated that he will resist any aggression other than by allied armies. The German wireless is filled with accusations of treachery and Bolshevik plots. It will be interesting to see whether the Germans try to occupy Rome or whether they only attempt to hold the line of the Po. I gather that in Harris's view the bombing of Germany from Italian airfields is not particularly favourable owing to the difficulty of getting accurate met. reports about the weather conditions over the Alps.

At the weekly meeting Hart again showed the kind of false information circulated by the Abwehr from Lisbon and Madrid which purports to come from this country. All of it is fantastic and totally inaccurate.

A report dated 5th Sept. was made by the S.D. in Rome to Berlin and stated that Badoglio had expressed the view that he would prefer a British landing to a German invasion. The Fuhrer gave the S.D. 6 hours to verify the information which he evidently regarded as of the highest importance.

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The British deserter William F. HEAP is to be trained by the Abwehr in Paris for some special mission.

TAR mentioned that Garbo had succeeded in bringing over another German Recce plane to Scapa.

I saw Duff at 5 o'clock with the D.G. He wished to discuss America. He was anxious that Mills should not return to Canada until the whole question had been settled. Stephenson is now coming over again ostensibly on a visit in company with Donovan. Clearly however he is afraid of what Denham is going to say when he reaches this country, and wants to be on the spot to deal with any counter-measures he thinks necessary. Duff is toying with the idea of putting Mills as our representative in Canada with the right to go to Washington where he would be under the auspices of the British Embassy. He rather takes the view however that this arrangement must be accepted by Stephenson. I warned him that Stephenson would probably make trouble about Mills because he is aware that Mills knows too much about BSC. I thought however that it would be a great mistake to give way to him on this point since Mills had undoubtedly made a great success of his mission both to the RCMP and to the FBI. I said that I thought it was essential to keep Mills out of the general wrangle over America. He agreed. The D.G. said that the arrangement with Mills

would be quite acceptable to him subject to anything Denham might have to say on his return.

September 9th

TAR tells me that Starkey has been a complete flop. He has been up at Fighter Command. Although the visibility was not particularly good the Germans must have seen our barges which went in to within 3 or 4 miles of the coast. We had 250 fighters in the air but not a single German plane showed up. Presumably they have orders not to take the air until we actually make a landing, or else they were already informed that the whole operation was a blind. This would not be surprising since the press were all given full details a few days ago.

I had a talk with Kemball Johnston and Blunt about the former's memo on the peace propaganda of neutral governments and missions. He had been prompted to write this owing to the case of SULZER. He thinks that the fact is not sufficiently appreciated in Government circles that from now onwards we must expect all neutral governments and their missions to be hot appeasers since although they wish for Germany's defeat they do not wish to see her annihilated, owing to their various financial and commercial assets in Germany. They are therefore likely to succumb to German propaganda about the Bolshevik bogey. Johnston does not think that we are

suitable equipped to meet this danger. He is in touch with a Left Wing Swedish Social Democratic journalist called Ava ANDERSEN, who he thinks would be willing to go to Sweden and take on a mission to find out precisely what the various trends of opinions are in Government and other circles. He offered this man to SIS some time ago but got little response. I have told him to make out a note about the case which I will take to C. My suggestion is that the man should be allowed to go, make no contact with SIS in Sweden, and report here on his return. We would then supply SIS with the information. I have also suggested to Kembal Johnston that he ~~sho~~ should have a talk with Loxley on the lines of his memo.

The Americans have landed at Naples and Teghorn. Our fleet is in Genoa. According to M.S.S. the Germans are marching on Rome. The Admiral of the Italian fleet has given orders that ships are not to be scuttled, but those at Taranto should proceed to Malta while those at Spezia are to put to sea. German submarines are out to intercept them.

I attended a meeting at the H.O. with Carew Robinson in the chair, to discuss D.R.s. The most important were 18B and 18B(a). As regards the former we pointed out that if it were abolished a certain number of known Germanspies would have to be released. This would be embarrassing, but we would not be prepared to advance this argument for the retention of the regulation. There was

another more important consideration, namely that if 18B were abolished the Home Secretary would have no power to deal with a British subject engaged in espionage on behalf of the Japanese. We thought therefore that Section 1 of 18B should be retained and amended to exclude "hostile origin or association". "recently concerned in acts prejudicial" should be retained. With some difficulty we got agreement that these suggestions should go forward. As regards 18b(a) we pointed out that we had some 20 people interned who had been brought back from Trinidad. A good many of them were Spaniards and it would be extremely undesirable for them to be at large between Stages A and B. Furthermore we anticipated that there might be an increase in this category of enemy gent. We expressed the view that it was essential that these people should be brought back to this country where their stories could be examined in the light of further information obtained. It came out during the discussion that the regulation originally came into force on humanitarian grounds, namely that it was undesirable to keep a white prisoner in a colonial prison and in an unhealthy climate. This argument would I think carry more weight than our own since if 18b(a) goes it necessitates the keeping of British subjects in prison in undesirable conditions.

Other less important regulations were considered with the Service Depts. present. A reluctance on the part of the A.O. to retain those regulations dealing with photography drew the retort from the Admiralty

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representative that their Lordships did not consider the war in the Far East a matter which should be pursued only during leisure hours on Saturday afternoons. This gave the H.O. quite a jolt.

I went after the meeting to see Duff Cooper and left with him the P.M.s report and the report on ZECH-NENTWICH.

I referred to our discussion yesterday about Mills and asked him whether he envisaged Stephenson remaining as M.I.5 representative in the Western Hemisphere. He said that he thought that this might be possible even if Mills had independent right of communication. He admitted however that a somewhat awkward situation would be created and Stephenson would probably object. I said that I thought the point was an important one, since Hoover could well understand that owing to the territorial divisions between ourselves and SI S we had been unable to place a permanent representative in the USA but he would not understand our appointing a representative who was not persona grata with himself.

Duff told me that the original offer of peace had originally come from the Italians and that it had been an offer of a complete turnover and active assistance to the allied armies. We had held out for unconditional surrender as a first step. Duff cannot explain precisely why we had let the Italians down by giving away the fact that the armistice had been signed on Sept. 3rd.

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September 10th

The D.G., Brooke-Booth and I had lunch with the Belgian Gen. Ganshof and Lepage. Gen. Ganshof found himself on the 25th June 1940 at Bordeaux. He had previously been responsible for the arrest and internment of all Belgian Quislings on May 12th 1940. He had heard that his subordinates in Belgium were going to be held responsible for his actions by the German authorities. He therefore considered it his duty to return to Brussels. Nobody paid any attention to him for a week or so but ultimately he was visited by the Gestapo and taken to prison. He remained some weeks without being interrogated at all. When questioned he took the attitude that he had merely acted in accordance with his duty. After a period of internment of some 7 months he was released but kept under very close observation. Through contacts in the Post Office he knew that his telephone conversations were being intercepted. Agents Provocateurs asking for assistance of one kind or another were constantly being sent to him by the Gestapo but he knew how to deal with them. Meanwhile he was actively concerned in building up Belgian resistance movements. He was arrested again in 1942 and kept in prison for some months. The Germans really had nothing concrete against him but were merely suspicious. In May 1943 a parachutist who was carrying important despatches crashed on landing. In

consequence Lepage sent him a warning. He was got out of Belgium with the assistance of SIS about 2 months ago, having previously been released by the Germans. He probably knows more about Belgian resistance movements than anybody in the country. He makes an extremely good impression and I believe is by far the most outstanding personality in the Belgian Govt. here. He is ostensibly head of the Dept. of Military Justice but carries far more weight than his office would imply. I told him roughly what the set up of an I.B. staff on the Second Front was likely to be. It seemed to me that the I.B.2 officer should have the closest liaison with the General who could obviously give him more guidance than anyone else. Gen. Ganshof had been responsible in May 1940 for the arrest of FANTO who was later closely associated with Gen. von Falkenhausen. He knew of FANTO's presence in this country and obviously felt somewhat apprehensive. He said he would be pleased to give us all the detailed information that we might require. During the conversation Lepage mentioned that he had a highly important Argentine agent who had the confidence of the German S.S. in Madrid. This agent had paid visits both to La Linea and Algeciras. He had mentioned this fact to Col. Dansey and offered to make use of the agent in any sense that might be advantageous to SIS. He had had no response. I said that we should be extremely interested to know about this man and the ground that he covered since we were very anxious about sabotage activities in

Gib. It might be that he could help us. Lepage said that if we would send an officer down he would be very pleased to give us the fullest details. This seems to me a typical case where Dansey in his general distrust of the Belgians has turned down an offer which he should either have accepted himself or at least passed on to Section V.

I had a meeting with Frost and Dick to go into the question of signals security which is to come up at the meeting of the RSC on Tuesday. There is first of all the question of the security of communications by non-service organisations in this country. It is agreed that we should have a representative on the Reid Committee and the JIC seem to think that we should be responsible for bringing to the notice of the Reid Committee breaches of security by non-service organisations. On the other hand Vivian takes the view that we could only call upon the services of RSS to monitor these communications provided they have the discretion to decide when they can spare their equipment and time from the demands of their normal work. Vivian seems to think that RSS is an SIS organisation and is apparently unaware of the fact that they were originally set up for the purpose of detecting illicit wireless communications from this country and as the technical tool of SIS and ourselves. We therefore have a perfect right to make demands upon their services. If they cannot fulfil these demands it is for them to show cause to the Chairman of the RSC. Frost takes the view that his own personnel could

do most of the monitoring required and that the rest of the problem could be solved by close personal relations with the non-service organisations concerned. We have to some extent been carrying this work in the past but we have never really had a charter. The other question to be decided is the security of the communications of allied Govts. This can be divided into 3 parts: allied forces, allied diplomatic and allied secret service. Vivian takes up a rather non possumus attitude on this question by saying that monitoring of the services of allied forces can easily be evaded by the transfer of the traffic to diplomatic channels. If this possibility exists, and obviously it does, we should monitor the diplomatic channels. All we are really asking is a clear statement of the facts. The services are supposed to be responsible for the security of the signals of allied services. What in fact are they doing about it? The Secret Service communications of allied Govts. are supposed to be the responsibility of SIS. Have they the cyphers? Do they know the contents of messages? If the cyphers are insecure what steps have been taken to warn the governments concerned? Do SIS ever take it upon themselves to refuse to send certain communications? If so is it open to government concerned to have them sent either through military or diplomatic channels? Our sole locus standi in this matter is that when a leak occurs we may well be looking all over the country for a body whereas in fact the information is going out over the air.

September 11th

Wells has raised the question of putting something in the monthly H.O. police report on the subject of Bunbury. He is reluctant to do this because he feels it wrong that the H.O. should mislead the police in an official document. I pointed out to him that we had faced up to this question long ago and made up our minds that in spite of the difficulties the question of the possible leakage of the truth had to be the first consideration. I discussed this matter with TAR and Victor. We eventually decided that provided Hughes did not think that the Suffolk police would be astonished not to read of the incident in the bulletin we should keep it out, and give a directive to RSLOs to the effect that they should, if asked, explain to CC.s that the item had not been put in owing to the inconclusive nature of the investigation. Wells said that the Executive did not always put cases into the Bulletin and that they could therefore defend themselves in this particular case. He also said that the Bulletin was generally read by the Head Clerk who took an intelligent interest in a matter of this sort and would almost certainly bring it to the notice of the C.C. Hughes telephoned later to say that he did not think that the omission of the Bunbury item in the Bulletin would cause comment from the local police. It was therefore agreed that with the D.G.s approval this line should be adopted and RSLOs if approached should say that the case had been omitted owing to its inconclusive nature.

Caulfeild, Brooke-Booth, Dick and I discussed the case of Haldane Porter. Caulfeild and Brooke-Booth think that he really ought to remain attached to the Yugo-slav missions in the Mid East and that he could be of more use in SIME than in ISLD. It was decided to ascertain first of all what relations ISLD had with the Yugo-slavs and what plans they were making for Second Front activities in the Balkans. We would then consider all the pros and cons and telegraph to H-P for his views. It might be that having visited Istanbul with Milicevic and having got accustomed to the climate his ideas about staying in Egypt might have changed. The D.G. does not intend to press him to stay in Mid East if he does not want to do so. If he comes back here he will be yet another who complains that they have not got enough to do. Even the D G. himself seems to be rather at a loose end.

Victor came in to tell me about a Czech called BLACEK who arrived here some 3 weeks ago. The first we heard of him was that a report was received that the Americans had arrested him at an aerodrome near Colchester. It seemed that BLACEK had strolled on to the aerodrome and asked whether he could be taken for a flip. He made a short flight with an American crew, and even handled the control. Later when the machine was being revved up, one of the crew got hold of a rubber reserve petrol feed pipe which when pulled down showed a large cut. Everybody's mind turned at once to the Czech, who had by then of course disappeared. He returned however some days

later and asked for another flip. The Americans thereupon arrested him. When interrogated he said that until a short time ago he had been serving in the German Air Force and he had joined the Luftwaffe in 1939. and had always had the intention of flying one of their planes to this country. He eventually found himself on the Russian Front. The pilot of a trainer plane in which he was flying had lost his way. BLACEK took this opportunity of directing him to Turkey where eventually the plane had to land. The occupants were interned but BLACEK succeeded in getting an interview with the British Air Attache. In this way he was finally shipped from Smyrna to Mid East and enlisted in the Czech forces. He arrived here as a Czech soldier and of course in this way evaded examination at the LRC. B.5 are investigating his case.

Tricycle is endeavouring to extract a bonus of \$2,000 from the Germans as a fee for bringing their wireless set with him.

September 13th

I had a meeting with the D.G., Frost and Dick to prepare for the meeting of the R.S.C. tomorrow. The D.G. is more or less agreed with the line we are adopting. Afterwards a meeting was held to review our decisions up to date on D.R.s. It was agreed to put forward to the H.O. our arguments for the retention of travel control as put forward at the meeting at the H.O. We would act in a similar manner as regards 18B and 18B(a).

It was felt that if we did not go on record our arguments might be rather badly presented to the senior officials of the H.O. who will have to make a decision on the policy to be adopted.

Maunsell is arriving on the 16th, also Denham.

Peter Reid brought Commodore Holland, head of Admiralty Signals, to see me. Holland wished to state that he attached considerable importance to the security of allied signals. I explained to him the position as far as I knew it and said that I hoped that we should get some clarification at tomorrow's meeting.

I dined with Ned and Peter. Peter was quite interesting about the new glider bomb. He says that research so far does not indicate that this new weapon is a particularly menacing one. It is not worked through any wire attachment. It is controlled from the aircraft but must be kept under visual observation through a sight. This has been fairly clearly demonstrated by the fact that it is not always accurate, sometimes falling short and sometimes going over the target. It could not be used at night like the apparatus with which we are at present experimenting.

September 14th

News today from the Naples front is not too good. We are having a particularly tough time. Attempts are being made to put in fresh forces. The possibility is envisaged that we might have to withdraw from the Salerno front. Forces from the south are pushing on but are still 130 miles from Naples.

At the directors' meeting today Hale raised the question of our sponsoring S.O.E. cases for internment. It was agreed that we should only take up the ~~judgels~~ judgments on behalf of SOE with the H.O. if general security was involved. If the case was merely one of discipline within SOE it was a matter for them to deal with the H.O. direct. They have in the past been inclined to get people interned merely because they were disgruntled and if released might talk about SOE's work and organisation. In case s of this sort they should put their own cases to the H.O.

Pilditch of D.I.B. came to see me. I told him as much as I could about our work. His real purpose was to see whether if possible we could not give him two more officers. He says that at present he only has two people, Jenkins and Finney, who are well acquainted with our type of work. Since the XX network extends all over India it is necessary to have someone who is constantly moving about. This throws too great a burden on the officer left behind. I said that at the moment we

were in rather a difficult position. We had accepted certain commitments to supply officers to the I.B. staff. We do not yet know quite the extent of these commitments. We had been told that we might have to supply as many as 15 officers. If this were the case we should be extremely hard put to it to find bodies. If we sent someone to India we should want to send a really efficient and well-trained officer, and at the moment I could not see quite where he was coming from. I promised to keep the matter in mind. Pilditch seemed to think that the situation was fairly well under control in India in spite of many opportunities offered both to the Germans and Japs to cash in on the general unrest. All the Jap spies had been caught but I think only in one or two cases have the transmitters been used. In one instance they had heard that the Japs were anxious to check up on the reliability of two Bengalis, who had offered their services. They had entrusted one of the parachute parties with this mission. The set on this occasion was used as a blown set, i.e. the call sign or transmission indicated in accordance with a pre-arranged plan that the agent was under control. With this set they replied to the Jap enquiry that the two Bengalis were splendid fellows and should be regarded as absolutely trustworthy. The natural inference of course would be that they were British agents and it is hoped that they have been dealt with accordingly. The only really successful case is the Silver case, but D.I.B. realise that it may not last for ever. He is therefore anxious to establish

other lines if possible.

I attended the meeting of the R.S.C. this afternoon. The following points emerged. Allied secret service communications are controlled by "C" except in the case of the Poles. Polish wave-lengths and call signs are known to "C" but he does not know anything about the contents of the messages. He is not anxious however about their security since he argues that if anything was going wrong there would almost certainly have been some repercussion on other services. This may or may not be so. It was agreed that the security of the signals of allied services were a matter for the British service. These signals were closely supervised by the Navy and Air Force since naval and air force units were integrated with the British. In the case of the armies however there was no internal or external supervision. It was hoped however that as soon as the British Army put its own signals security in order it would be able to pay attention to that of the allied armies.

As regards the diplomatic communications of the allies there appears to be no real supervision. It was felt that to monitor and break these communications would impose too great a task on GC & CS, who were already over-burdened with operational work. It was agreed that we should have a permanent representative on the Reid Committee, that

we should continue to look after the security of non-service bodies, but that the results of the monitoring of the communications of non-service Govt. Depts. should be sent by RSS to the Reid Committee and not to ourselves. Frost attached a good deal of importance to it being sent to ourselves. Personally I do not think that it matters. As regards companies, any monitoring in these cases would be reported to us and brought by us to the notice of the Reid Committee. We should also bring to the notice of the Reid Committee any further breaches of security by civilian Govt. dpts.

Victor lunched with Carton de Wiert. He was imprisoned in some castle by the Italians, together with Generals O'Connor and Neame. All three attempted to escape. With knives which they managed to purloin from their meals the dug a hole 12 ft. deep and then burrowed their way out of the castle grounds. While doing this they kept fit by climbing the stairs of the castle to the tune of 2,000 steps daily. They had saved up a large amount of food which they carried with them each pack weighing about 40 lbs. They went over the Appenines and reached the valley of the Po before they were caught. They were challenged twice previously but managed to get a way with it.

In August Carton de Wiert was told that his presence was required in Rome. He had no idea of the reasons, all news having been kept away from the prisoners. On arrival he was told that his services might be required

innconnection with certain negotiations regarding Rome being declared an open city. He accordingly agreed to do what he could. He was extremely well treated, getting large meals with champagne and red wine. It was impressed upon him that the mission would be a secret one and that he would therefore have to change into civilian clothes. A sailor was summoned and the clothes were ready within 24 hours. He left by plane for Lisbon with Gen. Castellano. He was told on the way by the General the real nature of his mission, which was in connection with peace proposals. While on the plane Castellano nudged him and pointed out the presence of a curious passenger who was apparently travelling for personal reasons. This was Grandi, with his beard shaved off, was on his way to Lisbon. On arrival in Lisbon Carton de Wiert was given permission to approach the British Embassy. They were astonished and pleased to see him and learn of the Castellano mission as another Italian general who had already been in Lisbon and had been given peace terms had apparently not yet arrived in Rome. For some reason this emissary, carrying the armistice terms and a wireless set, had thought fit to return to Italy via Germany. There does not appear to have been any sinister motive in this rather stupid move, and he did eventually reach Rome safely. The British Embassy were pleased to see Castellano since they wished to make certain alterations in the terms. These were handed to Castellano who was sent back via Gib. direct to Eisenhower in Sicily. de Wiert was allowed to proceed to England.

TAR tells me that Tricycle has arrived. There seems to be a tacit understanding between him and Johnnie Jebson, though nothing has been said in positive terms. He has brought a wireless set, £2,500 and \$2,000, in 3 Yugoslav diplomatic bags. We shall have a full report before long.

September 15th

I saw ZECH-NENTWICH with Dick at last night. I am absolutely convinced of the man's sincerity but he is undoubtedly fanatical in his outlook. introduced us as Col. Elphinstone and Capt. Mallaby-Deely. After we had got over this the meeting became quite informal and ZECH, otherwise NANSEN, gradually got into his stride. It became quite clear to me how the accumulative effect of the Nazi regime in Poland brought him to breaking point. He was horrified by the atrocities, the drunkenness and the general behaviour of the Germans. Having offered his life for his country and having been wounded in a dozen places he began to wonder what he had been fighting for. His natural instincts led him to correct injustices wherever it was within his power. This soon became known and attracted others to come to him with their troubles. Gradually he became more and more a focal point and more and more sympathetic with the local inhabitants. His conduct could not escape the notice of others, particularly the Gestapo who began to wonder why he received so many friendly greetings from Polish citizens in the street. Gradually

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he came to the point where he decided to give active assistance to the Polish resistance movement in spite of the fact that he regarded most of those concerned as highly indiscreet and some of them as not altogether disinterested from a personal point of view in connection with large sums of money they were obviously receiving from abroad. As soon as they got the funds, the tendency was to get drunk and talk about their activities. Although he liked women, he made up his mind to keep out of all love-affairs with women many of whom he admired for the part they were playing. He gave a graphic description of the incident when he was wounded on the Russian front. He lay out in No Man's Land 3 nights and 2 days and was in fact turned over by a Russian patrol and left for dead. He was finally picked up by a tank during a German counter-attack. A number of dead were placed on top the tank and he was placed on top of them. The tank then turned round and made for the German lines. Shortly afterwards it received a direct hit. He was blown into the air and wounded again. When being removed from the dressing station he had ceased to feel anything from the waist downwards. He had the impression that his legs were being left behind and said so. He was only reassured that his legs were still part of his body when his coat was pulled up and he was allowed to look at them. He showed us his wounds at special request. He had one on his forehead, one in his neck, 5 or 6 on his back, one on his hip and the

remainder on his legs. It seems almost a miracle that he could have survived for 3 night and 2 days lying on the ground during a Russian winter. He does not think a great deal of the Russian infantryman but has tremendous admiration for the Russian tank, which apparently has double armour, with a space between the outer and inner shell. A direct hit does not therefore usually incapacitate a tank. Even if the chains are damaged they can be removed and the tank can be operated on its wheels. The Russians have enormous numbers of guns which are fired by some radio-location apparatus with great accuracy. The location of enemy guns appears to be detected both by sound and by flash.

Zech talked a certain amount of Himmler. He regards him as a sadist and slightly mad. He is not intelligent and can easily be bowled out in argument but he has a great deal of peasant cunning. His father was the principal of some school and he himself received a very good education. ZECH has heard him talk about the English and their colonial policy. He paints the English as people who walk about cracking whips and referred to an incident in India where it was alleged that an Indian had struck a British subject. All local inhabitants had apparently been made to crawl on their hands and knees through the village. These incidents are held up to the Germans as something to be learned from the British as the correct method for the Herren-volk to treat an insubordinate nation.

ZECH said that he hoped that we would not think that he was merely concerned with giving us amusing and interesting details regarding his experiences. His mind was running on much bigger things. He had gone through an appalling time, both physically and mentally. He had taken the decision to act as he had and hoped that we would make the best possible use of him. He said that most people in Germany deplored the atrocities but that very few of them were prepared to do anything. He referred to his circle of friends at home some of whom listened to the British wireless and longed for the overthrow of the Nazis, but always said "Well, we must wait and see what happens. One day it will all come to an end". He was convinced however that if we treated Germany too leniently all those people and also the army would make preparation for a war of revenge. The whole country needed re-educating from top to bottom, otherwise the glorification of war and prowess on the battlefield would once more recreate a German Army or movements which would be as bad as that which had been experienced during the last ten years.

I was surprised to hear him say this, as it had not been clear to me from the report that in spite of his reverence for the honour of an officer and the decent feelings of most officers in the Wehrmacht they were in fact just as great a menace as the Nazis. ZECH himself is only 27 but he sees all this quite clearly, and is ready to do anything within his power to put it right. I am quite

convinced that some use ought to be made of his services. He himself I think envisages the possibility of being able to get into touch with his former colleagues in the Waffen S.S. and to assist us in the final stages of the war when we occupy Germany. He thinks the struggle will be very bitter and views with considerable apprehension the organisation of the whole country in Gaus, for the purpose of civil defence. He thinks that when that stage is reached he should be close at hand to advise on all the various personalities connected with the Party and the Army. He would be able to distinguish between those who should go and those who have certain remnants of decent feeling on which it would be possible to work.

ZECH was extremely impressed by the treatment he had received from Sutton-Pratt, our M.A. in Stockholm. It took him some time to get accustomed to the fact that a lieutenant in the Germany Army could speak on equal terms and frankly to an officer of the rank of Lt. Col. This was something which he had never experienced.

A meeting was held at Kinnaird House today to discuss with SOE the case of INGRAO. This character who had been brought over from the USA had gone bad on SOE and was proposing to publish details about their organisation and also about certain of our spies whom he had probably heard about at Brixton. The real fact is that the case was badly handled by SOE in the first instance. No blame attaches to us who were called in at a later

stage. Senter raised the question of internment of both men and women when it was desired to keep them incommunicado. This question is to be pursued independently by SEE and the A.O.

I had a talk with Duff about ZECH-NENTWICH. He felt that if possible some use ought to be made of him. I told him that I was going on leave, but that I could come back if necessary for the American wrangle. Bill Stephenson arrived at Prestwick this morning. He is well ahead of Denham and having got his views will doubtless be taking the necessary counter-action before his arrival. I have got out a note for the D.G. on what I think should be our objective at the next conference. We should aim at getting Mills established in Canada with the right to visit Washington whenever he wishes under the auspices of the British Embassy.

Maunsell is finding difficulty in getting a passage but hopes to be here before long.

The news is not frightfully good but not as bad as it might be. We have a good bridge-head immediately south of Salerno. Our right has however gone back almost to the beaches. The German are said to have driven a wedge between ourselves and the Americans which runs right down to the coast. The Americans are back on the beaches. We have succeeded in landing a certain number of reinforcements. Meanwhile Monty is pounding up the boot of Italy and is about 65 miles from Salerno. If we can hold out for the next 3 days we shall

be all right.

Dixon came in to talk about the Second Front. His interview with Hoyer-Miller of G.S.I.B 21st Army Group was not very satisfactory. H-M evidently had no idea how sections 1, 2 and 3 were going to work. His view seemed to be that everyone would collaborate. The point to be decided however is who does counter-espionage. The original charter indicates that this is done by the S.I(B) unit, whereas D.D.M.I.(O) in his charter, which is of more recent date, puts down counter-espionage and counter-sabotage under I.B.(3). This is of course where it should be, the position being analagous to that in this country. S.I.S. provide is with the information and we on all the facts presented take the action. The I.B.(1) unit should supply this information to the I.B.(3) unit who would use as its executive arm the F.S.P. located in I.B.(2).

September 27th

Returned from leave at 2 o'clock today with a shocking cold contracted on the last day. I gather that the D.G. was expecting me to return on Sunday night and was rather worried that I was not available for consultation today before the meeting with Duff Cooper and C. on the question of America. Butler has shown me the decisions which are the outcome of this meeting. They are as follows:

1. In future there will be no special representative of M.I.5 in Washington.
2. Mr. Denham will complete his tour in the Caribbean and then return and report.
3. Mr. Mills will return to Canada on special MI5 work.
4. M.I.5's relations with FBI will in future be restricted to communications through Mr. Thurston and, possibly, to special visits as in the past. Such visits will only take place with the knowledge and agreement of B.S.C.

Butler went over again to see Duff this afternoon in order to get the correct interpretation of para 1 which seems somewhat ambiguous. Duff however assured Butler that it meant our representation by Security-Co)Ordination had ceased. As regards the last para he said that he had complied with the D.G.'s wish that it should not be stated that we could only visit the FBI with Stephenson's knowledge and approval, and had substituted the word "agreement". If Stephenson did not agree, Duff would want to know exactly why. He thought it better to leave the wording as it was as he anticipated that C. would have considerable difficulty with Stephenson. Personally I think it is a pity to have resolutions which are ambiguously worded and are open to the most convenient interpretation by either party which has to work on them. As they stand Stephenson may well claim that he is still our representative in New York. Some colour will be given to this by the statement that we cannot visit the FBI without his knowledge and agreement.

While I have been away Denham has seen Duff and C. C. I think was somewhat shaken when Denham showed him a copy of his first letter to the D.G. in which he spoke of Viv. in glowing terms. C. also admitted that when he came to the second meeting under Duff's chairmanship he had not read the resolutions of the first meeting whereby it had been made perfectly clear that we were to establish some sort of separate representation in the USA. Meanwhile I gather Duff has spoken to Cadogan who is very surprised to hear that Stephenson had not been sacked 8 months ago. He said that he knew nothing about his high political reports. Even if they existed at all, Cadogan does not appear to attach much importance to them. It would be interesting to know who does.

Stopford came to talk to me about the suggestion that he should go with Alacrity. He clearly does not want to go and I gather from Dr. Page that his health is not particularly good. He seems to be in a somewhat nervous state apart from other ailments but there is nothing really serious which would prevent his going. The question to my mind is whether he can perform any useful function which could not be performed by any of the existing staff. I am told that he is to go in a purely advisory capacity. When the expedition was first mooted he was to proceed to Ponta in order to make all the necessary arrangements for the co-operation of the Portuguese authorities. Under present arrangements this is apparently to be handled by Paul Mathews and the diplomatic representation. Although he has instruc-

tions to assist the Force Commander, is not under his orders. He is a civilian attached to the consul. When the nature of the expedition was changed it was decided that we should train Maj. Dartford to do the job which would have been done by Stopford. A further change necessitated the training of an Air Force officer, Lt. Istead. Harry Allen said that if this officer was not satisfactory we would say so. He has in fact said so, and after a fortnight's delay we have been asked at the 11th hour to send Stopford. Benady who is in charge of Air Force security on the expedition says that he does not know what he is going to do. The Force Commander I gather is only going on the advice of Air Commodore Buss who thinks on principle that there should be an officer of the Security Service on the spot. The D.G. has said that Stopford is to go. I have spoken to Harry Allan who cannot enlighten me much and does not seem to be prepared to take any action. I have however suggested that we should try and get Stopford's charter defined, though by whom I really do not know since none of the Air Force seem to know what is required.

September 28th

Speir told me that the W.O. and Air Ministry were now taking the view that Stopford was taking part in Alacrity purely because we wanted him to go. Speir explained that this was very far from the case. He in fact felt that under existing conditions there was not very much that he could do. It is very

difficult to get at the truth. Eventually however I spoke to Air/Commodore Buss, now D. of I. He said that he had just spoken to the Force Commander and that quite definitely they wanted Stopford to go with the expedition. They did not think there was anybody really qualified to deal with security matters. I said that I thought Stopford's usefulness lay rather in his powers as a negotiator with the Portuguese authorities. He spoke the language and already had experience of the Portuguese police. Once he had obtained their full co-operation, the ordinary prophylactic security measures could be dealt with by any common-sense person. I saw Stopford and broke the news to him. I said that I thought that as we now had a definite request from Buss and the Force Commander we had to send somebody. We could not call upon Dartford as he belonged to M.I. and the expedition was no longer a military one but an Air Force one.

The D.G. had considered the matter before going on leave and according to Harry had decided that Stopford should go. I do not feel therefore that I can intervene unless special circumstances arose. I arranged for Stopford to see Buss and the Force Commander.

Mills has gone back to Canada. I have given him a letter to Commissioner Wood more or less explaining his position.

I had a talk with Maunsell who is gradually working his way through the office. I think he is impressed by what he has seen.

He is I think a little worried about Harry Allan's visit to Mid East. Harry is being sent out by the Chiefs of Staff to make recommendations about the distribution of non-operational intelligence. Maunsell had quite a lot to say about his difficulties with SIS. On the whole things are working fairly well, due almost entirely to the fact that Maunsell and Bowlby have more or less signed an agreement not to fall out whatever the state of affairs may be in London.

One of the bones of contention is that Maunsell is penetrating the Balkans. There is apparently very great anxiety about this. Maunsell has had a talk with Cowgill which has left him in some doubt as to whether Cowgill's fears have been allayed. The position in Mid East is exactly the same as the position here on the Second Front. Maunsell is anxious to have a talk with Dixon who I gather has progressed considerably since I was away on leave. I expect I shall be seeing more of Maunsell. It is difficult to form an opinion of him at the moment, although I should think that he certainly had the power of putting things across.

September 29th

Penetration of the Services by the C. P. is becoming rather serious. Ray Milne has been sacked from SIS and it has now been discovered that she has a man friend in SOE in the Balkan section who is also a member of the middle class communist group. He has admitted first

that May Milne told him she was indexing all the members of the German I.S.S and secondly that having been approached by SPRINGHALL he told the latter about the organisation of SOE and about the attitude of the British Govt. towards various irregular forces in Yugoslavia. He will probably be prosecuted and tried by courtmartial. There is another case of an officer who has given information to the Russians through SPRINGHALL and has in fact been in touch with the Russians himself. This is under investigation.

At the Wednesday meeting Hart mentioned that ISOS showed the preparation of 3 agents. One is described as an English agent destined for England and Canada. He is to travel as the representative of a Spanish business firm created for the purpose. The second is an Argentine, Ernesto HOPPE, who is to go to S.America to work for the Wirtshcraft. He will be taken off at Gib. when his ship calls there en route. Lisbon states that a Belgian, who Hart thinks is probably MAMPEY, is to come to this country as an agent under cover of joining the Forces.

Milmo mentioned the case. This man landed in a small boat in a remote bay in Iceland. The Americans took him to their hearts and treated him as an honoured guest, and made us promise to treat him in the same way when he came to England. The man is obviously a spy and is now at the LRC though it is intended that he shall go on to O20.

We shall however have to square this with our promise to the Americans to treat him as a

friend.

Hart mentioned that Thurston had shown him a report the latter had received from the FBI in Brazil about the arrival of a German agent with a negro operator in a small boat called the "Santa Barbara". Hart said that from his sources it was known that the Germans were preparing expeditions of this kind under the code name "Mercator". Mercator I had already taken place, and this was Mercator II. Le Havre was the originating point. The agent is being turned round by the F.B.I. who have, in order not to blow the case, allowed the "Santa Barbara" to return to Europe. Hart thinks this was a pity and that more value would have been obtained by retaining the boat and crew, one of whom was LANGHORST who could have given us a great deal of information, and the skipper Bill NISSEN, already known to us as involved in similar previous cases. We have handed Thurston an appreciation of the report and a questionnaire dealing with points which affect us.

Bavin of Security Co-Ordination came to see me. I think the real purpose of his visit was to explain to me about his dismissal from the RCMP. He took over intelligence from Rivett-Carnac and had a row with Asst. Commissioner Tate as a result of which he was sacked by Wood. He did not go into any details. He said however that he had since made it up with Wood and that their relations were satisfactory. I said that we had a great admiration for Wood and the R.C.M.P. and I thought it was a pity that

in approaching the question of Port Security BSC had rather allied themselves with the naval, military and air force chiefs. It would I thought have been quite possible to get the commissioner to do all that was required if he had been approached in a rather different way. There was no doubt in my mind that Stephenson has been once more playing an extremely cunning game. He realised that as Denham was returning to this country his presence here was desirable, to act as counter-weight and give them the necessary start. He therefore arranged to arrive here shortly before Denham, bringing with him both Stone and Bavin. Stone of External Affairs was the person who wrote the testimonial for Stephenson in which it was mentioned how good his relations were with the RCMP. Since his arrival here he has taken the trouble to insinuate to Duff that Mills is not really persona grata in Canada. Similar insinuations have been made by Bavin who has been one of the causes of complaint by Commissioner Wood against BSC. Stephenson I know does not want Mills in the western hemisphere, firstly because he thinks he may encroach on his preserves and secondly because he knows that Mills is fully conscious of all the difficulties of BSC. When he was here last Stephenson suggested to me that it would be better not to send Mills back as he would be tarred with Denham's brush. I endeavoured to pin him down on this by saying "What exactly do you mean? Have you got anything against Mills?" Stephenson was rather embarrassed by

this question and assured me that he had nothing against Mills. It was merely a question of being tarred with Denham's brush though precisely what was meant I could not discover.

Dick Butler and I went over to see Duff about the resolutions of the last meeting at Kinnaird House on the subject of America. We showed him the draft of the letter intended for Hoover which we thought should be signed by the D.G. He agreed with the draft subject to the omission of the para. about Denham visiting Hoover. He agreed with us that there would be bound to be a certain amount of off the record talk which would only stir up the mud. Duff also cut out one para. about regular visits by Mills. to "Washington" which he thought might upset C. who would almost certainly see it sooner or later. Duff's whole idea seems to be to have a somewhat weak and vague compromise by which we shall be able to carry on a fairly satisfactory liaison with the FBI. Personally I feel this is a mistake and that we have been wrong to pander so much to Stephenson's susceptibilities. Duff's position however is a difficult one since he has no real authority over "C". He is merely a negotiator and therefore has to work for the best compromise.

I mentioned the question of Denham going back to the Caribbean. It seemed to me that the principle object of his visit had been to see how far intelligence in the Caribbean Catalogue Reference KV/4/192th the MI5 organisation

which it had been proposed should be set up in Washington. Since we were now to have no representative the *raison d'être* for further exploratory visits seemed to fall to the ground. He said that he had seen Denham in the morning and that as he understood it there was work to be done there on behalf of the C.O. and also Denham had ideas about working for Stephenson in Mexico. We said that whatever the final decision was we thought that it should be definitely laid down before Denham departed exactly what he was going to do and to what body he was responsible for his various actions. Otherwise there was likely to be a good deal of trouble and confusion. It seemed to us fairly clear that Denham wanted to get a job of some sort in the western hemisphere. He could then combine his official work with keeping his business interests warm.

Duff mentioned that the JIC were preparing a paper in which they express the view that the war in Europe would be over within the next three months. I said I felt this view was a bit sanguine, although a sudden collapse was always a possibility.

Sefton Delmar is very impressed with ZECH. He is going to put him on the air for a series of talks alleged to be coming from some foreign country. He will speak to the German Army and open with the words: "Here speaks the German officer".

September 30th

A scheme has been put forward by Byron of the ISSB advocating that all communications should be severed for 3 days before OVERLORD. The purpose is to prevent leakage of information after the troops have been told about their objective. Apart from the impracticability of the scheme it obviously pinpoints the whole operation. We have now been asked to put forward our views as to how security can best be obtained, Byron's scheme having been turned down by the Chiefs of Staff. The matter will need very careful consideration. Personally I think we should rely very largely on our powers of deception. If plans are carefully made anything that we say should cause casual leakage to be discounted. One thing is certain, namely that the concentration of barges and other preparations cannot possibly be concealed from the enemy.

Thurston and Gimperman came to see me in order to find out what the final settlement had been with regard to our representation in the USA. I said that we had drafted a letter for the D.G.'s signature to Mr. Hoover and until he had approved and despatched it I could not say very much, since it was obviously improper to divulge to him the contents of a letter which my chief was sending to his. I would however show him a copy off the record as soon as I got the final draft from the D.G. who was away on leave. I told him that Mills was returning to Canada and that I hoped the FBI would be able to make as much use of him as

they had before. I said that our main channel of communication would remain through himself and that we hoped to make periodical visits. We should have no representation in the USA. We all regretted this but for reasons which I was not at liberty to state it had been found impossible to accede to our wishes. The present arrangement was a compromise which I hoped would work well. Thurston then asked me whether he could have copies of the photographs in Gwyer's Who's Who for the FBI records. I said that I would look into this. In so far as our own information was concerned he might have everything. I should however have to see how far SIS records were involved. I said that this also applied to the question of cover addresses in Lisbon about which I understood there had been a certain amount of discussion. He said he quite understood our position.

I had a long talk with Herbert about vetting which I am sure is an extremely important aspect of the work performed by this office. We are not judged by anything that is done in B. Division. It is only on the irritation that we cause to the public or outside depts. that our efficiency is assessed. It is therefore extremely important that these matters should be dealt with promptly and intelligently. Vetting has perhaps got us into more trouble than any other duties we perform. First of all we have to consider the difficulties which beset us at the outbreak of war. The only people really capable of expressing an opinion are those who have been responsible for building up the information

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in the files, in fact, largely B. Division. At the beginning of the war B. Division had about 6 officers trying to train 150 raw recruits. A vetting section was formed which was passing some 50,000 names per week over the records for one purpose or another. The effect of this was that the investigating branches could not get at the files which were required for more urgent and important purposes and that the information in the file was inadequately assessed because those who had to express an opinion did not know the value to attach to the reports. Since the beginning of the war the position has improved to a large extent. In certain types of case a policy has been evolved and in others there has been the necessary machinery for referring to the sections concerned. It would now in many cases be preferable if vetting were done within these sections, subject to carefully co-ordinated general policy which would need to be kept constantly under review. There are many files which contain extremely nebulous, inconclusive and in many cases unreliable information. The question may arise as to whether any importance should be attached for example to a report about a man received from, say, Athens in 1935 to the effect that he had frequented a house known to be occupied by an enemy agent and that he was believed to hold pro-Nazi sentiments. There is no possibility of getting back on the origin of this information or of assessing its reliability. Should it therefore be totally ignored? If Catalogue Reference 4/192 individual is found to be misbehaving himself we should obviously

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be open to serious criticism. On the other hand if we make use of it we may be doing the individual lasting injustice. Should we conduct a minute enquiry about the man's antecedents, and bona fides de novo? This would obviously take a considerable time and involve everybody in a great deal of work. It might also well be i conclusive, particular-ly if we could not confront the individual with the original information. Other questions/~~vetting~~ policy which arise concern the category of employment. If you let a man into an organisation who you would not recommend for confidential employment you have no control over his subsequent movements. You may well find 6 months later that he is doing highly confidential work. His name is not re-submitted before promotion.

These are some of the many problems which I think should be carefully explored by someone like Herbert Hart. The difficulty is to know how to get this done. I am proposing to have a talk with old Bacon and I shall try and persuade him that something of the kind is desirable. If we are successful I will talk to Harry Allan and then to the D.G.

Stamp and I went over to see Gen. Crockatt about the Icelandic subject who arrived a short time ago in Iceland ostensibly from Bodo. His story was obviously a poor one and when reported to the SIS man he communicated with his headquarters. We also expressed doubts and said we thought it was desirable that the man should be sent here.

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The Americans however took a different view. They believed in and very reluctantly agreed to us having him sent to this country, provided he were treated as a guest and remunerated for the information that he had provided. There appears to have been some undertaking of this sort between the American General in Command and the British Admiral who was responsible for bringing him to the country. When we got him to the LRC and heard his story Baxter was quite convinced he was a spy. Taxed with this he collapsed and has now made a full confession. He was in fact dropped by submarine from Bergen. He had a wireless set, \$ 5,000 and a code and instructions all of which he had buried in Iceland. He has pinpointed the place where they are hidden. We broke this news to Gen Crockatt who called in Col Calvert and also Col. Stevens who recently arrived from Iceland and was conversant with the case of Cobweb. It seems that was to communicate with his masters by wireless and would then be informed how to dispose of the money. He would be given the name of a contact, who it is almost certain would be Cobweb. We impressed upon Crockatt and Calvert that by virtue of the large fund of information carefully indexed here we had a very definite advantage over any intelligence people in Iceland. We thought therefore that some arrangement by which characters of this sort were put on a plane at once and sent here for examination would be profitable to all.

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Since the time factor might on occasion be important. In this

particular case for example it would be for consideration whether it should be turned round. Crockatt and Calvert were more than co-operative and said that they would be delighted to fall in with any recommendations that we liked to make. I made it clear that the disposal of the body was really a matter between G.2 and SIS since they operated in Iceland and we did not. We would let them have a full report on the case at the earliest possible moment.

I had a longish talk with Denham about his visit to the Caribbean. He is obviously very put out at his treatment and also by Vivian's behaviour. He has sent a stiff note to C. suggesting that Vivian should withdraw a note that he has circulated to Stephenson of the D.O. etc. about his (Denham) fishing in troubled waters etc. In fact he points out that Vivian has done exactly what he wrongly accuses the D.G. of doing when he circulated the gist of Wood's letter to Stephenson of the D.O. C. has sent a rather non-committal reply in which he expresses the view that it would be better to let things drop, but asks whether Denham approves of his letter being shown to Vivian. Denham had already said that he would have no objection and has repeated this in a further letter to C. He does not intend to let the matter drop. Meanwhile he is thinking of completing his tour in the Caribbean, though what precisely he has done there already I do not know. He certainly caused a certain amount of irritation to Stratton though I do not think this amounts to very much. Denham is very

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insistent on the point that the people really to matter in the USA are those who have the backing of the State Dept. He is quite sure that Hoover has the State Dept. well behind him, and that anyone who falls out with Hoover is making a great mistake.

Stopford has left tonight on Alacrity, having had very satisfactory conversations with the Force Commander and other personnel on the expedition whom he knows personally.

October 1st

At 4 a.m. today a man calling himself HANSEN apparently a Norwegian was dropped by parachute near Frazerburgh. He said that he had come from Farstadt and was a stevedore or labourer who had been in jail for stealing cigarettes and had then been contacted by the German Intelligence and sent to this country. He had attempted to come last Monday but the weather had been too bad and the aircraft had returned. The aircraft left Norway at 10.55 yesterday evening and was to have landed HANSEN at Ellon but in fact landed him near Fraserburgh. The man had two wireless sets, one of which was dropped with him and the other dropped separately. His instructions were to give himself up with one wireless set after he had buried the other. He was then to express the desire to join the Norwegian Forces and in 2 or 3 months he was to return to the other wireless set and start operations. He had been trained in Oslo and carried £60 in £10 and £5 notes.

The smaller notes were Scottish banknotes. He thinks that a further packet of money is with the other wireless set which has not yet been found. HANSEN, subject to the consent of the Lord Advocate, is being sent to O20. This man is presumably identical with an ISOS character who was mentioned some weeks ago as being trained in Norway for a journey to this country.

J.C., Marriott and Hugh Astor came to see me about the case of Lipstick. Lipstick is to go over and see his masters in Spain on the excuse of a short holiday. He wishes to take with him certain documents from the Catalans here to their headquarters in Barcelona. He also wishes to fix up some arrangement by which the Catalans can correspond with this country in secret ink. The Catalan aspect of the business presents considerable difficulties since both SIS and the F.O. have been anxious to keep clear of Catalans or any suggestion that this country is fostering the Catalan movement. I have suggested that Lipstick should take the chance with the micro-photographs which he might conceivably have made himself with a Leica camera, and that as regards the correspondence from Spain to the Catalan organisation here arrangements should be made for the letters to be sent to a cover address in Portugal and there collected. The secret ink in which they are written could be provided by Lipstick himself from stocks which he would demand for his own purposes from the Germans. If the correspondence was detected it would give the impression that the Germans

and not the British were in fact giving assistance to the Catalan movement. It appears that Dansey has rather thrown cold water on the proceedings as might well be expected, and we may have some difficulty in persuading C. that the project which has the approval of the Twenty Committee is a good one.

Charles, Ede, Dick and I had a talk with Maunsell who outlined to us his proposals for the future of SIME after the war. He thinks that SIME in a reduced form should continue, but points out that it will have no responsible head if there is no longer a General Staff, a Defence Committee or a Resident Minister. He thinks that it should be a joint show but that it should be largely based on MI5 London. He thinks that we should have control in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq while SIS should be in control in Persia, Syria and Turkey. Co-ordination would be assured through SIME. We all agreed that it was right to advance the theory that at the periphery at any rate it was essential that the two shows should be united. This may help to convince people that a similar amalgamation was necessary in London. Maunsell is going to put this view to the various departments that he sees here.

I went over to see "C" about two suggestions, one that Kemal Johnston's Swedish agent should go to Stockholm in order to discover more about compromise peace movements. "C" agreed that the agent should go and that he should be quite prepared to pay the bill which may

amount to something between 3-4 hundred pounds. The other project was that another Swede should go to Stockholm to discuss with the local TUC the possibilities of getting the Finnish TUs to make a move for peace.

According to this Swede they are ripe for peace providing they can get a guarantee of food supplies. "C" thought that this was really a matter for the F.O. He was very much in favour of something of the kind being done both for strategic reasons e.g. safety of our convoys and the use of Petsamo as a port, and in view of the coming Russian negotiations. He suggested that I should have a talk with Cavendish Bentinck.

"C" told me very confidentially that from his best source he learned that there was a definite move within the Army to take over control. Something might have happened a few months ago had not the bombing of Berlin led to the decentralisation of a number of ministries. He is replying that he has heard a great deal about a coup d'etat in the army before but that nothing happens. If they are really genuine they should get on with their dirty work as a proof of their bona fides. He particularly does not want a word said about this as previous attempts have always been frustrated by newspaper publicity which has made everybody very nervous. He mentioned the JIC paper but said that he had not as yet seen it. He did not quite know on what they were basing their extremely optimistic view though he felt that things in

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Germany were undoubtedly serious.

I had a talk with him about the Tricycle case. He told me he had been extremely interested in the reference to the information which the Germans were obtaining through our army signals. He said he was quite convinced that this was true and that Travis had told him that army signals security was absolutely rotten. He was quite prepared to go before any committee and say so. The trouble was he could not get DMI to move in the matter. I asked him whether he thought it would do any good if I took the extract from Tricycle's report and rubbed the DMI's nose in it. He said he thought it might be well worth while. I was surprised to find "C" taking this whole matter so seriously, since when we originally raised it he had been quite prepared to accept Gambier Barry's view that there was nothing to worry about. He told me that I could tell the DMI that he was extremely concerned, that the whole of the deception plans could be jeopardised by this serious breach of wireless discipline which in spite of the recommendations of the Reid Committee was still going on. He asked me if I should let him have a copy of the report, which I promised to do. I told him that I was sending a copy of the extract from Tricycle's report to Reid and impressed upon him that Reid was an extremely able fellow and totally disinterested as far as he himself was concerned. His one aim and object was to get the mess cleaned up. He was however in a difficult position since in so far as the army and other depts. were concerned he had no executive

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authority. The fact was that at the moment nothing really effective had been done. The army was still trying to get the necessary personnel to put their house in order. "C" said he thought the DMI really ought to take the matter up with the VCIGS.

I told "C" about _____ He was very pleased that the incident had occurred as he thought it would be an extremely salutary and much-needed lesson to the Americans.

I also told him about the arrival of HANSEN this morning.

October 2nd

The question of the use of the C.S.W. Black List has arisen. We had a certain amount of trouble a short time ago since in Palestine the inclusion of a name was regarded as being grounds for internment. The Black List has never been intended to act as more than a pointer. I am anxious to know precisely what its value has been. It is supposed only to cater for individuals who may visit the U.K. It does not therefore in a general way include enemy nationals. The suggestion has now been made that people of the type of William JOYCE should be included, but such people are not likely to arrive until after the war if at all. The question therefore to be considered is what is to be the future of the Black List, and whether we should start operation on the cessation of hostilities.

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This is a major problem which will have to be carefully considered. As a first step I think we should ascertain from all recipients of the Black List how far it has proved to be of any practical value. Some of the names on it seem to have been included on pretty flimsy evidence particularly when the action has been taken at the instigation of SIS.

Maunsell came to talk to me about his future. He has been in Cairo for the last 15-20 years and does not wish to remain there indefinitely. He would be quite content to stay on till the end of the war and possibly for a further period in order to establish SIME on a peace-time basis. If he does however he would not like to be forgotten. He would if possible like some job at home. If not, he would take his pension, if any, and retire, as he has a certain amount of private means. I told him that it was very difficult to foresee the future, that a possible amalgamation with SIS might provide a number of openings. I would however bear in mind what he had said and if it came within my power do my best to meet his wishes.

Gibbs came to talk to me about American affair. He said that information from the FBI related more and more to activities of the Abwehr in S. America. This was due largely to the fact that they find it easier to operate in S. America where the laws were more drastic than in their own country.

The effect of this was that the FBI and SIS were both sitting in on the interrogation of Abwehr agents with the local authorities in Brazil or Chile. The FBI having got the story, transmit it to Thurston for observations here. Thurston finds he can get a far more intelligent answer from us than he can from SIS. When he asks SIS a question he gets a very dry reply which is confined strictly to his particular request. If he comes to us, he gets a general appreciation and a whole lot of link-ups which he finds far more valuable. On the other hand SIS have or should have considerable records about activities in the western hemisphere which are not available to us. Hart can on occasions put him on to these but he meets with very poor response. All this points to one thing only, namely that our resources ought to be pooled with those of SIS. Before long we shall probably get into trouble for giving Thurston the relevant ISOS material.

HANSEN has arrived and a statement taken from him by Cookie. He came absolutely clean and there is no question of a prosecution. His spare wireless set has been found in a tree.

A German airman deserter called HOEFELS is due to arrive from Stockholm.

Victor came to talk to me about security in the Persian railway. His scheme for improving security seems to have gone the way of most things that have to pass through the military hierarchy. We shall have to consider ways and
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means for getting the question out of a rut. He is also writing a memo to Harry Allan about counter-sabotage, pointing out that at the moment there is no proper machinery for dealing with counter-sabotage activities in the field. Such planning as there is is concerned with Overlord. Meanwhile it is more than probable that problems are arising in Italy. There is as far as we know no provision either for counter-sabotage or for civil security duties. Presumably the authorities are as usual waiting for a crisis to arise, when they will send out an SOS. On the other hand things maybe happening about which they are totally unaware. Certainly the IB staff have no instruction in counter-sabotage duties at all. Harry Allen confines himself to suggesting that Rothschild note should be sent to Cossac and to M.I.11, who have a standing committee considering the work of I.B.1,2 and 3 in the field. It seems incredible that the W.O. have not wakened up to the fact that the situation for which they are laboriously preparing in connection with Overlord is one that has already arisen in Italy and for which they have made absolutely no provision.

October 3rd

Stephens rang me up to say that Nikolai HANSEN's cover name is HEINI. This definitely identifies him with an ISOS character. Somehow this fact had been missed both by the SIS and BLB registries. His case is not quite so good as it originally appeared. He was asked whether he had brought any secret

ink. He said that he had but that he could not remember where it was. Finally he said that it was concealed in one of his teeth. He was then asked whether he had any cover addresses to which he replied in the negative. It was pointed out to him that if he had secret ink obviously he would have an address to which to write. He then said that he would be given the address only after he had got into wireless communication. The argument was then advanced that his sole purpose for carrying secret ink was to use in the event of the wireless set being damaged. It was suggested that he should think again. He finally produced an address in Stockholm to which he said he had been instructed to write. His excuse for not giving this information before was that he was afraid we should make a mess of things and that his wife would get into trouble. O20 are not quite certain at present whether this excuse can be accepted. I have so informed Cookie. The secret ink which was in a little rubber cover was placed in a hollow tooth and cemented over. Hansen had been instructed to pick it out himself, and if unable to do so to get the tooth extracted by a dentist. Having got him to sign a statement to the effect that he was willing to have the secret ink extracted from his tooth by a British officer, Wynne O20 who is a qualified dentist, removed the cement and found the rubber casing with certain crystals inside.

Dick Butler has been down to see the D.G. and has brought back a signed letter for Hoover and also a letter for Winant, about our representation in the western hemisphere. The letter is I think a satisfactory one. The D.G. is generally rather worried about the whole American business and in particular about what I thought of the agreement. I am glad to say that Butler reassured him that I felt that we had done the best we could and would simply have to accept the situation.

Denham is in a considerable state of irritation. He is proposing to go back to America on Tuesday week. He has seen Stephenson and told him that he was proposing to see Hoover on his return in order to explain to him what had happened. Stephenson was dead against this unless Denham was accompanied by one of his officers. Denham said that on no account would he see Hoover in company with one of Stephenson's officers. On the other hand he would be quite prepared to see Hoover with Stephenson. I do not think this idea smiled on Stephenson either. It would certainly create an interesting situation.

In any case all are agreed that if he goes back to America Denham must have a definite charter from ourselves, C.O and SIS in which it is stated precisely what he is expected to do. Walter Bell whom I saw last night is thoroughly disgusted with the whole state of affairs. He says that Vivian, having spent 3 weeks in USA, thinks he knows all about everything. Bell who has spent 12 years there and knows all the personalities intimately, is never consulted. Meanwhile relations with

the Americans here are going from bad to worse. Only in Section V is there any sort of integration but this is hedged about by numerous restrictions which are changed constantly. The Americans have therefore got the feeling of being received but not received. This may of course be in part due to the machinations of G2 and ONI but it certainly needs taking in hand.

I had a talk with John Marriott about Gwyer's Who's Who going to the Americans. It is inextricably mixed up with SIS information and it is difficult to see how we can give it to them in part without its being misleading. On the other hand I do not see how I can give it to Thurston in its entirety without contravening the very definite agreement reached between C.S.S. and the D.G. a short time ago. I propose to have a talk with Philby.

October 4th

Thurston came to see me at my request. I handed to him the letter from the D.G. to Hoover which he will send to Washington by safe despatch. I also showed him a copy of this letter. I impressed upon him that this was for his personal information since it would obviously be improper for him to have prior knowledge of its contents or for any action to be taken on the other side until the official document had been received. He said that his office had been badgering for some time about the discussions over here. He read the letter and seemed

satisfied with its contents. He read between the lines what the difficulties had been. He quite understood that they were not of our making. I think it likely that Mills will receive a request before long to visit the Bureau. It will be interesting to see how his visit to Washington is received by Security Co-Ordination. Duff Cooper has told Mills that when visiting USA he is not expected to do more than call in on DSC and inform them roughly of what he is doing. I think however that we should get some clear idea as to what action he is to take if the suggestion is made that he should be accompanied to the Bureau by someone from BSC. I propose to discuss this matter with Denham.

At the daily meeting today Herbert mentioned a character named PALO, an Einz Marine agent being prepared for this country. There was some indication that he might have made his departure about Oct. 1st. Our view about the parachute spy HANSEN is that his explanation about not telling us about his secret ink and cover address is probably a genuine one. It would be difficult to prosecute him as not only has he told us that he is a spy but he has also told us that the Germans told him to tell us he was a spy. I do not think that we shall use him. His case will probably go to the D.P.P. as a matter of routine, but will not be recommended as one suitable for prosecution.

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Felipe appears to have a wireless agent in America. Thurston is making enquiries about this to see whether he is controlled.

I saw Cavendish-Bentinck with Hugh Astor about the Lipstick case, in order to get F.O. sanction for the taking over to Spain of the Catalan document and for arranging communications between Catalans in Barcelona and Catalans in this country. The purpose of the Lipstick visit is purely a counter-espionage one, but since Lipstock's heart is really in the Catalan movement his mission has a dual purpose. Anything to do with Catalans is extremely embarrassing to the F.O. Cavendish-Bentinck finally agreed that the documents could be sent over in the bag and handed to Lipstick when he goes to PCO Madrid to get his return visa. He also agreed that Lipstick could obtain ink from the Germans and give it to the Catalans for purposes of communication with this country by means of cover addresses in the U.K. He undertook to speak to C. on this matter and assure him that the plan had F.O. sanction.

I then spoke to him about the project which Clark of F. Division had put up. It related to the sending of a Swedish trade unionist to Stockholm where he would make suggestions for an approach to the Finnish T.U.s who were anxious for peace. Cavendish-Bentinck thought that this was undesirable. The Government line was that the Finns had to make their own peace with the Russians. If

they approach us officially we should of course communicate with the Russians. On the other hand any underhand intrigues would almost certainly come to the notice of the Russians and be misinterpreted. He thought therefore that it was better not to send him.

At the Press Meeting Tangye told me that communications from the Press line to the Evening Standard had been discontinued and that in future individual passengers known to the Evening Standard representative might be used. This is satisfactory since we have been searching the crews of the Lisbon aircraft. This action has evidently proved to be a satisfactory deterrent and the chances are that we were on the right lines.

Marriott and Tommy Harris told me that Johnny Jebson is now talking to Benton in Madrid about Garbo's organisation. This creates a somewhat awkward situation. If Jebson is going to tell us about our XX agents he will realise their true position if nothing results from the information which he gives. It is therefore desirable to try and put him off the track, but we must of course express some interest. Tommy Harris has worked out a plan for drawing Jebson off the scent. We have also decided to tell Benton that almost certain Jebson when speaking of the Kuhlenthal organisation is referring to Garbo.

I talked to Roger about M's organisation. He seems to think that there is a tendency, and rather an unjustifiable one, to run it down. He thinks M. has done good work in the past and he says that he has a certain number of quite competent agents. He is trying to get others in on a low level but finds difficulty owing to the fact that most people are employed on other things. He thinks M's failing is that he lives too much in the past; of these movements have changed considerably in the last few years, a fact which M. in his isolation in Dolphin Sq. does not recognise. He ought to get round and talk to people much more than he does.

We then got on to the Marita case, and Roger evidently does not like it. He cannot get out of his liberal mind that this is a serious form of provocation. In a very mild sense it is, but in the absence of any other methods I do think it is desirable to ascertain something about evilly-intentioned persons. Roger's view is that the country is full of evilly-intentioned persons but that there is no necessity to drag them out of their holes. They had much better be left to rot in obscurity, and will be swamped by the common sense of the community as a whole.

Hughes mentioned at the 12 o'clock meeting today that he had had 4 or 5 cases of alleged illicit wireless activity where registry traces had shown that the individual concerned had some sort of connection with communist or pseudo-communist circles. I said that he ought to go rather gently and to have a talk

with Hollis before taking any action.

October 5th

Col. Hill of SOE who is on a visit from Moscow called and was seen by Dick and myself. He brought with him John Senter and two other members of SOE who presumably deal with Russian affairs. The main purpose of his visit was to discuss our liaison with the Russians. I asked him to give us some kind of account of his work in Moscow and the degree of confidence or otherwise that he had established with his opposite numbers. He said that he worked on a very high level, his contact being BERIA who is head of that section of the NKID which deals exclusively with SOE matters. Like ourselves, all these various departments are inclined to work in water-tight compartments and to some extent in an atmosphere of rivalry. BERIA's representative over here was CHICHAEV. Col. Hill however did not think that he would be qualified to speak outside the scope of purely SOE activities. Even if we did establish a liaison with him with the approval of Moscow we should not stand to get very far. Hill had apparently been able to make some progress in spite of numerous difficulties. It was in the Baghat Ran or Silver case that the best co-operation had been achieved. The Russians had been however very much averse to the introduction of anyone from DIB India. They preferred to deal through one channel only. In exchange for the information that they gave, they had hoped to get information

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about the Far East. In fact we had been unable to assist them because we had no information. This they had found very difficult to believe. Co-operation had been achieved also in Persia where there seemed to be a good understanding between the British officer, named Spencer, and a Russian from BERIA's department. Hill had been subjected to the usual tactics of provocation. The Russians had sent him a man who had worked for him in 1920, and who had made suggestions about working for him again. Hill did not fall for this but immediately rang up the NKVD. The man was removed from the National Hotel where Hill stays with apologies. Three or four months later however he made another approach. Hill then became exceedingly annoyed. The man disappeared again and Hill was told that he had been suitably dealt with. The whole thing was an obvious plant. It was however an interesting example of Russian distrust. Hill had never made any attempt to disguise his past activities in Russia which were of course well known to them owing to the publication of his book. He thinks he was accepted because he was regarded as a professional. The Russians have a liking for professionals and experts. Hill assured us that he had been in no way responsible for the instructions which CHICHAEV had received from Moscow not to hold official conversations with U.35. He said he thought the Russians would assume that CHICHAEV was under some kind of routine observation in this country and he particularly asked that if it came to our

knowledge that CHICHAEV was conducting undesirable activities such as espionage, the complaint should go through the channel of Hill's mission in Moscow. "propos of this he had thought of making some capital out of the SPRINGHALL case in so far as the facts had been published in the press. Dick expressed the view that in addition to CHICHAEV'S SOE work, he was engaged in maintaining contact with the Czechs, possibly in order to obtain information as to Polish movements. I explained to Hill that the Russians with their long record of collaboration with the Germans going back 20 years, should have a great deal of information about German intelligence matters. We should if possible like to tap this information. Dick pointed out that the Russians were very slow and unsatisfactory in dealing with questions affecting the identification of their prisoners who arrive in this country from time to time. We felt that if any progress was to be made in the future it would have to be a development of Barclay's work in Moscow and come in the form of a request to the Russians to send someone here competent to deal with CE matters. We told SOE that our contact would not go further than a purely social one.

I saw the DMI about Tricycle's information regarding signals security. I told him that I had discussed the matter with C. who felt that the position was serious since it clearly made nonsense of our deception plans. The DMI agreed and asked me to put the matter in writing to him and also to the other Ds of I. I said that I brought the matter to his notice

since it seemed to indicate that the situation brought to light by the Reid Committee had not changed. I understood that there were certain difficulties about getting personnel but I thought that this confirmation of previous reports might stimulate activity. I told DMI that I had sent a copy of the information to Capt. Reid.

I had a meeting with Maunsell, Barrow, Dixon, Dick and Barry. The primary purpose was for Maunsell to explain the workings of the I.B. in Mid East, with particular reference to their preparations for supplying field units when operations commenced in the Balkans. He thought it highly important that I.B.1 and I.B.3 should work either as one unit or in the closest possible cooperation, and that something in the nature of SIME should be established in the rear of the armies at the earliest possible moment. Dixon produced a rough draft of a note on the relations between I.B.1, 2 and 3 which had been prepared after consultation between himself, Hoyer-Miller, Kenneth Younger and Cowgill. This note did not seem to me satisfactory since it referred to I.B.1 having a special room of its own which would clearly not be accessible to I.B.3. I felt very strongly that it was wrong to perpetuate the division between 5 and 6 within the zone of the armies and that something should be done towards the total integration of 1 and 3. Barrow seemed to agree with this. In fact everybody thought it desirable, although some doubted whether in the present circumstances this ideal state of affairs would be reached. The final suggestion was

that I should write a memo on the subject for Dixon, and either see Whiteford or write him a personal letter.

October 6th

Ede talked to me about Denham's visit to the Carribean. While he did not feel very enthusiastic about it he regarded it as inevitable. I said that I thought it was important that his charter should be defined and that Stratton should be informed. Ede feels a little that if the Carribean needs reorganising it a job for OC rather than for some entirely independent person who is not acquainted with the work of this office.

At the weekly meeting Hart said that there were three men waiting for visas for the UK. They are coming ostensibly as volunteers for the Belgian forces. All three are known to us as having been recruited by the German I.S. to work as agents. One of them has in fact confessed but the position as regards the other two is not yet clear. The self-confessed agent is a Belgian named BERTRAND, otherwise known as COMMET. He was connected with the Technical Air Section in Brussels. The second is de RAPPARD, of Belgian origin but Canadian by naturalisation. He has worked for the German I.S. in Spain since Nov. 1941 chiefly in Barcelona but does not appear to have given satisfaction. The third is named Raymond LALOU, and comes from the Abwehr station in Cologne and is to correspond in

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There was the usual spate of inaccurate information referring to affairs in this country which is believed to be fabricated in Lisbon and Madrid.

I saw Duff Cooper and took him over the MT5 report. I also gave him an account of the HANSEN and cases. We had a short discussion about America when I informed him about Denham's conversation with Stephenson, when Denham suggested visiting Hoover. I thought this rather significant as it might imply that Stephenson would always insist on Mills being accompanied to the Bureau by a representative of Security Co-Ordination. Duff said that if such a situation did arise Mills was to say that he required no introduction, but if DSC insisted he should telegraph home for instructions. Butler has written to Mills in this sense. I told Duff about our difficulties in connection with I.B.1 and 3. I said that this was a matter on which I should like to invoke his assistance but I felt in the present state of affairs it would be better if we could settle the matter on a lower level. The difficulty in all these matters was that if we called in higher authority we antagonised everyone on the lower level who would think that we were trying to use the big stick. While expressing his readiness to help in any way he could, he quite understood the position.

Lennox brought me his suggestions for the Catalogue Reference KW4/192 they amount to a general tightening up of the ordinary measures

at present in force but not beyond the point where they would be likely to cause any comment. We later had a discussion under the chairmanship of Harker, on the various proposals. Dick felt, and I think the meeting agreed, that the authorities should make up their minds to rely upon deception rather than any drastic security measures. The enemy would undoubtedly know that an attack was coming, but it was desirable to conceal from them the exact date, time, targets and numbers of troops involved. From the point of view of leakage the dangerous moment would be about D-3 when the troops would be given their final instructions. We were not so concerned about the troops themselves talking in pubs as about the danger of some leakage in high quarters which might go through neutral diplomats.

October 7th

Spent the day in bed.

October 8th

I produced a memo on IB 1 and 3 in which I drew attention to the definition of functions laid down by the military manual. Briefly IB1 corresponds to MI6, IB3 to MI5 and IB2 acts as the executive arm of either or both in addition to its military security duties. I then showed the respective function of MI5/6 pointing out that in 5 items they were more or less identical but that it was the experience of MI5 to translate information into terms of action and to take the necessary

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counter-measures. It seemed to me therefore that the organisational division between MI5 and MI6 which existed in quasi-civilian circumstances and caused both confusion and irritation should not be perpetrated in the zone of the armies. I showed this note to Hart, Speir and Harry Allen. They all seemed to agree that the policy was sound and that the ~~definition~~ of the MI5/6 functions was fair and accurate.

A Jap B.J. shows that the Jap Ambassador in Berlin has been told by the Germans that the rocket gun is likely to come into action about mid-December. It is said to have a range of 400 kms and to be able to shoot within a km. over or short of the target.

Stuart Hampshire of RSS has produced an interesting memo on the extension of the S.D. wireless network, which is now considerable.

I have put in a suggestion to Harry Allen that Dick should go to Italy and report at first hand on the work of IB both in the field and with Amgot. There is very little information at the moment, the general attitude being "Improvisation is going on. When things settle down we will let you know". It is a remarkable thing that a committee at the W.O. should be discussing the relations of IB1,2 and 3 for the purposes of Overlord, while nobody in the MI Directorate appears in the least worried by the fact that in Italy no provision for IB3 has been made. Meanwhile we learn from Hill-Dillon, who has
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now been in N. Africa for a year, that he requires a GSO. IB to control ports in addition to the officers we have already given him, and that he has promoted Mair to the rank of GSO2. IB and placing him more or less in control of the SI (b) unit. He says the MI6 officers are good people but individualists and need a staff officer to collate and co-ordinate their work. This is of course precisely what we have been saying for the past two years. What he really means is that people are running in to him constantly with bits of ISOS, reports from agents etc. and suggesting action. Hill-Dillon himself being busy has no one to collate and assess the value of these reports or to take the necessary counter-measures. These are purely MI5 functions and he has taken a year to come to the conclusion that he will appoint an MI5 officer to deal with them.

Denham told me about the talk he had with Vivian yesterday. Vivian has agreed to withdraw the letter that he wrote to the D.O. and the D.G. about Denham fishing in troubled waters. He will submit his letter of withdrawal to Denham for his approval before he sends it out. Denham says he thinks that Vivian is so distraught by the various intrigues that he has really lost his balance.

The Russian Trade Unionists who attended the conference have objected to their papers being examined by Censorship prior to their departure. By the special request of the Foreign Secretary, Herbert has agreed after

consultation with ourselves, to waive his rights. There is no real reason why the papers should not be examined but I am quite sure that the Russians will merely think that we are stupid. It is an entirely mistaken notion to think that incidents of this kind jeopardise diplomatic relations.

Prince Milo of Montenegro wants to come here from Eire and later to go to Russia. We know that he has been in touch with the German Legation in Dublin and there is no doubt that if he got here he would be a nuisance. Lord Lutton is sponsoring his case. We have recommended that he should be told to stay where he is.

Brooman-White is going up to Madrid before he returns here.

The German Committee in Russia which consists of German Communists, Left Wingers and officer P/Ws, is proclaiming a somewhat peculiar policy. It almost indicates that the Russians might be prepared to treat with the German Army. The Russians may of course be permitting this propaganda merely because they consider it to be a disintegrating force. There are endless rumours about Russo-German peace negotiations. They are however thought to be without foundation; who is putting them about and what the object is is not clear. There is little doubt that Ribbentrop would be prepared to come to terms with the Russians but Hitler is still an obstacle. The Japs are anxious for a settle-

ment as they think it would help them to save their skins. The Russians probably do not mind this propaganda as they may imagine that it will stimulate the Second Front. Meanwhile the Russians are forging ahead and look like getting across the Dneiper. It will be interesting to see what happens when they reach the Polish frontier. The Germans will clearly make capital out of this situation and try to win over the Poles in defence of their own country. This will throw a real spanner into Polish political circles here which are already very much divided on the question of Russia.

I dined with Dick Ellis, Hoare and Walter Bell. We had a very pleasant evening discussing everything except America. At 10.30 p.m I said that since I was under the impression that we had met to discuss the sordid subject of our relations with the USA perhaps we had better get on with it. I then told Ellis exactly what our aims and objects were. I said that for 4 years we had somehow not been able to arrive at a satisfactory liaison with the F.B.I. with whom owing to the analogy of our functions, it was obviously desirable that we should be in the closest contact. Stephenson had asked me why we had not given him 2 or 3 firstclass officers to conduct the liaison when we appointed him our representative. I explained to Ellis that we had never been able to get the agreement of SIS to our corresponding direct with Security Co-Ordination on matters which affected the FBI. They had insisted that we should correspond via Section V. Before

a final decision had been reached Thurston had arrived. This had altered the whole position and we then had to wait for Stephenson to come over. In any case I did not think that 3 people were necessary. All we wanted was one man with a thorough knowledge of our work and office sitting in the Bureau. It was a matter of indifference to us whether he worked under DSC colours, but owing to the unfortunate relations between Stephenson and Hoover he could only work effectively if he were constituted an MI5 liaison officer in direct touch with ourselves. Ellis said that he would be only too glad to help in any way that he could to improve matters. I said that if he thought that I could be of any assistance I would readily pay a visit to the MSA. I do not think however that such a visit could have any real effect at the moment since the crux of the problem was Stephenson's relations with Hoover. If Hoover could be persuaded to think better of Stephenson all might be well. The talk was thoroughly frank and friendly throughout.

The position of Johnnie Jebson seems to be somewhat precarious; we have done our best to urge him to stay on. He apparently thinks that the Gestapo are on his tracks and a short time ago he wrote a suicide letter which he deposited with an Abwehr official now in Madrid whom he took into his confidence. The suicide letter was intended to stage a cover for Jebson's evacuation to this country. He also told this Abwehr official that Tricycle was working for the British. There is no

reason at the moment to suppose that the official has passed the story on to his superiors. In the meantime, [redacted] has been passing apparently accurate information to SIS in Madrid. [redacted] has now committed himself to being a conscious informant. He has put us in the somewhat embarrassing position of giving information which would appear to relate to Garbo. If he gives us sufficient information to enable us to identify Garbo he will be able to work out for himself that Garbo is under control. We are therefore trying to get [redacted] away from Madrid to Lisbon. In connection with one of his Abwehr activities it has been suggested that [redacted] should see Admiral Canaris while the latter is in Madrid and this may presumably bring matters to a head one way or the other. Meanwhile Tricycle has been appointed to be [redacted] in London. Balloon has notionally gone to Canada and the Abwehr have agreed to make him a further payment subject to confirmation from the senior officers now visiting the [redacted] Threr.

Joseph's courier Irma has returned from Lisbon bringing a letter from the Jap Asst. N.A. thanking Joseph for his work, sending him further instructions and including £140 in payment for his services. The letter also stated that the Japs were doing their best to supply Joseph with secret ink and a radio transmitter. Joseph will shortly be returning to Lisbon himself.

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Mutt's transmitter and sabotage material are

to be dropped about the 15th October. SIS have now established direct touch with

October 9th

An Italian tanker named the Oltterra has been lying at Algeciras for some time. The chief engineer has now informed the British authorities that this ship is specially equipped for sabotage activities and has been responsible for some of the outrages committed at Gib. At the moment it is trying to efface all traces, and if unsuccessful may scuttle itself. There is a Spanish crew on board. Both ourselves and the Admiralty are anxious to get this ship to Gib.

October 11th

At the 12 o'clock meeting Hart mentioned the case of a man whose name is given as DRAKE. It seems that his initials may be D.C. He is an agent of Binz Marine who is apparently recently returned to the Peninsula from this country. He is to be met by an Abwehr official in Lisbon. The suggestion is that he may be either a Dutchman or a Belgian. Attempts are being made to identify this individual through I.I. and other sources.

The question of the custody of deserters was also discussed. Unless a man deserts in the field the F/W department disclaim custody. They have however been somewhat inconsistent in their policy. While we feel that all deserters who reach this country via neutral or British

territory should be closely examined by the Security Service, we think that if they can be proved to be soldiers they should ultimately be taken over as P/W. I have asked Milmo to put up a case for discussion at a special meeting called by Duff Cooper.

The D.G. has returned and Denham is leaving tonight.

I had lunch with Max Knight and talked to him about his organisation. I hoped that he would discuss Jimmie Dickson who I gather is causing a good deal of trouble, and is thought to be going slightly Fascist. I did get on to the subject of staff and I gathered that M. felt that Dickson had not the necessary qualifications to take over the organisation in an emergency. Dickson, in M's view, suffered from an inferiority complex. He will probably return to the Min. of Labour after the war. Bingham will also go back to journalism, as he normally draws a salary of about £1200 a year. M. has a high opinion of Bill Younger. I told M. what we were doing about the Marita case and he seemed to approve. I emphasised the necessity of getting woman agents into subversive organisations with a view to their becoming of use in a couple of years time. He said that he was doing his best but that at the present stage of the war it was hard to get hold of reliable people.

I had a meeting with Dixon and Harry Allen about I.B. Harry thought that my memo should be put through Barrows Committee rather than through Whitefoord. Personally I am indifferent so long as we get what we want. Dixon told me that he had had a long talk with Cowgill whom he thought was quite amenable. He kept on saying that I.B.1 were in no sense executive. On the other hand he said that I.B.1 could only communicate its information to the GSIB. Dixon said that this was unworkable and that there ought to be lateral communication between I.B.1 and 3. Dixon thinks that Cowgill might agree to this. I told him that he would have to get it down on paper otherwise things were apt to go wrong, since Cowgill had not a very good sense of the meaning of words. I doubt whether he is conscious of the fact himself. It often happens however that he gives a completely different account of a meeting to what actually took place.

Cookie's blood-lust has been aroused by the HANSEN case. He thinks that we should prosecute and wants to interview certain of the officers at Ham. Stephens is breathing fire. We have however tactfully persuaded Cookie that before he does so the question of principle must be decided.

October 12th

Cookie came to see me about the HANSEN case, and said that he was putting up for a ruling before proceeding further.

At the D.G.s meeting Adam gave a short account of his visit to the USA which seems to have been appreciated by the Americans and the Canadians.

I am arranging for Herbert to lecture the C.C.s on German espionage in those areas which will be occupied by ~~and~~ front armies.

I gather that there is a possibility that the Commissioner, who has broken his thigh and his 67, may retire, and that if he goes he might be succeeded either by Hordern or Sillitoe. Personally I would prefer Hordern who I am sure would make an excellent Commissioner. He is moreover a staunch ally of this office.

I have suggested that Cussen should look into the Marita case and give an unbiassed view on its merits and future conduct.

Maffey and Dev are apparently arranging for the escape of 20 interned British airmen who came down in Eire when on a practice flight. Those who come down during operational flights are apparently to remain in internment. The airmen will be moved to another camp and during the course of the move will be allowed to escape. This is

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rather a sign of the times. All neutrals are beginning to realise which side their bread is buttered.

Cecil has made a precis of the case of Charles Bernard Compton Phillips, an Irish solicitor who was working to the Abwehr in Hamburg before the war. His cover name was Tipperary. He started working in 1937 when he made an offer to the German Ambassador and later he received instructions from one P. van ZUIDEN of Amsterdam who sent him £15 and asked him to go to Cologne. In 1938 Phillips met Dr. Pfeffer at Osnabruck. He went to Hamburg in 1938 and again in March and June 1939 where he met a Dr. Lutz. He was to report on the military dispositions in the UK and N. Ireland. He does not appear to have done very much. He sent over press cuttings from "Flight" and "The Aeroplane" and a map of N Ireland with A.A. positions marked. He had secret ink and a code. He received his money from Kol & Co. of Amsterdam, who have featured in a number of other pre-war spy cases. Had the necessary link-up been made of Kol he might have been detected at an earlier date. PHILLIPS is thought to be unbalanced. A number of his relatives are in mental homes.

Horrocks discussed vetting with Hart and myself. He seemed to think that on the whole the subject was adequately covered since cases where a refusal was made would now be referred to the sections concerned. He is going to look further into the matter and suggests that I should have a talk with Bacon.

October 13th

At the Wednesday meeting I mentioned the question raised with me recently by Grogan of giving information about Axis secret inks and their reagents to the Belgian Congo. This raised a somewhat difficult question since the Congo officials would clearly give it to the Belgian Govt. We have a somewhat analagous situation in N. Africa where we refused to give information of the kind owing to the lack of positive information about the reliability of the personnel. My feeling is that we have to look ahead to the time when we occupy the continent. We should consider first of all how far secret ink would be a factor. Milmo suggests that even if it is not used between the continent and this country it may well be used behind our lines between enemy agents and wireless collection centres. It therefore seems to be desirable that as far as possible consistent with security we should impart our information to allied Govts. In addition to ourselves, SOE, SIS and the Americans are concerned. It is proposed therefore to have a meeting about it. As a preliminary step Briscoe has been asked to analyse our existing information and give (1) the names and substances which we know or suspect the Germans to be using as secret inks (2) the methods and technique employed by the Germans and their agents in the use of these substances as "protection" of secret writing and the preparation of cover letters, (3) methods employed by British and US Censorships in testing for these substances and in trying letters in which a secret ink is found. The

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important points to consider before imparting information to allied censorships are:

- (1) What is the source of the information?
- (2) is there any evidence that the Germans know that we are aware of it?
- (3) will it be to our disadvantage on balance if they do know that we are aware of it?
- (4) is it important that our own testing method should be concealed from the enemy? If so could we give the allied censorship a practical alternative of less technical value to the enemy? We must envisage that allied censorships are likely to be established in France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark and Poland as and when these countries are liberated.

Frost came to see me today. He told me that he had seen a certain Col. Jefferies of the W.O who had asked him whether he would be prepared to go to the Balkans. Frost said that when he asked what the job was Jefferies gave him to understand that it was exploratory. Frost did not think this satisfactory and therefore turned it down. The fact is I think that he does not want to go to the Balkans. He told me that the work at Barnet had been reduced to very low proportions and that it was difficult for the staff to justify its existence. He thought it would be a good thing if the wireless personnel did a military course. With this I agree since they may be useful as wireless operators for XX agents if they do not have to come into operation with the Mobile Units. Meanwhile I learn from Dixon that he has had a visit from G-P, who takes the view that Mobile Units should not cross the channel until RSS have detected an

illicit transmitter. Both Dixon and I think this is unsatisfactory since there would be obvious and dangerous delays before the set was finally run to earth. I should say the mobile units should cross the channel as soon as a bridgehead has been established. We know positively that a number of stations which are to be left behind in time of invasion are coming up for testing, and there may also be parachutists.

TAR and JC had a long talk with Felix Cowgill about the role of XX agents in the field. Felix seemed to think that Harmer would be sufficient to run the whole outfit. He was however a little disconcerted when TAR said he was proposing to send two agents into the field, probably Mutt and Garbo. He had not envisaged this possibility nor the necessity of having trained wireless operators to run the agents. He considered the duties of the I.B.1 unit to receive material from secret sources and to pass this on if they thought fit to IB3 via the G.I. IB. He said categorically that it was not the duty of I.B.1 to take executive action. When he was asked for his interpretation of civil security, or the duties of IB3, he said rather vaguely: "On port control etc.". TAR then said that he thought logically any unit sent into the field as part of the IB branch to run XX agents should be within the frame of IB3 rather than I.B.1. Felix did not agree. By the time TAR had sketched out his plans for a XX network on the second front it was clear that Felix

Catalogue Reference, KV4/192 the work and that he wanted us to supply the bodies which he would

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control. TAR said he had people fully trained for all these types of work and it would be possible for us to supply them. He also undertook to train any people in XX work nominated by Felix. During the meeting it was absolutely obvious that Felix was working to the original charter of MI5/6, namely the 3-mile limit and it was clear from various remarks he made that any XX agent running in a theatre of operations immediately became a section V commitment. TAR did not argue this point, nor the question of whether the XX agents section should be under the IB branch or under the Controller. If it is in the I.B. branch he thinks there is a clear case for its being in IB3. It was agreed that a small sub-committee consisting of Foley, Davies, TAR and JC should consider the problem of how many people and what types would be required to go into the field to run a XX section.

BrookBooth came to see me about a proposal that German P/Ws of Polish origin wishing to serve in the Polish forces should be allowed to come to this country from the continent. We have allowed them to come here from N. Africa because we thought that owing to the quick termination of hostilities the Germans would not have thought out any plan for infiltration of agents through this channel. If it could be avoided we would much rather not have these Poles for whose reliability we shall have to be entirely dependent on the Polish 2eme Bureau. It would clearly be no

use our interrogating them at the LRO. The matter is to be discussed on a higher level with the F.O.

Canaris has been down to Madrid again where he has seen both Vignon and Jordana. The question of British protests about German S.S. activities in Spain was discussed. It was agreed that while certain outward adjustments would have to be made the work would go on as usual.

The Otterra has been brought to Gib. with the agreement of the Italian authorities. It is suggested that Victor and Lewes should go to Gib. and assist in the interrogations. It is possible that the evidence obtained may provide the basis for a first class protest to the Spanish Govt.

A man called Dudley TAYLOR employed in CCO has been discovered to have a very peculiar background. In addition to being a bigamist and something of a crook, he contracted an obvious marriage of convenience with a woman called SLAZONEK who before the war was travelling about in very suspicious circumstances. She is now in California. Burt and Spooner are going to interview Dudley Taylor.

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October 14th

There has so far been no solution of the DRAKE problem.

ISOS shows that one HELMUTH who is connected with Ramirez's government in the Argentine, is going on a secret mission sponsored by the S.D. to see Himmler. It has been suggested that he should be taken off at Trinidad.

I have read through an extremely interesting case of the SOE agent KNIGHT. It discloses a lamentable state of affairs in the French Section of SOE. KNIGHT is a deplorable character who should on no account have ever been furnished with any information which if divulged might endanger the lives of others. We already had certain records of him before he was taken on. SOE said they asked us to vet him but there is no record here of such a request. The point is not very material since KNIGHT was already committing the gravest indiscretions during his period of training. He went on a special mission with others to blow up some factory or power station in France. The mission failed and KNIGHT went on to Paris. Here he was befriended by two members of the resistance organisation who got him to Lyons. Here he behaved with the gravest indiscretion and contrary to instructions frequented bars, etc. In addition he wrote several cards to a girl friend. He eventually got himself arrested, betrayed the people in Paris and also the man who had taken him to Lyons. On

The position of _____ now known as Artist, seems to have improved. The Germans have given him a passport visad for Portugal. There is nothing to indicate that his position with the Abwehr has been impaired. Tricycle is to go to Lisbon and will probably bring back his wireless operator. Balloon has had a letter that had 3 duffs on it, giving a code for informing the Germans about imminent operations. This in spite of the fact that he has already told them that he is leaving for Canada. It seems that the letter was prepared long before it was sent off since the instructions speak of the possible invasion in September. The letter only reached here on the 4th Oct. The _____ has at last got employment in PWE. The Germans are being

asked to drop another wireless set for Mutt and Jeff on the 21/22nd or 22/23rd. Meanwhile Mutt is going to report the arrival of HANSEN at Frazerburgh and complain to the Germans about their wasting their time when he is waiting for much needed material and help. Lipstick left Lisbon by air on the 10th October. Dragonfly is still without funds, although he has been assured that every effort is being made to effect payment. It is expected that some valuable jewellery will shortly be sent over by the Germans and they are still talking of sending a money remittance from Switzerland.

October 15th

I went over to see Newsam about the LOEWY case. The suggestion is that we should get certain Czechs over here who could take a controlling interest in the firm and supervise the activities of HAFNER who is thought to be going slow and sabotaging the war effort by agreeing to the construction of presses of faulty design. The Min. of Supply will not support the visas as probably they do not like to admit there is anything wrong. The H.O. do not normally grant a visa unless they have the support of some govt. dept. Newsam was very sympathetic and said that he would speak personally with Douglas of the M. of S. of whom he is a friend.

We then had a long discussion about the office. Newsam said how relieved he was to think that the relations of MI5 and the H.O. had improved so much. Then he said when every-
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body in the H.O. hated MI5 and when they believed that everyone in MI5 hated the H.O. He made some reference to the D.G. being a bit old and tired and wondered who would succeed him, when he retired. I said I had no idea. He then said he had very revolutionary ideas about the future of intelligence which he would very much like to discuss with me. I said I also had revolutionary views of a kind. I was for example quite convinced that CE ought to be under one head. I think that Newsam's mind is probably working on the absorption of investigation of subversive movements by the H.O. If so he has probably forgotten the Russian espionage side of communism, if he was ever aware of it. He is certainly not aware of the extent to which this is going on at the moment. It would I think be quite impossible to separate the two. He probably sees the rest of MI5 amalgamated with SIS. However I shall go into this later. Adam I gather is a source of some irritation. He thinks he is a nice old man but far too dogmatic, and uncompromising. I told Newsam that I fully realised that the prestige of our office with the public and govt. depts. depended not on investigations into espionage and subversive movements but on the efficiency of our working matters such as vetting, port control etc. If an SCO was rude to an I.O. or to an incoming passenger, or somebody not recommended for employment in confidential work on rather flimsy evidence, the stock of the whole office immediately went down to zero. He said that this was absolutely true and that it was extremely important that the routine

and boring side of Security Service work should be done with great efficiency. We also discussed registries and the importance of registries staffs being able to use their intelligence. Newsam said that in the old days he could get an extremely look-up because there were clerks who had made a careful study of the cases and remembered them. Now however it was quite impossible to get anything linked up intelligently. He therefore had to make ad hoc decisions on cases as they arose.

October 16th

Cussen and Orr came to see me to discuss the case of corruption with which Orr has been dealing at Room 055. It had reached a point where he wanted an 80a warrant from me to get information out of a chartered accountant. We explained to Orr that it was undesirable that we as an office should appear in these cases, although we were quite ready to give our assistance to the proper authorities. The case had reached a stage where it should be handed to Burt who on the authority of the Yard would bring the matter to the D.P. if the case was established.

Orr then went on to talk about certain information which had come to his notice about Duff Cooper. He said that Duff's ATS chauffeuse was extremely incensed at being asked to drive Lady Diana and her boy about London and then to take Mr. Duff Cooper and his mistress to shops in Bond St. Orr was asked to let us know if there was any chance of the chauffeuse blowing up and

lodging an official complaint, as this would clearly be undesirable and we should want to do something about it, by way of dropping a hint in the right quarter. There was of course no evidence that what the chauffeuse said was true.

Cussen told me that he wanted Milmo to tell O20 that when HANSEN said he had secret ink in his tooth they should have stopped the proceedings and taken him to the Oratory Schools where a official statement could have been taken. Cussen agreed that there was no case against HANSEN but on the other hand there might have been.

At the daily meeting Hart mentioned the case of HELMUTH. The F.O. have agreed that he should be taken off at Trinidad. This is however a case in which we should give the Americans the opportunity of interrogation. Difficulty arises owing to the fact of the source of the information being IZAK. IZAK should have been passed in camouflaged form to the FBI who by order of G.2 are not allowed to see it in the original. We should like to say to Thurston that on the basis of the information controlled by G.2 and by ONI we know that HLEMUTH is on his way to see Himmler and that we propose to take him off at Trinidad. As in the case of Perez GARCIA it would be desirable if time permitted to get this man back to this country. If on the other hand we could not arrange transport he should be as thoroughly interrogated as possible at Trinidad on a brief telegraphed from this country and the information passed to the

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FBI locally. I do not know whether SIS will agree to this.

October 18th

A meeting of certain RSLOs was held today to discuss security measures for OVERLORD. We first of all dealt with the suspect lists. Opinions varied somewhat. Reading thought there was no danger from those featuring on the commissioner's list or the H.O. list. ex-18B cases who had not been listed at all. Southern Command had been consulted and agreed Harlequin had produced no reaction from invasion list characters. Bristol thought that the bad cases on the commissioner's list should be interned as they might possibly move to other areas. The suggestion was made that 184 orders might be issued. The enemy aliens on the H.O. list should however in Reading's opinion be cleared out as the police in his area were not really capable of exercising proper supervision at a time of crisis. There was 168 persons in this category in his area. He thought they might perhaps first be interviewed as a result of which perhaps some discrimination could be made. Tonbridge would like to remove those on the commissioner's list but did not anticipate any trouble with those on the H.O. list. Cambridge was in favour of discrimination and the internment of certain people both on the commissioner's and H.O. lists. Cardiff thought that there should be discrimination and reinternment in certain cases. The general view seemed to be that a very small number of people should be removed from the

area and that if ways and means could be devised for preventing their return or entry into another coastal area the case would be met. It was felt generally that C.C.s and Army Staffs would agree to this.

We then discussed a visitor's ban within an area of 15 miles from the coast from about the Wash to Penzance and also for a limited stretch in the Bristol area. Views as to the value of this ban were: 3 for the ban and 2 against it. It was admitted that the ban was not easy to operate effectively but it was felt that it did in some way act as a deterrent, and enable action to be taken when undesirable people were found in the area.

Lastly we dealt with coast watching. The Navy are to be asked to step up coast watching. Latterly they have been removing their personnel. It was thought also that the Home Guard might assist. If this was approved a scheme for reporting back the arrest or whereabouts of a possible agent was to be gone into in detail.

RSLOs are meeting the ISSB this afternoon.

At the press meeting Tangye said that the information given out by Brendon-Bracken about the rocket-gun caused a considerable amount of consternation in press circles where it had been taken very seriously. The statement was made presumably in view of the fact that reports about the rocket-gun had appeared in Sweden.

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Dudley Clark came to see me today. We discussed the possibilities of deception for OVERLORD. Dudley Clark thought that it ought to be controlled from COSSAC rather than from 21st Army Group. He agreed with our proposals that it would be a good thing to have fairly complete organisation to put into the field. He felt however that the Controller's organisation was not big enough at the moment to cope with the situation. Dudley Clark controls quite a number of people at Army H.Q. in Italy who are responsible for the actual movement of units or dummy units to support deception.

I saw Kenneth today. He appears to be a fervent supporter of the integration of I.B.1 and 3. He came out with it without any prompting from me. He says that from what he can gather the CCAOs organisation on the continent is likely to be drastically cut down and to be reduced to little more than a liaison mission. It seems that the French and other allied governments are likely to have their own country organised and to do it better than anyone else within a very short time. It will however I think still be necessary to have IB officers in touch with local French authorities. Kenneth thinks that the IB officers get progressively better as they decline in rank. He has a very poor opinion of Barker Benfield and not much of an opinion of Hoyer-Miller.

Young of SIS came in in a great state about two of his agents. Actually two French policemen who had recently been got out of

France. He thought they ought to have a security examination and had therefore taken them to the LRC by arrangement through

When they got there they were kept waiting $\frac{3}{4}$ hour and then taken to an I.O. who wanted to know their real names and the method of their landing. He seemed to be in a great state about the whole thing, and was rather taking the attitude that if that kind of thing happened he would not take unaccredited agents to the LRC. I told him that that would not do. If there had been a blunder at the LRC we would deal with those responsible. It would be fatal to try and wriggle round the regulations because sooner or later it would be found out and there would be a row. It was far better to settle these things in an amicable way. I gather that this was the first occasion on which he had been to the LRC in spite of my urgent request to him some months ago to make the acquaintance of his opposite number and of Baxter.

October 19th

At the D.G.s meeting we discussed a paper which had been prepared by the H.O. suggesting that certain clauses in the amendments to the Aliens Restrictions Order should be cancelled. The principle items were the curfew, right to have a camera, motorcar or bicycle, motor-launch or speed boat, obligation of all citizens to report the presence of an alien who sleeps in their house. It seemed that after consultation with the Catalogue Reference: KW/4/192 to the abolition of these restrictions. I do not know whether

I had agreed to anything of the kind, but was told afterwards by Brook-Booth that the file was marked to the effect that Dick had discussed the abolition of these restrictions with me and that I had agreed. I made two general observations, firstly that the abolition of these restrictions was based rather on the assumption that they were framed to deal with invasion and that as the possibilities of invasion had now lessened they could be done away with. It seemed to me that this was rather an unfortunate moment to consider their abolition since we had just been discussing ways and means of tightening up security, particularly in those areas from which the Second Front would be launched. We did not mind very much about the curfew, the motorcar was governed by the lack of petrol, a motorboat could not be used without a permit from the Admiralty, but the bicycle did seem to be a rather important matter. Lane had told us only yesterday that he had 168 names of enemy aliens who were within 15 miles of the coast in his area. He thought that most of them should be removed before the Second Front opened. If they went outside the area and had bicycles it would be quite a simple matter for them to ride down to the coast whenever they liked without much chance of being caught. Further, bicycles increased movement and spread the area of leakage, which might be important in the period between briefing day and D. day. Lastly the troops might well feel at this stage when they are being specially urged to take precautions against leakage, the civil authorities restrictions. I

thought that if it could possibly be arranged we should try and get the security executive to postpone the discussion on the H.O. paper until views had crystallised as to what restrictions would be necessary for Overlord. It would obviously be extremely troublesome to all concerned if we took off restrictions and were then subsequently forced to put them on again. Harker was asked to go over and see Sir Herbert Creedy as a result of which I learned later that discussion had been postponed.

We had a meeting on Censorship to which Briscoe, Collins, Grogan, Dick, Milmo, TAR and Bobbie Mackenzie came. A request had been received from Henschie of S. African Censorship for information about secret writing and reagents to be passed to censorship in the Belgian Congo, whose organisation was improving. There was also the possibility of a visit shortly from Lesmaistre of N. Africa Censorship who had already suggested an interchange of information regarding secret writing. We were all agreed that we had to look rather further ahead and consider what we should be prepared to give the allied governments when the Second Front opened and they established Censorship units in territory now occupied by the enemy, since it seemed clear that although possibly there might not be much use of secret ink between this country and the continent, there might well be communication with wireless reporting centres behind our lines on the continent. Briscoe said that Censorship now had about 35 reagents or methods of throwing up S/W.

Seven of these were he thought highly secret but were more in the nature of technical processes which had thrown up one particular ink and might quite possibly throw up others about which we at present knew nothing. It seemed important to us all that these should be safeguarded at any rate until the Second Front opened. There were one or two which, either because they disclosed our own offensive inks or indicated out superior efficiency, it might well be wise never to disclose to anyone. Those left numbered 28. 20 of these had already been handed to the French at the beginning of the war and were probably already in the hands of the Germans. We felt that as the Belgian Congo was perhaps of decreasing importance owing to the opening up of the Mediterranean, there was no particular point at this stage in giving them more than the 20 reagents that we had already given the French. We thought however that there would be advantage in giving N. Africa the full 28 while retaining the seven. As soon as the Censorship on the continent got going we would consider what further assistance we could give. It was agreed that a note of this should be prepared and should be endorsed by all the parties concerned, namely ourselves, SIS, and SOE. We would then approach the Americans and obtain their approval.

October 20th

At the Wednesday meeting Hart mentioned that a certain difficulty was being experienced in getting HELMUTH back to this country. If we can get him to Bermuda he can come on a British warship. Unfortunately there is no plane available from Trinidad to Bermuda unless we get a Catalina sent down to fetch him. Efforts are being made to arrange this.

I talked to Badeley about the case of one FAWCETT. Just before the war FAWCETT was given a month's imprisonment for failing to support his wife and before going to jail deposited a tin box with a shopkeeper. The box was found to contain a number of letters received from a certain HOHNLEIN. They clearly referred to espionage or contemplated espionage. The documents were photographed and the box returned. Meanwhile a HOW had been put on FAWCETT. Nothing transpired before the outbreak of war when FAWCETT was interned under 13B. The case then, rather characteristically I'm afraid, was not pursued and only came to light when it came up for review by the Advisory Committee. There had been no interrogation on the letters in order not to give away the shopkeeper. Efforts are now being made to ascertain whether the shopkeeper would be prepared to allow interrogation on the basis of the letters. Meanwhile the Advisory Committee have recommended FAWCETT's release. Badeley has however suggested to them that if we can get

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the shopkeeper's permission, some interrogation should be carried out and that, as the case was, so to speak, sub judice, the Advisory Committee should question FAWCETT. This means of course that the Advisory Committee are doing the work of MI5. We are not in a very good position to protest since we have virtually done nothing for 4 years. On the other hand, knowing what we do of the Advisory Committee's procedure, there is not much chance of getting FAWCETT to convict himself. However we do not feel very hotly about the case, firstly because four years have elapsed and secondly because FAWCETT has done a period in a mental home. He is fairly obviously one of Rantzow's fish though at the moment we have no proof.

I had lunch with Jimmy Dickson. He seems to be very disturbed in his mind. He told me that he had had a bit of a row with Max Knight over the case of Mrs. Gladstone. He thought firstly that she was using one of the office cars for personal reasons and secondly that she was rather slack in her dealings with the agents. He put up several reports to this effect to M. and eventually something was done about the car. Mrs. Gladstone then resigned but was persuaded by M. to stay on. Later the incidents of slackness occurred and ended in a row, when both Dickson and Mrs. Gladstone went on leave. I gather that the latter is not returning. Dickson said that after these various incidents he had the impression that he had become the subject of suspicion. One member of the office had in fact been asked to keep an eye on him, and

stage a teaparty with his wife, I suppose with a view to getting Dickson's reactions. Someone else had told him that Max did not like to get rid of him as he thought he might publish a book about his experiences. He said that these incidents had entirely destroyed his confidence in Max and that one or two others were feeling the same way. He wanted my advice as to what he should do. He did not wish to blow his own trumpet but he felt that if he left the agency in other hands it might go seriously wrong and that a number of the informants might throw their hands in. When he returned from his leave he found himself taken off the agency work and placed on M's staff where he had practically nothing to do. Then Shepherd fell ill and they had to send him back to the agency as there was no one else to work it. I told him that clearly the present state of affairs could not continue. He would have to get those who had given him information to allow him to put his cards on the table to M. and talk the whole thing out. I thought that possibly there was quite a lot of misunderstanding on both sides. If as a result of this talk he still felt that he no longer had any confidence in M. it would be better for him to go back to the Ministry of Labour. While I thought that the running of the agency was extremely important I did not think it was any good his continuing that work in the present atmosphere. If he preferred it I said I could speak to M. and try to find out what the trouble was. He said that he would prefer to ~~fix~~ speak to M.

himself in the first instance.

The D.G. has written a letter to Frost in which he has told him that he thinks his contract should terminate at the end of November. Frost himself had told him that he was trying to get another job and that he had very little work to do. D.G. did not therefore feel that he could justify the appointment any longer.

Orr rang me up to say that a photographer named Nigel LAWREBCE on the Daily Mirror had called to say that he was being sent to Cardiff to get into touch with local D.M. representative who would indicate to him where Rudolf HESS took his walks in the vicinity of Abergavenny. The camera had a telescopic lens and presumably the photograph would be taken at a considerable distance without anybody's knowledge. I spoke to C. who said that HESS was no longer under his charge and he suggested I should have a word with Loxley and then with DFW. I spoke to Loxley who agreed it was undesirable that the photographs should appear. I then talked to a Major Crawford in the absence of Col. Evelyn Smith, who I was told had HESS's case in hand. I told Crawford the story and of Loxley's suggestion that the best move would be to keep HESS in barracks for a week or 10 days or until the incident had blown over. I should probably be in a position to let him know when the coast was clear. After the whole incident had died down we could then consider the issue of a D, Notice since it was the intention of the Mirror to publish

the photograph without reference to Press and Censorship. HESS is at present detained at Abergavenny.

Burt tells me that Barry of DPPs office was asked to go and see Alexander about the HOYSE case. Alexander made him a long speech about HOYSE and what a good fellow he was. He had often stayed with him. He then suggest that as there was a security angle to the case it might be a good thing to hold the proceedings in camera. He then drew attention to the fact that a bomb had been dropped at Southampton on Sunday. Burt has ascertained that this bomb was dropped about 8 miles away on the docks. Clearly it had nothing to do with any report on the HOYSE case that had appeared in the papers. In any case it was a matter for MAP and Sir Stafford Cripps has expressed the view that the fullest publicity should be given to the case.

October 21st

I saw Duff this morning and showed him certain Jap B.J.s. I also left with him two files relating to the cases which we have investigated for SOE, one of them containing Wethered's report on KNIGHT. I said that while the case of KNIGHT was a deplorable one and showed an obviously bad state of affairs in the French Section, Duff should bear in mind that we always get the sticky end of SOE and that they may be doing extremely good work in other. Dialogue Reference KV/4/192 However, remarkable in the case of KNIGHT that so much should have

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taken place without the knowledge of a senior officer. One of the great troubles about SOE was that their records were so badly kept. It was often extremely difficult to find out precisely what had happened when things went wrong. I pointed out to Duff that the suggestion had been made that perhaps the case of KNIGHT might be taken up on a high level. The difficulty was that if SOE thought we were exposing them to high authority we should never hear anything at all about cases such as that of KNIGHT.

I talked to Duff about signals security and told him precisely what I had done about Tricycle's report. I asked him whether, when he saw the P.M. and handed him the M.T.5. report he could draw his attention to that particular item. I thought that it could do no harm and might do good. He said that he had tried to see the P.M. but he is apparently very busy and so he was thinking of sending the report instead of delivering it in person.

David Boyle came to see me, firstly to say that he thought Hornung's grandson du Boulay of M O.2, who according to had in his cups blabbed about the Azores to the Portuguese Minister, should be quietly removed to other spheres. It has been left to me to suggest this to the D.M.I. We also discussed the Swedish Naval and Air Attaches. There is no doubt that the latter is getting a lot of information. He is accompanied on all his visits by an Air officer but the latter does not seem to supervise him very closely once he is at an aerodrome. The Naval Attache seems

to have been more nosy, and the other day bounced a midshipman into allowing him to see something on board ship. He told him that the Captain had given permission. This was untrue. I thought that a paper should be prepared and presented to the JIC on the dangers of imparting information to neutral attaches. The matter had been raised before but there would be no harm in raising it in rather a big way. We should also put in a warning about talking to diplomats. D.B. agreed and I have asked Antony to prepare a paper.

I gave D.B. a brief resume of our discussion on secret inks. He agreed with our decision to give certain information to the Belgian Congo and rather more to the French in North Africa, while withholding certain vital tests at any rate until the Second Front opened, when the matter could be reconsidered.

Harry Allen came in to see me to say goodbye before going to Mid East. He told me that from his conversations with Jock Whitefoord he gathered that the latter was a little worried about Dixon. He did not know whether Dixon was getting on or whether he was doing any planning. I said that I felt Dixon was in an extremely difficult position. It was almost impossible for him to start any planning until the Barrow Committee had decided what the relations of I.B.1, 2 and 3 were to be and what functions each section was to perform. In fact we cannot even give them a lecture,

since the first question they will ask is What are our duties and responsibilities? Equally the whole position of COAO seems to be in the melting pot, and lastly nobody knows what the operation is to be. It seemed to me that either Dixon, Younger and ourselves ought to settle this matter or the Barrow Committee. Harry, while appreciating these difficulties, seemed to think that Dixon could do something. I think the only thing is for me to go and see Jock Whitefoord.

The D.G. came up a little later and repeated what Harry had said. I told him what I had said to Harry. Personally I feel very strongly about the whole matter, which seems to me to have been grossly mishandled from the start. I had the utmost contempt for the M.I. Directorate who for 18 months have been deliberating on the question of I.B., and seemed totally incapable of making up their minds. If I were the DMI I should be gravely concerned about what is going on in Italy, but I doubt very much whether the question has ever entered his head that no proper provision has ever been made for I.B. duties there. Harry said nothing about Dick's visit, but I learn from Dick himself that he has, as in fact I always thought he would, written to Hill-Dillon. The answer is almost certain to be "Things in Italy seem to be working quite well but we cannot let you have a definite report until matters settle down. We do not think it necessary for Dick White to visit the Area". Of course the DMI ought to have sent a telegram to Kenneth Strong, saying that

subject to Eisenhower's approval, he proposed to send Dick White to get first hand experience of I.B. duties in the field in order that the Barrow Committee might have a better idea as to what will be required for Overlord.

We are getting a stream of reports from SIS on the state of morale in Germany. There seems no doubt that all but a small minority have given up hope of winning the war. There are still however a certain number who think that a compromise peace would be possible. There is a great fear of the Russians. Rumours are still current about Russo-German peace moves. There does not however seem to be any real evidence. The Japs, Turks and Spaniards are undoubtedly anxious to get peace negotiations between Germany and Russia started. Ribbentrop would I think like to do the same. Hitler on the other hand is opposed to anything of the kind and there is no indication that the Russians view such a proposition with favour. Turkey is anxious about the conference between Molotov, Eden and Hull in Moscow. She thinks that Britain, American and Russia may come to some agreement about concessions in the Mediterranean at Turkey's expense, and wonders whether it would not perhaps be worth her while to try and settle any outstanding points with Russia direct before the conference comes to an end. This is only the idea of the Turkish Minister in Washington and may not find favour in Ankara.

Forty-three German agents have been brought to this country during the last year, but only 13 were to operate in the U.K. The total

number of agents sent to the U.K. is now 75. According to HANSEN, the latest arrival, the Germans are training others. We must therefore expect an increase which is probably due to the enemy's anxiety about our invasion plans.

We now have nightly raids by not more than about a dozen planes. Only one or two reach the centre of London. These raids are no doubt retaliation for our nightly Mosquito raids over Berlin.

I learn from Montague that M.S.S are putting out frequent reports about the disposition of our troops in this country. It seems that we should not be told about this.

October 22nd

Mutt and Jeff did not receive their new transmitter, on the grounds that a plane with an experienced crew was not available. They have been promised delivery next month. Meanwhile Mutt is to be manoeuvred into the Intelligence Corps. Mutt and Jeff have sent an indignant message about the unheralded arrival of HANSEN whose capture has come to their notice. They say. "Extremely important. Jack furious. He retorts that parachute agent caught night 30th Sept. near Frazerburgh. This is madness. You promised us delivery. In stead of that you play silly tricks in our area. Why our rotten treatment. Do you by any chance think that new man can give better service? On account of length of service we must insist that we are considered first. Another trick like this and we are through".

This drew the reply "Don't be abusive. It all has its reason. Greetings and best wishes".

Last Sunday's "Sunday Chronicle" has raked up Plan Bunbury again. The Hamlet-Mullet-Puppet case is not going too well and raises some doubts. Hamlet has to go to Paris to explain. Joseph has left for Lisbon. Gelatine has received £238. The Worm has got employment with PWE. Lipstick has gone to Madrid where the Germans appear to be extremely satisfied with his preliminary interrogation. They have asked Berlin to send two experts on England to exploit Lipstick's information to the full. It now seems that serious efforts are being made to pay Dragonfly and that in fact some jewellery may shortly be arriving. In view of the possibilities of this case being revived efforts are being made to manoeuvre Dragonfly into a position which will enable him to travel about the country and report on troop movements.

I gave a lecture to the LRC this afternoon. AFTER referring to my first lecture, when I went over the pre-war ground, I explained that I would try and tell them firstly what we believe to be the enemy's sources of information in this country, and organisation, secondly what the German I.S. thought of us, and lastly what we thought of the German I.S.

As regards the enemy's sources of information, I said that they were (1) what we give him, (2) what he gets through neutral embassies, neutral journalists working to their embassies, and neutral missions, (3) what he gets from our

lack of signals security (4) what he gets from P/Ws and captured agents (5) what he gets from Eire (6) what he gets from seamen and pilots plying between this country and the Peninsula. (7) penetration of official or non-official British agencies abroad (8) what some of the more dubious members of the Abwehr in the Peninsula or elsewhere invent. (9) what they get from our Press (10) photographic reconnaissance.

What the German I.S. think of us: (a) he considers the FBI a far more formidable obstacle than the British S.S.. This is probably due to the policy of the FBI which is inclined to work on a smash and grab basis with huge headlines in the press. (b) he seems fairly satisfied with his performance here, probably because it is our policy to keep him as far as possible in the dark. (c) the enemy has sent over 15 agents during the last year and 75 altogether. Apart from the 13 that had been executed since the beginning of the war he is generally speaking in ignorance of what has happened to the remainder. He may speculate (1) that they have come here solely to get out of his clutches, (2) that having come here with good intentions they found matters difficult, got cold feet and did nothing, (3) that circumstances had made it impossible for them to operate or (4) that they have gone over to our side. (d) he must think that our powers of detecting an illicit transmitter from this country are strictly limited since as far as we can see he has confidence in 20 XX agents here who have been working

over a long period. (e) owing to lack of wireless discipline in the army, he cannot have a very high opinion of our military security. (f) he has a considerable respect for the LRC which he regards as a difficult barrier to pass. (g) in some quarters the Abwehr is inclined to think that the British I.S. is ubiquitous.

What we think of the Abwehr: (a) They made a bad start by not preparing the ground efficiently before the war. (b) While their organisation is sound and logical on paper, and in this respect has many advantages over our own it seems to fall down on matters of detail. (c) The quality of many of the agents is not good, vide the recent case of HANSEN. The training varies according to the district from which the agent comes but is on the whole not of a particularly high standard. (d) The cover stories are often weak. (e) Cover addresses show a lack of system involving grave risks to agents. (f) There does not appear to be any really careful scrutiny of an agent's work. There are times when his reports if looked at with a critical eye and compared with reports from other agents should lead to the conclusion that the individual is in our pay. Only high-grade technical information would seem to be the subject of careful scrutiny. (g) There are definite indications that certain sections of the Abwehr or agents working to them are fabricating entirely inaccurate information, which it should be impossible for any responsible person to swallow. Nevertheless the information is accepted not only locally but also in Berlin.

(h) It follows that certain representatives of the Abwehr must be regarded as, consciously or unconsciously dishonest. In this connection certain factors should be taken into account: (1) if personal relations are good there is a tendency among spy-masters to regard their agents as infallible, or at any rate as honest reports. (2) Even if a spy-master comes reluctantly to the conclusion that he has been having his leg pulled, it is difficult for him, particularly in the German Service, to admit to his superiors that a large expenditure of money has taken place over a long period on reports which have been largely misleading. There are undoubtedly cases where Abwehr officials who have come to this conclusion have deliberately continued to furnish false information or tried to sell out. (i) The enemy has failed to exploit to any degree the immensely advantageous position of the neutrality of Eire. (j) He has also failed to exploit a certain percentage of disloyal elements that are known to exist in this country. (k) He has failed in his attempts at sabotage in the British Isles although he has had some successes in Gib. (l) It is probably true to say that the Abwehr have failed to obtain any reliable information of strategic importance. They had no clear conception of the nature of our operations in N. Africa, they got no advance information about the Casablanca Conference, and they were muddled about our attack on Sicily. Tactically however they have had certain successes outside this country, particularly with regard to ship reporting in the Gib. area and also to some

extent in N. Africa where they carried out their successful attack on Gafsa. (m) Abt. III F. work has been good. (n) There seems little doubt that the OKW share our views about the inefficiency of the Abwehr since certain important members of its personnel have recently been removed from office, and considerable encroachments on its preserves made by the S.D. It is difficult therefore for us to say what weight is attached to reports received from the Abwehr and how far strategic and tactical moves are based on them. There has been some change in the manner of their distribution and the onus of assessing them has to some extent been decentralised on to local commanders in the field. In Berlin they pass to that section of the OKW known as Fremde Heere, where they are presumably collated with information from other sources.

In conclusion I complimented the LRC on the excellence of their work and said that it would be dangerous, even if we thought that the Abwehr was not particularly efficient, to relax our vigilance in any way. We knew that it was the enemy's intention to increase the number of agents he is sending here and presumably to improve his methods. He anticipated that we should invade the continent and he therefore was anxious to obtain as much information about our intentions as possible.

After the lecture I spoke personally to the heads of sections about the interrogation

of unaccredited agents. I explained to them that cases had been brought to my notice from time to time by CSS which were in the nature of complaints. It was said that agents were interrogated about their work for SIS and that there was a lack of security. In each case the matter had been gone into very carefully as a result of which it had been found that no fault lay with the LRC. I had explained that it was necessary to interrogate an unaccredited agent both on his movements and his contacts. If this were not done it was impossible to conduct a security examination. We as a service could not waive our rights unless SIS could assure us that an agent was accredited and known to them to be of proved reliability. There was however a psychological aspect to this whole question. Some of the examiners may in their time have run agents themselves. If so they would know it was extremely anxious work and that it was a natural inclination to safeguard such an agent from any possible risk of leakage about his work. I thought therefore that it was important that officers at the LRC should do their utmost to meet SIS's requirements in this respect even if they felt that the precautions were unnecessary or exaggerated. What was even more important was that the section heads should establish personal contact and obtain the confidence of their opposite numbers in the P. Sections of SIS. I had made strong representations to CSS that P. Officers should visit the LRC and satisfy themselves that the business was conducted with the utmost discretion. I found everyone very responsive.

October 23rd

Frost came to see me about the letter that he had received from the D.G. He asked me whether I had already seen it. I said that I had and that the D.G. had consulted me. As Frost himself had told me that he had very little work to do and was looking for another job I had agreed with the terms of the D.G.'s letter. Frost's attitude was quite friendly but he did not altogether like the passage in the D.G.'s letter where it was suggested that his agreement with this office should terminate at the end of November. He rather took up the attitude that poor old Frost had been brought into this office somewhat against his will on the assumption that there was a job to do. He quite saw that circumstances had changed but he felt that through no fault of his own he was now being thrown to the Army. He thought that it would be up to the office to see that he obtained suitable employment, and not sent to some distant station as an RTO. I said that I was sure that the D.G. in accordance with the terms of his letter would be very willing to assist Frost in any way to obtain other suitable employment. Frost said that he would write a reply to the D.G.'s letter somewhat on the lines of our conversation. I suggested that he should see the D.G. personally in addition to writing him the letter.

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October 25th

The D.G. called a meeting this morning to discuss our recommendations on OVERLORD to the ISSB, with particular reference to the establishment of a 15 mile belt from the Wash to Penzance. Barry had prepared a good note on the subject in which we expressed the view that a visitors' ban to this area would be of considerable assistance to the military authorities in preventing entry to certain regulated areas within the belt. We also thought that if it came to our knowledge that some inquisitive person was wishing to visit the coastal area it would be useful to have an official reason for keeping him out. Lastly we felt that it was difficult to urge the military to pay special attention to security matters during the period preceeding OVERLORD if we were at the same time going to acquiesce in freedom of movement for civilians, enemy aliens etc.

Jo Archer and Egerton-Johnson came to see me about a document which had been captured in N. Africa last June. It disclosed an accurate knowledge of the performances and production figures of most of our aircraft. In one case it stated that certain modifications were being made to the Stirling bomber. These modifications had been discussed on a high level in MAF and of course also with Shorts and the Bristol Co. but the whole scheme had been scrapped in March 1943. It seems fairly clear that this piece of information would not be discovered either from P/Ws or from a captured aircraft. The assumption is that it leaked either from MAF or from the companies

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through some neutral air attache, possibly the Swedish. I said that in my view we should conduct a very searching enquiry and have carte blanche for one of the B.5 officers to investigate MAP, Air Ministry and the factories concerned. It was arranged that I should see Air Marshal Sorley of MAP tomorrow.

MacIver came to see me about Badeley and Seeds.

I have arranged with him that Hart should go down and look at their work. It may be that in the purge we shall be able to dispense with Badeley's services. He is an honest plodder but not very reliable. Seeds then might perhaps be brought up here and placed under Hart.

I had a meeting with ADNI, Coombes of the ISSB, Lennox and others at which we discussed security measures for OVERLORD. The Admiralty agreed to look into the question of coast-watchers, and see whether first of all the numbers could be increased and secondly whether any assistance could be obtained from the Observer Corps and the Home Guard. As regards foreign fishing boats and crews Adam said that only 12 would remain at Brizham, as I gather that some of them are concerned in SI² activities. Such steps as were possible would be taken to warn fishing vessels about putting into Eire ports and Eire coasting vessels would be kept strictly to their four ports on the west coast. Lastly a limiting area would be made round the Bristol Channel for fishing vessels and Coastal Command would be asked to report any boats seen outside

that area. On the matter of Irish labour and travel we eventually came to the conclusion that it would be best to do nothing that was in any sense abnormal and to take the risk that any information which did leak out would be more likely to cause confusion than otherwise.

I dined with Harker and Liam Archer. The latter seemed in very good form. He has come over visiting Air Force training Centres etc.

October 26th

I attended a meeting at the JIC at which the future of that organisation was discussed. I said that as far as we were concerned we should welcome the existence of some such body where our problems could be aired. I made special reference of the study that we had made before the war of the NSDAP and its foreign branches. It was only with the greatest difficulty that we could get anybody to take any interest in this important matter. Had the JIC been there it might perhaps have been possible to get something done. As it was, the issue was always sidetracked, even though our paper reached the Cabinet on at least 2 occasions. When we suggested that the NSDAP and the Fascio should be dissolved, as alien to our institutions here, someone in the Cabinet said that this could not be done unless we dissolved the Communist Party, obviously a completely false analogy. It

was decided that the JIC would prepare a short paper without going into any detail, so that the matter might be on record when its status was considered at some future date.

The JIC then discussed a paper put up by DNI suggesting that a small committee should be formed on a low level of workers from the 3 Intelligence Services who were concerned with German affairs. The idea was to obtain the most up to date collated information regarding the enemy's counter-movements to OVERLORD in order that these might be brought to the notice of COSSAC. It was decided to ask COSSAC for their views. I rather gather that this proposal had come from below. It was not welcomed by the DMI who must I presume be a firm believer in the procedure of the M.I. Directorate, by which everything in theory percolates through from the lowest to the highest. The trouble is that it percolates very slowly and probably on some occasions not at all. If it does, the highest, who do not see the lowest, may well misinterpret its significance. If I were the DMI I should see Melland for quarter of an hour every day since from the M.I. point view he is handling by far the most vital material in the W.O. In fact, the DMI has only seen Melland once and that by accident. C. who was present at the meeting, spoke about a meeting of the Defence Committee which he had attended. The subject was the rocket gun. There was a number of eminent professors present including Lord Charwell. The latter maintained his view with considerable force

that the rocket-gun was either a hoax or a cover for something else. He did not think that it was scientifically possible to throw 75 tons on the rocket principle. This was not however the view of other prominent professors. The meeting was finally swayed by Smuts, who said that whatever the facts he thought there was sufficient evidence to regard the whole matter as extremely grave. He thought that every possible counter-action should be taken. I gather that the Air Force are going into action shortly on the various emplacements on the continent, the existence of which is known. C. was very emphatic that no further publicity should be given to this matter and no indication that HMG were in any sense alarmed by what had appeared in the Swedish Press. If the Germans thought that we had the wind up it would be increasingly difficult to sort out the facts from scare propaganda. The JIC take the view that if they had to make a bet they would come down on the side of Charwell but they think that every possible counter-measure should be taken. Regular meetings are to be held by the Sands Committee and the PM is to be kept constantly informed.

At the DGs meeting Brook Booth gave us an account of recent decisions about Italians here. There are apparently about 13,000 at large, only 9,000 of which are subject to restrictions. It is proposed that we should vet these 9,000 with a view to their being employed. The internees in the I.O.M. are also to be vetted. They will be released to take up employment but if in any way they prove unsatisfactory they will be re-interred. Dual nationals are also to be vetted on the

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same basis. They cannot however be re-interned unless there is a real case against them. They can only be prosecuted for any offence that they may commit as British subjects under the D.R.s. If of course there was an over-whelming case against them on security grounds a fresh 13B order could be obtained.

Gibbs came to see me about returning to a job in the Petroleum Board. I said that much as I regretted his departure, as I was quite sure that we should need his services later on, I could not retain him when there was no suitable job which would occupy his full time.

I called on Air Marshal Sorley with Jo Archer and Egerton-Johnson. We discussed the leakage case and he agreed that a thorough enquiry should be made. He thought it possible that a good deal of the information could have been built up from a variety of sources, namely P/W, observation of captured aircraft, etc. On the other hand the information as a whole was extremely accurate and the production figures could not very well have leaked except through MAP or the firm. He recommended that we should first of all try and ascertain whether the German report indicated leakage of a document. This could be done by a study of production figures for last June and also for a period of 3 to 6 months before that date. The figures given might possibly be the current figures or they might be figures which we anticipated we should reach on a certain date. We might then direct our enquiries to specific points in the document.

He would give us carte blanche to do this as far as MAP were concerned. He thought that in any case some sort of enquiry would be useful as it might throw up potential sources of leakage. It would also be good for firms to tell them that the performances of their aircraft and their production figures were accurately known to the enemy. I said that in my view the most likely channel of leakage was through neutral air attaches. We knew for certain that they were extremely active and that the information they supplied did ultimately reach the Germans. There would seem no point in these people being allowed such freedom of action since on reciprocal grounds we did not stand to gain anything from neutral countries. He entirely agreed. The trouble is that many firms manufacturing aircraft are thinking of the post war period and are anxious to advertise their goods to prospective foreign buyers. This is probably the way a good deal of the information goes out.

Major Villiers of Key Points came to see me. He had discovered that various secret establishments in use by ourselves, SIS and SOE had no priority in the case of fire, bomb disposals, hospital treatment etc. They had been kept off his list on the grounds of secrecy. He proposed to have a specially secret list and to make arrangements with his officer in the areas concerned to give first priority. The matter came to notice because a bomb dropped close to one of SOE's establishments. When they asked for hasty removal owing to large quantities of explosives in the vicinity they were told that as they

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were not on the key points list they could not be given any assistance for 2 or 3 days.

Maunsell, Charles Dick and I had a short talk about the future of SIME. We all agreed that it was very much dependent on the future of this office and the possible amalgamation of SIS and ourselves. At the same time it was thought desirable that Maunsell should put in some document recommending the continuance of SIME after the war. Its status locally would depend to some extent on whether the area remained a military one. It seemed likely that it would, in which case SIME might go under the local JIC. Alternatively it might come under the Minister, if there was a Minister. In any case we thought that if it reverted to a civilian status it should if possible be based on this office. If there was no amalgamation between ourselves and SIS SIME and ISLD should if possible become a joint MI5/6 concern.

October 27th

I gather that Frost is taking a line that he is fed up with MI5 and resigning and that the whole trouble is due to jealousy on my part. This is certainly an interesting point of view and I am deeply intrigued to know what I am supposed to be jealous of.

At the Wednesday meeting Hart said that William HEAP has arrived at Gib. with a somewhat unconvincing story. He will be sent on to the LRC. BERTRAND is waiting in Lisbon and is expected here shortly.

Wethered reported a rather bad case relating to Free French Resistance movements. An SOE agent reported a number of arrests. On enquiry it seemed that a list of the cover names of the agents had been sent out to the head of the organisation in France, who was subsequently arrested, interrogated and released. It must be assumed therefore that he divulged the real names of the individuals on the list. Why it was necessary to send such a list out goodness only knows.

Baxter mentioned the case of a man called LEON who had come through the LRC as an unaccredited agent of SOE. While a Belgian report from SIS was being carded it was discovered that a man of the same name was listed as an Abwehr agent. SIS had originally reported that they had no trace and presumably they never passed a copy of the report to SOE. Meanwhile they have lost the original report and the Belgian Surete from whom they got it, have also lost their copy. It now only remains for SOE to lose the agent who is undergoing a preliminary training.

There is confirmation of the Mederic story in certain messages which are being handed out by a representative of the German Legation in Berne to a representative of OSS. It was from this source that the GOERTZ telegrams which are undoubtedly authentic, were received. Other messages which apparently come from Stockholm are signed Hector and do deal with MAP subjects, although the information so far received is totally inaccurate. It is of a somewhat high level kind referring to conversa-

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tions between Portal and Harris in Cripps' ante-room. I am inclined to think that this line for what it is worth has little or no connection with the documents found in North Africa giving performances and production figures of our aircraft.

The Cypher Security Committee has gone into the security of cyphers used by the Armed Forces of the French National Committee and the Allied Govts. in exile. In their opening para. they say: "The Committee feels bound to express its grave concern at the insecurity of these cyphers and to bring this fact to the notice of the JIC". There follows a rough survey of all cyphers in use here and in the Mid East and N. Africa, and it is clear that the situation is far from satisfactory. It is suggested that the heads of the armed forces of the free nations should be invited to agree to the following procedure and to instruct their commanders accordingly:

1. cyphers used for the purpose of sending personal messages, the contents of which it must be recognised are not the affair of any of the other allied govts., must be re-cyphered in One Time Table and a specimen of the latter but not necessarily the page which will actually be used should be submitted to the appropriate British or U.S. authority for their scrutiny from the security view point before such pages are brought into use.

2. Wherever possible all operational messages should be sent in British or US cyphers and be routed through British or US channels.

3. Where communication through British or US channels is not practicable, the armed forces of the free nations will be supplied with proper combined cyphers by the British or US authorities and will use these in accordance with the instructions and with combined communications procedure.

4. the armed forces of the free nations will not use any cypher, code, communication system or signals procedure which in the opinion of the approving British or US authority is not secure, and will obtain the concurrence of these authorities before using any procedure other than the combined systems to be supplied.

5. They will bring to the notice of the British or US authorities any evidence which may come to their knowledge suggesting the compromise of any cypher used by any of the united nations.

This meeting of the Cypher Security Committee was evidently a result of the meeting that we had at Kinnaird House sometime ago, when a fairly complacent view about cypher security of allied govts. was taken by C. and G-P.

The argument was that other "Y" material had never thrown up any indication of leakage.

ARTIST has put in an extremely interesting report about recent changes within the Abwehr. Owing to demands by Gen. von Unruh that everyone of the 1903 class or younger should be called up and that 50% of the remaining Abwehr personnel should be replaced by wounded men from the front, Canaris reluctantly agreed to a cut of 25% of eligible Abwehr personnel, provided it was left to him to decide who could

be dispensed with. Eventually a list of only 15% was made up and many of these did not in the end leave the service of the Abwehr. Instances have come to light of the expenditure of large sums of money on 7 Jewish families which were got out with Canaris' connivance to Switzerland. Ostensibly the payments were made to them as agents but of course they have produced no information, except a certain amount that was made. Piekenbrock, the former head of Abt. I resigned, firstly because he did not like the Nazi regime and did not wish it perpetuated through the victory of Germany, and secondly because he did not feel that as an officer he could take active steps to bring about Germany's defeat. It is generally believed that he asked for a transfer to the eastern front on the assumption that he would probably be killed. In spite of his ability he tolerated extreme inefficiency in the Abwehr, and since the arrival of his successor HANSEN, many subordinate officers in responsible positions have been dismissed. ARTIST mentioned that the director of Einz Luft refused to assess Tricycle's reports from America since in his opinion it was impossible for anyone to transmit from that country. He took this view because his own W/T agent there had proved to be a XX. Hansen is a staff officer but much younger and more energetic than Piekenbrock. He is not a Nazi but he is determined to prevent Germany's defeat at all costs even if this involved coming to terms with Russia. He was formerly in Fremde Heere and was in charge of S.E. Europe. There is no doubt that he means to reform the Abwehr completely although he is having very grave

difficulty in getting suitable personnel. It is to be expected that traffic will be scrutinised with greater care and that certain XX agents now employed may be eliminated. ARTIST believes however that until Abt. I, Besides vetting reports for their value from the point of view of the armed forces and asking for criticisms from the Fremde Heere, makes a practice of passing them to Abt. III for assessment as to the bona fides of the agents supplying them, the Abwehr will not work really efficiently. He states that Abt. III is not as a rule consulted when agents are recruited. This is an interesting conclusion and had the practice which ARTIST now suggests been adopted by the offensive sections of SIS and SOE many disasters might have been avoided. ARTIST recommends that all material fed to the Germans should be in as great detail as possible. This of course has both advantages and disadvantages since reports in detail can be more easily checked. On the other hand vague reports do not carry much weight and are regarded with suspicion. The maxim is "If you lie, lie well and thoroughly and see that you do not get found out". ARTIST draws attention to the fact that the Abwehr tests its agents by asking them to give the location of divisions in the U.K. They are believed to do this as they get a lot of information regarding dispositions of our units through W/T intelligence and low-grade cypher breaks. To sum up, the new officers appointed by Hansen to the Abwehr have no experience of intelligence work nor in most cases of life abroad. They are lacking in technique and in many instances the knowledge

of foreign languages, but they are keener and more active than their predecessors and will probably succeed in tightening up the organisation.

Jack Barrow came to see me and I had a talk with him and Barry about Dixon. It seems that Jock Whitefoord really wants somebody with I.B. staff experience to cope with the organisation of the various units. He wants a man of a certain age and seniority who will be able to bludgeon his way through the heirarchy of the W.O. and of the Army Staffs. Hewould however wish to retain Dixon as his technical adviser on all civil security matters. He has nothing against Dixon but merely feels that he wants this extra help. I suggested that I should go and see Whitefoord in order to discuss this matter with him. I felt that perhaps he was not fully aware of the difficulties of Dixon's position but in spite of this I think there may be something in what he says. At any rate I would not try and dissuade him if he felt strongly about the matter. Barrow said that the last meeting of his committee was unanimous on the inter-relation of I.B.1,2 and 3. In other words my sine qua non for the separate existence of I.B.1 and 3 was accepted. He said however that Dixon was seeing 'iv. at the latter's request. I asked Barrow about Dick's suggested visit to Italy. He was all in favour of it and thought it would be an excellent thing for an IB officer from COSSAC to accompany him. I should rather doubt whether anything had been done about this matter so far. I intend to mention it to Jock Whitefoord when I see him

tomorrow and with Barrow's agreement I am going to see the DMI.

October 28th

Harker, Charles, Jim Hale, Dick Butler and I held a meeting to discuss the question of Frost. The legal view is that his contract is binding and that any arrangement about his departure should be an amicable one. It was decided that the best course would be for the D.G. to write a letter to Foot of the B.B.C. suggesting that Harker and Frost should discuss with him Frost's re-absorption into that organisation. If Foot did not wish to have Frost at the first interview it would be for him to say so. We thought however that it would be preferable for Frost to be there since he would then have no opportunity of saying that we had let him down with the B.B.C. The D.G. should see Frost and hand him a copy of the letter that he had written to the D.G. of the B.B.C.

Butler tells me that Stephenson has insisted on Denham being accompanied by a representative of his office if he goes to see Hoover. Denham replied that if he was to be accompanied he would only go with Stephenson himself. This Stephenson has refused to do. Stephenson has made it quite clear that this is the principle on which he proposes to work. It seems clear therefore that if Mills goes to Washington he will have to be accompanied by a DSC representative. This matter has been represented to Duff who does not wish to take up the question of principle with C.

until Mills meets with resistance.

Dick, Jo, Antony and I discussed the MAP problem. It was agreed that J. should extract from the German report those items for which there was no very reasonable explanation and that these should subsequently be the subject of enquiry by B.5 under his and our direction. We were not inclined to think that there was any link between the Hector messages and the information in the German report. On the evidence available it seemed that the German report is almost certainly compiled and not taken from a British document. This however needs verification. A useful checking point will be the production figures and Jo will undertake this job. We all felt that whatever the prospects of getting to the bottom of the case were, it would be valuable to conduct some sort of enquiry which would doubtless bring to light a number of potential sources of leakage. Jo gave various instances of how the information might have leaked out. MacKenna a director of Shorts, was formerly an RAF officer and is employed in the RAF Experimental establishment. His job is to go round all bomber stations and to find out from Stirling pilots what their difficulties are. He would naturally discuss any modifications to the aeroplane which were in contemplation. If these pilots were subsequently shot down they might well have given the information away unwittingly. A good deal could be done on the production figures by computation. If for example the enemy knew that there were so many Stirling squadrons in action they would be able to say roughly that to keep these

aeroplanes in the air with the losses incurred would necessitate a production of so many aeroplanes per month. Blunt is examining the position as regards messages sent out via neutral attaches. He will also get special facilities both for certain service attaches and possibly also for test pilots. Jo does not think there is much in keeping visitors away from factories. It was rather doubtful whether much information passes in this way. It is much more likely to pass over the dinner table when an attache has made contact with a test pilot, who must have the most up to date information about the machine. We know of course that Rupert Belleville of Vickers is in the closest touch with Sartorius, the Spanish Air Attache and that the latter is in possession of the production figures for Speke.

I saw Jock Whitefoord at the Club. I told him that I had heard from Harry Allan that he was not altogether happy about Dixon. He said that frankly he was not. Neither he nor Col. Black, of the American Forces, seemed to have any real confidence in him. He thought he ought to be getting on with the planning of a big scale but in certain memoranda that he had put up he did not feel that Dixon was quite the calibre to do this. He thought in a way that he ought to have somebody with Staff experience. He had nothing personal against Dixon. I said straight away that I understood his point of view and that if he had no confidence in Dixon, obviously Dixon must be withdrawn. On the other hand I did feel that Dixon had been in somewhat of a difficulty since it was not easy to plan until certain

basic matters had been settled. It had not yet been decided what the relations of I.B1,2 and 3 were to be. This matter was in the hands of the Barrow Committee. Equally the whole organisation of AMGOT was in the melting pot. Whitefoord agreed, but still felt that even if decisions had been made Dixon was not quite the man to handle the job. We agreed to meet again at lunch on Sunday to discuss the problem further.

I dined afterwards with Art Thurston who seems very satisfied with the co-operation he is getting here, but is evidently dissatisfied with the lack of co-operation he is experiencing with SIS. He hardly ever went to Ayder St. himself. Cimperman still went down and saw the ISOS but even in that field there were certain matters which had apparently been withheld. I told Thurston that I had seen Dick Ellis before he went back, that I had known him for a long time, liked him, and regarded him as straight. I did not know what the Bureau had against him. I rather doubt whether Thurston knew either.

John Booth called at the flat and stayed till about 1.30 a.m. talking about the N.African campaign. He had been ill with pneumonia for about 2 months but had now recovered. He was employed in N.Africa in a special unit for the interpretation of photographs. This branch of the service has now become immensely important and nobody dreams of going into battle without it. The Americans have no such unit.

John's account of the Americans is most depressing although he thinks that possibly they may have gained experience and improved during the Italian campaign. The difficulty in N. Africa was to stop them from running. The Grenadier Guards took Longstop Hill 3 times each time the Americans took over from them while they advanced on the next objective, and each time the Americans were driven out of their positions and the Guards had to re-occupy them. At Gafsa, where they had about 4 divisions they took over from what was little more than a battalion of Frenchmen. These Frenchmen had been holding the Germans back with considerable success, but immediately the Americans were attacked they decamped. More or less the same thing happened at Kirouan. Here the Guards were ordered to take one hill on the north side of the ravine and the Americans on the south side, in order that the armoured units could go through between the two hills. The purpose of this operation was to cut off Rommel's retreating forces which were being subjected to frontal attack by the 8th army. The Guards reached their objective on time but the Americans who had more than double the number of troops, did not move. A British General went round to see what was happening and received the reply that "my fellows are doing fine". When it was pointed out that they had apparently not started, the American general said that things were very tough. Asked whether he had any casualties, he replied no. In the end the Guards had to go through the American Division and capture the other hill. By that time it was too late for the armoured divisions to cut off Rommel.

In spite of these incidents the Americans appear to be entirely without shame. John's G.2 met a coloured driver going full out along the road to Bone. He stopped him and asked him what he was doing. The nigger replied "I'se retreatin'. I'se not stopping till I sees the sea".

I asked John the reason for the German collapse in front of Tunis and Bizerta. He said that they had apparently ascertained where our armour was concentrated and intended to go through. They brought up about 100 of their 88 mm gun which is used both for A.A. and anti-tank purposes, and concentrated them in the area. These were discovered by photograph reconnaissance. A huge concentration of some 600 British guns was brought up to deal with them. They were completely annihilated at the beginning of the attack and the armour went through, some 4 divisions fanning out in the rear of the enemy. The form now with artillery is to put them well out in front of the infantry before the attack begins. They are only covered by patrols. In addition to producing a creeping barrage they also do very effective counter-battery work. The German's most effective weapon is his anti-tank gun and his 6-barrelled mortar which seems to work on the Stokes principle.

The French fought magnificently in spite of their lack of equipment, in spite of their old telephones and wires as compared with the Americans cabinet wireless sets with teleprinters etc. The French always knew where their front line was but the Americans were ofte

20 miles out. One of the great faults in the American army is that they do not appear to have any leaders. They are so obsessed by what they believe to be democratic principles that the right man never seems to get to the top. John is now a strong supporter of the old school tie. It is not infrequent to find 3 NCOs and a squad of 6 men, with no one really taking command. Much of the American equipment is extremely good, particularly the Sherman tank. John does not think much of the German Tiger tank which though very formidable cannot owing to its weight operate very satisfactorily in difficult country. He thinks the Churchill has done very well in spite of criticism. Mopping up after the battle for Tunis and Bizerta did not take very long. Parties of German prisoners were given directions as to the route they were to take to Bone, which was the collecting centre and proceeded there almost unattended. They were most of them orderly and decent fellows, in contrast with the Italians who were dirty and insolent. The Italians are apparently capable of brutality and have also been guilty of appalling negligence in the handling of P/Ws. Some of our P/Ws were kept in a desert camp nearly 6 months and arrived in Italy in an appalling state.

There was considerable rivalry between the First and Eighth Armies and a good deal of comment on the self-advertisement of Monty. Everyone has a great respect for Alexander who seems to have the power of bringing order out of chaos in a very short time.

October 29th

I had a talk with Dick this morning about Dixon and also a long talk with Gwyer about his recent experiences which seem to show up many deficiencies in the I.B. organisation. I am quite sure that the first thing to do is to arrange that all the information bearing on the Second Front should be prepared in the right form by a Committee consisting of ourselves, SIS, Melland and 2 officers in 21st Army Group who appear to be collecting data. In the light of this information plus the experience derived from operations in Italy, should be possible to say how the I.B. forces should be disposed. To make a decision about the organisation in vacuo would seem to be entirely wrong. There does not for the moment appear to be any decision as to how a reserve army pool of 100 men and 20 officers is to be used. Some people think it should remain a pool, others think that these forces should be allocated down to divisions. I cannot see myself how Dixon alone can decide these matters and I agree with Whiteford that he needs an adviser with staff experience and knowledge of ordinary I.B. duties. He should however have at his elbow an expert who will advise him as to how to dispose his forces. What is absolutely wrong is that we know very little about the Army and the Army know very little about us.

* Brooman-White has returned but I have not
 Catalogue Reference: KW/4/192 his experiences.

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Frost attended a meeting of the junior JIC at which Signals Security by the Allied Govts. was discussed. Apparently Arnold-Foster and Cavendish-Bentinck were very much opposed to the granting of One-Time Pads to the Allies since they felt that this would cut us off from valuable intelligence. They suggested therefore that the matter should be referred back to the G.C. & C.S. Nobody seems to have asked the following questions: (a) what communications of the allied forces have been monitored during the last 6 months, (b) have they been correct, (c) what information do they contain? It seems to me that only with this data is it possible to decide whether security should take precedence over intelligence or vice-versa.

Milmo came to see me about 2,000 French airmen who are coming to this country from N. Africa for training, having been previously vetted locally. He feels very strongly, and I agree, that all the names should be passed over our records and that those who came to N. Africa after the German occupation should be examined at the LRC. The reasons are that on the analogy of the cases of FEYGUIN and some of these individuals may have been sent here to fly aircraft back to the enemy lines. BERTRAND who is coming here may give us important information about this. It has already transpired through ISOS that BERTRAND has been asked to find out what has happened to JUDE and another man who was mentioned by JUDE in his interrogation. This man is in fact Catalogue Reference: KV/4/192 has a brother with him. It would I think be criminal not to

examine these cases very carefully since an airman might well leave this country after briefing day for OVERLORD.

Walter Bell came to see me about America. He had had a long talk with Viv. who seemed to be extremely irritated with the FBI. Thurston apparently made contact with MEW whom he asked for information about agencies in S. America. Viv. regards this as the Trojan Horse. I said that I thought it would be much better to have these matters out with Thurston. Bell is going to try and tackle him. Probably Thurston is acting on the orders of TAMM.

October 30th

TAR came to tell me about discussions with the Controller and COSSAC as to the future of deception on the Second Front. He thinks that it ought to be done on the same lines as those employed by Dudley Clarke in the Mid East. Firstly there is Bevan, who controls global deception. Under him are controls for the eastern and western Mediterranean working to Dudley Clarke in Cairo. There is however at the moment no European controller. It is felt that one should be appointed and that he should be in COSSAC. His role would be to work out strategic deception. Under him will be an officer at 21st Army Group who will work out tactical deception. This officer will be responsible for working out tactical plans and deception and for giving the plan the necessary support on the ground by means

of dummy units and also by means of wireless deception. Under him will be an officer from B.1A who will be known as the controller of channels. It will be his responsibility to write out the messages for agents on the basis of his superior officer's plans and to place these messages through whatever agency is considered to be most suitable, whether it be in the field or in this country. This is how things are working in the Med. at the moment. Dudley Clarke is the controller of strategic deception. Under him in Italy is Trangeways who is responsible for tactical deception, works out a plan and moves the units on the ground, in addition to arranging for wireless deception. He has another officer under him who concocts the messages to be passed through agents. He goes first to the S.I(b) unit who may or may not be able to help. He also may use channels in Algiers or even in London.

Cussen came to see me about the CUENCA case. CUENCA has appealed to the Privy Council. All the documents in the case were obtained by his solicitor and sent to the Spanish Embassy here for transmission to whatever solicitor or counsel would be acting for CUENCA in an appeal. The documents came by bag, one copy being sent to us and the other to the Spanish Embassy. This was most unfortunate since the documents contained a good deal about Medlam's agents. So far as we know the Spanish Embassy did not get particularly excited about them and we have now succeeded in obtaining them through Ignatius. We are holding them here until they

are handed over to the firm of solicitors. The best procedure would have been for Medlam to despatch the documents on behalf of the solicitors in Gib. to us for transmission to the solicitors in London. This would have avoided the necessity for the documents passing through the hands of the Spanish Embassy.

Peter Ramsbotham called in. He is getting on with his training which will not be completed probably for about 2 or 3 months. He then hopes we may be able to place him in an I.B. unit. He is at present learning to ride a motor-bicycle.

October 31st

Tin-Eye rang up about HOPPE, the ISOS character at 020. They had been unable to get anything out of him up to the present. He had however forwarded his pants to this office in order that certain gelatinous substances found in the waistband or turn-up could be examined at the laboratory. Noakes got hold of Hedger who after submitting the substance to various tests said that he did not think it could be used either as an ink or a re-agent.

I lunched with Whitefoord and Col. Black, the American, his G.I. They confirm former views about Dixon and it seems fairly clear that we have no option but to withdraw him. It is I think rather bad luck as many of his difficulties have been due to lack of foresight by the Army, who should long ago have made up their minds what an I.B. Staff should look like. It was agreed that if I could obtain the D.G.s

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approval Dick should be attached to the IB Staff Officer who would be provided by the Army. He should have an assistant who after the planning stage was over could take over and proceed overseas if necessary. It was thought that Dick should do a fortnight with the Staff Officer and then go with his under-study to view the position on the ground in Italy.

We talked about deception. Whitefoord's view is that tactical deception within the bridgehead is not likely to be necessary since having established a bridgehead we should obviously be pushing out all along the line. The only form of deception which is likely to arise in the early stages could probably be more easily dealt with from here, e.g. an indication that we were going to land at several places. As I understand the position from Whitefoord, our estimate is that the forces that are known to be at our disposal can deal with the present estimate of German forces on the continent. In such an eventuality it is thought that the operation would move extremely quickly. If it can't, it is not worth doing at all. If therefore the German divisions on the continent are suddenly increased, it is quite possible that the operation won't take place, and that an alternative will be adopted. This is of course just the kind of thing that anyone planning an I.B. staff should know. I have arranged for Dick and myself to dine with Whitefoord and Black on Friday evening. In the meantime we should I think get out something in the nature of a plan which we can base on the

information acquired by Gwyer during his month attachment to I.B. at G. I. Q. Home Forces and 21st Army Group.

Ned Reid sent me down a file Levers Optical Bros. He brought the case to the notice of the Inland Revenue owing to certain curious banking transactions. On enquiry they found that they had been defrauded of some £42,000. Payments had been made for fictitious purchases of goods, and the cheques so drawn were cashed, and the cash went into the personal accounts of the directors. This, as it is a public company, was a fraud not only on the Revenue but also on the shareholders. The company had in its files fictitious invoices which went into considerable detail and had been stamped in different ways indicating that the goods had been received, examined, checked etc. whereas in fact there were no goods at all. This involved a widespread conspiracy within the company and also apparently meant that they had at least one accomplice outside who provided them with a printed and stamped receipt. The question of prosecution is under consideration. In the case of MORGAN which Ned is also investigating, the Revenue has also been defrauded of £300,000. MORGAN has already offered to pay up £400,000. His offer has been refused and a demand for the full amount is being made.

Stopford has wired to say that he is on his way back from the Azores. Victor has left for Gib. Maunsell has returned to London after waiting about on the aerodrome for 5 days

A serious case of attempted sabotage on the LMS line near Sheffield on 13th October has come to notice. Concrete blocks were placed on the line in one case and bogey wheels wedged at a crossing in another. It is thought that this was an attempt to derail the Scotch Express. The LMS Railway Police strongly suspect a railway fireman on the line but so far insufficient evidence has been obtained to take definite action.

The German sabotage service in Spain has approached a member of the Italian organisation to obtain details of the Gib. freshwater supply either with a view to contamination or destruction.

The Germans are increasing their activities against British shipping in Spanish ports. Madrid has recently requested Berlin to send more SCE equipment for their underwater attacks on our shipping. Berlin have also been asked to try and get hold of 6 members of the Italian Naval Sabotage organisation. They are to bring Italian sabotage equipment with them. Potash is being loaded on to allied ships in Spanish ports, particularly Huelva and Barcelona. ISOS indicates that a sabotage attempt is shortly to be made against one of the ships loading potash by inserting among the cargo a bomb camouflaged as a sack of potash. We propose to try and put skewers through each sack of potash before it is loaded.

The German agent FELIX in the Union of S. Africa has received instructions to carry out acts of

sabotage and has been given various formulae for incendiary and explosive bombs. Every recipe received is familiar to us, having been previously given to German saboteurs such as Mutt and Jeff, Zigzag, Robles, Dasch, Burger and others. Felix is asking for information about the contamination of high-speed steel by chemical methods. Impregnation of bales of wool with delayed action incendiary material, and the insertion of high explosive into cans of fruit intended for ships. He also wants to know about the contamination of locomotive boiler water and how this can be achieved. Felix's enquiries do not ring true in the sense that they display a certain amateurish ambitiousness which suggests that so far he has done nothing and is not likely to do much in the future.

November 1st

Uren, the SOE communist who gave information to SPRINGHALL, has been tried and court-martialled and received a sentence of 7 years. He divulged to complete lay-out of SOE's organisation.

I had a talk with Brook Booth, Dick, Stamp and Group-Capt. Buss about the French pilots being sent to this country from N. Africa. It was agreed that in the light of our knowledge which showed that no less than 9 cases assignments had been given to agents to fly aircraft back to German-occupied territory, it was of the utmost importance to have a proportion of these prospective French pilots thoroughly examined on arrival. We proposed

to pass all the names over the Central ISOS Index, B.I.Reg. and LRC records and to send those who had left the continent after the total occupation of France by the Germans to the LRC. Lastly we proposed to get photographs of all these prospective pilots and show them to FEYGUINE and others who might be able to pick out a spy. I felt that this was a matter of special importance in view of the possibility that one of these pilots might fly over to the enemy between briefing day and D.day and as an added precaution I recommended to G/C Buss that all allied pilots should be grounded between those dates if this could possibly be arranged. He agreed with me that this was a matter which should more properly be put through the ISSB.

I also discussed with Brock Booth the case of certain Polish pilots who have already come to this country. He is going to re-examine the position.

November 2nd

Brig.Vale rang me up today about the letter he had received from Whitefoord relating to Dixon. He wanted to know whether we should be prepared to take Dixon back. Otherwise they would have to get an adverse report on him from Whitefoord and then post him to some other unit as he was on army strength. I said that we were taking Dixon back and that we would also supply a G.2 to understudy Dick White.

We have now been able to piece together the
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story of Franz MAYER, the German sabotage agent arrested in Persia, but there is much still to come in. At the outbreak of war MAYER a man of 29, occupied a secretarial post in one of the commercial organisations of the Reichsgruppe Industrie. In December 1939 he was attached to the German Commercial Mission in Moscow. He returned to Potsdam in Feb. 1940 to join a signals unit as platoon commander, but following orders from the Military Adjutant in Berlin he was transferred in a few weeks to the S.D. Here he met Ramon GAMOTTA and together they volunteered for service in the Mid East, although neither of them had in fact any specialised knowledge of the area. They were, so MAYER claims, romantics imbued with the desire to emulate in this war the exploits of Lawrence in the last. After many delays and disputes with von Ettel, the German Minister in Teheran who objected to the journey, MAYER and GAMOTTA at last reached Persia in October 1940. They were singularly ill-equipped, being without specialist training in intelligence and without any directives as to what they were expected to do. They were obstructed in every way by the German Minister, who refused to allow them communication with Berlin. They succeeded however in making contacts among Persians whose goodwill was later to stand them in good stead, for in August 1941 when the country was occupied by ourselves and the Russians, they had to go into hiding on the outskirts of Teheran. MAYER remained politically inactive until March 1942 when he sought out the Japanese

Minister who was friendly but unco-operative. When however the Minister left in April 1942 he left MAYER 5 W/T sets and some much-needed cash. MAYER in turn gave the Minister a letter to the German Minister in Tokio with a situation report and a suggestion that the Kameradschaftsdienst programme should be used as a channel of communication with him, and enclosing a code to be operated if the suggestion was accepted. MAYER asked that his letter should be acknowledged over this greetings programme to which he listened regularly, and this according to MAYER was subsequently done. MAYER claims that his scheme to use these greetings broadcasts was original. MAYER's main problem has been to bring about some measure of agreement among his Persian friends, who included the influential Deputy i Shiraz, Habbibulah Naubakht, and Gen. Zahidi, G.O.C. for the Isfahan area. He wished to use these people for the formation of an effective 5th column. In Nov. 1942 MAYER was betrayed by one of his closest associates and narrowly escaped capture by the British when on a visit to Isfahan. His papers were seized and disclosed names of a great number of individuals in almost every class of Persian society as members of an extensive 5th column network. It was largely on this list that some 150 arrests were recently made in Persia. In Dec. 1942 MAYER received a KD greetings broadcast which revealed that a special courier was on his way to Teheran. Nothing ever came of this and MAYER was forced to send his Persian merchant on a second trip to Ankara stressing again his urgent need for a wireless operator, and suggesting 3 alterna-

tive landing grounds. He also evolved a plain language code for use in broadcasts from Berlin. In March 1943 MAYER heard by these means that his operator could be expected at the end of March. This Franz mission as it was called duly landed on the 30th March and made its way by camel and motor-truck to Teheran where contact was made with MAYER. The party consisted of 6 Germans 4 of whom were trained W/T operators. Four of the party were S.D. men including its leader Ernst BLUME. The mission came prepared to sabotage the Trans-Iranian railway, although Blume was the only one who had any sabotage training. This was however the last thing that MAYER wanted. He considered his creation of a 5th column in Persia the best way of assisting the war effort and that acts of sabotage could only serve to undermine his political plans, which were, as he described them, to obtain certain indirect control in Persian politics to enable him to thwart British policy in the short run and to assist a German advance through the Caucasus in the long run. The party was therefore diverted at the end of June to South Persia, where in the Bakhtiari country they were able to set up a W/T post and supply information on troop movements, aid to Russia convoys, and the position of oil wells. This party was reinforced by Berlin on the night of the 1st/2nd August with arms and equipment. Meanwhile MAYER in Teheran established communication by wireless with Berlin early in May 1943 and continued operating until his arrest in August which was due to Persian informers. Meanwhile the S.D. in Berlin were planning an

expedition to southern Persia which landed in the region of Shiraz in the middle of July. These people were not under MAYER's control although he succeeded in establishing contact with them. The party is still at large, in addition to a later S.D. party of 4 Germans who are believed to have landed some 50 miles south of Teheran. Both parties included a trained saboteur. There would appear therefore to be at present at large in Persia 9 identified German agents. The Security authorities in Persia believe that there may be some 10 more in addition whose presence they suspect but has not yet been confirmed. The MAYER case shows the SD working along parallel but at the same time competing lines with the Abwehr, and because the former, unlike the latter, is not primarily concerned with the immediate operational plans of the OKW the SD aided by their apparent greater efficiency and methods would appear today to be successfully displacing the Abwehr in Persia as it may yet well do in the Mid East area generally.

Lennox talked to us about future operations and the possibility of an attack on southern France in connection with OVERLORD. Until matters develop in Italy it is not possible to say how far attack of this sort would be feasible or desirable.

At the D.G.s meeting we discussed the P.M.s memo which asks all departments to review their position as they imagine it will be during the transition period from war to peace. The document is somewhat woolly and there seems

little for us to say beyond the fact that we shall be doing precisely what we are doing now, though the incidence may be more on subversive and political movements than on espionage. We shall have to adjust ourselves as the situation demands.

Perfect rang up about an exercise called Murray. Lothian who visited a meeting of CCs was told that they had been addressed by the G.O.C. Inverness on the subject of this exercise which involved suggestions to farmers not to sow crops in certain areas etc. and the evacuation of certain civilians. Perfect knew nothing about this exercise or whether it was in fact an exercise or an operation. I spoke to Lemnox about this but he was likewise in ignorance. He has now found out that Murray is merely an exercise. Perfect should of course have been informed by Spens.

The D.G. spoke to me about Dick going to COSSAC. He now thinks that we ought to let Dick go right in and write him off for the rest of the war. I told him from my point of view this would be impossible and moreover that I did not think it was what COSSAC desired. In discussing the matter with Barry, Charles and Dick, I have come to the conclusion that the best course would be to get John Mair back from N. Africa to fill the post of G.2 Civil Security in COSSAC, under the Staff Officer G.1 who will be nominated by COSSAC themselves. Dick could go to N. Africa, pick up Mair and go on to Italy, bringing Mair back with him.

I lunched with the Belgians, Pierlot, Delfosse, Lapage and Gen. Ganzhof. I asked Lapage and Ganzhof what precisely they were doing in connection with the Second Front. They rather turned the tables on me by saying "What do you want us to do, because so far nobody has told us anything". I explained that we as a department really had very little say in these matters. We were however supplying officers to the I.B. staff and it might be that we could use our influence in the right direction. Speaking quite personally I did not see how the British authorities thought they could possibly operate except in full collaboration with the Belgians who would normally know far more about the area and the people in it who were reliable or unreliable than anyone else. Ganzhof then said that he was quite confident about certain members of his Resistance organisation who were distributed throughout the various provinces. To meet these people he was trying to build up the nucleus of a small administration who would be briefed with dossiers compiled here and be able, in conjunction with reliable local residents of the Resistance movement, to give the authorities the best advice. He was however meeting with a certain amount of difficulty in extracting suitable personnel from the Belgian Army. He had recently been able to get powers to withdraw anyone over the age of 42. There were however others whom he wanted and he did not think that matters were progressing fast enough. He asked me to speak to his Prime Minister, which I accordingly did. Pierlot appreciated the point

I saw Duff in the afternoon and left with him the MT5 report. I told him that we had tried to write it up in a slightly different form as I understood that he had re-hashed the previous report. He gave me copies of his draft. He said that generally speaking the P.M. could not consume more than a very limited amount. I said that we should be very pleased to try and write up the material in a more concise form but that I fully realised that he, knowing the P.M.'s wishes, would undoubtedly be able to do it far better than we could. If therefore he preferred this method perhaps it would be better for us to give him the facts and leave the rest to him. He seemed quite satisfied.

I then spoke to him about the SOE case of KNIGHT. I explained to him that since I had last seen him Archie Boyle had called for a special report on certain aspects of the case from Max Knight, which we had given him. It seemed therefore that he was very conscious of SOE's defects and was determined to get them put right. This being so I thought that it would probably be better if he said nothing to Lord Selbourne. Selbourne would not know anything about the case, would send for Boyle or Senter who would then feel that we had sneaked on them. This would mean that in the future they would not consult us. He thoroughly understood the dilemma and we agreed that as long as something was being done it would be better to leave matters as they were.

The estimated strngth of the Luftwaffe in Russia is 1,600 front line as against 5,000 Russian planes. The Germans are believed to have 23-25 divisions in N. Italy. The Moscow Conference decided to press Turkey into the war.

A British subject named JOB has arrived here and was carefully interrogated by the Asst. SCO at Poole in the light of information given by us that someone was expected to come here with jewellery for Dragonfly. JOB first attracted attention owing to his rather weak story and the fact that he was the son of a naturalised German. He said that he had been interned in various camps and let out on parole and had finally got away through Spain. When searched he was found to have in his possession certain jewellery identical with that described as being destined for Dragonfly. JOB was let through but has been picked up by B.6 and housed with his brother. So far he has made no attempt to contact Dragonfly. We are going to let him run and see what he does. B.6 in following him overheard him say to his brother that in view of his German origin he was likely to be followed in this country.

November 3rd

Lennox came to see me about a suggestion that large numbers of Italians should be employed in the manufacture of concrete pylons at Southampton, Portsmouth and other coastal areas. These will be required for OVERLORD. Labour

is short and Italians are said to be special good at this type of work. COSSAC want to have our opinion from the security angle. I said that if large numbers of Italians were to be let loose within the 15 mile belt it would rather destroy the atmosphere of suggested security measures for OVERLORD. G.C.s would not like it and troops might object. There was also just a possibility that one of them might try and escape by boat. The fact that Italians were now co-belligerents did not to my mind affect the situation one way or another. If they were bored with life in this country they might try and get away. If they fell into the hands of the enemy they would tell everything they knew. I thought therefore that it would be better not to employ them on the south coast and in any case to have them under military guard.

Burt is seeing Sir S. Cripps and suggesting to him that he should give evidence in the HOYSE case. This would give considerable weight to the prosecution.

Jo Archer came to talk about the MAP case in which the Chief of the Air Staff seems to be taking a personal interest. He thinks that he ought to put in a preliminary report recommending that certain security measures should be adopted immediately particularly those relating to the visits of neutral attaches to factories and service aerodromes.

Catalogue Reference: KV/47192 the DGs letter about Frost saying that if we will let them have

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ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
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a confidential report about him they will arrange for his re-absorption.

At the Wednesday meeting we discussed the case of HELMUTH. He was arrested at Trinidad and taken to Bermuda by air and is coming thence by cruiser. He is due to arrive in about a week's time. The case is not a very easy one since HELMUTH is technically an Argentine diplomat on his way to Barcelona to take up a position as Argentine consul. In fact we know him to be destined for Berlin where he is to discuss with Himmler the question of getting arms into Argentine. If he has no incriminating documents on him and sticks to his statement that he is going to Barcelona, it will not be very easy to decide how he is to be disposed of. Vesey mentioned the case of SIBIRIL, who has been responsible for arranging the escape of some 100 Frenchmen by means of small boats. SIBIRIL himself got into difficulties and his organisation has been broken up. We are arranging for him to send a broadcast message which will convey to his collaborators that he has arrived safely in this country.

I later discussed the HELMUTH case with Wick, Herbert and Stamp. We decided that the best technique would be to send down to the port to meet him when he might ascertain something more about HELMUTH's character and whether he had talked at all during the voyage. This would give us an indication as to the best method of breaking him. We all agreed that ultimately he would have to go to O20

Catalogue Reference: KW4/1920 to be detained here for

the duration of the war. I felt that it was important that we should state the case with all its difficulties to the F.O. and make quite sure that if we sent him to O20 they would not press us for confessions, visits by Argentine diplomats etc. This is being done.

I have read the JIC paper on the probabilities of a German collapse, based on the experiences of 1918. There is no doubt that the parallel is a very remarkable one. Emphasis is laid on the fact that in 1918 we were taken unawares because our calculations were based almost entirely upon Germany's military power, whereas in fact the collapse was due to other causes. It is felt that if it were not that the political situation in Germany today was very different from that in 1918 the JIC would unhesitatingly predict that Germany would sue for an armistice before the end of the year. Today however the Nazi regime has had 10 years in which to destroy all traces of democratic ideas and institutions and has during that period been training the nation to endure great suffering. Police and Party control over all phases of the life of the country is very much more effective than anything that existed in 1918 and has so far been strong enough to make impossible anything in the way of organised opposition. Moreover Germany today is faced with the demand of unconditionalxx surrender to the United Nations, including Russia, instead of President Wilson's comparatively mild 14 pts.

Finally, the fear of retribution, particularly among the leaders, is this time far greater. These views of the JIC are dated 9th September but they saw no reason to alter them on the 21st October. In the intervening period they consider that there has been a steady deterioration in Germany's political, military and economic situation as a whole.

I have had long discussions about the G.2 appointment for COSSAC. Speir is rather against disturbing Mair. He thinks that Furnival-Jones would be rather at sea if he were sent to N. Africa to take Mair's place. We do not wish to move Kenneth to COSSAC as we feel that his knowledge of the French would be more valuable at 21st Army Group. Possibilities for the G.2 appointment are Furnival-Jones, Haylor, if he could be brought back from Mid East, or McDermot. The latter is perhaps the best choice of all.

We have had information from S. Africa obtained through MASSA who was arrested a short time ago, that the Ossewa Brandweg arrested SITTIG some 5 months ago owing to a quarrel that he was having with PAASCHE. SITTIG is being detained somewhere by the O.B. His whereabouts are known to Coetzee, the Asst. Chief of Police who has long been suspect from the British point of view, and is according to MASSA a valuable link with the O.B. organisation. This information is being brought to the notice of Smuts. Meanwhile PAASCHE's transmitter is still operating.

November 4th

B.5 are starting their investigations on the MAP case and a report is being submitted to Jo Archer on our preliminary findings.

Bonnefusse rang me up to say that General Cochet, who is head of all the Intelligence organisations in N.Africa, was anxious to see the D.G.

Thurston called this morning. I explained to him our proposals about divulging to the Franco and Belgians information relating to secret ink. He was in general agreement but wishes Grogan to clear the matter with the U.S. Censorship representative at the Prudential. He would then communicate with the Bureau and get their consent.

Foley called with [redacted] of SIS about the case of [redacted], who he wishes to run as a XX in Iceland. He presumed that if [redacted] was not working the Germans would assume that he had been captured and divulged the fact that he had a parcel to deliver to another agent (believed to be COBEB). The Germans would then expect that COBEB would be arrested and controlled. I said that I thought his assumption was unsound in the light of our experiences. [redacted] had never been given COBEB's address and would only have been given it when he came up on the air. The general view of the Germans was that we as an intelligence organisation were inefficient, and we were I thought inclined

Catalogue Reference:KV/4/192

to over-estimate their intelligence. However this was their affair. TAs thinks that it should also be the affair of the AX Committee where it will be aired this afternoon. Meanwhile we have agreed to release provided he is kept at one of TAs special houses where could be looked after by an FSP officer until he leaves for Iceland. Foley wants him to see a bit of London in order to support his cover story when he returns to Iceland.

I had a talk with Kenneth, who takes an extremely poor view of the I.B. officers. He says the fact is that none of them really know anything about the job, and the quality is extremely poor. Very few have the necessary language qualifications. In fact his own G.3 cannot speak French. There is now rather a panic about the possibility of RANKIN, which is a straight run through to Berlin. In such an eventuality IA will have practically nothing to do and will probably take charge of IB since IA at any rate have the language qualifications and is of a higher calibre. IB in the Army is evidently regarded as a second-grade occupation with little prospect of promotion. Consequently it gets cluttered up with duds. Kenneth is quite sure that our latest proposals are sound and, he thinks that we should give the Army as much as we possibly can. His opposite number in IB2, Major Rider, appears to be a good fellow, but Doyer-Miller is obviously quite useless. His sole previous experience has been as G.2 in a command. He Catalogue Reference: KV 74/192 Both Kenneth and Rider think that IB2 and 3 should be

amalgamated. The fact is that there is no point in having dividing lines between 1, 2 and 3. 2 will be obtaining information through interrogation by FSP and will also have to receive guidance from 1 and 3. The ordinary military security duties will be considerably reduced in the field: if units have not learned the lessons of security during the last three years in this country they are not likely to learn them when they go overseas.

Brook Booth came to tell me that he had made all the necessary arrangements with Chaney of the Air Ministry for the interrogation of the French pilots when they arrive. It appears however that a number of air-borne troops some of whom have not had a security examination and about 90 of whom reached N. Africa after the total occupation of France, are coming on the same ship. They are to be sent to Scotland for training. We both agreed that while their names should be put over the records, we could only conduct a security examination in special cases. There was a great difference between air-borne troops and pilots. From the point of view of security, the latter were far more dangerous, whereas the former would not constitute a very grave menace.

I saw the D.G. about the possibility of putting McDermot into COSSAC with Lick. He seemed quite receptive to this idea, although I expect there will be considerable opposition from Lennox.

November 5th

I saw Stopford who has returned from the Azores. Apparently the landing was conducted in an atmosphere of considerable confusion. Things were left behind that were wanted, important stores which were to have been landed first were landed last, etc.etc. The Portuguese however gave valuable assistance both in lorries and personnel. Stopford himself proceeded almost immediately to see the Consul at Terceira. He obtained the names of half a dozen reliable Portuguese residents. He then went on to see the military governor who was extremely co-operative and also the local chief of police. He does not think that much can be expected from the latter because he would obviously be well in with all the population and getting his rake-off this and that so that it would not be in his interests to do anything very drastic. The only method in Stopford's view is to build up a small nucleus of informants, which he has done. These people have been handed over to Benady. Of course Benady has no idea how to run them. He thinks they should come up and report to him at Headquarters once a week. He has however been told that this won't do.

On board the ship were a wireless operator and two cypher clerks. They were supposed to be able to communicate with London and also with Mathews but Mathews who went on in advance to Ponta del Gada, apparently had the wrong cyphers. He could communicate with London but

but not with the Force Commander, who of course had no idea what he was doing. The Portuguese authorities rounded up the wireless set in Ponta and Mathews proceeded to Horta with one van supplied by RSS and a snifter. A wireless transmitter had been located in a block of flats about 100 yds sq. but the presence of the van became known at once and was in fact reported to the Germans by the agent after which no further communication took place. The block of flats was searched but without result. Mathews is still sitting at Horta hoping that the agent will come up on the air. I am inclined to think however that he will have to wait some time. It would clearly have been better to have taken 3 snifters instead of a van. There might have been a chance of carrying out the operation without the facts becoming known to the whole town, who turned out in crowds to see the hunt. There is a small security problem at Horta in that reports of movements of our ships from there would clearly be of value to the enemy. Stopford did not go to Ponta del Gada as it seemed that police work in the other islands was purely a local affair and not controlled by the International Police. The Air Officer Commanding was extremely helpful and obviously glad to have someone who could advise him on security matters. Stopford took charge of the wireless station and also of the Purple Primer. I gather that once the wireless transmitter had been located in Horta Mathews intends to return, leaving the various consuls to represent SIS interests. If it was worth Stopford's while going at all, and I feel on the whole that it was, he cer-

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tainly should have been taken in on all the plans particularly those which concern SIS.

Rupert Speir and Barry came to talk to me about Scott-Harston, and we went afterwards to the D.G. Felix Cowgill wants him for his SI(b) unit for Norway. I pointed out to the D.G. that as no final decision had been made about OVERLORD, SIS were clearly taking the precaution of acquiring suitable officers for the alternative. We might also find ourselves in a similar position. Scott-Harston was one of the officers who had taken the course with this object in view. However since nobody seemed to rate his abilities very highly and since he was at the moment virtually unemployed and had been so for a good many months, the D.G. might feel that he should be released. The D.G. said that since his name was on the list of officers submitted to the DMI we could only agree to his going subject to the DMI's approval, and asked Speir to take up this point with DDMI(O).

A telegram has been received from Mills to say that he has been allowed to visit the FBI unattended. Honour was satisfied by a telephone call being put through to the FBI by the Security Co-Ordination officer in Washington announcing Mills' arrival.

Dick and I dined with Whitefoord and Black. There was a good deal of irrelevant and historic talk about the origins of COSSAC during which Black said that his arrival in COSSAC was quite fortuitous. Having been

sacked by Gen. Devers, he was gyrating in the air and landed on the only mattress. What was clear was that Whitefoord on his own admission knew very little about IB matters and that Black knew precisely nothing. We eventually got down to some sort of brass tacks. It was agreed that Dick should not go into COSSAC officially until the appointment of the new GSOL had been made, and that McDermot would be very acceptable, as his understudy. Meanwhile it seemed that Dick could help to put the Americans in the picture and could also make some progress with the Theatre Intelligence Section which is to be set-up in COSSAC to collate and distribute all information which relates to the area to be invaded. I pointed out that there was an even more important aspect of this problem, namely to get the information into such a form that it can be of real value to the FSP sections who have got to carry out the action. For this purpose it will be necessary to co-opt C.I.S. from Army Group which produced the Martian reports, SFS, ourselves, Melland and RSS. Both Dick and I thought that Gwyer is the most suitable person to carry out this work. This will give an opportunity for reviewing the Purple Primer and the question of its unsuitability for use in the field. I think Whitefoord and Black went away with a feeling that a problem which neither of them really understood was now to be properly tackled.

I saw C. this evening when I asked him about RSS messages relative to the disposition of our troops in this country. He said that

there had been one or two such messages, which he had in fact shown to the Controller who had been much concerned. I explained to him what TAR was doing in building up records which would show how this country looked through German eyes. If one of his agents happened to report that the 9th Armoured Division had been sent to Norwich, such a report might be blue-pencilled by the approving authorities who would not know that this fact was already known to the Germans. TAR's agent might in this way become compromised. C. thoroughly understood the point which had not previously occurred to him, and undertook to let us have details of any such messages in the future, which he would send personally to me.

He told me that MSS recently had been extremely illuminating, particularly on the air side. There were clearly grave shortages of all sorts of material. People were being told that they could not have this or that, that old planes were to be put into commission again, that Italian planes were to be used, etc. 30 ME's had even been sent from the north of Denmark to Roumania, presumably to deal with a possible attack on the Ploesti oil wells. There was clearly a shortage of petrol; on the other hand MSS had confirmed the use of the rocket. C. himself is convinced that the rocket will be used sometime during this winter. Probably during a foggy day when its flashes will not be able to be detected. Opinions still seemed to vary as to the efficacy of the weapon. The probability is that certain types will be used at short range and others at long range. I understand that we are