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producing a 10 ton bomb which will be in operation by mid-December. It is I think to be used in mining districts with a delay-action fuse which it is thought will break up the mines and cause them to be flooded. It can be lifted by the Lancaster.

I asked C. about Gen. Cochet. He had not met him but was going to do so. He was a little worried as he had heard that Cochet might remove Paillol. He hoped in our conversation we would do anything we could to put in a good word for Paillol who was doing extremely well.

November 6th

Gen. Cochet called to see the D.G. accompanied by Bonnefusse. He explained his position and then said that he was worried about the security of his agents in this country. There were some 60 of them and they were all herded together in one place, where they all talked about their business. The result had been that considerable damage had been done to French resistance movements in France. He thought it possible that there might be agents here picking up information, particularly Vichy agents. I said that I did not think that there were likely to be many German agents but that Vichy agents were far more difficult to detect. It was agreed that we would do anything possible to assist Bonnefusse to find better accommodation where these agents could be housed according to "rayons". This would at least ensure that if an agent of one "rayon" were caught he would not be in a

position to divulge information about other "rayons". If Bonnefusse at any time had reason to suspect that somebody was being unduly inquisitive, about the work of these agents he would ask for our assistance.

We then discussed the arrival of the French pilots, and Gen. Cochet agreed that this was a serious matter and that they should be very carefully vetted. Brook Booth pointed out that even the officer in charge of the party which had just arrived had said that he was not at all happy about certain individuals. We explained to the General that we were going to examine roughly 100 who had succeeded in getting out of France after the total occupation. He agreed that this was a sound precaution. It has not been possible to get a Spanish visa for Tricycle which is perhaps a good thing since it is preferable that his contacts with the Germans should be limited to Lisbon. Information has been received from Lisbon that Hamlet has received assurances from the Germans that all is well and that money for Puppet is on the way. A member of Ast Brussels called WERNER has got i to touch with him from the Spanish frontier and arranged a further meeting. It appears probable that the Germans still believe in this case in spite of the evidence to the contrary.

The Jap Ambassador in Berlin has been told by the Germans that the reverses on the eastern front are due to the unprecedented good weather. The Germans had been relying on the rains to give them breathing space. The Russians, taking advantage of this situation, had sent

up their winter reserves. Consequently they had a temporary superiority. It was thought however that they could not maintain their offensive throughout the winter. The Germans were counter-attacking with vigour and success in the region of Krivoi Rog. In Italy the Germans had 10 divisions which they intended to use in the frontline in the defence of Rome. They were faced by 10 Anglo-American divisions who had a cert in air superiority. The Germans have another 13 divisions in reserve. They believe that an attack in the Balkans has not been abandoned and that the next move will be against France, for which the British and Americans need at least 50 divisions. If these divisions were defeated it would probably be the turning point of the war. It was therefore doubtful whether we should embark on so hazardous a venture unless we were forced to do so as a result of the Moscow Conference. Germany was trying to achieve the 3 following objects in her prosecution of the war. First to stabilise the eastern front, secondly to use Germany's new weapon for attacks on Britain and thereby make it impossible for the Anglo-Americans to bomb German industry. Thirdly to deliver a crushing blow to the Anglo-Americans somewhere in Europe. Of These 3 it was thought on balance the probability is that the second project would be put into operation speedily.

The question of the wireless set in the German Legation in Dublin has again come up for review in the light of Overlord. Sir John Maiffey, who was present at a meeting at the D.O., took the view that if we made a request to the

Eire Govt. we should have to insist that action should be taken. Hitherto our policy had been to avoid raising any questions in which Irish neutrality would be the direct issue. It might be that the time would come when this policy could be revised, in which case the German Legation W/T would be a point of great value. The F.O. apparently take the view that action in Dublin might cause reprisals by the Germans in Berne and in the Vatican City. The latter problem might be solved within a month, when it was expected that Rome would be captured. They were anxious therefore that no action should be taken in the meantime. Cecil, speaking solely from the security point of view, said that he considered in view of Overlord that the continued presence of the W/T was a risk which should if possible be removed. The chance of its being used effectively might only be 100-1 against but the operation was one of such importance that even that risk ought not to be incurred. On the technical side Morton-Evans said that although there was a double check on Dublin both from London and Gib., no absolute guarantee of picking up a message could be given. In any case the harm might already be done. He did think however that prior to sending a communication there would be some signs on the air, as the set had not been used for a longish period. He also pointed out that it would always be possible to rig up a receiving set as transmitter. This could be done if the Legation obtained the services of Hans BELL the German interned airman, for which they were negotiating.

I have been looking at the case of OSNOVIENENKO. This man who described himself as a Ukrainian, was picked up by the police at the London Docks. Everything he has said appears to be untrue. He pleads that owing to ill-treatment by the Germans his memory has failed him, and that he is entirely unable to tell us how he reached this country, although he knows that he travelled on 5 different ships. The suggestion is that he is a deserter, possibly from the American forces. He expressed willingness to join the Czech Forces, the Polish Forces, the British Forces or the Russian Forces, or even to lie down in the interrogation room and have his head chopped off. It is extremely difficult to know how to deal with a case of this kind.

We are sending back to Italy the Italian Generals Messe, Olando and Berardi, and also a Maj. Boudier. The theory is that they are going to operate as co-belligerents. This is being kept very quiet for the moment.

November 7th

I lunched with Loxley, when I discussed with him the future of the office. He told me that a committee was discussing SIS's affairs at the moment. His own view, although I do not know what those of SIS are, is that C-E should come under us, both at home and abroad, and that we should be responsible to the F.O. for what we did abroad and to the H.O. for what we did in this country. He did not think that

subversive movements could be divided from espionage. He thought quite definitely that Passport Control should be kept clean of espionage and evidently thought it quite possible that we might take it over on the basis that it was the first line of C.E. and brought us into direct touch with our opposite numbers in foreign countries.

I asked him about the attitude of Russia to and the Polish question at the Moscow Conference.

He said that this was the one matter on which they had been somewhat sticky. Evidently no decision was reached. He thinks quite definitely that the Russians will occupy the whole of the Baltic States, Eastern Poland and Bessarabia.

I told Loxley about our troubles on the I.B. front and what we were proposing to do.

November 8th

Burt came to ask me whether he should take up the case which had been reported to Vine St. of a Col. GOWER of Hobart House who has, according to an Ordnance Officer or NCO who has returned from the Mid East, accepted a sum of £250 in order to give this man his discharge. He is in fact asking for £1,000. Burt after consultation with Speir and Ned Reid, is going to speak to Norman Kendal.

Hart and Milmo came to see me about the HELMUTH case. A letter has come in from Loxley which does not give us an absolute guarantee that we can hold HELMUTH at all costs. The indications so far are that he is likely to break fairly easily if subjected to the normal O20 treatment. We think therefore that the best thing is to send him to O20 but to segregate him from the other prisoners. O20 are to be very carefully briefed in order to protect IZAK.

There is another group of somewhat unsatisfactory cases at the LRC. They do their work extremely well in all the circumstances, but I have an uncomfortable feeling that an odd spy or two may be getting through.

Victor returned from Gib today. He seems to think that his visit has been worth while.

November 9th

At the D.G.s meeting today with Harker in the chair we discussed certain proposals put up by Denniston for the release of a number of German internees. I said that while I was in agreement with all Denniston's arguments, it was for consideration whether the moment was appropriate in view of the special instructions being issued to all military units regarding security in connection with Overlord. I gather that the COSSAC proposals are to be subject to discussions by the Security Executive next week.

I lunched with Lennox. He asked me whether I had any information about the future of the organisation and then went on to say that he himself had no particular job to go back to and wondered whether there was any future for himself in the Security Service. I said that it was extremely difficult to give him an answer without knowing precisely what the commitments of the Security Service were going to be in the postwar period.

He then talked about Harker who seemed to have ideas about remaining on after the war as DDG. This Lennox thought was quite impossible. In fact he felt that the sooner Harker went the better. It was painfully obvious to me that Lennox saw himself in Harker's position. He asked me what my intentions were and whether I aspired in any way to the position of DG. I said that I certainly was not breaking my neck to get the job but that if it were offered to me I should, in the light of experience, incline to modify my previous view that it would be wrong for me to accept the position. We discussed the IB front and the difficulties in COSSAC. Lennox said that if he could possibly be of any help by going in there he would be very glad to do so. I said that I rather doubted whether the job would be of sufficient importance, since I rather anticipated that once the planning had been done, which would be in the hands of Dick, there might not be a great deal more. Lennox said that in a way he felt himself slightly in a backwater and was wondering what he should do. I was doubtless aware that a short time ago a certain of suspicion had

fallen on him and implied that people thought that he was angling for the post of DG. He thought that even Dick regarded him with a certain amount of suspicion. I said that in that connection I did not think that his friend Desmond Orr had done him much good. I believed Desmond to be honest of purpose. He had spoken to me and I had given him my views quite frankly. At the same time I considered him somewhat unbalanced. My mind went back to the days of the Scrubs when Orr had walked up and down in an almost pathological state, saying that I and everybody else would be sacked and that Frost was going to take over. He wondered whether it would be a good thing for him to go and see the King about it. 10 minutes before he had done precisely the same thing in Victor's cell. Victor asked me afterwards if Orr had been to see me. I said he had and that I thought he was off his rocker. Victor had apparently gained the same impression. Lennox said that he realised that one had to be on one's guard against one's friends.

In talking to Dick afterwards, Dick thought that the idea of Lennox going into COSSAC as G.1 might not be quite so crazy as one might think. He certainly has a way with him and can put things over provided he takes advice, which he generally does. If he were left on his own his bluff might be called. The point is just worth considering.

Kembal Johnston tells me that MONKEY has been able to arrange for himself a passage to Sweden about the 25th of this month. I have informed Cordeaux.

C. has written to the D.G. asking for Brooman-White's services at Section V. I have recommended that we should give him to Philby on the understanding that we may have to recall him for TARS deception unit, and that for this reason he should remain on our payroll.

I dined with Victor. He had had an extremely interesting time at Gib. looking into the case of the Olterra. There is no doubt that all the operations from this tanker were conducted with the connivance of the Spanish authorities and we shall probably be able to make out a good case for the F.O. to put over in Madrid. Both Victor and B-W think that Medlam should be recalled and that Kirby Green should take over. Medlam himself seems quite anxious to change. There is no doubt that he is extremely unpopular on the Rock and that good relations with the Navy will never exist as long as he is there.

November 10th

At the Wednesday meeting Hart said that the Austrian Rudolf ENDERS who was recruited by the German I.S. as an agent for this country, is to be brought over. He has already given the British authorities in Lisbon a considerable amount of information. Recently the German I.S. in Lisbon has discussed the

possibility of working ENDERS inwith the organisation of Paul FIDRMUC, which works under a commercial cover. If this took place and ENDERS succeeds in penetrating FIDRMUC's organisation he might be useful in this country. FIDRMUC reports purporting to come from this country are almost without exception untrue.

The young English seaman William HEAP who offered his services to the German I.S. in Algeciras and who recently returned to Gib., has disappeared. He was not put under arrest owing to the difficulties of extradition or conducting the trial in Gib. Steps had been taken to persuade him to return voluntarily. Evidently he thought things over and decided to clear out. He is poor material and it is doubtful whether the Germans will be able to make much use of him. It was probable that they had already decided not to use him.

Wethered spoke about the unsatisfactory arrangements of SOE for the despatch of their agents. These agents are apparently never searched before their departure. It should of course be a normal precaution.

There have been a number of new arrivals, MOMPEAY, ELFERINK and BERTRAND. There is now conclusive evidence about HOPPE, who still remains adamant in O20. ELFERINK has so far disclosed nothing. Stephens thinks that it may take some little time for him to appreciate the atmosphere of O20.

There is a little trouble about MacDermot, who seems to have been associated with the organisation known as "W/4/192 Britain". This purports

to be anti-communist and anti-fascist. Its general tone is Beveridge. At the head of it was a curious Yugoslav personality known as MITRINOVITCH. He succeeded in collecting round him a number of cranks over whom he seemed to have an almost hypnotic influence. Free love and homosexuality seemed to play some part. MacDermot appears to have had a row with one member of this organisation in May 1939. He hit a man in the chest, who subsequently died from heart failure. MacDermot was charged with man-slaughter but acquitted. All this is rather unfortunate just at the moment when we are thinking of putting him into COSSAC. I have asked Cussen to look at the papers.

Dixon came to see me at my request. I broke to him the news that his appointment to COSSAC had not been entirely a success and that in all the circumstances we felt bound to withdraw him. I said that I thought that a muddle had occurred owing to a misconception of precisely what the job was. The military wanted one of their staff officers who they thought would be in a better position to drive things through. The idea was that he should have Dick as his adviser with an understudy provided by this office. Dixon took this blow extremely well but did not disguise that he had had many difficulties with which to contend. At present the whole of IB work was in charge of Col. Black and Blakeney neither of whom had the slightest knowledge of the subject or of security of any kind. Dixon had put forward certain memos to them which had

subsequently been re-written by them. The one on Port Control had been written by an American Naval Officer and was complete nonsense from beginning to end. I said that all this strengthened my view that Dick would be able to do far more outside the hierarchy of COSSAC as he would be able to give advice and at the same time have direct access to Whiteford. I had previously spoken to Whiteford who thought it would be better if I broke the news to Dixon. He took the opportunity of telling me that he was extremely pleased and impressed by the memo on T.I.S which Dick had put up. He intended to put this through with one or two minor amendments which he thought would probably ease its passage.

I spoke to Frost about Friday's meeting of the Reid Committee. He was rather taking the line that there was nothing more for us to do.

I said that I thought that from an educative point of view we should do for the civilian organisations what the Army were doing for the Signals Units. I arranged that we should discuss this matter further tomorrow. Meanwhile I have rung up Peter Reid telling him that Frost is leaving us but will probably be attending the meeting on Friday when he would try and disclaim any responsibility for civil security in signals matters. I asked Peter to push this matter well on to his plate, if he thought that we were the right people for the job. Peter seemed pleased with the general progress that had been made regarding military security. He was not pleased however with the rather stupid

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decision of the JIC on the private cyphers used by the heads of allied armies for communication with Mid East etc. He agreed with me that before coming to a decision the JIC should ask what material had been monitored and decyphered during the last 6 months. It was only in this way that the relative importance of intelligence over security or vice versa could be decided.

November 11th

The PM is off tomorrow by the Renown to Gib., Malta and Cairo. He is being joined by the President and a delegation from the Soviet Union, when the question of bringing Turkey into the war will be discussed. Cairo does not strike me as being a particularly good spot for such a meeting, since from the point of view of leakage it is more or less wide open.

Ede talked to me about Dixon replacing Medlam. I said I thought it would be wrong to supersede Kirby Green who was doing extremely well and knew the whole set up in Gib. It would take a new person quite a time to get the hang of things. The alternative might be to send Dixon to either Nairobi or India.

Tangye tells me that there is a great deal of gossip in Fleet St. about the rocket gun. The press, having been left in rather a state of uncertainty are surprised that no precautions have been taken to evacuate hospitals or children, and that no instructions have been issued to police or civil authorities. He

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thinks that if a rocket bomb does land up here and nothing has been done, the government will be in a somewhat awkward position. One of the difficulties is of course unknown to Tangye. If we show any signs of alarm there is no doubt that the Germans will pile it on good and proper. There will then be increase in difficulty in sorting out what is propaganda and what is truth.

Tommy Harris has made a very good report on GARBO's secret ink operation. The primary purpose was to assist censorship by letting it become known to the enemy that we were in possession of the re-agent for an ink which on account of its complex development creates considerable difficulties if mails are to be bulk-tested. A secondary purpose was to indicate to the enemy that through the medium of censorship additional security measures were being taken in the UK to prevent leakage of information prior to important military operations, in this case the exercise Starkey, by imposing 100% censorship on mails to the Iberian Peninsula and Switzerland. They might feel that if this was done with an exercise for invasion, similar procedure could be adopted prior to Overlord. Thirdly we hoped to create confusion by blowing a lot of Garbo's cover addresses and throwing him over to wireless, which in many respects is more convenient. The operation on the whole was fairly successful although had to some extent to goad the Germans into a

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realisation of the facts by various means. They did finally react after we had started to interrogate in Lisbon the various cover addressees. This was on 12.10.43 when they sent the following telegram: "Nearly all Lisbon addresses have been interrogated with regard to origin of letters. This appears to be a general measure all over the country. In accordance with instructions addressees have replied satisfactorily. Nevertheless no more letters have arrived. Our representative has left for Lisbon. Cease all correspondence also via the courier until further notice. Likewise agents correspondence. We will have to study a new procedure for sending correspondence avoiding English mail also Portuguese by making use of cut-outs (contacts). I will continue to keep you informed as to the result of our representative's journey. It is advisable that you should be on your guard".

Later they reacted even more forcibly, urging Garbo to lie low. Though it is perhaps a little early to draw conclusions we can I think claim that we have put the enemy to enormous inconvenience, destroying completely the greater portion of their cover address network in Lisbon, bringing the total number of addresses given to Garbo and subsequently cancelled by them to 23. We have deprived them of one of their best secret inks, concealing from them the fact of their use of basic inks. They will probably find it extremely difficult to establish a new cover address network on the scale of the one they have been using. It has served as a scare and

they now realise the necessity of keeping Garbo well supplied with reliable cover addresses, good cyphers and inks. The fact that he escapes detection should tend to make them have increased confidence in his ability to run his organisation. It should tend to make his somewhat incredible set-up appear more realistic. It is difficult to assess the degree to which they have associated this manoeuvre with operation Starkey but it is possible that reactions will yet come to light which will give us indications as to what they will expect us to do in connection with Overlord.

I went over to see Duff and told him about our progress on the I.B. front. I also told him about the history of JOB.

Later I saw the D.M.I. with TAR and Bevan. The purpose of the meeting was to get the DMI to agree to one approving authority in COSSAC instead of four as at present arranged. At the moment traffic has to be approved by the GCHQ, Home Forces through Goudie on behalf of DMI, by the Americans through 21st Army Group and through COSSAC. DMI thought there should be one approving authority at COSSAC. It might however be necessary to get approval in certain cases if the traffic concerned the American Armies outside the COSSAC group.

I showed the DMI the case of Neville du BOULAY who according to talked indiscreetly to the Portuguese Ambassador about the Catalogue Reference 41/192 the DMO who was very anxious if possible to prosecute. I explained

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quite definitely that the production of the evidence was out of the question and that in view of the family connections with the Portuguese it would be quite impossible to say anything to the officer at all on the basis of the information obtained. He should therefore be sent to the north of Scotland or to some country abroad which would prevent him from dining with the Portuguese Ambassador. This course was agreed.

Dick Butler has had a talk with MacDermot. There is no doubt that he was in the middle of the "New Britain" movement but that four years have caused him to change his views. The society has been dispersed and he now only very occasionally sees MITRINOVITCH in connection with some legal matter affecting the property. He still thinks that MITRINOVITCH is a very remarkable man, although he admits that his hypnotic influence and theories about free love were definitely unhealthy. Personally I do not think there is any need to worry about MacDermot or his suitability for the post in COSSAC.

Tangye tells me that Duff had resigned and was later to take up some important post abroad.

November 12th

Duff's resignation is reported in the press today. His post abroad is connected with the invasion of France. He apparently to be Minister Designate. This fact however is not to be made public.

Dick Butler has been over to see Creedy. It seems that Duff will remain in charge of the Security Executive for the time being. The future of that organisation is as yet undecided. Duff is seeing the PM today about the future executive head of this office. He thinks that he should not have a successor but that the department should from the Ministerial point of view come under the Minister of Defence, at any rate during war time.

I went over to see Newsam about the case. The latter wants an opportunity of having a look round London before going back to Iceland, this in order to give him the necessary cover with the local inhabitants who imagine that he has come here voluntarily to give information to the authorities. The Americans are now going to run him in conjunction with SIS. I am not sure whether this is wise. Their point is that if he is not run, Cobweb will be compromised. Newsam gave authority for the detention part of the 12(5)a order to be revoked and for 35, Crespign Rd. to be declared a proper place of detention. He thought that the I.O. would have to be informed at the port of departure in order to get the man clear. I saw no objection to this.

DMI rang up to say that the VCIQS was anxious to take disciplinary action against Du Boulay. He wanted to know whether he would be at liberty to discuss the matter with the Director of Personal Services. I said that C. was the Catalogue Reference KEV 4/192 and that therefore I could not really give him the answer. I then

then rang up D.B. and told him what had happened, advising him to have a word with C.

Tricycle has left for Lisbon. Ian Wilson is going today. Balloon is still notionally in Canada but may later be going there on his own business. Hamlet has been assured that Puppet's reports are much appreciated as the Germans have so few lines into this country. Lipstick has reported to SIS from Madrid. He says that a specialist from Berlin interrogated him with satisfactory results. The Germans regard him as a first-class agent. Lipstick expects to receive concrete instructions and directions from the Germans in Lisbon sent back to the country. Dragonfly now has notional employment as an investigator of Black Market offences in the Ministry of Food. This gives him the opportunity of travelling about.

I dined with Walter Bell and Kim. Walter tells me that has written a letter saying that Bill Stephenson and Hoover have now got their arms round each other's necks and are seeing each other every two days. If true, nobody could wish for anything better. It will be interesting to see precisely what it all amounts to.

I had a long talk with Kim about organisation. It seems that our ideas more or less coincide except that Kim is for total amalgamation of SIS and MI5. He thinks it would be difficult to separate C.E. work from the offensive side. Personally I do not agree. I cannot really see why there should not be close co-operation

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in the field. This has been found quite possible in SIME, and really boils down to the question of personalities. Kim evidently has a very high opinion of the officers of B. Division and regretted that both quality and numbers in Section V. were so low, and quite inadequate to perform the task that they had on hand. We talked about Brooman-White and the arrangement that I had put forward seems quite agreeable to Kim.

Frost came in to tell me about the meeting of the Reid Committee. He took the line that the pass had already been sold at the meeting at Kinnaird House a month or two ago, and that there was really nothing very much for him to say or do. In a sense of course he is quite right. It was agreed at that meeting that RSS should monitor the civil establishments as and when they were able and turn in the results to the Reid Committee on which are represented Min. of Supply, MAP, GPO, Railways, and Police. Reid's secretariat would give these bodies such assistance as they can and would point out to them the mistakes they had made. All these bodies are on occasions co-opted to the Reid Committee. The reason why I did not press this matter at the meeting at Kinnaird House was that I did not wish to build Frost up in a new job where he would again be at logger-heads with everybody. Had he not been there I should have pressed hard for our taking over the educational side and urged that RSS as our technical tool should monitor from time to time and turn in the

products to us. In the circumstances however it seemed better that the Reid Committee should take this matter in hand. The result is that we are now only asked to look after private firms which in fact we do already. We may possibly extend our activities in this direction.

November 13th

I gather from Sclater that Frost has some job for the BBC in connection with broadcasting from the Second Front. He is apparently to accompany Howard Marshall and look after the technical side of the equipment. Meanwhile he is bent on liquidating Barnet. I think the best thing will be for him to put down on paper what he thinks ought to be done with Barnet and then disappear. TAR can then look the whole organisation over and decide what is to be done. Meanwhile Maltby has communicated with Sclater, telling him that as soon as the coast is clear he wants to get together and decide how we and RSS can mutually assist one another.

November 15th

Dick Butler has seen Duff. Duff saw the PM on Friday in his bath. He was at that time somewhat harrassed (a) because he had just been injected for typhoid and had a temperature of 100 with a possible 101 the following day, (b) because of his impending departure for Cairo, and (c) owing to the dispute with the French over the Lebanon incident. The PM said that he had seen Duff's memo about the

future of the Dept. and had written to Ernest Brown telling him to take over the Security Executive and that he would also be Minister for MI5. Duff replied that this was quite impossible, since this meant that Brown would have access to all Most Secret material produced by SIS, apart from our own highly confidential reports. The PM. eventually, rather under protest, pressed his bell and cancelled his letter to Ernest Brown and sent for Eden and Bridges. Duff then discussed the matter with them, after which it was decided that in future our representation on the ministerial level should be Dick Law of the F.O. This is I think quite a wise decision. Dick Law is very much a coming man and the fact of our now being under an F.O. Minister will torpedo any objections that have formerly been raised to amalgamation on the grounds that we could not operate abroad because we are not under the F.O. We shall of course continue to be responsible to the H.O. for such matters as concern them. Creedy is to be head of the Security Executive, which will clearly on this account lose a certain count of its force. It will really be little more than a forum for discussion of inter-departmental matters.

At the press meeting today Tanguy said that the Fleet St. view of future operations was that we were going to attack the Cherbourg Peninsula in January.

I had a meeting with Felix, Dick, Milmo, Horrocks Kellar and Cheney on the subject of the compilation of a Black List which would

come into operation at Stage A. It was agreed that the basis of this Black List should be the second front documents, Purple Primers, and the like, which had been compiled by SIS. It was also agreed that a special list of people of international importance likely to travel from one area to another should be compiled. The responsibility for this list would be ours and the names would be submitted to Passport Control in the form of special circulars to their representatives abroad, instructing them to report back any applications.

I had a word with Horrocks afterwards. We are not very sanguine about the basis for the first list since we had doubts about the reliability of the information compiled by SIS. Horrocks will decide how the second list is to be compiled and who should be responsible for it. He will subsequently issue a circular.

Dick had a meeting with Felix last week when he explained to him the part that he is playing in COSSAC. Felix was inclined to take the view that in so far as the dissemination of information to L.B. staffs was concerned, this had already been arranged with Army Group. Dick said that Army Group were subordinate to COSSAC and whether Felix liked it or not the juggernaut of COSSAC would pass over him. He would therefore be well advised to come in with us and join in some sensible form of planning. Rather reluctantly Felix agreed to do this. Dick is having a frightful time

with Cols. Black and Blakeney, who, with their American A.T. secretary, commonly known as "Butterfly", are a knockabout turn of the Marx Bros. variety. Their knowledge of I.B. matters is zero and since they are at the moment in charge of that side of I. work at COSSAC the position is really rather serious. It is hoped that before long some responsible I.B. officer will be appointed.

○ G.I. I.B. Dick seems quite worn out with the "Butterfly" atmosphere and the whole set-up. In the middle of a serious conversation, Blakeney suddenly remembers that he has a date, rings up on the telephone and holds a long, frivolous and sexy conversation with a girl, with asides of "How'm I doing, Butterfly?". An important document relating to I.B. staff matters was required but needless to say nobody could find it. Butterfly on being somewhat harrassed tells the assembled company not to razz her. She also alludes to her senior officers as "the boys". Something will have to be done about the situation soon.

○ November 16th

I went to the J.I.C. today to discuss the paper recommending that the visits of Service and Civil Attaches to places of importance should be curtailed. The meeting was held late unfortunately and I had to leave at the critical moment to attend the decoration of Col. Bartik and Major Slama by Gen. Grasset at the W.O. This event seems to have been an unqualified success. The D.G. made an

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excellent speech. Brig. Vale, Rupert Speir, Dick, Charles, and myself were all present. I found it difficult to keep a straight face. There is no doubt that the whole proceedings including a slap-up lunch at Manetta's when Bartik made a very good little speech, will be most beneficial to the continuance of the good liaison with the Czechs.

November 17th

I discussed with Caroe the question of the W/T in the German Legation in Dublin. I drafted a letter to Archer of the D.O. agreeing with the contents of the note for Sir John Stephenson, but pointing out that the actual date of the demarche did not appear to have been decided on. I suggested that if it were made 4-5 weeks before the operation it would not give the Germans much time to get a new set going and would not as far as I could see pinpoint Overlord since aerial reconnaissance would by that time have made clear that operations were impending. I also suggested that to cover M-E's point about the possibility of a reserve transmitter the Eire authorities should be induced to ask HEMPEL for both his wireless sets or alternatively for his wireless set and any other wireless equipment in his possession.

At the Wednesday meeting Mrs. Spring said that ISOS disclosed that at the request of the BOT a man called "Bastler" is being sent to this country. The LRC have found a character called YONDKA *11/17/41* who is coming to see the BOT and seems to fit the bill. He

appears to have in his possession a cover address which has been given to Lipstick.

There is the usual flood of totally inaccurate reports from Lisbon and Madrid alleged to be received from this country.

Hughes came to tell me that Frost is telling is staff that the whole organisation at Barnet is being liquidated by Horrocks and that they had better look round for other jobs, and that he will be notifying all concerned. I think at this stage Frost is merely talking. I have spoken to Horrocks who tells me that his recommendations will be coming up to me tomorrow. He thinks it may be possible to bring the personnel up to London or at any rate the majority, but he agrees that no liquidation should take place until TAR has had an opportunity of looking into the department, and the liaison with RSS has been given a chance of developing.

Dixon came in to tell me that he had spoken to Whitefoord who was extremely sympathetic. Dixon told him quite frankly of his difficulties with the Americans and said that he would be well-advised to arrange that his new G.I. had direct access to higher authority and did not operate through Cols. Black and Blakeney, who had no knowledge of IB matters whatever. Whitefoord had apparently been unaware of the fact that Dixon's memo had been put in the wastepaper basket by these two mountebanks. Dick also saw him today and rubbed the point in.

Bruce Uttley came to see me about a Cypriot called MATTASS who has been acting as an agent for MEW at Mersin. This man is apparently a thoroughly undesirable Levantine and the consulate are anxious to get rid of him and feel he is less likely to do harm if he is sent here. I said that we could not refuse him leave to land as he was a British subject, although we were not anxious for more doubtful citizens here than was absolutely necessary.

November 18th

I saw Gibbs, who is leaving us in the course of the next day or two. He has offered to continue instruction to officers going overseas on counter-sabotage duties, and he is also willing to come back to us if we are really in difficulties.

I hear that Cookie has caught a spy aged 16 who was about to fly a Tiger-Moth over to Germany.

Tim Airy is leaving tomorrow for Ceylon and will probably be at Mountbatten's headquarters.

I had a meeting to discuss the case of JOB. TAR was rather anxious to knock him off on Saturday. The only fresh information is that he has visited an individual called PERLIMAN who may conceivably have some connection with a man of that name in Paris who has an Abwehr connections. So far JOB has not visited Dragonfly or delivered the goods. We have
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been trying to get through to the Germans to tell them ~~that~~ so, but so far without success. Bearing in mind that our main objective is to get Dragonfly on the air and on good terms with his master and in addition to safeguard his position as much as possible, we have decided to let the case run on for another week in the hope that the jewels will be delivered. We might then consider whether JOB was worth watching on the assumption that he might have some other assignment. If we could catch him out we might then prosecute him without introducing the Dragonfly incident at all. My own belief is that JOB decided to serve the Abwehr as a means of getting away and that he intends to pocket the jewellery and say nothing, in case he might be misunderstood and get into difficulties. This is not a very patriotic attitude if in fact he knows the jewellery was intended for a German agent in this country. If we arrest him on present evidence it is by no means certain that we shall be able to hold him. He might very well say that, hearing that he was coming here, a friend gave him the jewellery to deliver to someone named of whom he had no previous knowledge. He had not done so, either because he had not had time to deliver it in person, or because he thought the matter slightly fishy, or because he intended to keep the jewellery for himself. If he has to be released there will always be a certain risk of the truth getting back to the Germans. As long as he remains at large we cannot acknowledge the receipt of the jewellery since we do not know whether he has already communicated with the Germans in

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secret ink in which case our story might conflict with his. We have decided to let the case run for another week. Meanwhile we are discussing with the H.O. the conditions his arrest and detention can be carried out.

HELLMUTH has broken entirely and given us particulars about his relations with the SD and his mission to Berlin. This is fortunate the case was rather an awkward one from the political angle. The Argentine Ambassador was already intervening on his behalf.

Joseph has arrived in Lisbon and established contact with the Japs.

Treasure has arrived at last and after 5 days interrogation at the LRC was released. She is very intelligent and co-operative. Kliemann is supposed to be sending her a W/T transmitter via the Spanish diplomatic bag or by getting the transmitter disguised as a portable gramophone, packed by a gramophone company in Lisbon and sent over by them. Treasure is supposed to buy a second hand wireless receiving set as soon as possible after arrival and to listen for Kliemann straight away. She has two cover addresses to which to report her arrival. We are trying to get her employment with the British Red Cross.

has been interviewed by the American authorities and has given permission for his name to be used for XX purposes in America while he himself remains in the hands of the Dutch Govt. The case has been referred to the FBI.

November 19th

Garbo asked a short time ago what steps he should take in connection with the rocket-gun scare. Should he move his wife and children out of London, and report on the results of the rocket, by wireless, correcting errors of fire, etc. On 18.11.43 he received the reply "In regard to the rocket-gun, there is no cause for you to alarm yourself". This seems to fit in with the theory that although the Germans may have a rocket-gun its claims are grossly exaggerated.

The D.G. talked to me today about Brooman-White. He now wants him to act as a kind of P.A. to Dick. I said that if Dick wanted him I had no objection. I wondered a little however whether there was much in the circumstances he could do. Dick will have MacDermot to assist him in regard to the I.B. staff and other experts in this office on particular problems. Such papers as come up to him from Hart, Milmo etc. are already thoroughly digested. I told the D.G. about Frost's intention of liquidating his own department and sending letters round to all his contacts. The D.G. was annoyed, and said "He wull do no such thing".

The question of the publication of escape stories has been raised again through a rather critical letter received from Admiral Thomson, whose NDO has seen fit to criticise this department for being uncooperative. As luck would have it, both Stamp and I were in the ND 's r om when the Press & Censorship repre-

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sentative rang up. He could only give us an outline of the story with no name. We said that the story coincided very much with PERCH and that if the individual was PERCH the story should not be published since if PERCH was all right the organisation which helped him to escape and his relatives would suffer, and if on the other hand he was all wrong, we should be making a present to the enemy of the fact that he had passed successfully through our controls. The Censorship representative said that the individual with whom he was concerned had arrived within the last 24 or 48 hours. As PERCH had already been in the country for some weeks it was assumed that he was referring to some other individual about whom we had no knowledge. We asked him to ascertain the name but he did not seem inclined to help. Meanwhile it has been discovered that the story had already been released to the "News Chronicle". It is high time that a firm ban was put on all escape stories. The publication of the experiences of Lucienne CLOAREC a few weeks ago has successfully blown the Sibiril organisation, which has been responsible for getting well over 100 escapees to this country.

Dick Butler received a call from ADNI asking if he could possibly come over to Sanctuary Buildings on a matter of urgent importance. He found Lewes and Janson struggling with a note which they had been asked to prepare on the Security Service. It seems that the question of the future ministerial head of this office was referred to the Chiefs of Staff, who held a meeting. It goes without saying

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that none of them knew anything about the Security Service or indeed that it had ever had a ministerial head, though it is quite possible that the W.O. thought that it came under the C.I.G.S. They therefore decided to request their subordinates to obtain the necessary data about this obscure organisation in order that they might reach a decision on this momentous question. The effect of this had been that Admiral Syfret, Acting Chief of the Naval Staff, called a meeting consisting of himself, DNI, ADNI and others, which seems to have been somewhat on the level of the Marx Bros. Nobody apparently had the slightest idea what they were talking about, and eventually they broke up after instructing ADNI to collect the necessary data and prepare a paper. Dick Butler found a draft prepared by Janson which seemed to contain one or two major inaccuracies, but concluded on the note that the whole question seemed to be beyond the competence of the Admiralty and was really a matter on which the Director General of the Security Service himself should express an opinion. Lewes was extremely apologetic and it was very considerate of him to ring up and consult us. This is a typical example of how things go wrong when they reach exalted circles. Nobody knows what they are talking about and the fate of a department is decided by the toss of a coin. We decided that the D.G. must be informed about the whole matter tomorrow.

November 20th

Duff was very concerned about the fact of his successor being the subject of discussion by the Chiefs of Staff, and directed that Dick Butler should go over and see Bridges. When Butler got back here he found Malcolm Cumming in a state of great excitement because Pettit on behalf of Buss was seeking information about the Security Service and its responsibilities, clearly in connection with the question of its future ministerial head. Could we give him any assistance. There has so far been no reaction from the W.O. who doubtless say we already are under the Minister for War and that therefore the question does not arise. When Dick Butler saw Edward Bridges, the latter nearly hit the roof, shouted for his secretary and pressed bells. He said that the matter had got nothing to do with the Chiefs of Staff, that it was entirely in his hands. He had however consulted personally Sir Edward Grigg, also Sir Arthur Street and someone in the Admiralty. He had also had a word with Sir Alexander Cadogan. It had never been his intention that this matter should have been the subject of discussion by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and he instructed his secretary to summon the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff, when he will doubtless tell him that his masters are meddling in something which is not their concern.

I took Dick's meeting this morning. We discussed the case of HELLMUTH. SIS are apparently anxious to cash in on the information by giving it to G2, with the suggestion that they

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should discuss the position with the Chiefs of Staff. We however in the normal course of business should and must give the information to Thurston since it concerns an area for which Mr. Hoover is responsible. The real danger is of course that the FBI may start instigating a number of arrests of SD personnel which will result in the closing down of IZAK. We therefore propose to give SIS 48 hours start in order that they may warn G2 that they may be approached by the FBI for further information on the basis of IZAK, the existence of which the FBI are aware although they are not allowed to see the material. We shall then issue the O20 report both to Thurston and to SI, entering a caveat in our letter to Thurston against taking any precipitate action without prior consultation with the State Dept. SIS may say that we are jeopardising the IZAK material. This however would be totally untrue since it is perfectly possible that the FBI could take action purely on a basis of the Camp O20 report.

Reggie Gibbs told me about his conversation with Vivian. He is very worried about the latter who he thinks is suffering from persecution mania and from an obsession about the whole American business. He cannot stop talking about it and goes round and round like a squirrel in a cage. Gibbs discussed with him firstly the reasons why the FBI are incline to gravitate to this dept. rather than to Ryder St and secondly our reasons for wishing to discontinue the automatic sending of copies

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of all our correspondence with the FBI to SIS. He pointed out to Vivian that in almost every letter sent by the FBI they made a specific request, adding that they would be grateful for any other information in our possession "along similar lines". SI might or might not deal with specific questions but when they see "any other information on similar lines" they find themselves in something of a difficulty since as an office they are sending out and receiving wires all day with rarely any opportunity of digesting the material and considering the best use to which it can be put on a long term basis. We on the other hand made a careful study of all the material we received. O20 cases were thoroughly sifted, information distributed to all concerned, old cases were re-sifted in the light of further information etc. We were therefore better constituted to supply the "information on similar lines". This was a point which did not seem to occur to Vivian but he admitted that it was a point of considerable importance. As regards sending copies of our information to SIS Gibbs said that in future we proposed to ask Hurston to indicate on any items of information submitted to us whether or not he had passed a copy to SIS. If he had done so we should automatically send a copy of our reply to SIS. For the rest, GIBBS suggested that we should be allowed to use our discretion as to whether a matter was or was not of interest to SIS. He made it clear that Hurston was to an increasing extent obtaining his information by word of mouth and occasionally we followed up a conversation with an item of information in writing.

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Divorced from its context, such a letter would have no meaning for SIS at all and only lead to confusion. Vivian has apparently agreed to this arrangement.

C. and D.B. came to see me after lunch. I showed C. the note of Garbo's traffic relating to the rocket. C. thought it is in a sense somewhat re-assuring. He thinks it quite possible that the claims by P/W in connection with the rocket may well be exaggerated and that its primary use is for anti-invasion purposes. It is by no means certain that the emplacements in France are to be used for the installation of rocket apparatus. Meanwhile other German experiments are going on with something in the nature of a Queen Bee carrying a heavy load of explosive, but the indications are that nothing is likely to come into production before the New Year. The whole business seems to be still to a considerable extent in the experimental stage, although every possible effort is being made to get this new form of glider bomb into production.

C. told me that Passy is leaving here to take over command of the Intelligence Services in N. Africa. In fact he is more or less to take Cochet's place, the latter having been sacked, although he did not know it, before he arrived here. What is extremely unfortunate is that Rivet and Paillol have resigned. C. gathered that Passy was going to do all he could to retain the services of Paillol. The tendency of the French is to try and run the whole of the

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show from N. Africa. They have already unbut-
toned a large proportion of ISOS although
they have not got ISK. C. is very much
opposed to their trying to run agents into
France from N. Africa since this can only lead
to confusion. The French Service here is
going to be run by a general with a double
name who has recently come out of France.

November 21st

It has been agreed that should go to
Lisbon and Madrid for a period of 3 months.
He will make contact with his former German
connections in the Embassies and may ultimate-
ly worm his way into Abwehr circles.

John Marriott and J.C. came to see me about
a report from the NDO to the effect that a
plane had flown very low over the usual area
in Aberdeenshire last night. The RSLO wanted
to know whether we were expecting anything,
since the RAF had had instructions to leave
the plane alone. I think this is probably an
old instruction which had not been cancelled.
Curiously we had in fact had a date with
the Germans last night but for some reason
they had called it off. Perhaps they had
forgotten to tell their own air force. I am
finding out whether this flight can be
explained in any way on operational grounds.
If not we may have to organise a search. The
local police have been warned. I spoke to
Hume of Edinburgh Region who is referring the
matter back to Fighter Command HQ who will get
into direct touch with us. Perhaps when we
have seen the chart we may take a different
view.

We then discussed the case of Balloon. He normally corresponds through Sousa de Campos from whom both he and Gelatine receive drafts. Sousa de Campos has recently confessed to an agent of SIS that he is in touch with Balloon and Gelatine. This creates rather an awkward situation, since if we take no action Sousa de Campos will know that Balloon and Gelatine are XX agents, and may report the fact to the Germans. This will of course compromise Tricycle, Artist and everybody else. The suggestion is that Artist who is after all in control of the whole party, should be given the facts and provide some solution by which the Germans will cease to use Sousa de Campos. Marriott and J C. think this incident is the result of the blowing of cover addresses in Lisbon and Madrid during the 100% secret ink testing and subsequent action by Garbo, which has had the effect of frightening all those who are working for the Germans to such a degree that they are inclined to sell out to the British.

A propos of this we have had a letter from Mills in which he states that OSS have recently picked up several of Aspirin's controlled letters and sent them back to the FBI as of possible interest since they indicate the presence of an agent operating in the USA. It maybe that the individual who is being used as a cover address has reported the facts to OSS. Alternatively OSS, having got hold of the Watch List, may be trying to make contact with the addresses. This would

very easily account for Hoover's attitude as disclosed by Sir Edwin Herbert at the famous Kinnaird House meeting on the future of our relations with the U.S. authorities, when he said that Hoover had refused to pass addresses to his own censorship because he was afraid that they might reach CSS.

who has come out through Gib., is due to arrive at Ham tonight. I had a word with Stephens. I told him that I would be quite ready to tell us about all his colleagues, but might be less disposed to give us information on the part that he himself had played. He was probably of a type which might respond either to the soft pedal or the loud pedal. I thought therefore in the early stages it would be better not to treat him too rough.

In the property of HELLMUTH, who has completely broken, was found a piece of paper with the following words written under each other:
"Sigismundo, Panadera, Principal, Temporal, Conductor". As worked this out as follows: Sigismundo is Sigismund. Panadera is the Spanish for Baker and means BECKER, Principal means "Haupt", Temporal means "Sturm" and Conductor means "Fuehrer". Hence Sigismund BECKER, Hauptsturmfuehrer, who is the principal S.D. representative in B.A.

I spoke to the D.G. about his letter to C. on the subject of the I.B. and suggested that as things seemed to be going better it might be Catalogue Reference: KV/4692 the letter at this moment but to await developments and send it

later if necessary. He agreed to do this. He also spoke to me about Brooman-White, when I again gave him my reasons for thinking that he could not be of any great assistance to Dick.

November 22nd

I spoke to Fergie about HELLMUTH. He asks us not to tell Thurston that a copy is being handed to G.2. of our interrogation report. I said that the only purpose the action suggested would serve would be to build up G.2 at the expense of the FBI. Fergie denied that this was the purpose. He said that the sole idea was to inveigle G.2 to give the maximum assistance to the FBI. He argued that if G.2 knew the full facts of our report they might then be in a position to divulge more from secret sources. I could not quite follow this point since it seemed to me that if G.2 were only going to disclose the IZAK where it was confirmed by the interrogation report, their contribution would not be a particularly profitable one. It seemed to me that they would have to make up their minds whether they were prepared to disclose the IZAK or a paraphrase of it to the FBI or not. Quite obviously they should disclose it in toto, at the same time making stringent stipulations as to the use to which it can be put. Fergie told me that SIS had already notified G.2 that HELLMUTH had broken on the lines of the information contained in Most Secret material, and had advised them to approach the FBI and if necessary the State Dept. with a view to preventing any precipitate action by the FBI

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which might lead to a/continuance of IZAK.

I said that if SIS had already done this it seemed to me more than ever unnecessary for them to communicate an advanced summary of our interrogation report to G.2 before it had been passed to the FBI. I pointed out that while we thoroughly appreciated the necessity for preventing ill-considered action by the FBI, they were the dept. primarily concerned with the case. If therefore they found us communicating our interrogation report in advance to G.2 they would undoubtedly regard our action as a breach of faith. This was the situation which we wished to avoid at all costs. Fergie ended by accepting the terms of our letter. It was agreed that we would simultaneously hand a copy of the report to Thurston and to SIS and that Thurston would receive no covering letter at all.

JOB has challenged his watchers. This means that there is no object in continuing the observation and that we shall have to pull him in. It is proposed to arrest him under 18(3) and send him to the Oratory Schools.

I have now seen a chart of the aircraft that came in on Saturday night off the coast of Scotland. At only one point did it touch the coast and then only to a depth of about half a mile. I am very doubtful whether there was any attempt to drop an agent. Probably the plane was looking for convoys.

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I saw Jock Whitefoord this evening. I told him about MacDermot's past history. I said that 4 years ago he had been associated with the organisation known as "New Britain", which had at its head a curious individual called MITRONOVITCH who seemed to have almost hypnotic powers over his followers. Young MacDermot had been drawn into the organisation by his mother, who had financed him to a certain extent. The organisation was anti-communist and anti-fascist. Its basis seemed to be a kind of Beveridge Socialism. During one of the meetings young MacDermot had had a row with another member which had ended in a fight. His opponent who was hit in the chest died of heart failure and MacDermot was put on trial for manslaughter. He was acquitted, and since this incident he has had nothing more to do with the organisation, and hardly ever sees MITRONOVITCH.

I told Whitefoord that my personal view was that MacDermot was only too anxious to forget about the past and I felt confident that he would do his job at COSSAC extremely well. He was both intelligent and energetic. Whitefoord said he very much appreciated the D.G.'s wish that he should be informed. He was however quite satisfied that someone who had been employed in M.I.11 and subsequently in M.I.5 with satisfaction was good enough for Whitefoord said he would not mention the matter to anyone. He then told that he was very grateful for all the help Dick White had been giving him. He had studied the memo about the integration of I.B.1 and 3 and

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was quite satisfied that the course suggested was the right one. He had written to C. accordingly and did not anticipate any difficulty. I said that I always found C. most responsive. It was only when such questions got down to Cowgill's level that there was invariably trouble.

November 23rd-27th

Away with flu.

Dick tells me that his meeting at COSSAC was quite successful. Felix is ill and was represented by Vivian and a fellow called

Dick had the feeling that Vivian was wandering rather, and indulging in a certain amount of sentiment about Felix which could not be appreciated either by those who knew him or by the majority who did not. However agreement appears to have been reached. We are apparently to make a considerable contribution to the Purple Primer. Details of this are to be decided later. The meeting was primarily for the purpose of getting basic decisions and planning of certain aspects of IB work such as the interrogation of suspects etc. etc. I really think that M.I.5 are coming into their own at last, since Dick gathered from Adams that Kenneth Strong had laid it down quite definitely that no agents were to be run in N. Africa except under the IB staff. Trevor-Wilson is consequently to be withdrawn. This may account for Mair's appointment and promotion to G.2, in order that he may collate and co-ordinate the work of the S.I. (B) units. Jock Whiteford is now beginning

to talk of wanting an M.I.5 man for this and an M.I.5 man for that.

Pearce from East Africa is to take over Mac-Dermot's place in Lennox's section, since Brock refused to part with David. Rather hard on the latter seeing that he has done 4 years solid drudgery without any increase of pay. The job in Lennox's section would have given him a G.2's pay at least. He holds the rank at present but characteristically does not get the money.

JOB was arrested on the 23rd. He has been interrogated at the Oratory Schools and confessed. So far I have no details but I gather that TAR proposes to run him. He had some secret ink concealed in his bazor handle and in a key, but so far had not made use of it. He intended to hang on to the jewellery.

I heard a rather good P. M. story which I am told is absolutely true but not for repetition. A propos of Eden's visit to Mid East he said "The Foreign Secretary has asked me what he is to say to Turkey. I am of opinion that he should remind Turkey that Xmas is coming". He longed to send this message but refrained from doing so as he thought that Eden might take him too literally.

There was a lively discussion about Ireland's neutrality. Gray, the American Ambassador, drafted rather a good letter to Dev, urging Eire to join the Allies. When on leave he showed it to the President who showed it to

Winston at the time of the Quebec Conference. Winston referred it back to the Cabinet who pronounced against any move of the kind. The case was very ably argued by Cranbourne. The P.M. was not however satisfied. He takes the view that if Eire does not come in with us during the war, the prospect of a solution as between north and south will recede even further than it is already. Everyone will argue that had it not been for our hold upon the north the Germans might well have invaded Ireland with disastrous results to ourselves. If on the other hand Eire joined in with us and became a real part of the Commonwealth, some kind of solution might be possible. In the present state of the game the naval authorities do not regard the Irish bases as of any great importance. Maffey and the D.O. I believe opposed the move as they thought it better to let Ireland stew in her own juice and discover for herself how she alienated opinion both here and in the USA.

I gather that there has been some tentative approach by both the Scandinavians and the Low Countries to Gen. Smuts to be brought within the orbit of the British Empire. This is an extremely interesting move and one which, if the Irish only knew, might make them think quite a lot.

November 29th

Returned to work. I have been looking into the case of Charles BEDAUX who is under arrest in N.Africa. BEDAUX who is a naturalised American citizen of French origin, is in the custody of the Americans and may be tried either for treachery or for trading with the enemy. From papers found in his possession there is no doubt that he is a whole-hearted collaborationist but probably he is more interested in BEDAUX than anything else. He has had many connections with the Abwehr and with German officials, which fact he admits. He says however that it was only in this way that he could carry out his constructive policy by establishing a pipe line from the River Niger to N.Africa, which was to carry vegetable oils, He needed lorries, petrol, oil, tyres and finally iron and steel which he could only get with full German authority. Unfortunately for BEDAUX, ISOS and HARLEQUIN show that he has told only the half-truth, interspersed with a few lies. One of his more interesting statements is that he went to Berlin in Oct. 1941 at the instigation of a Dr. Joseph Francois MEDICUS, where he spent approximately 4 weeks discussing with a large number of experts the various plans for protection against the destruction of many oil refineries in the Persian Gulf. The idea was to protect these refineries from bombing from the air and also from long-distance artillery firing by the use of sand. BEDAUX explained that these refineries belong chiefly to the English and that Mr. E. A. O. Elkington of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. London could vouch for

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the purpose of his visit to Berlin. BEDAUX advised that he felt the refineries of the Persian Gulf belonged to the world at large and their destruction either by the retiring Allied Forces or by the attacking Germans would be a futile gesture. In his opinion these refineries should be standing intact at the conclusion of the war, regardless of its outcome, and it was his suggestion that the pipes of the refineries should be emptied and filled with sand so that they would be of no value to any country during the war, and therefore there would be no strategic purpose accomplished by destroying them. BEDAUX claimed that many of the German experts did not consider his plan practical while others contended it was out of the question in a total war. ISOS shows that on 25.10.41 the Abwehr in Brest informed Einzluft, Bremen, that BEDAUX was travelling to Berlin at the request of the Germany Embassy in Paris. He was anxious to have a conference with Sonderfuehrer Dr. Bensmann of Bremen who was to travel to Berlin for the purpose. On 27.10.41 Bremen was informed by the Abwehr in Paris that as Piekenbrock was ill, Bensmann was in the first instance to make a verbal report to his deputy, Lt. Col. Scholz. BEDAUX was not to be present at the interview. On 5.11.41 Bensmann was instructed to introduce BEDAUX to a certain Professor Endrou of Friedrich-Wilhelmstr. 12, Berlin.

From the above it seems not unlikely that as BEDAUX's company had for a long time been closely associated with the Anglo-Iranian and had presumably rationalised the whole

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concern according to the BEDAUZ system, the Germans thought that he might give them useful information at a time when they hoped to conduct a pincer movement in the Mid East. They would obviously have been anxious to prevent any destruction of the oil wells, and if they had had it in mind to drop air-borne troops it would have been of great value to them to have full information about the key points. This was in fact the mission of MULLER who visited the area in the autumn of the following year. His purpose was to prevent a possible scorched earth policy by the British. It was of course in August 1942 that Persia was occupied by ourselves and the Allies, but at that moment things were looking very ugly both in the Caucasus and in Libya.

TAR is not quite so certain about running JOB and is even contemplating the possibility of sacrificing Dragonfly and putting JOB on trial. JOB when first arrested still denied that he had been working for the enemy. After 24 hours at the Oratory Schools in solitary confinement he confessed that he had secreted ink in the handle of his razor and in a key. He did not however say anything about the jewellery. When asked about this he denied that it was for that purpose. It was only when he was shown the address to which he was to send it that he finally collapsed. His excuse ~~was~~ for not mentioning it before was that he had intended to keep it for his own use.

Cussen told me about his latest leakage case. A Dr. RAWDON-SMITH who has been employed by the Ministry of Supply and left to take up other

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employment, handed a great deal of information concerning deficiencies in our tank construction to Ronald Hyde, Tange's friend on the "Evening Standard". Hyde passed them on to Wilfred Roberts M.P., whose secretary, having forgotten to post the documents back to Hyde before going on leave to Ireland, gave them to a Censorship representative to put in the post for her. It was in this way that the contents of the document were discovered. Cussen is going to talk rather severely both to Hyde and RAWDON-SMITH. The idea was that when Wilfred Roberts asked awkward questions in the House the Evening Standard would have the necessary background in writing up the debate.

Little came to see me today. He has now been made D.N.I. Ottawa. He is working in very closely with Mills and is anxious to help in making up deception plans. He is having a look at B.I.A. documents.

Roger came to talk to me about M. He has been rather disturbed by a recent case where M. put 3 agents and on to a stateless Russian who was telling everybody that he was an agent of the OGPU. In fact this man had posed as an agent of the OGPU on no less than 3 different occasions and was thoroughly well known to the Police. What Roger feels is that M's organisation should not be allowed to pursue cases in the void. He should bring cases to the notice of sections concerned and accept their ruling as to future conduct. M. lives more or less
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very much out of

touch with the work of the office, and therefore becomes somewhat of a danger. Roger is I think going to register rather a strong protest.

Tommy Harris has concocted a very good anonymous letter which has been posted in Eire to the German Minister. It contains some quite reliable information which has been duly passed on to Berlin. TAR intends to use this channel for deception.

DMI rang me up about du BOULAY who has apparently been posted back to duty with the Irish Guards at Lingfield. DMI has asked us to put a check on his correspondence.

November 30th

I saw Moylan who was very friendly and readily agreed to take the name of any of our characters off the Camp 001 List. I pointed out to him the undesirability of these names appearing.

I discussed the case of JOB with TAR. I said that I did not think that it would be possible to liquidate JOB and still continue to run Dragonfly. If it was of paramount importance to keep Dragonfly we should have to give up the idea of the prosecution of JOB.

Dick seems to be getting on well with his planning at COSSAC in spite of numerous difficulties. We are making an offer of 6 interrogators and if Kenneth can get them we
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will train 6 others at the LRC.

Jock Whyte came to tell me about a character called STILES who has been acting as a stool pigeon in various British P/W camps in Germany. STILES has just turned up in Stockholm and relates that he has made a sensational escape. It is proposed to give him an opportunity of telling his story on arrival. There is considerable evidence from clandestine letters from P/Ws about STILES's activities but we may have some difficulty in producing witnesses who are at the moment in Germany. We shall probably have to intern STILES under 18B pending Court Martial.

Abbott is leaving as from tomorrow, and is going to join Swinton's staff in West Africa.

Frost has also left as from today.

It has been decided that Dixon shall replace Pearse in East Africa, the latter coming into Ops. section here in MacDermot's place.