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1

December 1st

I had a talk with Stopford about his memo on Alacrity. I told him that most of his recommendations had already been incorporated in our plans for the Second Front. Others did not seem to me to be of general application. He had made certain rather positive criticisms of the Admiralty. I thought that it might be politic for him to go over and see ADNI rather than send him a copy of the memo. He could then explain that we were sending out an SCO to Horta. As regards the other material in the report he would draft out notes for the depts. concerned which while giving all the facts would not be in any way offensive.

It has been decided to prosecute JOB and to close down the transmitter and Dragonfly. The principle reasons are that JOB's method of communication, namely to people in internee camps, is to be discouraged since the censorship are unable to cope with the large number of mails. At present they only test a small percentage. We could never trust JOB nor could we, in view of what has happened, ever use Dragonfly for deception. Information just received indicates that JOB had been previously trained as an Einz T/L agent. This he had not disclosed to us.

I lunched with Sclater and we discussed Frost's departure and the future of Barnet. RSS are showing strong signs of wishing to get together with us. M-E evidently feels some anxiety about the part they are to play on the Second

front, particularly if people like Elms are to be in charge of the mobile units.

I saw the DMI about the assessment of information disclosed in B.J.s as being sent from attaches in this country, in this particular case the Swedish M.A. I said that we obtained the assessment from Ops from our own security angle. In this case the information seemed to be fairly accurate and rather important. Could I take it that a matter of this kind was brought to the notice of the DMI by his own staff? DMI said that a matter of this sort would be done within his dept. I then asked whether Carlisle would be informed. He did not seem quite sure about this but made a note of it. He thought definitely that Carlisle should be given a hint to exercise rather more than ordinary care when dealing with the Swedish MA.

CAMPINI has arrived at Funchal with a British safe conduct. He was interrogated at Cape Town but without any result. No incriminating evidence was found in a search. A suggestion has been put forward that CAMPINI should be given safe conduct from Funchal to German-occupied Italy and that in exchange for this a Badoglio Consul now in German hands should be returned to southern Italy. We consider this a poor exchange. Another alternative is to give CAMPINI a safe conduct and then pull the ship in at Gib. where he could be interrogated by someone with a full knowledge of the case. This we consider also to be unsatisfactory since there would be no inducement for

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CAMPINI to say anything. He would gather a certain amount of information from us which he would take on to the Germans. We would much prefer that he remain in Funchal. A final suggestion is that the Germans should keep their Badoglio consul and that we should keep CAMPINI and bring him to this country for interrogation.

I saw an officer of OSS yesterday, called . . . He is here temporarily for 6 or 8 weeks while Murphy of OSS is back in Washington. Wheeler spoke of his first assignment after joining OSS. He said, "You would hardly believe it, but I was summoned to a meeting at which my chief, Bill Donovan, was in the chair. He read out a letter from the President. I cannot help thinking that the President may have had his tongue in his cheek but I am quite sure that my chief took the letter in all seriousness. The suggestion put forward by the President was that OSS should collect large quantities of bats known to exist in certain caves in Mexico. These bats should be put into crates and shipped to Seattle. They were to be taken from there to some point within flying distance of Tokyo where they would be put on board aeroplane. Attached to the feet and wings of the bats were to be small incendiaries. The bats were to be released from the aeroplanes near Tokyo the idea being that they would fly down the chimneys and that Tokyo would go up in flames. . . . himself had to investigate the possibility of the proposition and for that

purpose got into touch with a number of professors who were thought to be knowledgeable about bats. The proposition did not apparently get much further than this but the file is even now brought forward from time to time for further consideration.

There has been a tremendous fuss about MOSLEY's release. No reference was made by the H.O. to this dept. beforehand. This might have been a good thing since although the decision was clearly a high-level one, some precaution might have been taken to see that MOSLEY did not live with people with whom it might be undesirable for him to be in contact. W/C Jackson with whom he is residing, is engaged on highly important experimental flying work which has caused the A.M. to say that as long as MOSLEY remains in his present abode, Jackson cannot visit his own home. Alternative accommodation is now being sought for MOSLEY. The debate in the House went off fairly well and the voting against Morrison was 62. A great fuss has been made by Labour, presumably because they imagine that they may lose the support of the workers if they in any way identify themselves with MOSLEY's release. I wonder very much whether the workers, soldiers, sailors and airmen care one way or another. It seems to me that all that the Opposition has done is to give MOSLEY a lot of unnecessary publicity. It would have been much better to let him fade away into obscurity. Bernard Shaw who was interviewed by a newspaper woman called Miss Wheeler Ryan, was asked: "Do you think that anything short of

the resignation of Mr. Morrison would pacify those who are risking life and limb, to say nothing of enduring prolonged toil and privation, in the struggle against Fascism?"

Saw replied: "Those who are risking life and limb to defend their country are soldiers, sailors, airmen and miners, chiefly. You are asking me whether I think that the soldiers and sailors will run away and the miners come out on strike unless Mr. Morrison resigns. To put it more briefly, you are asking me whether I am a damned fool or not. I reply that it is not for me to say."

Miss Ryan then asked whether Shaw thought it too strong to say that the Home Secretary's decision, whether taken individually or in concert with others, was calculated to cause alarm and despondency among the masses of the people who responded to his exhortation to "go to it". Shaw replied: "I do not think it is a strong proposition at all. It makes me suspect that you are mentally deficient. I think this MOSLEY panic shameful. What sort of people are they to can be frightened out of their wits by a single man like Oswald MOSLEY or Rudolf HESS? They are fit subjects for the derision of Goebbels." Miss Ryan then said "A decision having been made, was it astute or stupid to bring Lord Dawson of Penn into the matter, as thought to overawe the public?" Shaw asked what was wrong with Lord Dawson of Penn. "Can you name a higher medical authority? He was good enough for King George V.. Is he not good enough for Sir Oswald MOSLEY? If he says that imprisonment would endanger Sir Oswald's life, do you expect Mr.

Morrison to say "All right, I will re-imprison him because I want to kill him and so does the whole Cabinet"? But even if MOSLEY were in rude health it was high time to release him, with apologies for having let him frighten us into scrapping the habeas corpus act because we dared not bring him to trial". The past part of this remark is not of course very sound.

December 2nd

The D.G. held a meeting to discuss the final draft by the Services recommending Security measures for OVERLORD. The only controversial issue seems to be the 15-mile belt. The arguments in favour of this are that the experience of the past has shown that it is difficult to control the regulated area within the 15-mile belt if visitors are allowed. It means further that when the regulated area is created the fact becomes broadcast since visitors from other parts of the country have to be told through the Press that they cannot to these places. This may pin-point concentration areas etc. There is of course a possibility that the south coast areas may, prior to operations, become a serious target for enemy aircraft. It is therefore desirable that a 15-mile belt should be as thinly populated with civilians as possible. Necessary accommodation for troops is another argument.

I had lunch with Peter Loxley. I asked him for his views about our coming under Dick Law as ministerial head. He had heard of the project but did not know how matters stood at

the moment, everyone being away. He agreed with me that it would probably be a good thing since it would undoubtedly facilitate some form of amalgamation at a later date. I asked him about the committee which was at present sitting to consider the future of SIS. He said that the committee consisted of himself, Neville Bland and Cadogan. It had so far heard the views of C., Dansey and Vivian. It was largely of a domestic kind and no decisions made would necessarily affect any scheme for amalgamation at a later date. I think Loxley has our point of view well in mind and thinks almost entirely as we do, namely that C.E. must be amalgamated and come under one head. He agreed that it was probably a good thing since it would undoubtedly be some form of amalgamation at a later date. He asked him about this. He thinks however that Passport Control should be cleaned up, and that it should not be engaged in any way in offensive operations either in the country in which it resides or in any other country. Offensive operations should have other cover. He is not quite certain whether C.E. should actually run Passport Control but he is quite certain that the head of it in each station should be thoroughly acquainted with C.E. matters. He thinks that an attaché at the Embassy might be better placed to run C.E. work in close touch with Passport Control. Either this officer or the PCO would have the closest possible liaison with the local authorities of an MI5 kind, names, police and deuxième bureaux. The relations would be purely on an exchange basis. Loxley holds the view that subversive movements would have

come in under such a scheme, namely that Communism or Fascist movements abroad would have to be amalgamated with our Communist and Fascist sections here and that the liaison with official depts abroad on both these questions would have to be conducted on the same basis as C.E. affairs. I have suggested to Loxley that I should let him have a note giving him broadly our views on the future of this dept. He seemed to think that this might be a good idea. Whether we give it to him personally for his guidance or officially is a matter for consideration.

I had a discussion with Milmo, Stamp and TAR about JOB. TAR had sent a minute to me expressing his view that he agreed to the prosecution of Job subject to there being no mention of the jewellery or of Dragonfly in the proceedings, as this might endanger Father who had connections with Dragonfly. TAR was also anxious that the Germans should not think that Dragonfly had been a XX agent, although he did not mind them thinking that possibly Dragonfly had been arrested. My view was that the moment JOB was prosecuted we must expect that the Germans had got on to from to Dragonfly and possibly from Dragonfly to Father. We could not rely on the stupidity that they had displayed in the case of RICHTER. We might of course get away with it again but we could not be certain. If therefore the maintenance of Father's position was of paramount importance JOB ought not to be prosecuted. The question of the mention of the jewellery was in my view irrelevant apart from the fact that it was a matter which we could not control

The Defence might very easily plead that JOB had intended to tell us everything but that after he had crossed the frontier he was asked to carry the jewellery and that cupidity had got the better of him. He had therefore decided to keep the jewellery and say nothing.

TAR I think is not very much worried about the link between Dragonfly and Father. He is however particularly anxious to prevent the Germans from getting the impression that Dragonfly was a D.A. since this might cause them to review their other cases. The proposal is therefore that JOB should be prosecuted and that Dragonfly should simply cease to transmit. The Germans will then be left guessing as to his fate. He may have got tipped off and escaped, or he may have been caught and held but not executed owing to lack of evidence.

Ian Wilson, who is in Lisbon, has reported that according to ARTIST who has had a talk with HENSS, an old friend in Amt VI, no leakages are taking place to the Abwehr or to the S.D. from British offices in Lisbon. The Germans do however get a certain amount of information from Col. Solberg, the American M.A. whose indiscretions are well known to us.

I had a long discussion with Joe Archer, Burt and TAR about the MAP case. Fish in the course of his enquiries has ascertained that the particular piece of information about the speed of the Spitfire 21 at a given height was officially only in possession of a few people, one of whom was almost undoubtedly Father.

He was a test pilot at Worthy Down when the trials were taking place. The trials began on May 7th but the prototype crashed on May 15th. Sometime between those dates the information first became available. It is unlikely that it was computed, since the speed obtained was some 40 mph faster than any of the engine experts expected. The document in which it appeared was compiled up to June 1st. Leakage therefore must have taken place at some date between 7th-15th May and 1st June. This gives roughly a period of 3 weeks. The test pilot was a man called Quill. He says however that Father was constantly in and out of his office with other test pilots and that the results of the test would almost certainly have been known to him and also to others engaged on similar work. He says moreover that before he left Father made a statement when in his cups that he had formerly worked for the German S.S. This matter had never been previously reported to us, and need not necessarily denote anything more than an indiscretion. In fact it might be argued that if he was in fact working for the German S.S. it would have been an extremely stupid thing to say. The result of the test of course was passed on to other people and though highly secret it probably was like ISOS known to a good many. It did not however reach MAP in print until May 27th which would only have left 4 days to get to Berlin. The suggestion has been made that possibly Father may have added something to one of his secret ink letters without our knowledge. This could not be so since clearly these letters are closely supervised. The next question is whether the

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letter could have reached the Germans in time. It normally takes some 4 weeks for a letter to reach Father's control station in Barcelona. There is also the possibility that if Harmer had communicated to Father that the Germans were not altogether satisfied with his information he might have wished to enhance his reputation with them on account of his wife who is resident in Belgium. He might also have been rather piqued at being sent to India. If Father has really been playing a double game it is rather remarkable that we have not seen any traces of it on ISOS. The whole matter is being gone into very carefully by Harmer and Fish. Personally I am sceptical about the information having leaked through Father, but one never knows. I think it is more likely to have gone through an air attache to Stockholm or Madrid, since what passes by these routes is only occasionally known to us. I am quite sure too that if the Spitfire 21 had exceeded all computations by 40 mph the fact must have been known to a large number of people who would have been prepared to dine out on the information.

December 3rd

Thurston came to see me about the BEDAUX case. He told me that he had seen Elkington and taken two statements from him which he had sent on to Washington. He had also had a look at Elkington's files. He was quite certain that neither Elkington nor the Anglo-Iranian were

a party to BEDAUX's visit to Berlin in Oct. 41. Elkington had known BEDAUX intimately for a long time and was in fact at Abadan when BEDAUX was there before the war. BEDAUX rationalised the whole method of production according to his own system, and was therefore in possession of full details about the whole plant. Before the war BEDAUX was playing politics with the Persian Govt. in connection with Anglo-Iranian. He caused a considerable amount of trouble and had to be told quite definitely that he had no authority to represent Anglo-Iranian with the Persian authorities in any discussions. Thurston said that he did not know at the moment whether BEDAUX was in the custody of the FBI or G2 or even where he was. The FBI had sent a couple of chaps to N. Africa to interrogate BEDAUX but in his view it was not possible to stage anything in the nature of a prosecution for treachery or espionage, since BEDAUX had covered himself by reporting frequently of Bullitt, Murphy and Mathews at Vichy. I explained to Thurston that our interest in the case was to some extent academic but that we should like to tie up any tag ends and get as clear a view as possible as to the extent to which the BEDAUX network had been used as a medium for espionage. Thurston suggested that we should send out a brief to Mills and that Mills could go down and examine the Bureau's files. I told Thurston about MULLER's mission to Persia in the early autumn of 42 which I thought might well have been based on information supplied by BEDAUX. I have asked Kellar to send a wire out to Mid East to get MULLER interrogated on this point.

It is possible too that MULLER may know something about Bensmann of Ast ~~Bremen~~ who was present at the meeting, and of Prof. Endrou.

AMGOT is now known as Amgotterdämmerung, or "The Twilight of the Röds".

I had a long talk with TAR about the MAP case and Father. I think we can fairly confidently eliminate the possibility of Father having reported the performance of the Spitfire at the end of one of his letters. There is only one or at the outside two letters which are in any way material to the investigation. In both these cases we have seen the contents of the letter go right through to Berlin. The full text is there without any addition. The only other possibility is that Father may have another link and that he is corresponding to another address. This seems equally unlikely since as his information was regarded as of considerable importance it is almost inconceivable that we should not have seen some reflection of his alternative method on ISOS. Fish is of course hopping with excitement and it is very difficult to damp his ardour without telling him the full facts. TAR has however gone so far as to tell him that we have positive information that the communications Father sent at the material time reached the Germans in terms identical with those despatched from here and without any additions. Personally I think that Fish and Jo Archer are relying far too much on the alleged secrecy of the information and the limited circulation.

I shall not be at all surprised if it were found that a large number of Spitfire pilots and possibly also Coastal Command pilots who are operating on the aerodrome at Worthy Down had not been acquainted with the remarkable performance of the Spitfire 21, which did roughly 450 mph at about 24,000 ft.

Pandora shows that the Irish have already warned HEMPEL that they may be recalling all wireless sets. This has probably come about from a conversation which Cecil had the other day with McKenna, the Irish Chief of Staff. McKenna asked him what we were really anxious about. Cecil said that in connection with the Second Front we were clearly concerned about leakage of information which might take place by wireless from the German Legation and said that possibly some demarche might be made in this connection. McKenna was very sympathetic. The probability is that he reported the matter and that Dev. thought it better to take action before receiving a peremptory request. The Germans have no alternative method of communication except cable and are wondering whether it would be possible to get wireless parts by submarine. They will be left without a receiving set as well as without a transmitter as their set is both.

When the Armistice with Italy was announced the German sabotage Service at Madrid began to investigate the possibilities of preventing Italian merchant ships in Spanish ports from falling into British hands. Some of these ships opened the sea-cocks, but it was thought

advisable to attach bombs to others. This was done at Cadiz and attempts were also made at Huelva and Cartegna. An attempt to sabotage the British s.s. Greathope at Huelva was prevented by a member of our counter-sabotage squad operating under water. On 14th No. he found a object wired to the ship's rudder which was detached by divers and fell to the bottom of the harbour. A certain San Felice who seems to have been a member of the Italian Secret Service, is now collaborating to some extent with the Allies in the Mid East. He has told us that the attempts against the Kaituna, the Fernplant and the Scilian Prince some weeks ago were made by Italian Naval experts operating from the Turkish mainland. According to him, the Naval experts returned to Italy 3 months ago taking all their stocks of sabotage material with them. He does not think that any further attempts will be made from the Turkish mainland. He disclosed that information about our counter-sabotage measures had been obtained from somebody connected with Lloyds agency. This man is probably an extremely undesirable person known as RICKARDS. For some reason or other San Felice has not been pressed to disclose the exact source of his information. This point is being taken up.

Important information about intended sabotage activities of the German SS in Italy has recently been received. Requests are made by the German sabotage service for large quantities of equipment most of which is SO₂ material. Hill-Dillon has been warned. SO₂ recently designed a new form of limpet with which to sabotage

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German ships. This limpet has a booby trap incorporated so that if it is discovered and an attempt is made to pull it off, the bomb automatically goes off, killing the anti-sabotage personnel and doing almost as much damage as if it were left sticking to the hull. Unfortunately SOE have discovered that this equipment which was issued to their agents in Norway has been definitely compromised. Suitable warnings have been sent to the under-water squad at GIB. Meanwhile we think that we have discovered a method of neutralising the bomb which SOE had not thought of.

December 4th

So far as can be judged the affairs of Tricycle and Artist in the Iberian Peninsula are going well and the traffic which Tricycle took over with him has been well judged in Berlin who have given their consent to a large money advance being made.

Dragonfly has succeeded in re-establishing contact with the Germans, although no traffic of any importance has been exchanged. In view of the unfortunate developments in the JOB case it has been deemed advisable that Dragonfly should not again transmit, in the hopes that the Germans will conclude that he has been identified and arrested. We particularly do not wish them to think he has been a D.A. as this might cause them to review other traffic.

A position which may be serious has arisen due to a possible leakage from the internee
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camp in which JEFF was originally detained, namely Camp WX. There was apparently communication between Camp WX and another adjacent internment camp from which certain individuals were returned to Germany on an exchange basis. If the Germans know that Jeff has been interned they must think that both Mutt and Jeff are compromised.

B
'ronx's payment for November has now arrived.

Artist has been giving information about the Plan Dream method of payment to Garbo.

Artist has informed us that the Bermans in Brussels believe in Puppet but that nobody else does. We should learn in the fairly near future what attitude the experts in Berlin take towards Hamlet at their forthcoming meeting.

Joseph has had further meetings with the Japs. No details are yet available.

Treasure has already been communicating with the Germans in S/T.

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Lwyer is going part time to COSSAC to prepare the IB brief and to collate information received from all sources.

Frost came in to say goodbye. He is taking on some Second Front job and will be working with Howard Marshall. We can now get down to the reorganisation of Barnet.

An F.O. report dated 22.11.43 on Morale in Germany sums up the present position as follows:
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"Though no doubt discussions of such projects continue in military and conservative circles, there is no report of any attempt yet on the part of the military leaders or industrialists to overthrow the Nazi regime. There have in fact been no signs of active opposition in any quarter. Nevertheless awareness of impending defeat has grown and readiness to accept it. The prestige of Hitler has fallen yet further. Even Party circles share these feelings and over the whole field of administration the effective control exercised by the authorities is slackening. There is severe strain, apathy and indifference which tends to cause all work to lessen and lower production, and increase the tendency mentioned in the last report to give personal safety and private interest precedence over the needs of the war effort. Morale in the armed forces seems considerably higher than at home. If it were not, it is hard to see how the German Army would continue to fight so well. But here too there have been signs of sagging and reports speak of a slackening of discipline during the retreat in the West. There is evidence of considerable depression among the forces of occupation, particularly in Norway, while the possibility of the contagion of low morale at home spreading to the fighting services appears to be causing anxiety to the authorities. The morale of crews of operational U-boats particularly those based on French ports, has declined considerably. As regards the German Air Force, figures from the Russian front are deficient but that from other theatres indicates that there has been some decline of morale and slight weakening of

fighting spirit.

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS

December 1958

Antony showed me a report of CERVELL, the Swedish Air Attache. It contained a certain amount of confidential information about our engine construction at Bristol, with a promise that more highly confidential material would be given in the next bag carried by a Swedish courier. It was stated that in passing this information the firm had gone behind the backs of the Air Ministry as they were looking to their commercial prospects after the war, and wished to impress Sweden with the performance of their aircraft. CERVELL further disclosed by inference that he was getting a good deal of information from his American colleague, Col. Turner, who at the moment is in the USA but will be returning shortly. This information is rather opportune in the light of the paper that we have recently submitted to the JIC on the subject of leakage through attaches.

Burt talked to me about the MAP enquiry, fish is ardently pursuing Father. He has ascertained that Quill actually asked for the services of Father. I told Burt that while I did not wish to impede investigations in any way frankly I did not think that Father was the guilty party. I was of opinion that at least 100 people must have known about the performance of the Spitfire and probably most of the squadrons. Certainly everybody at Worthy Down would have known, and knows of that kind gets about very quickly. It would

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then only be necessary for a pilot to be brought down and for his conversation with another pilot to be intercepted by microphone in a prison camp. Moreover I had just had information of a serious leakage of information through the Swedish air attache.

I saw Holderness and Miss Nunn about the latter's appointment as MI5 representative in the H.O. I explained that in my view the real value of the appointment would be to get Miss Nunn thoroughly acquainted with all our work and methods; on grounds of secrecy it was very often difficult for us to put information on files or in letters. The consequence was that our correspondence with the H.O. was always rather guarded and I felt looked on with a certain amount of suspicion. There was perhaps a tendency to regard us as rather irresponsible people with false beards. I thought that if Miss Nunn knew exactly how we worked and how we obtained our information it might be possible to create more confidence in the advice given by us from time to time to the H.O. I explained that the great bar to this in the past had been lack of a contact who had sufficient time to deal with our work and the absence of any confidential registry in the H.O. Certain of our files, so far from being available to the whole office, were not even available to all the members of my own division. We dealt with this situation by having a small registry linked up with the main registry. This ensured that no action could be taken by some other division without prior reference to

myself or one of my section officers. When I had originally raised the question of H.O. representation with Maxwell he had expressed his willingness to start some confidential registry in the H.O. I was not quite sure whether this would be necessary or not. It might be sufficient if Miss Nunn was thoroughly acquainted with our work here and used as consultant by other sections of the H.O. If necessary she could come over and consult our files when a difficult point arose. I thought that we could leave this question until Miss Nunn had had a general look-round. I told her that I had made arrangements for Major Cussen to be her conductor. He would explain the whole office to her and see that she got what she wanted. All that now seemed necessary was for Maxwell to write a note to the D.G. in continuation of previous correspondence, saying that Miss Nunn had been appointed.

Antony and I saw Air-Commodore Buss about CERVELL's report. Buss said that he was very worried about the information it contained and still more worried about the more confidential information which is to go to Sweden about the middle of the month. I said that we were doing our best to anteprehis but of course we should not be able to stop it. He said that he had spoken to Inglis who was not very inclined to take any action since he was on friendly terms not only with CERVELL but also with Col. Turner the American Air Attache. Buss on the other hand thought that the matter was extremely serious. I suggested as a possible way out that we should draw the

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attention of the J.I.C. to this report in connection with the memo which we had recently submitted, and that we should recommend to the Chiefs of Staff that Service Depts. should inform attaches that owing to the discovery of a document in Sicily indicating that the enemy had a considerable knowledge of our aircraft, they had regretfully been compelled to suspend visits to factories and aircraft firms. This could be coupled with a warning to firms themselves. Buss seemed to think this a good idea but before we take any action he is anxious to have another word with Inglis. He will let me know the result. I have not told Jo Archer about this as he is away with flu.

Dickson and Roberts came to see me about their troubles. They both seem to take a pretty poor view of M. and his organisation. Mickson wants to work to B. Division and Roberts to B.1C. Dickson thinks that far too much money is being expended and that there is not sufficient concentration on the work. I said that I would consider their proposals and let them know.

December 7th

According to the 'urnish Minister in Berne, who obtains his information from one of the director of the Swiss Bank and other sources, Schacht has recently been attending a meeting of the administrative body of the bank for international settlements. He made contact with the British and American banking organisations to whom he made an armistice peace proposal. The sugges-
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tion was that we and the Americans should occupy Germany and that meanwhile a front would be held against the Russians. Schacht said that he was speaking in the name of the industrialists and the Generals who were convinced that the war was lost. His proposals were rejected, in London and Washington. It is understood that similar proposals have been made in Lisbon which have also been turned down.

I held a meeting with Baxter, Milmo and Jock Whyte about escapers and evaders. It was decided that Milmo would draw up a memo for discussion with MI9 in which the dangers of the situation both from our point of view and the MI9 point of view would be made clear with certain specific examples. We would then suggest that at any rate in the case of allied nationals who had taken more than a month to get through the period at the MI9 camp should be extended to a week; in order to cope with the situation we would try and provide a French-speaking officer who would be attached to the LRC and thoroughly conversant with the index. He would be available to take interrogations when required.

At the D.G.s meeting today I raised the case of KERN, the undesirable banker who, backed by the Treasury, had succeeded in getting an exit visa for the USA. It seemed to me undesirable that we should pass on information to the detriment of an individual who was backed by

an official Govt. dept. What had been wrong in this case was that the Treasury had backed the visa before consulting us. The matter is to be raised on the Travel Control Committee

As regards the Italian P/W who are now to be absorbed into industry, it was decided that we should inform D.P.W. that it would be undesirable to employ these people in regulated areas.

TAR and I went to Barnet this afternoon. We discussed first of all the future of the wire-less experts. It seemed to me that they might be useful on 2nd Front operations. I have asked Sclater to get out a memo explaining exactly what takes place when a W/T is reported either by D.King or by informant. It seemed to me that precisely the same situation would arise within the zone of the armies and somebody would be required to conduct the hunt, the primary purpose of which would be to get hold of the agent and turn him round. When we got the paper on this subject Dick should take it up with COSSAC. TAR is going to spend some time at Barnet and will first of all go into the whole question of policy. I have impressed upon him that before falling into the arms of Maltby and G.P. it would be as well to acquaint himself thoroughly with the constitutional position. At the moment R.S.S.'s view on this matter are far from satisfactory. Although they were responsible to us as well as to S.I.S. they were quite capable of taking away transmitters which should be used for our purposes and using them to carry out jobs for other depts.

We had no idea how the resources of R.S.S. are allocated. For instance we are never informed as to the extent to which transmitters are being used for the purpose of general search. G.P I think takes the line that although he may have a vague responsibility towards us for what happens in this country, we are in no way concerned in what he does abroad. On this basis he failed to consult us before sending a van to the Azores. Had there been some sort of consultation the whole operation might have been carried out better than it was. The probability is that the van ought never to have been sent at all.

December 8th

At the Wednesday meeting the case of "Bastler" was mentioned. After observation by D.6 and careful enquiry at the LRC the conclusion has been reached that de BONDRA is not the man concerned. Personally I am not entirely convinced although I have not seen the detailed evicence. I have asked Kellar and Burne, a propos of the Rickards case, to make some enquiry about the duties of Lloyds representatives abroad and the extent to which they are informed of our shipping movements.

TAR is rather worried about the position of his D.A.s. Owing to the intervention of Artist the whole Tricycle set-up might collapse, at any moment, and cannot at any rate be used for deception purposes. Artist has also heard about Plan Dream which brings him perilously near to Garbo. Mean hile it has been decided
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ascertained that for a good many months communication by signalling has been going on between Camp WX and the adjacent Nazi internment camp. Sometimes this signalling took the form of throwing a brick with a message on it. It seems also that broadcast programmes were made in both camps which were linked to the same receiver. This means that a person in one camp could by speaking into the microphone employed be able to be heard in the other camp. A number of prisoners have been questioned as to their knowledge about the inmates of Camp WX. As a result we have ascertained that the presence there of Jeff and Summer was known to the Nazi Camp and in particular to a man called KARL who was allowed to go back to Germany a short time ago on an exchange basis. This may mean that Tate is blown and also Mutt. Karl was doubtless vetted on his record but not on the fact that he had been in close proximity to Camp WX.

Dragonfly has had to be liquidated. This leaves us with rather a motley crew, since even Lipstick who is in a very strong position is probably known to Artist. Sniper and Fil and Bronx appear to be secure but the first two have not yet really got going. Treasure is also all right but not really in action and has no wireless set.

I understand that the German bombing raid on Bari was rather a disastrous affair for us. Some 12 ammunition ships were blown up.

Lipstick arrived back the other day with large quantities of duff on his tie.

I went over to see C. this afternoon. I told him that we had recently been asked by Dr. Vick of the Industrial research Dept. of the Ministry of Supply for our opinion on the possible leakage of information from factories which were concerned with the production of infra-red apparatus. Vick's view was that so much depended on the surprise element that if there were any grounds for thinking that serious leakage had occurred it might alter the course of operations. David's view is that in so far as factories are concerned the risk is very small. It does appear however that infra-red was used by the one-man submarine in their attack on the Tirpitz some weeks ago and that the Germans may possibly have captured a torpedo intact, although insofar as infra-red is concerned there was a self-destroying gadget. Infra-red was also used on the beaches at Salerno in some form or another and on a ship which was sunk in the Mediterranean. I told C. that we were going through our agents' traffic but I thought that there might have been some reference to the subject on M.S.S. He said he thought that possibly there were references. He would find out and let me know. I told him that Dr. Vick was submitting a report to the X. Committee, whatever that might be. C. thought he had heard of it but did not know what it did.

I then told C. about Miss Nunn and asked him whether he would have any objection to her seeing me. I explained the

purpose of her appointment and that much of the advantages of it would be lost if we were forced to withhold certain information from her. If we could persuade her that this dept. and others were doing useful work it might be helpful both to ourselves and to SIS. C. agreed to Miss Nunn seeing this material, and suggested that she might be told, by way of a caution, that C. was personally responsible to the P.M. for the material and that her name had therefore been placed on the P.M. list.

I told C. about OSS's curious action in the Peninsula when they had returned one of Aspirin's letters to his cover address to the FBI stating that they thought it denoted the presence of an agent in the USA. It had occurred to me as possible that OSS might be working on the basis of the Censorship Watch List and that this might be Hoover's reason for not wishing to pass secret addresses to the Censorship. C. thought this was quite probable; although he did not see what he could do he thought it would be as well to bear the possibility in mind that OSS might be carrying out CE activities in the Peninsula by putting agents in on cover addresses. They were quite capable of doing this kind of thing without reference to anyone.

C. told me that French Intelligence was in an appalling mess. He had had a pathetic letter from Rivet, about some sort of political defence committee which was now responsible and of course knew nothing about the job.

Rivet's own position is very shaky and Paillol still more so. Passy has taken over. If Paillol goes he will probably apply for the services of Bonnefusse. C. is just waiting to see what happens, but if he is not satisfied ~~when~~ the French have sorted out their affairs he may refuse to co-operate with inexperienced politicians. This would mean the isolation of French Intelligence in this country which would be quite a serious matter.

C. thought that, unfortunate as the remark was, Smuts was quite right when he said that the French were finished as a nation and obviously sunk to the lowest depths.

I asked C. if he had heard anything about any approach by any European countries to come within the British Commonwealth as foreshadowed by Smuts in his speech. He said he had heard of representations by Hungary and Roumania but not by any other countries.

We then got on to the rocket-gun and the Queen Bee. C. is quite certain that the latter will be used, though opinions vary to some extent as to the date. From a very good source he has heard that it would probably not be a going concern before March or April, whilst from other sources the indications are that it might start in January. There are anything up to 100 of what are known as "ski-sites" which are for the purpose of catapulting these aircraft into the air. They are said to have a speed of about 400 mph and carry a load of 2 tons of explosive. The sites appear

to be directed towards London, Southampton and Bristol. They are more or less identical in design with the sites already photographed at Peenemünde. It is thought that the recent dropping of flares over London, remaining in the air for anything upto $3/4$ of an hour, might have something to do with the guiding of the Queen Bee on to its target. Instructions have now been issued to Air Force pilots to help them in coping with this type of aircraft and also the ski-sites. Bombing of the sites has already begun but I do not think that up to the present it has been particularly successful. C. thinks that there may be a rocket-gun. There is apparently a large emplacement at Watten which may be for the purpose of launching a rocket but he is rather inclined to think that too extravagant claims have been made for it and that it has been exploited by the Germans more as propaganda than anything else, in order to cover up the Queen Bee.

I asked C. whether Overlord was likely to be advanced in consequence. He said that this was the subject of discussion at the moment in N. Africa but that so far he had heard nothing. He thought that Turkey was probably going to give us bases. It would doubtful whether they would come in as co-belligerents.

C. then told me that he had heard from certain well-placed quarters that Scotland Yard took a very poor view of MI5. I said that this was highly probable for three reasons, firstly because the Yard had not the slightest idea what we were doing and only occasionally got

some rather trivial enquiry to investigate. Doubtless they judged the general standard of our work by these enquiries, which might only be the tying up of a few tag ends, but appeared rather futile. The second reason was the STOCKMAN case, which could not have made us very popular in high quarters since it disclosed the fact that at least a dozen policemen were deeply involved in corruption. This knowledge of the unreliability of the police was of course a limiting factor on the amount of information that we gave them. Lastly there was the presence here of Burt and his officers, who had always been rather a sore point with S.B. The latter thought that enquiries made by Burt and his men should really be made by the Yard. C. said he was very glad to know these things since in future he would be able to put a stop to any such stories.

December 9th

Dick and I had dinner with Whitefoord at the Travellers last night when the plan for late Overlord was explained and apparently met with full approval. We tackled the question of Percy. Jock Whitefoord replied that while he very much sympathised he thought that we might do a lot worse. He said there was already a tendency in Etoussa to say that the British in Cossac were over-loaded. If therefore we put in a British officer over Percy, the supreme commander when he took office might take exception to this and impose on us some

frightful American who knew nothing about anything, when we should have to begin all over again. In other words we might well be out of the fryingpan into the fire. In Percy we had at least somebody who was manageable although at times he might be trying. He had a great respect for Dick and for the way he had handled the whole problem. If things really got difficult Whitefoord himself was ready to take a hand, and Dick could have access to him whenever he wanted. I am sorry for Dick but I think that Jock Whitefoord is right and that we should make the best of Percy. Meanwhile Providence is on our side with regard to Col. Blakeney whose services have been urgently called for by some other dept. His place will be taken shortly by MacLeod.

I had a talk with Burt. I mentioned that information had reached me from a high quarter that the Yard took a very poor view of this office. I asked Burt whether he thought that was true and whether the reasons were as previously stated by men. He said that he had gained a similar impression but that he had never lost an opportunity of expressing a contrary view. He said the criticisms were nearly all based on ignorance. If he were expressing a criticism himself the only things that he would say would be that there were a certain number of cases that might be more easily cleared up by direct enquiry instead of beating about the bush with HOWs etc. With this I heartily agreed. He thought too that on occasions there was a tendency to accept reports

of a rather vague kind and act on them. With this I also agreed. Apart from these twopoints he had a very high opinion of the work done here. I think he is anxious to stay on after the war.

Jock Whitefoord rang me up this morning to say that he had very much enjoyed our meeting last night and that he had already discussed post Overlord with Percy. Percy had drawn his attention to certain F.O. telegrams to Washington on the subject of a United Nations Security Organisation. He thought this might be some appalling creation of Bill Donovan's. I said that I had heard nothing about it but that I would find out from the F.O., since it might run counter to our own plans.

Joe Stephenson has telegraphed from Cairo to say that Polish W/T transmitters are as plentiful as tabby-cats in the Middle East and are causing great anxiety. These are of course the Polish secret service communications for which C. is responsible. He told the meeting at Kinnaird House in September that he had no control over them and that they were not monitored or broken. He thought however that if there was anything going wrong there would be some reflection on other sources. This seemed to me to be a very doubtful argument. The secret service communications of ^{other} allied govts. are supposed to be passed through SIS channels and to be vetted. It would however be interesting to know how this works in practice.

December 10th

I had a talk with Baxter about his cutting down enquiries to B.I.Reg. He thinks that this could be considerably reduced without any real danger. To this I have agreed. We then discussed registries in a general way. I said that I felt it was a pity that our own main registry and possibly also B.I.Reg. was not designed on lines somewhat similar to the Information Index. I felt that this could only be done by someone who really understood the intelligence problem. For example, the LRC might get information that a waiter in a cafe opposite the station at Perpignan was probably a German agent. If there had been any information on this subject before, the general registry would have no means of picking it up. The Information Index could merely turn up the card for Perpignan and get it. Equally B.I.B. might ask for graces for all agents coming here with similar assignments, e.g. flying an aircraft back to occupied territory. Owing to the excellence of their memories they might probably get back on this information but if someone new had to come in and take over the section, we might not be able to get at it. I have always had in mind a small intelligence staff in our general registry and I still think that considerable advantages might be derived from such an arrangement, since there are opportunities for seeing things and co-ordinating generally that do not occur in any other part of the office.

Jock Whyte came to tell me that STYLES, the P/W who had been acting as a stool-pigeon for the Germans and had miraculously escaped to Stockholm, has now disappeared. He telephoned to the Embassy saying that he has gone back to Germany in the hopes of getting out one of his comrades. There is little doubt that he got cold feet about coming back to this country. Probably someone in Stockholm inadvertently roused his suspicions. Meanwhile I have told Spooner to take statements from all those who have any information to give about STYLES so that we shall be ready to receive him if and when he turns up.

RUSER, who has gone to Camp 020, has told us that he was given a promise by the Asst.M.A. in Madrid that if he came back to this country he would be allowed his liberty. He has also told us that his mother, who is still in Madrid, is known to the Germans, and so is his desertion to the British. Since the Germans are looking for the mother, it has been decided if possible to get her out since she might conceivably compromise Artist. Meanwhile we are trying to find out what promises were in fact made to RUSER. This is of course a matter on which we should have been informed before RUSER came here. Tricicle has got a questionnaire from the S.D., which is the first that we have had from that organisation. It deals almost entirely with political matters in this country. Ian Wilson has returned with quite a lot of interesting information. Amongst other things Artist has told him that

Fremdeheere do not do more than say that a report is reliable or unreliable, confirmed or unconfirmed; they have no knowledge of the antecedents of the agent. Abt. I do not appear to assess the information. They generally leave this to Fremdeheere, whose comments are somewhat colourless. In Artist's view Abt. I will always be led up the garden till they have the antecedents of their agents carefully vetted by Abt. III. Mercifully there seems very little chance of this coming about.

Brooman-White, who is trying to make bricks in Section V. without straw, tells me that the registrationsystem is terrible. It is apparently the policy to card an individual not more than once a month. To find any reports in the intervening period one has to comb through endless papers.

The J.I.C. have put in quite an interesting report in which they try to review scales of enemy attack on sea, land and air against certain areas throughout the world. They say that in view of the steadily deteriorating position of Germany and Japan and the probable development of allied strategy, it is unlikely that any future revision of these estimates will be on an upward scale. The report indicates the general weakness of the German position throughout the Mediterranean area. As regards sea communications in the North Atlantic, it is said that the Tirpitz is out of action for a period of at least 2 months and cannot be made operationally sea-worthy without re-fitting and repair in a main dockyard. The battle-cruiser

Gneisenau has been dismantled. The 8" cruiser Hipha is probably out of commission. No work can be observed on the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin and there are no indications that Germany intends to put her into commission. The effective German main units therefore are the battle-cruiser Scharnhorst, pocket battleships Scheer and Lutzow, and 8" cruiser Prince Eugen. The 6" cruisers have not the endurance to operate on trade routes. It is considered extremely improbable that with so few main units and without an aircraft carrier the German Navy would risk a fleet action. About 120 German U-boats, of which at the very most 80 may be at sea at any time, are now based on French West Coast ports. The rate of U-boat sinkings has been higher, and the rate of entry into operational service lower, than was anticipated, but we cannot with certainty assume that the enemy may not be able to maintain or slightly increase their present strength. In the event of an Allied cross-channel invasion of the Continent Germany might operate a limited number of U-boats (including 250-ton boats) in the Channel.

December 11th

Abetz had a conversation with Petain on the 4-5th Dec. when he asked for clarification of Petain's attitude towards Germany. This had arisen over Petain's suggestion that the National Assembly should be re-convened. Abetz said that in no circumstances could Germany consider the re-convening of an Assembly which had had the effrontery to declare war on Germany. Such

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a step would take at least 2-3 months, during which period France would be without a Govt. England and America might well take this opportunity for opening the Second Front. There is apparently some suggestion that an attempt may be made to assassinate Petain just before Anglo-American landing operations begin. The Marshal was threatened with the possibility of Germany taking over the whole of the Govt. if he did not drop his proposal to convene the National Assembly. Petain has therefore found himself obliged to conform to the wishes of the Germans. Laval has been warned that he must strengthen his Cabinet by the inclusion of members of other collaborationist parties as well as his own.

A telegram has been received from S.I.S. at Lourenco Marques about a plot to assassinate Smuts. The idea is to substitute his pilot for a representative of the Broderbond. A telegram has already been to Mid East, and Pretoria. We have informed Nairobi, Daressalem Bulawayo, Lukasa and Kampala. Antony has been over to inform Stephenson at the D.O. who did not seem very excited. Smuts is at the moment in Cairo.

Lipstick in addition to bringing 9 duffs on his tie, which contain an elaborate questionnaire, brought escudos to the value to £1380. His visit has been very satisfactory. The questions are mainly of a technical character relating to various forms of RDF and rocket propulsion. In Madrid he was asked to submit
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a report on the concrete runway at Sutton Common, an aerial photograph of which had been taken and a copy of which was shown to him. It was suggested that the runway might be an underground hanger. It was also suggested to Lipstick that he should take a course of lectures in pyrotechnics as the Germans were very anxious to have information regarding our latest developments in this science. The enemy appear to be taking a much greater interest in the messages Tate is sending and are asking a number of questions in extension of the information which is sent over. This may indicate increased confidence or that special tests as to his reliability are being carried out in the light of information supplied by Karl who was in touch with Camp WX and may have reported on the possibilities of Tate being blown.

The B.B.C. have put up a suggestion that the German wives of certain personnel in their employ and other Germans known to them should be allowed to send a broadcast message to their relatives at Xmas, without submitting to the usual practice of a 14 days delay, which is the rule for communications by allied nationals to their relatives in occupied territory. We are objecting to the proposal since although security grounds are somewhat flimsy it seems undesirable that Germans in this country should communicate by broadcast to their relations in Germany who may well be Nazis. On general political grounds Xmas fraternisation would seem to be a mistake at this moment.

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Shelford and I went over to see Vincent Massey about the case of SEMPILL. I gave a brief outline of SEMPILL's record and explained that I did not think we had sufficient information on security grounds to refuse him an exit permit, particularly since the case had already been backed by the Canadian Army authorities. Vincent Massey got on to a member of his staff and ascertained that the suggestion for SEMPILL's visit to Canada had arisen through his connection with the Catholic welfare organisation known as the Knights of St. Columbus, of which he was President in this country, and Mr. Slade, the Canadian representative of the organisation here had obtained the backing of the Army. I explained to Massey that SEMPILL's case might be summarised by saying that his primary interest was in his own pocket. He would not have direct dealings with the enemy but if there was a chance of doing a deal and the divulging of confidential information might assist in negotiations he would have no scruples. Apart from this he was notoriously indiscreet, and had recently blotted his copybook at the Anglo-Swedish luncheon when he had supported Lady Snowden in her views about a negotiated peace. Massey said he knew SEMPILL, who was an ardent Catholic. Had he been consulted in the first instance about the exit permit he would undoubtedly have done all he could to prevent the matter going forward, since in his view SEMPILL was not the kind of person who was likely to improve Anglo-Canadian relations. He might easily say something stupid. He thought SEMPILL was unbalanced. In the

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circumstances however he did not think that it was possible now to intervene. He thought it better that SEMPILL should be allowed to go and that the Canadian police should not be informed. I have suggested to the DG. that we should write a private letter to Mills giving him a general outline of SEMPILL's case and telling him to keep the matter to himself unless he was consulted by the RCMP or the military authorities or unless he saw SEMPILL committing indiscretions or poking his nose into matters which were not his concern.

Jock Whyte came to see me in rather a state about the work of his section. He said that there were so many P/Ws arriving that he could not really cope with them all. I told him that I had instructed B.5 to take statements in the STYLES case. I thought this was work that they should properly do and that instead of travelling about himself he should allow them to collect the statements which might be the basis of evidence in proceedings against P/Ws who had acted as stool-pigeons in British P/W Camps in Germany.

Kim Philby came to see me. He had further information about the plot to assassinate Smuts. There is now some suggestion of a revolutionary movement by the Broderbond. Kim is rather sceptical about the information which comes to SIS 3rd hand, the intermediary being a prostitute.

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 Kim seems to think that the I.B. business was going fairly well but rather anticipated more trouble from Felix. He did not seem altogether happy about Gwyer's appointment. He thought it would probably work out all right but wondered whether the idea was that Gwyer should have a permanent position at Cossac. He seemed to think that Gwyer was slightly over-rated and that he was inclined to spin meetings out unnecessarily. I said that I would talk to Dick about this. I do not think that Kim necessarily wants us to make a change. He is only indicating that the appointment if a permanency, might possibly lead to difficulties. Felix of course hates Gwyer. I gather that Dick's meeting with Felix yesterday was a bit sticky.

TAR has put forward a somewhat grandiose scheme for running deception in the field. The idea is that he should hold a GS01 appointment at COSSAC, maintaining liaison with Ops B., I.B. and LCS (Bevan's organisation). At D-30 he should send a GS02, 2 GS03's and 3 officers etc. to 21st Army Group. The GS02 working in a sort of capacity to himself at Cossac, i.e. he will come directly under the BGSI and will work to Ops.B on the one hand and I.B. on the other. This scheme gives him virtual control of the running of D.A.s. It is therefore likely to meet with violent opposition from Felix.

Rupert told me a typical Ned Lutyens joke. He was dining at a restaurant and when presented with some fish, asked the waiter what it was.

The waiter replied that it was cod. Lutyens said "This piece of cod passeth all understanding".

December 12th

Zigzag has again been referred to on ISOS. He is evidently still in the land of the living and appears to have another assignment abroad. He is to correspond with a cover address in Lisbon. His cover letters are to be on the subject of cork. This probably has some bearing on the affairs of zum HINGSTE and the LINKE case.

December 13th

I went over to see Archie Boyle and John Senter on the subject of the enquiry by the JIC into SOE. I made it plain to them both that we had no wish to take part in any indictment against SOE. We had been summoned to give evidence and we should naturally have to answer any questions that were put to us. In this connection I said that Wethered and Victor could be accompanying me to the R.O. Both Archie and John Senter completely understood our position. Boyle tells me that the whole matter had arisen through a complaint by Air Marshall Harris of Bomber Command. Whether he knew that the Dutch organisation had been blown for 2 years I can't say but presumably he did, in which case he would have felt that his bombers and pilots were being wasted on useless enterprises, which only had

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the effect of supplying the Germans with sabotage material which was ultimately used against us. — He had I gather been asked to arrange for some 400 sorties during the next moon period, and was probably wondering whether they were embarking on an equally useless enterprise.

I raised the question with Boyle and Senter of SOE headquarters staff going into the field. It seemed to me that if they were people who had not only fairly complete knowledge of their own organisation but also of ours, and that of SIS, they might if caught be forced to divulge important facts. Senter said that only in special cases did such visits take place and that the officers concerned had practically no knowledge of either our organisation or that of SIS.

I lunched with Jock Whitefoord. He told me that he was having a certain amount of trouble about the security measures of COSSAC. A paper had gone up to the Chiefs of Staff but unfortunately Nye had also raised the question of journalists and the D.B.C. This had led the Chiefs of Staff to demand a paper embodying these questions also. Whitefoord was trying to get the two questions disentangled.

We then discussed TAR's deception unit. I made it clear to Whitefoord that there might be a certain amount of controversy with SIS about the running of XX agents. It seemed to us however that XXs should be run primarily for the
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purpose of deception and that since deception was mainly an ops matter, TAR's unit though based administratively on I.B. would have to be under Ops control. Whitefoord thought this was sound but was a little doubtful about the possibilities of deception in the field.

In the early stages of course deception would be controlled from this country and would be directed towards persuading the enemy that

other landings are likely to take place. In the field it could not really come into operation until the bridgehead had pushed well out. Whitefoord seemed to think that it would be extremely difficult either physically or notionally to take agents over. I said that this was not really so difficult as it seemed. We already had an agent notionally in the I. Corps, and he might conceivably have opportunities of using a wireless set. Our experience was that the Germans would swallow almost anything and we had the inestimable advantage of knowing whether in fact they were doing so or not. Apart from these agents there would it was hoped be an opportunity of turning round some of those captured in the field. We knew

that it was the intention of the enemy to leave a certain number behind and that these people were already periodically coming up for testing.

Lastly Whitefoord asked me whether it would be possible to let him have certain reports relating to internal affairs in Germany and particularly those which gave details about German underground organisations. He had apparently, through Charles Peake his political adviser, got a cer-

tain amount of information derived from ZECH. I told him the history of this individual and that although his story was a very remarkable one we had after careful sifting come to the conclusion that he was genuine. I could always arrange that information of the kind given by ZECH should be transmitted to him, if it came from our sources. On the other hand I saw a considerable number of reports from SIS in which I thought he might be interested. I could pass these to him but it would be contrary to the rules. I suggested therefore that he might apply direct to C. He had I think already approached DMI but the latter had turned him down, mainly I think on grounds of security. Obviously he ought to have everything he wants on the subject on underground movements in Germany. F.O. prints and JIC reports are not much use on this subject.

I attended an enquiry by Cavendish-Bentinck and Capel-Dunne into SOE's activities. John Senter and Mockler-Ferryman were present, and Wethered and Victor gave evidence. I explained the system by which we dealt with accredited and unaccredited agents. Wethered was asked whether any unaccredited agents had proved to be spies. The answer was that although suspicion had attached to some of them there was no proven case. Equally there was not proven case against any agent who had come out and been reported to us by SOE. There were cases of agents who had given others away and bought their freedom on the grounds that they were going to work for the enemy. There was however no reason to think that they intended to carry out their assignments. Wethered's evidence

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only took about 5 minutes. Victor then gave his views in some detail on the sabotage question. He said that the Germans were using a considerable amount of our material in operations against our shipping both at Gib., in Spanish ports and in N. Africa. Furthermore there had been recent indications of large quantities of SOE material being sent down from Berlin to Rome. It was not always possible to say whether this material had reached the Germans through an SOE agency or through combined operations, or other paramilitary units. In some cases however it could be said, owing to the devices being received back in their original packing, that they came through SOE agencies. Victor pointed out that we had very little information about out/compromised SOE camouflage material, which on occasions might be rather more difficult to deal with. Mockler-Egryman said that such equipment was not likely to be dumped in large quantities. It would probably be taken over on special expeditions, and although the German might have a few samples they probably would not have sufficient quantities to distribute their sabotage agents in various parts of the world. The new booby trap clamp was explained and it was pointed out that devices of this kind caused us considerable anxiety since it would obviously hamper the operations of our under-water divers. Victor said that although we knew of a dump in Berlin and also at an Abt. 11 training centre in France, it was impossible for us to estimate the quantities of SOE material at present in enemy hands or the percentage of the total amounts dropped that went astray.

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I dined with Kim Philby, Peter Brown and
of SIS. Kim mentioned the fact that
Alexander @ MAX, the Czech who has been working
for the Germans for a considerable time, now
knew that he was under suspicion and was
evidently afraid of being bumped off. Attempts
to get him here and to the USA more than a
year ago failed and the suggestion that SOE
should bump him off was turned down by the F.O.
Efforts are now being made by Paillol whose F.O.
agent he was at one time, to get him over to
N.Africa. There is not however much chance
of success.

December 14th

The D.G. held a meeting with Lennox, Harker,
Charles and myself, to discuss security measures
for Overlord, Lennox putting forward a paper
recommending the curtailments of visits, particu-
larly those of neutrals. The question of
Irish labour is also to be discussed. It seems
almost impossible to keep Irishmen out the
15-mile belt. Many of them are employed there
at the present time and of course go back to
Ireland on leave once every 6 months.

A report has come in from the officer who con-
ducted CERVELL, Swedish MA, CARLBOM, Asst. Air
Attache, and Prince Bertil on a visit to the
Bristol aircraft factory. They had lunch with
the chief engineer, tea with the test pilot
and spent the evening at the guest house with
the chief designer. It is not surprising there-
fore that CERVELL has been able to inform his
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Govt. about the programme, prospects and future designs of Bristol aircraft. The conducting officer probably had to look after Prince Bertil while the test pilot, chief engineer and chief designer got together with CERVELL. As long as this practice is allowed to continue it is a hopeless task to try and prevent leakage to the enemy.

Duff came over to say goodbye before going to N. Africa, and made a short speech. He was very complimentary about the work of the dept. He spoke about his successor. He thought that ministerially we ought to come under the Minister of Defence, but for the sake of convenience he thought we should probably come under the Foreign Secretary and more directly under Dick Law.

I had a long letter from Joe Stephenson about signals security in the Middle East. He refers entirely to allied signals about which nobody seems to know very much. I have spoken to Peter Reid and am going to send him a copy of the report.

TAR and I talked to the D.G. about the deception unit for COSSAC. He seems to be in general agreement with TAR's scheme which has now gone forward.

December 15th

At the Wednesday meeting today Hart mentioned the case of a cover address in Stockholm being used by the Germans which was that of an anti-Nazi committee. This seems to imply the penetration of anti-Nazi circles in Stockholm and their use as a suitable cover for Abwehr correspondence in secret ink.

Milmo mentioned the case of a man called CHAMBORD spying for the Japs in the Argentine, on his way back to Lisbon. He has been taken off at Trinidad.

HOPPE escaped from hospital and asked a priest for permission to use his phone. The priest appears to have overheard a certain amount of what was being said and telephoned for the police. HOPPE had asked the Argentine Embassy to send a car for him. He told them that he had been wrongfully detained. Through one of B-'s agents we have ascertained that the Argentines were not particularly interested. There is no doubt that HOPPE is a German agent, but he has resisted all our efforts to get him to talk.

Jock Whyte tells me that a report has now come in from Stockholm to say that STYLES has been located in a hospital. M.I.9 are being asked to induce him to come over as soon as possible. If he refuses to come there is apparently nothing to be done.

According to Artist, Ostro works direct to Einzheer in Berlin where one CARNAP has no function other than running Ostro. K.O. Portugal forward Ostro's reports for him but take no part in running his case. When CARNAP is out of Berlin, BECK @ WERNICKE acts as his representative. Ostro has never disclosed to CARNAP or anyone else who his agents are or how he gets his information. Artist does not believe in him. He is however regarded by Berlin as a sort of prima donna who must not be ruffled. Berlin sometimes sends other reports to Ostro for his evaluation. Artist thinks this helps him to invent his own reports. A civil pilot is supposed to act as a courier for him about once a fortnight. He draws some money for his supposed agents but not very much.

December 16th

A message has come through to Garbo, the full text of which is being deciphered, recommending him to get out of London but to say nothing. I have passed this on to C. who says that it confirms information he has just received that the rocket or the Queen Bee may be expected early in January. The nature of his message which is from a good source, is slightly vague since it refers to the neutralisation of the Air Force. C. said that he would see that the information reached Cavendish-Bentinck and the head of the committee which is looking into this particular question.

C. was much amused by a report which Harker had shown him giving de COURCY's views on Stewart Catalogue Reference:KV/4/193

himself. One of the accusations is that C. is the kind of person who would pump you and then go and tell MI5. C. sees de COURCY from time to time in White's and regards him as a poisonous fellow although not unlikeable to meet. He is clever in certain ways but obviously meddles in things which he does not understand and is far too big for his boots.

C. had no fresh news about the P.M., who according to the announcement in the House today is ill, with a patch of pneumonia on his left lung. He heard from him a day or two ago when he was asking for papers to read.

Charles Butler and Malcolm Cumming are finding out what evacuation arrangements other depts. are making. We apparently propose to retire on Blenheim if necessary. What I would like to avoid is having all our papers scattered around Mayfair with no place to go and no communications. The trouble is that we have no battle headquarters.

December 17th

I went over to the F.O. to examine certain telegrams between Washington and London about the suggested setting up of an Intelligence Security organisation in Germany after the armistice. This appears to be a sequel to the 4-Power declaration in Moscow. The organisation is obviously intended to cover the administration of the whole of Germany. The whole question is very much in embryo. No discussions have so far taken place. I do not imagine that such an organisation would

attempt to do more than act as a co-ordinating body between, ourselves, the Russians and the Americans. It should not interfere with the suggestion of COSSAC for a counter-intelligence bureau in Germany, though it might be advisable for this bureau to have a liaison with the International Security Intelligence organisation which will presumably be in Berlin.

I met Pollock who is our consul in Stockholm. He had apparently been talking to the Swedes here, and knew about CERVELL and OXENTIerna. He had told the Swedes while discussing the case of OXENTIerna that we were extremely anxious about information leaking out and that neutral attaches should for the time being be content to sit back and virtually do nothing. He received quite a sympathetic hearing. The Swede replied that he rather had the impression that the Air Attache was doing a bit too much. In this of course he is quite right.

The D.G. gave a farewell lunch to Duff. He told me that Eddie Grant had asked whether he could give him a job in N. Africa. I said that I knew that Eddie had been rather disappointed about not getting a job in COSSAC but quite frankly I did not think he would have been particularly suitable. Duff agreed. He then asked me whether there would be any job for Eddie after the war. I said it was very difficult to say. We should not have regional officers but we might have people at headquarters who would be going out to

visit C.C.s.

I saw Jock Whitefoord at his request.

He showed me a paper on T.I.S. which had been prepared by Gwyer and Percy. Though rather long it seemed to cover all the points and be basically sound. Whitefoord is going to summarise the document in such a way that it will be acceptable to the W.O. and enable us to get the necessary establishment. It provides a staff both for the Intelligence Bureau in Germany and for a Liaison Section here. He thinks that the Liaison Section should come under the J.I.C. I said it was important that it should have some parent body but that it should not be hampered in any way through getting tied up with the military hierarchy. It should as far as possible have direct communication with Germany.

I asked about Dick White's visit to North Africa. Whitefoord said he would give me a reply early in January. In principle he was very much in favour of it since he thought Percy would need somebody to keep his feet on the ground. He wanted however to get the organisation basically settled before Dick went away. He thought the end of Jan. might be a suitable time for the visit. He said that he had signed a letter to C. about S.I.(b) units. This leaves in abeyance the question of the running of D.A.s and makes it clear that C.E. is not the exclusive province of SIS either in the executive sense or from the point of view of information.

I spoke about TARs memo. I said that I hoped he would not be alarmed at the demands for personnel. I thought we could supply a number of officers and that the other ranks could be supplied by I.B.2 to a considerable extent. He said that he was leaving this question entirely to Ops.

I had a talk with Antony ^{?Buss} and Jo Archer. Jo is going to see Buss and find out whether Inglis has made up his mind as to what should be done about CERVELL. Our proposal is to put forward another paper to the JIC, pointing out what has happened, and suggesting that the Chiefs of Staff should close down on visits both to aerodromes and factories on the basis of the document picked up in Sicily. We should further recommend that these measures will be ineffective as long as Turner, the American Air Attache, remains in his present post, since he is clearly imparting a great deal of information to CERVELL. Lastly we should recommend that Jo should lecture to the managements of the principle aircraft factories on the basis of the German document. Jo still seems to be very convinced that the performance of the Spitfire 21 constitutes a definite leakage and he still thinks that Father was responsible. Certainly there is a good deal of circumstantial evidence but my own view is that Father is innocent. I base myself almost entirely on the traffic and on the general ISOS setup. Meanwhile Fish is pursuing his enquiries.

Tricycle's stock seems to be very high and the Catalogue Reference:KV/4/193

material which he took over to Lisbon has found great favour. He is particularly well regarded by Schrupe who is shortly to take up the duties of Gruppenleiter I.H. West. Tricycle has received an elaborate questionnaire of a technical naval kind.

The first man to come out through his escape route has now reached Gib. He was selected by Tricycle's brother in order to play the part of a D.A. and wireless operator.

The Germans do not take a very good view of Balloon. They regard him as lazy and as having poor judgment. They also suspect that as an Englishman he would never give anything really vital away though he would not be beyond giving a certain amount in order to get money. Efforts are being made to close the Balloon case.

Lipstick has announced his intention of marrying the daughter of Suner the well-known Catalan separatist. This is rather an unfortunate development since if news of the marriage leaks back to the Germans Lipstick's position will be jeopardised.

The Germans are offering to drop a transmitter for Mutt and Jeff between the first and tenth Jan.

Bronx has received a payment for December.

Another message has been received for Garbo dated 16/12 about arrangements that he is to make in connection with Bodyline.

December 18th

Buss and TAR came to see me about Crossbow. On the assumption that Crossbow is a magnetically controlled aircraft with a gyroscope, it has been suggested that trenches should be dug along the Kent coast to protect copper wire which will be used in setting up a magnetic field by the use of powerful generators.

The professor who is in charge of these preparations is anxious to know how soon the enemy is likely to become aware of what is going on. I said that if he was thinking of leakage through spies in this country or through individuals going to the Continent or to Eire, it might well take a matter of months. What I thought however was far more probable was that the enemy, knowing the possible counter-measures to an aircraft of his own construction, would become aware through reconnaissance photos of what we were doing. He might also, for all I knew, make certain deductions from the electrical disturbances. I could not see however that this should necessarily deter the professor from taking the measures suggested. I presume that these counter-measures have been taken owing to a report that the ski-sites are constructed of material which will not affect a magnetic compass. There is however at the moment no positive evidence that this type of aircraft is going to be employed. We may be up against some other radio-controlled device. So far the Govt. have issued no warning to the public which seems to me a mistake since if even 2 or 3 of these aircraft should land up in London

and a large number of casualties result, they may be open to very severe criticism. It would, I should have thought, be quite easy to have said that a heavy bombardment of London must be regarded as a possibility in the near future and that anybody who is able to leave should do so. It may be of course that the counter-measures of the Air Force, who are bombarding the sites, will be effective, or that the rocket and the aircraft may turn out to be damp squibs., but it seems unwise to bank on this. The arrangements as regards Govt. offices appear to be extremely sketchy. Even our own are not very well defined.

Jo and I had a talk with Buss afterwards about the case of CERVELL. It is agreed that as soon as the paper was prepared I should take it to Inglis personally and get his approval for putting the paper before the JIC. Buss seems to think that Inglis is taking the matter rather lightly. He keeps on referring to CERVELL as a first-class air attache. He wishes that some of ours were as good. CERVELL's excellence is an air attache is precisely what we are complaining about. It is the old idea that if a man is friendly to this country he does not constitute a menace, although Inglis must know as well as we do that any information he gets ultimately reaches the enemy. Jo's idea is that in addition to clamping down on visits by air attaches to aerodromes and factories, we should also get the Society of British Aircraft Constructors to issue a warning to their firms and that Jo himself should lecture

the firms on the basis of the document picked up in Sicily.

Jo tells me that the brother of CRETEUR who is at present in the Air Force, was a great friend of Father's. He thinks therefore that Father may possibly have told CRETEUR about the performance of the Spitfire 21 and that CRETEUR passed the information on to the Germans.

I doubt whether this is right, since BERTRAN from whom we first heard of CRETEUR said that he was asked by RADEMACHER to enquire about JUDE and CRETEUR, as he has received no information from them. Moreover RADEMACHER in mentioning CRETEUR said that he was referring to the one who was formerly a Sabena pilot. We assumed therefore that he was referring to Gabriel, who is now at 020.

December 20th

During the weekend I read a report of 90 pages. It is extremely interesting since it was through Dr. Kurt JOHANNSEN of Hamburg that he first came into contact with the Abwehr. Before the war a number of journalists in this country, including Singer and Abs-hagen, used to send reports to JOHANNSEN on political and economic matters, marked "Confidential and not for publication". Ostensibly JOHANNSEN was dealing solely with the advertising of German import and export business. He was however financed by the Ministry of Propaganda and did a considerable amount of work for the German MEW. Later worked in the Fremdendienst, a propagan

da service which was set up for bear-leading visitors from this country and the USA to Germany. obtained this job through his shipping connections. His father had been employed by Norddeutscher Lloyd and had been captain of the Leviathan. He was interned in the USA. and his mother were at liberty and himself received most of his education the USA. He eventually drifted to Spain and it was there that he became definitely connected with the Abwehr. There is no doubt that the Germans were giving assistance to Franco in the very early stages of the revolution. report shows how K.O. Spain and K.O. Portugal were gradually built up through professional Abwehr officers making use of local business people. complains quite moderately that he never actually wished to leave Spain and that it was only on the insistence of Thompson that he did so. Definite promises were made to him that he would be given his liberty in this country. He thinks that he should still be of great use to us in Spain and Portugal owing to the number of contacts that he has there outside the Abwehr, and he is quite prepared to go back if we provide him with some sort of papers which will prevent him from being picked up by a junior member of the Spanish police and expelled from the country. The usual practice of the Gestapo in dealing with a recalcitrant German is to arrange that his passport should not be renewed. Immediately it expires the Spanish police arrest the man and push him over the frontier in conjunction with the Gestapo.

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thinks however that the tide in Spain is beginning to turn in our favour, and that certainly the junior Spanish officers would not now be prepared to act in this way.

I had a discussion with Jim, Cussen, Jock Whyte about STYLES, at which it was decided that before taking any action we should be well advised to check up on statements which STYLES had made. We could then put the case forward to the H.O. giving an account of STYLES alleged activities in the camps and saying that in a number of respects his statement to us on arrival had been proved to be untrue. If we could not say this and STYLES subsequently turned out to be a hero, we should be open to very serious criticism.

Later in the evening Jock Whyte rang up to ask whether I had any objection to the Commandant preferring a charge against STYLES for misdemeanours committed at Marylebone. I said that that was entirely a matter for the Commandant and that if he had grounds for making a charge it would not in any way interfere with any enquiries that we had in mind. I recommended Jock however to have a word with Jim Hale.

Milmo, TAR and Marriott came to talk about the handling of the case of Strictly speaking, BLB had the machinery for distributing information, which was an ordinary O20 product. They had however no means of making the necessary arrangements for safe custody, documents etc. In this particular

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case the job was being handled by B. I. A. but it seemed undesirable that a man like should be put in one of TARs establishments, where all sorts of other things were going on connected with the work of B. I. A. I said I thought Milmo should put up a note and we should endeavour to get him an officer whose express business it would be to handle cases of this kind. It seemed to us likely that we might have a good many more people of the type of .

I have had an interesting letter from John Mair, from which it is quite clear that all our warnings about civil security in Italy have been well founded. Quite obviously the situation is chaotic. People are beginning to wonder why no spies have been caught, and Dudley-Clark is bringing pressure to bear on Hill-Dillon, as he is in great need of D.A.s. The tendency has been to regard the S.I.(b) unit as a body of experts on C.E. and security. As the army know nothing about these matters they pass all such enquiries and investigations to the S.I.(b) unit who have no real experience of the kind of work required. There have only been two cases so far, one that of an Italian named MANFREDI which has been rather mishandled, and the other that of a German named NICKEL. The Americans got hold of NICKEL and interrogated him with the S.I(b) unit. They reported that he had broken down and was a spy. He was sent by mistake to the USA where enquiry showed that he was merely a deserter. He was then flown back to N. Africa where he was

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further interrogated and the fact of his being a deserter was confirmed.

John Mair is urging Hill-Dillon to ask for 4-5 M.I.5 officers, but it is of course now too late. We are heavily committed for OVERLORD and even if Hill-Dillon has the grace to ask us for assistance I doubt whether we can give it him. We gave him an opportunity of having our assistance 6 months before the N.African campaign but both he and Vivian contested at the meeting that N.Africa was foreign territory and that SIS had the ground well covered. In conversations I have had with Robb, who has returned from Italy, the situation on the I.B. front is quite chaotic. He takes a very poor view of Hill-Dillon. Crean, the S.C.O. we sent out to N.Africa, has done extremely well, and is not only running the ports but carrying on a very profitable liaison with the French. John Mair of course ought to go to Italy and be placed in charge of I.B.3 working in close co-operation with the S.I(b) unit. I gather that Hill-Dillon is reluctant to send him since he has come to rely on him too much for I.B. duties in N. Africa. Further confirmation about the state of affairs in Italy has been obtained from an American O.S.S. officer who has just returned to this country. He attended a COSSAC meeting and gave an account of his experiences. He made an impassioned speech about the deficiencies of the I.B. Investigating staff and endorsed all the plans that we had made to provide an efficient I.B. staff for OVERLORD. I gather that all this has

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come as somewhat of a shock to Felix, who has been obstinately contesting every inch of the way.

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December 21st

came to see me and put forward the project that he had mentioned to Antony and Courtney yesterday. I agreed with his proposals.

The D.G. called a meeting to discuss Irish labour in the light of OVERLORD, and recent information to the effect that Hempel has instructions to use every endeavour to obtain information on future operations. I suggested that we should first of all get the Army to stop all leave at the time that leave is stoppe

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for those taking part in the operation. This should be done a month to 6 weeks before the operation. Simultaneously we should refuse exit permits from this country to all civilians except those engaged in business connected with the national war effort. Lennox was told to get Whitefoord to write us a letter asking for our views on this problem. We shall then have to put the case to the JIC.

I spoke to the DMI about Kellar's Ispal material. In view of the rather critical situation in Palestine, it has been decided that a resume of this material should go out at the earliest possible moment, and should be in the possession of the High Commissioner. I said that while I heartily concurred with this view I thought it was extremely important to ensure that the material was properly handled at the other end. We knew that most offices in Palestine were penetrated. I pointed out to the DMI that there were numerous types of information which were sent to me personally but that in practice quite a number of people had to know about them. It was this situation against which I was anxious to guard in the Mid East. He said he was quite satisfied that the military offices were not penetrated, and he agreed to our instituting the necessary safeguards on a lower level where the C.O. had given their final agreement to the material being sent out. I have so informed Kellar.

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Two parachutists named KENNY and O'REILLY have come down in Co. Clare. They descended on the night of the 15/16th. One of them was injured and is now in hospital with pneumonia and the other one is in custody. Both these individuals were formerly in the Channel Islands like LENIHAN and had been listed and circulated after careful research by B.L.H. One of them has been broadcasting from Germany.

Ede came to see me about Ryde. He thinks and I agree that Ryde will probably have to stay in S. Africa for some time. Some of Websters duties can be laid off on to the S.O.I at Capetown and on to Lenton. ^{Despite} the difficulty of Ryde's position vis-a-vis the S. African authorities, it is I think essential to have some point to which we can communicate important and highly secret information. It may be that at a later date Ryde could be replaced.

I had a meeting with Cookie, Cussen, and Jock Whyte. It seems fairly clear that Jock Whyte disgusted with the decision not to arrest STYLES, had binged up the Commandant of Marylebone to have STYLES arrested by the APM. The latter potested that he could not hold the man without a proper charge. Jock had then seen the Judge Advocate General who rather weakly had preferred a charge of conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline in that STYLES was seen to have been wearing sergeant's uniform and had improperly fraternised with the Germans. At

this stage Cookie and Cussen had been to see the Judge Advocate and pointed out to him that at the moment there was no evidence. There were people in this country who could testify but no statements had yet been taken. It was therefore far better to do as we had originally arranged and allow STYLES to go to his home, where we would exercise such supervision as was possible. Meanwhile Spooner would collect the statements and a charge could be preferred at a later date. A statement has now come from Sutton-Pratt indicating that STYLES stole the camera previously mentioned in Malmo and the watches in Stockholm, and further that his statement about his arrival in an unconscious state at Malmo appeared to be untrue.

At the weekly meeting today Hart announced that a long argument was taking place as to whether Chester was a port, between Berlin and Madrid.

Stamp mentioned the case of FRESSET, another airman who has an assignment to fly a plane back to occupied territory. No further progress has been made with the case of de GONDRA whose activities have not given rise to any suspicion. There is however a mention of one Eugen BASLER who may be identical with the ISOS character BASTLER ~~formerly~~ thought to be de GONDRA. Enquiries are being made.

Grogan informed the meeting that 12 carefully prepared letters in secret ink with suitable cover text had been inserted into censorship with a view to testing the machinery. Only

two of these letters had been submitted to the testing dept. The remaining 10 were then sent for testing but in only two cases was anything found. The answer is that everyone has become a bit stale. Ever since the beginning of the war only one letter has been found, namely the letter written to LAUREYSSENS. The Riot Act has been read in several quarters and it is hoped that in future there will be some improvement. Further tests will be made periodically.

Jock Whyte has put forward an obstinate memo in which he urges that STYLES should be placed under arrest. He has passed it to Jim for his comments. Jim says that while it is within our powers he still sticks to his former recommendation that the statements should be properly checked before action is taken. I have so informed Jock.

I had a talk with Buster and TAR about the case of CRETEUR. No progress has been made at O20 and the general impression is that we may have got hold of the wrong man or that RADEMACHER who was obviously vague about C's christian name may have made a mistake or had some ulterior motive in coupling his name with that of JUDE. It seems clear that Gabriel CRETEUR will have to be released. The next difficulty is to decide how to dispose of him. We cannot very well send him back. Harmer points out that if a man is a pilot on an aerodrome it is always open to him to get into an airplane and fly off. It may therefore be better to send him either to India or the Belgian Congo. This is hard

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treatment if the man is innocent but I do not see how it can be avoided. CRETEUR was concerned in several resistance movements in Belgium before coming to this country and there are several people who can speak as to his integrity, but unfortunately their evidence is not conclusive. In the absence of positive evidence we cannot take the risk of CRETEUR stepping into an airplane between briefing day and D-day. Milmo is having a talk with Cheney of the Air Ministry and Harmer will probably speak to Col. Wouters of the Belgian Air Force who seems to be a sound person. Meanwhile we may attempt to get some reaction from RADEMACHER through Sniper, but this will take some time.

A request for the removal of the W/T set at the German Legation was made by Dev on the 21st after the latter had been seen by Maffey. Dev mentioned the possibility of the removal of our own set. Maffey said it was a convenience and the question was not pressed. Meanwhile Hempel is trying to get hold of an old Abwehr set deposited in Ireland before the war. This is probably the set referred to years ago by SNOW. At one time we thought it might possibly have been used by Sam STEWART but there was never any real evidence on the point. If HEMPEL can hand this set over he will keep his own. If however he has to give up his set in the immediate future he will try and get hold of the Abwehr set.

I had a long talk with J.C. about

J.C.'s view is that although SIS got out
in case he should be kidnapped and betray

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ARTIST, there is a greater danger to ARTIST if presence in this country is discovered. The Germans will conclude that he has blown Tricycle and possibly also Artist. could be of little use to us here but might do good work in Spain. I said that I thought the presence of mother in Spain was a danger and that SIS should continue their endeavours to get her out. This would ease mind and not in any way prejudice his chances of working in Spain. The matter is to be discussed at a meeting tomorrow with SI-.

I spoke to Jo about the MAP case. I said that I thought he should have a careful investigation made as to the possibilities of communication with the enemy from aircraft. I would like to assume that foreexample either the test pilot or an ordinary Spitfire pilot was an enemy agent. What could he do with his existing equipment or with any other equipment to which he could obtain access, and what would be the chances of his being detected.

Roger Hollis has put up a paper about M/S. He thinks that M and his boys are out of touch with the work of F. Division, and he suggests that each section should have an officer who would be solely responsible for the handling of the section's agents. This officer should work in the section and be fully acquainted with all available information. M. should be used as a talent-spotter and adviser. I entirely agree that M. is out of touch with recent developments in the communist and fascist

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field and that he and his subordinates do not see nearly enough of the section officers with whom they are working. I personally do not see M. more than about once in 6 months. Roger tells me he has not seen him for 3 months. My own view is that M. should have far closer contact with sections, and access to reports, if he is going to perform any useful function at all. While he may occasionally come across a suitable agent, I do not think he is in a strong position as a talent-spotter. A section officer will know far more about the personalities. He will be able to say that so and so is worth buying up or that so and so constitutes a focal point, whence interesting information can be obtained. At this stage M. should be called in to consultation and assist in carrying out the section's wishes. He could either arrange an indirect approach to the individual concerned or he could arrange for an agent to be put in alongside, e.g. as a secretary. His advice in this connection should be valuable. He could on no account run agents on his own without the co-operation of the section. The old system worked when the office was small and M. was thoroughly au fait with communist and fascist affairs. When the office expanded he was also of value in giving advice and in handling agents, for the simple reason that many of the people in the sections had no experience at all. Now that the office has settled down and competent people are in charge they are able to do a lot of this work for themselves.

There has been a sudden influx of pigeons. On 16/10 there were two enemy pigeons found on board a British coasting vessel about 7 miles off Orfordness. One carried a message in German giving the ring numbers of 5 other pigeons and its own and stating that the time of release was 14 hours on the 16th October. Probably the date should have been the 15th. The only other information given was "Clear weather. Wind west". On the 6th December a bird came on board a motor-launch 23 miles off Lowestoft. This one carried a Dutch ring and its wings were stamped "Wehrmacht". It carried no message. On the 7th Dec. a pigeon came on board a vessel in the Thames Estuary. It carried no message but had on its wing "Wehrmacht Brieftaube". On the 8th Dec. a pigeon was caught on the RAF station at Swanton Morley. It carried an official Wehrmacht message in an aluminium container giving the particulars of 3 birds including its own. On the 8th also birds came into the loft of a fancier 8 miles north of Norwich. Its wings were stamped "Wehrmacht" and it carried no message. It would seem that the enemy were making a new departure in the use of pigeons and that they are training them for flights over the N. Sea. There are two possible reasons: firstly the birds may be undergoing training for use on E. boats wishing to keep wireless silence; secondly the enemy may be using pigeons on practice flights as near to our coast as they can conveniently get in order ultimately to use these birds for carrying back messages from agents in this country. In comparing the two possibilities

it would seem unlikely that the enemy would suddenly decide to use birds on E. boats when he ~~would~~ have done so at any time during the last 4 years. The second possibility would therefore seem to be the most likely.

December 23rd

I had a meeting with Kim, Lloyd, J.C., TAR, Wilsc Marriott and Reed, on the subject of the future of . We came to the conclusion that before making up our minds as to whether should go back, it was necessary to put the proposition to ARTIST and get his views. An endeavour would be made to persuade him that was far more valuable to us in Spain than here, and that unless he thought would constitute a serious menace to his own position, we should like to send him back. Meanwhile J.C. will talk to . and find out whether he would prefer his mother to be got over here if he himself goes back. SIS will endeavour to ascertain whether mother's passport had run out and whether either the Germans or the Spanish authorities have tried to make contact with her.

December 24th

I saw Spooner and asked him to prepare a case for the JAG on such evidence that he could obtain showing that STYLES was guilty of conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline. I had in mind the question of his wearing a sergeant's stripes and his insubordination to the camp doctor.

Gwyer has talked to me about the state of the records in Section V. This is quite a serious matter as it is only with considerable difficulty that they will ever be able to get back on original sources of the information which forms their contribution to the compilation of records now going on under COSSAC. We may have to take this up in a big way. Q

I saw the D.G. about Curry and explained to what I felt to be the position. I thought the best advice we could give Curry was to stay where he is provided he could operate directly under Vivian and not under Cowgill. // I spoke to Stopford about the suggestion that we should provide an officer to decontaminate the Channel Islands in the event of RANKIN C. He is going to take on the job of collecting the information etc. and if necessary would be prepared to go. He is also anxious to do some work in Germany when occasion arises although he wants to get back to his original job soon after the war.

December 28th

D.G. held a meeting on Irish labour in connection with OVERLORD. It was agreed that we should recommend the stoppage of leave at about D-6 weeks which is to include all forces. Simultaneously civilian travel will be cut down to cases of national importance.

Beaumont came to see me about a letter he had had from Chaney of the Air Ministry. He is Catalogue Reference: KV 74/193
concerned about the Wynnen who arrive here on the basis of an ordre de mission counter-

signed by 2 or 3 people in N. Africa, one of whom is Hill-Dillon. Some of these people have only just got out of occupied territory and often they are not coming for the purpose stated. Sometimes we receive no prior notification of their arrival. We have just had a very unsatisfactory case. It seems quite possible for any Frenchman arriving in North Africa and wishing to avoid service there to get an ordre de mission.

The Eire Govt. have removed the set from the German Legation.

The sinking of the "Scharnhorst" has caused a great sensation. Apparently she had been out once or twice before and each time had succeeded in evading our convoy escort. This time the Navy got the measure of her form and succeeded in cutting her off. The performance of the 3 destroyers was particularly good, and contrasts very markedly with the action by 11 German destroyers against two of our cruisers in the Bay of Biscay which has just been announced. We sank 3 and the others were damaged before they escaped.

I saw Inglis, A.C.S.I., this afternoon, and showed him a copy of the note I was proposing to put to the JIC. He was I think quite convinced that both CERVELL and Turner, the American Air Attache, constituted a serious menace. The whole question in Inglis's mind is rather bound up with a recent request by the Swedish Govt. for 200 Spitfires. This request came from the Swedish Chief of Staff, who

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pointed out that if the Swedish Air Force was so equipped he could persuade the govt. to refuse any further deliveries of iron ore to the Germans. The F.O. take the view that such a suggestion was not acceptable unless it came from the Swedish Govt. The Swedes then went to the Americans, which was the cause of Col Turner's visit to Sweden. Turner has since been in the USA but Inglis does not know what the outcome of the American negotiations has been. He thinks it a pity that we do not supply the Swedes with aircraft both on a short term and a long term view. Turner has been very helpful in keeping Inglis informed of all the moves in this game, and it is for this reason that he does not want to offend Turner. He also knows CERVELL extremely well. He likes him but realises that his excellence as an air attache makes him dangerous. Inglis agrees to the recommendations in our paper. He finds it difficult however to find a means of neutralising Turner. I have suggested that he might approach Gen. Peabody. Peabody could then speak to Turner on the basis of the document picked up in Sicily, explain to him that the British were stopping all visits and instructing him to be extremely circumspect in his relations with neutral attaches. While this would not be wholly satisfactory, it might go some way towards tightening things up.

I went to see [redacted] with J.C. and Ronnie Reed. He was very pleasant and civil and I think honest of purpose. There is no doubt to my mind that he is anxious to return to Spain and confident that he will [redacted] away with it. His

proposal is to live somewhere just outside Madrid and to maintain contact with some 6 or 8 agents who are rather on the fringe of the Abwehr. Hewould not have any contact with the regular officials of the Abwehr. He would move about only at night. He says that ~~now that~~ the Falange militia has been abolished there is little danger from the Spanish police. He would like if possible to return with Costa Rican papers or failing these with Brazilian. I suggested to him that if he were going back it might be better for his mother to remain in Spain since people would consider it rather odd if she disappeared. He seemed to agree about this and thought that he would be able to gauge the situation better when he got back. He would in many ways prefer to see his mother in this country.

I had a talk with Gwyer about arrangements for the Counter-Intelligence Bureau in Germany after the war, and the necessary staff here to deal with its enquiries. Jock Whitefoord has put forward a draft note to the W.O. in which he suggests that a Counter-Intelligence Board should be set up here in addition to an information section. A C-I.B. would when in difficulties appeal to the JIC. I have said that I feel that the C-I.B. is redundant. The Information Section with its secretary will have representatives from all depts concerned in this country and could be left in charge of G.I of the rear echelon at COSSAC. If there were any policy difficulties they could be referred to the JIC, who had the power to co-opt anyone they lined, including if necessary OSS. I think this should work, but there is

of course a difficulty that the JIC is not a joint Anglo-American organisation.

Antony tells me that CERVELL has succeeded in getting his most secret information away. This comes out on special material.

Stopford is trying to put over his scheme for I.B. in the Air Force. Buss is very keen to get this through but there has been very great opposition from the AFMs dept.

December 29th

Trivycle's return has been delayed for reasons which are not clear. In the meantime Freak has arrived in this country. He has made a good first impression and his full story is being obtained.

Antony, B-W and Little came to see me about the case of Italians coming from Lourenco Marques. It was proposed that they should be landed at Casablanca and interrogated. Those who were undesirable would be sent to England for internment, while the remainder would be sent back to Italy. It was explained to SIS that the H.O. would be extremely annoyed if they were not informed about the possible arrival of these individuals. We were not particularly anxious to have them here since all the information that they could give would be extracted by Muggeridge in Algiers. It seemed however that only by agreeing with the proposals of AFHQ would the Italians be deported from Lourenco Marques at all.

I rang up Loxley to whom I explained the position. I suggested that he should get into touch with the H.O. He rang me back shortly afterwards to say that the H.O. were prepared to accept up to 150 Italians. I urged him not to encourage N.Africa to send large numbers here since they would only clutter up the camps and eventually be released. We would prefer that as many as possible went back to Italy.

I had a talk with Chaney and Beaumont about the French airmen coming here on ordres de mission. Later I went up and saw Larry Allen. It was agreed that we should draft a wire to Hill-Dillon asking him to include the Air Force representative in N.Africa on the list of those who endorsed ordres de mission. I intend to follow this up by writing a letter to Hill-Dillon giving him full particulars. Meanwhile Chaney is proposing to go out and examine the whole system. I impressed upon him that however thorough the examination in N.Africa would appear to be it could not possibly cover the ground that we are in a position to cover at the LRC. At present we receive no copies of the reports from N. Africa and since the data they contain is never passed over the records at LRC we may be missing quite a lot. Chaney explained to me that there were a number of Frenchmen arriving here who had no fixed job to go to and concerning whom no previous warning had been given.

In the middle of November a ship employed on German I.S. work was instructed to put into Arcachon under the name of the "Koralle". It was to make a short stay and the crew were to be pledged to secrecy. In August of this year the German agent KOPFF who was captured in Brazil after crossing the Atlantic in a yacht, stated that a similar enterprise to Canada would take place about 3 months later in a boat called the "Koralle". Canada has been warned that the "Koralle" may have left on its mission.

On 16th December two Belgians arrived here as a married couple called HENNIBERT. They had confessed to the Belgian authorities in Lisbon that they had been recruited to work for the Germans and since their arrival they have made statements on their contacts with the German I.S. They are both identifiable on ISOS.

December 30th

I asked Burt about the case of STYLES. He told me that Spooner and Davis were working hard on the preparation of a statement which he thought would provide sufficient evidence to charge STYLES with misdemeanour, under military law.

TAR and I had a talk with Charles and Horrocks about B.L.A funds with particular reference to making provision for paying back all agents after the war. We have the X Fund but we do not know what claims may be made upon it. It

contains some £33,000 for which we do not think there can be any claim, and another £13000 or more which will more probably have to be handed back. - There are many points of law which are not particularly clear e.g. if an agent lands here by parachute with £500 and for certain reasons is not prosecuted is he entitled on his release to the £500 he brought with him? Similarly are the relatives of an executed spy entitled to any effects found on him when he was arrested? We have therefore decided not to touch the X Fund until all these various points have been cleared up. If the Treasury try and get their fingers on it we shall have to explain to them the position.

I had another meeting with SIS and B.1A on the subject of It is agreed by all except Ian Wilson that should go back and that ARTIST should have the position explained to him either by Foley or by He would be told that after a thorough examination of the case we had come to the conclusion that did not constitute any real menace to Artist's own security and that in any case he had strict instructions not to make contact with Artist. SIS will try to supply with the necessary papers and to get him back as early as possible. will explore the position of his mother when he gets there.

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January 6th 1944

Looked into the office this evening after being away a week with flu.

January 7th

Dick, TAR and I discussed B.3B. TAR's idea is to get Hughes, Walker and Miss Maconochie up here and to leave Sclater at Barnet with the T operators. The D.G. has agreed.

I have got the D.G. to agree to making TAR an ADB.

Art Thurston came to see me. I discussed with him the case of STRASSBURGER. The Americans are interested in this man's banking account which we obtained under an 80a warrant. I explained to Thurston that it was of paramount importance that no legal action should be taken upon this information in the USA. It could only be used as a pointer for other enquiries. If there was any slip-up not only would our relations be seriously jeopardised vis-a-vis the banks but also our relations with the FBI. Worse still, we might be liable for action. Thurston said he was certain that the FBI would respect our confidence and would thoroughly appreciate the position since they themselves were liable to an action in the USA unless they obtained information under sub-poena.

Thurston told me that he would be leaving us shortly as he had resigned from the FBI in

order to join the Army. He had been trying to get his release for a long time but had been talked out of it by Ladd. This is quite a serious step for him since he would not be re-admitted to the FBI. He feels that he is a young man and ought to be shouldering a rifle, for which I very much admire him. He will be a great loss to us here.

I had a meeting with Brooke-Booth, Hart, Robb, Chaney of the Air Ministry, Cheney and Stamp on the question of the arrival of allied nationals here from N. Africa. From information supplied by Robb it was quite clear that the French LRC and the French system of granting Ordres de Commission provided no security whatsoever and would have in future to be totally ignored. We agreed that in future all allied airmen should be looked up by SIS, B. I. Reg. Central Reg. and LRC and that all those who had come out of occupied France should go to the LRC. As regards other arms of the Services, and civilians, a similar proposition would be adopted, except that only those who had come out since the occupation would be looked up.

The British Consul at Algiers should in future be instructed to notify us of all cases where he granted a visa to someone who has come out since the occupation. Chaney would make his own arrangements through his representative in N. Africa that visas were not granted to allied airmen unless there was a specific job for them in this country. SCOs would be instructed that the fact that an

allied national had come out of occupied territory since Nov. 1942 should constitute prime facie grounds for sending him to the HRC. For some reason or other this has not been done in the past.

Dick and I went to see Jock Whitefoord. He told us about his visit to C. the other day when C. had said that the business of the preparation of the information relating to Occupied Territory and to Germany was a matter for Section V and the COSSAC rear echelon should virtually come under Section V. C. had said rather airily that he could provide the officers to do this work. I told Jock Whitefoord that in my view C. was totally ill-informed as to what was going on. He could not provide the necessary staff nor indeed was his own office likely to produce much information relating to Germany. The principle contributors would be M.I.14 on Gestapo matters, PWE and possibly ourselves. C's whole idea was based on a misconception that this was a territorial matter. Our view was that the normal division between 5 and 6 did not enter into the case where intelligence within the zone of the armies was concerned. We eventually hammered out a formula which we hope will be acceptable. The collating staff is to be under COSSAC before the operation and directed by McLeod the new G.I.I.B. Gwyer will be the principle editor. The various contributors will be lending staff to do the work. When COSSAC goes over seas this organisation will come under Jack Barrow M.L.11 who on policy matters

will go to the JIC. This should ensure that the work is done properly and prevent it from getting into the usual section V muddle. It is really upto the Army to make their demands but they are all so chicken-hearted and so ignorant about the real issues that they never have the guts to stand up for their rights.

Whitefoord introduced me to Williams, the new BCSI, 21st Army group. He is a Merton Don, aged about 30, who has been with Monty from Alamein, to Sicily.

Barker-Benfield has been thrown out on his ear. Williams is a personal friend of T-R and is also known to J.C. so we ought to have him in the bag with an MI5 label tied round his neck.

Hempel has received instructions not to hand over his wireless set. Unfortunately he has already done so.

I had a long talk with Toby Mathew at the club. I explained to him what we had in mind with regard to Miss Nunn. He seemed to think the scheme would work admirably. I said that we should leave it largely to her discretion as to what she passed on to higher officers in the H.O., including Newsam, but that we were under certain difficulties since we were the custodians on behalf of SIS for a good deal of highly secret material which we were not normally authorised to impart to anyone else. I had however got special permission to acquaint Miss Nunn with the nature of these

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sources. We intended therefore to go the whole hog. I very much hoped that this would result in a greater confidence by the H.O. in MI5. It seemed to me that there was no very great understanding of the work done here, since I gathered that recently the H.O. had made a bid to take us over ministerially. Toby Mathew knew about this. There had apparently been a storm from the fighting services when the suggestion was made. I then went on to say that the police were equally ignorant of what we did and that it had reached me from a variety of sources that the Commissioner and Norman Kendal were inclined to run us down in consequence. Mathew said that he thought that probably MI5 knew a great deal more about the police than the police did about MI5, from which I implied that he probably had some knowledge of the report that we had put up in the STOCKMAN case. In any case he is well aware of the corruption that is going on. He told me that the H.O. were looking for a new Commissioner of Police. The job had been offered to Walter Monckton but that he had turned it down. Did I know of any suitable candidate? I strongly recommended Hordern although I said that I could not speak from very intimate knowledge, beyond saying that our relations with him were excellent and that his force appeared to be a highly efficient one. My knowledge was confined largely to Hordern as a man and personal friend. I had the highest regard for his integrity. He struck me as being fearless, frank and honest, certainly a personality and one whom men would be ready to follow. I knew that

he from time to time went into the H.O. and rapped the table. It might be therefore that he was not very popular in various quarters. I did not feel however that this should prejudice his chances. Mathew said that he did not know him but that he would certainly give the question consideration. He did not think a great deal of Shillito nor did he appear to have heard Teggart's name mentioned. The H.O. are looking for someone who will clean up the mess without destroying public confidence. They want a good atmosphere and a man who will be able to weather the extremely difficult period which is bound to occur after the war. I told Mathew that the police were disgruntled about their pay, that in my view the heads were living somewhat in a vacuum, that they did not know their D.D.I.'s, that if the D.D.I. was wrong probably the whole station was wrong and that the police would not welcome the appointment of another ex-General, Air Marshal or Admiral. I think they would far rather have a man who had some experience of police duties.

Mathew expressed grave dissatisfaction with the D.P.P. He never wishes to prosecute unless he is 100% certain of winning his case. Often the A.O. or the Treasury wish to bring an action merely to show that certain crimes or misdemeanours do not pass unnoticed. In such cases they never can get the D.P.P. to move. I told him that we liked the D.P.P. personally but our experience was somewhat similar.

Mathew said that Maxwell was a strong supporter of the D.G., that they got on extremely well together. Newsam on the other hand seems to dislike the D.G. because he gets bitten by the latter at the Executive and is not consulted in matters affecting this office. Mathew does not dislike Newsam but thinks his manners are extremely bad.

January 8th

I saw the D.M.I. this morning about ISFAL I. Paget has taken out a copy of Kellar's memo and will discuss it with Maunsell on arrival. It is quite possible that he will leave it in Maunsell's safe custody. He would like two copies of the detailed dossier to go to Paget and possibly 3. One copy would be held in the W.O. He mentioned TAR's plan for deception during Second Front operations and asked me whether I thought it was necessary for me to hold a meeting. I said I thought it would be desirable for him to see TAR, Barrow, Whitefoord and probably Jarvis-Reed. I emphasised very strongly that if deception could be used at all in the field it would be essentially an ops matter. He is going to call a meeting next week. He thinks that possibly the W. Board ought to be informed of the general plan.

He was very worried that Whitefoord had used the words double agent in a letter. I explained to him that the Germans used D.A.s and that it was common form the world over. The only thing that really mattered was that the Germans did not know the extent to which we are doing it. The D.M.I. has a curious

complex about this matter and seems to think that nobody has ever heard of a D.A. except ourselves.

The bombing of the Bodyline and Crossbow target in France is going on systematically and is thought to be fairly effective though only about 17 of the sites have so far been dealt with. If Crossbow is working on a magnetic compass it is thought that the ground will be so impregnated with metal from the bombing that the controlled aircraft will be put right off their course.

Dick and TAR talked to me about a scheme for tidying up the work of the division, possibly under two A.D.B.s, Hart being the other. They are going to draw up some scheme for consideration. We also are going to try to get some sort of blue print on the future of the office since a committee in the F.O. consisting of Cavendish-Bentinck, Cadogan, Loxley and Neville Bland has gone some way towards the reorganisation of SIS. It has been decided to use Passport Control in future purely as a defensive weapon. In other words in the present set-up it would be purely a Section V interest and not an organ of the P.Sections. This is a move in the right direction, but if we and Section V amalgamated the control of PCD should really come to us as being the people ultimately responsible for keeping British territory clean of undesirable individuals.

Anthony has got mikes in on CERVELL. We have
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in Eire is shortly going back to Spain.

On his return it is quite possible that he may be induced to carry a wireless set for HEMPFL. We shall try and get a look at this and if possible put it out of order.

Spooner and Davis are building up the case against STYLES. They have some 66 statements to take.

PADGHAM arrived here two days ago and is to be employed in PWE.

January 16th

I lunched with Peter Loxley. He told me that the D.M.I. was probably going and might be succeeded by Brig. Kirkman, who is a brother of the Kirkman who is the present D.D.M.I(I).

The enquiry into the affairs of SOE has resulted in the JIC putting in an unfavourable report. Selbourne has come back with a strong note virtually saying that the JIC do not know what they are talking about. The matter has now been referred to the Defence Committee.

Loxley asked me whether I thought it would be any good putting in a judge to conduct an impartial enquiry. I said I doubted whether anybody could arrive at a satisfactory conclusion unless he had a pretty intimate knowledge of the work of SIS, M.I.5 and SOE. Anybody who has the wool pulled over his eyes.

I asked Loxley how the SIS committee was going on. He said they held a meeting about once a week of a very informal kind. They had seen C., Dansey, Vivian, Woolcombe, Denniston, Travis. It looks rather as if the G.C. & C.S. were going to have an F.O. administrative head but presumably C. will remain the custodian of source. Loxley thinks that now that the consular service is amalgamated with the FO there will be an opportunity of putting consuls more au fait with secret material. At present they know nothing about it and are always rather uneasy about British agents operating in their area and in consequence not always very co-operative. He thinks that if they knew more about the whole set up better results might be achieved. I asked him frankly what he thought about the question of amalgamation of Section V and ourselves. He thought primarily that you could not separate subversive movements and C.E. and I think I convinced him that ordinary security measures could not be divorced from either of the other subjects. He felt definitely that it was a waste of time for Section V and ourselves to be covering the same ground and that some form of amalgamation, possibly with a dual responsibility to the F.O. and H.O., was essential. He did not think that any steps which were being taken now would prejudice such an amalgamation.

January 17th

Returned from leave.

The US casualties up to December 23rd have been published. The total is 105,229 for the Army. This figure includes 16,831 killed, 38,916 wounded, 24,067 missing and 25,415 prisoners. Casualties among the American elements of the 5th Army since the invasion of Italy is 17,119, which include 2,798 killed, 11,762 wounded and 2,559 missing. The latest figures of casualties in the Navy, Marine Corps and Coastguards are 15,186 killed, 6,616 wounded, 8,429 missing, and 4,292 prisoners, bringing the total casualties for all Services to 139,752. This total is remarkable after two years of war, particularly when one considers that the casualties for the first 24 hours of the Battle of the Somme were 100,000,000.

Cecil tells me that the two Irish parachutists who came down in Eire a few weeks ago were both S.D. agents. We are doing our best to assist the Irish in their interrogations, but they have not so far succeeded in extracting very much.

The P.M. has passed on a wire that he has received from the President indicating a leakage from the British Embassy in Cairo about Anglo-Turkish relations. The report came from OSS and was believed to be reliable. The Chiefs of Staff are apparently very concerned. It seems possible that the

information may have been derived from the breaking of Turkish cyphers. We know from the case of Max GERHARD, an agent captured in the M.E. and formerly a member of the German Cryptographic Bureau in Athens, that Turkish cyphers have been read for some time.

It seems that at the meeting at Teheran Stalin expressed the view that the phrase: "unconditional surrender" was an unfortunate one. He thought that the Germans ought to have been told that if they gave up they would be treated reasonably.

According to a neutral source of SIS, after the meeting between Eden and the Turkish Foreign Secretary, which had been rather stormy, Turkey was faced with a peremptory Russian demand that she should take a definite stand with regard to the war not later than 31/12. and this demand was backed by Gt. Britain. It was then that President Inonu decided to change tactics and to inform the Allies that Turkey was ready to enter the war with her limited resources in infantry, machine-guns and artillery, provided the Allies were ready to fulfil their part of the bargain. Steinhardt, the American Ambassador at Ankara, persuaded Roosevelt and the P.M. that the Turkish policy was reasonable. Roosevelt succeeded in persuading Stalin to change his former intransigent attitude towards Turkey into a more moderate one.

CERVELL has written another despatch in which he speculates on the date of the opening of

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the Second Front. He bases his information partly on his own observations, and partly on those of a Czech officer with whom he is very friendly. He has obtained permission to visit an American bomber unit which operates with Marauders. This again goes to show that unless there is some concerted plan between ourselves and the Americans about foreign attaches and their visits, we will be wasting our time in tightening up precautions for our own aerodromes and factories.

Dick tells me that he has had a good deal of trouble at COSSAC. It seems that Jock Whiteford has sold the pass and that the information required for forthcoming operations is to be collated in Section V and not at Norfolk House. Dick is preparing a statement and I propose to go and see C. on the whole question. I gather however that TAR's proposals about the running of XX have been accepted, largely due to the fact that Foley has generously stated that this work can be done better by B.1A than SIS.

Tricycle has now been questioned on his stay in Lisbon and it is clear that he has been extremely successful, and that the material he took with him is very highly regarded both in Lisbon and Berlin. Karsthoff obtained agreement at the Abwehr conference at Baden-Baden that Tricycle was to be entrusted with the most secret and important tasks. In Lisbon he was treated like a hero by all concerned including Schreiber who is now moving to

Berlin as head of Einzheer West. For the first time he was able to persuade the Germans to pay his extremely liberal salary in advance. During the visit Freak duly passed through the escape route and Tricycle was able to arrange that the next batch of escapees should not contain any agents but should consist entirely of persons whom he had nominated. He further secured acceptance of the condition that if at any time in the future any agents were to be sent out through this route, they must be chosen by Dreadnaught which would ensure that their people would know from the start that they are to XX the Germans. Tricycle is to return towards the end of February when he will be expected to take back answers to some of the questions which he brought. He was told by Karsthoff after the Baden-Baden conference that he was regarded as the No.1 agent. Tricycle has brought Gelatine a fresh ink, instructions to receive communications by duff, and a questionnaire, money etc. He was to deliver this material to Gelatine without disclosing his identity. The judgment on Gelatine in Lisbon was that she did not know what was important and that while her letters contained a lot of nonsense she occasionally without knowing it included something of considerable importance.

The Mutt and Jeff case is still in doubt owing to the possibility of its having been blown by KARL, the German who was repatriated from the Nazi camp which had communication with Camp WX. As the dropping operation did not take place in spite of Jeff over-staying his

leave for 2 days communication has broken off at the end of last week and an attempt will be made to force the Germans to carry out the operation later. Meanwhile it has been decided that Mutt should forthwith be moved notionally to an OCTU so as to get him away from Scotland and in this way it is hoped that whatever the Germans believe in the case, o harm will be done and possibly may help in continuing the case.

The Germans interest in Brutus appears to be reviving and they are starting to ask interesting questions.

A letter has been received from Hamlet enclosing correspondence from Bergman of Ost Brussels, showing that the latter does still not have the confidence of Berlin in running this ase. At the same time Hamlet has offered Puppet 15,000 pesetas payable in Madrid.

Milmo has made out his analysis of Camp 020 cases for the year 1943. The total number of cases held on 31.12.43 was 120 as against 90 on the same date in 1942, and 54 on the same date in 1941. 67 were admitted in 1943, 18 released, 7 transferred and 2 prosecuted. Of those admitted in 1943, 54 proved to be spies as against 43 in the previous year. Of the above 54, there were 39 cases in which there were identifiable traces, on ISOS (an increase from 55.8 to 72.2 % over the previous year). There were 21 cases in which the capture of the agent was attributable to ISOS,

an increase from 35% to 38.9 %. There were 15 cases for which there was no identifiable trace on ISOS at all, a decrease from 44.2% to 27.8%. Of the total of 54, 30 were captured abroad, as against 14 in the previous year, and 24 in the U.K. as against 29 in the previous year. Out of the total of 24 apprehended in the U.K., only 22 were intended to operate in this country. Of these ISOS showed traces of 16, 3 were captured on account of ISOS. 16 gave themselves up or were D.A.s ab initio. Of the 3 whose capture was attributable to ISOS, MENEZES would certainly have been otherwise detected, HUYSMANN would almost certainly have been detected, while LALOU's fate would have been problematical. Among those who came to this country de GRAAF, JOB and STEINER are really the only 3 that we can claim to have captured single-handed.

January 18th

The HOYSS case opened yesterday, and is likely to take a week. A further piece of evidence has been obtained from MAP to the effect that ARMSTRONG signed a statement before taking up his position in which he agreed that he would not accept any commissions from firms.

further

I attended the JIC today when our paper about attaches was discussed. It was decided to issue a further warning from the P.M. about the dangers of discussing confidential matters with foreign attaches, particularly neutrals. As regards Service attaches, the JIC would

recommend that all visits to establishments and factories should for the time being be refused. Lastly it was decided to obtain as far as possible the co-operation of the Americans and particularly on the air side. Inglis would approach Peabody on the basis of the document picked up in Sicily and would point out to him the dangers of service attaches communicating with neutrals. He would get Peabody to talk to Turner about his relations with various neutral attaches, particularly the Swedes.

S/Ldeader Chaney came to see me at my request about SEMPILL. We had intercepted a letter from him to SEMPILL indicating that he would like to see the latter on his return from Canada. Chaney told me that this was in connection with a proposal to form a committee and a club for Polish air officers. Funds were to be raised for the purpose of helping distressed officers particularly those who had got into debt. The Poles did not really like the idea but did not wish to turn down what appeared to be a generous offer from the noble lord. The moving spirit is apparently a Mrs. Stafford LEWES, formerly known as the Countess Carla JENSEN. This lady has written a book about the spying activities of the British Govt. in the last war. She is an adventuress of the first order and was a short time ago declared a bankrupt. Her debts have now been paid by her husband who is a wealthy stockbroker, possibly in order to enable her to bring an action against Lady Jersey (Virginia Cherrill) who has been talking rather indiscreetly about

Mrs. Stafford LEWES being a 5th columnist. The latter has given out that she can raise thousands of pounds but when pressed to say how much she had raised, she gave the figure of £225. Her committee consists of Lord SEMPILL, Chairman, Sir Hector McNeil, whose general undesirability is well-known, Sir Hector's daughter Moira Montgomery, Lady Manton, Mrs. Stafford Lewes, Sec. and John Mills @ Jan Milstein of the Ambassadors Club, treasurer. It is perhaps a little curious that Mrs. Stafford LEWES is believed to run gambling parties. Presumably her idea is to fleece the Polish Air Force officers by gambling and then pay them back out of funds which she will raise from the public. Meanwhile efforts are being made to persuade the LCC to refuse a licence for the club and the Poles have been induced to defer acceptance of Lord SEMPILL's offer for 3 months. Chaney has seen SEMPILL's secretary in his absence. She states that he knows nothing about Mrs. Stafford LEWES, but that the lady had written to him and asked him to be president of the club, and he, wishing to further what he considered a good cause, had accepted the proposal. SEMPILL apparently has an office at 120 Pall Mall, on the top floor, where his secretary resides. There is no name on the door.

January 19th

I had a word with Miss Nunn who under Cussen's able direction doing a tour of B. Division. She is most interested in what she has seen already. I explained to her that I had, not

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without difficulty obtained permission for her to be let in on most secret material but that this permission did not strictly go beyond herself. I felt however that if she was questioned by the Home Secretary, Sir Alexander Maxwell or Sir Frank Newsam, she should be as forthcoming as she thought necessary. As regards her immediate superiors or other senior officers in the H.O., I did not feel that she should disclose her sources but I was quite ready to leave it to her discretion, seeing that she had been in a highly confidential post as Sir Alexander Maxwell's secretary, to impart as much information in general terms as she thought the occasion demanded. I impressed upon her that I was going slightly outside my powers and that if anything went wrong I should be in very serious trouble.

At the Wednesday meeting Noakes mentioned the case of WIJKAERT, the Belgian who has recently arrived here and seems to have been more intimately tied up with the Germans than he led us to believe in his statement. His case is very similar to that of de GRAAF. I asked whether S.L.A. had been brought into the case as they might possibly wish to take a statement. Milmo said that at the moment there was not sufficient evidence to render this necessary.

Grogan talked about the teleprinter service of the Eire newspapers. He had conducted very careful examinations and was satisfied that nothing of an undesirable nature was being transmitted. The services are monitored periodically and no breach of security has been

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been noticed. It may however be possible to give these papers telephone circuits which can be monitored 100%. This of course would be preferable from the point of view of Overlord and efforts are being made to persuade Admiral Thomson to make the necessary arrangements.

Stanford read out long questionnaires received through Tricycle and covering almost every conceivable subject.

I spent the afternoon at the Old Bailey where HOYSE, ARMSTRONG and BLOSS were on trial for corruption and bribery. HOYSE was being defended by Pat Hastings, ARMSTRONG by Khaki Roberts and Bloss by Beyfus, K.C. The prosecution was conducted by Maxwell Lyfe, the Solicitor General, and Byrne. Pat Hastings made an extremely good opening speech for the Defence although he was at times a little too facetious to carry conviction. He did very little in the way of cross-examining Burt, Spooner or Fish. He was up to all his usual tricks of trying to discredit the case of prosecution in the eyes of the jury. He said that Sir Hugo had gone in for aircraft construction because his son was interested in civil aviation but his son had joined up and had been killed in action. Sir Hugo's one ambition was to construct the best possible aircraft that could be designed. HOYSE went into the box for 5 minutes but as Sir Patrick had another engagement proceedings were adjourned to the following day.

3/8/45
Dick has had a troublesome meeting with Black and Vivian. Gwyer criticised certain of the
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cards being submitted to COSSAC by Section V on the grounds of inaccuracy and inadequacy. His criticisms were I think justifiable. They were forwarded to Vivian by Black and Vivian replied personally to Whitefoord in the most violent terms abusing Gwyer and ending up with a request for his removal. This letter was marked personal to Whitefoord but this was only discovered after it had been read by Black and McDermot. It could not therefore be brought up at the discussion. Dick said it was clear that Vivian had not even seen the cards which were the subject of dispute and that he was considerably shaken when he realised the magnitude of the problem and the responsibility that SIS were taking on in demanding that the whole work should in future be done by Section V. Dick said that he intended to contest the issue and if possible bring it before the JIC. He agreed that perhaps Gwyer would have done better to have discussed the deficiencies of the cards with Carew-Huntin the first instance. The meeting I gather was outwardly amiable and it was decided that Dick should have a talk with Gwyer and to try and effect the necessary improvements.

January 20th

I attended the Old Bailey again this morning when HOYSE was cross-examined. He did not make a good impression and clearly the Judge was not on his side. The most difficult question that he had to answer was why he had thought it necessary to open a special account for his transaction with ARMSTRONG,

when he could have quite easily got an overdraft through his bank. This would seem to have been far and away the most desirable course seeing that the defence had stressed very strongly the personal nature of the transaction. The account that he opened was in his own name and in that of the secretary of Cunliffe-Owens, and the amount had been finally debited to Sir Hugo's personal account. In other words the transaction was given very much a company flavour rather than a personal one. HOYSE really had no answer except that he had not given the matter much thought and had done it that way because it seemed the most convenient. Sir Hugo went into the box and made a bad impression under cross-examination. He said that he knew nothing of the transaction until the police enquiries had begun. When asked what he would have thought of the transaction had he been aware of it, he said he did not know what he would have thought. Later he was asked about the sale of BLOSS's shares in the cinema company. He stated that HOYSE had consulted him about the matter as he thought that the shares were worth more than 10/- and that he had rung up Rank who was the owner of the company and Rank had agreed to purchase them at £1. It was suggested to him that he had done this to oblige HOYSE or BLOSS but he insisted that he had done it as a purely business transaction. He was then asked whether he did not consider it rather peculiar that two millionaires should be telephoning about such a paltry sum as £200 which to them would merely be a matter of pocket-money. He said that he was not in the habit of doing this but in this case it was

merely an ordinary business transaction.

I had a meeting in the afternoon with Horrocks Brooke-Booth, Ede, Dick, Gwyer, Stamp, Ke lar and Burn about the Black List which is to come into operation after Stage A. We all agreed that the Purple Primer would not provide a satisfactory basis for such a Black List since it was inadequate and since it was to be used solely on a regional basis. It did not get over the difficulty of an alien failing to get a visa in Lisbon and proceeding to Rotterdam or Stockholm and getting it there. Apart from this, air travel after the war would probably be far easier. One might even have a case of a man failing to get a visa in Europe and proceeding to the USA for his papers. It seemed therefore that such a list should be on a world-wide basis. It was finally agreed that we should carefully prepare a list of British subjects who had been in enemy-occupied territory and were believed to have been associated with the Germans, which would come into force at Stage A. and that we should circulate all sections asking for their views as to the type of person who should feature on the international list and the standard of information required for his inclusion on that list.

I had a talk with Herbert about the future of the office. He still thinks that if we took over C E. it would be necessary to conduct certain enquiries abroad, if not in peace time certainly in war time, and that we should therefore have to have the necessary organisation to do so. I said that I thought that

while it was necessary to have some sort of position overseas which would enable us to carry out direct liaison with our opposite numbers we could leave the active enquiries on foreign territory to SIS. This would of course postulate something like a Section V organisation. I thought that this was inevitable since any other scheme would always be open to criticism that you could not have two organisations operating on foreign territory.

It has been decided to send Sir John Dashwood to Ankara to investigate the case of leakage relating to our plans for operations in the Balkans. It is quite clear from ISOS that certain documents have gone astray between Sir Knatchbull-Hugesson's return to Cairo and the date of the first ISOS message, which actually gave one of the code names of the operation. There was a leakage some time ago from the British Embassy in Ankara when it was clear that an agent had been getting into the Ambassador's staff. The position was never cleared up, nor do I think it likely to be by Sir John Dashwood, who has no experience whatever of investigation. This is once more a case of territorial division between ourselves and other departments instead of functional ones. An investigation of this sort could best be conducted by a combination of Hart, Cussen and Burt. There is of course also the question of sending through another document (a) for the purpose of seeing what happened to it and (b) for the purpose of neutralising the leakage of the previous document. I do not know whether this question

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has even been considered, as we were not consulted. The whole business was transacted between SIS, F.O. and the Chiefs of Staff. I am so heartily sick of the absurdity of the present situation that if I were ever offered the job of taking over this department I should feel inclined to stipulate that unless territorial boundaries were abolished and the show reorganised on a functional basis I would not be prepared to take over. I should not be very keen on taking over in any case. In the present atmosphere the position would be intolerable.

1/18/41 Dick had a meeting with _____ and Gwyer when differences of opinion were ironed out more or less satisfactorily.

January 21st

I attended a meeting of the W. Board. TAR brought the position up to date as regards the D.A.s at present at the disposal of the XX Committee. He then explained about the unfortunate incident at Camp TX which has probably resulted in the blowing of Mutt and Jeff, if not also of Tate. The latter however we believe has got away with it. The next point was Brutus. The W. Board agreed that he could be used for deception on the order of battle provided this were done on present lines and discreetly. The W. Board expressed confidence in the agents who were to be used for the purpose of deception in Overlord. Lastly we discussed the question of approving authorities. It was agreed that
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Wild recently brought back from the Mediterranean and an officer who had worked under Dudley-Clark should be the approving authority both British and American in COSSAC, and should become a member of the XX Committee. If he needs a deputy it will probably have to be an American. That officer would have to be initiated. Present at the meeting were DMI, DNI, Sir Findlater Stewart, A/C.Buss, Cowgill, TAR, Montagu and myself.

Cecil has had a lot of trouble over a question in the house by Little of an Ulster constituency who is agitating about the Irish parachutists and urging that the seriousness of the situation should be taken up with the Eire authorities. Little was not satisfied with the answer he got and now proposes to raise the question on the adjournment. It has been decided that the Home Secretary should see Sir Basil Brooke, the Ulster P.M. who is over here at the moment, explain to him that we are in close touch with the Eire authorities in this matter and they are proving extremely co-operative. Basil Brooke will then be authorised to tell Little that from enquiries he has made he is satisfied that the Eire authorities are doing all they possibly can and that Mr Devalera will implement his pledge not to allow southern Ireland to become a base for operations against this country. It is hoped in this way to get Little to withdraw his motion.

The DMI called a meeting to discuss the use of DAs for deception in Overlord. Others present were Whiteford, Fleetwood-Hesketh,
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Jarvis-Reed, Wild, Bevan, Kirkman, C., Cowgill, TAR and myself. Whitefoord had obviously sold out to SIS. He thought that the unit should be with the S.C.I. unit (S.C.I. is the new description for the S.I.(b) or I.B.1 unit. It means Secret Counter-Intelligence and conforms with American nomenclature). There was obviously some sense in this claim in that the S.C.I. unit has the communications and is also the recipient of ISOS. Moreover it has an establishment with facilities for moving about. The only objection is that control is maintained by SIS. Personally I think that in the field it would probably work. Cowgill and C. then made it clear that they were proposing to make use of French officers. I asked whether these officers were experienced in D.A. work and was told that they were. It was however agreed that Harmer should go as D.A. expert and that we should have a pool of 8 officers available here to be sent out at any moment. We should further undertake to train 4 American officers who would be working in the American Army Group. The final position of the Deception Unit, which it was originally felt should be under Ops B. has been deferred pending discussions between Wild, who is Bevan's deception man in the European theatre, MI5 and MI6. Wild is very much on our side and I am sure will use all his influence to see that control is under Ops B. rather than the S.C.I. When an agent has been captured in the field it is for consultation between S.C.I. and Ops B. as to whether he is suitable for deception purposes. Two things seemed to stand out at this meeting, firstly that Cowgill was struggling to maintain

control of D.A.s in the S.C.I. unit and that apart from Harmer he did not intend to draw very much on the MI5 pool. His idea is to give the cases to the Frenchmen and I can quite see a situation arising when our pool of 8 officers here will be twiddling their thumbs waiting in vain for a call. It may be that Harmer will be able to adjust this. If of course he is under Ops B. he will be in a much stronger position. I impressed upon Wild after the meeting the dangers of the French getting hold of these cases and the importance of getting in on them at the earliest possible moment. When an agent is d.f'd. it should then be a matter for consultation between all concerned as to how he is to be arrested. If this is badly done and left in the hands of the French, deception agents will be spoilt before they ever reach Ops.B. C's strangle-hold on this whole party is (a) the ISOS and (b) his direct wireless communication. Jock Whitefoord was sceptical about the possibilities of taking agents over to France, either notionally or otherwise. It was however pointed out to him that we had a fellow notionally in the FSP who would inform his masters that he was going overseas. They might then arrange for sets to be deposited with various agents so that if he was in the vicinity he could use these sets for purposes of communication. It was mentioned that there might be cases where a deception agent would be left behind, the S.C.I. unit having moved elsewhere. TAR suggested that the case officer should use the agent's set both for communication with the enemy and communication with Ops B or S.C.I. in the field.

C. said to me after the meeting that he was in favour of the attachment of our people to the S.C.I. unit and that he would jolly well see that things worked. He rather implied that if there were any difficulties from the Section V point of view he would very quickly call them to order.

I had a talk with Bevan about the leakage of documents relating to our Balkan plans from the Embassy at Ankara. He said that he had heard about this and that he had been rung up yesterday evening by Godrington's people with some suggestion that he should prepare a deception document. He agreed with me that the idea was a good one (a) from the point of view of neutralising the ill effects of the leakage and (b) from the point of view of detecting the collaborator. He was however largely in ignorance as to what the documents contained. It was obviously impossible for him to prepare any counter-documents unless he could see the full text and unless he knew precisely the circumstances in which the leakage had taken place. He expressed his intention of looking into the matter.

January 22nd

There was a rather heavy raid last night. 99 planes crossed the coast, half of them at about 9 pm and the other half at 4.30 a.m. On the first occasion 14 got through to London and on the second 13. 16 in all were brought down. A few bombs were dropped in London and the suburbs and a certain number in Kent.

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We landed 2½ divisions at 5 am today south of Rome. They are to march north to hold the high ground. It is said that the Germans are very hard-pressed on the Italian front and have very few reserves. The fighting however is extremely difficult, firstly owing to the hilly country and secondly owing to the extensive mining of the forward areas.

I dined with J.C. and Thornton of M.I.3 last night. Thornton talked a certain amount about the Russians. He said they were in many ways very difficult. I spoke about the recent incident of the Pravda publishing an imaginary interview in the Pyrenees between Ribbentrop and certain British officials. He thought that Moscow had done this out of pique owing to the attitude we had taken up about eastern Poland. He agreed with me that the Russians would understand us much better if we told them quite bluntly when and how they got off. He quoted an instance when Gen. Firebrace who was looking after the Russians here had been the recipient of complaints by the Russians about what they were shown in this country. Firebrace eventually came to the end of his tether and said "If you have got any complaints to make, you had better get in the car and we will go straight and you can make them to the C.I.G.S. direct". The Russians shut up like oysters and no further complaints were heard.

Gilbert Kyle told me that the ISK situation is not as bad as they expected. Two changes have taken place, one on the first and the

other on the 15th of the month and apparently there were to be no further changes. While this has resulted in a temporary decrease in the product owing to the difficulties of getting it out, it is thought these difficulties will be overcome fairly soon. The situation with regard to the peninsula is less serious than in regard to the Balkans.

There has been a blaze in the press about arrest of HELMUTH. It is important that we should stop a question being asked in the house as to why he has not been tried. Such a question would not only embarrass us with the Argentine authorities but would make it apparent to the enemy that in fact no charge lies against a man working for the Germans in other than British territory. Harker is seeing Morrison's private secretary. Apparently you cannot prevent a question being put on the order paper unless it discloses information vital to the enemy. In answering the question, however, it is always possible to say that more cannot be said for security reasons. The other alternative is to get the M.P. to withdraw his question. It is possible however to arrange with the clerks to be informed as soon as the question is put down. This we have done.

There is a reflection on ISOS which indicates a possibility that the Germans may be attempting to send a wireless set to Father.

Bronx has received her January payment of £100.

Tricycle has written a letter to say that Break hopes to be able to start transmitting on the 1st Feb. Treasure has received a call but unfortunately part of the message was missed owing to conditions and it has not been possible to decode.

Peach previously known as Wendy is a White Russian from Siberia who has lived most of his life in the Far East, probably in Shanghai but has served intermittently for some years on British ships. In 1940-41 he worked according to his own statement as a D.A. for the Americans against Japan. In November last he was sent to Lisbon by B.L. with an idea of re-establishing contact with the Japs. He has carried out his mission successfully and was interviewed at some length on December 14th by two Japs whom he believes to be the M.A. and A.M.A. His former connection with the Jap S.S. is being verified and he has been asked to return to Lisbon in about 2 months time. Meanwhile he has been given a questionnaire.

January 24th

HOYES, ARMSTRONG and BLOSS were acquitted on the 22nd. The Judge in his summing up seemed to treat the matter rather light-heartedly and gave a clear direction to the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. It would seem likely that after hearing the evidence of Sir Alexander Dunbar who had stated quite incorrectly that Cunliffe Owens were the only firm who could take on the Seafire contract the Judge had made up his mind that the bottom

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had fallen out of the case of the prosecution and that in the absence of any startling evidence the jury should acquit. The result is disappointing and unfortunate although I think that the case may still have considerable repercussions and that it was rightly brought. Burt tells me that Bripps has caused an independent investigation to be made into the firm's affairs and that before the proceedings opened he notified Cunliffe Owen that unless Hoyes and the secretary Chown were removed he would take over the whole business. It remains to be seen whether in the light of the court proceedings he is intending to modify his views. There is no real reason why he should.

I took Dick's meeting this morning. Milmo informed the meeting that MANFREDI, the spy from Italy, had been broken at Camp 20. This man, concerning whom there were ISOS traces, was interrogated by the S.I(b) unit and both they and Hill-Dillon stated that they thought he was possibly an innocent victim of the S.D. since he strongly denied all the accusations. Hill-Dillon even went so far as to oppose his being sent to this country. This is one more instance of the inability of the S.I(b) unit to handle cases of this sort. They have neither the time nor the properly-trained personnel to do the job. This is I think gradually sinking in since a few weeks ago we were asked to send out 3 interrogators.

Hart mentioned an ISOS message which indicated that a wireless operator on a ship which had recently called at Trinidad, was likely to

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communicate with a German station in Spain, presumably on matters relating to convoys. There are two Spanish vessels which left Trinidad at the time in question. Efforts are being made to trace any second telegram from Trinidad to Spain, reporting the ship's departure, and the Navy are being warned to keep convoys clear of both these Spanish
ps.

A directive has now gone to S.C.O.s about sending to the LRC all Frenchmen who came out of France since the total occupation. Application of this order to Frenchmen who have an ordre de mission is still a matter for discussion between E. Division and the French.

Mrs. Pitt mentioned that two suspect letters had been picked up by censorship going from this country to Lisbon. One had received the ordinary test but without result. The second one would be tested to the point of destruction.

I had a discussion with Anthony and Stopford about the suggested re-opening of the Swedish Air Line. We are putting forward the following views to the Air Ministry. We realise that the over-riding consideration is Overlord. We feel, however, that it would be advisable to defer the question at any rate until the Germans give a safe conduct, without which the Swedes will not operate. We do not want A.B. transport in London to be liquidated since we obtain valuable information from there. The line is closed down

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this will probably close down as well. As regards personnel on the Swedish Air Line, they are always a potential danger. On the other hand two of the suspects were killed when the aircraft was shot down a month or two ago. D.4 would find it convenient to have only one air line, since they are in a stronger position in checking the entry of people who want to come here on quite plausible missions and whose visas cannot justifiably be refused.

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On the whole we prefer the route not to operate, but we would like to convey to them that it might be opened at any time.

has now told FLORMAN that CERVELL has special means for getting special stuff over to Sweden by fast motor-boat. SOE reports show that they are running fast motor-boats to Sweden which bring back to this country ball bearings. It seems likely therefore that CERVELL is in on this racket. I am proposing to take this matter up with Archie Boyle. Stopford has ascertained through official in the Air Minis-Catalogue Reference:KV/4/193

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try responsible for liaison with British Air Attaches abroad, that Laycock, our air attache in Stockholm, has sent an open letter for outward transmission to CERVELL in which he warns the latter to be careful as he is the subject of enquiry by the Security authorities in this country. It is almost past belief that such a letter could have been written. There does not appear to be any sinister intent at the back of it, but is an example of sheer stupidity. Buss is taking this matter up. Codrington asked me whether any measures that we were taking in this country against the Swedes

He wanted to know this as H.M.G. were intending to lodge a strong protest to the Swedes about their rather clumsy miking of the British Embassy. They had apparently been dropping mikes down the chimneys.

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Tommy Harris told me last night that on Friday the Chinese M.A. had been round to see the Spanish M.A. He had told the latter that the British were intending to invade Spain during the course of the next few days. The Spaniard

had become extremely alarmed and was telegraphing all over the place. I told Harris to find out whether Bevan was responsible for the rumour, although I thought this was unlikely. I also arranged for Carlisle to be informed since it seemed to me that the Chinese M.A. was rather definitely on the wrong side of the fence.

Derbyshire came to tell me that he went to a cocktail party given by Major Seddon of SOE and had met CHICHEV and his assistant KRASSINSKY. During a conversation with the latter the usual party line had been put over. The Russians were bearing the brunt of the whole war. Their casualties were 6 million against our 40,000. Why did we not open a Second Front? Russia would settle the Polish affair in her own way. It seems a great pity to me that it is usually the form not to hit back at the Russians when they make irresponsible statements of this kind. I am quite sure that it would pay us every time. If we merely accept their statements they regard us as weak. I told Derbyshire that on the whole I thought it would be as well if he did not meet these people since we have more or less agreed not to develop our connection here in order not to prejudice any relations that C. and SOE may have in Moscow.

Dick has put in a long note about the work done by himself, McDermot and Gwyer at COSSAC. It is a remarkable fact that when he went to COSSAC not one single directive had been issued to Army Groups and lower formations on I.B. matters, and that within a month some 50 pages

of directives had gone out, every one of them written by Dick, McDermot or Gwyer. Even basic I.B. matters which might have been solved by the W.O. years ago had to be thrashed out. The worst feature of the whole business has been the torpedoing by SS of the plans for collating intelligence relating to Germany and the set-up of the necessary machinery to feed a central intelligence bureau in Germany after the armistice. Gwyer in an extremely able memo shows how inadequate the existing machinery is likely to be, ~~for~~ the commitment, which affects some 8 norther depts. having been handed over to Section V, whose contribution in the nature of things can only be a very small one. This decision, overriding the views of all the other contributors, was taken after a uni-lateral discussion between Whitefoord and C. without any reference to Dick. The question now arises as to whether we are going to sit down under this. Dick suggests putting the whole matter to the J.I.C. Personally, I am doubtful about the chances of success unless we can persuade C. that he is not adequately equipped to fulfil the responsibility that he has taken on. Alternatively we could wait until Whiteley replaces Whitefoord and then reopen the whole question.

January 25th

The J.I.C. have given a resume' of what they consider to be the forces at the disposal of the enemy to oppose a Second Front. On the assumption (a) that Overlord will be carried out approximately at the appointed time, (b) that

Anvil will be carried out a few days afterwards (c) that we are established on the Rimini-Pisa line, and (d) that Russian pressure on the eastern front is maintained, it is thought that Germany will be able to take into the forces sufficient to make good wastage and to maintain the army at approximately the same size as at the corresponding period in 1943 though at the expense of quality. She will during the winter try to economise with regard to the Luftwaffe and to refit and build up for the opening of the summer campaign as strong a defensive Air Force as possible. If the Russian offensive continues as at present and Germany is driven back to her eastern frontier, it is unlikely that she could transfer more than 5 divisions to the west. In the Mediterranean and S.E. Europe she will have to expect operations either in the Gulf of Genoa, the south of France and even in the Balkans, and will therefore be unlikely materially to reduce her land or air forces, although a few divisions might be spared. In Scandinavia, which is strategically so important for Germany, she will have to maintain her forces although she might recall 2 or 3 divisions from Norway once the direction of our assault became apparent. In France and the Low Countries Germany has during the last 2 years tried to maintain a strength in field formations of some 40 divisions in various stages of training and of varying strength and quality. At times part of this force has had to be released to meet crises elsewhere. Realising the possibility of an invasion in the West, Germany will aim at having a strength

in field formations of some 45 divisions, of which some 13 may be offensive. On D-1 day opposition to Overlord is likely to consist of 1 to 2 defensive divisions, reinforced later on the same day by 2 offensive divisions. In addition there will be personnel amounting the static coastal and A.A. artillery. Making no allowance for the delays imposed by allied interference or patriot activities, this opposition might be reinforced by a further 7 or 8 divisions by D plus 7. Reinforcement from outside France after the assault is unlikely to exceed some 10 divisions drawn as necessary from Norway, Italy, Balkans and Central Europe and also some 5 divisions from the Russian Front if the situation there is not too desperate. In the air Germany might make immediately available a force of some 1350 aircraft which might be reinforced by D plus 1 by some further 300 aircraft. German naval forces are likely to consist of some 15 destroyers and torpedo boats and a fleet of U-boats and mine laying craft. In addition a number of small submarines may be detailed for channel operations. The reinforcement by Service forces after Overlord is likely to be restricted to a few destroyers, torpedo-boats, mine-sweepers and other light craft. Ocean-going U-boats may give some assistance.

I lunched with the Belgians. They are beginning to get together with SIS but are still rather in the air as to what they are expected to do when the second front opens. Lepage mentioned that there were a number of Belgians who had passed through the LRC but who had at

one time or another served in the German forces. From the Belgian point of view they were traitors, and the Belgians would like to see them interned. I explained to him our difficulties, namely that even if we got an order the man might well be subsequently released. His point is that when these people go back and come up for trial they will be able to say that their case was investigated by the British and they were left at large. I asked him to let me have a list of people to whom he referred. Brooke-Booth did not seem to know who they were so presumably they are just wandering about unchecked.

Burt tells me that he has been asked by Mr. Justice Staple to go and see him. I have advised him to spill the whole beans. Since the trial Burt has ascertained from MAP that Cunliffe-Owens is in a frightful mess. They have an overdraft of 1,300,000 since they cannot produce proper costing figures to the Govt. If this evidence could have been produced in court it would have torpedoed that given by Sir Alexander Dunbar.

January 26th

We have heard that a satisfactory meeting was held at the Security Executive on the 15-mile belt. Brig. West made a very moving speech for the Ops side of COSSAC. He put forward three grounds, firstly security, secondly increase of traffic and 3rdly the possibility of bombing in the area prior to the operation. Findlater-Stewart was in the chair and in

favour of the belt. The only opposition came from the H.O. and Ministry of Home Security, represented by Maxwell, Brown, Newsam and Hoare. Newsam and Brown remained in opposition but Maxwell seemed more or less persuaded. He is still however somewhat unconvinced on the security side in spite of a meeting of all the C.C.s in the area who have all by a large majority voted for the ban. Dick has drawn up a note on what he believes to be the real security reasons. These are that the H.O. tend to rely rather on the police more than the citizen catching spies. The citizen will not be able to play his part if the area is filled with large numbers of unknown tourists or visitors. If the ground is cleared of tourists anybody who is not known locally is much more likely to come to light, unless he is going to live in the open fields, which he would find extremely difficult. The whole question now has to go to the War Cabinet for a decision. The H.O. are & think extremely stupid in resisting the imposition of the ban in spite of the extreme dangers with which our armies are likely to be faced. Even if there is a half per cent security in the scheme any inconvenience to the public or anyone else should be disregarded. It is this kind of opposition which makes the Services regard the H.O. as a lot of 5th columnists.

Art Thurston came to tell me that he expected to be off very soon and that his successor would be Joe Lynch who has up to now been liaison officer in Ottawa with the RCMP. I had lunch with Lynch when I was in Ottawa in

1942 and he made a very favourable impression. If we have to lose Art we probably could not do better.

At the Wednesday meeting today Herbert disclosed that ISOS indicated that the unidentified German agent BUNSEN, thought to be a Swiss, had left this country for Lisbon and Switzerland somewhere round the middle of January, where contact was to be made with an Abwehr representative from Berlin. This is rather disconcerting since it means that we have had a German agent here since Dec. 1942. We should however be able to pin-point him on the present evidence.

Gogan said that Major HOLM of the Norwegian Army, who is responsible for censorship matters had left with Francis two documents containing information of first-class importance. One is a general description of German censorship practice in Norway and the other is a translation of the German censorship manual of instructions concerning the examination and testing of all kinds of material for secret messages. E.1A have obtained additional copies of these documents and also an appendix of no less importance containing the formulae of the secret writing tests used by the Germans.

Sclater mentioned that a P/W had said that the Germans were in the habit of listening to our commercial stations. Grogan said that there were 1000 commercial stations in this country to the colonies and dominions and over

100 to Northern Ireland, which were not monitor with the exception of the press lines. The military and the B.B.C. apparently have their own lines. Gogan is going to look into this.

Sclater gave an account of the work by the vans on an American station which had been d.f.d by R.S.S. The station was at first thought to be a British military or Air Force one as it was apparently using their procedure. The vans went out to the Horsham area where they got a very strong signal which did not operate the needle. Another bearing caused them to put the Bristol van out, which luckily found its target pretty quickly. The point of this story is that it almost impossible to say more than that a wireless transmitter is in the north or south of England. Unless you can get into the ground-wave your vans don't operate. To get into the ground wave you may need to be very close to their target. There is still no inter-com between the vans and they cannot operate for more than 8 hours without having to drive several hundred miles in order to recharge their batteries. Not a very good show. Sclater is going to find out who is responsible for American Army Signal security.

Stamp said that further evidence cast considerable doubt on the case of PRESSAY, who was being run by TAR under the name of BOOTLE, in conjunction with the French. An OSS agent happened to meet PRESSAY and gave information to the effect that his real name was TIKHMANIEF a white Russian. This is now confirmed from other sources, and links up with information Catalogue Reference:KV/4/193

that FRESSAY may have been working for the Germans in N. Africa. There has also been further evidence against FEYGUINE who has been interned in the I.O.M. Both these cases make one slightly apprehensive about FIDO and indeed about many other Frenchmen, Belgians, and Dutchmen who are off-loaded through the LTC on to the Allied Govts.

Anthony tells me that through LEMON he has ascertained almost certainly that Bartlett is CERVELL's contact in the Bristol Aircraft Col. We are taking steps accordingly.

Victor has had a large number of reports about fires on troop ships and transports at Liverpool, Birkenhead and Glasgow. In one case a device has been found, which is being forwarded to this office. It has been decided to send a representative of B.5 to investigate. If these outbreaks are not accidental, the areas are suggestive of the I.R.A.

A report has been received of an explosion on one of our railways rather like a fog signal. No damage was done but certain devices were found which are usually attached to an S.O.E. railway clam. Also a crushed S.O.E. "pencil". Two officers had apparently been seen in the vicinity. This may be a case of SOE testing their equipment, on the other hand it is difficult to account for the pencil. Further enquiry is being made.

Last night I had a long discussion with Victor and Theresa Clay about the Marita case. The latest development shows that the Imperial

Fascist League is forming an inner council of six of which a Mrs. LEACH is one of the members. I think this shows the value of the case. I am sure that for the present it should proceed on the same lines. There is no doubt that a prosecution is out of the question both on technical and other grounds.

JOB was condemned to death at the Old Bailey today.

January 27th

Gibbs came to see me about an official of the Petroleum Board called AULD, who committed a grave indiscretion by imparting to an officer he met casually in the Cumberland Hotel the information relating to our pipe lines specially constructed for the Second Front. I got him to tell Cussen about the case from the Petroleum Board point of view. While they do not wish to minimise the gravity of the indiscretion they say that AULD is an extremely hard worker and at the present moment is quite indispensable. He is a first-class engineer and is almost entirely responsible for the lines to the coast and across the channel. They are also anxious if possible to avoid publicity which would give the impression that the Board were grossly indiscreet. We explained to Gibbs that this matter had come to us through the military who took a very grave view, since the disclosure was of the highest military importance. If we failed to prosecute in this case they would say that soldiers were court-martialled and imprisoned for this kind of thing where-

as civilians could get away with it. At the same time we would explore the possibilities of getting a heavy fine rather than imprisonment.

I gather from Gibbs that our total consumption of petrol in this country before the war was roughly 5 million tons p.a. This is now roughly the figure for the Air Force alone.

Treasure's station has been heard again but unfortunately it was not possible to de-code this one either.

Walker and TAR have been working on a XX pigeon racket. The suggestion is to get a number of moderately good English pigeons, take off their English rings and fit them with bogus Dutch rings as worn by birds recently captured. These birds should then be taken over to Holland and released from an aircraft without parachute. Even if this were done at night it is likely that the majority of these birds would, in time, from their wing-markings, be reported to the Wehrmacht authorities. Two possibilities follow. The German loft men if they did not investigate too closely the serial number of the ring, would take the bird in as one of theirs and if eventually this bird were given to an agent who was to operate from this country it would then most likely fly back to his English home in stead of its adopted Dutch one which is a longer flight. In this way we would stand a chance of intercepting a message which had been put on by an agent. Alternatively the German

pigeon men would eventually tumble to the idea that some of their birds were fakes and would be obliged to check all their pigeons, sort out the genuine ones and destroy the fakes. This quite possible might take a considerable time and bother and if it was done at the right psychological moment it might just throw them off their balance for sufficiently long to be extremely useful to us. The wings of the German pigeons are stamped Wehrmacht. We should have a similar stamp made. The question of re-welding the rings however presents certain but not insuperable difficulties. The Dutch serial numbers we hope to get from Dutch pigeon fanciers in this country.

January 28th

Tommy Harris came to see me with a toy Scotch terrier which is stuffed with correspondence from GARBO. This peculiar looking object will notionally be taken over by GARBO's courier.

I had a brief talk with Art Thurston and Joe Lynch his successor. Art is leaving on Sunday. We are giving him a lunch tomorrow at the Savoy.

I had a conference with David Boyle, Anthony and Courtenay.

CERVELL gives an account of his successful visit to the American Marauder station, and a letter of introduction to the new American Air Attache who he says is "very communicative". He speculates on invasion and gives a certain number of details about

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technical devices. We decided that this communication would have to go on. We thought however that CERVELL's removal would have to be seriously considered. It may be that we should defer any action about MAYCOCK until the decision about CERVELL has been made, since if we turn out CERVELL it may conveniently lead to the expulsion of MAYCOCK by the Swedes. C. has had a letter from his representative at Stockholm telling him about the indiscretions of POLLOCK about CERVELL to MAYCOCK. This was evidently what led MAYCOCK to write such a stupid letter to CERVELL warning him to be more discreet. C. will now ask the Air Ministry for a copy of this letter and take the whole matter up on a fairly high level. Meanwhile we are considering what can be done about BARTLETT the Sales Manager of Bristol Aircraft Co. He is notoriously indiscreet and we now know from our own sources that CERVELL regards him as his technical adviser on aircraft matters. It seems not unlikely therefore that he was the person who communicated the information from the Bristol Co. about the Orion engine. We are considering whether he should not be questioned by Cussen and Burt. The matter is however somewhat complicated as the evidence at the moment is by no means conclusive.

Lennox spoke to me about getting a ban placed on visits of all attaches into the area within the 15-mile belt. I mentioned it to Harry and we propose to put a note up to the JIC. It is essential that the Americans should come into this scheme and incidentally into any other

efforts of the kind. Otherwise they are apt to make nonsense of the precautions we are taking.

January 29th

I saw a photograph taken when H2S is in operation. H2S reflects all perpendicular objects, which come out in white. The smallest groups of buildings are shown up, and the shape of any particular town is easily identified.

Certain Americans have been rather boasting about the superiority of their night-fighter devices and induced Cunningham, our ace night fighter pilot to try them out on his machine. The result of this experiment was rather astonishing. Our own night fighters in the raid last Friday when some 90 odd came over brought down 14 and Cunningham brought down nothing. Two others were brought down by AA fire.

I took Dick's meeting. ISOS discloses that the S.D. in reporting from Rome on our dispositions said that they had no information either from reliable or Abwehr sources.

Herbert is still trying to follow up the BUNSEN case. There is now some suggestion that it may be purely notional, since Brandes the controlling officer is putting up a notional agent to H.Q. in order that he can stay in Lisbon and has also told Tricycle not to bring back any good information from this country as it will prolong the war.

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Both ISAK and B.J.s indicate that the Germans are firmly of opinion that HELMUTH's downfall was due to intrigues between the Abwehr and the S.D. in B.A. Herbert is strongly of opinion that we should these differences by the publication of as much of the information that we have from O20 as possible. Stewart Hampshire of OSS is also very keen on this. We are going to work this up.

Since the bomb explosion on a ship carrying oranges from Spain to this country there has been an increasing campaign against the Spanish Govt. These of course have been coupled with full dress protests to the F.O. The latest article relates to observation by German agents from Moroccan Spanish ports on ships passing through the straits.

We gave Thurston and Joe Lynch a B.Division farewell lunch at the Savoy which I think was appreciated.

Charles Cholmondeley came to see me about the case of COATALEN. This man is a French fighter pilot who was brought down over Occupied Territory but succeeded in evading and lying up with his relations from July 1942 to Aug. 1943. The circumstances were considered rather suspicious and although there was no definite evidence against him it was felt that on grounds of security he should be grounded. His French squadron-leader has now appealed against this decision. These cases are extremely difficult since if by any chance COATALEN was wrong and flew a plane to occupied territory between briefing day and D. day, the

consequences might be very serious. I have promised to review the case again. One of the points against COATALEN was that on his return here he had applied to join SOE. It now transpires that he heard of SOE through some fellow in the Air Ministry and that it was from that quarter that he received this advice.

January 30th

Genl Nordenskiöld, head of the Swedish Air Force, has told CERVELL that he has recently had a visit from MAYCOCK British Air Attache in Stockholm. MAYCOCK said that CERVELL was seeing much more of the English, so much so that there was some anxiety in case they might tell him too much. Nordenskiöld has therefore repeated his advice to CERVELL not to appear interested in any operational or strategical matters which are important for the British to keep secret, and which are of minor importance from the point of the development of Swedish air force. He has also intimated to CERVELL that although the Swedes are naturally curious to find out where our invasion is to take place, this is a matter of relatively little importance to Sweden, if it does not actually affect that country. He thinks therefore it is unnecessary for CERVELL to expose himself to suspicion by making enquiries on this point. His principal objectives should be the state and development in technique and tactics, and such matters as would appear reasonable to the British. This is of course a very proper attitude, but it may have been written with a purpose.

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January 31st

A.D.N.I. is heading a delegation to Washington. For 2 years an argument has been going on about the grading of reports. The main bone of contention is that the Americans refuse to have a "Most Secret" grade. They say that if a thing is secret ~~it~~ is secret and that any higher grade has no meaning. I gather that the main trouble in the Admiralty, with whom grading is a matter of considerable importance, is that the American arrangement completely upsets their filing system. Consequently after 2 years a delegation has to cross the Atlantic and waste 5 weeks of valuable time.

Peter Loxley is going to N. Africa at the end of this week, mainly to look into the whole set-up in the French Intelligence system, which is highly unsatisfactory.

As arranged with David Boyle on Sunday, we sent in our paper about CERVELL to the JIC today. We recommend that CERVELL should be removed but that if the consequences are considered too grave owing to his close association with Nordenskiöld, it was suggested that an officer of fairly high rank from the Air Ministry should go out to Stockholm, inform Nordenskiöld that it had come to our knowledge that CERVELL had been getting information of a secret kind from one of our firms and generally poking his nose too deeply into our affairs, that a

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prosecution of certain officials of the firm would probably ensue, that we hoped to keep CERVELL's name out of it but that we should have to insist in the future that no visits take place. This would apply to all attaches, military, naval or air. We have also suggested that the Americans should be brought into line on the highest possible level. The measures need cause no embarrassment to them since they could say that as attaches were accredited to the Court of St. James, and not to the U.S. Govt., it was for the British to place what restrictions they thought fit.

Foley and Drew-Brook came to see me and Milmo on the subject of Springbbbk. Drew-Brook feels rather under an obligation to the RCMP to relieve them of Springbock. We pointed out that we did not wish to be unhelpful in any way but that it would be extremely embarrassing for us to receive Springbock at this moment. All sorts of restrictions both of civil and military populations were being imposed on grounds of security. We could not very well leave Springbock at large, even if there was only a one percent chance that he was wrong, and he would undoubtedly cause comment, since troops were so thick on the ground that there was no place where he could be isolated. If we locked him up he would have a legitimate complaint owing to the conditions in which he has been working for the last 3 years and it is not unlikely that the H.O. might feel obliged to release him. I asked Drew-Brook to put this to Commissioner Wood and to explain that it was

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only on account of the tremendous importance of secrecy in connection with future operations that made it necessary for us to request him to keep Springbock for the time being.

I gave an undertaking that we would receive him here as soon as the crisis was over.

I went to see Archie Boyle this afternoon. I explained to him that Sitreps had shown that SOE were running fast motor-boats to Sweden for the purpose of ~~collecting~~ collecting ball-bearings, that

CERVELL had some sort of means for exporting certain parts of aircraft which he had obtained in this country, and that an agent of ours had reported that Florman of A.B. Transport was talking about secret means for the export of goods through Parry of the British and Northern Shipping Co. These 3 things seemed to link up.

Archie after talking to Wiskeman on the telephone told me that within the last 10 days an agreement had been reached between the Ministry of War Transport, Coleridge and Weston, and the Swedish Legation, by which the latter could export up to one ton of goods per ship on a charge of £400, sink or swim. This was the first that Archie had heard of the arrangement and he had no idea what security precautions were taken. He said he would be only too ready to assist in any way he could. The obtaining of ball bearings from Sweden was part of a general plan put up by SOE about a year or 13 months ago. They suggested that Schweinfurt and a factory near Paris making ball bearings should be put out of action but

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that before this was done they should pre-empt Swedish ball-bearings for 18 months ahead. They obtained from the Treasury for this purpose a grant of one million pounds, but they found it impossible to get Harris of Bomber Command to co-operate. Eventually they went to the Americans who bombed Schweinfurt with considerable effect. Harris said that Schweinfurt would be an extremely difficult target to find and, and had asked SOE to put in agents with beacons through Switzerland. This they had been unable to do. SOE have got out a considerable quantity of ball bearings and hope for a total amount of 500 tons during the winter months. They have only lost one MTB so far. The Germans are aware of what is going on and their boats are closely watched while in Gothenburg. The whole business is of course done with the connivance of the Swedes. The fact is also known to the Navy and to the Air Force who give air cover.

February 1st

I am told that SOE have information that Swedish firms are supplying machinery to Germany to replace that damaged in the Schweinfurt raid.

I attended the JIC meeting this morning, when our paper about CERVELL and another one about general restrictions on foreign attaches was heard. Cavendish-Bentinck was against any drastic action against CERVELL but favoured the plan of sending out an Air Force officer to see Nordenskiöld. D.N.I. was in favour of

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turning CERVELL out. Cavendish-Bentinck asked me whether I would be satisfied with the alternative project. I said that as long as CERVELL was here we could not say that there was adequate security. Whatever reprimand he might get it would be rather like instructing a journalist^{not} to report what he saw and heard to his editor. On the other hand I thoroughly understood the diplomatic difficulties and if the meeting felt they outweighed the extra security that would be gained by CERVELL's removal, the procedure suggested was obviously the next best thing. It was agreed that service attaches should be refused leave to visit within the 15-mile belt, and at Cavendish-Bentinck's suggestion the F.O. will be consulted about extending this ban to other neutral diplomats. The Americans are to be brought in line with this policy and also with the policy of closing down entirely on all visits to factories, aerodromes, dockyards, military camps etc.

The D.G. called a meeting of myself, Dick and Harry to discuss the position as regards the Second Front and our difficulties with SIS. It was agreed that we should seek the co-operation of the new M.G. Int. Whiteley, who has taken over from Jock Whiteford and that since the question of the Bureau was coming up before the J.I.C. for ratification we should then raise the point about the preparation of the information and the rear echelon. I pointed out to Harry that the J.I.C. was in some ways perhaps not the best forum for this discussion, since

nobody would know much about the question and C. would stress the necessity for the information to be prepared in his office owing to its great secrecy. Harry said that he would see that the D.M.I. was carefully briefed.

J.C. tells me that there is a warning out for Celery's arrest for embezzlement. Celery has apparently disappeared.

Findlater-Stewart's committee on the security of Overlord has decided that there is no insuperable objection to the imposition of a ban on travel between Gt. Britain and Ireland so far as the civil depts. are concerned, though it will probably be impossible to prevent some adverse effect on the supply of Irish labour. This opinion is subject to the following conditions: (a) that a similar ban is placed on service leave, (b) that no attempt is made to select Irish immigrant labour for special treatment, (c) that provision is made for Irish labour desirous of employment in Gt. Britain to have free entry, (d) that arrangements are made to prevent any interference with our cattle imports, (e) that special arrangements are made for members of the merchant service on which dock for a few days at ports in Gt. Britain or N. Ireland to visit their families anywhere in the U.K., (f) that it is made clear when the ban is announced that it is a temporary measure and is required for reasons of military security in connection with the launching of our offensive. If the ban is

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imposed it is recommended (1) that not more than 24 hours notice should be given but that provision should be made for exemption in the case of civilians who have already obtained exit permits, and all Irish workers who are due to take their prescribed holiday, to leave up to 10 days after the ban is put on. (2) the ban should not be imposed until Easter and not too long before the operation is due to start.

ISOS discloses that the Germans are getting hold of American uniforms.

Burt tells me that both HOYES and CHEOWN the Secretary of Cunliffe Owens, have been dismissed, and that the company is for sale. There is an overdraft of 1 million 3 hundred thousand pounds.

All B.5 officers are out on alleged sabotage cases in various parts of the country.

Instructions have gone out to SCOs that they are to disregard Ordres de Mission if the holder has come out of Occupied Territory since the total occupation of France. There were 12 cases of serious abuse of the ordres de mission the other day. A party of Frenchmen admitted that the ordres de mission were old ones. Obviously the whole system is quite meaningless.

Herbert lectured to the Americans, His notes are to be roneod and distributed to certain officers of G.2. I have read them and they

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contain nothing in the way of information that we could not have obtained from people at 020.

Dennis Page tells me that the information supplied to him about Garbo's code was of the utmost value. Before he received this code he was working entirely in the air and says that it is quite doubtful whether he would have ever got on to the right lines. Once he had the system he knew that all his energies were going in the right direction, and he was able to solve the code in about 5 months. It covers Huelva, Barcelona, San Sebastian, Cadiz, Melilla and a number of other stations.

February 2nd

At the weekly meeting Herbert mentioned that he had not been able to make any further progress with the case of BUNSEN. He had examined the cases of all Swedes but none of them fitted the facts. He was beginning to think that BUNSEN might well be notional.

Milmo mentioned that a P/W had been captured in Italy who had formerly been employed in the Abwehr registry in Berlin. He had already given information to the effect that JOHANSEN who was mixed up in an SOE case and was captain of a boat plying between this country and Norway, was a XX, and also GULBRAND) SEN. It is satisfactory to find that we had reached a similar conclusion and that this man had not mentioned anyone of whom we had no knowledge. Efforts are being made to get this P/W sent here for further interrogation.

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There is a proposal to extend the BOAC Air Service to Madrid. This presents a counter-sabotage problem on which Victor is making recommendations.

Jock Whyte has produced a story obtained from an American evader, Lt. Robert Grimes. This officer brought back a message from one "Lily" in Brussels. She wished to draw attention to Col. Kennedy who was connected with Intelligence or sabotage and who was said to be stationed in London. Lily did not know whether he was good or bad. She also mentioned a German in London whose name was given as van MURCK who was said to be connected with Col. Kennedy in some way and to be sending messages to Belgium by wireless. Grimes said further that van MURCK'S messaged opened with the words "On demande le cheval de bois". Grimes said he thought the messages were sent over around 9 pm as they were sent when the BBC news was on. He did not know the wavelength. He stated that he was merely conveying the message that had been given him and that he has no further details. The message was given in writing to Lily by the Chief in Brussels. Lily and the Chief are said to be known to Major Langley.

Victor rang up to say that he had just dismantled a bomb found in a case of onions at Kettering. This bomb consisted of a number of blocks of TNT and two German time clocks enclosed in plastic. Owing to some mechanical defect the clocks had stopped, but on getting a bump in course of transit from the docks

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one of them had re-started and would have gone off in 7 days. Meanwhile Hope has been ringing up from Newcastle. He says that the C.C. is slightly annoyed that he was never told about the explosions in the orange ships Stanhope and Haywood. He is worried about some 3,000 cases which are still on the quay and also about the remaining 7,000 cases which have been distributed throughout the UK down to retailers. He was thinking of communicating with H.O. in order that all these cases could be traced and ripped open. I told him to calm the C.C. down since we had reason to think that there would be no further explosions (ISOS had disclosed that there were 5 bombs. 3 went off on the Stanhope and one on the Haywood. The discovery of the 5th therefore accounted for them all). I told Hope that he could also tell the C.C. that the chances of any more bombs going off now was remote owing to the time factor, and that in any case the public had been warned in the Press and would doubtless report any suspicious circumstances to the police.

TAR tells me that Gen. Bedell-Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, has given Wild carte blanche for the formation of an "A" force for the Second Front. This seems to indicate that the deception unit which we shall be supplying with officers will be an entirely separate organisation with full establishment.

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Burt came to tell me that there had been a certain amount of trouble with S.B. over the AULD case. Canning had evidently complained to Kendal that this was a matter that ought to have been handled by S.B. It was decided to let S.B. serve the summons.

Walter Bell tells me that he lunched today with a Col. Carter of G.2. and Viv. Col. Carter produced out of his pocket the roneoed synopsis of Hart's lecture on the Abwehr. He said "I suppose this is being done by your people?" Viv. on looking at the document said that the course was being given by us although of course there was much in the document which pertained to the work of his organisation. I am rather expecting a cry that the production of this document constitutes a grave breach of security. In fact however there is not one single word in it which could not have been obtained from information which we have received from our own sources quite independently of ISOS.

We have an interesting S.D. case from the Middle East. A man who originally gave his name as Van der LINDE was apprehended. He finally confessed that he was a German named Hans MERZ, entrusted with a mission from the S.D. to establish contact with Poles in the Middle East. He is supposed to be coming from a Polish resistance organisation believed to be under German control. The probability is that in fact he was engaged to sow discord amongst the Poles and to undermine their confidence in their resistance organisations. He would also have hoped to penetrate other Polish

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resistance organisations.

Lennox has just come in with a minute from the P.M. who wishes to turn out all hostile Legations in Eire. This minute was handed by the P.M. to Ismay, from Ismay to the Chiefs of Staff, from the Chiefs of Staff to the JIC, the J.I.C. to the ISSB who handed it to Lennox who gave it to me. It reached me at 6.30 with a request for a full memo to be submitted to the JIC by 7. to be embodied in their paper to be discussed by the Chiefs of Staff at 10.30 tomorrow. The Chiefs of Staff were to advise the P.M who would deal with the question at the Cabinet meeting on Friday.

The PM began by saying that he was increasingly concerned by the danger of leakage to Overlord from the German and Jap Legations in Dublin. He did not appear to be aware of the removal of the German minister's wireless set or of his methods of communication, which are under control. In his view a demand should be made by ourselves and the US separately that the German and enemy legations should be sent away forthwith. If Dev.refused then we should ask that the legations should be searched for wireless, that wireless messages should no longer be allowed, and that we should if need be put a blockade on southern Ireland and prevent any vessel or aircraft leaving. He wanted to know whether this was possible. He felt sure we had a duty to the lives of our soldiers and we ought not to be behind hand when the US themselves were pressing in a

matter of this kind against the hostile gangs in Dublin. It seemed to him that the Americans must be supported in their demands for the expulsion of the hostile legations. The Chiefs of Staff were asked to prepare a paper (a) setting out the present position as regards enemy nationals, wireless and cyphers in Ireland, (b) evaluating the risk to the security of Overlord resulting from (a), and (c) putting up proposals as to what steps should be taken to eliminate the above risk, with particular reference to the PM's minute and suggestion that the Legations should be removed. In the absence of Cecil and most of the staff who had gone home, I got out a draft paper which I discussed with Capel-Dunn at the JIC. We jointly prepared a note for the JIC to hand to the Chiefs of Staff. We gave a statement of the position with regard to communications, emphasising that there was 5 or 6 days delay on anything that left Dublin and that the information was controlled; that the risk of leakage from Dublin was less serious than the possibilities of leakage from London through neutral embassies and that the closing down of the German legation would to a large extent leave us in the dark as to what information was going out and how. We should not be able to prevent the Germans from attempting to establishing other wireless channels which we might not detect, and we might lose the co-operation of the Eire authorities. Lastly we should lose the valuable deception channel through which we had already planted 4 messages.

February 3rd

Victor and I went to see Findlater-Stewart about the possibility of making some announcement to the press on the subject of bombs which might be found in cases of oranges and onions. This seemed necessary as all sorts of bodies, Home Guard, Police etc. were giving instructions that cases should be set aside.

This would mean that the goods would rot. Findlater-Stewart said that in a case of this sort you never quite knew whether in addition a large number of other bodies it might not even be necessary to consult the Archbishop of Canterbury. He thought however that a meeting should be called between ourselves, the MOI, MWT and Ministry of Food. I duly attended this meeting at 3.15. It was suggested that subject to confirmation by the Ministry of Food, whose representative did not feel quite sure of himself, we should say that 5 bombs have been traced to the Stanhope and Heywood, that in view of the lapse of time no further explosions were expected, and that 10 ships had since arrived without any untoward incident. If however anything suspicious was seen, it should be reported to the police. The public should be assured that the bombs were in the cases and not in the oranges or onions.

I lunched with Drew-Brook, the SIS man in Canada. He talked a lot about the rising French-Canadian population. The British population was now only 43% of the total population. French Canadians were not interested in either ourselves or the Americans.

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Fundamentally their view was that they had been the original occupants of Canada, and that they should govern the country. Drew-Brook thought that they would be well on the way to doing this if the British did not wake up to the fact. His idea was that in view of the tremendous Canadian effort in the industrial field, ship-building, armaments etc., the British should go in for a policy of industrialisation and should start up branch factories in Canada which would trade with South America and the East. He thought this would be better than an extensive emigration for agricultural purposes. He has discussed this matter with Lord Selbourne who he found slightly unsympathetic. Selbourne's view is that the Govt. could not very well take this up and it must be left to private enterprise. He is however going to think the matter over,

At 4.30 I attended a meeting with Victor at the JIC, where Cavendish-Bentinck wished to know how we assessed the risk of sabotage. Ismay had produced a paper showing that some 32,000 military police of one kind or another were employed on guarding places of importance. He thought this number was excessive. We said that even if there were no sabotage risk we did not feel that the numbers at present employed were more than adequate to maintain security against espionage, leakage of information and pilferage. As regards sabotage, we said that the risks by resident saboteurs were negligible but from D.30 up to D. day the chances of saboteurs being para-

chuted into this country could not be neglected. The number of targets which were suitable for attack by secret saboteurs and the destruction of which would have a significant effect on Overlord, was small. The Security Service had arranged to issue necessary instructions regarding counter-measures to those responsible for the security of the installations which are considered vulnerable and liable to attack from secret saboteurs. I said risks to Overlord from espionage, parachutists etc was a far graver matter than the risk from sabotage agents.

Brook-Booth and Furnival-Jones came to see me about over a thousand allied nationals at present in Stockholm whom the Americans wished to get over to train as airmen. They proposed to get these men over at the rate of about 175 a week by special Liberators. I said that for security they should all go through the LRC provided the LRC could handle them. We should like if possible to have advance information. I told Furnival-Jones to discuss the matter with Dick who would speak to Baxter.

February 4th

In "Justice of the Peace and Local government Review" of Jan. 15th 1944, there appears an extremely interesting article, entitled "Agent Provocateur". I am told that it was written by Lawson Walton of the D.P.P.'s office in consultation with the D.F.I. to set a trap for someone reasonably suspected of indulging in a course of criminal conduct which has been

has been approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal (R.W. Pickley 2 C LAR 53) and such conduct has been commended under para. 3 of the report of the Legal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure of March 16th 1929, where after an exhaustive review of the merits and demerits of such action the committee recommended "as an exception to the general rule participation in offences may be resorted to by the police in cases where there is good reason to believe that the offence is habitually committed in circumstances in which observation by a 3rd party is ex hypothesi impossible". Two essential elements are necessary to distinguish the conduct of an officer properly making an investigation into crime from that of an agent provocateur. Firstly the officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that the suspected person is habitually committing a certain class of crime. The test of the genuineness of this belief rests as in all cases in which a genuine belief is an essential element, upon the facts disclosed to the officer prior to his taking action. If his information is such that reasonable belief is justified then it is his duty to be prepared to participate in the crime in order to obtain evidence which would lead to the conviction of the offender. The agent provocateur however goes on less well-substantiated suspicion. He wishes to provoke crime and with this object in view will approach anyone whom he thinks will be a likely victim. The second essential element lies in the conduct

of the officer after he has contacted the suspect. It is essential that he "accepts the suspect's answer. He must not in the event of a refusal to participate in a criminal action hold out an inducement. He has sprung the trap and the trap has failed, and so far as that enquiry is concerned he must consider it concluded. There is no reason why at a later stage, if information is forthcoming that the offence is continuing, a further similar attempt to obtain evidence could not be attempted. The Agent Provocateur will, as the term implies, attempt to induce a suspect to commit a crime after his first refusal by holding out the hope of reward or other means. Such conduct could not be too severely condemned if it were adopted by a police officer or other investigating authority. The state of the officer's mind prior to contacting the suspect is a question of fact and can be proved by the information in his possession which induced him to adopt this particular line of enquiry. The offence must in all cases be such that detection by ordinary methods of outside observation is impossible."

I had frequent conversations with Jane and C. on the subject of a note giving the pros and cons in favour of the expulsion of hostile legations from Eire. It was thought desirable to have this short note for presentation to the P.M. if, as was expected, he wished to consult C. and the D.G. before meeting the Cabinet. As we received no such call before

1 pm I suggested to C. that he might like to send a copy of this note to the P.M., through Bridges or any other appropriate channel.

I had a talk with Anthony. I have asked him to look into the question of F.O. telegrams which has become of increasing importance in regard to affairs in the Mid East, particularly Palestine.

C. tells me that the P.M. has withdrawn all copies of the JIC memo on the expulsion of hostile legations from Dublin. He does not know the reason but is trying to find out.

February 5th

Canaris gave an order two days ago that there was to be no more sabotage in Spain until further notice. It seems therefore that our protest to the Spanish Govt. has borne fruit. Spain has clearly got rather nervous about her position and there is considerable comment in their newspapers about the American decision to cut off oil supplies. The F.O. are consequently getting a bit nervous and have refused to allow any announcement to be made in the press about the oranges and onions. The Ministry of Food are also against this as they made a rather premature announcement some time ago in which they said they had examined all the cases and found no explosives. In fact they did arrange for the Naval Bomb Disposal Squad to probe the cases but this was a totally inadequate way of discovering the bombs. The result is that Catalogue Reference: KV/4/193

know whether they should rip open the cases or put them aside for inspection. Information about the discovered bomb at Kettering is now fairly widespread.

I asked Caroe to find out from ZECH what he thought about the Katyn murders. ZECH was in the German Army when they marched into the parts of Poland which the Russians had occupied. He says that there is absolutely no doubt that when the German Army arrived the Poles welcomed them as liberators, despite the fact that the Poles have no love for the Germans. Their hatred of the Russians is considerable, and the latter had treated them during the months of occupation with great cruelty. ZECH gives as examples the large numbers of all classes of the population who were deported to European Russia, chiefly Archangel and Siberia for heavy labour. In Lemberg the population was made to parade in front of the Russians and show their hands. At Anyone whose hands indicated that they were unused to manual labour was deported. No one shown any consideration. He says this is a fact and not just rumour. The Russians also treated all P/Ws, especially Polish officers, shamefully. At the time when the Smolensk fell and when, according to ZECH, the officers were probaghy murdered, Sikorski was in Moscow and the Russian-Polish Treaty was being signed. Had the Russians taken these P/Ws with them when they retreated, they would have supplied Sikorski with plenty of evidence of Russian cruelty and ill-treatment, and would have

opposed a Russian-Polish alliance. On the other hand had the Russians let these officers fall alive into German hands, they would have run the risk of their being used by the Germans for propaganda purposes against the Russians. This might have prevented the treaty from being signed. ZECH is convinced that ^{had} these Polish P/W in anything like such numbers fallen into German hands he would have heard of them, and that they would have been shown to the Red Cross as evidence of Russian cruelty. The Germans were extremely keen to impress upon their soldiers the sort of treatment they could expect if they fell into Russian hands, so as to make them fight to the bitter end. When the Russo-Polish Treaty had been signed, the Russians flooded Poland with leaflets dropped from planes informing the population of the Treaty. The Germans were anxiously looking round for good propaganda and these officers would have been useful had they been available. He thinks that it is unlikely that the Germans would have captured the officers alive and murdered them at some later date, but he does not exclude the possibility that certain Polish P/Ws subsequently murdered by the Germans might have been put into the same graves. ZECH who of course is well disposed towards the Poles, is very anti-Bolshevik, but he is quite willing to admit that both the Gestapo and the S.S. would have been capable of executing large numbers of Polish P/W. In fact he knows they are guilty of worse crimes against the civilian population. His view of the whole incident is based on the fact that Polish officers were cruelly treated by the Russians

and as such, if captured alive, by the Germans, would have been of great value for propaganda purposes.

February 7th

Harry and I went over to the JIC in order to assist in the drafting of Cavendish-Bentinck's paper on sabotage risks in the U.K. Ismay has asked for this report in connection with the man-power situation. Harry stressed the point that the 32,000 police employed at various establishments had many other duties to perform which included such things as prevention of leakage of information due to an illicit entry, protection of secret trials and secret weapons which might give important information regarding future operations, unauthorised entry or departure from U.K. at certain points, interference with dispersed aircraft by small boys, police control within large establishments and lastly the prevention of large-scale pilferage. We agreed that the negligible scale of German sabotage in this country hitherto, the lack of evidence of sabotage plans, the apparent lack of suitably trained personnel and the great difficulties inherent in the infiltration of the necessary agents, led us to the conclusion that the risks of effective sabotage in the U.K. were so small as not to constitute a menace to the war effort. Such danger as there was must be anticipated mainly in the areas connected with the mounting of Overlord, where special precautions would be necessary at certain selected points.

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Brooman-White told me a few days ago that roughly a dozen spies have been caught in Italy by our patrols, either trying to land in small boats or coming through the lines.

We had a meeting here with Peter Reid, Wilson, his Signals Security officer, Maltby, M-E TAR, Kellar and Sclater, to discuss the Signals Security in Mid East. Peter told us that the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff calling all Allied Govts. to submit to the vetting of their cyphers and the adoption of our procedure was at present under discussion in Washington and likely to receive approval. When this has been done, there will be a joint Anglo-American request addressed to all Allied Govts. This should considerably improve the position. Meanwhile the letter written by Joe Stephenson in Mid East had at least disclosed that SIME, whose interest ~~was~~ in Signals Security was somewhat similar to our own, was very much in the dark. There seemed to be a number of sets transmitting and nobody quite knew whether they were authorised or not. Both Wilson and Peter delivered quite a sharp attack on Maltby, who what ever his merits may be, never fails to radiate dishonesty. C, accepts full responsibility for clandestine traffic by the Poles and Czechs and the position as regards Poles has recently been improved by a demand for their cyphers. This has been done on a high level in order that we can say to the Russians that we have knowledge of the communications of the Poles with their resistance organisations and that these organisations are not being used to operate Catalogue Reference: KV/4/193 that seems really

that RSS in the Mid East should work in closer co-operation with Signals 9 who are now responsible there for signals security. It would of course be ideal if there was some sort of unit responsible for keeping an eye on allied signals in Mid East. This should logically be done by Sigs.9 but they have so many other duties and such a big job in keeping their own signals in order that it is doubtful whether they are covering the allied ground as well.

Wilson seemed very venomous against C. He was anxious to know exactly where all the trouble lay and what the relations were between SIME and SIS and ourselves and SIS. I explained the position as best I could, and pointed out that although we are ultimately responsible for leakage of information in this country, we have no control over the machinery. We can only draw attention to a state of affairs on the basis of information received. We had in fact done this on information obtained from two Abwehr officers. SIME were in very much the same position as ourselves.

I had a meeting with Dick, Hale, Cheney, Baxter and Milmo to discuss Milmo's report expressing anxiety about doubtful characters passing through the LRC. My attention was drawn to the case of NEUKERMANS and also to that of FRESSAY. The former had a good cover story and was extremely skilful under cross-examination. He was later denounced by WYCKAERT and brought back. He has since confessed not only that he got his secret ink through the LRC and communicated with the Germans but that he

had other means of communication if all others broke down, i.e. transmitting from an aircraft in flight. NEUKERMANS is a Belgian and a trained pilot. The case of FRESSAY is equally serious. He was being run by the French in conjunction with ourselves as a D.A. and was sleeping with a woman working for Vaudreuil of the French 2eme Bureau. It was decided that Milmo and I should see Maxwell and seek his co-operation in asking the F.O. to support us in refusing admission to aliens abroad during the next 3 or 4 months. If he agrees to this we can put up a paper showing proposals for the diversion of Belgians to the Congo, Frenchmen to N. Africa, Poles and as many other nationals as possible to Mid East. This would be handled by an F.O. note to each of the allied governments in question. If the H.O. did not come into line on this we should have to impress upon them the necessity for locking up all doubtful cases which may amount to something like 100 a month.

I spoke to Sir John Stephenson at the D.O. about the P.M.'s proposal that the Eire Govt. should turn out the hostile legations in Dublin and I have also seen Cecil who has just returned from Eire. The history of this matter is rather a long one. The wife of David Grey, the American Minister in Dublin, is the aunt of the President's wife. Some months ago Grey drafted a rather stupid letter to Dev. in which he advocated that we should have the use of ports and airfields in Eire. He showed this to the President when on a visit to the White House which took place during the

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PM's visit to the States. The letter had by that time been considerably watered down by the State Dept. The PM sent a copy of it to the Cabinet and said that he would like to discuss it on his return. He subsequently had a considerable battle with Cranbourne who put forward the very sound argument that Dev might make it a condition of such a concession that we should agree to a union between north and south. We should then, if we refused, be open to pressure by the Americans because we were standing in the way of their plan, which they argued was in the general interest of allied security and the war effort. Cranbourne's view eventually prevailed, much to the annoyance of David Grey who then set his mind to getting the hostile legations kicked out of Dublin. The PM therefore feels himself in a rather weak position vis-a-vis the USA and is anxious to meet their wishes. He considered the JIC paper compiled by Capel-Dunne and myself. Although it caused him a certain amount of irritation he eventually agreed that the project could not be pressed on security grounds. The paper I think makes it fairly clear that security might well be better served by leaving the hostile legations where they are. It has however been decided to allow the Americans to proceed on their own. Later we shall say that we concurred. Nobody expects for one moment that Dev will agree but the Americans will make political capital out of the incident since they will be able to say that they did everything they could to safeguard the lives of their citizens in forthcoming operations but that the Eire Govt. refused to listen

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This may have a considerable effect on the Irish vote in the forthcoming presidential elections.

Meanwhile Cecil had conversations in Dublin with Mackenna the Chief of Staff and also with Liam Archer. It has been discovered that the passports of the two Irish parachutists O'REILLY and KENNY bear a forged visa and signature purporting to be those of the Eire Legation in Berlin. These documents seem to constitute a serious indictment against the German Govt. and Liam Archer thinks that they could be used with considerable force in a demand for the removal of the Legation, and the severance of diplomatic relations. Cecil thinks that if the matter were properly approached it might be possible to get the Eire authorities to take the action required by the Americans on their own. In one way this might be good but if we feel that security is better served by leaving the legations in Dublin the present suggestion of an approach by the Americans, which is almost certain to meet with refusal, would perhaps be the better one. Personally I think it would be disastrous if the Eire Govt. broke off their relations at our instigation since they would then come to us and ask for armaments, for their protection. These armaments would then probably after the war be used against us in a battle between north and south.

The D.G. showed me a minute from the PM to Lindlater Stewart in which he says that he is not convinced about the necessity for the

creation of a 15-mile belt and a visitors ban. He argues rather loosely that such a ban can only be justified on security grounds which he considers to be very slender. He thinks that there is as much to be feared from the residents ~~from~~ from the visitors. He does not believe in the dangers of dislocation through bombardment and in the ensuing traffic congestion. He wants to have a list of special points in the 15 mile belt area entry to which in the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff would constitute a real menace. What he does not understand of course is that if the area is thickly populated with holiday-makers, the spy is unlikely to stand out. Clearly residents are known to each other and to the police and with a visitors ban the spy might well be detected by either. There is also the point that if we knew that an undesirable person was going down to the area, we should have no means of preventing the visit. Lastly if visits within the 15 mile belt are to be allowed there is a greater chance that details about impending operations will reach neutral attaches.

February 8th

I had a talk with Grogan and Anthony about the staggering of diplomatic cables prior to Overlord. Censorship have put forward a suggestion that diplomatic missions here should be informed that on a date to be specified their telegrams will be subject to 3 or 4 days delay.

Each mission would be given to understand that there were certain other missions which might be sending out operational information but that they of course were in no way suspect from that point of view. The alternative method which is the one we prefer is to gradually increase delays up to the time of Overlord on grounds of shortage of staff. These grounds would only be given if we were challenged, it would not be possible to plead that the lines were congested since the operators at the other end would know that this was false. Grogan is going to get Herbert's approval of our proposals and we will then have a meeting with Censorship, David Boyle and G.C & C.S. since the latter will be asked to organise press services during the last 2-3 weeks. During that period we should be sending out nothing that had not been read except on lines which could not be dealt with. This latter category unfortunately includes two of the most dangerous, namely the Swedish and Spanish.

At the D.G.s meeting I explained the line we are proposing to take with Sir A. Maxwell about a wider interpretation of 12(5)a and the diversion of as many allied nationals to the Belgian Congo and Mid East as possible.

On 5.2.44 the information re CROSSBOW was as follows: 97 sites have been found by air photograph and the total number is not likely to be more than 120. It has not been possible to deduce any consistent repair policy from photographs of bombed sites but it appears that some sites are repaired together and that an

average of about 10 days is needed for organisation of repair work before repair and reconstruction work begins. Craters on bomb sites are often deliberately left unfilled in order to create the impression that a site has been abandoned. It is thought unlikely that the Germans will launch CROSSBOW during the next 4 weeks. The absence of small gauge railway installations near ski-sites led to the conclusion that an organisation existed for receiving supplies by rail and subsequently delivering them by road to the operational sites. Photograph interpretations now disclose the existence of certain sites which have certain common features suitable for use as supply-sites. Each of the supply sites comprises a number of standardised buildings together with other buildings of various patterns consisting of pre-cast concrete blocks. They are all heavily defended by flak. The farthest advanced of these supply sites is at Valognes in the Cherbourg peninsula.

As regards the pilotless aircraft, it appears that the Germans have not yet succeeded in getting everything to work correctly at the same time. If the main features of the missile that have each functioned well independently were to work together at the same time, the resulting performance would cause 40% of the number launched to land in an area equivalent to greater London. The Germans may shortly be able to achieve this combined performance in their trials. Operational performance of a comparable standard would presumably take longer. They must of course ~~depend~~ depend on the efficacy or otherwise

of our bombing of the sites. A particularly large site is in process of construction at Wizernes, and is heavily defended by flak. Photographs taken on Jan. 21st show that the construction of the circular emplacement is still at an early stage and could not be greatly damaged by bombing.

February 9th

Milmo and I went to see Maxwell and suggested to him that we should jointly approach the F.O. with a view to their preventing as many allied nationals as possible from coming to this country during the next few months. We also asked for a wider interpretation of 12(5)a which would enable us to lock up anything up to 100 a month unsatisfactory cases. We undertook to review these cases at about D plus 30. Maxwell was extremely sympathetic. He said that he would write to Cadogan and suggest a meeting between the F.O., Moylan and ourselves. He seemed amenable to the suggestion that 12(5)a should be more widely used for unsatisfactory cases. We explained to him in some detail of our anxieties due to the case of NEUKERMANS, and I think he was impressed with the importance of the whole matter.

At the weekly meeting today Hart mentioned the case of the seamen William HEAP, who had offered his services to the Germans, and had been put in a Spanish prison. HEAP has now been brought back to this country, but has so far not come clean. He is a poor type aged about 19.

Hart also mentioned the case which was being investigated by Seeds. It concerns a BOAC pilot who has been carrying letters for a woman at Hythe to her sister in Lisbon. Her sister is of Irish extraction, married to a Portuguese, and anti-British. Though there is not necessarily anything particularly sinister in this case it does show that pilots carry letters. I have suggested to D.4 that they should look into this matter and see what can be done about snap-searches both of aircraft and crews. This would at least act as a deterrent. Another interesting feature of the case is that the Portuguese husband is interested in the purchase of coffee and its resale to Germany. Coffee is one of Fidrmuc's main interests and Fidrmuc frequently renders reports which he says he gets from a BOAC pilot. Fidrmuc is just leaving for Barcelona and has been given the Iron Cross, presumably as a reward for the volumes of inaccurate information that he has been supplying to the Abwehr. He is of course a protege of Canaris.

Milmo raised a rather grave issue re Censorship as disclosed by the case of NEUKERMANS, who sent out two letters to a cover address which was on the I.B. list. It was thought by some that at anyrate the addresses on the I.B. list which are covered from our own sources might be included in the Security List without very much danger. The I.B. list is to be scrutinised from this point of view when we would have a further discussion with Grogan, Milmo and TAR.

Jock Whyte referred to the case of an escaped prisoner called BERTRAM on whom certain doubts have been thrown by other returned P/Ws. I am extremely uneasy about the present arrangements for the interrogation of escapees and evaders, and have spoken again to Milmo. His memo on this subject had been held up pending certain examples which were to be supplied by Jock. I think there is sufficient data to go ahead with M.I.9 without these examples and I propose to get Cockatt over and discuss the whole question. It is of course quite insane that M.I.9's activities and those of SIS and SOE are not fully known to the LRC, and that the LRC is not regarded as the servant of all those organisations. The LRC should have the fullest possible particulars about escape routes and about conditions in occupied territory. They would then be in a far better position to detect spies and also to protect the offensive organisations.

Charles tells me that the D G. is upset about the memo which I gave him showing our present and future commitments with regard to the Second Front. I have in fact told him about all these things but he has presumably forgotten. He is particularly worried about our offer of 6 interrogators from the LRC but he evidently does not understand that they will in effect be a kind of LRC advance guard and take off work from the LRC in the same way that the RSLOs took off work from the central office in 1940-41.

The D.G. saw myself, Dick, MacIver, TAR and Charles Butler firstly on the subject of Dykes and D'Arcy Irvine. He agreed to Dykes coming to B.IA provided MacIver found that the Regional Commissioners concerned did not object. It was proposed that Glover should supervise both the Notts and Birmingham regions. As regards D'Arcy Irvine, the D.G. was agreeable to his being taken on. TAR however said that the prospects of getting him were not very bright. The D.G. then considered my note to him setting out our present and future commitments for COSSAC. He had the impression that without prior consultation with himself we had been taking on commitments which might seriously impair the efficiency of the office, and it was clearly no good trying to explain to him that all these matters had been the subject of discussion which he had evidently forgotten. He was particularly worried about the suggestion about the 6 interrogators from LRC. Dick and I pointed out that these officers would be a sort of advance guard for the LRC and in that sense would be taking work off the Lrc. The D.G. was not inclined to accept this view and said he would like to see Baxter. We have of course consulted Baxter intimately on the whole problem.

February 10th

Cheney came to see me about the project of sending about 2,000 Norwegians to this country from Stockholm. These people were to join the

Norwegian forces and the Norwegian Merchant Navy. I spoke to Maxwell as this proposal

Catalogue Reference KV/4/193 the suggestions we

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had been making yesterday about stopping as many allied nationals from coming to this country as possible, until after Overlord had been launched. He had not heard of the suggestion which I think had originally been made by the Norwegians to the Americans, who had agreed to bring these people here in Liberators. He said that he would take the matter up at once. I also got the D.G. to write to Cadogan.

Geoffrey Wethered told me about the case of an SOE man called GILBERT, a Frenchman who has been running a reception committee for SOE agents in France. He has been denounced as an enemy agent from 3 different sources. It is however extremely difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion since either the material witnesses are not here or GILBERT cannot on grounds of security be interrogated on the basis of their evidence. GILBERT is at present the only channel through which SOE can put agents into France. They are therefore anxious if possible to send him back.

I had a word with the DMI about ISPAL. Maunsell wants to bring Kirk, Hunloke and the GOCFAL-estine into the picture. DMI agreed subject to C's approval.

I am told that the enquiry into the affairs of SOE eventually reached Cabinet level, where an unfavourable view was taken. The PM however on his return from N. Africa sent for Selbourne and gave orders that the dropping of agents was to continue.

Harry came to talk to me about the JIC paper on sabotage risks. I have suggested certain amendments since there were statements which if challenged could not be substantiated. Altogether the report is I think rather an unsatisfactory one.

D.P.F. has turned down the prosecution of LALOU

Ned Reid has netted another £100,000 for the treasury.

I had dinner with Lemon, TAR and Anthony. Lemon strikes me as bring quite bright and intelligent. She has certainly done us very well.

ISOS shows the demand by Berlin from Italy to supply British and American uniforms. These may be required for agents, saboteurs or commando troops.

February 11th

I had rather a blow-up with the D.G. this morning. He wanted to discuss with me Stopford's I.B. draft for the Channel Islands.

He began by saying that he thought that Stopford's section seemed to be spreading itself all over the office. I said that Stopford's section had been primarily conceived for the purpose of running seamen agents to foreign ports for the purpose of penetrating any German organisation employed in running seamen agents and getting control of that side of the German I.S. subsequently he had had included in his charter the penetration

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of fast air lines to the continent. It was true that his work had somewhat declined as regards the seamen agents. At the same time he had a number of useful contacts, in particular two agents, the only two we had who were in contact with the Japs in Lisbon. He had however been doing valuable work with the Swedish Air Lines.

The D.G. then drew attention to the fact that obviously Stopford's report had entailed an immense amount of careful work and rather implied that if he had time to do that he could not be doing his other job. I pointed out that before he took on the Channel Islands job I had obtained the D.G.'s sanction, that I had chosen Stopford to do the work as he had had previous experience in the Azores, and that if he was going to provide the brief obviously he would have to do the spade work himself, particularly if he became the I.B. officer in charge. At this stage I really rather lost my temper. I said that if I could not be trusted to make use of the officers in my division to the best advantage it would be better if the D.G. got someone else to do the job. He then said that he had not known anything about the commitments for the I.B. front that we had discussed on the previous day. I said that I had at one time or another discussed them all with him, that T&R and I had explained the whole position as regards his deception unit and that all I was trying to do was to carry out to the best of my ability the commitments of this office which were laid