




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down in the War Book and in our letter to DMI. The D.G. then rather calmed down and said that I must not resent criticism, and that he did not wish to become like Felix Cowgill, head of an organisation of whose workings he was unaware. We then passed on to other things.

Both Dick Butler and Charles, after some difficulty, have got the D.G. to agree to letting Charles, myself, Horrocks and Dick White form a small committee for considering the post-war organisation. The committee is to be entirely informal and we shall let the D.G. know the result of our deliberations in due course.

John Senter came to see me about the vetting of their officers who go into the field. He said that Archie Boyle would undertake to scrutinise every case very carefully from our point of view, and that wherever there was a doubt as to whether an SOE agent going into the field had too much knowledge of any depts. work, he would refer the case to us. Senter then discussed the case of GILBERT.



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Foulkes came to see me before leaving for N. Africa, where he is going going as an interrogator. He has done very well at the LRC.

The DMI rang up to tell me that he now had misgivings about ISPAL material being sent to Hunloke in view of the suggestion that he had a Jewish mistress. He wanted me to consult C. I saw C. later in the evening. He said that until the question of the Jewish mistress was cleared up he did not wish Hunloke to have access to ISPAL. I said that it would be necessary for me to inform Maunsell that there were allegations against Hunloke, and that meanwhile he would have to be kept out of the picture. I sent a clear the line telegram off the same day.

I showed C. a draft letter to Cadogan about the Polish general KUKEIL who according to Orange is in touch with the Germans on the subject of Polish resistance movements. Some negotiations are apparently going on through Red Cross channels. C. was interested in this as he had certain confirmation about the Red Cross. He

thought the moment was right to send the

letter to Cadogan and asked me to let him have a copy.

Admiral Dunbar-Nasmith, V.C. has seriously blotted his copybook. He summoned a meeting of some 50 ship-builders, gave them a pep talk and said that he would be wanting their services for repair work in connection with Second Front operations. He was then asked when these services would be required. He replied "Between you and me it will be somewhere around May 1st". This disclosure was evidently a little too much for one of the ship-builders, who reported the facts to the SCO at Lowestoft, who passed it on to us. I believe the Admiral is to receive a loganberry from their Lordships.

C. told me that the P.M. tackled him about the Irish question which arose some days ago, and accused him of putting a spoke in his wheel. C. replied that he was only concerned with the diplomatic cable side of the business, not with the security angle. This rather confirms that the P.M. was considerably irritated by the memo prepared by me and Capel-Dunn.

At the time Stewart was with him the P.M. was discussing the visitors ban with Pug Ismay. Ismay tried to reason with him. He said that at present the Americans ~~and~~ had their mistresses down at Brighton. The P.M. replied "A jolly good thing. Very good for them both". It is obviously going to be very difficult to convince the P.M. of the necessity of the ban.

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Gen. Grasset rang me up this evening about our proposal to restrict the entry here of enrolled and unenrolled allies who came from Lisbon, Gib. and N. Africa. I explained to him our point of view. He said there were difficulties. but he was generally sympathetic. He hoped that if there was a meeting on the subject he would have an opportunity for airing his views. I assured him that this would be so.

The P.M. has put his gold and diamond pen through the visitors ban suggestion. There was a stormy meeting at which the CIGS began by saying "Prime Minister, I am not asking for this - I am demanding it". It was not long before he discovered that he was demanding in vain. The P.M. was about to turn the whole thing down when the usual suggestion was made that a committee should be formed to look into the whole question of the security of Overlord. The committee is to consist of the Minister of Production, Minister of Aircraft Production, Home Secretary and Duncan Sandys, none of whom of course know anything about security. It is to consider (1) the possibility of withdrawing for the time being from foreign diplomatic representatives the right to transmit any communications other than those censored by British authorities or to leave the country after a certain date. (2) the prevention of the export of newspapers, (3) more strengthened surveillance of ships and aircraft leaving Gt. Britain or Ireland and complete prevention of all contacts with enemy or neutral countries.

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ries and (4) the detection of secret enemy wireless apparatus and increased precautions against espionage. The effect of the visitors ban in giving increased security is to be re-examined in the light of the report on the 4 questions enumerated above. Findlater Stewart is to assist in the collection of material for this report.

February 12th

The D.G. buried the hatchet this morning after our meeting yesterday. He asked about the security of the air lines to Lisbon. I said that we were ~~fairly~~ happy about them but there were nevertheless obvious opportunities. We had in fact had a case of a woman in Hythe giving a letter to a BOAC pilot to take to her sister in Lisbon whose husband was a Portuguese trading with the enemy.

"Eathered has seen GILBERT who does not on the whole make a bad impression. It is however impossible to get at the truth and we cannot but recommend that he should not again be sent into the field.

Grogan came to tell me that the MOI had for some unknown reason refused to give us access to press reports sent out by foreign journalists, unless we could first prove to them that there was a real security reason.

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The D G. held a meeting on Overlord Security

The D.G. has written a general preamble outlining the work of the office which he proposes to hand to Findlater Stewart.

February 14th

Maunsell has come back with a somewhat petulant telegram about Huntoke. I read this over to DMI. He suggested that we should have a meeting later with C.

Sniper received a wireless communication about the 10th Feb. but reception was poor. Brutus is still trying to persuade the Germans to send him a new wireless set and if possible a new photographic apparatus. The possibilities of dropping material in France are also being considered.

According to Artist, HANSEN, head of Abt. I has been very favourably impressed by Tricycle's last report. Great efforts are expected from him. Lisbon has instructed the station which is to receive Freak's transmissions to use their very best operators and take every care because news of the highest military importance is expected through this channel. Artist has stated that 3 people, none of them agents, are to be sent out through Tricycle's escape route when he returns to Lisbon at the end of the month. Again according to Artist, the Germans want Tricycle to be back by Feb. 20th, which is

earlier than what was previously arranged. Plans are being made for Peach to leave for Lisbon in the course of the next few days with a certain amount of traffic which should establish him in the eyes of the Japs as a competent agent.

Hitler and Ribbentrop have been trying to explain away the present position of Germany to the Japs. They pretend not to view the prospect of the Second Front with any grave alarm. They make out that it is only being undertaken by us on account of Russian pressure and that it will not be a very big affair. They think that they will be able to deal with it effectively. Such an operation was not possible on a large scale in the near future and would probably take place in June; small scale operations were possible at any time, and would probably be carried out before that time. The possibilities of peace with Russia were remote. The interpretation of the reports of meetings between Ribbentrop and the British which appeared in Pravda were merely a Soviet manoeuvre towards getting a Second Front started, Hitler and Ribbentrop believe that Turkey is trying to keep out of the war but pressure on her from the British and Americans was strong. Britain and America wanted to use Turkey as an air base and had demanded permission for bombers to make use of Turkish aerodromes and Turkey had refused and equipped her aerodromes with machine-guns. Thereupon Britain and America had sent experts to Turkey by way of assisting

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the Turkish Air Force. Turkey had finally agreed to let a small number of such personnel enter the country. Meanwhile Turkey was employing delaying tactics in giving out that she could not enter a war without certain munitions which Britain and America could not easily supply. Germany did not feel particularly anxious about Bulgaria and Roumania. Ribbentrop intimated that when Rome had been occupied the Germans had obtained possession of a great many Italian diplomatic papers and that these showed that Ciano had got together proof that he had from the first been opposed to participation in the war and had thus prepared for Italy's defection. What was particularly disgraceful was that Ciano had falsified accounts of what had passed at discussions with the Germans. Hitler attributed Germany's present position to the failure of the Italians. He blamed the Italian Navy for not giving sufficiently active support in the maintenance of the Tunis bridgehead. This led to the landings in Sicily and to the collapse of Italy. Hitler had originally intended defending the line of the Appenines but owing to the bungling strategy of the British and Americans he had been able to hold the south Italian front which had been intended to be a temporary one.

The number of divisions sent as reinforcements to Italy and the Balkans had reached 35. These divisions had been pledged to the Eastern front. However it had been necessary to make

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increased preparations in the West. He had had to make up his mind to give ground in the east to avoid jeopardising the western front in any way. The war on the eastern front would be continued on this principle. He might order withdrawal from the northern sector or from the Dnieper salient. He announced that there would be no break-down and if the opportunity presented itself he intended to go over to the offensive in the west. He had 7 divisions in Finland, 12 in Norway, 6 in Denmark, and 62 in France including Belgium and Holland, of which 30 were mobile reserve divisions. Included also were 4 S.S. divisions and the Hermann Goering Division. All the other divisions could not be described as first class. He had a long coast line to defend and it would be impossible to repel any and every landing at the water's edge. It was his intention to prevent any enlargement of the bridgehead or the establishment of a Second Front in the true sense. When asked whether he knew where the landing operations would be carried out he replied that he had to confess that he did not. He thought the most effective place would be the English channel but immense preparation would be required for that and the difficulties would be very great. He thought therefore that they would have a better chance in going for the relatively weakly-defended coast round Bordeaux or somewhere in Portugal. He had made preparations to meet the possible eventuality of a Portuguese landing, but he wanted this matter kept strictly secret. He did not expect any reference to Spain, but took a

very poor view of Franco. Referring to the reprisals against Britain Hitler said these would be carried out chiefly by means of rocket guns. Preparations were nearly complete and experiments had shown that they were highly successful. They were effective as far as a line drawn east and west in the vicinity of Birmingham. He would not say when the bombardment would begin but thought that the rockets would have considerable success against the mainland of Britain. Besides this bombers had been got ready and had begun their raids on London. By all the above measures he hoped eventually to regain the offensive. Hitler was worried about the activities of the partisans in the Balkans. Things were not going too well. Equally his submarine campaign had not been particularly successful. He hoped to improve matters by magnetic torpedoes, by increasing the speed of submarines and by providing additional A.A. guns.

The D.G. held a meeting to discuss our paper on Overlord. It was decided that I, Dick Butler and Harry Allen should represent the office at Findlater Stewart's Committee. In the afternoon the H.O. had a meeting to discuss the P.M.'s paper. I was asked to attend at the 11th hour, apparently on the assumption that our views would be incorporated in the H.O. paper. Newsam was I think rather surprised to find that we were putting in a separate paper. We then discussed the merits or the ban. My suggestion about hotel and boarding house keepers being allowed to

demand Identity Cards was quite sympathetic -ly received by Newsam. On the whole the H.O. gave the impression of feeling that they are fighting a losing battle.

February 15th

Milmo and I attended a meeting at the H.O. with Maxwell in the chair. Others present were Gen. Grasset, Col. Carlisle, Major Dru, 3 representatives of the Air Ministry and a representative of the F.O. We put forward the suggestion backed by the H.O. that as many refugees coming here either as refugees or for the purpose of joining the allied forces should be diverted to N. Africa. The F.O. undertook to make enquiries as to whether the French could be induced to accept these people. We also asked whether embodied troops could be kept from coming here as reinforcements. The Air Ministry said that the various integrated allied squadrons did need replacements due to casualties, but that there probably we're enough over here already to last for 2 or 3 months. They did not however wish to have a gap in their training programme if this could be avoided. As regards airborne troops, Gen. Grasset gave the rather alarming news that it was proposed to put one Frenchman into every stick of airborne troops dropped. This means of course that these Frenchmen would have to be briefed some time before the operation and would at least know something about the target which they were destined to attack. In these circumstances they become definite security risks and should

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as far as possible be vetted. The men however we fear most were the trained pilots, this in view of the fact that assignments had been given to a number of agents to pick up a plane and fly it back to occupied territory. We had been concentrating particularly on people who had left occupied territory after the total occupation. There was no one to speak as regards naval requirements but I gather that the Navy will not allow Frenchmen who come out of occupied territory to go to the LRC.

The meeting broke up on the understanding that the F.O. representative would find out the reactions of the French in N.Africa to the suggested acceptance by them of refugees from Lisbon and Gib., and that the W.O. and Air Ministry would look into the whole question of reinforcements and see what they could do to cut down their requirements during the next 6 months.

After the meeting Milmo and I had a discussion with Maxwell about a wider interpretation of 12(5a) to cover the more dubious LRC cases. Anyone in this category is first to go to the I.O.M. and the applications we put in will make it clear that we are only asking for a temporary precaution until about D plus 30 when cases can be reviewed. Maxwell agreed to the procedure suggested and is quite prepared to see it made retrospective if we have any strong cases where people have already been released from allied forces and are still active.

J.C. and Ronnie Reed came in to tell me about Catalogue Reference KV/4193. I want him to go back to

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Lisbon and this view is supported by SIS. The argument is that the Germans are already looking for [redacted] and his mother and that if he were taken he might be forced to talk, and possibly to compromise Artist, although in fact he can have only a suspicion that Artist may be working for us. He knows that Artist offered his services but thought they were turned down. I cannot help feeling that this case has been rather mishandled. There have been endless delays through [redacted] in Lisbon not getting into touch with Artist. Personally I think it is a pity that [redacted] does not go back. He can only be an embarrassment to us here as we cannot give him anything to do.

The Press announces that Charles BEDAUX, on being informed that a Grand Jury was to investigate whether a charge lay against him under the U.S. espionage laws, committed suicide at Miami.

I dined with Walter Bell, Hoare and Col. Carter of G. 2, who was formerly in Panama and took an active part in what was known as the GOUGH case. He was quite frank about the amateur way in which the whole thing had been handled, and fully realises that the more Phillips Oppenheim and promising a case looks at the outset, the less likely is there to be anything in it.

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February 16th

At the weekly meeting Dick made a statement about the forthcoming amalgamation of the B.1 Inf. and B.1 Reg. A compromise has been reached with Horrocks and files will be made for all the leading personalities in the Abwehr. The registry is designed so as to give a maximum amount of intelligence to a look-up and in fact to a certain extent approximates to the system that we had before the war. We do not wish to make the system too rigid and it was explained to all present that they should bring to notice immediately any cases where they thought they were not getting proper service. In this way we hoped to create the best possible form of registry to meet our needs.

ISOS this week shows that as a result of the announcement of Erich VERMEHREN's defection to the allied side (he was employed at Ankara) the Abwehr and S.D. have been called upon to investigate possible ramifications of the case in Lisbon, where VERMERHEN's mother Petra, the journalist, has been living. She is a member of the German I.S. and has been interviewed by the local S.D. She has left by air presumably for Germany.

Arising out of this, the German I.S. had been warned by Portuguese contacts that their activities have been betrayed to the Allies by a British agent in Berlin who is said by them to have access to German I.S. correspondence and by a Roumanian in Lisbon named BACONULE. The LK 14/193 had previously worked

in the German I.S. and according to the Portuguese contact had been responsible for recent leakages to the Allies about Canaris's movements and about the activities of Hans BRANDES.

The S.D. in Lisbon are being sent instructions to report on allied invasion plans and on the progress of negotiations between Spain and Portugal on the one hand and the U.K. and U.S.A. on the other.

The Einz Marine agent EASTLER previously mentioned, who was thought possibly to be identical with a Spaniard named de GONDRA, now appears to be a Frenchman. It seems unlikely that he ever came to this country and probable that he went to N. Africa where he appears to have been accepted in Algiers as a French reserve officer. He is expected to return to Madrid on a permit granted by the National Committee of Liberation on about the 15th February.

The usual flow of inaccurate reports alleged to be coming from this country continues.

Milmo talked about the case of ABEN who seems to be an S.D. penetration agent.

Grogan mentioned that arrangements are in train for transferring the I.B. list to the C.S.L.

Brock had a good story which I gather has some foundation in fact, of an SOE officer of Right Wing tendencies, who was induced through a

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member of some Greek resistance movement to meet the Mayor of Athens who asked him if he would collaborate with the Germans in suppressing the communists. He apparently agreed, and a meeting was arranged at which representatives of SOE and the Gestapo were present, armed with Tommy-guns. The SOE officer eventually flew back to Cairo in order to obtain instructions. History does not relate the sequel to this fantastic story.

I had a meeting with DMI, C. and Brig. Kirkman about Hunloke. DMI asked me to correct my telegram to Maunsell where I had referred to "allegations" made by the W.O. to the effect that Hunloke had a Jewish mistress. He thought the word "allegations" was a little too strong. Apparently there are only rumours brought back from Mid East by 3 officers. Personally I cannot see the difference between rumours which lead to the withholding by high officials of the W.O. of information from a security officer which he needs in order to perform his work, and "allegations". I said that I thought it was essential that the matter should be cleared up or that Hunloke should be removed. D.M.I. said he was worried about the information reaching a wider circle and thought that some telegram might be sent from Padgett through the W.O. rather than through Maunsell and ourselves. Meanwhile he thought I should telegraph to Maunsell and ask what arrangements would be made for the reception of the information and for its safe custody. I said that I had no jurisdiction over Maunsell and that since he was under the

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It was rather an ordeal but everybody made very kind speeches. Most people were fairly tight, in particular Tin-Eye, who struck a rather dangerous note in his speech by referring to people who, in contrast to myself, went about in red tabs but were not really soldiers. He was taken up on this rather later in the evening by Victor, and at one moment it looked as if there might be a stand-up fight. Making the usual gesture with his hands, Tin-Eye said "Now I am going to give you a snub". Victor replied by telling him to keep his Palethorpes quiet. At this stage the D.G. drew up, evidently interested in fanning the flames. Horrocks did not mend matters by giving an account of his own war service, but the argument eventually became so incoherent that the party broke up without any serious incident.

4.35 left for London today.
February 17th

I attended Lindlater Stewart's meeting from 10-1, when we discussed diplomatic communications, communications between allied H.Q. in this country and overseas agencies, wireless security, the infiltration of agents, internal security and the timing of security measures. Present were Herbert and Francis of censorship, myself, Anthony and Dick Butler, Crow from the F.O., Vivian, and Percy Black from SHAEF.

While the risk of leakage through diplomatic telegram and bag was a serious one it was recognised that total stoppage might seriously
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and prevent the S.A.C. from getting information

military authorities and had been head of SIME for 4 years, I felt that he might resent any enquiry by myself as to whether he knew how to carry on his business. I thought that any such enquiry should be made more appropriately either by the W.O. or by C. who was the custodian of the sources. It was finally decided that D.M.I. should telgraph to Padgett and that C. should telegraph to Teague. I told the D.M.I. that meanwhile Mansell had gone up to Palestine in order to make enquiries about Hunloke.

I attended a meeting which lasted for 3½ hours under the chairmanship of Findlater Stewart. Almost every Govt. dpt. was represented. Findlater explained that he had been ordered to put up a paper for the Cabinet Committee which was to look into the whole question of the security of Overlord, and in the light of such additional points as they might see fit to recommend, a decision should be reached as to whether the visitors' ban would give further security and was justifiable.

Most of the ground was already familiar, but certain measures to impose further delays on mails, telegrams, etc. were agreed to. The co-operation of the Minl of War Transport in agreeing to send their ships destined for the peninsula via N. Africa was extremely valuable contribution. More delicate matters of radio security and diplomatic cables and bags were left for a smaller gathering.

The D.C. very kindly gave a dinner for me at the Hyde Park Hotel to celebrate my C.B.E.

from the continent which he regarded as vital to the conduct of future operations. We thought however that the problem might be eased if the Swedish Air Line was stopped. It was recognised however that this might possibly caused the Swedes to withdraw facilities from BOAC. As an alternative to total stoppage, we recommended a gradual delay on telegrams. We had originally calculated on 5 or 6 days, but since the briefing period was in fact to be D-14, there might be difficulties in holding the position for so long a period. Communication between allied H.Q. in this country and overseas agencies was a constant source of anxiety and it seemed that little could be done beyond ensuring cypher security. A paper from the Chiefs of Staff was now in Washington, suggesting that all allied govts. should be approached and asked to conform to our procedure. As regards wireless security we pointed out that RSS kept watch on all foreign stations of the Abwehr and S.D. handling two-way traffic and that in addition they maintained a general search. It did not seem possible that the existing personnel and equipment could do more.

S.S. did not think that an illicit station was operating in this country at the moment but it was pointed out that their observation was subject to certain restrictions. They were looking for Abwehr procedure, whereas an agent might use British official procedure, which would be a matter for detection by Army Signals, who were ill-equipped to meet the task. The Security Service however had a second string to their bow in the case of agents dropping by post. Catalogue Reference KV/4/193 would get notification from

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Fighter Command of the area in which it was thought an agent had been dropped. This did not however provide against the possibility of an agent having landed by rubber boat. Attention was drawn to the possibility of leakage of information over police and railway circuits. This matter was however being dealt with by the Reid Committee. It was agreed by all that the broadcasting of messages indicating safe arrival of refugees should be subjected to a month's delay. At present the delay is only 14 days. On the question of infiltration of agents support was given to our recommendations that refugees and un-enrolled troops should if possible be diverted elsewhere for the next few months. Herbert drew attention to the fact that to draw a line anywhere in England and think that you can prevent by censorship methods communication between one side and the other was an illusion. It had been clearly demonstrated in the case of the I.O.W. where conditions were far more favourable. In fact it was found that people who worked in Southampton worked in Cowes and people who worked in Cowes lived in Southampton. The same would seem to apply to an increasing degree if any attempt was made to censor correspondence going to and from the banned areas. The most that could be done were snap-checks and prosecutions in all cases, which would act as a deterrent.

Dick and I had a word with Hopkinson who is back from Lisbon. He has been given the low-
down on Reference KV4/403 about Tricycle in case his assistance is required.

J.C. came to tell me about ~~There is~~ a definite decision that he should not go back. ~~though~~ distressed, has accepted the position with good grace. Steps are to be taken to get his mother over here.

Victor told me that the measures which I have previously mentioned for diverting magnetic-ally controlled aircraft are not possible owing to a miscalculation. It was originally suggested that a huge copper wire should be placed all along the Kent coast and that by means of generators the earth's magnetic pull could be changed. This would have had the effect of turning the aircraft away from London towards the North Sea. The Prof. (R.V. Nones) and others have been working on this on the basis that 200,000 kilowatts would be required. This appeared to constitute the whole output of Battersea Power Station and would have meant that a large part of industry and lighting would cease. The P.M. who was in N. Africa was informed and decided that in spite of this difficulty the power should be used against controlled aircraft. It was later discovered that something had gone wrong with the arithmetic and that a naught had been left out. The whole scheme has consequently been abandoned.

Geoffrey Wethered tells me that the letter which I signed to SOE on the subject of GILBERT has created a tremendous upheaval in SOE. Archie Boyle and the Security section support us in our views. Gubbins takes the line that either Catalogue Reference K664/193 GILBERT or locked him up. The fact is that from the evidence avail-

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able it is quite impossible for anyone to say whether GILBERT is right or wrong. There is however a strong element of doubt about the case, and in our view he should not be allowed to return to the field. Equally we consider that LOUBA the other gentleman in the case, is extremely doubtful. He is however being sent back.

TAR is rather in favour of the release of the Little Man and his son. Personally I am opposed to this until after D. day.

Lennox came to ask me whether if a suitable opportunity arose he should say anything to Cripps about the delicate nature of the information that was coming before him. I said I thought it most undesirable that he should do anything of the kind; since Findlater Stewart was in charge and were it to go back to him that the Security Service were butting in behind his back he would not unnaturally be extremely annoyed.

At Cecil's request I had a talk with Sir John Stephenson and told him about our suggestion to Findlater Stewart this morning not to interfere in any way with the German cables from Dublin.

February 18th

The minutes of the two meetings on the security of Overlord which have been held under the chairmanship of Findlater Stewart reached us at 10 P.M. on this morning. On the whole they seem fairly accurate, but there are certain

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points which we wanted to amend. One of them was the question of advertisements where we thought the danger was not sufficiently emphasised, and the other was under the heading of Radio Security, where we felt that perhaps the possibilities of catching a spy either through RSS or by the tracking of aircraft were placed too high. There was no mention of rubber boats.

I went with the D.G. to the Cabinet Meeting on Overlord security this morning. Oliver Lyttleton was in the chair, and others present were Herbert Morrison, Stafford Cripps, Duncan Sandys, Findlater, Whiteley of COSSAC, Herbert, Cadogan and Newsam. We started with the paper on Findlater's first meeting.

As regards American mails it was decided that Herbert should be supplied if possible with more personnel, but that he should in any case transfer a large number of people from American Censorship to N.Ireland censorship in order to bring the latter up to as near 100% as possible. In order to compensate for this loss on the censorship of American mails it was decided to delay them for a period of weeks. Mail to our P/Ws are to be delayed 3 months and a similar delay is to be imposed on letters from this country written by Italian P/Ws, some of which are now to go direct to Italy. The question of paraphrasing telegrams was raised. Herbert pointed out that a certain amount was already being done, and that it was not practicable to do more.

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The Army are to be asked to cut down their briefing period if possible to 10 days or less. The PM is to be asked to make a speech on security.

The question of telegrams to neutral territory was discussed in some detail. Duncan Sandys postulated that the enemy might have been building up his order of battle by sending plain language code telegrams to neutral countries, and thought therefore that all private telegrams to neutral countries should be stopped. Herbert said this would have the effect making a spy use commercial cover. To deal with this problem it would first be necessary to have a White List, to which he was opposed in principle, and secondly to arrange that other commercial telegrams were sponsored by some govt. dept. This question had been gone into no less than 3 times and was thought to be impracticable. Oliver Lyttleton took the view that such an arrangement would not only constipate the whole P.O. machinery but that of most govt. depts. as well. I said that while I did not wish to be complacent, I could say that the building up of the order of battle by means of plain language code telegrams over a long period was not the form of the German I.S. as we knew it. I did however think that there was a risk of a plain language code telegram giving the target and date of Overlord. The most dangerous period would be after the briefing had begun, but this could be covered by a 14-16 days delay on all telegrams going to neutral countries. Steps were being taken to see that mail going

to our Commando units in Yugoslavia is censored in Cairo, if this is not already being done.

Press telegrams were discussed and the procedure was explained. Stafford Cripps did not attach much importance to the statement in the paper that press representatives had been vetted since from his personal experience he thought that Freddie KUH was an extremely dangerous man. He thought he was the type who would place his journalistic career before the allied cause. I said that our experience of KUH was that he got to know everything of importance, almost, at least 4 or 5 days before anyone else and that he was not above getting round censorship rules if this was technically possible. We did not think however that he was anything in the nature of a German spy. He was merely a highly intelligent and perhaps somewhat unscrupulous journalist. The opinion of the Committee was that he ought to be removed. The suggestion was first made that as he was an American press correspondent, within the zone of the armies, it was for the Supreme Allied Commander to make the move. Eisenhower had dismissed journalists from the N. African area and therefore presumably could do it here. The Home Secretary here sounded a note of caution. Were we going to hand over to the S.A.C. powers of deportation which were at present vested in the Home Secretary? This was generally considered a serious snag and it was agreed that the position should be explored, and that the M.O.I. should be consulted.

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Oliver Lyttleton said that he proposed to make his first report in the following form (1) the ring round Britain and measures agreed, (2) extra measures proposed, and (3) remaining gaps when 1 and 2 had been put into force. There may be an annexed report setting out certain aspects of 1, 2 and 3 in greater detail.

I attended the Second Meeting of the War Cabinet Committee at 4 this afternoon, at which the D.G. was not present. We continued to examine Findlater's first paper of 17th Feb. The proceedings rose progressively to what seemed to me to be a high pitch of insanity.

With regard to private telephones, telegraph and teleprinter (para. 1(c)), it was agreed that in the case of the 7 circuits hired by newspapers in Eire and N. Ireland, a skilled P.O. operator should be placed alongside the operator of the newspaper company as has been arranged in the case of the Press Association, Exchange Telegraph and Daily Mail. All newspaper operators for the Eire and N. Ireland circuits are to be vetted by ourselves.

It was agreed that the export of all newspapers to Gibl should be suspended on a given date and that a ban should be placed on the export of all provincial newspapers. It was felt that it would not be possible to ban the export of the principal dailies to the continent but that steps should be taken to explore whether it was possible to block out advertisements for the foreign editions. The general view

was that this was impracticable.

With regard to travel by air, as far as Service aircraft were concerned it was agreed to tighten up the regulations concerning the carrying of letters by crews and to publicise penalties. All air lines to Eire are to be suspended except those entirely under BOAC control. The A.B. Transport line to Sweden is if possible to be suspended. The F.O. are to seek advice from the British Minister in Stockholm on the possibility of reprisals, since the Ministry of Production attach great importance to the continuance of our own service owing to the ball-bearings and other valuable material which is being brought by air to this country. If it is not possible to suspend the A.B. Transport line it is recommended that the crews should be segregated and housed in buildings to be constructed on the aerodrome at Dyce. They will not be allowed to proceed outside the area of the drome. I pointed out that the normal procedure was for someone from the London office of A.B. Transport to visit the crews, and that it was always possible for such a person to give them information or correspondence. The Committee thought that provided this individual was vetted and approved by M.I.5 such contact could be allowed. The Committee considered that from a given date all passengers and crews, whether male or female, should be subjected to a strict search before leaving the country. I pointed out that this was a fairly drastic measure which would doubtless meet with a storm of protest specially where British subjects were

concerned, that accommodation would have to be provided and that both men and women searchers would have to be provided. MI5 were asked to look into this problem and report further. I pointed out that it was always open to the Swedish authorities to send out one of their diplomats who could leave without an exit permit and who would be normally immune from search. He could also carry out information about the operation in his head. As far as the personnel were concerned, we had been relieved of some anxiety through the death of two whom we regarded as slightly suspect. We had no special reason for regarding the remainder of A.B. Transport with any degree of suspicion.

The meeting then went on to Lindlater's second paper of the 17th.

The suggestion was put forward that for a period of a month or 6 weeks all neutral diplomatic communications in cypher and diplomatic bags should be suspended. Allied bags might also need consideration. Cadogan was asked for his views. He said that we might suffer reciprocal treatment and that unless it were possible for the Americans to vary our traffic the matter would certainly be serious. He would however explore the position. I said that of course I could not speak for C. but that from such knowledge as I had of his organisation his efficiency would be seriously impaired if communication from Stockholm, Lisbon and Madrid were suspended. This would react on us from the C.E. point of view. I doubted whether it would be possible for the Americans

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to carry his traffic. It was suggested that possibly his business could be conducted by air. I said that the volume and urgency of it were such that I doubted whether this would be practicable. Certain operations which we had in hand would be seriously hampered. Whiteley said that SHAEF would not wish to be deprived of information coming from the continent to which they attached great value.

The suggestion was then made that the whole of the diplomatic corps should be removed from London and segregated somewhere in the north of England or in Scotland. I said that if this were done it would be necessary to keep all diplomats incommunicado since they derived a certain amount of their information from their own journalists. Cadogan, who viewed this measure with some apprehension, said that he would look into the matter and report further.

The D.G. spoke to Morrison after the meeting this morning, and showed him two examples of the C.P. getting holding of MULBERRY or PLUTO. In the case of MULBERRY, a man who had been working on the job was extremely perturbed because he could not get a dredger. He was very much afraid that he would not be able to complete his job by the scheduled time and that therefore the 2nd front would not be able to open. He would like if possible to go to the Mersey and bring a dredger round by sea himself. So worried was he about this that he reported it to the Party with the suggestion that Willy Gallagher should ask a question in

the House . This is an interesting example of the Red Flag becoming the red, white and blue. The reporting of PLUTO was perhaps more malicious. The trouble and danger lies in the fact that the C.P. encourages its members to poke their noses into all sorts of secret matters. This can only lead to the dissemination of knowledge and this clearly highly undesirable. It does not however provide any argument for the visitors ban since the C.P. would not send out agents to discover these matters but merely rely on their members to come and report to them at headquarters if they saw anything of interest to the Russians. Morrison was very quick to make the point that these leakages were rather an argument against than for the visitors ban. It is precisely what I had told the D.G. previously on two occasions. The D.G. also showed Morrison an even worse potential leakage through an organisation known as "MASS Observation ". In a directive for Jan. 1944 issued by this organisation and marked Priority A, people were to be asked to describe in as much detail as possible their feelings about the 2nd front. They were to say where they thought we would land, how soon we expected to open the 2nd front and their fears and hopes focussing on the 2nd front.

I dined with J.C. and Brig. Williams, BGSI, 21st Army Group, who is a Merton Don and Monty's star Intelligence man. He went through the whole of the Libyan campaign and N. Africa and also the campaign in Italy up to and including Salerno. He said that the morale of our troops

was at a very low ebb when Monty came out to Cairo. They felt that they had been badly led and that their equipment was poor. The fighting quality of the troops was however extremely good considering the conditions that prevailed. Monty's first success at Alamein was the turning point. The Germans did exactly what he had calculated that they would do. He had encouraged them to make their advance over the soft sand north of the Quatra depression by planting false maps on them. These maps were left in a burned-out tank, and, according to von Thoma, "ommel based his action upon them. Had the Germans, instead of turning north, gone straight on, there is no doubt that the 8th Army would have been in very grave difficulties. There followed the advance from Alamein. I asked what the gun-frontage was and was told that there were 600 guns to 3,000 yds. This of course is not a very great concentration as compared with actions like the Battle of the Somme or Paschendaal. Contrary to my expectation I was told that field-guns still did not fire at a greater rate than 4 rounds per gun per minute.

The P.M.'s first visit was not a very great success. The feeling of the 8th Army was one of great depression and what they really wanted was new leaders and better equipment. They did not appreciate what the P.M. had done or gone through, and were generally rather self-centred in their outlook. His second visit was a great success. The King's visit was a moderate success, and somewhat hampered

by the fact that he was suffering from guppy tummy.

Williams saw quite a lot of von Thoma and also of Messe, the Italian. Von Thoma was very bitter against Rommel. He had reported to Rommel 3 times that the Italians had given way at Alamein. Rommel would not believe him and ordered him to ret'ennoitre. It was during these reconnaissances that he was captured. He said rather bitterly "Perhaps Rommel will believe me now".

Von Thoma did not know that he had had a New Zealand division opposing him. In fact, though it seems almost incredible, he did not know where N.Z. was. Still less had he known about the Maories, whom he regarded as savages. He was most insistent about the wrongness of employing such troops and he implored Williams to take steps to have them withdrawn from the front.

Williams had a long discussion with Messe about the battle of the Mareth Line. He asked him why he had decided to stand at Mareth rather than at Aquarit. The latter would according to Williams have been an extremely difficult position to take. Messe said that he entirely agreed. The trouble was that his orders came from Rome and Berlin and he had nothing to do but obey them.

Williams also had long talks with the German general von Nebenstein, of whom he had a high regard. He said that generally speaking the Germans had put up an extremely efficient and

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very clean and chivalrous fight. This had so impressed the British troops that they regarded the whole business as rather like a game of cricket. It was only when they got to Italy and when they saw the ruthless way in which the Germans treated the civil population that their attitude began to change.

Williams had a high regard for the Italian Intelligence. He said that they had made far more intelligent deductions from the information that they received than the Germans, particularly with regard to the attack on Sicily.

I asked Williams whether he could confirm John Booth's story about Tunis. He said that it was absolutely true. The Germans had thought that we were going through with our armour at a certain point and had concentrated a large number of 88's. These had been spotted by aerial photograph. A concentration of 600 British guns had been brought up and had completely wiped out the German defence. Our armour had then gone through and fanned out to right and left.

Williams told me a very interesting story about the Russians. When he was in the desert he had attached to him a representative of TASS called VASILIEV. VASILIEV came to see him and asked him when he would be allowed to see the P/W interrogations. Williams told him he was sorry but that he could not see them. VASILIEV then repeated his question and was told again that he would not be allowed to see such

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reports. He asked to whom he should appeal. He was told that he could only appeal to Williams and that his appeal was rejected. He then said "Thank you. I shall be able to report that I have done everything possible to obtain this information but that it has been refused to me". Later on a Soviet military mission arrived in Italy. At the head of this mission was Lt. Gen. VASSILIEV, Williams said that he was very pleased to meet him again and to see that he was now dressed as a Lt. Gen. He asked him if he would like to see the P/W reports. VASILIEV replied that he would and he was immediately given access to them. The mission was rather in the nature of an inspection by a higher military authority. The impression was given that they had come to the Italian front in order to see that we were doing our job properly. Although the members of the mission displayed quite a high degree of intelligence our methods seemed to be quite incomprehensible to them. On occasion they asked the most extraordinary questions. One of them was "How many guns do you have per thousand metres?". Williams said that this depended on the situation in any particular area. The Russians then accused him of holding back and trying to mislead them. He assured them however that this was the correct answer and said that he presumed from the question that they had a fixed ratio. The Russians replied that this was so. Williams then asked them whether he was correct in assuming that as they have to turn out enormous numbers of gunners with comparatively little training they found it easier to adopt uniform system which worked

owing to the preponderance of their armaments and man-power. The Russians replied that this was in fact the reason. For the same reason they had their divisional, corps and army zones fixed according to a regular pattern. They said that otherwise they would not be able to maintain touch on so large a front in a battle which moved so fast.

The Russians were entirely at a loss to understand how it was possible for the head of the Air Force and the CinC of the army to reach agreement without some supreme over-riding authority. They imagine that when the Air Force was called upon to carry out a task in conjunction with the infantry they might not comply. They had to see the system in operation to believe it, and as luck would have it a call was made from the infantry and answered by the Air Force in a matter of minutes. Not only that but the offending batteries were wiped out. The Russians were deeply impressed. The fact is that the Russian Army is worked on a totalitarian mechanised line and they find it difficult to believe that any other system can work.

They went away quite impressed and Williams thinks they will have given the 8th Army a good chat to old Joe.

I asked Williams about the Anzio bridgehead. I had imagined that a bridgehead landing must be a far more formidable operation than the general public seemed to think. He said that this was so, that Salerno had been a very near thing. In fact on the 14th Sept. they thought the game was up. The trouble was that on that

occasion the troops had not dug themselves in. In the case of the Anzio bridgehead the lesson of digging in had been rather too deeply impressed upon them. The result was that they did not capture the high ground which they had intended to take. They were suffering considerably in consequence.

We then passed on to I.B. matters. Williams said that he was somewhat worried about this problem. He did not know much about it himself. He had found matters in Italy highly unsatisfactory. Amgot had generally made a mess of things and there was virtually no civil security machinery. He did not think that his present GS01, IB, Hoyer-Miller, was up to his job, and was looking round for someone to replace him. He had heard about Niall MacDermot, and had already made some suggestion to SHAEF which had not been very well received. He wanted to know what I thought of MacDermot. I said that from what I had seen of his work he was extremely good, very intelligent and very energetic. I then gave Williams an outline of what we had been doing in COSSAC and a general outline of the work of the whole office. I thought it was highly important that he should meet Dick and have arranged with him to dine next Thursday. As I saw the picture, Dick and MacDermot's work in SHAEF was largely over and it was necessary then to explain and elaborate in greater detail the practical measures necessary for organising IB in lower formations. If therefore Williams decided to take MacDermot, I would suggest his having Dick as an IB adviser to 21st Army Group in the same way as he had been adviser to SHAEF.

Williams thought this might be an extremely good idea.

We talked quite a lot about the German IS, and its various weaknesses. He seemed to have come to the same conclusions as ourselves.

We also discussed TAR's deception unit. Williams does not think a great deal of Wild. It has a high opinion of Strangeways. He says that Wild works rather day to day whereas Strangeways looks much farther ahead. He regards Strangeways as being extremely intelligent as well as very brave and practical as a regular soldier.

I explained to Williams what the proposals were with regard to TAR's deception unit and I am going to arrange for him to meet TAR next week.

February 19th

Curry came to see me about his future. He seemed to think that he had better stay in SIS at any rate for the present. I agreed that that was the only course to adopt.

In the afternoon I went over to see Arnold-Foster and Viv. in order to give them a picture of yesterday's Cabinet Committee meeting. I had previously spoken to C. and told him that I thought that he should have a representative at any future meetings. Arnold-Foster did not seem to think that a total stoppage of diplomatic telegrams would seriously affect SIS work if neutral governments decided on reprisals.

He thought that they could work on their transmitters about which they could argue for some considerable time, and that if they did finally have to count them off they could use American communications. Arnold-Foster arranged a meeting between Himself, Viv. and Ted Maltby, to review the reports of Findlater Stewart's meeting where the position of RSS had been put down as a result of information supplied by myself and Viv. I gathered later that Maltby approved of the statement except that he wanted it made clear that it was in the present circumstances impossible to obtain another 100 sets and operators or to train the latter, and that even if this were possible, the increase in efficiency would only be very small.

February 20th

The D.G. asked Findlater Stewart to come over and review certain points that he had put down which he felt argued in favour of the imposition of the visitors' ban. Findlater agreed with most of them and then gave us a general picture of how this whole question seemed to have gone wrong in the Cabinet. He was convinced at the beginning of the meeting that all the ministers with the exception of the P.M. and Home Secretary were in favour of the ban. The Chief of Staff began by saying that he was not asking for it, ~~he~~ was demanding it. The Home Secretary said that although he did not believe in its efficacy, he was not going to die in the last ditch about it. The

P.M. however was obviously against it from the outset, kept on shaking his finger at Findlater across the table and saying that if one man got through the whole game is up. This was a kind of red herring across the whole proceedings, since the argument was that if you can reduce the number of people who can see things of operational importance, you would correspondingly reduce the number of people who would talk about it. There would clearly be residents who come up to London every day, who would do a certain amount of talking, but the more the numbers could be reduced the better. The second argument which apparently never got the chance of being heard, was of course far the most potent, namely that if you keep the area clear of visitors the spy would be much more likely to stand out against the background of the resident population who were known to each other and to the police. The Home Secretary, seeing that the P.M. was on his side, began to try out a number of somewhat specious arguments about the police being diverted from their more important duties and the hardships inflicted on the cockney who wished to spend his weekend at Southend or Brighton. The rest of those present fearing a final decision against the ban, resorted to the well known expedient of suggesting that a committee should look into the whole question. Hence the Cabinet Committee and the endless discussions about Overlord security, which in fact originated from the Security Service advocating one additional and quite reasonable measure, which, had not the Home Office decided to dig their toes in, would never have gone further than the Security Executive.

It became a Cabinet matter as soon as the Chiefs of Staff came into the picture and telegraphed to the P.M. at Marrakesh. They got an unfavourable reply and Findlater had from that moment to take up the running, and produced his first paper for the Cabinet discussion.

February 21st

We resumed discussions at the Cabinet Committee at 11 this morning. We dealt with diplomatic communications, when it was decided to stop cables, bags and couriers ex-UK destined for neutral countries from a date to be specified later. This was to include Eire bags and cypher communications. It was not clear whether there was to be a stoppage also of incoming telegrams and bags and no opportunity was given for raising this point. It was agreed that the German and neutral cables which are routed through this country from Dublin should be allowed to continue and that bags should also be allowed provided it could be ensured that information was not inserted here while the bags were in transit. The argument was that Eire should be treated like other neutrals and that we did not allow the cables and bags sent via this country to go on, the Eire Govt. might feel disposed to give diplomatic representatives in Dublin direct facilities by wireless and by bag through ships sailing direct from Eire to the Peninsula.

Roger tells me that the Transport Workers Union have blotted their copybook. At a general

meeting they discussed the allocation of labour for certain secret tasks to be carried out on the south coast including Phoenix. This appeared in their minutes, a copy of which they sent to the branch of the union in Dublin. Mercifully this copy was intercepted by Censorship. The matter has been taken up with the Home Secretary and it is suggested that Cussen should investigate to find out what further distribution has been given to the document.

I had a long talk with Victor about oranges and onions. It seemed to me that since we had reason to believe that a 5th bomb had been placed on board one of the ships, we were taking rather a heavy responsibility in saying that no special steps should be taken to locate it. As being the only experienced dept. in sabotage, ought we not perhaps to have taken charge at the outset rather than allow the Navy to employ all sorts of methods. e.g. probing the crates, which in fact we knew to be quite useless. While I agreed with Victor that probably the action or lack of action was the only course, I think we ought to get the position clear. Victor is going to prepare a memo on the subject.

I had a discussion with Grogan, Trevor-Wilson and Brook-Booth about bringing the allies into the censorship picture. They would have to set up censorship units after the allied occupation and it seemed desirable that they should have the necessary training. This implied certain security risks. We all felt that these risks

would have to be taken but agreed that we should not give them the 7 special tests, at any rate until after D.day.

Artist has put in two very interesting reports. He emphasises the extent to which the Germans are relying on Tricycle to give them reports about the date of the landing in France. He thinks that Tricycle should speculate on the basis of information that he has received from the Gen.Staff circles, but should make certain reservations, since a report with a reservation is more easily believed by the Fremdeheere than categorical statements.

Artist can arrange for such a report to appear more plausible through getting it confirmed by BRANDES. He says that BRANDES is quite prepared to repeat the contents of a message received by him from Tricycle as one received from other sources. BRANDES is well thought of in Berlin although in Artist's opinion his reports are based on the "constructive imagination of his sub-agents". A report emanating from Tricycle and repeated by BRANDES will receive, as a confirmed report, the highest degree of credibility which an Abwehr report can get in the eyes of the Gen.Staff. Further, if the event does not materialise, confirmation by BRANDES would save Tricycle from being accused of deliberate deception as in such a case a change of enemy plans would be assumed. BRANDES would not have knowledge of this double game, but would be grateful for the good tips. This would not be unfair treatment of BRANDES because if he knew the truth he would probably want to join

in the game. Apparently this business of confirmed reports is common practice in certain Abwehr circles of the more unscrupulous kind.

According to von Karsthoff, recent events in Spain have practically ended the relations of the K.O. with official Spanish circles. The K.O. has been told that unfortunately, owing to English pressure, it will not in future be able to bank on the support of the Spanish authorities. It is even feared that Spain will demand the dissolution of the K.O. and will expel all known members of the Abwehr. In view of this critical situation preparations are being made to maintain the I.S., and cash reserves of 1500 pesetas are on their way from Berlin. Endeavours will be made to win over diplomats for Abwehr work in spite of the present prohibition of the German F.O. The chances of the success of the future organisation are not estimated to be very high. Artist may be asked to play a prominent part in the shadow organisation, as his name has not been mentioned in any of the complaints from the British.

Canaris's reputation has in the past been largely maintained though the importance of his Spanish connections. He may therefore fare badly in the future.

With regard to the observation of ships in the Straits of Gib., the proposed replacement of Abwehr men by Spanish individuals is only making slow progress and it is not possible to gain a reliable observation of ship traffic prior to April 1st.

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It would certainly be a pity if the Abwehr were to lose ground at the expense of the S.D. There is a definite advantage to us in keeping the Abwehr in position owing to its relative inefficiency.

Confirmation of Artist's report is contained in a Jap B.J. to the effect that the head of the "Organ" in Spain, namely Alcazar de VELASCO, has been told by the President of the Cortes that in view of the new law to condemn to death any Spaniard who has committed any act such as violates Spanish neutrality he may be in serious danger. He should therefore take temporary refuge in France before the law in question was promulgated. From similar material it is also clear that early in February a decision was reached by the German F.O. to review in co-operation with the OKW the compass and functions of the Abwehr in neutral countries. It is hoped to ascertain whether the risks entailed on the diplomatic side are like to outweigh any advantages to be gained from Abwehr activity.

It seems that the Americans have weighed in heavily on the espionage front in Spain and have drawn attention to the activities of KOBEE whom they hold responsible for the loss of a capital ship and one cruiser in the Pacific. They have also pointed out to Franco that the Axis was making skilful use of Spanish diplomatic organs and demanded a strict enquiry into this matter. Apparently Alcazar de VELASCO is not greatly alarmed. He takes cover under Catalogue Reference:KV/4/193

the fact that he was appointed in Sener's time and with the full concurrence of Franco, to be head of the Press Office of the Spanish Embassy in London. Franco is therefore himself some sort of accomplice.

It seems there is some anxiety about an Italian PAULUCCI who was the person who originally planned the bribing of the "Organ" and is now thought ~~to have~~ have gone over to the enemy.

February 22nd

I had a long talk with Spooner about the case of STYLES who has got a year's imprisonment with hard labour. Spooner had mentioned two Poles, Antoni STARUSKEWICZ and Edmond ZIOL-KOWSKI, who had come through by the same route as STYLES and had been examined at the LRC. As there seems no doubt that STYLES got away with the connivance of the Germans I think the case of the two Poles should be reviewed.

Herbert has just come back from a visit to an American unit in the south-west of England. He found them extremely responsive and very keen to learn. A few of them had attended our course in London, and there is no doubt that MI5 stands high in American counter-intelligence circles.

I attended a Cabinet meeting at 3 this afternoon. After reviewing certain matters affecting shipping and communications by allied govts., it was agreed that as far as possible refugees,

recruits and unenrolled allied personnel should be diverted to N. Africa and elsewhere in so far as this is possible. It was further agreed that Findlater Stewart should look into the question of the danger of leakage from British agents introduced into Germany or Occupied Territory. Finally the committee discussed the ban on visitors to the coastal belt. Morrison said that the effect of imposing a ban would be to reduce very substantially the areas available for holidays. He did not believe that the ban would add very much to security since the greatest danger arose from indiscreet talk by persons residing in the coastal belt. The police force have been greatly depeted and it would be impossible for them to enforce the ban completely. Indeed the added duties placed on them by the imposition of the ban might make it impossible for them to carry out other more important security measures. These arguments seemed rather specious. Any inconvenience to the public is not really a consideration when so much is at stake, and it might be argued that during the Overlord period the checking of identity documents should be the most important part of police duties. So far from adding to their troubles it should reduce them, since they would have fewer people to challenge and any doubtful persons would be more easily distinguished. Morrison produced figures obtained from the MWT which were not particularly informative. Findlater Stewart on the other hand produced figures which he had obtained from the Ministry of Food. They showed that 200,000 people a week obtained food cards in the banned area. These people there-

fore went for periods of longer than 5 days. It had to be assumed that there must be at least another 100,000 who would be going down for weekends. These made a total of 1,200,000 per month or roughly the equivalent of one-third of the total population which is estimated at about 3,500,000. It was not of course possible to say how far the figure of 300,000 per week would be reduced through a legitimate channel.

It seemed however likely that it might well be reduced by something like 50%. The D.G. made a very good speech emphasising that the main purpose of the ban was to make a spy stand out. If the area was filled with trippers bivouacking on the downs or filling up the boarding houses and hotels a spy would have a good cover. Duncan Sandys was in favour of the ban anyway, Oliver Lyttleton was wavering until the D.G. made his speech and Stafford Cripps was inclined to think that the ban was worth while if all the other precautions were adopted. He came right over when he heard the D.G.'s speech. Apparently this particular angle of the problem had not been presented at all to the Cabinet. The P.M. had completely

clouded the issue by persisting in his theory that if one man got through it would completely nullify the effects of the ban. As he went out Morrison tapped the D.G. on the back and said "You old scoundrel".

Kellar tells me that there is, now Ispal 3, which appears to be communications between Zionists and their various contacts in Europe.

I saw Mountain this afternoon, when we discussed the document purporting to have been written by D'ASTIER and circulated to resistance movements in France. This document reached Mountain from a rather dubious character called Thurloe Prior who was sacked from the Army for conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline. He also has a rather unsavoury business reputation. Prior has a friend in the French Military Mission whose name has been given as "Estienne". The latter was worried about this document since it referred to lists which were to be drawn up of French collaborationists who would be bumped off on D-day. Individual assassinations were not permitted but the local resistance committee, backed by popular opinion, was authorised to carry out the executions. The French officer thought that this was creating a blood bath and wished if possible to take such action as would prevent such a state of affairs. Geoffrey Wethered who saw him gave an assurance that the information would be passed to the proper quarter and that the informant's name would be safeguarded. He could not however say what action the authorities would take. The informant has promised to give further information if it comes his way.

David Grey, the American Ambassador in Dublin, has made his demarche. Dev gave him a flat refusal, which was really all he wanted.

February 23rd

Lipstick has received a postcard which undoubtedly comes from the Germans, but which the Censorship failed to intercept. It is not at present clear whether Lipstick realises from whom the postcard originated, but he showed a great reluctance to admitting receipt of it. Finally he said, unconvincingly, that he believed it had come from the Catalans.

The exchange of messages on Freak's radio is now working properly and the receiving station is passing on the messages to Berlin.

Balloon conducted Tricycle on a tour of most of Kent, including coastal areas in the course of which no identity papers had to be produced at any stage by either of them.

Bronx has received nearly £300, apparently from the Germans, during the last few days. The exact significance of these payments is not quite clear but at least £100 must be in respect of bonus and salary, and efforts will be made to make her pay it over.

Sniper has received a message which is difficult to decypher but apparently it refers to radio-controlled rocket gliders.

The Germans are attempting to send a wireless set to Father in India, or alternatively to get into communication with him by letter. This arrangement is being made through the intermediary of an agent in Istanbul. It now appears

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that this agent is controlled by SIME and is known to them as Blackguard. India are very doubtful whether they can risk tying up Father with an agent controlled by SIME but we are advising them that we do not think another opportunity of getting a wireless set to Father is likely to arise.

TAR and I went to see Maxwell about the case of Snow and his son. The H.O. were suggesting that perhaps the son could now be released. We explained the position to Maxwell and said that in our view both Snow and his son must hang together as a case and that we felt it would be unwise to release either of them at the moment. We should be quite prepared to reconsider their case immediately after the launching of Overlord. Maxwell agreed.

At the weekly meeting today ISOS disclosed that the S.D. in Lisbon has received information that a certain individual who may possibly be Brazilian will arrive in Lisbon at the beginning of March on his way to London. He is to stay a week in London and will then return to Lisbon where he will get into touch with the S.D. It is not possible to identify this individual on present information. The German I.S. station in Lisbon has been informed by Berlin that Einzwirtschaft is willing to allow its own agents to act as couriers to Abwehr agents in London and America. These Einzwi. agents can take money, ink and instructions to such Abwehr links provided that they are not endangered by so doing. There are as usual many reports purporting to emanate from this country but all of them are untrue.

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Stamp told us that NEUKERMANS has now disclosed that he sent 8 or 9 letters in secret ink to an address in Barcelona which was not on the Watch List. However the fact that the letters got through is somewhat disquieting, and the question is being taken up with Censorship. If the information of NEUKERMANN is to be believed, there was nothing of importance in the letters, which were mostly inaccurate.

Sclater mentioned that certain en clair Polish signals believed to be Polish military signals had been picked up by RSS in Scotland. The Poles who have been questioned about this are not particularly helpful. It is not of course certain that the messages were being sent from Gt. Britain. In the corrupt form in which they were picked up they are not particularly intelligible.

I gave the meeting a short account of the battle of the ban.

Bill Younger came to see me about an American woman employed by M/S. who had been approached by an American officer, presumably someone from OSS, with a suggestion that she should go to Stockholm. The idea is that she should make tentative approaches to German business men in order to start a defeatist movement in Germany. I said that she would have to make up her own mind as to whether she accepted this job or not but that the proposition struck me as being a particularly futile one. There is not the slightest point in trying to convert German business men about the futility of the

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present struggle. They are already converted. They are however an extremely small minority and more or less impotent.

Roach and Warden came to see me about the GILBERT case. Rather reluctantly I agreed that GILBERT should be housed somewhere in the Midlands. The RSLO should be informed and also the local police in order that we should at least know if he absented himself from the area. I said that I was in fact just as worried about LOUBA and his associates as I was about GILBERT, but that it was quite impossible to express any definite opinion about these cases unless one had access to everybody who had had anything to do with them. Evidently the Security section of SOE have had a considerable struggle over GILBERT and have not had much help from their country section. It is the same old trouble of blind faith of the man who runs an agent.

Paddy Barry came to see me about the enrolled allied personnel and the possibility of getting the Services to send them to N. Africa for the next 6 months. He thinks it should be a J.I.C. matter. I told him that the question was of some urgency as we now had powers to lock people up if we were in doubt but that we did not wish to lock up more than necessary. It was however essential that we should see all those who had come out of occupied territory after the total occupation of France.

February 24th

I had a talk with Jo Archer and TAR about the presentation of the Spitfire leakage case. TAR has undertaken on the basis of Jo's report his own and Fish's, to prepare a note which will not disclose secret sources and will put the case in its proper perspective for presentation to the Chief of the Air Staff who is interested; the report will also go to MAP.

I had a talk with Archie Boyle about the arrangement between MWT and the Swedish Legation to carry one ton of freight to Sweden in MTBs which are collecting ball bearings from Gothenberg. Archie agrees that the freight ought to be examined. He suggests that we should approach the MWT and propose either that they should pack the crates or that they should be examined in the normal way by Customs. The matter is now of some importance in the light of the suggestion by the Cabinet Committee that diplomatic communication should be cut prior to Overlord. If this is done the Swedes may well regard the SOE boats as a convenient channel for communication.

I then talked to Archie about the GILBERT case. He said that his section had had a battle royal with Gubbins and had won. He was quite frank about the difficulties which his section encountered in getting to the bottom of cases of this case and thoroughly sympathised with me when I said that it seemed almost impossible to get at the full facts. While I was there Geoffrey Wethered rang up to say that an enquiry had come to

Jo Archer from the Air Ministry about the GILBERT case. The A.M. had been asked to send over aircraft to GILBERT's successor and wanted to know our views. Archie said that we were at liberty to report to the A.M. our findings on the GILBERT case. In the light of what we said they would have to make up their own minds. It seemed to me that if we had doubts about GILBERT we should equally have doubts about his successor. One must assume that if GILBERT was wrong the Germans knew all about his organisation. Their only reason for keeping it in being would be to watch those who pass through it and round them up at a suitable moment. If therefore they found that GILBERT was not returning they would take steps to deal with subordinates unless they were in German pay.

Kenneth came in in the afternoon. I told him about the possibility of Niall MacDermot taking over Hoyer-Miller's job. He seemed quite pleased with the idea. He said however that from what he had heard it seemed doubtful if Williams would be able to accept our offer of interrogators from the LRC owing to establishment difficulties. I shall have to go into this, as it seems important since unless we have a proper section on the continent we shall be flooded out here with undesirables. ,

I attended a meeting at Norfolk House with Findlater Stewart in the chair. The purpose was to go through the draft report of the Cabinet Committee. A sensation was caused

when Crowe who was representing the F.O. stated that the proposal to sever diplomatic communications had not been understood by Sir Alexander Cadogan. He had thought that the proposal was to stop communications 10 days before the operation and to inform the neutral governments if we wished to continue the stoppage for a longer period. The only answer to this was that either Sir Alexander or Sir Orme Sargent or both must have been asleep. The F.O. also said that they were opposed to the ban on the 2,000 Norwegians. They were however in agreement with the statement provided it was made clear that we agreed to accept them if they were transferred immediately to Canada. Findlater said that he had consulted Sir J. Stephenson of the D.O. who had no objection to the suggested treatment of fire bags provided it conformed to the treatment of other neutrals.

Dick and I dined with Williams BGSI. His conversation about his experiences in N. Africa was so entertaining that we did not really get down to much business. He said however that he had more or less made up his mind to take MacDermot provided he could pass his medical. This I am sure is a good step. He also expressed his intention of coming in to see TAR in order to discuss the deception unit.

One story he told us was interesting. He had been with a forward tank reconnaissance unit at about the time the Germans landed at Agheila. Nobody would believe for a long time that the Germans had landed. Williams

after cruising about in the desert decided to return along the coastal road. When doing so he passed another tank on the road but did not recognise its markings. It was only after it had gone several hundred yards that he realised that it was a German tank. The Germans too had failed to recognise him. They then turned round and fired at each other but both missed. It was only then that the German landing was confirmed.

Williams also talked about M.S.S. He had given a lecture at B.F. on its use. Monty had in fact had early intimation about the German dumps of petrol and ammunition. These had been effectively dealt with by the Air Force. When he saw Von Thoma, the latter was convinced that the information regarding these dumps had been given by Arab spies.

Williams has a great admiration for Tedder. He said that had it not been for the political issue Tedder would have made a firstclass Supreme Commander. During the worst moments of the desert fighting he kept his head in the most remarkable way. It was of paramount importance to stop Rommel from getting oil at the time when he reached Alamein. MSS showed that he was short of oil but that he was expecting to get supplied by tanker at Tobruk. Tedder gave orders that at all costs these tankers were to be knocked out. It was really a suicide job for Wellingtons but was completely successful, and probably did more to prevent Rommel's advance to Alexandria than anything else.

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February 25th

I had a talk with Burt, when I told him the history of our report about STOCKMAN and the police. This became necessary since it seemed that Skardon had got on to the case of Moss Simmonds, a deserter who bribed the policeman with £50 when he came to arrest him. There was an obvious danger of the lines getting crossed. I reminded Burt of the time when he had spoken to me about the invdstrigation into corruption at the Yard. I said that I had n t told him at that time as I felt that in some ways it might embarrass him. I thought now however that he should have the full story. As he knew, Ned Reid from time to time received reports from banks about curious accounts. Investigation had shown that transactions were almost invariably conducted by black marketers. We had produced a report on this subject to Sir Alexander Maxwell, stating that we had no particular wish to conduct enquiries of this kind which were outside our sphere but we were not anxious that other bodies should start making enquiries with banks or using telephone checks since they would probably spoil our legitimate business. It was arranged therefore that Sir Charles Teggart should be appointed by the Min. of Food to invesitgate and that we would pass the information to him, since he was a person thoroughly accustomed to handling delicate subjects. We got on to Stockman and ~~had~~ it soon became ~~evident~~ that considerably bribery and corrup-
Catalogue Reference KV/4/193 g on. Having amassed a good deal of information we submitted a

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report to Sir Alexander Maxwell. He had called in the Commissioner who passed the report to Sir N. Kendall. We had since become aware that a certain amount of information was going back to crooks. It seemed therefore that whatever arrangements Sir Norman had made were not likely to produce the best results. I asked Burt what he would have done if he had been Sir Alexander Maxwell. He said that having informed the Commissioner he would have made arrangements for some outside body to conduct the enquiry since it was obviously impossible for the Yard to conduct the enquiry themselves. He said that he would have a talk with

Chief Inspector Barrett who had been placed in charge with a view to finding out how far people were aware that M.I.5 had been supplying the information and also that special methods were being employed.

Burt told me about the case of a police officer called Hill. I said that as far as I knew we had had nothing to do with the case. He said the effect had been rather disastrous. Evidently the police had tapped in on the telephone conversation, of which they had taken a record. This had been played over to some 6 or 7 police officers who had talked about it, and the information had clearly got back to the crooks.

I attended a meeting at Norfolk House when we discussed the dangers of SIS and SOE agents going into the field. Windlater explained that the ministers desired to be assured by the various Services responsible for sending agents overseas (a) that no agent was given any information about the forthcoming operations which was not absolutely essential to his mission (b) that in cases where the agent must be given some information the Service concerned would consider carefully whether the advantage to be gained by sending out a man outweighed the possibility of leakage which might result if he were captured and (c) that all possible precautions would be taken to ensure that agents about to leave should not be in a position to obtain dangerous information either by visits to the south coast or in conversation with informed persons, e.g., any allied headquarters. Gen. Whiteley pointed out that SHAEF felt that the agencies concerned should decide themselves what information should be given to agents and that all such information should be referred to SHAEF before any action was taken. SIS said that their agents never get anything that would indicate the target. They were more or less spread out over the continent and were concerned solely with the supply of information. SOE said that none of their agents had any knowledge of the target or date and that wherever they were going they would be given identical instructions of a general character telling them what they were to do when the time came. In fact instructions would not be given to them until after D-day. Both SIS and SOE agents get periodical leave

and there is a certain chance that they may pick up information. At the SOE School at Beaulieu nobody is allowed outside the grounds except for the purpose of two exercises, one in Bournemouth and one in Southampton. As it is possible these agents might see something important in Southampton, SOE are asking us to look into the question.

Col. Neave of OSS said that all his work was carried out through the agency of SIS and SOE. The Committee felt that although we could be reasonably satisfied about the operations of allied headquarters, the existence of lines between France and Algiers controlled by the French National Committee constituted a danger of serious leakage. Although these various assurances were given I personally felt far from satisfied about SOE agents going into the field and also about allied agents who are either directly under their control or those who are approved by the allied headquarters. They are supposed to be searched but in fact this is extremely difficult, and if done really thoroughly would obviously cause appalling friction. The only really satisfactory measure would be to close down operations of all these people for 2 months prior to D. day.

Tricycle is ready to depart but has to wait until Saturday for a plane.

Freak has got through satisfactorily. The fact that the enemy put two stations on to the job of receiving his traffic confirms

that they regard it as of the greatest importance.

Treasure is leaving by air on Saturday and hopes to bring back a W/T set.

The Mullet and Puppet case still goes on although Berman who was running it in Brussels has been sacked. His successor is one Werner whom Hamlet hopes to meet in the near future.

Bronx has received another monthly payment, with an additional £100, of which £50 is for expenses and £50 as a bonus for hard work.

Lipstick has given an explanation of the circumstances in which he received a postcard from Spain which was at first accepted as satisfactory. In view of information which has now been received regarding Lipstick's activities in connection with the Catalan organisation in the autumn of last year, there are further grounds for doubt as to his integrity. This case is being very closely gone into. There is no doubt that he has been indiscreet as a result of which a number of his Catalan friends have been arrested.

v February 26th

The Garbo network now consists of about 24 agents, some conscious and some unconscious but all notional. Steps are being taken to

get them placed notionally in various parts of the country where they may provide useful information about Overlord.

On the 19th February reports on Crossbow showed that up to the 15th there was evidence of repairs to or intentions to repair some 23 out of 73 sites which had been assessed as Class A or B on that date. The delay imposed on the enemy's building or repairs by bombing has been considerable and up to date it has not been possible to detect any comprehensive or consistent repair policy. The construction of supply sites has reached an advanced stage but there is no evidence of the arrival of pilotless aircraft components on supply sites.

There have been four fairly sharp raids on London during the week, one bomb falling at the bottom of St. James's St., causing considerable damage from blast, which now seems to be far more widespread. Victor's flat was damaged. He was lucky to be sleeping in the country. These attacks were the heaviest since May 1941 and all were of short duration. Provisionally it is estimated that 120 bombers operated over land on the 1st occasion, 95 on the 2nd and 150 on the 3rd. Probably a larger proportion than on recent occasions reached London. H.E. and I.B. were dropped more or less simultaneously and the first attack caused 48 fires in London and 24 outside, in the 2nd, 606 fires in London and 50 outside and in the 3rd, 235 in London and 34 outside. On all these occasions the dock area received little attention. There wa

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was no great concentration at any one borough, but on the whole S.W. London received the main weight of all these attacks. Casualties in London were, 1st attack 182, second 216 and 3rd 29. The minor attack on 21/22nd Feb. was made by 15 aircraft which except in a single penetration as far as Beckenham operated over southern and S.E. England had did negligible harm. Enemy losses in aircraft amount to 20, roughly 5½%. The Germans assess this figure as somewhat higher.

February 28th

The D.G. told me he was going to see Cripps on a matter ^{un}connected with Overlord. He intended to have a fairly frank talk with him, I said I thought ~~it~~ was important, in addition to giving him a general review of our work, to torpedo the Home Secretary's argument about the police being diverted to more important duties. The D.G. sent for me when he returned. He evidently told Cripps a good deal. Cripps is entirely sold on the question of the visitors' ban and will presumably support it in the Cabinet.

I saw C. and took him the document about French resistance movements which we had received from the Frenchman giving his name as ETIENNE. C. sent for Claude Dansey who said that he had also had a copy of this document through an informant in this country, who had something to do with the resistance movement formerly known as the Alliance. The head of this organisation

had been caught and the network had been broken up. It now seemed from the second document received that the Germans were trying to revive the Alliance and use it as a means for penetrating other resistance movements. Dansey said that this was quite plausible and that in fact Manuel of the French 2^{ème} Bureau had approached him a short time ago on the subject of the Alliance. Dansey thought that the French document purporting to be written by d'Astier was probably a genuine one. He thought however that it was slightly curious that we should have both received a copy. It might be that it had been released with some ulterior motive. He did not know the identity of ETIENNE and I promised to give him a description in case he had got the document from the same informant.

We then had a general talk about resistance movements. C. expressed the greatest anxiety about the activities of SOE and the allied governments. He is quite sure that they are all penetrated and that in fact there was practically no resistance movement on the continent outside the communists. He showed me a Sitrep indicating that 25 tons had been dropped in France during the last moon period. Accompanying this report was a map, marking where the arms had been dropped but indicating that not 25 but hundreds of tons had been dropped. C. thought that most of the arms were going straight to the Germans. He knew in fact that a French Commandant who had landed the other day illicitly had been arrested with about 60 of his confederates.

This matter had been reported to Algiers. We know of course of the case of GILBERT and LOUBA. C. told me that he had blown up recently on the whole question with the PM. He had really let himself go and the PM had told him that he was prejudiced against SOE. He said that he was nothing of the sort. He realised the difficulty of their task but that equally he realised that the majority of the material got into wrong hands and that they were penetrated up to the hilt. The effect was to make his work far more difficult than it was already and also to compromise the French military organisation of Gen. Revers. The General had got a very good idea of how the Germans were going to meet an attack and where their concentrations of rolling stock would be. He had made plans to put this rolling stock out of action. In view however of the activities of SOE, the Germans were making wholesale arrests. They had instituted a new pass system which would pin-point anybody who was not doing regular work in the factory and they had introduced some dozens of railway workers to take over the whole railway system. C. doubted therefore whether there would be any resistance in France at all except by the communists. The PM eventually told him to sit down and not to get excited. He did however say that he wished to be kept informed of any other facts which came to C's notice about resistance movements and SOE.

I went to see Sir John Stephenson in order to tell him about SEMPILL. As we expected

SEMPILL had made a fool of himself in Canada and has got mixed up in politics and made some indiscreet speeches. The High Commissioner in Canada is anxious to get rid of him. Stephenson did not see what action could be taken for getting him home unless we could possibly find out what companies he represented. If the chairman of the company was a suitable person the S. of S. might then approach him and see if he could get SEMPILL recalled. Vincent Massey is in Ottawa but Stephenson did not think that he could ask him to intervene.

He told me that Grey had been to see Dev and got a rocket. He was followed shortly by Maffey who was not at all well received. Dev got very excited and said that if necessary Ireland would fight. Maffey told him that there was no need for him to be upstage. He was merely being asked to give the legations their marching orders. If he did not see fit to do so that was that. Dev's next move was to send for the Canadian High Commissioner. He protested that he was being pestered with notes by the British and Americans and tried to enlist Canadian support. He did not however get much help. The Canadians said that while it was perhaps a pity to address formal notes on this subject he thoroughly appreciated the British and American point of view. They were about to undertake an extremely vital operation with the Germans at their door. He thoroughly understood their representations and anxiety.

February 29th

I had a meeting with Brook Booth, Kembal Johnston and Philby about the case of KUKEL. The letter that we sent to the F.O. had been sent back to SIS for comments. Dansey had made a number of a somewhat vague kind and was definitely inaccurate. Kim had no evidence of improper activities by KUKEL although he knew him to be strongly anti-Russian. Kembal Johnson was very confident about Orange but said that he would try and press him for further details. Meanwhile Kim is going to dig round in Broadway.

Kembal Johnson, Brook Booth and I then discussed the CERVELL case and the interrogation of the Czech officer Knorr. Plant who had left for Stockholm on the 23rd to see Nordenskiold, was going to draw the latter's attention firstly to Cervell's relations with the Bristol Aircraft Co. and secondly to the indiscreet conversations he was having with a Czech officer on the subject of the Second Front. Simultaneously with this action it had been proposed that we should on the one hand severely interrogate Bartlett and on the other try and extract a confession from the Czech officer Knorr. We came to the conclusion that there was nothing further to be done about Bartlett who has already received a rocket from Freeman of MAF and apparently is a much chastened man. We agreed however that there might be considerable advantage if we could get Paddy Barry to talk to Knorr. This was arranged.

Harker had a meeting about the E.I. Reg. In view of the recent bombing of London there was a considerable feeling that either it should be housed in the basement and a considerable duplication of records and cards carried out or that it should be moved bodily to BP. We should undoubtedly be in serious straits if it were to be out of action even for a period of a few months. The matter was left open for final decision after further enquiries had been made about the accommodation.

The D.G. has written a note on the one man aspect of the ban. The P.M. at the first meeting of the Cabinet had stressed the point that if one man could get into the area the whole purpose of the ban would be nullified. This of course was a bad red herring since we are always up against the one man. The memo is unfortunately full of references to India including the P.O.W's visit in 1911. While his arguments are perfectly sound, they would I think carry more conviction if they were based on spies in England instead of terrorists in India.

March 1st.

J.C. and Ronnie Reed came to see me about for whom they want to find some sort of employment. I rang up Leonard Ingrams and suggested that J.C. should go round and see him.

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TAR tells me that a crisis has arisen in the


Garbo and Tricycle cases. The trouble is that Artist has once more been poking his nose into Kuhlenthal's affairs and has evidently convinced himself that most of K's agents are under control. This of course includes the Garbo network. He has therefore suggested that as Tricycle is having rather a difficult time with Schreiber we could back him up by planting similar information through Kuhlenthal. We cannot of course admit to Artist that we have no control over K's organisation. Somehow or other we shall have to ride him off. Meanwhile Tricycle is apparently anxious to have Ian Wilson to hold his hand. We are therefore sending him to Lisbon by the next plane.

At the weekly meeting ISOS showed that, presumably as a result of the publicity given to the arrest of O'REILLY, and KENNY in Eire, the Abwehr in Madrid and Lisbon have been given instructions that no further operations are to be undertaken in Eire.

Another urgent request has been made to the Abwehr in Italy to provide civilian clothes as well as army uniforms and equipment. These are to be sent as soon as possible to France for special operations. It has apparently been impossible to obtain the required civilian clothing in Germany since all spare stocks are reserved for bombed-out people. Presumably these clothes are required for spies or commandos, to be used either here prior to D. day or on the continent after the operation has begun.

The D.G. and I went to see Findlater Stewart before the Cabinet meeting in order to clarify our views. It seems that the whole question of the ban is more or less in the lap of the gods. We have tried to think of all the rational arguments. The trouble is that we may be faced with the irrational.

Burt had a long talk with about a meeting he had with C.I. Barrett who is investigating corruption at the Yard. He was quite convinced that Barrett had no intimate knowledge of our technique. On the other hand he was certain that Barrett and his assistants would get nowhere in clearing matters up. Evidently the ground has been well fouled, and even if one started again, using a different organisation, the chances of success would be somewhat remote.



The D.G. and I attended a meeting of the Cabinet committee at 6 this evening, in case we were wanted. As a matter of fact we sat outside in the lobby stoking the fire for 1½ hrs

at the end of which Bridges came out to say that the discussion did not appear to be making much progress and that our services would not be required. Before the meeting the party assembled in the lobby. Ernie Bevin came up while we were talking to Findlater. He seemed to think that a great deal of fuss was being made about nothing. He said that during the last 4 years he had moved hundreds of thousands of men and their families from one part of the country to another. He had been urged by his colleagues to seek the approval of the House before taking action but had refused to do so on the grounds that if you once talked to the House about it there was certain to be trouble. He had never had a murmur from the workmen who took the whole matter as part of their contribution to the war effort. He realised that the question of the diplomatic communications was a bit tricky. I said that the F.O. were likely to be a bit sticky. He said "Oh yes, but then you see they belong to the same union". Bevin then said that his experience of the present Cabinet was that if you were prepared to miss the first train you might catch the second or third. He was clearly alluding to the suggestion put forward at the first meeting of the Cabinet when the P.M. was adamant that a committee should be formed to look into the whole question. John Anderson also talked to us. He seemed to be more than usually pompous and back in his old mood of the cautious P.U.S. He thought the problem of the ban presented great difficulties. He was not staying for the present meeting as obviously the whole question would have to

come before the full Cabinet. I gave him our point of view about keeping the area clear of holiday-makers in order that the spy should stand out if he tried to camp out or take a room at a holiday. He seemed to think there might be something in this. He left us saying that we had his sympathy for what it was worth

March 2nd

TAR, Mockler-Ferryman and Roach came to discuss the ETIENNE document. M-F brought a note by Robin Brook of SOE. Brook evidently thinks that the document is basically genuine although he doubts whether d'Astier is the author. At the time it was written Andre PHILIP was in charge. The documents purports to be issued by the head of the resistance movements in France, but this does not preclude the possibility that it was drafted in Algiers. SOE are on the whole fairly satisfied with its contents since it seems to indicate that they are concerned about fighting the Germans as well as seizing power, and liquidating the collaborationists. The only possible motive for the document being planted would be to encourage SOE to let the French resistance movement have more arms. SOE have rather been taking up the attitude that as the French were more concerned about civilian matters it was not much use sending them arms. As soon as we can identify the informant we propose to send a copy of the document to the F.O. and also to SHAEF.

I saw Hunter this afternoon and told him that

he would have to dismiss one of his watchers who has been taking somewhat indiscreetly in a public bar.

Joe Lynch came to tell me about an American journalist, William David BAYLES, who wants to go to Stockholm for the Sunday Despatch and Sunday Times. He was formerly with the March of Time and is reported to have been educated in Germany. It is said that on his way here from America he dined at the German Legation in Dublin. He has been refused an exit permit to Stockholm.

It is reported that in last night's raid on Stuttgart we only lost 4 planes.

We had a meeting with the D.G. today at which it was decided to move the B.1 Reg to Blenheim.

At 3 p.m. we had another meeting under the chairmanship of Findlater Stewart on Overlord security. He told us what had happened at yesterday's Cabinet Meeting. Apart from a certain number of minor points raised by the M.O.I., we had been asked to discuss the possibility of corridors for the civil population extending throughout the area down to the sea. For obvious reasons this did not appear to the meeting to be a reasonable solution. The coup de grace was given when Con produced a map showing all works of importance from the Wash to Lands End. It was evident to all that there could be only about 2 places where it would be possible for

a very limited number of people to spend a holiday and that it would be almost impossible for the police to keep holiday makers within this area. Even Newsam appeared to be convinced.

As regards diplomatic telegrams, the meeting, with the exception of the F.O. and D.O., took the view that the F.O.'s suggestion to suspend diplomatic communications 10 days before the operation, or to try any kind of cat and mouse business was quite unworkable and even dangerous. The meeting felt that it was a case of all or nothing and recorded their views to this effect.

As regards Norwegians, Crow of the F.O. said that the F.O. had committed themselves and were not anxious to go back on their word to the Norwegians. I explained that we had just had a meeting with the H.O. and Services with a view to minimising the traffic passing through the LRC in order that during this critical period our examinations could be more thorough. If we were now going to have forced on us some 2,000 Norwegians, the effect of any assistance that we might get from the Services would be nullified. It was urged by the MWT that 500 Norwegians were required. They admitted however that these people would be put in the pool and would be employed on any ship going to any destination. There was clearly a security risk even if the people were vetted. The view was then expressed that if the Norwegians were drafted into

the Forces they would be innocuous. I said that this was far from the case. They might even be very dangerous since they would obviously have facilities to move about in military areas. We could not stop them from sending telegrams or writing letters in secret ink. My view was recorded and will be discussed by the Cabinet Committee on Monday.

TAR has been told by SHAEF about what would appear to be a rather serious French leakage. A short time ago d'Astier submitted to SHAEF a plan for the Second Front. SHAEF thought it was probably a ballon d'essai in order to find out what our plans were. Something very nearly approaching this plan appeared in the Evening Standard on the 25th February with a statement to the effect that it had been considered by Eisenhower and Monty who were examining the proposals. I gather from Fleetwood Hesketh who has been handling the matter for SHAEF that the plan was passed through SOE. I have asked for full details.

March 3rd

Loudspeaker reports that in the recent heavy RAF raid on Stuttgart during which 4 bombers were lost. the target was missed by several miles, and certain fires were started in villages which gave rise to the usual reports that fires could be seen many miles away.

About 120 Crossbow sites are known to the RAF. Some 90 have been interfered with. The Air Ministry consider that the Germans have in no sense given up the idea of Crossbow. German aircraft coming over here at night have A.I in their tails. This enables them to take evasive action against our night fighters. I gather that we are fitting similar equipment in our bombers.

The raids by the USAF the week before last on fighter production plants in Germany are considered to be the most successful air operations of the whole war, and that if good weather continues they will have a crippling effect on the German aircraft industry. Night-er cover is possible all the way in to the target, the fuselage of the Mustang being filled up with spare petrol tanks, quite apart from auxiliary wing tanks. This cannot unfortunately be done with a Spitfire.

The Mustang was designed by the German Jew who was Willi Messerschmidt's principal designer until he was kicked out by the Nazis. This plane was considered to be of no interest by the Air Ministry and handed to British Army co-operation. Subsequently the Packard engine co. made Merlin engines under licence from Rolls Royce incorporating this in Mustangs which are now very hot indeed. Fortresses carry no block-busters, only 500 ton bombs and an occasional thousand pounder. They carry a 100 lb incendiary which is considered to have devastating results. The

new British petrol-sprinkling incendiary bomb will come into operational use in the near future and is said to be far superior to any other incendiary bomb at present in use

Harris's bombing operations on Berlin have been suspended for the moment and he has been forced to concentrate on aircraft assembly and manufacturing centres such as Schweinfurt and Augsburg. The Air Ministry now consider that a raid is only successful when pathfinders can actually see their target as well as using H2S. That is to say unless they can look over the edge of the aircraft and see a town it is rare for a raid to be a success. Leipzig was the most successful raid for a considerable time, two thirds of the town having been completely destroyed.

Mockler-Ferryman, Roach and TAR came to see me again about the French document. Robin Brook of SOE had seen it and was of the opinion that it was genuine and was being put about by Giraudists who did not approve of the policy. He thought the document was of importance and should perhaps be shown to the F.O. He also thought that we should ascertain whether it had got into the possession of OSS. As regards the means by which it had got into the field, if in fact it had, it was explained that political documents which were carried out about once a week in a suitcase were only very desultorily examined at the aerodrome. It is thought however that such a document would almost certainly have caught the eye of Dismore, who is responsible for

censorship. It is never possible to take copies of these documents since a Frenchman is generally present during their examination. People are asked whether they are carrying documents and their pockets are emptied but there is no thorough search. The same applies to other nationalities, and of course the Poles are allowed to carry out sealed packages which are privileged.

Harry held a meeting on Overlord, when we ran through the Cabinet Committee's document.

Newsam rang up to say that he entirely agreed with us about bringing Norwegians to this country. For once we find ourselves on the same side of the fence as the H.O.

I have told Hunter to sack Munro, the watcher who has proved unsatisfactory. Some time ago Munro falsified his expenses and now he is boasting to barmaids in pubs about his work.

Jock Whyte blew in in his golfing kit and cap to tell me a long and to me incoherent story about a British deserter who had arrived here from Poland with 1,000 American dollars given him by the Germans. His name is JEFFEREYS.

We have had 877 people through the LRC during the month of February.

The Americans have been over Berlin for the first time in daylight.

The Abwehr are speculating about the Second Front and are not very wide of the mark on present decisions.

March 4th

I asked Jock Whyte to come and see me today. I said that I had heard by a side wind that he was leaving us and I hoped that he was not handing in his resignation with a serious sense of grievance. This caused him to blow up and abuse the organisation. He said that he had come here on the understanding that promotion went according to length of service. I said I knew nothing of any such arrangement and asked him where he had got his information. He said from Kell. He then said that lots of people had been made Lt. Cols. because they had to do a job where such military rank was necessary. I learned afterwards that he had TAR in mind and that the last straw had been TAR's promotion to A.D.B. (If length of service is the criterion for promotion in his mind, then TAR in any case has been here longer than Jock.) It just shows

how wide of the mark old Jock is and how much he has blown himself up in his own estimation. The fact is that he is only fitted to do a very straightforward routine job under fairly close supervision. He simply has not got the capacity to do more and never will have. I did not attempt to argue with him and my temperature remained throughout at 98.4. I told him that I had really wanted to discuss his successor and to ask him his views about Isham. This only caused a further

outburst in which he said he would not recommend Isham or anybody else to have anything to do with B. Division. I then said that if that was his view further discussion was not likely to be very profitable. With this he stumped out and slammed the door.

The reactions of the high-ranking German P/Ws are very remarkable. Bassenge thinks it a sign of our very good breeding that we do not reproach the German I/Ws with the raids in the same way that we did not make them suffer reprisals for the shackling of British P/W in Germany. Von Thoma is of the opinion that these raids are in the nature of nuisance raids ~~xxxx~~ and will have no effect on the outcome of the war. Gen. Cruwell retires to the lavatory when the barrage begins. Gen. Bramer, who is being repatriated, made a very nice speech to the Commandant before his departure. He stated that now he was going he could reveal to the Commandant that he had 25% English blood. He had not done so before in case the Commandant should think he wished thereby to get special treatment. Every time he looked out of the window and saw his very smart guards he was proud of his English blood. When the Commandant had left he made a further speech to a BAO. Having formally reminded the BAO that he had been commander of the Afrika Corps, he stated that he wished to present him with a memento; not only in his own name but in the name of all the officers of the Afrika Corps has a token of their gratitude for the British gentlemenly(sic). He then gave the BAO his armband "AfrikaCorps"

from his uniform with the remark that not even Arnim was entitled to wear that. Cramer was not at all looking forward to his interview with Hitler. He would however have to give a full report on the last days in Tunis and on his stay at No. 11 camp. About the latter he could say nothing but good. He would however tell Hitler the truth about von Arnim, whose behaviour in the camp was the worst possible propaganda for the German Army, and Cramer apologised for it to the BAO. He regarded von Arnim as an "office general" and not as a fighter. Cramer's personal vanity had not left him on arrival at the station which he was surprised to find still standing. His guard was stopped by a policeman, and the BAO explained that they would have to drive in as a German prisoner was in it. Cramer took exception to this and suggested that the BAO might have explained that a German General was there. Cramer refused to have his German batman in the same carriage or a British private with a rifle. He had finally to be reminded that he was still a P/W. Cruwell has decided that he can make himself ill enough to qualify for repatriation either by taking cold baths which make him very nervous, or by scratching the eczema on his leg and transferring it to his whole body.

Tricycle left for Lisbon on Saturday and has already had an all-night interrogation from Schreiber. This has evidently made him a little nervous but he seems to be doing fairly well. Karsthoff is taking Tricycle's

information to Berlin. Treasure left on the 1st March.

A German P/W N.O. has obtained the following information from a tank specialist who has driven one of the new so-called "beetles" which appeared in the Anzio bridgehead. In the tank, which is fairly close to the ground, there is an explosive charge. The tanks are steered by remote control from their base towards the enemy. You do not need to watch these tanks, as it films what it sees in front of it and this is automatically reproduced by wireless at the tank's base. The remote control base cannot see the tank, which may be behind a hill but they can steer it. The explosive charge can be detonated by a time fuse which will operate long enough to enable the tank to turn and withdraw.

March 6th

I had a meeting at the F.O. with Cadogan, Viv., Orme Sargent and Loxley, on the subject firstly of the diplomatic cyphers and secondly the Norwegians. The real purpose of the meeting was to discover if possible some alternative to the complete severance of diplomatic communication which caused the F.O. considerable anxiety. Viv. put forward the view that it was arguable that as nothing had gone wrong with operation Torch, the Germans were just as likely to be confused about Overlord. I felt that there was a distinct difference here, since Overlord

was actually being mounted from this country and there was much on the ground which would give the whole show away, whereas Torch was only a case of embarkation for an unknown destination. Viv. also put forward a view that it was better to know what information the enemy was getting in order that you could plug what was wrong and divert what was right. This argument is at first sight quite plausible but it postulates that we read everything, as in fact we do not. We fall down on the two most important lines, namely the Spanish and Swedish, both of which have direct contact with the Axis. The F.O. hoped that it might be sufficient to impose a delay during the briefing period. Cadogan took a grave view of the possibilities of retaliation.

We then discussed the 2,000 Norwegians. Viv. was far from helpful. He suggested that SIS should do an immense amount of preliminary vetting in Stockholm and expressed the view that these Norwegians who had been at the lumber camps some of them for 18 months, were not likely to be very dangerous. This encouraged the F.O. to urge us to take as many as possible, merely because they want to get themselves out of a rather awkward situation, which it is fair to say is not entirely of their making. The whole suggestion started 18 months ago when Air Marshal Bowhill asked the Americans if they could supply transport. At that time the Americans said no. Later however the question was revived by Gen. Spaatz and a Norwegian Admiral. They

had in fact fixed up an arrangement to bring the Norwegians here without ever consulting the F.O. or ourselves. Faced with this fait accompli the F.O. more or less endorsed the proposal. It was only at this stage that we had the story.

I went direct from this meeting to the Cabinet Committee where both these problems were again discussed. The Cabinet endorsed their previous recommendations that diplomatic telegrams, bags and couriers should be suspended at least 60 days before the Operation.

As regards Norwegians, Viv. again intervened but I fought the case as best I could. The Committee agreed that we should take as many as we could consistent with security, but that the details should be worked out between ourselves, H.O. and F.O. I

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Vivian Seymer came to see me. I had asked him to call as I thought he might, if he was willing, take on Jock Whyte's work. He seemed quite keen to do it and I left him to think things over. He told me the story of his demobilisation. Before the A.D. school was disbanded he had under him 2 Lt. Col.s, about 20 majors and 180 captains. The captains who were the cream of those who had passed through the school and then had been brought back, much against their will were posted to units as Lts. to serve under people who they themselves had trained. The Lt. Col.s and majors were sent to Woolwich where they have been kicking their heels for 3 moths. Vivian had to attend a course in map reading which he

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had done 28 years ago at the shop. Exasperated at having nothing to do he eventually got the Ministry of Reconstruction to apply for his release. The only anxiety to the W.O. when they boarded him was that he should make a declaration that he was leaving voluntarily, so that they would not be obliged to give him a gratuity for his 4 years hard work. Having got his discharge he joined the Home Guard to serve as an A.A. gunner. He is 49 and A.1 fit with a D.S.O., M.C. and bar to his credit. This is quite typical of the A.G. a branch of the W.O. who do nothing but shout for man-power and when they get it keep people hanging about doing nothing.

MARCH 7TH

I attended the J.I.C. meeting today when they took our paper suggesting that the Services should cut down as far as possible on their requirements of unenrolled allied personnel who keep on coming here from N.Africa. A number of these people had come out of France since the total occupation and had to be examined. We were anxious to keep the numbers as low as possible in order to interrogate those who have to come more thoroughly. The J.I.C. took the view that refugees should go to N.Africa, that unenrolled personnel should be diverted to N.Africa and that the forces should cut down enrolled personnel as far as possible. As regards the last category they could not commit themselves, as it seemed to be a matter for SHAEF. to decide. It was

agreed therefore that a further meeting should be held on Thursday when SHAEF should be asked to be present.

I had a meeting at the H.Q. with Newsam, Warner of the F.O., Kirk and Jeffes. We agreed to take 200 Norwegians and to pass them through the schools at 25 per week. This number to be stepped up if we could obtain relief from the services. Alternatively we could take 2,000 and put them into the I.O.M. under conditions similar to those imposed on enemy aliens and British Fascists. These people could not be examined under a period of about 20 months, and there would obviously be grave repercussions. The F.O. wished to make this offer to the Norwegians but said they would paint it as black as possible since they felt it could only end in trouble.

A Belgian called JAMOTTE has succeeded in getting through the LRC. His name came up on an ISOS service which had only just been broken, although it was some 4 months old. Herbert had the name passed over the records and found that the man had come through the LRC with a bad chit some time ago. He had been passed on to the Belgians with a warning and as a result of observation kept by them he had been arrested owing to his suspicious conduct.

I told the D.M.I. that I had had a telegram from Maunsell in which he said that Hunloke had been completely white-washed. He would like therefore to bring him into the ISPAL

picture. GOC Palestine was thoroughly satisfied, and so was the C. in C.

I have just heard about LEUKACEVIC, a Yugoslav who is arriving here in the suite of King Peter. According to ISOS he contracted a treaty with the Germans some time ago and in fact agreed to collaborate with them against the Partisans. The indications are however that the Germans do not altogether trust him. The question arises as to what they are going to do with him when he gets here.

Crossbow reports for March 4th show that the rate of construction and repair of the ski-sites has been considerably reduced. The average delay between the time the site is rendered Category A and the commencement of repairs is 14 days and in the case of Cat. B sites 24 days. The enemy appears to concentrate his resources on the most advanced sites rather than spreading them over a large number. Priority in repair work is given to launching points which are heavily camouflaged. Reports on production are still vague and do no more than give an impression that stocks of pilotless aircraft may amount to about 3,000 with a monthly production of 1,000. It is likely that various modifications will have to be introduced.

March 8th,

Efforts are being made to trace JAMMOTTE who was in the Belgian gendarmerie and has now joined the Belgian forces. He has bought

himself a typewriter and is reported to be taking an interest in aerodromes.

One of B.I.A.'s agents has received a plain language code which is to indicate the sector of the coast at which the Second Front will be opened. The telegrams containing this code are supposed to come from the Guaranty Trust Co. to the Banco Espirito Santo and the code lies in the amount of money demanded. I gather that the reaction of the bank would normally be to tell the client to send his own telegram. However there mightwell be cases where the bank would perform this service. There is on the other hand no possible machinery at present in force for preventing anyone sending a telegram to a bank in Lisbon which purports to come from a bank in this country. This is quite a serious matter since Censorship does not provide against such a contingency. Telegrams of the kind described would probably be sent on without question. I asked Grogan to look into the matter and let me have a report.

Grogan said that he had made arrangements in view of the NEUKERMANN'S case for all Barcelona letters to be tested.

Dick gave the meeting a talk about the I.B. side in relation to the Second Front.

Kemal Johnston and Guy Burgess came to see me about Orange. Burgess has ascertained that

Orange got his information about KUKEL from the Swiss M.A. who got it from the Polish MA.

Burgess raised the question of Orange's future. He has the opportunity of becoming editor of the Suricher Zeitung. This gives him considerable financial advantages. On the other hand in many ways he and his wife would prefer to remain here. In order to tip the balance it is proposed that we should pay Orange his expenses when he throws a party which provides us with information. This I think we should certainly do, as there is no doubt that Orange should prove extremely valuable to us particularly in the post-war period.

I had a long talk with John last night. He told me that almost every detail of Crossbow had been worked out from aerial photographs. It had even been possible to say where the magnetic apparatus was inserted since this had to be done in a wooden building. Every detail of the construction of these sites is known and although the German camouflage is now extremely good it is on the whole somewhat doubtful whether the Germans could construct the site without our knowing about it. Most of the details that have been worked out by photograph have been confirmed by an individual who has actually been employed building a ski-site in France. John is rather appalled by the German defences which seem to consist of explosive mine-fields behind which are gun-emplacements which are again surrounded by anti-personnel mines.

Beyond this there is another mine field. If Air-borne troops were dropped behind this defence line they would be up against the same difficulties as those attacking from the front. The trouble about destroying a minf-field by aerial ~~A~~bombardment is that such an operation is only likely to be partially successful. It is not possible to do it systematically through taking photographs and checking up since the mines can so quickly be replaced.

I went to see Loxley about LEUKACEVIC. We agreed that it would be best in the first instance to approach King Peter's entourage and find out what story LUEKACEVIC had told his own people. We should then be in a better position to judge whether he should be locked up.

I asked Reggie Gibbs to come and see me about the Springbok case. He told me that to the best of his recollection Thurston had asked him whether he could see our file. Knowing that it contained Felix's letter Gibbs told Thurston that there was nothing on the file that was not already at SIS and that since it was their case he had better make application to them. This story had got somewhat magnified into a refusal by SIS to tell them anything about Springbok. SIS say they never intended to keep from the FBI information about Springbok except that which related to his finances. On the other hand there is a letter in our file in which Felix says that it would not be appropriate to discuss Springbok's case with the F.B.I.

Dickson came to talk to me about his position.

He says everything is going on as usual and that he feels very worried about the whole state of affairs. I told him that I had not made any recommendations about his being run by B.I.B because I was waiting for a decision on a matter of policy with regard to the running of M/S which had been taken up by Hollis. Dickson told me that he had just managed to get 6 fire-watchers into the Spanish Embassy. They ought to be quite useful if there is any trouble.

March 9th

I talked to Burt about the STOCKMAN case. I thought that possibly if he was willing to express his views to the D.G. on the handling of current cases the D.G. might feel inclined to tell Maxwell that in his view nothing would be done as long as the Yard tried to clean this matter up themselves. The work would obviously have to be done by an outside body. Burt was dead against my saying anything. He said that if anything did leak out about his having expressed such views it would be the end of his relations with Norman Mendal and the Yard.

Brig. Crockatt came to see me about the case of a man called CAMPBELL, an escaped P/W who, according to Lemon has been describing his experiences to CERVELL and others. M.I.9 wanted to prosecute. I said that this would be impossible but that we should not mind

CAMPBELL being given a reprimand on perfectly general lines. He could be told that it had come to the knowledge of the W.O. that he had been talking about his experiences and that if any more reports reached us he would find himself in serious trouble.

Unfortunately I did not get an opportunity of talking to Crockatt about Jock Whyte. I learn however from C. that he had been told by someone, presumably Crockatt, that we were sacking an extremely good officer named Whyte at a very critical moment. This officer was liked by all and had been doing valuable work. There is of course a lot of malicious propaganda being spread about the place by Jock, but I have no doubt that we shall be able to live it down. I told C. who was at pains to affirm that it was none of his business, that Jock Whyte was a man of small capacity on whom I had never been able to rely. Infact - should have been glad to see the last of him more than 4 years ago.

I went over to see Orme Sargent about the LEUKACEVIC case. Peter Loxley and Ward were also present. Orme Sargent has a typically F.O. manner and outlook. He clearly had not studied the papers and began by treating me as a somewhat crude policeman who wanted to get everyone locked up. I ended by shouting him down and explaining that at the moment we were not suggesting any such course. We felt that the best thing would be for the F.O. to approach the King or someone in his suite and ask them to give an account of LEUKACEVIC's

activities during the last 6 or 8 months, as disclosed to them by L. himself. If it transpired that L. had disclosed to his own people that he had made a treaty with the Germans for special purposes, this information coupled with the MSS information that the Germans did not want L. to leave Yugoslavia would go a long way towards clearing matters up. If on the other hand L. had merely told ~~his own~~ people the same story that he had told the British authorities in Mid East, the case against him would look fairly black and in our view he would then merit internment and interrogation. Orme Sargent seemed inclined to "get rid of him quietly". I said I thought that this did not really meet the case. Obviously he would be an embarrassment if he were at large in the Mid East and if he got back to Yugoslavia he might be a real danger. Equally we did not want him wandering about here. He had therefore much better be locked up.

While we were talking Crow and Eden's private secretary bounced into the room, their faces wreathed in smiles, and said that they wanted to give Orme Sargent the latest tip about the Norwegians. They mentioned that the P.M. had lunched with the King of Norway, and had decreed that all the Norwegians were to come here and be rapidly examined by the Security Service at a higher rate than 150 a week. I told Orme Sargent that it was quite impossible to do this unless the services could give us some relief. Orme Sargent tried to minimise the importance of the Norwegians. I

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told him that we had more than 20 Norwegian subjects up at 020, that it was more than probable that the batch from Stockholm would contain two or 3 spies and that we had had two cases of people with instructions to send telegrams in code and that the Germans were stepping up their activities in this country to a considerable degree. It was quite possible to carry out any sort of examination at the LRC in under one day per man per officer. The average period for getting through the LRC was something like 10 days.

I spoke to Loxley afterwards. He said he thought that we should write a full-dress letter of protest to the S. of S. It certainly is pretty futile sitting round a table for about 3 weeks to consider a lot of panic measures for the security of Overlord and then to have the front gate opened by the P.M. over a cup of coffee with the King of Norway. It is a great pity that this great man cannot keep his fingers off a number of minor problems with which he should never be concerned at all

C. told me that the P.M. was very annoyed at the Cabinet meeting because the Security Service could not deal with the Norwegians. I gather that no decision was reached about diplomatic cyphers.

Bronx has just received her monthly payment from the Germans of £98. She has the plain language code on the Guaranty Trust previously mentioned. "Send £80 which I need for my dentist" means "Invasion in a week's time"

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Atlantic. £70 means N. France, and Belgium, £60, N. France and Bay of Biscay, £50 Bay of Biscay, £40 Mediterranean, £30 Denmark, £20 Norway, £10 the Balkans. In case of invasion at several places, these sums added together are to be given. for example "Send £30 plus £80 and the rest as soon as possible".

Garbo is preparing to carry out another Plan Dream.

The Abwehr have told Tate that they have nonne who can assist him in getting bomber reports from the Cambridge district, but they are making enquiries from "other depts.". In view of the nature of the two questionnaires recently received by Lipstick from the Germans it is considered that he is not at present compromised, although the danger of his becoming so as a result of the Catalan round-up still exists.

I had a long talk with Ian Wilson, who has just returned from Lisbon. He seems to think that the position both of Tricycle and Artist is fairly secure at the moment. He has managed to lay Artist off from poking his nose too deeply into the affairs of Kuhlenthal by expressing the view that K. like Ostro, is one of those people who make up most of their information.

has succeeded in making contact with ariaux, a German journalist whom he knew formerly in Brussels. This ought to make a very good reference. Catalogue Reference: KW/4/193.

March 10th

and Buckmaster

Warden/of SOE came to see me about GILBERT. Buckmaster is evidently at his wits end to know what to do with GILBERT who is bored to tears at Stratford on Avon and like to blow up at any moment. The proposal had been put forward that he should operate as an ATA pilot. I said that if we considered that he was too doubtful to be allowed to go back into the field, flying an aeroplane was the last job we should wish him to do in this country. I said that on the evidence available I did not see how anybody could possibly clear GILBERT although he might be entirely innocent. Personally I felt that LOUBA and ROGER were quite as suspicious if not more so. Buckmaster then said that LOUBA had been responsible for blowing up and seriously damaging certain factories. I asked whether he was quite sure that LOUBA had committed the acts of sabotage. Were they not perhaps carried out by communists. LOUBA might well have cashed in on the incident in order to build himself up in the eyes of the British. I just could not believe in Col. HEINRICH and his relations with LOUBA and ROGER. At this stage Buckmaster said "Presumably you do not think anybody ought to go into the field at all". I said "Well, frankly, in the present circumstances I don't". I am sorry for Buckmaster who is obviously very over-worked and harrassed, and I promised to do what I could to think up some job for GILBERT.

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I understand from Cecil that there is now a proposal to cut off all Eire telephones from this country.

Nordenskiold, has written a note to CERVELL telling him to watch his step, and CERVELL has made an application to go and see Plant.

Newsam rang up about the Norwegians. He has had a letter from Cadogan saying that at lunch with the King of Norway and the Norwegian P.M. and Foreign Minister on March 9th, the P.M. said that he thought the rate of 150 a week for vetting Norwegians was not enough and undertook that arrangements should be made to increase it. He asked the Foreign Secretary to see that this was done. The Norwegians apparently said that if our difficulties were due to the limited number of staff capable of carrying out the necessary examination they could certainly help by providing suitable Norwegians for the purpose. Cadogan also said that one of the reasons why the Norwegians were anxious to get these men out was that the Americans had promised to make over a number of ships to them and they had not the men to man them without these reinforcements. It is quite interesting that the Norwegians have come clean on this point.

March 11th

I hear that the visitors' ban has at last been approved. The question of diplomatic communications is however still in the air.

I arranged that Geoffrey Wethered should take over Jock Whyte's work until I can get Vivian Seymer into the saddle.

Newsam rang up again. He wants to have a meeting at 11 next Monday. I said that we would come prepared to see the 2,000 Norwegians brought to the I.O.M. where the Norwegian authorities could assist them to fill up forms.

We would then say what people we wanted to see. Unless there were any special grounds we should not ask for them to be sent to the LRC. Probably we should only examine about 10% and the remainder would be released without any examination at all. We could not possibly do more and the responsibility must lie with those who had given the orders. We should say so in a formal letter to the S. of S. Newsam seemed to think this was all right.

According to Artist the Chief of the German General Staff, Zeitzler, has had access to Tricycles latest reports but is inclined to express doubts about their authenticity.

Apparently what is wanted is more detail. It is interesting that reports of this kind do in fact reach and are considered by the General Staff. Kuhlenthal has also expressed doubts about Tricycle's reports. Artist suggests that we should pass similar reports to those submitted by Tricycle through Kuhlenthal. This would give added authority. It seems that as a result of the enquiries being made into the K.O's in neutral countries, a compromise solution will be reached reducing the personnel of the Abwehr at the expense

of the S.D. There is a drastic reorganisation of the Abwehr in France and Belgium owing to invasion prospects. Brussels station is to be transferred to Wiesbaden, leaving Abt. III behind. Dijon is to be transferred to Stuttgart, Bordeaux to Cologne or Wiesbaden. The Paris Abwehrstelle is to be re-named Leitstelle Westen and to remain in situ. All Meldekoepfe are to go except the Bureau Wiegand which is to be kept open for the sake of Tricycle. Leitstelle Westen is to be much smaller than Leitstelle Paris and the spare personnel is to be transferred to Wiesbaden. Stations in France and Belgian will leave behind their shadow organisations. Brussels claims to have 25 men, Bordeaux has frankly said they have nobody, Paris had 4 at present, working on main sets. These are to be replaced by battery sets as soon as possible. In order to run the shadow organisation and presumably for other Abwehr duties, Abwehrtrupps are to be formed from the old Abwehrstelle. These will consist of 6 men in uniform attached to IC of the General Staff of the A.O.K. There will be two Abwehrkommandos attached to the Army Group in France.

March 22nd

I returned to work today after flu.

Cyril Mills is back from Canada on a visit. He seems to get on well and to have had no further trouble with Security Co-Ordination. All his dealings in Washington are with Barty Bouverie, who is more than helpful. He told me that he had tipped off D.S. C. about SEMPILL

but had received a note from Dick to the effect that Bill Stevenson knew SEMPILL well and thought him entirely beyond any subversive activity of any kind. This of course is not exactly the point. The trouble with SEMPILL now is that he is grossly indiscreet and has a knack of saying the wrong thing on every possible occasion. Furthermore, he is not in the Western Hemisphere in order to further the cause of the Knights of St. Columbus, but rather to do some business deals in connection with post-war aviation. It is probably in this connection that he has become acquainted with Stevenson.

Vivian Seymer came to see me and have fixed up his appointment in place of Jock Whyte, who left on the 15th. The general view seems to be that Jock made very heavy weather of his job, which was conducted in the usual somewhat muddle-headed way. If Seymer does not find that he had got enough to do he will assist Geoffrey Wethered. He also intends to continue his job in the Home Guard.

Owing to an oversight Dennis Page has sent us a copy of a new series of messages which appears to relate to Russian espionage in Scandinavia. Enquiry shows that this series has now reached 280, and was issued to all the other recipients of ISOS and ISK with a special note from SIS that on no account was it to be shown to MI5. It seems to me that this procedure on the part of SIS is both irregular and inept. We have a right to

know precisely how the forces of R.S.S. are being disposed. This is part of Dick's duties as chairman of the RSIC. The RSIC has to assess priorities but cannot possibly do so unless it knows how the personnel and equipment of R.S.S. are employed. R.S.S. is the technical tool of ourselves and SIS and not an SIS body as most people in that organisation seem to imagine. Secondly if the messages disclose Russian espionage methods they are certainly relative to the studies of this dept. Lastly it is highly insulting to MI5 for a letter to be circulated to other depts. implying that we are not the sort of people who can be trusted to handle confidential papers.

I learn that Felix is going to the Burmese Front where he intends to unfurl the Section V. flag preparatory to the opening of Stage B. He takes the view that the war in the west is over.

The Norwegian business has been settled. They are to be housed in the IOM where they will be examined by Norwegian E. officers. A small percentage of those who appear suspect will be sent down to the LRC. We are making it quite clear that we cannot accept the responsibility for this arrangement which has been forced upon us. Meanwhile there are 660 people at the LRC and nothing appears to have been done to stop the flow. Moylan, when challenged with this at Findlater Stewart's meeting said that he did not know that there was a system of visas for these

people. Jeffes has now telegraphed out. All this ought to have been done weeks ago, when Milmo and I had a conference at the H.O. at which Maxwell, Newsam Moyland and Prestige were all present.

The question of diplomatic telegrams is still in abeyance. No decision has been reached as to whether they are to be stopped. Meanwhile they are being staggered. The visitors ban is to take effect on April 1st.

I saw Dickson, who came to talk about his memo on M/S. I said that I would like, with his concurrence to discuss the whole question with Hollis, when he returned on Friday. I felt there were only two courses open, either for me to tell the D.G. that I did not think Dickson's show worked very well in M/S and should come directly under Blunt, or to have the whole position of M/S investigated. I thought that if all the facts contained in his memo were true it would be right and proper that the matter should be looked into and that cards should be placed on the table. This however would be a serious matter for him, if the allegations were not substantiated. It was difficult for me to express an opinion as I did not really know the work of the section, which was mainly carried out on behalf of F. Division. After talking to Hollis, I would speak to him again.

March 23rd

I had a long talk with TAR, who said that Army Signals had reason to think that the Germans

were trying to muscle in on their communications by using their procedure. The case is not yet proven, but it would not be surprising if there were something in it. I gather however that there is evidence to show that the Germans are finding it much more difficult to get information by means of W/T intelligence, which is on account of the general tightening up that has been going on as a result of our representations some months ago.

TAR and Phipps visited the SOE school at Beaulieu and have come to the conclusion that the school should be removed to a line north of the "ash to the Bristol Channel or that certain of its outstations, from which activities in the Solent can be observed, should be closed down, and that exercises in Bournemouth and Southampton should cease. We carried out this enquiry at the request of SOE and as a result of Findlater Stewart's committee which has had to give an assurance to the Cabinet that the necessary precautions have been taken to see that agents going into the field were not in possession of vital information about Overlord.

Col. McLeod G.I Counter-Intelligence SHAEF came to see me. We had a general discussion about I.B. matters and covered most of the ground. He evidently is most grateful for all the assistance that we have given and sees eye to eye with us in almost every particular. He was mostly concerned about the C.C.I. Bureau

which is to be established in Germany after the Armistice and is looking round for personnel. He had his eye on Stopford. I said that we should be very pleased to let Stopford go if the D.G. approved and that we also had others in mind. He wanted the Bureau to have all the necessary ingredients. He was most worried about most secret material. I said that what he would have to guard against would be little blankettted bits of information. It would be essential for him to have the raw product and for those who had to act upon it to see it and study it. He would probably have a battle about this. He entirely agreed. I said that I was the last person to wish to perpetrate any 5/6 warfare. In fact I had been fighting against it for some years. I personally had the best of relations with C. but we had had considerable difficulty with some of his subordinates who held very strongly to the view that if people had to make use of the material they should know all about it. Any other course was dangerous.

5/R 2/13- He then talked in the highest terms about Gwyer and his work. He was very anxious to have him as the collator, collector and distributor of intelligence at SHAEF. He thought he had entirely the right mind for the job and was second to none. I said that provided the D.G. agreed, I should be delighted to see Gwyer take up the position.

March 24th

Burt came to see me about some pornographic photographs which he had obtained for SOE who are arranging to have them dropped over the Japanese lines. They have on the back of them a statement to the effect that any Japanese surrendering with one of these photographs will be given reasonable conditions of internment. Burt wondered whether this whole scheme was approved in the highest quarters and whether if not we as an office might find ourselves in trouble. I said that I had confined myself to getting a request in writing from a responsible officer in SOE, that we as an office took no responsibility but were merely rendering SOE a service. I agreed however that it might be wise to put the whole question to Archie Boyle and point out that if this action had not the approval of the Govt. of India and possibly also other Govt. Depts. there might be trouble. The distribution of photographs of this kind would inevitably be laid to the door of the British Govt. and be held up against us as a breach of the Geneva Convention. I accordingly spoke to Archie Boyle. He said that he did not much like the whole proposition himself but that he was under the impression that it had the highest approval, including that of the authorities in India. He would however look further into the matter and let me know.

Vivian Seymer started work here today under the guidance of Geoffrey Wethered.

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Garbo's story to the Abwehr about being blackmailed by his courier has gone down in a big way. He has received a message of hearty congratulations and his conduct is regarded as being on a par with the highest gallantry in the field.

Treasure has returned. Her wireless set is coming by bag. She had got £1,200 and a diamond bracelet for £300. In addition she has brought some excellent cigars for her notional head in the M.O.I.

Admiral Burnett called here to see the D.G. He has just been appointed C. in C. South Atlantic. The D.G. told him something of the set-up in S. Africa, and is arranging for Ryde to call on him when he gets to S. Africa.

We are arranging with the F.O. for special facilities on MAMBLAS.

Crossbow reports of the 13th March indicate that the total number of ski-sites under construction is about 100 and not 120 as previously stated. The enemy appear to be giving priority to the repair of launching points and fuel store buildings. There have been further reports that the enemy is experiencing difficulties with labour. Some progress has been made at Watten and at Mimoyecques a report indicating the work at the latter place on rocket launching having recently been received.

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March 25th

I had a long talk with Roger Hollis, who has read Jimmy Dickson's memo on M/S. While he feels that it contains slight indications of neurosis, there is nevertheless a fairly large substratum of truth indicating a certain lack of organisation and laxity of control in financial matters. There is also sex which rears its ugly head in various directions. Relations between officers and members of the staff outside office hours may not directly be the concern of the dept. At the same time when the head of a section who is married is known to be living with his secretary or another member of the female staff the general atmosphere within the section is likely to deteriorate. Roger tells me that the present discussions with Barker and Horrocks are not getting very far. There seems to be a tendency to try and solve the difficulty by effecting a closer liaison between M/S and F.Divn. Roger does not think that this meets the point. He takes the view that most of the people in M/S are not really qualified to interrogate agents intelligently since they themselves are not sufficiently au fait with the communist and fascist movements. He suggests that it might be an advantage if I had a talk with Horrocks after I have seen Roberts on Monday.

I spoke to Petch today about the final^{ized} decision regarding diplomatic cables. Apparently the whole question is to remain in abeyance until next month. The F.O. seem to think that it has been permanently shelved. It probably has until some grave breach of security has been committed. When the horse has bolted there will doubtless be attempt to bolt the stable door and thereby pin-point the operation. I suggested to Petch that it might be possible without causing any serious come-back to start delay in telegrams by a gradual process until D. Day. This was in fact our original suggestion although it had been conceived on a basis of 4-6 days delay. If however we can step this up to 10 days it might have a certain value. Petch said that he would put this point to Findlater Stewart.

Two other points have arisen connected with Overlord security: (1) the application of an exit permit by two Chilean diplomats to go to Lisbon for a month's holiday. The F.O. feel that they cannot be stopped. (2) The movements of diplomats as distinct from Service attaches. This has been discussed at the JIC some time ago and at Cavendish Bentinck's suggestion he undertook to explore the possibilities. Two weeks ago however he rang up to say that the opposition presented so many difficulties that he did not think it was feasible. The present situation is that while service attaches cannot go into the banned area, a diplomat can travel freely. I think we shall raise this question again.

I telephoned to Peter Loxley about a report which indicated that Bailey had been talking to a Yugoslav official in Cairo and had expressed the view that the Chetniks were far superior people to the Partisans. This is as may be, but probably Bailey, who would not have access to ISOS material, is in ignorance of details relating to Mihailovic's collaboration with the Germans. I gather that Bailey will not be returning to Yugoslavia. Meanwhile LEUKACEVIC is being sent back at Mihailovic's request in order to facilitate the exit of 20 or 30 British liaison officers who are present at Mihailovic's headquarters. There is no doubt that the Yugoslav situation is in a thorough mess.

There is evidence to show that the traffic supplied for deception purposes by Dudley Clarke to Tricycle has been sent on to the Balkans. We intend to carry out another Plan Dream directly with Garcia ARMAS, eliminating MUNOZ as the intermediary. Pesetas will be paid over directly to ARMAS's brother when he visits Madrid from San Sebastian. By arrangement with the French Fido is to be posted to Algiers and subsequently to W. Africa. In this way it is hoped to keep him out of Father's way. We planned for the delivery of a new wireless set for Brutus by parachute. This plan has now been abandoned by the Germans but instead they are promising to make two deliveries at an hotel in London. It is feared that this may be effected by Tricycle, although the latter will be instructed to refuse on the grounds that he does not want

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to be tied up with another agent.

The German view of Pétain at the moment is that for his 88 years he is both physically and mentally astonishingly alert. He is still capable of coming to a decision and holding to a resolve, but after long periods of strain there are noticeable signs of fatigue and during the events of recent times his memory has easily failed him. In his capacity as head of the State therefore he is to a large extent thrown back on the support of his staff and accepts to a large degree their opinions. The Marshal still dislikes Laval intensely, holding him responsible for the failure of the national revolution and blaming him for not dealing more energetically with the internal situation. Pétain is a strong supporter of the suppression of disorder and in this connection both Darnand and Henriot enjoy his confidence. The Marshal is bitterly anti-Bolshevik and fears a catastrophe if the Second Front is successful. His principle hope is for an understanding between the western powers and Germany which will restore to France her freedom and independence. Meanwhile Pétain does not wish to do anything to compromise himself in the eyes of the Americans and ourselves.

The Germans have informed the Japs that their action in Hungary was due to their distrust of the Prime Minister Kallay who appeared desirous of pulling Hungary out of the war at the first opportunity. Hungary was apparently infiltrating more troops on the Roumanian border with the result that Roumania who had sent a large

number of first line troops to the eastern front, was becoming uneasy about her rear. Horthy is regarded as being sincere in his collaboration with Germany. The Germans appear to be to some extent anxious that we may attack Spain.

March 26th

I gather that Operation Anvil was cancelled the day before yesterday.

I lunched today with Peter Loxley. We discussed to some extent the post-war organisation. He is still very positively of the opinion that the present arrangement between ourselves and SIS cannot be allowed to continue. He does not think that there should be total amalgamation but he does believe in a constant interchange of personnel as between ourselves, SIS EnO. and the Service Intelligence depts. He rather hoped that the present arrangement by which Eden was our minister might facilitate something of the kind. He has evidently been discussing the whole problem with Pat Riley when he was in N. Africa. I suggested the possibility of our having allotted to us the post of assistant PCO with the duties of carrying out the liaison with the local police and 2eme bureaux. This would seem logical if Passport Control was going to lose its secret service character.

I then discussed the question of the reorganisation of the German Police Force. I gather there is to be a conference on this subject

on Tuesday and I thought that we ought to be represented. Meanwhile we have collected certain information from Columbine and Altmann which should prove useful. Loxley is going to arrange for our representation.

March 27th

According to a wire from Maffey, the Eire Govt. are stopping the recruitment of Irish labour from this country. The excuse is that as the Eire Govt. do not know what sanctions we are going to impose they may have to keep men for cutting peat if they cannot get coal. Maffey is anxious to make some reassuring statement. The P.M. on the other hand seems to take pleasure in keeping Dev on tenter-hooks. The whole effect of this of course is to damage ourselves. The Americans, having started the trouble are now easing off, giving Ireland certain commodities they want and leaving us to hold the security baby.

Neville Bland was enquiring about two Dutchmen concerning whom he had had a complaint from the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs. Baxter tells me that they came out with a party which was facilitated by Louis de Bray and that one if not 2 of the party are definitely spies. I have told Bland that we will look into this case and let him know the result.

Tricycle who is at present in Lisbon with his
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brother is playing for very high stakes. He is telling the Abwehr that he will not go on working for them unless he gets a guarantee regarding his post-war future. I suppose he wants them to deposit a large sum in a neutral country. Lisbon are backing him but Berlin are clearly a bit worried.

March 28th

I had a talk with Stopford about his organ-
isation. He said that SIS were extremely
pleased about the prospect of his new recruit
where
he will doubtless be very useful. This is
rather a good example of how C.E. should
really work as one unit.

We then talked about the case of STANTON, a
temporary civil servant and journalist
attached to Lord Beaverbrook's staff. A
letter had been obtained which was
written by CARLBERG to his headquarters in
Sweden, and showed that STANTON had been
giving away a large amount of information both
to CARLBERG and to the Americans relating
civil aviation matters. This letter was
shown to Hildred, unfortunately without
prior reference to Dick or myself. Hildred was
asked to treat it confidentially, but showed
it to the Beaver, who immediately went off the
deep end and sacked STANTON. It emerged that
leakage of information from his dept. had
been worrying the Beaver for a long time,
and only a few days previously he had been
shocked to find that an account of a meeting
that he had held was cabled back to him by

Lord Halifax from Washington within 48 hours. Halifax had got it from the Americans. Suspicion had already fallen on STANTON, but there was no proof. There are strong indications that this leakage may be connected with the leakage of other information which has been disclosed from Stockholm B.J.s. STANTON has been in touch with CERVELL and also with CARLBERG and the information acquired, which covers not only civil aviation but Air Ministry information, as probably leaked through the German connection in the Swedish General Staff in Stockholm. The Beaver appears to be extremely grateful to this dept. and somewhat rattled. I hope the incident may teach him that when he takes on a job it is not always the wise procedure to surround himself with a lot of journalists. It is a pity in a way that the information was given to Hildred before we had had an opportunity of passing information through STANTON and seeing whether it came out on the B.J.s. We should then have had positive proof of what was going on. At present we are still somewhat in the dark.

At the D.G.s meeting today we had a discussion about Top Secret, the new regulation about grading which are the outcome of the conference at Washington. There is likely to be considerable confusion. Under the present instructions it is almost impossible to know how to card one's information. Actually, anything formerly Most Secret should not be labelled Top Secret, but after this is done, all sorts of restrictions are placed

upon it from the point of view of its transmission from one place to another. Many things which were formerly secret will not be down-graded to confidential. This is perhaps logical but may again cause some confusion. The instructions are extremely badly worded. In fact it would be possible to call certain categories Top Secret, secret or confidential. The D.G. has suggested that we should take the matter up with SIS and SOE in order that we might get some sort of uniformity amongst ourselves.

I had a talk with Horrocks about M/S. I had previously talked last night with Roberts. I said that my general impression was that Dickson was perhaps a little too neurotic, but at the same time there was a good deal in what he said. The atmosphere in M/S is certainly deplorable, both from the sex point of view and organisationally. I told Horrocks that in my view it was rather difficult if a married man, head of a section, was known to his staff to have formerly lived with one of the secretaries and now to be living with another. Horrocks entirely agreed. He said that the facts were known to Barker but that his sole efforts were concentrated on shielding M. As regards the organisation, I told Horrocks my views as to what this should be on the assumption that all the personnel were thoroughly desirable. At the moment I thought M. was an unsuitable head,

that the appearance
of Darvell whom I did not know personally did
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not inspire confidence, that Bill Younger was a nice chap and I should say quite straight, and that Bingham was probably able and generally speaking all right. I had a high opinion of Roberts. Dickson I felt under better conditions would be all right. He was certainly hardworking, keen and conscientious. He had moreover done very good work with the agency. Horrocks and Hollis are meeting Harker on Sunday but Horrocks does not think that they are likely to make much progress. The trouble is that if I take up the whole thing with Harker he will probably discuss it with M. Horrocks thought that as far as Dickson was concerned I might suggest that in future he should work direct to Blunt, and give as my reason that his present relations with M. were not conducive to good work.

I saw Lt. Hill, a pupil of J.C.s. who has a very good academic record. He has been grounded however owing to an aeroplane crash. He was one of the first people to operate in an Army Co-operation unit. All these people are gunners and their job is to direct artillery fire on suitable targets. They appear to have immense scope and can if a suitable target is found concentrate the whole of the artillery of a division on one spot. This work has now been reduced to a fine art and is extremely effective. I am considering Hill as a possible recruit for B.W. as he has a legal training, being a barrister in civil life.

I hear that a canoe has been found washed up on
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the coast of Kent. The matter is being investigated.

March 29th

I saw Coll. Bruce, OSS, today, and showed him the document relating to French resistance plan for D-day, which we had obtained some time ago through Bill Mountain, Thurloe Prior and a Frenchman called ESTIENNE. Bruce said that to the best of his knowledge he had not seen the document before. He could however make sure by asking van der Stricht, head of his French S.O. section. He said however that had van der Stricht seen it he would undoubtedly have communicated it to Robin Brook of SOE. Since therefore the latter had not seen it, it was clear that it had not reached OSS through any other channel. I have now sent a copy of the document to the F.O. with Robin Brook's comments.

I had a talk with Grogan and Dick Butler about a meeting called for today by Lindlater Stewart. Apparently the F.O. are worried about diplomatic communications in the light of the suspension of airmail. I think that there is some slight misunderstanding. As the instruction stands at present there is no question of preventing couriers or diplomatic bags from going by air mail to Lisbon. On the other hand the ordinary diplomatic correspondence which is theoretically privileged and passes through the mails, would of course be a bit delayed as it would go by surface craft and would not reach the peninsula for

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at least a month. The F.O. are very anxious that this type of mail should go by plane. I do not see particular point in raising an objection.

I saw A.H. Barclay, who was formerly with RSS and with the F/W Dept. and asked him if he would be willing to give us two hours a day on transcribing records of Swedish special material which we are proposing to take.

He is at present working in a leather business in the city but would come here every evening at 5.30. He is ready to accept £5 a week.

At the 11.30 meeting today Mrs. Spring mentioned that there is at present in Madrid a Norwegian who has been sent down on a mission to this country by the German I.S. station at Bergen. He was to have received a cover address in Sweden but a suitable one was not available, and according to the latest arrangement a new address will be passed to him by blind transmission. SIS think that this man is identical with a Norwegian named BRODERSEN who is at present in Madrid and has applied for permission to come to the U.K. Arrangements have been made to facilitate his journey. The suggestion of communication by blind W/T is interesting, since Treasure is not only to receive in blind W/T but to send blind. It will be interesting to see how far RSS are equipped to deal with this proposition. The only other instance that we have had of blind W/T is in

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Grogan told the meeting about the censorship measures imposed by Overlord and also about the latest information relating to the

There have been 2 or 3 cases recently in the western hemisphere, one affecting a P/W in Canada who had instructions to communicate by this method. We are finding out whether a certain percentage of the German Army are instructed in this method or whether this P/W had some connection with the Abwehr and came to know about the method in that way. Meanwhile we are considering counter measures. It is suggested that we should adopt some process of neutralising any suspect letters, the testing process is a very elaborate one. Before taking this action we are finding out whether SIS and SOE or the FBI will be in any way affected.

Cecil mentioned that there was a tendency by the military and also possibly by the police to regard Irish labourers with suspicion. This is of course in view of the general flap about Eire. He thinks that every effort should be made to prevent prosecution of Irish labourers. There are no grounds for thinking that as a class they have been engaging either in espionage or sabotage, but if they are harrassed they might, undesirably in view of the important work on which they are employed, become subversive and troublesome. An instruction is being sent to RSLOs in this sense with a view to their smoothing down the military and police.

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The Germans have asked us whether we can supply

them with information about the Russian Army.
"hat a hope.

Tate has been given the urgent assignment of pin-pointing the A.A. defences of London. Precisely what the purpose of this is we do not know.

Wiegand of the Abwehrstelle in Paris visited Berlin towards the end of February, when he had a talk with the Abwehr representative for S.E. Europe on Hitler's personal staff. This representative said that it was impossible for the Germans to win the war by force of arms but that they could still achieve success by political means. Col. Hansen on the other hand who is second in command to Admiral Canaris, stated that Jodl had expressed the same views but added that the General Staff, i.e. Zeitzler and his officers, did not agree and were for the most part convinced that the war was lost both militarily and politically. Also according to Hansen Rundstedt had expressed pessimism regarding the outcome of the allied invasion, although he had been given new divisions. Hansen also said that the General Staff considered that the forces on the eastern front had sufficient reserves to defend Poland.

I saw Tommy the night before last. He told me that Joe Stalin is being extremely troublesome and has recently sent two very rude telegrams to the P.M. on the subject of Poland. This is rather a set-back as it was thought that his manners had been improving lately. The P.M. is however said to have remarked that his belly

was already red from crawling to old Joe. The question of paramount importance is that no possible excuse should be given to the Russians for making a separate peace. There is no special reason for thinking that they have intentions in that direction, but there is always a lingering fear. Personally I am inclined to doubt whether crawling to old Joe will ever do us much good but the question is obviously a very difficult and delicate one.

I gather that Eden is likely to be leaving the F.O. in order that he may act as deputy leader of the House. The probability is that he will be succeeded by Cranbourne. A ballon d'essai was put out by the Observer on Sunday last suggesting that the Beaver should go to the F.O. This I am told, and am relieved to hear, is not on the tapis.

I attended the ~~indlater~~ Stewart meeting this afternoon. It was decided that the diplomatic missions here would have to accept the fact that their communications which went through the ordinary mail would suffer the same delays as other mails, due to the suspension of the air mail service to Lisbon. From an administrative point of view it would apparently be quite impossible to extract diplomatic mail from the ordinary post. Any mail sent by bag however, with or without courier, would be allowed to go as usual by plane. It was pointed out however that all this would be subject to the final decision by the Cabinet as regards the suspension of diplomatic communi-

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cations by bag, telegram or courier. In this connection Findlater Stewart passed on to the D.G.s letter in which he suggested that progressive delays on telegrams might be for consideration. Crowe of the F.O. fought a strong rearguard action, saying that such delays were almost certain to become apparent ~~even~~ in a few days, with resulting protests. He doubted whether the F.O. would be able to hold the position for as long as a month with progressive delays up to 8-10 days. It was agreed by all that there would be no point in stopping telegrams if communication could go by bag every day. On the other hand it was pointed out that there was not much sense in delaying diplomatic communication from Eire up to 8 days if communications could continue from this country without any delay at all. Findlater Stewart agreed that if anything was to be done it would have to be done soon. He did not know what was really in the minds of the Cabinet or what had led them to decide to postpone the issue. He was communicating with Bridges in order to find this out. Meanwhile he proposed to raise the question in a further note, pointing out that if the Cabinet did not make up their minds soon they would lose the opportunity of doing so at all, since if delays are to be imposed progressively we should have to begin almost at once unless we were going to pin-point the operation.

We discussed the question of exit permits for diplomats who wish to spend their holidays in Lisbon. It was agreed that this could only be

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considered in conjunction with the question of the diplomatic cables, bags and couriers.

Lastly we discussed the movement of diplomats as distinct from service attaches. The F.O. for once seemed to agree that there would be no objection to notifying the diplomats that the restrictions on the banned area apply to them in the same way as to any other citizens in this country.

After the meeting Herbert raised the question of what are known as E.F.M. messages to troops. These messages consist of 3 groups, and are based on a code book of some 150 groups. The addressee's name is in one time pad. It is argued that if a spy came over here and used this code but applied a different meaning to the groups which normally implied greetings or enquiries about health, they could quite easily use the E.F.M. system as a code. The German monitoring service would merely have to look out for certain groups. They would not be concerned with the name of the addressee but the sender's name which has to appear en clair would give them a further indication that the message was one in which they should take an interest. It was agreed that the E.F.M. service should be discontinued, but that en clair messages to troops should be allowed to continue.

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March 30th

Crockatt of M.I.9 came to see me today about the work of the Transit Camp. I began by talking about Jock Whyte. I told Crockatt that I had reason to think that Jock had been putting round rather mischievous information about his own departure. The impression was given that he had been unjustly sacked. This was not in accordance with the facts. He had in reality resigned and I would not disguise that this had been somewhat of a relief to us all. The fact was that he had certain definite limitations. This had caused him to be passed over and he had developed what amounted to persecution mania. Crockatt said that he had only seen Jock Whyte once or twice but that all his staff had found him very easy to get on with and very helpful. I said I was sure that this would be the case, but that I thought we could give him much better service. I had got Col. Seymer to take on the job and although he had had nothing previously to do with intelligence work he had an extremely distinguished record and was thoroughly accustomed to talking to soldiers. Until he had got into the saddle I had arranged that he should be looked after either by Wethered or by Caroe, both of whom had considerable experience, and knew the M.I.9 set-up.

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I then explained to Crockatt the position of B.5. I said that they were of course professional police officers but they were situated in this office and directly under me, and were for the purposes of any enquiry regarded as M.I.5 officers. It would be better therefore if M.I.9 officers did not refer to them as the police, since anyone interrogated by the police always felt that he was under suspicion or that anything he said would be taken down and might involve him in proceedings sooner or later. The result was that he was not particularly communicative. Crockatt said that he would tell his officers about this.

I then went on to talk about the advisability of having M.I.9 reports on record at the LRC. This I thought was advisable both from our point of view and also for M.I.9's own protection. Crockatt entirely agreed but said that unfortunately the escape routes were run by C. He had a posse of officers sitting at Bowdoy and working in conjunction with Cohen. I told Crockatt about our difficulties with the P. Sections in matters affecting the LRC. We had begun to break them down but not without an immense amount of trouble. I anticipated therefore that C. would be reluctant to have details of his escape organisations on the Information Index. Crockatt said that he would speak to Col. Neave, his representative, and sound the ground. I suggested that possibly Neave might like to go down to the LRC and see precisely how it was worked in order to satisfy himself that the Index was quite secure. Crockatt thought this an ex-
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cellent idea. Later Crockatt rang me up to say that he had spoken to "eave who had evidently had a word with Cohen. There is apparently no objection to our having copies of the reports. The suggestion was made that the matter should go through Cowgill as being the official liaison with ourselves. I said - did not see the slightest necessity for bringing Cowgill into the picture provided the P. Sections were in agreement. The reports were M.I.9 reports and once the P. Sections' concurrence had been received they could be sent direct to Seymer. Crockatt agreed with this and we shall now receive the reports regularly. They will subsequently go to the LRC for inclusion in the Index. Crockatt could not have been more helpful and friendly. I introduced him to Seymer who is going down to Beaconsfield on Monday.

Dennis Page came in to see me at my request. I wanted to talk to him about ISNOR. I showed him a copy of my minute to the D.G. which I was proposing to show to C. Page said that he thought every word of it was true and fully justifiable. I said that I was quite prepared to let the matter drop if it was going to get him into any serious trouble or if he would rather I did nothing. He said that on the contrary he thought that it should be taken up and that I should say quite frankly that a copy of one of these messages had been sent to us by mistake. Meanwhile Page would report the tragic event to Cowgill. He said that he had warned Cowgill that something of the kind was almost bound to happen and that

sooner or later knowledge of these messages would come to the ears of M.I.5.

Guttery came to see me from the Ministry of War Transport. He is anxious if possible to get over some Dutch seamen from Stockholm. He says that he is going to be very hard-pressed when the Second Front opens, and wants to get as many seamen as he can lay hands on. He said that he was hoping to get some 500 Norwegians but that he would be glad to be notified when they arrived and when they were released to the Norwegian Govt. shipping pool. His purpose in getting these Norwegian seamen is in order to get back British seamen that he has lent to the Norwegians. The Norwegians on the other hand would like to keep the British seamen they have got and use any further Norwegian seamen they can get in order to get ships from America. I said that we would do our best to get priority for the Norwegian seamen and have arranged with Brook Booth for him to make the approach through the Norwegian L. Office.

As regards the Dutch, I said that the security risk would be high and that we could not possibly accept Dutch from Stockholm without giving them a thorough examination. They were more dangerous than the Norwegians since we had recently had two cases indicating that all the Dutch escape routes to Stockholm have been blown and that the Germans have been passing agents down them. If however too many of the Norwegians do not come our way for examination and the Services could ultimately

relieve the pressure, we would see what we could do. One of Guttery's fears is that all allied seamen sailing to their own countries after the Second Front opens are almost certain to leave their ships and proceed to their homes. He therefore anticipates large numbers of desertions and a considerable shortage.

There has been slight trouble about Treasure. She was apparently challenged by the Portuguese international Police and asked why she was travelling on a British passport when she had previously travelled on French papers. She referred them to the Press Attache, who rather stupidly said that it had been done for convenience. The Portuguese have now approached Passport Control and asked for the reason for this rather curious move. Jeffes with great self-sacrifice has fobbed them off by saying that he is extremely sorry but that he had been had for a sucker. He has very large numbers of applications and unfortunately the previous papers about this woman did not get linked up. She therefore managed to get away with a British passport. This had subsequently been discovered and she had been recalled. She was of course technically working for the M.O.I. The latter have been warned that if they are approached by the Portuguese they must tell the same story.

I saw _____ of this office about her association with CARLBOM the Swedish Assistant Air Attache, which had been disclosed on special Catalogue Reference: KW/4/193 she ought not

to have given her telephone number here, which is contrary to office regulations. Her answer when asked for it should have been that people are not allowed to ring her up at the office. This however might have led to further questions to which she could have replied that she worked at the War Office. It seems that CARLBOM thinks that she is in the WRNS. He is undoubtedly very persistent, but whether this is due to her personal attractions or to the fact that he knows that she is connected with a govt. dept. it is not possible to say. I warned her that some of these Swedes are very popular, particularly CERVELL, CARLBOM's boss partly because they are very charming and partly because they are thoroughly pro-British. This however made it if possible more dangerous as everyone was inclined to say that they were "one of us" and to confide in them. She asked me whether she should break off the association, which for personal reasons would not worry her. I said that on the whole I thought she might be wise to do so since the more intimate her acquaintance became the more likely was CARLBOM to be to question her in detail about her work. She would then be forced to create a sort of aura of mystery round herself which would be embarrassing. She agreed and said that she would do her best to break away.

Cyril Mills is leaving for Canada tonight. The question of his commission is still in consideration by the War Office.

March 31st

I went to see C. about ISNOR and left him a minute which I had drafted for the D.G. I said that I had on reflection decided to come over and see whether I could settle the matter with C. personally rather than start a barney.

C. read the note and I am quite convinced did not recall having issued any instructions nor did he appear to know much about the material.

He thought at first that it referred to ISCOT but I put him right on this point. He said that they were anxious to restrict the circulation of Russian material because there had been cases of penetration, and he felt that it would be a very serious matter if the Russians knew that we were taking an interest in them. I pointed out to him that the Russians would probably expect this and further that if he was anxious about leakage he should be just as anxious about sending material of that kind to the Services as to anybody else since we had reason to know that there were a considerable number of communists in the Services, some of them in quite important positions. We had had occasion to get one or two of them removed elsewhere.

C. then said that in any case he entirely saw the point made in my note about the RSIC and about the damaging effect of the incidents of this kind on relations between SIS and ourselves. He did not know precisely the circumstances but he thought that certainly the D.G., Dick and myself should have been informed about what was going on. He promised to make

enquiries and let me know. Quite clearly Felix had put a fast one over on him and got him to initial some memo saying that the ISNOR should only be circulated to the Services. I am quite sure that C. himself does not recollect anything about it and he probably put his initials on the document at a moment when he was pretty busy and did not reliaise its implications. His staff of course should protect him from this kind of thing and had Peter Reilly been there I doubt whether Felix would have got away with it.

We then discussed the leakage case at Ankara. I asked what had happened. C. said that all that Johnnie Dashwood had succeeded in discovering was that the Ambassador was extremely lax in his ways. He took documents home etc. It seemed likely that the papers had either been looked at in the train between Cairo and Ankara or that someone had a key to the Ambassadors box. Nothing definite however had been discovered. I took the opportunity of saying how ridiculous it was to send out people like Dashwood to conduct enquiries of this kind. Functionally it was obviously a matter for MI 5. Had we been asked, we should have sent a team of 2 or 3, one person with knowledge of secret sources, another accustomed to dealing with leakage. I pointed out that we literally had hundreds of cases which we were investigating daily. Lastly probably Burt or one of his men. We might then have tightened up security thoroughly and possibly have discovered the culprit. The probability was that the leakage had been taking

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place ever since the subject was opened two years ago and we were still no further. C. entirely agreed about this and said that he would speak to Loxley, but that he realised as I had that Will Goddington was the real snag.

C. thought that after the war we undoubtedly should have somebody in the principle Embassies abroad who would be responsible for local security. I heartily agreed. This seemed to me a good beginning and I thought it tactful not to go further at that point and say that we should have the responsibility for conducting the liaison with the local police and Zeme bureaux.

C. appeared to be very pleased with the way things were going on. He said that MSS showed that probably a whole Panzer Division had been surrounded in the Ukraine, that the Luftwaffe was stretched to its utmost limits, in fact to a point where bomber crews were being turned over to fighters owing to shortage of pilots. He said that according to the latest information, the Germans were intending to fight us on the beaches in the Second Front and not wait until we had effected a landing. The immediate counter-attack would probably be in the hands of Rommel, although Rundstedt would be the supreme commander. The Germans had stepped up their divisions in the Low Countries from 48 to 62. There ~~would~~^{were} also signs that they were preparing to withdraw certain forces from the Balkans.

C. told me that OSS had had an approach from the Russians, particularly about German agents penetrating the Caucasus. This of course has been the subject of protest from the Soviet Govt. to the Turkish Minister. We shall also be supplying them with any information in our possession. C. intends to keep a close contact with Donovan on this matter. He said that in Moscow he had not had very much response in spite of the information that he had given.

I had a meeting on the security of Overlord. We went through all the various points in the Cabinet memo and checked up to see that the necessary action had been taken.

Estienne has returned from Algiers and informs us that he showed the document reputed to have been written by d'Astier both to Giraud and de Gaulle. Neither of them appeared to like it and I gather that there has been a bit of a row. The general feeling is that the two brothers d'Astier and rassy appear to be acting on their own and to be going rather further to the left than even de Gaulle would wish. Various changes are contemplated.

Dick started for N. Africa but has as usual returned from the station. He is leaving again tomorrow.

We raided Neuremburg on the 30th and lost 95 planes.

April 16th

I returned from leave.

I had a long talk with TAR. He tells me that the Cabinet have finally decided to stop all diplomatic cables, couriers and bags and that this is to be extended to the allies, including the French. The only exceptions are the

Americans and Russians. This was the result of the note put up by Findlater Stewart to the Cabinet, pointing out that the matter had to be decided one way or another, otherwise they would lose the chance of making a decision at all. He made it clear that the alternatives of progressive delays or cat and mouse stoppages could never be wholly satisfactory, and that if nothing was going to be done at all it would have to be done now otherwise it would pin-point the operation.

Tricycle has returned and appears to have the full confidence of the Germans.

Artist had made it clear that he knows all about the Garbo set-up and believes it to be a blind. He talks to us now on the assumption that the whole of Kuhlenthal's organisation is under our control. Meanwhile Artist himself appears to be rather under a cloud as far as his own people are concerned. They think that he is being too inquisitive, particularly about the Ostro organisation. The Germans are doing their best to isolate him from information of this kind. Whether this is due to jealousy or suspicion is not clear. It may be that they are nervous about

his discovering that Ostro's set-up is largely notional..

Lipstick has been liquidated, as it was felt that the Germans might believe him to be under control owing to his active connection with the Catalan movement which owing to Lipstock's indiscretions may well have come to their notice.

TAR has come to an arrangement with Felix by which the deception section with 21st Army Group will be attached for the purposes of administration and communication to the SCI unit. The head of it will be Christopher Harmer who will take his orders from the GSOL I.B. and head of the Ops.B section. TAR has also arranged with Felix that we shall have a representative in Ryder St. when the battle starts. This should ensure that if anything concerns us we shall get it passed on with the maximum amount of speed.

Felix has left for the USA where he is going to set up in conjunction with OSS some Section V. organisation which has to operate in the Far East.

During my absence there have been various wireless tests. Garbo on instructions from the Germans has been communicating in British Army procedure. He was picked up after a certain time and after a hint had been given to RSS. He was however also picked up in Gib., who notified RSS about certain peculiarities in the signals. This is on the whole fairly

satisfactory. Treasure is going to start communicating blind and we shall see whether they are equally successful in her case. Tests have also been taking place to see whether spies can move freely within the 15-mile belt. One has been caught, but another, whose documents were by no means good has succeeded in getting through 7 or 8 controls and has so far not been spotted.

Two new spies have arrived. One called van Hove, a Dutchman who has made a confession, and a Roumanian called Călean. The latter seems to be of little importance.

2/12/45 Gwyer came to talk to me about T.I.S. There seemed to be some hold-up in SHAEF on the question of establishment.

Washington have suggested that a further note should go to the Eire Govt. requesting them to expel the enemy legations. Winant has replied: "I hate it, Grey hates it, the P.M. would probably like it, so what?" Personally I think it would be a great mistake, since the Irish are in a highly co-operative mood and have even asked us and the Americans to establish representation in Dublin in order to see that all security measures are properly co-ordinated. This we do not wish to do, since there would be little for these officers to do and the present system is working quite satisfactorily.

April 17th

A B.J. indicates that SITTIG is aware of the fact that steps are being taken to round up his wireless set. It looks as if there had been a leakage through the monitoring organisation.

On 11th April the J.I.C. considered a memo from C. in which it was recommended that in the interests of the security of Overlord, a total ban should be imposed on the transport of agents from this country to France and the Low Countries by sea. This ban should apply to inward transport. SOE were in agreement with this proposal. The JIC Sub-Committee noted with approval that C. and SOE agreed not to send agents to France and the Low Countries by sea after the 5th May.

At the daily meeting Mrs. Spring mentioned that one FUNFUS had apparently been despatched here as an agent on the 15th April by air from Lisbon. There is some possibility that this man may be identical with a man called BENDIA who has come here ostensibly to buy paper with which to print Spanish banknotes. BENDIA is under observation. Meanwhile we are seeing a list of passengers from Lisbon.

Brutus has had a questionnaire about a number of ships all of which are on the stocks. We are getting Admiralty comments. This questionnaire displays considerable knowledge.

Teresa Clay raised the question of the return of certain German civilians to their own

country on an exchange basis. Some Austrian woman in one of the camps is collecting information from visitors which she intends to take out. This has come to light through the Marita organisation. I said that this case should be referred to Denniston, that he should find out when the party was to leave, and that if there was any suggestion of its going before D-day, we should register a strong protest. On the other hand we must accept it that information will reach internees from the outside and that those who go back are bound to carry a certain amount with them. This will be of little importance after the Second Front opens.

A settlement has been reached regarding action to be taken here when we learn from secret sources that bombs have been placed among food cargoes from the Peninsula. I raised this matter with Victor before he went away, and wrote to Findlater Stewart, who called a meeting of the depts. concerned. It has been decided that the risk that we took in not opening all the crates was a justifiable one, and should be accepted in future.

If any incident arose consideration is to be given immediately to measures to reassure the public and if an explosion or an unexploded bomb is discovered Sir Findlater would immediately call another meeting. Meanwhile we are under no obligation to inform supply depts. if information is received from secret sources about the possibility of a bomb being on board. We shall merely act as usual in conjunction with the Admiralty.

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The Chiefs of Staff in Washington have at last replied about the security of allied cyphers. They have suggested the writing of an extremely weak letter urging allied govts. to consult their British or American colleagues. If they did consult, the matter would be dealt with by the Cypher Security Board. The importance of this question however lapses with the general prohibition of diplomatic communication.

Walter Bell came to see me. He is very anxious for Cecil and me to meet Marlin of O.S.S., who has recently been in Eire. He apparently thinks highly of Marlin.

Melland called to urge me to allow Dick to take the appointment of head of the C.C.I.B. in Germany. During my absence there have been certain developments in this direction. The D.G. had suggested Maunsell, who apparently is not very favourably viewed as a candidate by Jack Barrow. Meanwhile Whitely has written to the D.G. suggesting that the appointment of the head of the Bureau should be filled by a man with MI5 experience. I said to Melland that my only anxiety was that Dick's services in the immediate postwar period would be urgently required to assist in the solution of the reconstruction of the office, and that if we did not plan carefully at that stage we might well suffer for 20 years. Apart from this it would impose a very heavy burden on me if I had to dispense with his services for a matter of 2 years. However I would find out what had happened and give the matter careful thought.

I had a talk with Bird about the B.1 Reg. He seems to think that things are running pretty smoothly. He agrees with me however that it needs careful watching from the intelligence side. There is no doubt that the mechanical side will be vastly improved and that carding will be absolutely up to date.

I attended a dinner given by the D.G. for Gen. Bissell, head of G.2. Others present were Jock Whiteley, Sinclair the new D.M.I., Gen. Peabody of SHAEE, Col. Shean, Col. McLeod, MacDermot, TAR, Dick Butler, Sir N. Kendal and Harker. Bissell made an extremely good little speech about the hospitality which he had received and about Anglo-American relations. He pleaded very strongly that we should be patient with all these young Americans who were invading this country, many of whom had not even seen a shot fired, whereas we had been in the toils of war for 4 years and clearly felt the strain. He evidently had a great affection for this country and had carried away pleasant memories of his association with the British in the last war. He is an airman and has I think only just been doing staff duties for about 3 months.

I should say he was a great improvement on Gen. Strong. He is in any case an extremely pleasant individual, and has made a very good impression over here. I told him as much as I could about the general set-up here. I also had a longish talk with the new D.M.I. and also with Jock Whiteley, both of whom seemed very easy to get on with. The D.M.I. is I think a great improvement on his predecessor.

There is a strong tendency here to compare our operations in Italy at Cassino with the vast sweeps by the Russians towards the Carpathians. This is a great pity, and cannot very easily be corrected without giving offence to our allies, who are certainly making the most of it. The facts are of course that a situation has been reached on the Italian front which is comparable to that of the Ypres salient in the last war, perhaps even more so since the ground in Italy is far more suitable for defence. There is clearly little chance of taking any advantage of the superiority in man power or equipment, if indeed such exists (except in the air, I doubt whether it does). The only element of surprise which can move a front of that sort is a beachhead landing, and you frequently hear people say "Why don't we make other landings at different places all along the coast, particularly since we have complete superiority at sea". The answer there is - I think that beachhead landings are an extremely difficult and complex manoeuvre which entails the use of an enormous amount of craft and of the building up of maintenance units and reserves, without which the mechanised army of today is rendered powerless. We are the only people who have carried out any such manoeuvre with any degree of success. The Germans have never tried, except at Crete where by all the rules of the game they should have lost, and where their casualties were extremely heavy. The Russians tried it at Kerch but were unable to make any progress until the force opposing them were taken in the rear. We however carried out a highly

successful landing in Sicily, through the use of nearly 3,000 craft. We have also landed at Salerno, where for 24 hours we were nearly driven into the sea because we failed to dig in. We also successfully landed at Anzio but failed to take the high ground which might have had the effect of imperilling German communications to such a degree that they would have been forced to retire. The lessons learned at Salerno were apparently taken too much to heart with the result that everyone concentrated on digging in at Anzio instead of moving on to the high ground.

On the Russian front I was told by Jock Whiteley that the divisional front on the German side is 10-15 miles, that in many places there are only patrols and that the German divisions are far from up to strength. In fact many of them are reduced to hundreds instead of thousands. Probably the fully equipped divisional front would be at least 20 miles. When it is considered that there were 27 divisions in the Second Army holding the Ypres salient which worked out at something like a division every 500 yds., it is not surprising that the Russian front is so manoeuvrable. The odds against the Germans are over all about 2 to 1 in manpower and equipment, and when attacks are made anything from 4-5 to 1. There is therefore ample opportunity for effective strategic and tactical moves. What is remarkable about the Russian performance is firstly the vast amount of equipment produced, and secondly their power to follow up even though resistance may be slight. Here I think we have to consider

what the Russians have been doing for the last 25 years. They have lived under perhaps the most rigid autocracy that the world has ever known and under conditions which the more civilised nations of western Europe would not tolerate for a moment. They have therefore had at their disposal a vast population of 185 millions working under almost slave labour conditions and concentrating primarily on the building up of a war industry. It is surprising that they have during that period of 25 years been able to transform a peasant population mainly accustomed to the handling of primitive agricultural instruments into a nation that is capable of manufacturing and handling a highly mechanised army. But if this were to be done it could not have been carried out under more favourable conditions. It would probably have been quite impossible under any other regime.. The follow-up of the Russians and their rapid advances are undoubtedly remarkable and are I should say attributable to their somewhat primitive toughness, to the conditions that they have endured for 20 years, their over-whelming superiority in machines and numbers, to their traditional reputation as fighters within their own country provided they have the necessary equipment, and to the penalties which they know they will incur if they do not put their last ounce into the struggle.

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April 18th

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Hollis has talked to me about a film called "Jacob Sverdlov" which Brook-Wilkinson wanted me to see. The film is purely propaganda for the revolution and for Soviet Russia but is also historical. Although the Board do not like it it is very difficult to take exception to historical facts which took place 25 years ago. On the other hand this kind of thing merely tends further to blur the issue and confuse the public mind.

<12 8/78

McLeod came to see me about T.I.S. and Gwyer. He had had a talk with - and with others in Section V who apparently have a violent hate against Gwyer. Cowgill has even said to Shean that he could not tolerate Gwyer's appointment in SHAEF. As McLeod pointed out this appointment has nothing to do with MI6. If SHAEF still want him and we are prepared to release him they have a perfect right to appoint whoever they like. I said that this matter must rest with SHAEF. I was not inclined to withdraw Gwyer as a candidate merely because he had certain characteristics which were distasteful to Section V. He had proved his worth to SHAEF who had a high regard for his ability and if they wanted to appoint him I would do my utmost to get the D.G. to release him. McLeod entirely agreed with this view and somewhat apologetically said it would be a great help if I would see Whiteley and go through the T.I.S. memo which he (McL) had put up and which he felt Whiteley had probably

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there is much work to be done, and Gwyer and his beavers are standing idle when they might be assisting in the 3-fold purpose of keeping the French brief up to date, collating and assessing their reports for SHAEF and preparing a German brief. There was also the Dutch and Belgian material which had to be integrated. McLeod then told me that he had seen Dirkmanns of the Dutch 2^{ème} Bureau who had arranged for Gwyer to look at his stuff. Gwyer had gone down and somehow or other there had been a mis-understanding and Dirkmanns had complained to SIS. As far as he could see from talking to Gwyer, Dirkmanns had entirely gone back on what he had previously agreed to do. Gwyer apparently had no difficulty with the Belgians Lepage and Ganzhof who were most helpful. This incident had, McLeod believed, been taken up with C. and would doubtless add fuel to the anti-Gwyer fire.

Dickson came to see me. He wants to take on one or two extra people who can move about profitably in the various strata of domestic servant life. I told him that I considered his memo and had come to the conclusion that it would be likely to do him or anyone else much not good if he presented it but that I proposed to put forward a suggestion that his part of M/S should be transferred directly to Blunt.

I had a talk with Tan about Gwyer. Tan says that Kim is violently opposed to him and that if he is at SHAEF he will not be able to put his nose into Section V. with any prospect of getting anything. The only way of getting over this

difficulty if SHAEF want Gwyer is to have Hart in the Section V. war room and to instruct Gwyer to deal with Hart and Hart only.

April 19th

I saw Ronnie Haylor this morning. Dick I gather left N. Africa for Italy about last Monday week so we ought to expect him back within a fortnight. Hill-Dillon seems to think that everything in the garden is lovely and that Haylor's services for the establishment of a screen in N. Africa or at Bali are not really necessary. Whether he will continue to think so after Dick has made his survey I cannot say. It is however patently clear that there is no adequate advance LRC system at all. Kim whom I saw yesterday agrees with this and says that Jarvis is in a real muddle and hopes that Dick and B-W will be able to sort things out between them.

There are now some 19 ski-sites for Crossbow undergoing repair in France. There seemed evidence of the delivery of machinery at 2 sites. Low level photographic reconnaissance has not been able to confirm or deny the presence of launching rails on 3 sites where they were suspected of being in position. There is evidence of high-concentrated hydrogen peroxide at Reenemunde and at Oberraderach near Friedrichshaven. This is probably one of the fuels used for the HS293 rocket bomb and for pilotless aircraft. Buildings similar to the main structure at Wattenn are under construction at Siracourt and Sottevast. Propaganda both at home and abroad has given very little attention

to the subject of retaliation.

April 20th

I spent the morning at SHAEF. I had a talk with Shean who showed me the establishment for C.I. staffs that he had put forward to Whiteley. He said that he had considered all the jobs very carefully and that he regarded his requirements as the very minimum. Privately he thought that he would want before long probably 3 times as many officers.

Whiteley has seen this document and suggested a 20/25% cut all round. I said, and Shean agreed, that it was quite impossible to cut T.I.S. I proposed to tell the General so and would let him know the result of my interview.

I saw Whiteley and told him that the D.G. was recommending Maunsell for the C.C.I.B. job. I thought we should also be able to give him 3 or 4 other good trained MI5 officers and possibly Dick White for a few months to start the thing off. He seemed pleased with the idea. He said that he had known Maunsell in Mid East and had worked with him and that he would be a very satisfactory choice.

I then went on to discuss T.I.S. I drew his attention to McLeod's memo on establishment and duties. I said that the work was accumulating. Meanwhile a number of people who could be getting on with it were standing idle. I said that I did not think it could possibly be done with a smaller establishment. He would

only be creating a bottle-neck which would be worse than useless. It is clearly necessary to have the records coming and going out to some focal point but if this channel is to become congested it will only lead to chaos. Whiteley entirely agreed. He said that he was desperately anxious to keep establishment down in order to be as mobile as possible. He thought he would be able to get his demands met but he wished to be able to justify them up to the hilt. I said that what worried us most was that in the meantime work was accumulating and that there was nobody to deal with it. He did not think he would be able to get his establishment through much before May 12th. I said that if it would be of any help to him and he did want us to supply staff or a certain proportion of it, I would try and get the D.G. to let him have such officers as he desired on loan. He seemed to think that this might be a solution and undertook to discuss the matter with Shean and McLeod.

I then saw Shean and McLeod and told them about Whiteley's views. I said that I thought they would be well advised to strike while the iron was hot since if we had to wait until May 12th the arrears of work would become a very serious matter. I hope they will act accordingly but they seem to me to be a bit chicken-hearted.

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They then discussed with me the position of Gwyer. I asked them very definitely for their opinion of Gwyer and whether they wanted him. They said that undoubtedly they did, and that

they had a high opinion of the work that he had done for SHAEF. The only difficulty was with Section V. who seemed to have a violent hate against Gwyer. They said that they themselves of course knew of his somewhat irritating manner, but that they had never had any trouble with him. He was extremely hardworking and had never been in any way insubordinate. I said that it was entirely a matter for them but that if they decided they wanted him I would do my best to smooth out the difficulties between Gwyer and Section V. I would firstly tell Gwyer that he had got to do everything that he possibly could to avoid giving the slightest cause for irritation between T I.S. and Section V. I would also talk to Philby and say that if he felt that it was impossible for Gwyer to speak to anybody in Section V. I would let him have Hart for his War Room and that if Gwyer wanted anything from Section V he would always have to deal through Hart, who was 100% persona grata with Philby. They seemed pleased with this idea.

When speaking to Whiteley I was very pleased to find that he seemed to have the right idea about the relative functions of MI5/6. He told me that after a good deal of consideration he had somewhat reversed Jock Whitefoord's arrangements with SIS. He was quite convinced that I.B. matters in the field should be treated on a functional rather than a territorial basis. He therefore wished

S.I.S. to be the suppliers of information and ourselves to be responsible for taking executive action upon it. Both organisations of course being part of the I.B. staff.

I attended a meeting of the J.I.C. at which Capel-Dunne, C and representatives of the Signals Depts. of the Admiralty, Army and Air Force were present. The purpose was to discuss military communications of allied armies and to devise means for censoring them. The Admiralty suggested that either these communications should go over British Naval routes and in British cyphers or that all messages should be submitted en clair and cyphers deposited. It would then be for the Admiralty to decide whether those of non-security interest should be communicated by the allied govt.s over their own channels. Before making a decision however it would be necessary to ascertain how far the Navy were equipped to deal with this extra traffic. At present the Dutch were sending some 4,000 groups a day, the Norwegians communicated with Spitzbergen and USA, and the French of course had numerous communications about the movements of their ships. It was thought that the French would undoubtedly create difficulties. Their cyphers were weak. The Army said that they would like to adopt a similar procedure and if they could carry them, to pass all messages over British routes in British cypher. This was by far and away the most clean-cut proposition. The Poles in Italy were at present communicating with London, and

the French, Czechs and Belgians sent numerous messages, it was believed mostly by cable. The question was asked whether Censorship under existing instructions would stop these telegrams. Enquiries are being made. The Air Force said that they carried a certain amount of transit traffic for allied forces but the latter principally communicated by cable. These cables should be stopped by Censorship. It was pointed out that it would be possible for a Polish station in Aberdeen for example to communicate with the continent by using its ordinary equipment issued to troops. They could also communicate with Mid East at night. They would however be running considerable risk and it was not thought that the Poles are out to beat the ban. Far more anxiety was felt about the French who would almost undoubtedly set themselves out to defeat the regulations.

I had a talk with C. afterwards about the possibility of the Swedes having an illicit wireless set. I told him that CERVELL had remarked that while the restrictions were irksome there was a way round. There had also been a report of a mysterious box in the Swedish Embassy. The situation was being watched by mobile units but I wanted to be clear precisely what action we could take if a transmitter came up without damaging C's interests. He said that he would be seriously concerned if the Swedes took away his set in Stockholm, although it was at present only being used for reception and not for transmitters. He suggested that I should have a

talk with Peter Loxley and see whether the FO could find suitable grounds on which to argue.

I spoke to Loxley who said that in his view there was a perfectly good case, particularly since the transmitter in Stockholm about which the Swedes apparently knew, had not been used for transmission.

TAR, Buster, Bird and I discussed the 21st Army Group I.B. Brief. With the exception of one or two minor points it seemed quite satisfactory. The majority of them of course have been drafted here in one form or another.

I spoke to the D.G. about the possibility of Haylor running the CCIB in Germany. I gather from Haylor that Dick had very tentatively made this suggestion to him in Algiers. Curiously enough I had thought of it myself in the watches of the night. The D.G. has unfortunately made up his mind about Maunsell being the most suitable person for the post. While I think that in some ways Maunsell is better equipped and certainly knows the military hierarchy, there is no doubt that Haylor has the better brain. In any case he might be useful if he were prepared to work under Maunsell.

Ginger Lewis who is now at SIAEF has asked us whether we could let him have some of our counter-sabotage divers from GIB. for work on the Second Front. It emerged in a discussion that he had with Victor that the real trouble is due to the Germans having placed all sorts of iron and concrete under-water

obstacles along the French coast below the low tide mark. Somehow or other these have got to be got out of the way. They cannot unfortunately be tackled before D. day without pin-pointing the target. Experiments are going on to discover some rapid means for their removal by divers who will go ahead with the landing craft. This is clearly a suicide job for which we doubt whether our divers, most of whom are over 45, would be considered suitable.

April 21st

5/12 8/15 I had a long conversation with Kim on the subject of Gwyer. I said that I wished him to speak quite frankly, but I would begin by saying that I fully realised all Gwyer's difficulties and the irritation that he caused. At the same time I had a high respect for his work as also had Dick, many others, and most important, SHAEF, who were proposing to employ him. Since the work in T.I.S. was all in arrears, it seemed to be almost criminal to throw over-board somebody who was well qualified to do the job. I told Kim that there was considerable background to all this and quite unwarrantably an attempt had been made some time ago by Felix Cowgill to get the whole of Gwyer's information section abolished. This had been suitably dealt with, not without a good deal of feeling. It was quite obviously no business of Felix's to saw how and in what form we should card and arrange the ISOS for our own use. It was also worth noting that not only had Section V. availed themselves of our records, but that two members had felt so

strongly about Felix's letter that they had taken the trouble to ring up Gwyer and say that they did not wish to be associated with it. Kim did not know anything about this. So far not one single word had been put down writing to any responsible officer in this dept. stating the complaints against Gwyer. All that had happened was that Vivian had written a vitriolic letter to Whiteford and C. had now written to Whiteley. On neither occasion had any representations been made here. What would C. think if we suddenly wrote a vitriolic letter to Whiteley about Felix. God knows we have sufficient cause. Kim entirely agreed with this and thought the procedure was utterly wrong. At the same time he said that he was convinced that if Gwyer was at I.I.S. there would be continual trouble and that even my suggestion of Hart being in the Section V war room and acting as a buffer would not completely solve the problem. I said that I thought it was entirely a matter for SHAEF, that I had told SHAEF exactly my views about Gwyer, both pros and cons, and that neither C. nor ourselves could dictate to SHAEF in a matter affecting the appointment of their own staff. If however they decided to have Gwyer I would wash his head in the hopes that it might prevent him from giving any further cause for complaint, and I would also do my best to get the DG to put Hart into the war room to act as a buffer.

Soon after Kim left McLeon arrived to tell me that Whiteley had received a letter from C. taking exception to the proposed appointment of Gwyer. I said that I thought this was

grossly improper seeing that no representations had been made by C. to the DG. He was in fact commenting on one of our officers to an outside body without prior reference to ourselves.

Apart from this one rather began to wonder whether C. was commanding SHAFF or Ike Eisenhower. He then said that he and Shean had had a discussion with Whiteley, had told him how much they valued Gwyer's services, ^{but} had said that in the interests of smooth working they found it difficult to recommend Gwyer's appointment. I gather also that C. in his letter had suggested the appointment of another officer from GC & CS. I said that anybody from GC & CS would not be of much use for some time and that in any case it might perhaps be a mistake to put Gwyer's women under a different head whom they might not understand. Perhaps therefore the General should write to the DG and ask him to suggest an alternative to Gwyer. I would try and see whether the DG would release Hart at any rate for the next few weeks.

I lunched with Ronnie Maylor and broke to him that the DG was already set on Maunsell for the CCIB job. I asked him whether he would be willing to serve under Maunsell. He did not appear to be very keen though I think he would do the job if pressed. He feels a little that having done some very hard and fairly big jobs for 4 years that he would have preferred to have complete change.

Harry held a meeting on the security of Overlord. There did not seem to be any new points of any importance.

Later I went to a meeting at the FO with the DG, to which Cadogan, Findlater Stewart, Morton, Newsam, Loxley and Crowe were present. This meeting had been called to consider certain cases of diplomats who either wanted to come in or go out and were prevented by the ban. It was decided generally that we ought to take a strong line. Otherwise we should be over-whelmed with applications. The most difficult cases were those of the Portuguese Ambassador who was to return to this country from Lisbon, and the P.M. of Luxemburg who wanted to come back from the USA. The principle reason for stopping the movements of diplomats was that they would possibly be able to fix up some sort of code for communication. This of course in theory would very much apply to the Portuguese Ambassador. In fact however no one thought that he would be a party to any such arrangements. On the other hand if he were allowed to proceed it might create a dangerous precedent. The same feelings existed regarding the P.M. of Luxemburg. It was eventually decided to refer these two cases to the P.M. Three Norwegians, including the Defence Minister, wished to go back to Stockholm to continue their activities in the underground movement in Norway. It seemed that they constituted a serious danger but nobody knew quite how they got here or whether they were under SIS or SOE control. It was decided that this matter should be further gone into. The other cases were turned down. They included new Ambassadors passing between here and Moscow or here and the USA. A

difficult one was McMillan's wife. McMillan had telegraphed to her through the FO telling her to come out as soon as possible and to get the FO to make all the necessary arrangements. Everyone felt that if she would deny herself this privilege it would provide both the FO and Newsam's committee with an excellent argument if they could say that the wife of a Cabinet Minister had been refused an exit permit from this country, and that therefore Ambassadors and others should not feel aggrieved if they received similar treatment. I suggested that she might be approached on these lines. It was eventually decided to refer this case to Bridges.

April 22nd

5/4/77
I saw Kim this morning and told him about SHAEF's decision re Gwyer. I asked him if he knew that a letter had been written by C. to Whiteley. He said that he did not. I said I thought it was most unfortunate that such a letter should have been written and in fact grossly improper. I said that this matter placed me in an awkward position since it was difficult to see how the D.G. could avoid hearing about it. He might then quite justifiably go through the roof. Apart from this it could neither do our office nor SIS any good to wash our dirty linen in Shaeff. Kim offered to speak to Vivian and suggest that he should come round and see the D.G. I said I thought that the moment had passed and that Vivian's presence here was likely to do more harm than good. Meanwhile I would see whether

it might be possible to put Hart into T.I.S. as I felt that if Gwyer's girls were going to be employed it might be better to have someone from here to look after them.

McLeod rang me up later and we arranged that Whiteley should write a letter to the D.G. asking for the services of an officer and 6 TS for SHAEF. I spoke to the D.G. and put him in the picture as far as possible about T.I.S. and the urgency of the work to be done there. I then told him briefly what had happened about Gwyer and suggested tentatively that we might at any rate lend Hart to SHAEF for the next few weeks in order to get things going until the establishment put forward had been approved by the W.O. He was as I expected irritated by the attitude of Section V. towards Gwyer which he felt was small-minded, and was annoyed at being asked to lend personnel. He thinks quite rightly that if the Army employ people they should pay for them. I said that I had spent hours on this problem and that I was just as indignant as he was. Were it not that the matter was of such urgency and importance I should have been inclined to tell the Army to get on with it. Obviously however we could not do this and I hoped therefore that he would see his way to granting Whiteley's request and to putting Hart in on a temporary basis. He agreed to consider the matter. He seemed fairly satisfied as regards the women but was doubtful about Hart.

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Withrington tells me that Inspector the ace CID sleuth has an account of some £3,000 with Barclay's branch in the East End. He has told the branch that he notes he has paid in have been won on the dogs. This is of course the normal cover. There is a well-known character in the creek world with whom various officials at the Yard are in touch for one reason or another. This man does quit a lot by getting dogs doped. He backs on a certainty. When he wants the police to turn a blind eye he gives them a useful tip and they in turn begin to grow rich. Alternatively they receive money for services rendered and have an arrangement with a booky in the dog racing racket who for a consideration will a bogus transaction in their books. We have already had reason to suspect. Incidentally he was deputed to interrogate Victor in connection with one of our bogus sabotage enterprises.

Kim came to see me in the afternoon about a Belgian who had been arrested and condemned to death by the Germans for assisting at the escape of some 300 allied airmen. He wanted to know if there was any possibility of an exchange. This is of course an old question. The only kind of exchange that would be likely to appeal to the Germans would be the release of a German subject who was under sentence of death. We have no Germans in this category. Nearly all our prisoners are neutrals. Secondly if we try and effect an exchange with an allied national whose country is occupied by the Germans it merely encourages the Germans

to arrest others with the idea of using them as a quid pro quo to get their spies here released or at least their names disclosed. It seemed however just possible that the Germans might be prepared to accept one of their own generals like Cruwell. They would not be of much use to the enemy at this stage and most of them are hotly anti-Nazi and some of them are even pro-British. All of them are fairly

disillusioned. Kim will probably explore this avenue. I said that I thought there was some advantage in starting communications through the Protecting Power since once negotiations were opened the carrying out of the sentence of death would probably be suspended. It might in the end be possible to tide over the negotiations till the reoccupation of the continent.

Dick has written to the D.G. from Algiers. He left for Italy last Tuesday week. He says that Hill-Dillon evidently thinks that his machinery for dealing with spies needs improvement in the nature of an LRC, although he wants interrogators. The fact is that he has no machinery at all. Haylor is therefore out of a job and Dick thinks that he might well do the C.C.I.B. job instead of Maunsell. John Mair is going on to Italy with Dick. Dick says that M.I.5 influence at AFHQ is dominating and the relations between our people and C's are absolutely perfect. Jarvis, the SIS man in charge, told Dick that he is convinced of the necessity of having MI5 men working alongside their own in the North African theatre.

The J.I.C. have tried to estimate the potentialities of French Resistance. They say that up till the end of March some 30,000 weapons had been distributed to French resisters. This figure does not include known losses but a deduction of 20% must be allowed for unknown losses and for deterioration. There have been further deliveries of about 20,000 weapons from M. Africa and there are also believed to be certain stocks of French arms already in the hands of the resisters. It is considered therefore that in France about 100,000 men are provided with arms and ammunition. The total numerical strength of the resistance movement is much greater but cannot be considered of military value without arms. There is said to exist an organisation to co-ordinate activity of all important groups. It has been built up from its beginning since about a year ago but the standard of efficiency varies widely from bad to excellent in individual groups. There is a tendency especially in the Armee Secrete to create a large central directing organisation in France with various committees and a staff on semi-military lines. This is an obvious danger from the point of view of penetration. A good many political differences exist particularly between the supporters of Giraud and de Gaulle. The Communists are hoping and working for power after liberation but are putting the elimination of the Germans first. They appear to be the most efficient organisation. Vichy are taking strenuous counter measures which are supported by Darnand. The effect of present-day activities against the German war effort is thought to be appreciable although it

cannot be stated that the German military machinery is thereby seriously impaired. The general conclusions are that day to day activities are contributing to the weakening of the German war effort but that the real value of resistance lies in the building up of the means to strike on D-day. It is felt that at the worst resistance cannot fail to be of value owing to the extent to which it diverts German energy, and at the best it may so derange the German lines of communication that it cannot fail to be a determining factor in the battle. The above information is I presume mainly based on SOE reports which have presumably to be taken at their face value.

There is to be a security meeting between ourselves OSS and Dan. The suggestion was originally made by Joe Walsh to the D.O. and the Americans. Cecil sees in this an attempt to shelve responsibility. If we refuse to meet them they may say they had made an effort to co-operate which had been turned down, and if we met them and something goes wrong about

Overlord security they would say that they did everything they were asked to do. They would however have difficulty in giving publicity to the negotiations at any rate until the war was over, since such publicity would compromise their neutrality. Cecil suggests that as a preamble to any discussions, we should say (a) it was recognised by both parties that as long as the Axis Legations remain in Eire there would be no possibility of 100% guarantee of security (b) that the responsibility for any leakage that may occur through the presence

of these legations must remain an Irish responsibility. (c) that the suggested conference could only examine in the light of (a) and (b) whether there was any further security measure which the Irish could take.

From P/W reports it seems that the Germans have to some extent succeeded in making the Luftwaffe believe that their raids on London are far greater than in fact they are.

The first incoming message to Treasure was received on the 19th April. This message clearly indicated that the Germans had received Treasure's first message. We are continuing to send messages as frequently as possible in order to establish a satisfactory contact. Mutt has been extremely indiscreet about his doings in this country and has been severely interrogated by J.C. and Harmer. Tricycle has now told his story and as far as his own personal contacts with the Abwehr and S.D. are concerned he has again got away with it with extraordinary success. The greater part of his report is confirmed by ISOS. Tricycle has brought back £250 and a letter of instructions for Gelatine. Discussions have taken place with the F.B.I. about obtaining information from the USA for Joseph and about the possibility of ultimately sending Joseph himself to America. Peach has now returned from his second visit to the Japs in Lisbon. They seem to be interested in his report and have promised to send him £200 through a channel which we had arranged. Tate has now received a message asking him to exert all his efforts

efforts to find out about invasion preparations. Another Plan Dream is going through.

April 23rd

We received notification today that 3,300 Frenchmen of the Armoured Division had arrived from N.Africa. We had been led to believe that this division would not be arriving before the end of May. 400 out of the contingent came out of occupied France after the total occupation. After a good deal of telephoning it was decided that they should proceed to Hull where they are joining the 4th US Army Group. We would look up the 400 and interrogate any who had adverse traces. We were also asking the French Security to let us see any reports which we can also pass over the LRC index. Meanwhile a paper had to be put up to the Chiefs of Staff, asking them whether our present scheme should continue or whether the 400 should all be subjected to a thorough security examination at the LRC. We have pointed out that we could not get them through under 4-6 weeks and that during this period their training would be dislocated.

I have gone over the ground of TIS again with the D.G. but quite clearly he is rather in the air as to what it is all about. We are to have a further discussion with TAR and await the arrival of Gen.Whiteley's letter.

April 24th

Victor tells me that he has had a meeting with Air Marshal Peck, Gen. Brunshill and Pug Ismay to discuss the future of the Bacteriological Committee. Victor said quite bluntly that the committee should not be in the hands of Ernie Brown but somebody like Sir Findlater Stewart. He had always regarded the committee's deliberations as Top Secret but now apparently they were being discussed by all kinds of people and particularly by Americans. Moreover at the P.M.'s suggestion we had gone into ~~the~~ production in the USA in order that we might be ready in case the Germans attempted any funny business. Nobody seemed to have taken any steps to see that these further moves were properly safeguarded from the security angle. Documents have been circulated to all and sundry. Victor has also seen C. on this question. He said that the bomb in which Tube Alloys were interested might be in production by November. The problem had been solved but might just have a number of teething troubles to go through. The effect of this bomb will be devastating in the extreme.

I saw Niall McDermot and told him about Gwyer. He thought that it was all most regrettable. He could not think of any particular job into which Gwyer would fit at the moment.

Cecil and I had dinner with W. Bell and Marlin of O.S.S. Marlin was formerly at Trinity College Dublin and was sent over to Ireland by OSS some 6 months ago, ostensibly as one of Ambassador Grey's attaches. He seems to have gone

down very well with the Irish who always refer him in glowing terms, particularly Joe Walshe. Marlin however does not think very much of Joe nor does he very much like the general set-up in Ireland as compared with 1932 when he was at Trinity. He regrets the passage of the Anglo-Irish and rather dislikes the little counter-jumpers who have established themselves in office, many of whom have only a thin veneer of culture. One is inclined to wonder whether Marlin says one thing to us and another to the Irish but on the whole I am inclined to think that he is straight. He is certainly a very pleasant individual. He is going to act as the American representative in the Security talks that we are to have over here with Dan.

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Kim told me that he had had a long talk with Viv. about the Gwyer incident and had eventually got Viv. to ring up C. and ask the latter's permission for Philby to disclose to me the SIS candidate for the appointment in TIS. He wished to tell me that it was Gilbert Ayle.

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This I had in fact heard from TIS. I think probably the idea in telling me this is to reassure us and to prevent us sending dart to TIS whom they are anxious to get for the war room, at Ryder St. I said that I would consider this and that if they were going to supply someone I could not think of anyone better than Ryle although it would take anyone a fair time to pick up the threads.

Findlater Stewart called a meeting this morning between ourselves, SIS, SOE and OSS. The primary purpose was to decide whether members of the Norwegian underground movement should be allowed to go back to Stockholm. SOE said they took no responsibility for these people who were run by the Norwegian Govt. from Stockholm. If however they had control over them they would not according to present standards send them back until after the Second Front had opened. We then went into other security measures, being taken to ensure that there should be no leakage of information through agents going into the field. SOE said that they had tightened things up considerably. The agents were being more thoroughly searched and had to sign a declaration. Documents taken in suitcases were now going to be examined by Censorship and customs. The Polish sealed bags are to be discontinued. They contained micro-photograph films which if opened are exposed. The films contain cypher messages. I raised the question of leave granted to agents before they went into the field. SOE said that they had instructions out dated March 31st to the effect that no ~~xxx~~ agent on leave should go to the banned area. John Senter said that Mock-

ler-Ferryman had given instructions that a complete list of agents likely to go into the field during the next few months was to be submitted to him. This would be vetted by SOE Security Section and also by the Security Service if necessary. Findlater-Stewart asked whether SIS would be ready to adopt similar measures. As the SIS representative had not turned up we could get no answer to this question. I said however that I doubted whether they would agree to anything of the kind. It was decided that the minutes of this meeting should be sent to SIS and that they should be asked to conform.

I had lunch with M. He spoke about the inquisition into his affairs by Roger and Horrocks with a certain amount of resentment. He asked me whether I knew anything about it. I said that I knew something of the kind was going on and that in fact I had had on one occasion been consulted and that I had given my views on what the organisation should be. I repeated them to M. who expressed himself in entire agreement. He complained however that I. Division did not really keep him informed. His reports were never criticised and he never got any guidance. The only people whose judgment he appeared to respect were Clarke and Wendy Gilvie. There may possibly be something in this. I spoke to Horrocks later in the day and he told me that there was a certain amount of justification for this complaint.

I had a long talk with Herbert and Bird about sending 6 girls to SHAEF. Bird complains that

the beavers are wanted to bring the French Whos Who up to date in order that our records here should be in perfect shape when the Second Front opens. I see the importance of this. At the same time it is equally important that TIS should get on a proper footing. Moreover we have to some extent committed ourselves to providing the necessary staff. I think we shall have to arrive at some sort of compromise. We would send 3 girls to SHAEF at the outside and possibly fill up with new recruits from the registry or LRC.

I had a meeting at the F.O. with Lindlater Stewart in the chair. Cadogan and other F.O. representatives, Desmond Morton, C. and Spurborg were also present. It was decided that the representatives of the Norwegian underground movement should not be allowed to go to Stockholm, that Eady McMillan should be asked to postpone her journey and that the P.M. of Luxembourg should come back to this country. The Portuguese Ambassador no longer wishes to come as he cannot communicate in cypher. The Poles are being very difficult. They are very much on their dignity and have written a long memo which is historical and largely irrelevant. They are ready to conform to all the restrictions except the one demanding that they deposit their cyphers. Mikolaicec has seen the P.M. who has rather sold the pass. He said that he was ready to waive the demand about depositing the cyphers on condition first that the number of messages sent in these cyphers was cut down to an absolute minimum, secondly that the en clair text of the message was communicated to us, thirdly that

Mikolaicec gave the P.M. his personal word of honour that no messages were sent in secret cyphers except those of which the actual text had been deposited with us, and fourthly that the existence of this understanding should be kept absolutely confidential otherwise HMG would be exposed to representations from other foreign governments in a less favourable position.

C. said that Brendan Bracken who had not been officially informed of this arrangement was already aware of it. It had presumably reached him through press sources and would by now be all over Fleet St. The Committee decided to make representations to the P.M. that this concession to the Poles placed us in a very awkward position and that since the Polish P.M. had already broken his word the arrangement should be abrogated.

April 26th

At the weekoy meeting today we discussed the case of FUNDUS and his possible identity with BENDIA. Part for a variety of reasons which seem plausible is of opinion that Bendia is not our man. He rather thinks that suspicion points to a man called DUDLEY who came over on the same place and is employed by JKCC at Lisbon. The case of FUNDUS in so far as we know it from ISOS is based on Lisbon, and it would be reasonable to suppose that there was a more likely candidate than Benida who comes from Barcelona. We have decided however to continue observation on BENDIA and to refuse both him and DUDLEY leave to return to the peninsula. This can be done easily under the general ban. Meanwhile other enquiries are

being made about DUDLEY.

Garbo has received a message intimating that someone will make contact with him for the purpose of using his wireless to send 17 single group messages. This looks as if this man was intended to report on the date and target of Overlord. It is extremely important as it may give us a first-class opportunity of deceiving the enemy on a big scale. It is possible that this man may be one Pedro who is according to ISOS to arrive here about the 29th.

Sclater reported that the wireless sets of the two Irish parachutists O'REILLY and KENNY, who were dropped in Ireland some time ago, are of a very high grade. The voltages were not however suitable for either this country or Eire, but were suitable for the USA. Equally inapplicable to the crystals. I think this is therefore one more example of S.D. inefficiency unless it was intended that the agents were ultimately to proceed to the USA.

Van HOVE is to be put up for trial. NUCKERMANNS who is on trial is pleading insanity. They are putting a witness for the prosecution, a doctor Cookie is getting hold of.

I had a long talk with Gwyer and broke to him that the present difficulties about TIS were due to the fact that he was persona non grata with Section V. I told him that I had done my best to get things straightened out but that clearly the decision must rest with SHAEF. I did not wish him to think that his work here was not

thoroughly appreciated or indeed that those in SHAEF who knew about it were not equally appreciative. On the other hand they might feel that to avoid any sort of friction it would be better not apply for his services. I then asked him about his beavers. He said that in his view the French Whos Who could be brought up to date even if 3 or 4 of the beavers were sent over to SHAEF. The possibilities of getting on with the French Whos Who were to some extent limited by the fact that only two of the beavers were allowed to be in Ryder St. at the same time. He thought however that work might be speeded up if they had more direction. I then asked him how it was that Bird was in charge of this work. He said that he had made it quite clear that he did not wish to become a kind of B.I Registry Potter. He had however never said that he wished to discontinue his work in the Information Section, but somehow or other this had all been handed over to Bird, and he himself had been left high and dry. I think that the explanation is that Dick in anticipation of Gwyer going into SHAEF thought Bird had better get into the saddle and take over the keeping up to date of the French Whos Who. When however the French Whos Who is up to date it will form the basis of personal files which will be added to as and when information comes in. I think that subject to anything that Dick has to say it would be better for Gwyer to finish off the French Whos Who, which is undoubtedly important in connection with Overlord, and then the document can form part of the B.I Reg. on a personal file basis.

I lunched with Curry, who is evidently rather worried about his future. He has agreed to stay on with SIS until the armistice in Europe, and this has been accepted by SIS and the D.G. Vivian however still had in mind that Curry's section will ultimately become part of Section V and that Curry will not serve under Cowgill. Meanwhile Curry says that it is extremely difficult to do any effective work since the records at SIS are in a hopeless state. He has constantly raised this matter but Vivian seems powerless to get it improved. He told me of a case the other day where a file was produced about a communist in Mexico. Curry made a precis of this for Evans of Security Co-Ordination and sent a copy of it to Miss Bagot. The latter wrote to him asking whether he had made a full precis of the file since there appeared to be a number of important documents of SIS origin which were not included. It was found that there were some 20 such items which were scattered about in other files and had never been put into the man's P.F. Curry was merely told that if he wanted information of that sort not only should he call for personal file but extra traces as well. This is by no means the only instance. In fact this is common form. Apart from this individuals are only carded once a month. This throws on the sections an enormous amount of extra work. It is clearly impossible for SIS to hold themselves out as being responsible for counter-espionage or communism abroad if they have no means of recording documents, and in fact very inadequate personnel for dealing with them even if they were recorded. It would be merely futile for SIS to start building up a

huge registry system at this stage which would merely be a duplication of our own records. The real answer of course is that the two registries should be amalgamated. I told Curry that it was very difficult to say how he could fit into this office at any future date since we did not know what our charter was to be. I could not help feeling however that something would be done in the way of amalgamation and that there would be plenty of work for everyone to do. Curry was very anxious that I should see Vivian who he says is suffering from frustration and persecution mania. I said that the only reason I had not seen him for so long was that I felt that his views were so fundamentally opposed to my own that a conversation was likely to be unprofitable. I would however see what I could do.

Harry, Lennox, Cussen, Robb, TAR, Dick Butler and I went through the agenda for a conference which is to take place tomorrow at SHAEF. It deals with various security measures before Overlord and counter-intelligence matters after Overlord.

J
C. came to talk about who is very anxious that something should appear in the press to indicate that he was caught by the British while attempting to get away from the persecution of the Gestapo to the Argentine. I said that first it would be necessary to ascertain how he could have come into British hands on his way from Spain to the Argentine and secondly that it would be better if his story appeared under an American dateline and was copied over here. thinks that if such a story were made it would help him after the armistice.

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After careful consideration/the case of FRUIN and DRIFBEEK, two Dutchmen who came out through a blown escape route in the care of Louis de BRAY, I have decided that they could be released. The Dutch Foreign Minister knows both their families and is prepared to vouch for them. It seems to me quite clear that if one is a spy both are spies. It is however unlikely that two people of the social status and integrity of their families who are personally known to van Kleffens, should have been simultaneously recruited by the Abwehr. Further it is true to say that their early contacts were quite reputable. It was only when they got to Paris that they were put on a blown escape route through the agency of Louis de BRAY. If they are spies they must have been trained in Holland since there was no time to train them in Paris. It seems however unlikely that they were trained in Holland since their contacts were of a reputable kind. On the other hand it is curious that they were not arrested on the frontier like certain other members of the party. According to our present standards I should not release them were it not for the guarantees given by van Kleffens.

"We gave a dinner to Tricycle which the DG, TAR, Marriott, Wilson, Foley, Lloyd, Butler and I attended. The dinner was I think a great success. The D.G. made a short speech to which Tricycle replied. Tricycle was full of praise for Wilson for whom he clearly has the greatest respect. I think he realises that if Wilson had not been at his side coaching him he could never have achieved the position that he has now reached.

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He told me also that Wilson had made a very good impression on Artist and that further if he could find time to go over to Lisbon it would undoubtedly give Artist very great encouragement. He spoke in a very moving way about his brother, whom he had met in Lisbon. His brother has of course been leading the Germans up the garden in Belgrade for the last 4 years. It was unknown to Tricycle that the cigars smoked at the dinner were kindly provided by Dr. Kleeman of Ast. Paris. These cigars were given to Treasure for her notional boss in the M.O.I.

Dick has been signalled from Algiers and should be here in the course of a day or so.

April 27th

Gwyer has had a talk with Dick Butler about his position which he feels ought to be clarified. He does not wish to make a fuss but he thinks that SIS should say quite definitely what they have against him and give him an opportunity of answering the accusations.

The Paris controls of Tate, Brutus, Treasure and Freak have now moved back to Hamburg. This confirms other reports that we have had from Artist that the French stations of the Abwehr were moving back to Hamburg and Wiesbaden.

We have had a report that one Jack Vickers is on board the s.s. Mary B. Mitchell ex Lisbon sailing to Dublin via Fishguard. This man

has confessed that he was recruited by the Germans some time in 1943 and trained in the use of secret ink which he was to use on the back of Red Cross letters. He was eventually dropped by the Abwehr as they found that he had British relatives fighting in the 8th Army. It is difficult to understand why they allowed him to leave Holland or why, if he was a British subject, he was at large. We shall be taking him off at Fishguard and having him interrogated. He says that he reported the Abwehr's approach to a Dutch girl working for the English. Her name was van der BUM (repeat BUM).

A telegram has come in from Michael Hyde saying that Coetzee has staged some plot against him alleging that an agent of Lenton's whom he was employing had held up two individuals at the point of the revolver. The whole thing is of course fantastic nonsense. Hyde has seen Baston but Baston is very much under the thumb of Coetzee. We have wired back to Hyde telling him to report all the facts to the High Commissioner with a view to the matter being taken up with Gen. Smuts. Hyde is of course acting under Gen. Smuts' and Lenton's instructions when making use of the police although Baston was informed up to a point. The police are clearly jealous and antagonistic to any British interference in their affairs. They also detest Lenton.

April 23th

I attended the F.O. Committee on communications. We were presented with the French complaint that as the seat of their government was in Algiers while they had to conduct a great deal of their business in London, it was impossible for them to carry on. It seemed generally agreed that something would have to be done in so far as communications between Gen. Koenig and Gen. de Gaulle were concerned, but no solution of this problem was reached. We also discussed the Polish case. It was agreed that we should inform the F.M. that the unilateral arrangement which he had made with Mikolajczyk very much cut the ground from under our feet, since they laid us open to serious criticism by other governments who had deposited their cyphers. While Mikolajczyk's word of honour that he would not disclose the arrangement might be all right, it was obvious that many others would have to know precisely what the arrangement was. It was therefore impossible that sooner or later the facts would not get out.

There was a good deal of talk about French transmitters. C. said that he was satisfied and a similar assurance was given by SOE. Although it was recognised that it was within the power of the French to transmit, C. thought that if they did he would be almost certain to know. Anxiety was expressed both by Spurborg of SOE and C. about Polish communications with their underground movement in France. Further

discussions are to take place.

Spitfires were over Germany last Wednesday for the first time. They have evidently been equipped with auxiliary petrol tanks.

Dick says that in N. Africa everyone is tremendously impressed by the restrictions on communication. They really do think that something is going to happen. They are however doubtful about the outcome and about the project as a whole. They feel that the threat of invasion will be better than the invasion itself and that our best line would be to attack in the Balkans in support of Tito.

I attended a meeting at Norfolk House from 5 to 5 at which some 50 people were present. An endeavour was made to find some solution to the problem of the 30,000 refugees who are expected from the Bridgehead, at the rate of 2,000 a day from D plus 2 onwards. Nobody was particularly helpful. The only really suitable place would be the I.O.M. since conditions there would be tolerable and therefore not likely to give rise to such a storm from allied governments and parliament. It would however only hold 15,000 and the camps were now largely taken up by Navy and Army training units who showed no indication of moving. Other alternatives were to put the refugees in military camps, but these would not be available till D plus 4 at the earliest and would consist of huts with the people sleeping on the floor. The third suggestion was to requisition houses but it was

difficult to see how these could be isolated.

It was agreed that in any case a camp would have to be established in the vicinity of Shoreham to hold some 4-6,000 refugees since all of them would have to be examined medically before they travel further. They would also have to be deloused. We made it clear that there was very little basis for examination, but on the whole we would prefer to see the whole party kept in internment and shipped back to the continent en bloc as soon as possible.

General Gurney, DPS War Office, eventually asked for some statement from us on the security risks involved. This we undertook to give. Meanwhile various preliminary steps are being taken by the Ministry of Health and other depts. concerned.

Cecil has been summoned to a security meeting with the Irish and Americans. The Americans are keen to discuss the possibility of stopping the German and neutral cables which pass through this country. Would the Irish give a guarantee that they would not give the Germans facilities by wireless. Cecil said that he could not discuss this matter since it had been dealt with by the Cabinet. If it was thought advisable to re-open this question it would have to be done from the top and could not form part of the agenda of a rather low-level security meeting.

Several canisters containing about £7,000 in dollars, and about a million Belgian Francs, have been broken open on the aerodrome. These were to have been dropped on the continent. Burt and
Catalogue Reference:KV/4/193

Spooner have been investigating and have arrested two RAF men found in possession of some of the notes. They have now confessed. The Belgian francs were apparently burned, but a large proportion of the dollars have been recovered.

It is now quite clear that Canaris who has been head of the Abwehr since 1936 at least, has been virtually dismissed from his post. This is thought to be due partly to the inefficiency of the Abwehr and partly to the political unreliability of some of its members who had recently deserted. Himmler took advantage of the situation to discredit Canaris by implicating him in a scandal concerning the irregular use of Abwehr funds. The situation was aggravated by Abwehr activities on neutral territory which had caused protests and got the German F.O. into trouble. There followed a general review of Abwehr personnel in neutral countries. The present position is not altogether clear but it seems that some time during the middle of March the following agreement was reached between the Abwehr and the S.D. Hansen will remain head of Abt. I and has taken over the direction of all 3 Sections. The S.D. are to receive copies of all Abwehr reports. The names of all Abwehr agents are to be communicated to the S.D. No one is to be sent abroad without the S.D.'s permission. Kaltenbrunner is the administrative head but Hansen is said to have the right of appeal to Himmler.

I hear that an envelope containing important extracts from ISOS which goes to the Controller of Deception from RSS was inadvertently handed to

the Poles by the messenger. The Poles also receive

communications from RSS. The Poles opened the envelope and returned it saying they thought it must be intended for someone else. This incident has caused a considerable flutter in the IS S dovescots.

April 29th

Further messages have been received this week indicating that the Germans are receiving Treasure's messages. Both sets are still sending blind, but we are trying to get the other side to acknowledge Treasure's transmissions by giving O.K. at the end. This will save repetition and should speed things up.

The Mullet and Puppet case is still going on. Hamlet has received a payment from Werner in Madrid. There has been a slight hitch in the latest Plan Dream. Although the enemy said that the fruit merchant's brother was not staying in the hotel in Madrid, a telegram was received by the fruit merchant in London saying that he was. A further request was made to the enemy to pay over the pesetas. Although they say that this has been done, the fruit merchant in London has not yet received a confirmatory telegram from his brother which we are waiting before we can take possession of the sterling deposited with Dick Butler's firm. A further deal is to be carried out for 200,000 pesetas plus a promissary note for the balance which will be paid over on the deal after this one.

ISOS indicates that the Germans remain entirely

satisfied with Tricycle. Artists's position continues to be somewhat involved as his so-called friend Brandes continues to report on him to the Abwehr and the Gestapo who are investigating his finances.

Joseph's courier returned from Lisbon. He has been interviewed and a written report is on the way. His meeting with the Japs was satisfactory. They paid him 140, confirmed the accuracy of an earlier report, and gave a new address in Lisbon to which traffic could be sent.

There has been considerable trouble in Egypt due to the King wishing to get rid of Nahas Pasha by unconstitutional means. He thinks that Nahas is too much under British influence. This has caused a crisis and the possibility of the King's abdication has been considered. This might lead to a revolt in the army. Gen. Paget has become somewhat concerned, and has been asking for more troops to deal with the situation. The P.M. has been handling the situation. On the 24th April he told Paget. "You must not get disturbed by all this Egyptian chatter. If riots should occur you must not count in battalions and V.P.s but in vigorous and successful use of tanks and armoured cars which will very soon change the face of affairs. Do not call the Palace clique the forces of law and order. Here is a case of a King threatening to overthrow a lawfully constituted Government which has proved itself faithful to us in the months of crisis. If he abdicates or has to be deposed, we have Mohamed Ali, the heir apparent, and

other elder statesmen on whom the Ambassador can count. We are absolutely determined to support the Ambassador in his wise and experienced handling of the matter. Don't diverge from these explicit instructions for which I take full responsibility. The Ambassador is to be supported". This was followed by another telegram saying "Let me know how many tanks there are in Egypt and Palestine, including the workshops. They need not all be battle-worthy as in most cases the work they may have to do will only be street demonstrations. Three or four camps of about 50 each, adequately guarded, should come into being in the next week or so, say near the Pyramids, Abbassia and other places where they cannot fail to be noticed. Interested enquirers should be told that large-scale exercises are intended in the near future. Let me know what you can do. Please don't talk in terms of dozens of battalions. Let me know also about the RAF available. They will not be needed except to buzz around."

By the 25th April the political crisis seemed to be over as the King had agreed to allow the Nahas Govt. to continue in power.

On the 28th April it was reported that/fresh Crossbow ski-sites had been found at Belhamelin in the Cherbourg Peninsula. This site appeared to be orientated towards Bristol. Repairs to ski-sites have proceeded at a much faster rate during the past 6 weeks than formerly. Three supply sites are now structurally complete, 3 verynearly complete and 2 at a less advanced stage of completion. As regards the large sites,

Siracourt has made specially rapid progress and construction is actively continuing at Sottevast, Watten, Wizernes and Mimoyecques.

Dick, Tark and I had a long discussion about Gwyer. While we all felt outraged by SIS's intervention and the way it had been done, we felt that whatever were done we could not render him more popular in SIS circles. It was therefore difficult for us to attempt to force him on SAEF even if we got Section V to withdraw their objections.

RSS have carried out an extensive test to discover the GARBO transmitter. The report on this exercise is very distressing. The GARBO camouflage plan commenced on the 13th March but the M.U.s were not told to commence their investigations till 14th April. From 13/3 to 14/4 GARBO's transmitter was on the air (and the operator was listening) for a total of 29 hours, an average of one hour per day. On the 14th April the M.U.s were brought into action. They reported that the GARBO transmitter operated for 4½ hours between 14th and 19th April inclusive. In fact it operated for over 6½ hours and it would seem that the second frequency of the transmitter was not recorded at all. On the 15th April GARBO transmitted for 2 whole hours. This incident shakes my confidence completely in the powers of RSS of detecting illicit wireless either in this country or anywhere else. It is disturbing since the impression was given to the Findlater Stewart Committee and subsequently to the Cabinet that no illicit transmissions were likely to be undetected for long. Clearly this is not the case.

A Diary of the Year

JANUARY

- 1 Valdivia Lulu captured by Russians.—Loss of H.M. destroyer Beane announced.
- 2 Buna Government Station, in Papua, occupied by allies.
- 3 Mozdok and Malgovek captured by Russians.
- 4 Japanese convoy intercepted off New Guinea by allied A.F.; 3 transports sunk, 3 damaged, 113 aircraft destroyed or damaged.
- 5 Japanese cruiser sunk by allied bomber off Gasmata.
- 6 Extraterritorial rights in China renounced by Great Britain and the United States.—Loss of H.M. submarine Utmost announced.—Naples raided by R.A.F.
- 7 Essen raided by R.A.F.
- 8 President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill met at Casablanca. Conference ended on 24th: "Unconditional surrender" of Axis Powers demanded.—Lorient raided by R.A.F.
- 9 Lorient again raided by R.A.F.—Eighth Army attacked at Buerat.
- 10 Iraq declared war on Germany, Italy and Japan.—Berlin raided by R.A.F.; again on 17th and 30th.
- 11 London area raided: 10 bombers destroyed.
- 12 Siege of Leningrad raised.
- 13 Mid-day raid on London.
- 14 Voroshilovsk (Caucasus) captured by Russians.—Eighth Army occupied Homs and Tarrhuna.
- 15 Salsk (Caucasus) captured by Russians.—Cologne raided by R.A.F.
- 16 Tripoli entered by Eighth Army.—Lorient and Brest raided by U.S.A.A.F.
- 17 Loss of H.M. submarine Traveller announced.
- 18 Voronezh occupied by Russians.
- 19 Lorient and Bordeaux raided by R.A.F.
- 20 Wilhelmshaven raided by U.S.A.A.F.; Düsseldorf raided by R.A.F.
- 21 Eighth Army advance guard crossed Tunisian border.—Lorient raided by R.A.F.
- 22 Mr. Churchill visited Turkey.—Field-Marshal Paulus and 16 generals captured at Stalingrad.—Hamburg raided by R.A.F.
- 23 Zuara occupied by Eighth Army.

FEBRUARY

- 1 Loss of H.M. Submarine P222 announced.
- 2 Remaining German forces at Stalingrad capitulated.—Cologne heavily raided by R.A.F.
- 3 Mr. Churchill arrived at Tripoli.—Hamburg raided by R.A.F.
- 4 N.W. Germany raided in daylight by U.S.A.A.F.; Turin, Spezia and Lorient raided by R.A.F.
- 5 Lieutenant-General Eisenhower appointed in command of N. African theatre of operations.
- 6 Lorient raided by R.A.F.—Fateh and Gostishchevo (Voronezh section), Kratotskaya (Ukraine) and Azov (south of Rostov) captured by Russians.
- 7 Kursk captured by Russians.
- 8 Gandhi began three weeks' fast.
- 9 Loss of H.M. submarine P48 announced.—Wilhelmshaven raided by R.A.F.; again on 18th, 19th, 24th, and 26th.
- 10 Krasnodar captured by Russians.
- 11 Lorient raided by R.A.F.
- 12 Rostov, Voroshilovgrad and Krasny Sulin captured by Russians; Milan and Spezia raided by R.A.F.; Cologne raided by R.A.F.
- 13 Kharkov captured by Russians.—Lorient heavily attacked by R.A.F.; St. Nazaire raided by R.A.F.
- 14 Mme. Chiang Kai-Shek addressed U.S. Congress.—Foum Tahouine occupied by Eighth Army.
- 15 Bremen heavily raided by R.A.F.
- 16 Seaborne raid by allied forces from India on Myebon, south of Akyab.
- 17 R.A.F. began "round-the-clock" bombing.—Nuremberg raided by R.A.F.
- 18 Dunkirk (four times) and Cologne raided by R.A.F.
- 19 Brest raided by U.S.A.A.F. and Dunkirk by R.A.F.
- 20 St. Nazaire raided by R.A.F.

MARCH

- 1 Berlin raided by R.A.F.; again on March 27th and 29th.
- 2 Air attack on Japanese gunboats in Mikagaki Straits: 10 warships, 12 transports damaged.
- 3 Rzhev occupied by Russians.—Grazing raided by R.A.F.
- 4 Essen heavily raided by R.A.F.
- 5 Gzhatsk captured by Russians.—Brest and Lorient raided by U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F.
- 6 Nuremberg raided by R.A.F.
- 7 Loss of H.M.C. corvette Weyburn announced.—Munich heavily raided by R.A.F.
- 8 Loss of H.M. submarine P311 announced.—Stuttgart raided by R.A.F.
- 9 Vlasia occupied by Russians.—Essen heavily raided by R.A.F.; Rouen raided by U.S.A.A.F.
- 10 Norwegian naval forces sank 2 vessels in Florø harbour.
- 11 Kharkov evacuated by Russians.—Darwin raided by Japanese aircraft; Kiska in Aleutians raided by U.S.A.A.F.; Naples raided by U.S.A.A.F.
- 12 Vegesack U-boat yards raided by U.S.A.A.F.
- 13 Eighth Army attack against Mareth Line.
- 14 Byelorod captured by Russians.
- 15 Loss of H.M. destroyer Lightning announced.—Wilhelmshaven raided by U.S.A.A.F.; St. Nazaire raided by R.A.F.
- 16 Eighth Army attacked El Hamma position.—Duisburg and other Ruhr targets raided by R.A.F.
- 17 Fougou captured by U.S. forces.
- 18 Mareth, Tounia and Matmata occupied by Eighth Army.—Rouen raided by U.S.A.A.F.; Rotterdam by R.A.F.; St. Nazaire heavily raided by R.A.F.
- 19 Gabes and El Hamma occupied by Eighth Army.
- 20 First Army occupied Sejenane.

APRIL

- 1 Lorient and St. Nazaire raided.
- 2 Essen (Krupps) raided (900 tons of bombs).
- 3 Renault works at Billancourt bombed by U.S.A.A.F.—Naples heavily raided by U.S.A.A.F. from N. Africa; again on 6th, 11th, 12th, 15th, 24th, 28th.—Kiel raided by R.A.F.
- 4 Loss of H.M. Submarine Tigris announced.
- 5 Offensive opened by First Army in Northern Tunisia.—Bolivia declared war on Axis nations.
- 6 U.S. forces broke through in Maknassy area.
- 7 Duisburg raided by R.A.F.—Loss of H.M. destroyer Harvester announced.
- 8 Slax occupied by Eighth Army.—Sardinia raided by Flying Fortresses.—Italian cruiser Trieste sunk; Gorizia hit.—Königsberg raided by Soviet Air Force; again on 12th.
- 9 H.M. the Queen broadcast to women of the Empire.—Kairouan occupied by 37th Army.
- 10 Sicily occupied by Eighth Army.—37 Japanese planes damaged or destroyed in attack on Port Moresby.
- 11 Spezia raided by home-based R.A.F. bombers; again on 18th.—Kiska (in Aleutians) raided 10 times by U.S.A.A.F. Again on 14th (8 times), 18th (9 times), again on 30th.
- 12 Treasures from Malta occupied Kerkennabo Islands off Tunisian coast.—Heavy Japanese raid on Milne Bay; R.A.F. raided Stuttgart.
- 13 2 Italian destroyers sunk off Sicily by British destroyers.
- 14 Brest and Lorient raided by U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F.—Skoda works at Pilsen, Mannheim and Ludwigshafen bombed by R.A.F.
- 15 Focke-Wulf works at Bremen bombed by U.S.A.A.F.
- 16 58 enemy transport planes and 16 others shot down off Cape Bon, Tunisia.
- 17 President Roosevelt visited Mexico.—Stettin and Rostock raided by R.A.F.; Berlin raided by Mosquitoes.
- 18 Enfidaville and Takrunna (Tunisia) captured.
- 19 Loss of H.M. submarine Thunderbolt announced.—Insterburg E. Prussia raided by Thunderbolt, A.F.
- 20 Japanese positions in Aleutians bombed by U.S. warships.—Naples raided by Middle East aircraft.
- 21 Jebel Mansour occupied by French forces.
- 22 Russia broke off relations with Poland.—Heavy raid (over 1,300 tons) on Duisburg.
- 23 Longstop Hill (Tunisia) cleared by First Army.
- 24 Loss of Norwegian destroyer Eskdale announced.—Königsberg raided by Soviet A.F.

MAY

- 1 St. Nazaire raided by U.S.A.A.F.
- 2 Mateur (Tunisia) occupied by U.S. forces. Loss of H.M. destroyer Beverley announced.
- 3 Sinking of 4 Japanese ships and 2 destroyers, in Pacific announced.—Loss of H.M. submarine Turbulent announced.—Antwerp raided by U.S.A.A.F.; Dortmund raided (1,500 tons).
- 4 Krymskaya (Kuban) captured by Russians.
- 5 German airfields in Russia bombed by Soviet Air Force; repeated following days: 540 planes destroyed or damaged.—Loss of H.M. submarine Salub announced.
- 6 Tunis and Bizerta captured.
- 7 Loss of H.M. destroyer Pakenham announced.
- 8 U.S. forces landed in Attu Island (Aleutians).
- 9 Duisburg heavily raided (1,500 tons); Warsaw raided by Soviet A.F.; Naples raided by N.W. African Air Forces.
- 10 Axis forces in Tunisia surrender.—Meaulle and St. Omer raided by U.S.A.A.F.; Berlin, Bochum, and other objectives in Czechoslovakia raided by R.A.F.
- 11 Mr. Churchill's broadcast to Home Guard.—Kiel Velsen (Holland), Antwerp, and Courtrai raided by U.S.A.A.F.; Civita Vecchia, near Rome, raided by N.W. African Air Forces; Palermo bombed.
- 12 Emden raided by U.S.A.A.F.; 21st R.A.F. raids on Berlin; again on 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st.
- 13 Bey of Tunis deposed.—Loss of H.M. submarine Splendid announced.—Lorient, Keroman, and Bordeaux raided by U.S.A.A.F.—Molne and Elder Dams breached by R.A.F. Lancasters.
- 14 Mr. Churchill addressed both Houses of Congress in Washington.—Kiel and Flensburg raided by U.S.A.A.F.
- 15 Bremen, Emden, and Wilhelmshaven raided by U.S.A.A.F.; 74 enemy aircraft destroyed.
- 16 Dissolution of Comintern announced.

- 25 Spanish Press appealed to prevent further bombing of cities.—Preveza (W. coast of Greece) raided by R.A.F. from M. East; Düsseldorf raided.
- 27 Jena optical instrument works bombed by R.A.F.; Essen raided.
- 29 Counter-offensive on Hupeh-Hunan border launched by Chinese with U.S. air support.—Loss of H.M. submarine Regent announced.—U. S. Pacific Fleet Nazaire and Rennes raided by U.S.A.A.F.; Wuppertal raided (1,500 tons).
- 30 General de Gaulle arrived in Algiers.—Naples raided by 100 Flying Fortresses.—Sinking of 5 U-boats by Coastal command announced.

JUNE

- 1 Pantelleria bombarded by Navy; repeated on 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 8th, 10th; bombed from air again, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th.—Naples bombed; repeated 16th, 20th, 21st, 25th.
- 2 Mr. Alexander reported M.A. as record for U-boat destruction.—Pope appealed in respect for "laws of humanity" in air war.—Kursk raided by German aeroplanes, losing 162.
- 3 Generals Giraud and de Gaulle reached agreement on constitution of Executive Committee.—Orel raided by 520 Russian aeroplanes.
- 4 Argentine Government overthrown.
- 5 Spain suggested "no bombing zones" in belligerent countries.—San Giovanni raided by U.S.A.A.F. (again on 19th, 20th, 21st, 27th); Messina (again 7th, 13th, 18th, 25th, 28th, 29th); and Reggio di Calabria (again 19th, 20th, 21st, 28th).
- 6 Composition of French Committee of National Liberation announced.
- 7 Soviet Air Force attacked by German aerodromes, destroying or damaging 150-160 aeroplanes.
- 8 Further attacks on German aerodromes with 700 aeroplanes; 150 German machines destroyed.—Rabaul raided by allied aeroplanes; again 12th, 13th, 15th, 19th, 26th.
- 9 Pantelleria surrendered.—Zeebrugge raided by Ventura bombers; Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven raided by Flying Fortresses; Düsseldorf and Münster raided (2,000 tons).
- 10 The King arrived in N. Africa by air.—Lampedusa surrendered.—Bochum raided.
- 11 Linosa Island, N.E. of Lampedusa, surrendered.—Kiel and Bremen raided by U.S.A.A.F.
- 12 Madame Chiang Kai-Shek addressed Canadian Parliament.—Ninety-four Japanese aeroplanes destroyed over Solomons; six U.S. machines lost.—Cologne raided.
- 13 Concentrated raid on Schneider works at Le Creusot.
- 14 H.M. King George VI visited Malta.—Sinking of two U-boats during five-day battle in Atlantic announced.—Friedrichshafen radioteletype equipment factories bombed.
- 15 Krefeld heavily raided by R.A.F.
- 16 Macassar (Celebes) raided by U.S. Liberators after flight of 2,000 miles.—Spezia raided by R.A.F. Lancasters on return from N. Africa.
- 17 U.S. forces landed on Rendova Island (Solomon Islands); 121 Japanese aeroplanes destroyed.

JULY

- 1 Viru Harbour, New Georgia Island, captured by U.S. forces.
- 2 Cologne raided by R.A.F.
- 3 Gen. Sikorski and other Polish leaders killed in air crash near Gibraltar.—Le Mans aircraft factory, Nantes repair shops, and La Pallice U-boat installations bombed by U.S.A.A.F.—Cretan airfields raided by British land forces.—Japanese cruisers and destroyers intercepted by allied force N. of New Georgia; Solomons; several Japanese vessels sunk; U.S. cruiser Helena lost.
- 4 Germans launched offensive in East Prussia; Helmsdorf sectors. Loss of U.S. destroyer Strong announced. Kiska bombed by U.S. naval force; repeated on July 20th, 22nd, 30th.
- 5 Vangunu Island, Solomons, captured by U.S. forces.—Cologne heavily raided by R.A.F.
- 6 Gen. Eisenhower landed in Sicily and U.S. forces.
- 7 Sicily invaded by British and U.S. forces.
- 8 Turin raided by R.A.F.—Cruiser 3 destroyers; N. of New Georgia; U.S. cruiser Gwin sunk.
- 9 Aachen raided by R.A.F.
- 10 Villacoublay and airfields in France raided by U.S.A.A.F.; destroying 45 aircraft.—Naples raided by Allied bombers; repeated July 15, 16, 17, 20.
- 11 Russian offensives N. and E. of Orel announced.—Mubo, New Guinea, captured.—Japanese lost 45 aircraft (allies 3) over Rendova Island.—Peugeot works at Montbéliard bombed by R.A.F.
- 12 Canadians captured Calligaris in Sicily.—Munich raided by R.A.F.
- 13 Setting up of A.M.G.O. in Sicily announced.—Shipping between Butin and Falt (Solomons) raided by 200 Allied aircraft; cruiser, 2 destroyers and 4 other ships sunk, 44 fighters shot down. Allies lost 6 aircraft.
- 14 Rome raided by 700 U.S. aircraft.—Hitler and Mussolini met at Verona.—Japanese naval base in Kurile Islands, N. of Japan, bombed by Liberators from Aleutians.—Japanese convoy W. of Kolombangara attacked by Allied aircraft; 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers sunk; 1 destroyer probably sunk; 1 transport, 4 destroyers damaged.
- 15 Free German movement set up in Russia.
- 16 Fascist Grand Council met.—Heroy, S.W. of Oslo, and Trondheim raided by U.S.A.A.F.; Hamburg heavily raided by R.A.F.; repeated on 25th by U.S.A.A.F. (day), R.A.F. (night), 26th by U.S.A.A.F. (day), R.A.F. (night), 27th and 30th by R.A.F.; Leghorn bombed by R.A.F. returning from N. Africa.
- 17 Mussolini resigned.—Warplane aircraft factory, seaplane base at Wostrow and Kiel shipyards bombed by U.S.A.A.F.; again on July 29th; Essen raided heavily by R.A.F.
- 18 Martial law in Italy. Fascist Party dissolved.—Hanover, Wilhelmshaven and Wesermünde raided by U.S.A.A.F.
- 19 Kassel and Oschersleben aircraft factories bombed by U.S.A.A.F.; over 60 enemy aircraft shot down.
- 20 Loss of submarine P615 announced.
- 21 Kassel aircraft factory bombed by U.S.A.A.F., destroying 52 enemy fighters; Renuched raided by R.A.F.

AUGUST

- 1 Ploesti oil wells bombed by U.S.A.A.F.
- 2 Regabuto captured by Canadians. Centuripe by Eighth Army.—Znamenskaya (Orel sector) captured by Russians.—Hamburg raided by R.A.F.
- 3 Catania captured by U.S. forces.—Successful action (lasting three days) against 25-30 U-boats in Atlantic announced.
- 4 Orel captured by Russians.—Le Trait shipyards bombed by R.A.F.
- 5 Catania captured by British troops.—Biogorod captured by Russians.—Sweden cancelled traffic agreement with Germany.
- 6 Troina captured by Seventh Army.—Allied capture of Munda announced.
- 7 Milan, Turin, and Genoa raided by R.A.F.—Taormina bombed by British Navy.
- 8 Guardia captured by British.—Mannheim-Ludwigshafen raided by R.A.F.—Castellammare di Stabia (G. of Naples) and Cape Vaticano bombed.
- 9 Mr. Churchill arrived in Quebec.—Khotuets captured by Russians.
- 10 Milan and Turin raided by R.A.F.; Bonn, Gelsenkirchen, and Wessling raided by U.S.A.A.F.; Berlin raided by Mosquitoes (again 14th, 15th, 17th, 19th, 24th, 25th).
- 11 Randazzo occupied by British and U.S. forces.—Rome marshalling yards bombed by U.S.A.A.F.—Russian offensive E. of Smolensk announced.—Wiener-Neustadt aircraft factory bombed by U.S.A.A.F. from Middle E., without loss.
- 12 Milan raided by R.A.F.
- 13 Taormina captured by Eighth Army.—Vella Lavella (Solomons) occupied by U.S. forces.—Karachi captured by Russians.—Loss of U.S. submarine Pickrel, destroyer Maddox, and four other naval vessels announced.—Milan raided by R.A.F.
- 14 Turin raided by R.A.F.—Wewak airfields bombed by allied aircraft; 215 Japanese aircraft destroyed by 18th for loss of six.
- 15 President Roosevelt arrived in Quebec.—Messina captured by U.S. forces; resistance in Sicily ended.—Sinking of nine vessels off Italy by British submarines announced.—Schweinfurt and Regensburg raided by U.S.A.A.F. bombers; shooting down 367 bombers.—Loss of 23 bombers.
- 16 Peenemunde research station (U-boat base) bombed by R.A.F.
- 17 Flying aeroplane works bombed by Dutch A.F.
- 18 Leverkusen chemical works bombed by R.A.F.
- 19 Capture of Kharkov by Russians announced.—Berlin heavily raided by R.A.F.
- 20 President Roosevelt addressed both Houses of Parliament in Ottawa.
- 21 French Committee of National Liberation recognized by Allies.
- 22 Nuremberg raided by R.A.F.
- 23 King Boris of Bulgaria died.—Organized resistance in New Georgia ended.
- 24 Loss of British submarine Saracen announced.—Civita Vecchia railway yards bombed by Allied aircraft, again same night and 31st.—München-Gladbach-Rheydt raided by R.A.F.
- 25 Glukov and Rytsk captured by Russian.—Batteries N. of Reggio and in Cape Pelatti are bombed by H.M.S. Rodney, Nelson, and Orion.—Pisa (raided by allied aircraft; Berlin heavily raided by R.A.F.

SEPTEMBER

- 1 President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill met in Washington.—Brenner Pass bombed by U.S.A.A.F.

- 3 Italian armistice signed.—Eighth Army troops landed on mainland in toe of Italy.—Proletarsk (Donetz) captured by Russians.—Loss of H.M. sloop Egret announced.—U.S.A.A.F. attacked works outside Paris and enemy airfields in France.—Berlin heavily raided by R.A.F.
- 4 Allied forces landed E. of Lae in New Guinea.
- 5 San Stefano captured by Eighth Army.—Mannheim-Ludwigshafen heavily raided by R.A.F.
- 6 Destruction of seven U-boats in Bay of Biscay announced.—Stuttgart raided by U.S.A.A.F.; Munich raided by R.A.F.
- 8 Italy surrendered to allies.—Staling captured by Russians.
- 9 Allied forces landed near Naples.—Taranto occupied by British.—Persia declared war on Germany.—Loss of H.M. destroyer Puckeridge announced.
- 10 Italian fleet reached Malta.—Rome occupied by German troops.—Fifth Army captured Salerno.
- 11 Catanzaro and Brindisi occupied by allies.
- 12 Crotone captured by Eighth Army.—Liberation of Mussolini announced.—Russian Patriarch crowned in Moscow Cathedral.
- 13 French troops landed in Corsica.—Heavy fighting in Salerno area, N.W.A.A.F. made most concentrated attack of war.—Evacuation of Brianks by Germans announced.—Salomons (N. Guinea) captured by Allies.
- 14 Mussolini issued proclamation resuming supreme direction of Fascism in Italy.—Archbishop of York arrived in Moscow.—U.S.A.A.F. bombed works near Paris.
- 15 Novorossiysk captured by Russians.—Lae (N. Guinea) captured by Australians.
- 16 Capture of Brianks by Russians announced.
- 17 Mr. Churchill returned to London.—Evacuation of Sardinia by Germans announced.—British landings in Dodecanese Islands announced.—Convoy in N. Atlantic attacked for four days and nights by U-boats; six cargo vessels sunk; H.M. destroyer St. Croix, corvette Polyanthos, and frigate Itchen lost.
- 18 Potenza captured by Eighth Army.
- 19 Hanover, Emden, and Oldenburg raided by R.A.F.—Tirpitz attacked by midget submarines in Alten Fjord.
- 20 Capture of Poltava and Uedra by Russians announced.—Nantes twice raided by U.S.A.A.F.; Mannheim-Ludwigshafen, Darmstadt, and Aachen raided by R.A.F.
- 21 Offensive by Fifth Army opened from Salerno.
- 22 Capture of Smolensk and Roslavl by Russians announced.
- 23 U.S. forces landed on Mono Island (Solomons).
- 24 Capture of Nizhni-Dneprovsk by Russians announced.—Foggia occupied by Eighth Army.—Germans landed in Corfu.—Emden raided heavily by U.S.A.A.F.
- 25 Full armistice terms signed by Italy.—Pompeii occupied by Fifth Army.—Capture of Kremenchuk and Rudnya by Russians announced.—Bochum raided by R.A.F.

OCTOBER

- 1 Naples occupied by Fifth Army.—Munich and Wiener-Neustadt raided by U.S.A.A.F. from N.W. Africa.
- 2 Finschhafen occupied by A.I.F.—Japanese warships off Kolombangara attacked by allied aircraft, gunboat and 40 barges sunk at Vila, destroyer hit in Buka area.—Emden heavily raided by U.S.A.A.F.; Munich by R.A.F.
- 3 Tama captured by Russians.—Kassel heavily raided by R.A.F.—Cos attacked by Germans.—Landing at Termoli by Eighth Army.—Sinking of Japanese submarine by New Zealand corvette Tui announced.
- 4 Corsica liberated.—British fleet with U.S. vessels including aircraft carrier in action off Norway, 8 enemy merchant ships hit.—Light naval forces in English Channel set on fire 2 destroyers, damaged others.—Frankfurt heavily raided by U.S.A.A.F., by R.A.F. at night.
- 5 Gen. Smuts arrived in London.—Wake Island attacked by U.S. naval force.—Loss of Greek submarine Katsonis announced.
- 6 Loss of H.M. trawler Meror announced.—Allied warships sank Japanese light cruiser and 2 destroyers in Vella Gulf, damaged 2 destroyers near Kolombangara.
- 7 Russians announced renewal of offensive.—Dnieper crossed. Capture of Capua by Fifth Army announced.—Stuttgart, Friedrichshafen, and Munich raided by R.A.F.—London raided.
- 8 Bremen raided by U.S.A.A.F., Hanover, Bremen, and Berlin by R.A.F.—Loss of Greek destroyer Queen Olga announced.—Larino captured by Eighth Army.
- 9 Marienburg, Anklam, Danzig, and Gdynia raided by U.S.A.A.F.—Loss of H.M. destroyer Intrepid announced.
- 10 Münster, Koesfeld, and Encheide raided by U.S.A.A.F.; again on 21st.
- 11 Agreement with Portugal for use of Azores announced.—Fifth Army launched attack on Volturno River.—Heavy air attack on Japanese at Rabaul; many aircraft destroyed, 3 destroyers, 3 cargo boats, 43 smaller vessels, 70 harbour craft sunk or destroyed.
- 12 Italy declared war on Germany.—Announced that whole of New Georgia group of the Solomons occupied by allies.—Fifth Army advanced on line of Volturno river.—Loss of U.S. destroyers Buck and Bristol announced.
- 13 Italy accepted as co-belligerent in war against Germany.—Schweinfurt heavily raided by U.S.A.A.F., destroying 99 enemy fighters, 26 probably destroyed, 17 damaged, for loss of 60 bombers, 2 fighters.—Zaporozhe captured by Russians.
- 14 Berlin raided by R.A.F.
- 15 Mr. Eden and Mr. Cordell Hull arrived in Moscow.—Hanover raided by R.A.F.—San Stefano and Montecellone captured by Eighth Army.—Rabaul heavily raided, 60 Japanese aircraft destroyed; attempted enemy landing at Finschhafen repulsed.
- 16 Duren raided by U.S.A.A.F., Leipzig by R.A.F.—Lord Wavell installed as Viceroy of India.
- 17 Belgo-Dutch agreement for fixed exchange rate signed.
- 18 Kassel heavily raided by R.A.F.
- 19 Swedish passenger liner shot down by Germans.—Capture of Melitopol by Russians announced.—H.M. cruiser Charybdis and destroyer Limbourne sunk.
- 20 Heavy air attack on Rabaul; 123 Japanese aircraft destroyed, 45 probably destroyed; 1 destroyer, 5 coastal craft sunk.

NOVEMBER

- 1 Germans' land retreat from Crimea cut off.—Allied forces landed on Bougainville Island.
- 2 Wiener Neustadt raided by U.S.A.A.F. from N.W. Africa.
- 3 Biggest daylight attack to date by U.S.A.A.F., mainly on Wilhelmshaven.—Düsseldorf heavily raided by R.A.F.
- 4 Fifth Army captured Isernia and by occupation of Castelpetroso linked up with Eighth Army.
- 5 Connally resolution on international organization for peace passed by U.S. Senate.—Vatican City bombed.—Over 1,000 aircraft of U.S.A.A.F. raided Gelsenkirchen and Münster.
- 6 Kiev captured by Russians.
- 7 Duren raided by U.S.A.A.F.
- 8 Gen. Giraud resigned from Committee of National Liberation.—Unna created.—Destruction of 60 U-boats in three months ending October announced.—Castiglione captured by Eighth Army.
- 9 Allied Control Commission for Italy formed.—Loss of U.S. destroyer Bonie Ann and sinking of U-boat, announced.—Sinking of British submarines in Aegean of 7 ships, probable sinking of 3 and damage to 6, and loss of H.M. destroyer Eclipse, H.M. submarine Usurper, and U.S. destroyers Beatty, Henley, and Chevalier announced.
- 10 President and members of Government of Lebanon arrested by French troops.—Parliament dissolved. Officials released on 22nd.—1 Japanese cruiser, 2 destroyers sunk, 9 damaged probably sunk, 88 aircraft destroyed off Bougainville.
- 11 Gen. Roatta removed from post as Chief of Staff, Italian army.—German recapture of Zhitomir announced.
- 12 Leros garrison surrendered.—Marseilles airfields attacked by Allied aircraft.
- 13 Berlin and Ludwigshafen raided by R.A.F.
- 14 Heaviest R.A.F. raid on Berlin to date; again on 23rd, 24th and 25th (by Mosquitoes), 26th.—Samos captured by Germans.
- 15-26 Cairo Conference (Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt, General Chiang Kai-Shek).
- 25 General Smuts delivered speech on world affairs.
- 26 U.S.A.A.F. raided Bremen (heaviest daylight raid of war), again on 29th.—Capture of Gomel by Russians announced.
- 27 Teheran Conference (Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill). Ended on Dec. 1st.
- 28 Bremen raided by U.S.A.A.F.
- 29 Solingen raided by U.S.A.A.F.; again on Dec. 1st.

DECEMBER

- 1 Berlin raided by R.A.F.; again on December 16th, 23rd and 29th.
- 2 Leipzig raided by R.A.F.—Fifth Army attacked from Capua.
- 3 Bolivia declared war on Axis countries.
- 4-6 Cairo Conference between President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, and President Franco.
- 5 Destruction of six U-boats in Atlantic by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. announced.
- 6 Moro River reached by Eighth Army.
- 7 President Roosevelt visited Malta.
- 8 Capture of Znamenska by Russians announced.
- 9 Capture of Znamenska, damage to three, in Atlantic, announced.—Emden raided by U.S.A.A.F., destroying 138 German fighters.
- 10 Czech-Soviet Treaty signed.
- 11 Capture of Cherkassy by Russians announced.
- 12 Capture of German and Russian war criminals hanged at Eilat.—Bolivian Government overthrown.
- 13 Bremen raided by U.S.A.A.F., Frankfurt by R.A.F.
- 14 Appointment of Allied invasion chiefs announced; further appointments on 27th and 28th.—Over 2,000 Allied aircraft attack enemy objectives in Northern France.
- 15 Scharnhorst sunk off North Cape.—Great Russian victory over Kiev announced.
- 16 Ortona captured by Eighth Army.
- 17 Destruction of 3 German destroyers in Bay of Biscay announced.
- 18 Further Russian successes in Kiev salient announced.—Heavy raid by U.S.A.A.F. on Germany.
- 19 Zhitomir captured by Russians.